INTELLIGENCE REPORT PEKING'S SUPPORT OF INSURGENIES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA (REFERENCE TITLE: POLO LIII)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010052-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 128
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 5, 2010
• Sequence Number: 52
• Publication Date: April 1, 1973
• Content Type: IR

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Sia_S
Intelligence Report
Peking's Support of Insurgencies
In Southeast Asia
(Reference Title POLO LIII)
1
Trr -,7e
Co Costray
Secret
April 1973
RSS No. 0085/73
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WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by saw.
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? PEKING'S SUPPORT OF INSURGENCIES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This study establishes the facts and examines
the purposes of China's support of insurgencies in
Southeast Asia.
It is a fact that, despite China's overall
policy of friendly relations, and despite the passage
of some four years since the general ending of
Cultural Revolution militancy, China continues to
sponsor and support insurgencies against certain
governments in Southeast Asia./
These remote insurgencies are not likely to threaten
the Rangoon or Bangkok governments, but the fact
remains that China's covert sponsorship of these
insurrections is clearly impeding China's diplomatic
attempts to elicit further responsiveness from these
same governments.
This study i-Y:amines various possible purposes
behind this self-defeating course -- "two faced," as
the Burmese call it. Is the Chinese purpose essentially
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that of attempting to exert added pressure on certain
of China's small neighbors? Or a concern not to be
up-staged by any new Soviet presence in Southeast Asia
and in the support of revolutionary movements? Or
an unwillingness or inability to cease supporting
insurgencies once begun? Or bureaucratic disarray
in the conduct of Chinese foreign relations? Or, a
reflection of Maoist impulses? The study concludes
that it is the latter of these purposes which carries
the greatest force: China supports certain insurgencies
in Southeast Asia largely because that's the way the
boss, Mao Tse-tung, wants it -- for his own mix of
stubbornly-held ideological and personal reasons.
This study has received constructive assistance
from a number of CIA offices. The study's interpretations
are those of its author and of this
Staff.
Hal Ford
Chief, DD/I Special Research Staff
sF.riz FT
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PEKING'S SUPPORT OF INSURGENCIES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
Summary
Peking has a two-level foreign policy with
respect to certain governments in Southeast Asia:
ostensibly friendly diplomacy on one level; and
insurgency-support on another -- most notably in
Burma and Thailand, to a lesser extent in Malaysia
and the Philippines. The explanation for this
anomaly is to be found mainly in the ideological
and personal predilections of Mao Tse-tung, who
still has such authority in the PRC that he can and
does require the continuation of one policy,
insurgency-support, which impedes Chinese progress
in its overall diplomatic efforts.
The policy of insurgency-support does not
seem to be essentially a device for exerting pressure
on nearby governments, the stick of a rationally-
conceived carrot-and-stick approach. Burma, for
example, gives the Chinese leaders no cause for
applying pressure: it is non-aligned, it has paid
reparations to Peking for the damages of the mid-
1967 anti-Chinese riots, and it has exchanged
ambassadors with the PRC. Nonetheless, China is
not only supporting but sponsoring the northeast
insurgency, and the results are now detrimental to
Peking's diplomatic interests -- so much so that
Prime Minister Ne Win is being forced out of his
quiet isolationist policy into an active search for
a common front against Peking, including a possible
detente with Thailand. For its part, Thailand does
give the Chinese leaders cause for applying pressure
in order to eliminate the US military presence there,
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but Peking has not indicated that insurgency-support
would end if that cause were to be removed: the
Chinese-run operational radio, Voice of the People
of Thailand, broadcasting from south China, continues
to attack the US military presence in Thailand but
has never suggested that the insurgents might settle
with Bangkok if that presence were removed.
Nor does insurgency-support seem intended
to prevent the Soviets from filling the "vacuum"
left by US withdrawals from the area. Nearby
countries have their own inclinations and reasons
for avoiding a request for a Soviet presence.
Ironically, if anything might work to frighten nearby
countries, providing for them a reason to turn to
the Soviets for concrete military aid, it would be
the heightening of Chinese insurgency-support.
Similarly, the Chinese do not appear to be
supporting these insurgencies in order to demonstrate
to radicals, world-wide, that they are more revolu-
tionary than the Soviets. The evidence is that the
Chinese have shown no particular concern with their
image among radicals in recent years: for example,
China disparaged the revolutionary actions of rebels
in Ceylon and Bangladesh in 1971; and the Chinese
opened themselves to charges within the world Communist
movement of "opportunistic betrayal" in July 1971 when
they quickly moved to strengthen relations with the
new government in the Sudan, which had arrested
large numbers of Communists.
Neither does insurgency-support seem to have
been continued (and even somewhat increased in the
cases of Burma and Thailand) because of momentum,
or "bureaucratic lag." Mao surely has the authority
to end insurgency-support if he so desired. He
demonstrated his ability to turn policy around com-
pletely with respect to relations with the US. He
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also changed from encouraging Hanoi to "protract" its
effort against South Vietnam to accepting the cease-
fire arrangements. It would be far less difficult
for him to knock off covert support of small-scale
insurrection in nearby countries.
Chou En-lai has apparently had to comply with
Mao's wishes in this respect. He has explicitly
endorsed continuation of insurgency-support. So far
as can be observed and judged, Chou has never, since
Mao came to dominate the Chinese leadership in 1935,
opposed Mao's will, once Mao had made clear what
policy he wanted carried out. Chou's survival sug-
gests not that he is more subtle in thwarting Mao's
preferences than other Chinese leaders purged in
recent years, but that he has never tried to deceive
Mao. His style of work seems to have been, and still
to be, that of using persuasion at a time when Mao
is open to persuasion. Chou apparently has been
permitted by Mao to subordinate revolution-support
to PRC diplomatic needs in several cases outside
Southeast Asia, Ethiopia and Zaire being notable
examples. But he has apparently had to comply with
Mao's abiding view on support for the nearby in-
surgencies.
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The
Chinese themselvQ; for the first time admitted (in
March 1973) that sustained Chinese aid would include
"manpower" inputs into Burma. Additional support is
present in the form of material aid: this has included
modern weapons and supplies, as well as the extensive
use of a PLA hospital near the Burma and Thailand
border.
j/This policy indicates that when faced with
the concrete, specific choice of either priority to
diplomacy or priority to insurgency-support, the
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Chinese leaders thus far are continuing to give
priority to the latter in dealing with these coun-
tries.
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In Malaysia, Peking's support of the 1,800
insurgents does not include direct inputs of personnel
or weapons, for obvious logistical reasons. This
handicap is also operative in Peking's support of
the 1,000 Maoist insurgents in the Philippines. The
Communist leadership of both these insurgencies is
loyal to Peking on an entire range of issues and
is pledged to fight a long, Mao-model war against
the government. The Chinese-run operational radio,
Voice of the Malayan Revolution, broadcasts regularly
from south China to insurgents in Malaysia, calling
for an expansion of their armed struggle. There
is no sign that these broadcasts will be discontinued
in the near future.
/Southeast Asian leaders believe the single most
important obstacle to establishing diplomatic re]a-
tions with Peking is this insurgency-support. Peking's
policy strengthens the argument against establishing
relations by those men within the respective country
leaderships who desire a go-slow approach; it weakens
the argument of those who advocate early recognition.
Undoubtedly, Chou En-lai is fully informed of this
impediment to new diplomatic successes, and sees
the irrationality of it.
The main reason for the continuation of Peking's
self-defeating policy to support insurgencies nearby
seems clearly to be Mao's ideological and personal
desire to prove that Mao-model armed struggles can
be born and survive. On a deeper, perhaps even
unconscious, level he may want to prove this to
himself -- as well as to the scoffing Soviets, who
have disputed this point with him for over a decade.
Mao still insists that armed struggle is the only
dogma
in
to national power for Communists. This
in Mao's thinking apparently is not as firmly rooted
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in Chou's thinking. As with Stalin, it will prob-
ably prove to be the case that after the dominant
leader is dead certain of the old leader's obsessions
-- including, in the Chinese case, support of in-
surgencies -- will be exposed for what they are,
irrational concepts impeding policy, and will then
be marked for discard.
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PEKING'S SUPPORT OF INSURGENCIES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
Contents
? 'Page
IDEOLOGY: THE UNSHAKEN FOUNDATION 1
The Source of Insurgency Revival 1
The Incongruous Mix in Southeast Asia . . 7
Radio Peking and the Clandestine Radios . ? 10
The Retreat from Ideological Rigidity
Elsewhere 12
Africa and the Middle East 12
Latin America 15
The Durability of Iduology: "Armed
Struggle" 17
The Durability of Chinese Insurgency-
Support 22
PEKING'S PRIMARY ROLE IN THE INSURGENCIES . . 27
Burma 27
Thailand 49
PEKING'S INSPIRATIONAL ROLE 83
The Philippines 83
Malaysia
West 110
? East: North Borneo 127
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PEKING'S SUPPORT OF INSURGENCIES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
IDEOLOGY: THE UNSHAKEN FOUNDATION
Since Mao Tse-tung's Cultural Revolution in 1967,
and earlier in the case of Thailand, Peking has been
playing a major role in stimulating the revival of
floundering insurgencies in several Southeast Asian
countries. The armed insurgencies in Burma, Thailand,
Malaysia, and the Philippines virtually had collapsed
in the 1950's and in effect, had been abandoned by
Peking for purposes of diplomacy. This policy of dis-
engagement was reversed in the case of Thailand in
1965, and in the cases of Burma, Malaysia, and the
Philippines in 1967. The new policy of political
stimulation and various kinds of material support
stems basically from the ideological and personal in-
clinations Of Mao which had been touched off by a punish-
ment motive but which are not now sustained by that
motive.
The Source of Insurgency Revival
The thrust -- that is, the initial propulsion --
for revival of the insurgencies came from Peking rather
than from the guerrillas who were hiding in the jungles.
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SOUTHEAST ASIA: Areas of Communist Insurgency
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The policy of deliberate stimulation. included an
entire range of methods of practical support. One of
the material inputs which required a Chinese leader-
ship decision was the diplomatically sensitive one of
supplying Chinese-made weapons. Prior to the Cultural
Revolution, it had been Chinese practice to avoid
such a policy of supply, inasmuch as captured Chinese-
made weapons would be concrete evidence of PRC inter-
ference in revolution beyond its borders. But in 1967,
Mao apparently decided to chan e this cautious and
prudent policy
Evidence later revealed (for the first time in 1969),
that the Thai insurgents were being supplied with
clearly identified Chinese-made AK-47 assault rifles.
The insurgents in Burma were also shown to have been
receiving easily identifiable Chinese-made weapons.
That this was deliberate Chinese policy, rather than
a policy the North Vietnamese on their own were
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practicing from caches in Laos, is indicated by the
statement of Politburo member Kang Sheng.
The shift from a policy of disengagement to one
of deliberate stimulation and support was accompanied
by Chinese insistence to the insurgents that the guer-
rilla war must be well-organized in order to make posi-
tive gains. At an early date, the Chinese began to
show their pleasure with the new and serious way the
insurgents were prosecuting the small war. For example,
speaking to an "activist congress" in Shanghai on 4
April 1968, Politburo member Chang Chun-chiao said that
"In Burma, guerrilla warfare has made faster progress
in one year than in the past 20 years." The three
clandestine radio stations beaming broadcasts into
the nearby insurgencies from China for several years
have noted the improvement in organization, commitment,
and fighting tactics of the insurgents Peking supports.
The contrast with the poor showing of the 1950's is
striking.
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The Incongruous Mix in Southeast Asia
Peking's foreign policy toward Southeast Asia
is strikingly marked by a dual approach. The People's
Republic of China (PRC) is .simultaneously trying to
improve relations with countries in the area while the
CCP is supporting insurrections -- and helping to expand
them -- within these countries. Both policies are
going forward at the same time. Diplomacy toward Burma,
Thailand, Malaysia (including North Borneo), and the
Philippines is not displacing insurgency-support. In-
surgency-support is not displacing diplomacy. By con-
trast, policy toward Africa (other than PRC support
of insurgencies against colonial or white governments)
and Latin America reveals a clear-cut displacement of
insurgency-support by diplomacy. In the Middle East,
PRC support of Arab insurgency against Israel primarily
aids national self-interest rather than revolutionary
interest. Only in Southeast Asia is the PRC policy
equally and inharmoniously mixed.
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This is further evidence that PRC diplomacy must
work within revolutionary limits. PRC Foreign Ministry
officials (and Chou En-lai) have a warrant to "adopt
a flexible attitude" to improve government-to-govern-
ment relations "even if a country previously adopted a
policy hostile to China" (as a joint editorial of
1 October 1972 put it), But they have no warrant, even
in private talks, to promise an end to insurgency-
support in Southeast Asia.
Chou, and Foreign Ministry officials working for
him, apparently are operating under an overall guide-
line of Mao's. This guideline requires that they main-
tain for Southeast Asia a two-level policy, clearly
duplistic in the view of leaders in nearby countries,
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and duplistic in the Chinese leaders' own perception
of it. There is evidence that the two-level policy
is a deliberate and planned course of action, rather
than a dying remnant of a policy Mao retains reluct-
antly. In capsule form, the policy requires that Chou
work for improved relations with Burma, Thailand,
Malaysia, and the Philippines but not at the expense
of ceasing support of the insurgencies in these four
countries.
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Radio Peking and the Clandestine Radios
The Chinese seem to recognize that their image
with the Western powers and Japan requires a concealment
of the extent of PRC support of insurgency. This fact
is reflected most clearly in Chou's well-documented
actions to differentiate government from party support,
and open from covert support.
Radio Peking, which beams broadcasts to a wide
range of international audiences, has reduced its
coverage of nearby insurgency developments. This has
taken place, step-by-step, since the fall of 1970 in
the case of Burma, and since mid-1971 in the cases of
Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines. Recourse to
a similar low-profile, or disengagement from open sup-
port, has been the policy also with the PRC central
press. Radio Peking and the central press now only
rarely initiate a commentary on the nearby insurgencies.
The practice has become one of rebroadcasting or
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reprinting either an item from one of the clandestine
radios in south China or from foreign news sources.
The three clandestine radios, broadcasting from
complexes in China -- two from Yunnan and one from
Hunan -- continuu to beam native language programs
regularly to the insurgents in Burma, Thailand, and
Malaysia. Programs detailing aspects of the insurgency
in the Philippines are carried by the radio handling
Malaysian guerrilla developments. The broadcaEts range
in content from guidance and indoctrination prc grams
to highly abusive attacks on the leaders of nearby
governments in the area. The attacks are more abusive
than those Radio Peking had carried, except for a period
in 1967 at the peak of Mao's Cultural Revolution. They
are a source of concern to leaders of nearby govern- .
ments, and they are one ot the concrete Chinese practices
which has slowed down the progress of PRC diplomacy in
the area.
Aside from the emphasis in the broadcasts on how
to make the insurgencies work, the radio programs are
conceived on the assumption that the men in the field
are under a strong study discipline. On occasion, the
assumption seems to be that they are under roughly the
same study discipline as CCP mainland cadres. For
example, in May 1972, the text of one of Mao's essays
was broadcast to insurgent cadres in Malaysia by the
broadcasts of the clandestine Voice of the Malayan
Revolution (VMR). On other occasions, the complete
text of PRC statements are broadcast, obviously for
study and memorization.
There is considerable evidence that Chou En-lai
is the most important official implementing the trans-
parent device of separating state-to-state from party-
to-party relations. Chou's personal activities began
in the spring of 1971, included the visit of Ne Win in
August 1971, and appeared openly as a basic policy in
October 1971, when Peking started to'lhold separate
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National Day receptions for foreign diplomats and
foreign Communists.
The number of greeting messages, connected with
various Chinese anniversary dates and attributed to
Communist parties engaged in the nearby insurgencies,
has been reduced in Radio Peking and central press
coverage. These messages are handled by the clandestine
radios assigned to each insurgency. Messages of greet-
ings from one Communist Party to another are also
assigned to the clandestine radios, a recent example
being the message from the Burmese Communists to the
Thai Communists on 30 November 1972, commending the Thais
for fighting against the "traitorous Thanom-Praphat
clique" and for "following the teaching of great Chair-
man Mao Tse-tung that political power grows out of the
barrel of a gun." The broadcast stated that the Burmese
Communists are following the same Mao-model policy.
The Retreat from Ideological Rigidity Elsewhere
Beyond Southeast Asia, Chinese spokesmen have
a less restricted scope which permits them in private
talks to promise to cease supporting uprisings within
other countries. They are able effectively to avoid
risking damage to PRC diplomacy; they need not accept
a slowdown in its advance by rigidly supporting insur-
rections or sudden coups.
Africa and the Middle East
A clear indication that the Chinese are aware
of the incongruity of revolution and diplomacy is
found in the way they have downgraded insurgency-support
(except in cases of colonial or white regimes) when
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they desire a rapid advance of government-to-government
relations. In order to let diplomacy take command,
they have begun to say that China cannot support in- 25X1
surrection in Africa because there is no potential there
for it.[
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In the Middle East, Chinese diplomacy requires
PRC support of a certain guerrilla war -- that is, the
one Arab fedayeen are trying to wage against Israel.
The Arab guerrillas are not ideological allies. They
are not Communists, and they are not likely to establish
a Communist regime, or a viable base area, or even a
Communist Party organization. The ideological element
here is dominated by the practical one of PRC diplomacy
toward Arab governments, even though in this case Peking
is openly supporting "armed struggle."
Latin America
In Latin America also diplomacy has taken command,
The main thrust of policy is to avoid revolutionary
statements and to stress government-to-government rela-
tions. One exception will be discussed later.
/China intends to be very
cautious when it comes to supporting armed revolts and
guerrilla movements in Latin America.
the PRC does not intend to jeopardize
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current prospects for diplomatic gains by ill-conceived
support of revolutionary movements they really know
nothing about. (Actually, in Latin America as in Africa,
the Chinese are now unwilling to support guerrilla wars
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about which they know a great deal.) This policy of
disengagement was more fully elaborated on 25 August
1971 by Keng Piao, Director of the International Liaison
Department, CCP. Keng told
/that China would support only "organized"
pro.Peking Communist parties, presumably only those
which were unfractured and amenable to CCP guidance.
Keng said that China would not become involved with
adventurous movements like the Tupamaros in Uruguay,
the rebel armed forces in Guatemala, and (obviously)
"Che" Guevara's men,
Chou En-lai was to put the policy into practice.
Following Peru's recognition of the PRC (2 November
1971), the Chinese desired a further improvement
of government-to-government relations. When, therefore,
a visiting cabinet minister of Peru asked Chou, in mid-
January 1972, why pro-Peking parties in Peru were al-
lowed to continue to attack the Lima government as a
"fascist regime" when, supposedly, good relations existed
between the two governments, Chou reacted against the
revolutionaries. He angrily condemned the action
of these groups. He said that no party in Peru had
ever received official authorization to include "China"
in its party name or to assume that it represented the
Chinese people or the CCP, By contrast, in Southeast
Asia, the China-based clandestine radios continue to
disparage certain nearby governments as "fascist regimes."
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The Durability of Ideology: "Armed Struggle"
In Latin American policy, there is at least
one exception of considerable significance. That is,
there is an instance in which an ideological concept
was defended -- openly and deliberately -- in a way
not conducive to PRC diplomatic progress. It was
defended by the man with the most diplomatic sense
in the Chinese leadership: Chou En-lai. The instance
is yet another confirmation that certain elements
indestructable core elements -- still exist in
Mao's thinking. In this case, the core element was
Mao's view that the only way to permanent national
power for revolutionaries is by way of "armed struggle."
In early September 1971, one year after Allende's
electoral victory in Chile, in an interview with a
Mexican editor in Peking, Chou was asked about the
CCP's position that national power must be seized only
by "armed force." He was asked how he viewed the parlia-
mentary road -- the path of elections Allende had
taken. Chou's response was along rigid ideological
lines. He chose not to be diplomatic; that is, he
did not equivocate and did not avoid disparaging
Allende's election route to power. He chose a criti-
cal tack despite the fact that Allende's government
had shown goodwill: it had cut ties with Taipei and
granted formal recognition to Peking on 5 January
1971. This action had provided Peking with an import-
ant breakthrough in government relations in Latin
America.
Chou proceeded to give an analysis for world-
wide publication which was similar to that of doc-
trinal extremists in Chile and not flattering to
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Allende. Disregarding the fact that Allende had at-
tained decisive political support before the assassina-
tion of General Schneider, Chou insisted that "what
most helped Salvador Allende, the truly decisive factor,
was a counter-revolutionary bullet, an assassain's
bullet, which killed General Schneider..0 therefore,
the majority vote went to Allende," Chou made the
point explicitly that:
We do not believe in struggle by
the parliamentary method.
He described Allende's victory in unflattering terms
as a "transitory phenomenon" which could be lost,
and Allende as having won the "government but not the
power" because he did not control the army, which
later could be used against him. Pro-Soviet Communists
in Chile immediately attacked, Chou for this example
of ideological gaucherie, and Allende himself undoubt-
edly was angered by it.
This exceptional behavior is a case of ideology
taking precedence over diplomatic tact. The fact that
Mao holds tenaciously to certain ideological positions
because of doctrinal and personal predilection -- and
holds them ever more tenaciously because the Soviets
continue to oppose them -- is the fundamental reason
why doctrine displaced diplomatic prudence in the case
of Allende's victory.
Allende's victory had been protrayed by various
Communists in the international movement as a valid
demonstration that Mao was wrong about "armed struggle"
being the only road to national power. Peking's defense
of Mao's ideological position had been set forth at
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great length, with great heat, and with great publicity
in the joint editorial in Peking's central press on
17 March 1971.
Comrade Mao Tse-tung...points out:
'According to the Marxist theory of
the state, the army is the chief com-
ponent of state power. Whoever wants
to seize and retain state power must
have a strong army. '
Violent revolution is the universal
principle of proletarian revolution...
and there is no exception...
In the past decades, many Communist
parties have participated in elections
and parliaments, but none has set up
a dictatorship of the proletariat by
such means. Even if a Communist party
should win a ma.ority in parliament
or parttctpate 1,n the government, this
would not mean any change in the char-
acter of bourgeois political power,
still less in the smashing of the old
state machine...
The proletariat must use the gun to
seize political power and must use
the gun to defend it... (emphasis
supplied)
An analysis of Chou's early September 1971 interview
strongly suggests that he was repeating the ideological
position of the abovementioned March 1971 joint edi-
torial. Prior to Allende's electoral victory, Peking
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had been supporting a more radical group of Chilean
Communists against the pro-Moscow local Communists.
In July 1970, Politburo member Kang Sheng had made
a special point of praising the pro-Chinese Revolu-
tionary Communist Party of Chile precisely because
it held the line of taking power only through "armed
struggle," as opposed to the "revisionist line of the
Soviet clique." Allende's popular-vote victory was
a direct refutation of Mao's dogmatic view. But in
early September 1971, Chou had to comply with Mao's ?
ideological position, and he had to do so publicly.
In trying to demonstrate that somehow "armed struggle"
had aided Allende -- "an assassain's bullet" -- and
that Allende might not be able to consolidate his
victory because he did not control the army, Chou
was being abrasive, making statements contrary to
what would have benefited PRC national interests in
Santiago.
The ideological view that national power must
be seized along the road of "armed struggle" rather
than along the parliamentary road cuts across the
grain of a foreign policy of flexibility. It could
impede progress in diplomacy toward democracies which
already have recognized the PRC as China's only legal
government, or which are being encouraged to grant
such recognition. There is some evidence that Chou
is aware of this and may want to dilute the doctrine
in certain cases. He may be seeking Mao's permission
to be more selective about defending the "armed strug-
gle" concept outside of the insurgencies in Southeast
Asia which the PRC supports.
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the more rigid formula is the view that offically
prevails. The Peking central press has published
excerpts of an article written by the Central Com-
mittee of the pro-Chinese Communist Party of Brazil
which included the statement that the Brazilian people's
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"road of armed struggle" is "the only road possible"
for revolutionary victory. (Peking NCNA 17 Febru-
ary 1972)/
The Durability of Chinese Insurgency-Support
The ideological position that "armed struggle,"
rather than the parliamentary road, is the only road
to power is being sustained in Chinese comment on
the insurgencies they support. It appears on occasion
in the central press. All three clandestine radios
continue to beam this fixed position into Burma, Thai-
land, and Malaysia. These insurgencies, and the one
Peking helps to inspire, in the Philippines, comprise
the clearest example, in Mao's apparent view, that
he is right and the Soviet leaders are wrong in the
fervently contested view that guerrilla wars, not
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elections, are the best way to seize national power.
The Chinese are telling their client insurgents in
the field that even Stalin had denounced the parlia-
mentary road. The Chinese-operated VMR, between 20
and 26 September 1972, beamed broadcasts into Malaysia
containing the first half of Stalin's work, Foundations
of Leninism, in which Stalin criticized the partie?- of
the Second International for being subservient to
the parliamentary road. This is the ideological
position with which cadres in the insurgencies must
comply.
This is Mao's ideological core position, with
which Chou must comply. Thus far, it seems to be
impervious to change despite the shift to flexibility
in foreign policy. The end of the war in Vietnam,
therefore, will probably not lead to an end of Chinese
insurgency-suppol.t. It probably will continue at
least until Mao dies.
It is the basic assumption of this paper that
Mao dominates the Chinese leaders in making major
policy decisions. He dominates, for example, his
wife and Chou. So far as can be observed and judged,
Chou has never, since Mao came to dominate the Chinese
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leadership in 1935, opposed Mao's will, once Mao had
made it clear what he wanted carried out in policy.
Chou's survival suggests not that he is more subtle
in thwarting Mao's preferences than other Chinese
leaders (who are now political corpses), but that
he has never tried to deceive Mao. His style of work
seems to have been, and still to be, that of using
persuasion at a time when Mao is open to persuasion.
The 1969 firefights on the Sino-Soviet border and
Soviet verbal threats provided Chou with a great op-
portunity to persuade Mao convincingly of the benefits
(and need) of a foreign policy of flexible maneuver.
Chou's conjectured persuasion of Mao includ?d an effort
to make Mao see the wisdom of restricting Chinese sup-
port of insurgencies outside Southeast Asia (with
certain exceptions).
Chou has been permitted by Mao to have his way
in subordinating revolution-support to PRC diplomatic
needs in several cases outside Southeast Asia. He
and other Chinese officials have criticized "Che"
Guevara, the Tupamaros, pro-Peking Communists in Peru,
and the Ceylonese short-term insurgents. Chou, on
the evidence, seems to have had a lower opinion of
foreign insurgents as worthwhile clients, than Mao,
has had. This difference in appraisal almost certainly
exists today, especially regarding some nearby states.
While Mao now permits Chou to end insurgency-
support elsewhere, his abiding view apparently is to
sustain support for those which are gradually expanding
in Burma, Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines. Chou
clearly must comply with this abiding view.
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Within the framework of interpretation which
? sees Maoist ideology -- Mao's persoaal "thought" --
as the main reason for sustained insurgency-support,
? this support is being provided in a sensible way.
? The Chinese are making small inputs gradually, rather
than big inputs at priority speed, into the insurgencies
in Burma and Thailand. The ideologically-motivated
? policy is being carried out only in certain countries
where it is feasible for the Chinese to guide it.
The capability to guide and influence -- this is the
first reqUirement for Chinese support. Provided that
such a capability is at hand, certain other criteria
determine the Chinese policy. First, the Chinese
must control the insurgency directly with their own
cadres, or through pro-Chinese cadres in the insurgent
ranks. Second, proximity to the borders of China
determines, to some degree, the capability the Chinese
have in guiding an insurgency. Third, the insurgency
must be viable to begin with, or open to a Chinese
role in making it viable. The insurgency must be
amenable to Chinese guidance on organizational work,
ideological commitment, and military integrity.
Mao apparently does not seem deterred from
sponsoring or supporting these insurgencies in South-
east Asia by the probability that they will not spread
from the periphery to the vital center of the countries
where they are developing. It seems to be more import-
ant at present to him that they exist than that they
are made to expand rapidly and extensively. Mao appar-
ently believes that withdrawing Peking's support (and
thereby risking the collapse of some of them) would
give the Soviet leaders a big ideological victory
in the dispute over "armed struggle." The anti-
. Soviet animus in his thinking may buttress his own
ideological predilection to sustain insurgency-support.
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The importance of the ideological motivation,
the persistence of dogma in Mao's thinking, seems to
be far greater than in Chou's thinking. Moreover,
Chou has no pretensions to doctrinal creativity. As
with Stalin, it will probably prove to be the case
that only after the dominant leader is dead that cer-
tain detrimental obsessions with ideology will be
exposed for what they are, irrational concepts impeding
policy, and will then be marked for discard.
r?Ot
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K r. I
PEKING'S PRIMARY ROLE IN THE INSURGENCIES
Burma
China is the main propelling force in the
expanding insurgency in Burma's northeast.1
The need to send across the border such an
impressive array of PLA personnel is a measure of
how badly the Communist insurgency had floundered
prior to 1967 when operating on its own, and of
how badly it might deteriorate if Pekirg were to
withdraw its thoroughgoing sponsorship.
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The insurgency is not controlled by local
Burmese Communists. Specifically, it is not con-
trolled by the Chairman of the Burma Communist Party
-- the BCP (White Flag), led by Chairman Thakin Zin.
He is operating farther south, in the Pegu Yoma
mountains, with a small remnant force which is
euphemistically touted as the "Central Command." It
is still an ineffective remnant of the pre-1967 Burmese
Communist forces;
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BURMA: Areas of Communist Insurgency
KACHIN STATE
CHINA
,?(Mengko
Area of map
RANGOON
QD
Kunlong
Tangyan.
MINIM
WA
STATE
Ilia Minimal
?
Ranging
?
TATE
51 891 11.72 OA
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?-17,77-77,77771ThrrIrr?757774r777,117
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oiLk.I.LN.JC, .1.
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r Theoretically, Chairman Thakin
Zin is responsible for making policy decisions, and
as recent as 20 August 1972, the PRC-run clandestine
radio station beamed his "instructions? to Burma in-
surgents. In practice, however, he and his group of
followers defer to the instructions from the Northeast
Command on all key issues.
Compared to the small gains in territory made
by the end of 1969, the land the insurgents now hold
in the northeast shows a course of expansion rather
than contraction. China's input also is growing.
Everything the Chinese diplomats have done on the
level of government-to-government relations with Rangoon
and Ne Win has not changed the fact that Peking covertly
is sponsoring this expansion by continuing to train
tribal insurgents in China and by sending in men,
weapons, ammunition, and medical supplies.
As a result of the Chinese input of special
PLA personnel, and also because of intensive organiza-
tional work conducted among the tribal peoples, the
insurgency in the northeast is now the most effective
one that Rangoon has ever had to grapple with. The
professional political and organizational work of
the Chinese which raises the level of discipline and
competence has also been urged upon insurgent forces
in Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines by Peking.
As a result, these forces are no longer ineffectual
roving bands of "only-military" (Guevaraist-type)
guerrillas, as they had been prior to 1967. All this
points beyond mere rhetoric, mere token support,
and mere gesture to a serious, professional policy
intended, on the practical level, to make certain
insurgencies in Southeast Asia take hold ant gradually
expand along the road of "protracted war."
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The Byrma case shows more clearly than any
other case the existence of a motivation in addition
to, or more important and durable than, the more
rational one of punishment. In the summer of 1967,
Mao acted to punish Ne Win for the anti-Chinese riots
in Rangoon, and the method he used was to revive the
insurgency in the northeast. But Ne Win has agreed
to reparations and the grudge Mao has held against him
may no longer be the major motivation which sustains
Peking's insurgency-support,
Another motivation of Mao's existed side-by-
side with the punishment (or revenge-for-riots)
motivation. This was his revolutionary compulsion which
dominated his foreign policy thinking in 1966 and
1967. It is neither anti-Ne Win nor anti-U.S. It
is an independent ideological element in Mao's political
thinking. The anti-Chinese riots, in retrospect,
appear to have been a triggering mechanism for direct-
ing PRC hostility toward Burna. But in 1973, revenge
for the riots probably is not the major motivation
for sustaining insurgency support.
In short, there are two reasons for sustaining
the small war today; namely, Mao's nursing of a grudge
-- in 1973 probably secondary -- and Mao's revolutionary
urge to make a Mao-model insurgency work.. Neither
one makes good sense from the viewpoint of Peking's
national interests, especially as the main thrust of
those interests is to maneuver internationally around
the USSR's foreign policy. This requires flexibility
toward Burma as well as other states in the area.
Several alternative explanations of PRC motiva-
tion appear weak. PRC sponsorship of. the Burma insurg-
ency in the northeast does not help Hanoi in its war
effort in the region. Furthermore, it leaves the new
flexible diplomacy carried out by Chou En-lai open
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to the risk that the Soviets might be welcomed in to
supply military items by a frustrated Ne Win (or his
successor), forced to turn away from China. Yet there
is good evidence that Chinese diplomacy is partly
directed toward keeping Soviet influence out of the
area. Finally, he may seek a common front with Thailand.
Explaining the insurgency as a pressuring tool
is also difficult. Territory in the mountainous tribal
area of Burma's northeast does not now provide Peking
with leverage to exert real pressure at the leadership
level in Rangoon. Ne Win's foreign policy has not
been moved by such pressure to be more anti-U.S., or
to be any more "neutral" than it has been. Holding
and expanding territory still is a long way from moving
the tribal-based insurrection in the northeast mountains
into the lowlands where the Burma people live. And
in the lowlands, it would be more effectively resisted.
It would provide the Burmese leaders with an easy-to-
publicize international issue of a national threat
-- an issue which would be injurious to Peking's foreign
policy posture as a government which does not inter-
fere in other governments' internal affairs.
Chinese diplomacy is not supplemented by it.
Insurgency-support is not the stick of a carrot-and-
stick policy, cleverly directed toward driving Rangoon
to adopt PRC foreign policy preferences. On the con-
trary, the hard evidence is that PRC diplomacy is
impeded by insurgency-support.
As flexible diplomacy gathered momentum, in
mid-i/0, NCNA articles (i.e., media commentaries
which could be easily attributed to Peking as the
source) were reduced in numbers and made less anti-
Rangoon. But a clandestine radio station (broadcast-
ing media commentaries which could not be as easily
attributed to Peking as the source) was established
(March 1971). Chou En-lai and Foreign Ministry
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officials have had to take a duplistic line -- that
is, denying insurgency-support in such a way as to
leave their listeners with a strong sense of Chinese
insincerity, and with no pledge of an end to PRC sup-
port.
The existence of this incongruity seems to
reflect Mao's desires, with which Chou must comply.
Since the mid-1950's, Chinese Communist policy
toward the Burma insurgency had been to give advice
but not material support to the old Burma Communist
Party. In the mid-1950's also, Peking was careful
not to give overt propaganda support to these Com-
munist dissidents, Behind-the-scenes, the Chinese
leaders had encouraged the BCP to come in from the
countryside to negotiate with the government for a
ceasefire; but they had not gone so far as to require
the BCP to meet Rangoon's key demand that it turn
in its weapons.
This non-support situation changed during Mao's
Cultural Revolution. The triggering incident was
the anti-Chinese riots in Rangoon of June 1967. In
these riots, 50-80 local Chinese and one PRC aid-
technician were killed, A motivation for punishment
and a motivation for revolution were aroused in Mao's
thinking. On 29 June 1967, Peking for the first time
praised the "armed struggle" waged against the govern-
ment. By early July, Peking was calling for the
government's "overthrow." At the same time (July
1967) speaking in a revolutionary way, a Burmese Com-
munist client resident in Peking denounced Liu Shao-chi
for having "betrayed" the revolution in Burma -- the
implication being that it would not be abandoned again.
Evidence that the Chinese had opted for a policy
of material inputs (beyond intensified propaganda
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ant.i.m.ce
support) appeared soon afterward. In late July 1967,
Chinese military officers contacted Kachin and Shan
insurgents in the northeast to begin military planning.
Starting in August, the Chinese began their important
organizational efforts, designed to strengthen the
influence of Peking and the newer BCP (White Flag)
among the tribal Kachins and Shans. This political
work was also necessary to regularize the activities
of the insurgents, to add discipline to their fighting
fervor, and to make clear an ultimate political goal.
Thereafter, Chinese training and supply of the tribal
insurgents in the northeast expanded. Peking supplied
decisive guidance to make the new insurgency viable
in the border region. The insurgency became a Chinese-
sponsored guerrilla war of mainly Kachins and Shans
against government troops, inasmuch as Peking had
abandoned the old BCP which got nowhere in its opera-
tions in central Burma and which had aiipointed a new
party chairman, Thakin Zin, not of Peking's choosing.
A major step was taken when the Chinese went
beyond using only Burma-side nationals: they began
to recruit PRC citizens (mainly tribal minorities with
some Han Chinese) on the Yunnan-side for fighting
in northeast Burma. By March 1968 such Yunnan-side
recruitment was well underway. Rather than wait
until Burma-side tribal minorities could be mustered
into combat units, the Chinese, who showed every sign
of being anxious to put muscle into this "people's
war" in the northeast, recruited quickly on their
side./
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Peking's public media began to play down the
Chinese statements of support, reflecting a decision
which probably was made in late August or early
September 1970. The last NCNA initiated comment on
the insurgency was broadcast on 4 September. Subse-
quently, NCNA has not initiated its own comment, citing
instead other sources.
The source of propaganda was shifted to broad-
casts of a new political instrument: The Voice of the
People of Burma (VPB). It is a clandestine radio
operation, broadcasting from within China, pinpointed
in location to Mangshih, Yunnan and established in
March 1971. Depicted to foreign audiences as the
iDsurgents' "own" radio station, it is run by tbe
Chinese. This shift in the overt source of propaganda,
intended to conceal from innocents the fact that Peking
was the ultimate source, and intended to improve the
PRC international image, almost certainly reflects
Chou En-lai's diplomacy-conscious thinking. Chou
apparently had persuaded Mao that insurgency-support
impedes diplomatic maneuvering, that such support
should be given a much lower public profile, and that
one way to lower the public profile would be to establish
a new clandestine radio attributed to the insurgents
alone. The establishment of the radio also suggests
that while Mao was persuaded to act to aid PRC diplo-
matic requirements, he preferred a course which was
only a new way to provide propaganda guidance and
encouragement of the insurgency, not the total cessation
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of support. The cases of Thailand and Malaysia show
a similar shift of propaganda guidance and support
away from Peking's public media (particulaIly Radio!,
Peking broadcasts and NCNA press articles) to the
ongoing broadcasts of the clandestine radios assigned
to beam programs into Thailand and Malaysia..
The new not-made-in-Peking profile was also
used to pave the way for an exchange of ambassadors,
with the Burmese man arriving in Peking in November
1970, When, in March 1971, the Chinese finally sent
their ambassador to Rangoon, the Chinese inaugurated
the new clandestine radio. But it would seem that
Chinese material aid to the insurgents is a more ac-
curate measure of Peking's attitude toward Rangoon
than the state of diplomatic relations. Ever since
the change in overt propaganda support in the fall
of 1970, there has been no evidence of a reduction
in Chinese military aid in the period.
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The Chinese leaders were not that much anxious
to improve diplomatic relations with Rangoon that they
would avoid criticizing Ne Win's government. On the
contrary, they used the clandestine radio to mount
vehement attacks on that government, and Ne Win was
reported to have been extremely embarrassed by the
start of the broadcasts less than one week after the
arrival of the new Chinese ambassador in Rangoon
(March 1971). The clandestine radio provided even
stronger political support for the insurgency and
more provocative attacks on Ne Win than Radio Peking
had been issuing.
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Aside from the matter of whether Mao still
demands an abject apology from Ne Win for the mid-
1967 Pqngoon anti-Chinese riots, the Burmese have
moved on another issue to satisfy Peking
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The inflexibility of the Chinese position had
been made clear earlier when Ne Win attempted to use
personal diplomacy with Peking. Despite wishful
thinking after Ne Win's 25X1
visit to Peking (from 6-12 August 1971) to the effect
that Peking would reduce its support of the insurgents,
in fact the Chinese did not do so. On the contrary,
they seem to have been stimulated to demonstrate their
determination to sustain aid, 25X1
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/despite
outward appearances -- e.g,, NCNA's depiction of Ne
Win's talk with Mao on 7 August as "friendly" and
Chou's reference to the Burmese leader on the preced-
ing day as a "friend" -- Chinese broadcasts supporting
the insurgents were not diminished. The China-based
clandestine radio on 15 August not only called for Ne
Win's "overthrow" but ended with the call: "Long
live (BCP) Chairman Thakin Zin and Mao Tse-tung."
The Chinese not only did not close down their
clandestine radio or drop their insurgency-support
but they seem to have intensified this activity
-- after several quiet months -- subsequent to Ne
Win's personal appeals. On 12 August, the very day
that Ne Win returned from China, forces of the
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Northeast Command overran Burmese counterinsurgency
bases near Kunlong, a town about 60 miles northeast
of Lashio and only 15 miles from the border, On 15
August, the clandestine radio in Yunnan called his
visit one of several "sly tricks" to overcome his
domestic problems and repeated the belligerent appeal
to Burmese to unite with the BCP "to crush the reac-
tionary Ne Win government." On 17 August, the in-
surgents captured Hopang, a town 10 miles east of
Kunlong. In view of Chinese control over the North-
east Command's military operations, these mid-August
attacks (the first since the seizure of Mengmao in
May, 70 miles east of Lashio) may have been ordered
by Peking partly with the purpose of reminding Ne
Win of China's policy to sustain the insurgency.
Ne Win was silent for more than a month after
his return. There is little doubt that during many
long hours of private talks with Chou he had not
succeeded in gaining an assurance that support for
the insurgents would end. The Yunnan-based VPB
continued to hammer at him as "the common enemy" who
had to be "crushed." (VPB broadcast of 3 October
1971) It also taunted him for having tried to pre-
vent his troops from listening to VPB broadcasts:
"Even if Ne Win prohibits them, they will listen to
the broadcasts..." (VPB broadcast of 7 October
1971) As for the guidance-disseminating role of the
VPB, on 20 August 1972, important instructions were
being beamed into Burma from the clandestine radio.
On that date, the excerpts of an instructional speech
(given by Chairman Thakin Zin) were relayed by the
radio, stressing the need for recruitment of new
party members based on a "unity-with-allies" prin-
ciple. The instructions also declared the necessity
to "crush" the "common enemy, the Ne Win-San Yu
clique."
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In the field of actual fighting, the highest
point of the insurgency in the northeast occurred
after Ne Win's visit and his requests in Peking that
PRC support be ended. On 20 November 1971, undoubtedly
with Chinese initiative, insurgent forces attacked
Kunlong and held it under siege for a month. On 5
December, the Chinese-run VPB beamed a broadcast com-
menting on the fighting, boasting that 60 government
troops had been killed. Until this major attack -- the
biggest engagement since Independence in Burma -- the
insurgents had confined themselves to attacks on
smaller targets.
VPB broadcasts from Yunnan haranged Rangoon
after the siege. In January 1972, deputy prime
minister Brigadier General San Yu, who was head of
the government during Ne Win's temporary absence in
December and who had flown to Strategic Command
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Headquarters in Lashio personally to assess the siege,
was for the first time attacked by the VPB. This ex-
tension of Chinese hostility to No Win's probable
successor was a more accurate indication of the state
of Peking Rangoon relations than the improvement of
economic relations earlier in August, the dispatch of
a Burmese ping pong team to Peking in November, and
the Chinese request that Burma represent PRC interests
in Bangladesh in December 1971.7-
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Armed insurgent strength in the Wa region south
of Kunlong was estimated in June 1972 to be about
1,500. These units are well-armed with Chinese-made
weapons. The contingents which seized Pangyang in
May used mortars before the final assault.1
The fighting in the Wa area was the most in-
tensive and extensive since the attacks on Kunlong.
Insurgent successes there may have been a factor in
the timing of Ne Win's decision, reported in mid-June,
to seek military equipment from the Soviet Union.
Rangoon is mainly interested in automatic weapons
and ammunition, mortars, and artillery shells. Sub-
sequently, Ne Win decided against seeking Soviet aid.
About half of the government's military effort is
directed against insurgents, primarily those supported
by the PRC in the northeast.
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However, Peking is taking only superficial
actions to conceal its support for the BCP (White
Flag). One of these moves is the decision to keep
Burmese Communist leaders away from the 31 July 1972
Army Day reception in Peking, in contrast with their
attendance at the 1971 turnout. Nevertheless, on
20 August 1972, the clandestine radio broadcast in-
structions to the insurgents from the party leader,
Thakin Zin.
Peking is expanding the insurgency -- already
spaced out over six years -- at a slow pace. The in-
tention seems to be to keep it at a low boil and to
seize small amounts of land, calculating that such
nibbling will not be used by Ne Win to sound an alarm
among major world powers. Some of the land now
seized is referred to as "liberated areas" by the
insurgents in the field and their Chinese sponsors,
and it is unlikely that it will be voluntarily
returned to the control of government or non-Communist
forces.
Prior to the ceasefire in Vietnam (January
1973) there was no indication that it would in any
way affect the PRC's policy of sponsoring the in-
surgency in Burma. The Chinese-run VPB made it clear
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that this policy would go forward at a deliberate
pace, and subsequently, as recent as 18 March 1973,
the VPB called for more people in Burma to take the
path of "revolution," demanding that they "oppose
and fight the Ne Win-San Yu military government."
The insurgency in the northeast probably
will continue to be sponsored by Peking at least
until Mao dies. Chou En-lai and other Chinese
officials have attributed the PRC policy directly
to Mao -- as something that he desires. In the
view of this author, this is the single most im-
portant factor in Peking's sponsoring role.
Thailand
The insurgency in north and northeast Thailand
is inspired and guided by Peking. When, in 1967,
the more active dissident area -- the northeast -- was
hard hit by Thai government forces, Peking subsequ-
ently acted to give it material aid, political resolve,
and psychological sense of purpose. Peking almost
certainly has the ultimate deciding voice in the
strategy of insurgency in both areas, demonstrably
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THAILAND: Areas of Communist Insurgency
HJ
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514897 11.72 CAA
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NORTH THAILAND
Areas of Communist Insurgency
BURMA
Chiang
Khong,
Chiang Rai
twot ro firluong Noun
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(Udorn)
Area of communist insurgency
' Communist supply route
50
Miles
5141196 11 12 CIA
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so in the north and apparently so in the northeast.
Thus within the context of overall guidance, Peking
is the dominant influence among Communist Party of
Thailand (CPT) leaders./
The CPT has been under Chinese Communist con-
trol ever since it came into existence in 1926. The
CPT leadership which emerged in later years did so
exclusively under the tutelage of the Chinese Com-
munist Party (CCP). In the mid-1960's there became
available confirmation of this fact.
Peking has retained the ability to exert over-
all guidance of the insurgency in the north and north-
east because the top leaders of the CPT remain loyal
to the huge parent party, the CCP. The CCP trained
these leaders, promoted them, and now sustains them.
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/More importantly, there are no signs
of real organizational independence, although leaders
in the northeast may have some autonomy in tactical
matters. There are no independent Ho Chi Minhs or
Fidel Castros in the CPT. The tie between the CCP
and the CPT is more than an ideological link. It
is an organizational link.
The main radio station devoted to guidance
and indoctrination of the CPT insurgents in the
north and northeast is the Chinese-run Voice of the
People of Thailand (VPT), broadcasting into Thailand
from its base near Kunming, Yunnan., Radio Hanoi re-
plays various broadcasts of the VPT, including battle
reports, but the North Vietnamese do not have a
separate radio station assigned to covering the in-
surgency.
The VPT, like the two additional clandestine
radio stations broadcasting from south China, relays
something more than mere propaganda, It is concrete
guidance. The 1 December 1972 CPT Central Committee
"statement" which it broadcast into Thailand con-
tained explicit instructions on an entire range of
concrete policies. The contents of the CPT "statement"
-- identical in style, wording, and policy-position
with CCP materials -- make it highly likely that it
was drafted by the Chinese Communists in China and
approved by the CCP leadership. The "statement" is
an operational one, inasmuch as it tells insurgents
in the field what they must do.
The "statement" lays it down to CPT personnel
that "armed struggle" is the only way to attain
national power-- the position opposedly'the'SoViets,
and.by some CPT members in previous years. The
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O.U.k.a.M.E.? .1.
insurgency has "proven" that Mao's doctrine is the
correct one.
The past 30 years have proven
that the revolution can never be
achieved through peaceful means, a
parliamentary system or a coup d'etat
over a deadly enemy, armed from head
to foot, which rules by a savage
fascist dictatorship.
It states that the insurgent army is set up on the Mao
model as "a new-type revolutionary army, in accordance
with Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought;" this army
has a 10-point "code of conduct" and was established
with great stress on "cultivating a sense of political
consciousness in our fighters." The "statement" in-
structs that guerrilla areas must be "transformed"
into strongholds,
Moreover, in order to strengthen
these revolutionary strongholds, we
must further enhance the people's
revolutionary power, expand the
people's armed forces -- including
irregular forces, regional forces,
and village fighters -- raise the
political and ideological level of
the people, lead the masses in solv-
ing land problems, promote economic
development, improve the welfare of
the people, and raise their cultural
and hygienic standards. (emphasis
supplied)
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Continuing this instruction, personnel are told that
"we must" construct the CPT along Maoist political,
organizational, and ideological lines; all party
members "must" grasp party policy, which includes
Mao's prescription for inner-party struggle -- namely,
"cure the sickness to help the patient, and unity-
criticism-self-criticism-unity." Further instructions
are that all party units "must" do a good job in re-
cruiting new members, "must" train local cadres, "must"
study ability and performance before promoting cadres,
and "must" promote organizational and disciplinary
principles within the party.
The "statement" sets a "main task" for the
CPT. It stresses the need to "build more strong-
holds and strengthen them, and expand the guerrilla
zone." It does not clarify the distinction between
stronghold and guerrilla zone. The "statement"
details the steps that "must" be undertaken by the
populace in the strongholds and by all insurgent
combat personnel.
As for the people in the strong-
holds, they must heighten their revo-
lutionary spirit, support the armed
forces, the state power and the revo-
lutionary war, exert utmost efforts
to strengthen the strongholds, boost
food production, increase political
awareness, and resolutely fight to
safeguard these strong bases.
All commanders and fighters in
the people 's armed forces must strive
to raise their political standards,
exert efforts to study the strategy
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azik.avo
and tactics of the revolutionary war,
improve military techniques, and
further heighten the solidarity
between the commanding echelon and
fighters and between the armed forces
and the people...
The "statement" goes well beyond the broadcasts which
the VPT occasionally beams into Thailand for morale-
building purposes and for informational purposes -- two
types of broadcasts which in themselves are more than
rhetoric or propaganda in the usual sense. It presents
gridance, a concrete program which CPT cadres in the
field "must" put into action.
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The CPT leadership is primarily Chinese, with
only a few Thais having boen promoted to key positions,
and these having been trained for many years in China.
This ethnic Chinese domination at the top of a Peking-
controlled party apparatus helps to sustain that control.
It was significant that the delegates representing the
CPT at the November 1960 conference of Communist parties
in Moscow spoke in Chinese, not Thai./
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CPT subordination to the CCP is also apparent
in the obedient and unequivocal support given to every
position the CCP adopts in the Sino-Soviet dispute. The
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CPT does not display any of the independence associated
with a really unsubordinated party apparatus. By con-
trast, the independent North Vietnamese -- leaders of
the Lao Dong Party -- adopt a position of neutrality
in the dispute, clearly showing unsubordinated status.
CPT greetings to the CCP have none of the self-respect
of Lao Dong Party greetings, but they display instead
a sycophantic quality to the parent party, especially
in the sustained tribute to Mao's "thought," indicating
apparatus subordination.
The CPT is neither free from Peking's control
nor subordinated to Hanoi's control at the top leader-
ship level. But at the lower level the situation has
been changing.)
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Top leaders of the CPT had been trained in China
in the 1950's at a time when the Vietnamese Communists
had no training role. Only in the mid-1960's, and
afterward, were the North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao
allowed to help in the training of cadres.)
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Prior to 1967, the insurgency in the northeast
was not well-organized and there was nothing of signi-
ficance under CPT control stirring in the tribal areas
of Lhe north. The Chinese, in several steps strung out
over the years, and with North Vietnamese help, moved
in the direction of sponsoring a viable guerrilla war,
making it more professional and efficient than anything
previously in Thailand.
In mid-1962, the Chinese established a key
guidance and indoctrination instrument: the VPT radio
station near Kunming, Yunnan. VPT broadcasts en-
couraged the insurgents to begin a Mao-model "armed
struggle" against local government forces.\
Peking introduced a sense of urgency into this
low-boil insurgency only when larger strategic con-
siderations confronted the Chinese and North Vietnamese
leaders. The major consideration was the establishment
of more U.S. air bases in Thailand to be used in support
of the allied effort in Laos. (Souvanna Phouma first
requested U.S. reconnaissance in May 1964, and a month
later these planes were authorized to return fire.
Thai pilots participated by mid-1964, manning some T-28
bombers. All this was from bases in Thailand.) Peking's
attention turned to Thailand to warn the Thai leaders
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against cooperation with the U.S. against Communist
forces in Laos, and then to punish the Thai leaders for
not responding properly to the warning, Thus the marked
increase in Peking's attention to the Thai insurgency
had its beginning in a punishment motive, But, as will
be shown, at the same time a revolutionary motive was
present in Mao's policy thinking on supporting such in-
surgencies,
The Chinese acted to revive the small insurgency
by directing CPT cadres in the field to expand their
recruitment among non-Communist dissidents. An addi-
tional course of action was Chinese use of various anti-
Bangkok Thai leaders in several "front" groups to serve
as a rallying point for dissidents anywhere in Thailand,
The "front" groups were organized in Peking,
In November 1965, Radio Peking and the VPT simul-
taneously announced the formation of the openly anti-
Bangkok Thai Independence Movement (TIM), On 1 January
1966, the Thai Patriotic Front (TPF) was placed along-
side the TIM to serve as a possible rallying organization
for anti-Bangkok dissidents, The idea was to bring
together Thai elements who would agree to openly criticize
the government and cooperate with Peking in building
an out-of-country political entity. These "fronts,"
however, later proved to be ineffective. They included
in their ranks Thai exiles who began to quarrel among
themselves, and in 1969 they were marked for discard when
the Chinese decided to stress the direct leadership role
of the CPT of the insurgency. Unlike the "fronts," the
CPT was a disciplined and obedient instrument of Peking's
policy.
The course taken to expand the insurgency can
be traced back to September 1964, although low-boil
training of guerrilla fighters had taken place in
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previous years.
On 8 December 1964, Radio Peking for
the first time called for the "overthrow" of the Bangkok
government.
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The year 1965 included not only a top-level Chi-
nese decision to beef up the Thailand insurgency but
also implementation of that decision in the form of
training and strategic planning. r
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In the field in the northeast, it was not until
1966 that the CPT-led insurgents shifted their tactics
from avoiding contact with Thai armed forces to a military
campaign directed against local police forces. By the
end of 1966, the insurgents had inflicted about 50
casualties on Thai government personnel. But the
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guerrillas were handed a major defeat in 1967, In
February and August, Thai security forces captured
key Communist guerrillas in the northeast, virtually
destroying the insurgency there for several years.
The Chinese shifted their attention in 1967 from
the ruins of the guerrilla effort in the northeast to
the north, In the north, the Chinese saw greater as-
sets and potential. The insurgents were mostly tribal
(Meo), and they were better fighters. The rugged
mountains provided safer sanctuary; and supply lines
from China through Laos were shorter. The CPT was to
recruit among them.
Meo people in the north had been trained, on
a small scale, in North Vietnam and China prior to
1967. But in that year, the effort may have been
stepped upfli
/The Chinese have placed
a very strong emphasis on the need for insurgents to
be totally indoctrinated and organizationally well-
disciplined. The idea of insurgents "gradually raising
their political consciousness and sense of organization"
in order to make a revolution succeed (Peking reople's
Daily, Red Flag, Liberation Army Daily joint editorial
of 1 OcTiTer 972) is considered by the Chinese one of
the clear differences between Mao's road and Guevara's
"purely military" road. The imposition of this idea
on the practical activities of the CPT recruiters and
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organizers in the north and northeast has helped give
the insurgencies there the firm fou%dation of discipline
needed to make a revolution advance. Political commit-
ment undoubtedly was stressed in the course of training
of Meo and Yao tribesmenC
The shift to the Meo insurgents in the north
was also reflected in Peking's indoctrination and
guidance instruments. Starting in the summer of 1968,
Radio Peking and the VPT began carrying Meo-language
broadcasts to the tribal fighters. The content was
inflammatory and clearly intended to turn the Meos
decisively against the government, (Fighting between
the Meos and government forces had already broken out
in the north in early 1968; more seriously, an insurgent
unit had attacked the town of Chon Daen in the tri-
province aiea farther south in November 1968.) In
September 1968, greatly intensified broadcasting from
China became a regular feature of Chinese support and
guidance. The theme was oppression of the Meo people.
The theme has been carried through to the present time.
An example of Peking's indoctrination and stimulation
effort follows:
The US-Thanom clique has constantly
looked down upon the Meo people....
The Meo tribesmen have earned their
living for generations without the
help of an oppressive administration...
the CPT is leading the people to rise
and stage a revolution,..the Meo
people have no alternative,..than to
take arms and fight against it...
(Yunnan-based VPT broadcast of 30
August 1969) (Emphasis supplied)
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These broadcasts are also beamed in to help the insur-
gents in their recruitment effort. For example, the
contents of a leaflet mailed to a "village volunteer"
member in south Thailand on 26 June 1972 used themes
which appear in VPT broadcasts: the goal of the in-
surgency is to "overthrow" the government, there is only
one party -- the CPT -- and there is "no foreigner in
the CPT," the small war is expanding and the government
cannot "suppress us," every day the people "give more
support to the TPLAF," and "you should turn the barrel
of your gun on the US-Thanom-Praphat regime which is
the enemy of the people."
In parallel with their stress on political com-
mitment, the Chinese placed heavy emphasis on strength-
ening military organization in insurgent ranks. A
regular army command was established as the "Supreme
Command." Significantly, this information was for the
first time revealed by Radio Peking in a broadcast of
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1 January 1969. The insurgent forces in north and
northeast Thailand were renamed the "Thai People's
Liberation Armed Forces" (TPLAF), organized to fight
under the "Supreme Command." On 3 January Radio
Peking took the unprecedented step of having a
Chinese official's promise made public to provide
"more powerful support to...the revolutionary people
of Thailand."
Thereafter in 1969, the Chinese began to refer
openly to another organizational improvement -- namely,
to the CPT's leadership role of the insurgency. Refer-
ences to the useless political "fronts" (the TIM and
TPF) were dropped from Peking media statements.
Recruitment and organizational efforts were
thereafter partly directed toward winnin the support
of the Meo seosle for the TPLAF.
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Beginning in early 1971, Chinese broadcasts re-
flected an apparently optimistic appraisal of the in-
surgency gains in the north and northeast. By late
summer, the claims were that "relatively consolidated
revolutionary base areas have been set up in certain
regions in north Thailand." (NCNA article of 6 August
1971) The Doi Pha Chi camp was a consolidated base
area.
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In the immediate future, it is highly unlikely
that Peking will stop sponsoring the insurgency. If
it were merely a matter of improving its international
image for diplomatic reasons such support might cease.
However, not only the clandestine VPT radio station
but NCNA, in its own name, has denounced the "Thanom-
Praphat clique," praised the outlawed CPT, and en-
couraged the TPLAF to fight on and grow in strength
"under extremely difficult conditions." (NCNA com-
mentary on the 8th anniversary of the insurgency,
broadcast from Peking on 7 August 1972) Thus despite
Chou En-lai's friendly welcome to the leader ("advisor")
of the Thai table tennis delegation on 5 September
1972, government-to-government relations will be
kept distinct from PRC support.
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While Mao lives, Peking probably will persist
in sponsoring the CPT in the insurgency. At the same
tim, it will continue with its diplomacy, raising it
to a higher level of official contact with Bangkok.
This dual policy will require a clear-cut separation
of insurgency-support from diplomacy, and Peking in
October 1972 did just that by avoiding any mention of
National Day greetings from the CPT. Nevertheless,
the VPT still beams its broadcasts into ThaLland from
China to buoy up insurgent morale, to set propaganda
themes for them, and to incite anti-Bangkok animosity
in order to help them recruit followers.
The Thais have asked that the Chinese stop the
VPT's subversive broadcasts. The response of the
Chinese leaders has been most recently made clear by
a broadcast stating, in effect, that the request will
be denied. The broadcast, beamed from China, celebrated
the 11th anniversary of the VPT, and went on to declare
that
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The Thai people, under oppression
by the US-Thanom clique, have as their
propaganda weapon and their voice this
VPT, They have been working together
in the mobilization and moraZe-boostin
of the forces...
No matter what methods tricks or
arnpaign it
resorts to the bandit US-Thanom clig
will never thwart an destroy the VPT.
77:75717Eas t in T lai to Thailand o1
1 March 1973) (emphasis supplied)
This deliberate Chinese rebuke to the Thai leaders is
another indication that insurgency-support will continue
despite the ceasefire in Vietnam.
The insurgency has shown significant concrete
gains in the last two years. More PLA personnel may
be sent in to be integrated into insurgent ranks.
The number of insurgents in the north and northeast
has been increasing each year. In September 1972,
estimates put the figures at about 2,900 armed person-
nel in the north and about 2,000 in the northeast.
Peking probably will support the expansion of these
regular force units with even more Chinese-made
armament, which may include new items, such as heavy
machine guns, to supplement the weapons now coming
into the north and northeast.
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???
11I K Il I
PEKING'S INSPIRATIONAL ROLE
The Philippines
Peking's support of the new, Maoist anti-govern-
ment insurgency in the various Philippine islands is
primarily in the form of political guidance and encourage-
ment. However, there is good evidence of training and
some funding of pro-Peking leftists over the years.
By far the most important, enduring, and substan-
tive input from the Chinese Communists, however, is the
mental hold they have over the young Filipino Communist,
Jose Ma. Sison (aka Amado Guerro) who has strongly sup-
ported Peking on political issues and on the tactics
for carrying out the insurgency. This commitment was
made between mid-1966 and mid-1967, during his visits
to CEina. Through Peking's guidance and influence, Sison
has split off a young and more violence-oriented faction
of Communists from the old Communist Party of the Philip-
pines (PKP) and a less corrupted faction of insurgents
from the old and degenerated Huk guerrilla movement.
With this nucleus and with strong political support
from Peking, Sison has implanted a new insurgency in
northeastern Luzon (recently taking hold in other areas)
which is more disciplined than the old Huk movement.
He has directed the expansion of his political and
military components along the lines prescribed by his
"god," Mao Tse-tung, Sison stresses gradual expan-
sion of "base areas," "quick-decision" warfare, "mass
work," organizational discipline, and party control
over the army ("the party controls the gun"). The
Chinese seem to be satisfied that the commitment of
this new leader to Mao's policies is so strong that
he is as good as a CCP official in the field.
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Philippines: Areas of Maoist Communist Insurgency*
? Area of Maoist communist Insurgency
c% Maoist Communist training camp
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The conversion of PKP-member Sison from his dedi-
cation to urban youth radical activities -- as leader
of the ultra-left Patriotic Youth organization in Manila
to dedication to Maoist rural armed insurgency was the
? result of a confluence of several events. First, he
had been feuding with older PKP leaders at the time when
Mao's Cultural Revolution erupted in China. Also at
that time, the Chinese leaders were casting about for
support from radicals in various non-Communist Asian
countries where US forces were based and were being
used to aid Vietnam war efforts. Finally, Mao's dis-
pute with the Soviet leaders on an entire range of
issues -- including the demands that foreign Communists
condemn the CPSU openly and support Mao's obsession that
"only" armed insurgency is the road to power for Com-
munist parties -- was intensifying. Unlike the leaders
of the old PKP, who avoided denouncing the US, remained
neutral in the Sino-Soviet dispute, and rejected rural
insurgency, Sison adopted all of Mao's pcsitions.
In the fall of 1966, Sison was far more willing
than the PKP leadership to denounce the presence of
US bases in the Philippines and to launch his youth
activists into organized demonstrations against this
presence And he was willing to take on the PKP in
an internecine fight to move it into the Chines2 camp
against the Soviets. He was strongly encouraged and
influenced by the Chinese all along the way.
The Chinese role in Sison's conversion was spread
out over a period of two years, 1966 and 1967. As in the
Thailand case, Peking first began to encourage insurgent
forces in Luzon -- the old Huk units -- when it became
apparent to the Chinese leaders that President Marcos'
administration had decided to cooperate with the US
military effort in Vietnam. In February 1966, at the
time when the Vietnam aid bill of Marcos was pending
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in Congress and was the center of a major dispute, Radio
Peking broadcasts to the Philippines for the first time
changed in nature, from avoidance of comment on Philip-
pine internal matters to open encouragement of the in-
surgents. Broadcasts in Tagalog and Filipino to the
islands drastically increased. Some Chinese leaders
may have tried to keep this change from injuring the
few contacts made with Philippine political figures on
the diplomatic level./
The Chi-
nese apparently had not yet reached the point of encourag-
ing a split in the old PKP, and in August 1966, they
invited a PKP member, A.V. Hernandez, to Peking, where
he spoke in praise of Mao, condemned "revisionism," and
attacked the US on the Vietnam war. The Chinese clearly
had begun to think in terms of punishment for the govern-
ment when, in late 1966, Peking began to add "the
Milippines" to Laos, South Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia,
and Malaysia as Asian countries where armed struggle
was developing.
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In 1967, Sison found more favor with Peking. He
had become an officer in two radical organizations set
up in the spring of 1967, and he became active in these
in addition to retaining his post as chairman of the
radical youth organization. More importantly, at a
time when Peking was encouraging splits within old-line
parties of the Communist movement, Sison held a position
on the Secretariat Staff of the PKP. Sison feuded with
PKP leaders from the fall of 1966 to the spring of
1967 -- that is, after his first visit to Peking and
just before his second tour in China. The older PKP
leaders insisted on remaining neutral rather than siding
with Mao against the Soviet leaders, and because Sison
could not impose his line (and for other reasons), he
withdrew his small faction from the PKP in mid-April
1967./
How much encouragement
the Chinese gave Sison to split the PKP from within is
not known, but he clearly was aware that Peking was
encouraging splits within other neutral or pro-Soviet
parties. In any case, the result of his deliberate
internal opposition was the formation of a nucleus
within the PKP for Peking to support. Peking took
Sison on as the most promising of the young, violence-
oriented Communists for the purpose of carrying out
Mao's policy of making armed insurgency work.
Following this internal split and prior to the
formation of a separate party, the Chinese hosted Sison
for seven weeks, beginning with his entry into China
in May 1967. As in 1966, he held discussions with of-
ficials of the liaison organ, the Chinese People's
Institute for Foreign Affairs, who almost certaiilly
were briefed on the course of the internal PKP split,
He was received by Foreign Minister Chen Yi on 7 June.
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It was during this Chinese-sponsored visit that he be-
came the carrier of Mao's policy for the Philippine
insurgency.
In early May in Peking, Sison made his commitment
clear in a strongly Maoist speech. He called for expul-
sion of the US from the islands, condemnation by the PKP
of the CPSU, affirmation of "unity" with the CCP, and
acceptance of the "success" of Mao's Cultural Revolu-
tion and of the superiority of Mao's doctrines. Sison
declared "armed struggle" to be the PKP policy. He
made an inspired defense of Mao's view that the "only"
way to attain national power for Communists is "armed
struggle," in the course of which the party must be
entirely rebuilt and "rural bases" must be develc,ned.
(Reprinted in New Zealand's People's Voice, 10 May 1967)
His early May speech in Peking was followed by an NCNA
announcement on 21 May which reported that, in a letter
to the CCP or, I May, the PKP had pledged itself to a
policy of "armed struggle."
This direct intervention by the Chinese into the
factional dispute within the PKP aligned the CCP with
Sison's faction; the CCP supported his faction and en-
couraged him in his opposition. The Chinese-inspired
"PKP" pledge appeared as a formal "PKP" politburo
statement, the text of which was broadcast in Tagalog
to the Philippines. It declared war on the "revision-
ist" faction. Later in May, a Peking-directed propa-
ganda campaign was unleashed, the broadcasts stressing
Huk military operations and claiming that this was "a
new development" toward armed insurgency in the Philip-
pines revolution. On. 29 May, for the first time, an
NCNA article revealed that a Philippine People's Libera-
tion Army "led by the PKP" was actively engaged in
guerrilla wai.fare on Luzon. On the 30th, a People's
paily. commentary spoke of final victory "if, armed
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with Mao Tse-tung's Thought, they fight a people's war,
establish revolutionary base areas, and encircle the
cities from the countryside." Chinese influence in the
formulations was undeniable.
Owing to Mao's adamantly-pursued dispute with
Moscow on ideological issues, the touting of the "PKP"
at the time as a party dedicated to the doctrine of
"armed struggle" was important. As in the cases of
Burma, Thailand, and Malaysia, there is a very special
motivation for Peking's enduring support of armed in-
surgency -- something aside from the anti-US aspect.
That motivation is Mao's obsession -- or compulsion
(Khrushchev had described it as an "itch") -- to prove
to himself and to others that his road to power is
the best and "only" road for revolutionaries. This
obsession is irrational, as there are examples of
revolutionaries taking power by palace coups and by
legal election processes. But it exists as a funda-
mental motivating force, imbuing an otherwise strongly
pragmatic foreign policy with an encumbering dogma.
As recently as 1 December 1972, the Chinese have again
asserted that neither coups nor elections can supplant
armed struggle" as the only way to attain national
power.
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When it is expedient, for reasons of national
interest, to disengage from insurgencies elsewhere in
the world, the Chinese leader who desires such disengage-
ment (Chou En-lai is the most important) must persuade
Mao that a particular insurgency must not be openly
supported by Peking. And Mao apparently will accept
disengagement from some but not from all insurgencies
Peking had been supporting. The Philippines case shows
continuing political support and favor towards the man
who is leading "armed struggle" in the islands.
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Within the following two years, that was roughly
what Sison was successful in doing. Sison formed the
new, pro-Chinese Philippine Communist Party-Marxist/
Leninist (PKP-M/L) when, on 26 December 1968, he took
his followers out of the old, neutral PKP, breaking
with the old-line leader Pedro Taruc and his followers.
As for the military arm of the new Party, Sison managed
to acquire this component of his new organization
through an alliance. "Commander Dante," a former old-
line Huk, split with his Huk chief and joined Sison,
and formed the New People's Army (NPA), the formation
date being declared as 29 March 1969.
In line with what Peking at that time in 1969
was prescribing for insurgencies in Burma, Thailand,
and Malaysia -- namely, that the party lead the army --
the NPA was made subordinate to the party, headed by
Chairman of the Central Committee Sison.
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It is
probable that Sison already has named a new NPA commander-
in-chief. Corpus would be the most likely choice. In
any case, the involved Chinese have made it clear that
they want Sison's men to continue to repudiate "the
roving-rebel ideology" of the old Huks (NCNA article
of 26 December 1971)
The insurgelts seem to have been careful from
the start to emplace themselves in secure areas
Within one year of its formation, the NPA had moved
the area of its military operations from central Luzon
-- the old bailiwick of the Huks -- to Isabela Province
in northeast Luzon, where the presence of sympathizers
(particularly the local governor) facilitated survival,
and where the terrain (surrounding mountains) enabled
Sison and "Dante" to expand their forces in relative
security.
The Maoist orientation of Sison and his insurgent
...Ines is apparent in many aspects. Political methods
and guerrilla tactics have been taken from Mao's writings
by Sison, who has annoyed other leaders by reiterating
the Chinese hero's ideas on guerrilla warfare inces-
santly. Sison disseminates these ideas throughout the
PKP-M/L and in the
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lectures he gives as Director of the party's School of
Mao Tse-tung Thought (located near San Guillermo in cen-
tral Isabela Province). As for more practical Maoist
policies, the emphasis given to building political
organizations from the grass roots and making base areas
secure politically (as well as militarily) is apparent
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/ Encourage-
ment and praise from Peking had come in the form of an
NCNA broadcast of 24 August which noted that NPA "propa-
ganda teams" had been active, that "militia" organiza-
tions had been established in some villages, that
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ished, and that Mao's ideas had been propagated among
the "poor peasants."
Yet another point of stress was on formation of
militia forces, or self-defense corps, under the guise
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of what appeared to be legitimate associations called
Barrio [i.e., village] Youth Organizations, This
activity was intended to help mobilize for the NPA an
entire community and place it on a virtual war footing
"in defense of a barrio" against government forces,
A similar course had been followed in Burma and Thailand.
As for improving the military integrity of the NPA and
the militia, the existence of
a Lin Piao Military Academy -- a special branch of
Sison's School of Mao Tse-tung Thought. (No doubt the
Academy's name has since been changed.) The NPA,
according to an NCNA broadcast of 21 December 1971,
has its own official newspaper (as the PKP-M/L has its
own), and it is clear from what Poking media stressed
that the NPA has been tasked with making political
cadres out of its fighting men,/
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Peking, for its part, transmitted via NCNA a
26 December 1970 statement of the PKP-M/L Central Com-
mittee which stated that the party adhered to Mao's
"Thought" and was pursuing "to the end" the purge
of the old "Lava revisionist renegade clique and the
Taruc-Sumulong gangster clique" -- reference to the
pro-Soviet Lava (arrested in 1964), Huk commander
Sumulong (captured in September 1970 by Philippines
security forces), and old-line PKP leader Taruc (killed
in October 1970). Subsequent Peking-carried statements
of the Philippine insurgents led by Sison strongly
suggest that a dispute was waged within the old PKP
over the wisdom of forming the NPA. An NPA statement
of 29 March 1971 (cared by NCNA on 10 April 1971)
delared that the "complete collapse" of the Taruc-
. Sumulong "gangster clique" in "less than two years
after its mass criticism and repudiation" had "totally
vindicated the correctness of the establishment of the
NPA under a Communist party inspired by Marxism-Leninism
Mao Tse-tung Thought." (emphasis supplied) The old
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PKP in 1972 has shown some signs of being revived -- or
temporarily propped up -- as it has tried to compete for
support among urban intellectuals by engaging in acts
of violence (bomb-planting and assassination). But
it clearly is now the inferior Communist Party in numbers,
morale, and appeal among youthful radicals.
As in the cases of Burma, Thailand, and Malaysia,
small advances in diplomacy did not curtail Peking's
support for the Sison insurgents. When in mid-May
1971 two unofficial Philippine economic missions visited
China and were received by Chou for a "friendly" conver-
sation, Peking had already lumped Presdient Marcos to-
gether with Ne Win in a Voice of the People of Burma (VPB)
broac,cast on 18 April which declared that these two
leaders could not prevent the "doom of being overthrown .
by their own peoples" Following the economic missions'
visits, NCNA cited a 21 May 1971 PKP-M/L newspaper article
which praised the NPA exploits against the forces of the
Philippine "reactionary government." And following the
completion of the first major Philippine-PRC trade agree-
ment in late August 1971, NCNA carried two news articles
on the 26 August destruction of three government heli-
copters by the NPA.
Peking has carried reports indicating the areas
of guerrilla activity and some of the Maoist military
techniques being used. The insurgents were reported as
operating not only in northeastern Luzon but also in
other Luzon provinces, and in the Visayas and Mindanao.
In February 1972, the insurgents claimed that
Units of the NPA are now actively
carrying out armed struggle in
northern Luzon, central Luzon,
southern Luzon, and the western
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Visayas. In Mindanao, the party and
the NPA have deployed cadres to train
fighters from the poor peasants and
oppressed national minorities to fight
the Zandgrabbers and the reactionary
armed forces. (NCNA excerpts of aag
Bayan article, broadcast by Radio
Peking on 3 May 1972)
The PKP-M/L organ Ang Bayan claimed in late April 1972
that "regular fighters" have increased eight-fold
since 1969 and that "mass" support has been extended
to 18 provinces of Luzon and western Visayas. Ang Bayan
also claimed that the NPA now has the capability "to
launch tactical offensives within the strategic defense," 25X1
the meaning of "tactical offensives"
probably being quick-decision
ambush actions against government patrols of platoon
size. (NCNA report of 29 April 1972) Sison's party
organ on 9 September 1972 carried a completely Mao-
oriented report on how NPA forces had been able to
thwart the encirclement campaign of the Philippine
army's "reactionary" troops. "The NPA concentrated
its main forces while evading the enemy main forces
and annihilated small and isolated enemy units."
(NCNA excerpts of Ang Bayan article, broadcast by
Radio Peking on 5 December 1972)
The Philippine insurgency has been expanding
under Sison's control even thou .h its numbers are
small.
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The main source of arms and ammunition for the
NPA is internal, that is, equipment comes from combat
captures, purchases from gun-traffickers, and weapons
roundups (or collection drives) carried out in the
islands. In order to conceal the sordid, covert nature
of some acquisitions of weapons, the insurgents claim
that they are using primarily the prescription -- a
Maoist one -- of obtaining weapons from the enemy.
Mao had said of China's civil war that "the enemy is our
supply sergeant" -- a position now found convenient
for Peking to paraphrase in connection with weapons-
supplying of the NPA. Thus NCNA on 3 March 1972 made
the following excerpts of a PKP-M/L newspaper article
when discussing weapons acquisition:
Confronted with the large-scale recruit-
ment of commanders and fighters for the
NPA, the party and the people's army
are fulfilling their arms requirement
aEfEaEllli by relying on their own
strength. The 24imara source of arms
and military equipment for the people's
army is the battlefront. More than
20_212.2t.e,f_ficuiggssja of the people's
army come from the enemy. Victories
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in ambushes and raids ensure arms
and ammunition for the Red fighters.
(emphasis supplied)
Given the availability of smuggled guns and the practice
of many radicals of acquiring and storing weapons in
urban areas, the 90 percent figure probably exaggerates
the proportion taken in combat. The newspaper article
sensibly does not indicate the source of the other 10
percent of acquisitions.
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On the diplomatic level, Peking's policy can be
expected to move toward rationality by small degrees.
This would mean more people- co-people contacts and,
eventually, some official contacts. For more than a
year -- that is, since June 1971, and even several
months earlier -- NCNA articles broadcast by Peking
on developments in the Philippines have shown a diplomatic
sensibleness in r..voiding, for the most part, attacks
on the Marcos dministration by name. More recently,
Peking was careful to use foreign press reports to
imply its criticism of Marcos' declaration of martial
law (22 September 1972), and this particular restraint
has been maintained. This is in line with the low
profile of insurgency-support that Peking has adopted
in open media. Peking. desires non-official relations
now and official relations later with Manila. But not
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at the expense of endin all olitical su ort to the
Sison forces.
The Chinese will probably continue their broad-
casting of reports on developments in the insurgency.
On the one hand, Radio Peking broadcasts will probably
continue to avoid direct attacks on the Marcos ad-
ministration by name, using foreign press sources to
relay such criticism. On the other hand, the VMR will
probably be used, as it has been up until the present,
to carry vituperative attacks on the Manila government.
The Chinese do not operate a separate radio station for
the Philippine insurgency; their policy has been to
use the VMR. For example, on 9 September 1972, the
VMR was used to broadcast to Malaysia and Singapore
a statement from Sison's PKP-M/L which derided the
government of President Marcos as a "puppet" regime
of the U.S.
The dedication of Sison to Mao's revolutionary
views marks him as the most fervent Mao-idolizer of all
pro-Peking foreign Communist leaders. In practical
terms, this means he is conducting himself obediently
in the Sino-Soviet dispute in criticizing Moscow by
name and expanding the Mao-model revolution in the
islands. Thus in his letter to the CCP on the 50th
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anniversary of the Chinese party (July 1971), Sison
personally disparaged the "Soviet Union" as "the
4
center of modern revisionism." He was emphatic in
dedicating his party to sustained learning from the
Chinese model:
?
The Communist Party of the Philip-
pines emulates the CCP. It constantly
strives to grasp the teachings of Chair-
man Mao. The living study and applica-
tion of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung
Thought in Philippine conditions is
today the main concern of the Communist
Party of the Philippines. (Sison
message published by NCNA, 10 July 1971)
Sison spoke also of moving the insurgency into the stage
of "socialist revolution," which is to be the final
revolutionary stage before seizure of national power.
Even the future form of the Communist state is to be
the "people's democracy" of Mao's terminology. On 3
June 1972, an NCNA article declared the final goal of
the Philippine insurgents led by the PKP-M/L to be such
a Maoist "people's democracy." On 5 December 1972,
an NCNA article praised the NPA for using Mao's tactics
to destroy "reactionary" troops.
Sison is acting to win important non-Communist
political support for his insurgency, and has dangled
the bait of a share in a future revolutionary govern-
ment to prospective allies./
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Peking's two-level policy of diplomacy and
insurgency-support probably will continue. As for
Sison's policy, he probably will adhere to Mao's
prescription for waging a protracted war, only
gradually expanding party ranks, the NPA, and terri-
torial holdings.
Malaysia
West
Peking has the overall guiding role in'the re-
vivied insurgency in northern West Malaysia (south of
the Thai border). Its dominant influence is based on
its control of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP).
This party is virtually an operational wing of the CCP,
and in the late 1940s and early 1950s some top MCP of-
ficials held dual membership in the CCP and the MCP.
Top MCP officials may still be controlled by such dual
membership today. In addition to the organizational
tie, the strong racial tie is very important in sustain-
ing the subordination of the MCP and its insurgents to
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MALAYSIA: Areas of Communist Insurgency
GULF 01,
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117.75?',7,773777.71,7
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the parent Chinese party: most of the insurgent Com-
munists are ethnic Chinese. Malaysia's Chinese school
system has radical youth organizations which act as
recruiting centers for the MCP, and recruiting in the
countryside is also most effective among Chinese.
The MCP today shows none of the independence
which marks a free, unsubordinated Communist party.
It obediently adopts all CCP positions in the Sino-
Soviet dispute without variation. It issues servile
statements of tribute to the CCP and its leaders.
For example, the 1 April 1972 MCP Central Committee
letter of condolence on the death of CCP Politburo
member Hsieh Fu-chih pledged to take Hsieh's revolu-
tionary attitude "as a model of our learning." More-
over, from 24-27 May 1972 the Voice of the Malayan
Revolution (VMR) -- the Chinese-run covert radio
station broadcasting from Changsha, Hunan in south-
central China -- imposed on insurgents in the field
a series of broadcasts carrying the complete text of
Mao's Talks at the Yenan Forum on Art and Literature
(1942). Mainland cadres were subjected to the same
study task on the 30th anniversary of Mao's Talks.
The broadcasts implied that the MCP insurgents iii the
field were under the same CCP ideological and organi-
zational discipline as mainland cadres.
The Most important contribution Peking makes to
the insurgency, is high-level guidance, indoctrination,
and encouragement. There is abundant evidence that
insurgents in the field use broadcasts of the VMR to
set themes for indoctrination lectures. Many of the
broadcasts used for political-toughening also carry
detailed information on PRC developments through the
broadcasting of articles in the Peking People's Daily
and Red Flag. The organizing and political-toughening
role?WT this radio station's broadcasts goes beyond
mere revolutionary rhetoric and becomes practical aid.
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Most of the insurgents in northern West Malaysia
are Chinese, not Malays (who distrust Communist con-
cepts), and some have been infiltrated from China. But
most of them have been in the field since the end of
the Emergency (1948-1960), when Malaysian security forces
chased them into southern Thailand. Many new cadres
have been recruited in the field and never have been
to the mainland. Because of the difficult jungle ter-
rain and the cooperation of the local inhabitants in
West Malaysia -- mostly cooperation by local Chinese --
Malaysian security forces are encountering difficulties
in courterinsurgency operations. Peking now seems to
be determined to broaden the ranks of the MCP and its
combat arm, the Malayan National Liberation Army (MNLA)
so that more Malays are brought in. The insurgents
are going about this kind of party-building in a gradual,
deliberate way, but the resistance of the Malays to
Communist appeals will continue to impede the pace of
expansion.
Chinese support of the insurgency is maintained
under a clear distinction between government and party
relations. Like the situation existing between Peking
on the one hand, and Rangoon, Bangkok, and Manila on the
other hand, improvements in government relations do not
carry with them a reduction or cessation of PRC support
of the Communist insurgents. Mao is apparently unwill-
ing to close down support, as was done in the period just
after World War II by the Soviets and in the mid-1950s
by the Chinese during the policy of Bandung-inspired
peaceful coexistence. Ending of support was criticized
as a "mistake" at the peak of Mao's Cultural Revolu-
tion in August 1967 in Peking by a Malayan Communist
leader, who is a client of the CCP. In a real sense,
PRC support of the insurgency is a continuation of Mao's
thinking during his Cultural Revolution regarding nearby
guerrilla wars.
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The support, in contrast to the direct support
given the Burma and Thailand insurgencies, does not
include direct physical inputs, for obvious logistical
reasons,
The impetus for reviving the insurgency in West
Malaysia came from Peking, and at the time of the peak
of Mao's "anti-revisionist" Cultural Revolution, in
mid-1967, By mid-1968, some 600 armed Communist in-
surgents, who had huddled in sanctuaries in southern
Thailand where they had been chased in the late 1950s
by Malaysian security forces, began to move gradually
from inactive to active status under stimulation from
Peking. They MOVEZ; back across the border, first to
reconnoiter and then permanently to position themselves
in small base areas in northern West Malaysia, The
CTs -- that is, Communist Terrorists or members of
the MNLA numbered about 600 regular armed cadres
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at the close of the Emergency (1948-1960), expanded to
about 1,000 by mid-1968, to about 1,600 in mid-1970,
and to about 1,800 in mid-1972, The slow upward pro-
gression in the number of armed insurgents represents
a positive gain, and the existence of small bases capable
of accommodating about 40-60 CTs points toward a long-
term potential expansion.
The kindling spark was presumably in the form
of a secret directive during Mao's Cultural Revolution,
but the public form of the spark came as an article
written by a Chinese Communist client in Peking: a
Malay Communist, P,V, Sarma, Chief of the Malayan
National Liberation League (MNLL), The exhortations in
the article, which was published in the MNLL's Mao-line
journal in August 1967, in effect directed the Malayan
Communists to get out of front activities in Malayan
parliamentary politics and out of the southern Thailand
sanctuaries, to take up their weapons, and to start
organizing themselves for serious work: guerrilla war-
fare. It insisted that "armed struggle" was the only
way to attain political power, that the MCP had made
a serious "mistake" in abandoning armed struggle just
after World War II, and that the situation was becoming
favorable for a resumption of guerrilla warfare to be
handled in a well-organized way.
The article of Sarma had considerable signi-
ficance, The fact that this key article was written while
the author was in Peking as the representative of the
MNLL and that it contained Mao-type exhortations on
the absolute need for "armed struggle" as the only road
to power in Malaysia indicates that it represented a
Chinese Communist initiative, Peking's ideological
position that "armed struggle" should be the main form
of struggle in Malaysia was affirmed in the formal MCP
statement of i June 1968, Army-insurgent work would
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replace political-front work and "parliamentary"
politics. The statement was another indication of MCP
subordination tc the parent Chinese party.
Thus tho stage of beginning the armed struggle
was reached in West Malaysia in June 1968. The same
held true for the beginning of political agitation among
the "masses":/
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The
course of insurgent military actions between 1968 and
1P72 in the field demonstrates that Peking and its client,
the MCP, were not engaged only in the rhetoric of revolu-
tion, but were also engaged in the real thing. That
is, Peking's support was not merely token aid, not
simulated aid of no real account. On the conL:arv,
Peking's guidance, indoctriaation, and enc,wragemt
activities were positive concrete act: J;oigned tn tave
the effect of reviving an insurgency and making sire
that the revival did not die at its rebirth.
The Peking-inspire0 revival of the armed insurgenr)
can be fixed to the date of 17 June 1968 whe) a ..orce
of tl,e MNLA for the first time since the latc liFAs
attacked a Malaysian sAcurity force unit on Mr1nvsian
territory. This well-crained Communist forcc numbered
about 40 armed and uniformed men, and their
effectively carried out. The evidence is tilat the revival
of the insurgency in mid-1968 reflected from the start
considerable military competence: good planning tactical
caution, good execution./
/Their mission later became that
of making selective attacks on Malaysian security force
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units and undertaking selective sabotage of key instal-
lations in West Malaysia. Toward the end of 1968, the
number of MNLA -- or CT -- incursions from southern
Thailand gradually increased. In late 1970, it was
solidly confirmed that small groups of CT infiltrators
had permanently established small bases for inside-
Malaysia operations -- a development occuring for the
first time since the late 1950s.)
The CTs were still building their units and were
not in a phase of general offensive operations. But
they did engage in selective strikes against government
forces. A major incident involving the mining by CT
forces of the main west coast road linking Malaysia
and Thailand took place in late October 1969. On 10
December, a strategic installation was hit: a group
of CTs blew up the 100-foot-long railway bridge on
Malaysian territory about two miles southwest of
Padang Besar, Perlis Province, severing for a few days
the main railway link between Thailand and Malaysia.
Gradually the CTs increased the number of cross-border
incursions, their calculation having been to demon-
strate their ability to operate on Malaysian territory
without suffering excessive combat losses. They wanted
to test their own ability to safely infiltrate, to hit
important installations and roads, and to move bigger
units across undetected. The planning was careful, the
pace deliberate, and the actions generally low-risk.
Peking's role in the overall guidance of these
developments is further suggested by its establishing,
on PRC soil, the clandestine radio station -- the
VMR -- at a time when CT units first began to be embedded
across the southern Thailand border. Inaugurated on
15 November 1969, the radio station claimed to be the
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"Malayan people's own radio station." Actually, ac-
cording to technical observations, the VMR broadcasts
from a location near Changsha, in YunAan Province in
south-central China. The November broadcast declared
that the VMR
exert utmost efforts to propagate
Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought and
the policies of the MCP,..it will prepare
revolutionary public opinion for the
launching of an extensive people's war
in Malaya with the purpose of crushing
imperialism, modern revisionism, and all
reactionaries at home, and establishing
a people's republic of Malaya. (emphasis
supplied)
In order to set forth "policies" and prepare "revolu-
tionary" public opinion, the VMR has been broadcasting
to Malaysia and Singapore 56 hours per week. On oc-
casion, an entire week is devoted to one major subject.
For example, from 4 co 10 October 1972, the VMR devoted
its time exclusively to broadcasting the MCP's New
Constitution.
Since the fall of 1970, Peking has been sanitiz-
ing Radio Peking replays of VMR broadcasts, editing
out derogatory references to the Malaysian leaders by
name. But this effort to improve the diplomatic image
to foreign audiences has not changed the nature of the
broadcasts of the VMR which are beamed into Malaysia
and Singapore. These broadcasts continue to direct the
insurgents to sustain their "armed struggle" in a pro-
tracted way against government forces.
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In order to increase the mass following of the
MCP, the Chinese have decided to cross ethnic lines
in setting forth their Communist appeals0 It is a
significant fact that PRC-directed VMR broadcasts are
made in three languages -- Chinese, Malay, and Tamil --
with almost equal time to Malay and Chinese Thus
despite the fact that most pro-Communist elements in
West Malaysia .are Chinese, Peking is actively trying
to make inroads among the Malays The strong emphasis
placed on influencing Malays toward the Communist in-
surgency reflects Peking's awareness that the guer-
rilla war cannot expand in a big way in actual ter-
ritory seized without bringing in this dominant
national group.
Peking had been carrying out a policy of unity-
of-all-nationalities in Burma and Thailand to expand
insurgent ranks there, That a similar policy was
operative in Malaysia is indicated by the new appeals
to Malays in the field and in Peking-originated
guidance An example of such guidance is the VMR
editorial of 29 April 1972, later carried by NCNA on
4 May in excerpt form, ieclaring that the MCP is the
real representative of "all nationalities" of the
country. For the most part, however, Malays (in
contrast to the Chinese) have remained impervious
to the influence of such Maoist indoctrination.
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Since the revival of the insurgency in 1968,
Peking has been working to raise the determination
of the fighters to persist in a protracted war.
Morale-building broadcasts are exaggerating the
losses of government units whenever a minor clash
between Malaysian security forces and the MNLA in
border areas occurs. For example, on 3 July 1970,
NCNA, quoting the China-based radio station, VMR, claimed
that the CTs' 12th Regiment had shot down a fighter-
bomber and a helicopter and had damaged another heli-
copter. It also insisted that "the broad masses in
the enemy-occupied areas are waging more extensive armed
struggle in enthusiastic responso to the call of the
MCP."
The VMR continues to call for the "overthrow"
of the government, to declare Mao's road to be the
"only" one to attain power, and to remind MCP cadres
that they "mast" sustain their study of Mao's ideology.
In a major editorial greeting the PRC's National Day,
the VMR declared on 30 September 1972 that
Socialist China is an unshakable base
area for the world revolutionw.
From their protracted revolution-
ary practice, the people of our country
have fully realized that to overthrow
an imperialist-colonialipt rule and
their puppets, we must rely only on
arms but not on ballot boxes, as was
pointed out in the important statement
of the Central Committee of the MCP of
25 April 1972 ....
The Razak clique is shouting for the
setting up of a national front, and the
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Lee Kuan Yew clique has been staging
its general elections comedy dramanne,
Their death-bed struggle cannot save
them from their doom?,
We must raise still higher the
great red banner of Marxism-Leninism-
Mao Tsetung Thought, , (emphasis sup-
plied)
Subsequently, the insurgents have been told "to fight
to the end- against the "Razak clique." (VMR broad-
cast of 4 November 1972)
Separating diplomacy out fromlPeking's dual
policy of diplomacy insurgency has been the task of
Chou En-lai, who skillfully accentuated the positive
during the May 1971 visit of the Malaysian trade
delegation to Peking. Stressing diplomacy, Chou
seemed to accept Malaysia as one country: he was the
first Chinese leader to drop the usage, "Malaya," which
had implied Peking's insistence (since the formation
of Malaysia as a Federation in 1963) that it was still
unacceptable as a single new state,. Chou tried to stay
away from explicit and unequivocal statements regard-
ing the insur encv half of Pekin 's olic toward
Malaysia.
Actually, Chou's acceptance of Malaysia as a
single country was only a dialectical tactic, to use
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t Er
CCP language. Peking does not accept the existence
of Malaysia. Chinese maps in 1965 did not show a
federated Malaysia, but rather depicted Malaya as
a separate country in the west and Sarawak and Sabah
(i.e., most of North Borneo) as still under colonial
rule in the east. Peking's new World Atlas, published
in February 1972 by the PRC's Cartographic Institute
and therefore representing the official view, con
tinues this policy. Tt adheres to the pre-1963 name
of "Malaya" on its map pages, and in the commentary
accompanying the maps, the relevant section is called
"Malaya." It also maintains ambiguity about whether
Singapore is now an independent country or part of
Malaya. Singapore is discussed under the "Malaya"
section of the commentary, and on the map pages,
it is divided from "Malaya" by a regional rather
than an international boundary. More importantly,
the commentary carries forward Peking's policy of
supporting the insurgency, declaring in the Nalaya"
section that "on 1 February 1949, a national libera-
tion army was established under the leadership of
the Malayan Communist Party; it actively began a
people's armed struggle."
I the VMR attacked
"Razak and his ilk? (VMR broadcast of 28 August 1971).
Similar attacks against the Malaysian leader have
been continued by the Chinese-run clandestine radio.
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Keeping any improvement in diplomatic or trade
relations as a separate matter, which will not effect
support for the insurgency, Peking had its NCNA publish
two articles, one on insurgency in West Malaysia and
the other on terrorist actions in East Malaysia (North
Borneo), using the PRC-based 1/MR as the source of the
commentaries. There have been small steps toward im-
proving relations. For example, a ping-pong delegation
was sent to Peking in mid-August 1972, the PRC ambas-
sador in Rangoon attended the Malaysian National Day
reception there on 31 August, and PRC central media
avoided any mention of greetings from the MCP during
the 1 October Natj.onal Day celebrations in Peking.
Nevertheless, the Chinese have not disengaged from
support of the insurgency.
Most recently, they again have refused to
disavow support of the MCP-led insurgents. In the
course of this refusal, Chinese officials showed subtlety
in trying to equate the anti-Razak broadcasts with the
non-subversive, non-hostile, and non-revolutionary prac-
tices of most Western countries in disseminating religious
and political views abroad. They adopted the tactic
of making analogies where, in fact, sharp contrasts
_xist. Their analogy-making procedure avoided all
mention of the hostile nature of almost every VMR
broadcast beamed into Malaysia which attack the
domestic and foreign policies of Prime Minister Razak,
as well as the Prime Minister personally as a "fascist
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dictator." More importantly, their procedure was
an effort to conceal the revolutionary-subversive
intent of the broadcasts -- namely, to provide guid-
ance and to encourage the insurgents to do a profes-
sional job of expanding their armed units and the
territory they hold.
Devite the fact that the only condition
Malaysia placed on establishing relations with
Peking was that the PRC renounce its support of
the MCP, in late November 1972 such a promise was
not given.
The Secretary General of the Malaysian Ministry
of Foreign Affairs told the US ambassador in Kuala
Lumpur on 7 December 1972 that during his November talks
with Chou, Chou reviewed the PRC position on the MCP
in historical perspective, saying that China indeed
supported the MCP in its struggle against British im-
perialism. PRC support continued today as a matter
of ideology -- Chou depicted it as "akin to religion" --
to provide moral support for other socialist movements.
Chou went on to say that this continued support should
not be a matter of concern for Kuala' Lumpur because
China would limit such support to the propaganda level.
China would not engage in direct support of subversion
against the Malaysian government. Chou also said that
he was sure that this problem could be arranged between
the two countries in a mutually satisfactory way. It
is possible that Chou was hinting at a deal whereby Kuala
Lumpur would agree to recognize the PRC as the only
government of China at the price of Peking ceasing its
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VMR broadcasts into Malaysia. It is more likely, how-
ever, that Chou's remark was intended to increase the
optimism of Kuala Lumpur about an end to Chinese sup-
port in order to combat the retarding effect on im-
proved relations of counsel given Razak by Djakarta,
Bangkok, and Manila. This would mean a greater in-
clination in Kuala Lumpur to further improve relations
without, beforehand, attaining a PRC promise to end
insurgency-support.
In effect, as late as November 1972, Chinese
officials explicitly refused to disavow support for
wars of "national liberation," stating to Malaysian
officials that support in the form of radio broadcasts
and sympathy "would continue." This Chinese position
was a direct rebuff to an explicit Malaysian request
for an end to PRC insurgency-support.
The insurgents in Malaysia are not yet in a
general offensive stage. They are intensively work-
ing mainly on establishing more bases and recruiting
personnel. NCNA broadcasts (as well as the VMR) have
noted this situation, reflecting an awareness in
Peking that the MNLA still represents a small insurgency
by contrast with the Malaysian security forces in
northern West Malaysia. Possibly in the ne.:1 year or
two, the MNLA will resort to more offensive forays from
base areas. Chinese political and radio propaganda
support continues, and most likely will continue, at
least until Mao dies.
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East: North Borneo
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Peking keeps its political support of the insurg-
ency in West Malaysia separate from its support of the
even smaller terrorist operations of Communists in "North
Kalimantan" -- the name Peking uses for North Borneo,
consisting of Sarawak and Sabah in East Malaysia. The
Chinese leaders were forced to a decision in 1963 when
"North Kalimantan" became part of the new Malaysia Federa-
tion: to accept the coalescence of the new Malaysia and
encourage the Sarawak Communists to coalesce into one
party with the MCP or to follow Sukarno's "confronta-
tion" policy of opposing the union of "North Kalimantan"
with Malaysia and thereby keeping the Sarawak Communists
apart from the MCP. In deciding upon the latter course,
the Chinese leaders in 1964 established in Peking a
front, the North Kalimantan National Liberation League,
led by Sarawak Communists. Peking media thereafter
touted the small insurgency in broadcasts as a revolu-
tionary "armed struggle" distinct from MCP operations.
The Sarawak Communists, desiring independence from
Indonesia as well as from Malaysia, have also kept clear
of-subordination to the Indonesian Communist Party.
Until recently, the Chinese have equivocated on
the matter of the existence or non-existence of a
separate, independent "North Kalimantan Communist Party."
a
Sarawak Communist party had been established in January
1968 and that its party constitution exists as well
as its covert apparatus. The Chinese now seem willing
to recognize the party. Their Yunnan-based VMR during
the period between 2 and 12 December 1972 for the first
time referred to the "North Kalimantan Communist Party,"
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suggesting Peking's apparent view that the Sarawak'
insurgents are somewhat more unified than previously
and should be encouraged further to tighten up their
organization.
Chinese support of the North Kalimantan guer-
rillas -- the Sarawak Communist Organization (SCO), a
name used for convenience in referring to them -- con-
sists of political guidance and encouragement. Ever
since the formation of Malaysia in 1963, the Chinese
have housed and used various Sarawak Communist leaders
and "front" leaders in Peking. The journal of the
North Kalimantan National Liberation League, Liberation
News, is printed in China. In the fall of 1965, when
the Indonesianarmy began a large-scale annihilation
of Communists and suspected Communists, remnants of
the Sarawak guerrillas moved across the border into
the nearby jungles of East Malaysia, and the Chinese
supported their cause. But systematic political
guidance and encouragement did not begin until the start
of Mao's Cultural Revolution.
The new, systematic stage of Chinese guidance and
encouragement began on 9 July 1966. On that da a
North Kalimantan client of the Chinese
/called for the
guerrillas to
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(1) "take up arms" in order to attain
"national liberation" io
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(2) "fully mobilize the masses of
peasants" of various "nation-
alities" (rather than almost ex-
clusively rallying local Chinese),
(3) "unite" all the "classes and
nationalities" that can be united,
(4) "expose" the "reactionary" nature
of the "ruling clioue,"
(5) "wage the people's war," and
(6) "persist in self-reliance."
This Peking initiative was given additional force with-
in one month. Another North Kalimantan client of the
Chinese was used by them to make a declaration from
Shanghai on 9 August 1966.
We must wage a people's war in accord-
ance with Mao Tse-tung's strategy and
tactics for guerrilla war. In pa74ti-
cular, we must do mass work and rely
on local armed units and militia.
The Chinese used these two men to fire the opening shot
in order to revive the small insurgency. By means of
such programmatic instructions, the Chinese helped move
the insurgency into a new stage, stressing the serious
matters of the need to work with the populace, of the
need for increased discipline and political commitment,
and of the need for military professionalism.
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The North Kalimantan guerrillrs began to in-
doctrinate their rank and file. Peking later stated
that the North Kalimantan "People's Armed Forces" had
"initiated a movement to study and apply, creatively,
Chairman Mao's brilliant writings," especially those
which insisted that real revolutionaries can win
against the worst odds. (NCNA article of 28 December
1968) The guerrillas "study Mao Tsetung thought in
the course of their war, use it to review and sum up
the practice of their struggle, and raise their under-
standing steadily," (NCNA article of 2 November 1969)
Thus despite the small size of the insurgency, the
Chinese were determined to help the guerrillas disci-
pline their ranks and deepen their political commit-
ment so that the movement would not sputter and die.
Most of the weapons held by men in the field
in this North Borneo mini-insurgency have been stolen,
and there is no reliable evidence of outside sources
of arms, ammunition, or other supplies, Their groups
still are not big enough to combine into a guerrilla
army ?hich could mount a sustained insurgency. However,
from 1971 to the spring of 1972 their numbers have
increased from 500 to about 1,000, Peking broadcasts
since 1969 have been stressing the need to gain sup-
port of minority nationalities. The SCO has made some
progress in recruiting among the Ibans -- a non-Malay
tribal group which, together with local Chinese, pro-
vides areas of sanctuary for the terrorists when
hounded by Malaysian government security forces, They
do not seem to have a disciplined political organization.
They do not have an intensive military trAining program
or permanent base areas, as do the CTs in West Malaysia.
However, they are troublesome enough to have impelled
Malaysian authorities to launch counterinsurgency opera-
tions against them, draining off some security fortes
from West Malaysia,
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In recent years, both the VMR and Radio Peking
have referred more and more to the North Kalimantan
People's Armed Forces and have virtually dropped fefer-
ences to the front of the Sarawak Communists since 1969.
As in the case of Burma, Thailand, and West Malaysia,
great stress has been placed on building up contacts
with "all" nationalities (rather than keeping the
insurgency exclusively ethnic Chinese). But since
permanent "base areas" apparently do not exist in
Sarawak yet, such areas are not mentioned in broadcasts,
although "mass work" reportedly has opened up some safe-
havens among the "various nationalities." An NCNA
article of 23 February 1972, which claimed that the
People's Armed Forces have existed since 1965, discussed
SCO areas of operations without claiming the establish-
ment of "base areas" -- presumably a future target for
the SCO. For the present, friendly zones were adequate.
In the course of protracted revo-
lutionary struggle, the People's Armed
Forces have done mass work apart from
fighting. Thus they have established
close relations with the masses of
people of various nationalities like
those of fish to water. The commanders
and combatants of the People's Forces
frequently go to the areas of various
nationalities to live and labor together
with the local people. They give medical
treatment to the sick, concern themselves
with the well-being of the masses, and
propagate revolutionary truth among them.
Not a few of the people have rendered
support and protection to the People's
Armed Forces, disregarding ti.eir own
safety and even sacrificing their own
lives. Whenever the reactionary troops
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and police came to launch "encirclement
and suppression" operations, the people
passed on information to the People's
Forces and rendered them all kinds of
support so that they could know the
enemy's movements and, using flexible
tactics, attack the enemy
The article claims that the insurgents are improving
their military and political training, studying "people's
war" doctrine -- Mao's, by implication -- in order to
"enhance their combat capability." As for the goals
of the "protracted" war, the article maintains Peking's'
ambiguity, saying only that the "revolution" in North
Kalimantan should succeed but making no mention as to
who is to be overthrown and whether it is independence
that is to be attained.
The insurgents in Sarawak and farther south in
the western portion of Borneo (Kalimantan) apparently
are still avoiding use of the phrase, "Communist Party,"
to depict their organization. The ambiguity of whether
they are a separate "Communist Party" in a separate
country or part of the larger MCP is being sustained.
The insurgents may have banded together in a new
organization to im rove their internal control structure
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The Peking-run VMR continues to broa cast on evelopments
in the insurgency in east Malaysia, and it is likely
that these broadcasts as well as those of Radio Peking
are monitored and utilized by the guerrillas.
As in other cases of Peking's support for in-
surgency in Southeast Asia, there is today a clash
between insurgency-support and diplomatic-advance in
PRC policy. On the one hand, Peking's propaganda
implies that liberation or independence from the
Malaysian Federation is a demand of Sarawak Communists,
that that is what they are fighting for, and that that
is what the Chinese leaders are supporting. On the
other hand, for diplomacy purposes, Chou En-lai in May
1971 made reference to "Malaysia." This implied that
Peking accepts the permanency and territorial integrity
of the Federation as one state formed in 1963. This
two-level policy of both insurgency-support and diplo-
macy shows no signs of ending.
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