THE SOVIET HELICOPTER INDUSTRY: DEVELOPMENT AND PROSPECTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00313R000300110007-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 9, 2009
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: December 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
The Soviet Helicopter
Industry: Development
and Prospects
NGA Review Complete
Secret
SOV 84-10205X
SW 84-10102X
December 1984
copy 415
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~'`^~f Directorate of
o- Intelli
gence
The Soviet Helicopter
Industry: Development
and Prospects
This paper was written by Office
of Soviet Analysis, and Office of
Scientific and Weapons Research. Comments and
queries are welcome and may be addressed to the
Chief, Defense Industries Division, SOYA, on
Secret
SOV 84-10205X
SW 84-10102X
December 1984
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Summary
Information available
as of 27 November 1984
was used in this report.
and Prospects
The Soviet Helicopter
Industry: Development
of all Soviet helicopters produced over the last three decades.
Since its founding under great pressure from Stalin in the late 1940s, the
Soviet helicopter industry has produced approximately 23,000 helicopters
and overseen production of roughly 5,000 more in Poland. Nearly all of
these helicopters were designed by the Mil or Kamov design bureaus, the
latter occupying a small niche in the industry, mostly designing special-
purpose helicopters for the Navy. Initially, the Soviets built most of their
transport helicopters to move civilian personnel and equipment to remote
areas of the USSR. Since the mid-1960s, however, military transport and
attack applications have become dominant: the military received only
about 25 percent of the helicopters produced in 1965, but by the early
1980s the military received approximately 90 percent. Three of the 17
helicopter models-the MI-2 light transport, the MI-8 medium transport,
and the MI-24 attack helicopter-have accounted for roughly 60 percent
The Soviets have several helicopters which are in late stages of develop-
ment and probably will satisfy their needs through much of the 1990s.
These include:
? The Havoc, a Mil-designed attack helicopter and probably the first
Soviet class to have a forward-looking infrared (FLIR) target acquisition
system that should allow it to maneuver safely in bad weather and
engage targets at night.
? The Hokum, a Kamov-designed attack helicopter whose configuration
and performance suggest it may be used, at least in part, for air-to-air
combat.
? The Sokol, designed jointly by Soviet and Polish engineers, as a light-to-
medium replacement for the MI-4 transport helicopter.
? A medium transport the Soviets are
developing to supplement and eventually replace the 1960s-vintage MI-8.
this helicopter uses tilt-rotors, it will undoubt-
lags five to 10 years behind the United States'.
edly be able to fly substantially farther and faster than the MI-8.
Even though early Soviet scientists were pioneers of helicopter technology,
analysis of these systems suggests that the USSR's helicopter industry now
develop other helicopters, in addition to those for the Navy.
the dominant design bureau, even though Kamov is demonstrating it can
In the 1990s the Soviet helicopter industry will concentrate on assimilating
the production of basic helicopter models now in testing and on incorporat-
ing product improvements. As these new models are assimilated, we believe
overall helicopter production will expand. Mil will probably continue to be
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Soviet aircraft plants still emphasize labor-intensive methods and conven-
tional materials, suggesting that assimilation of new helicopters incorporat-
ing more advanced technology and materials is likely to be a challenge.
Therefore, producers are more likely than before to emphasize retooling
instead of plant expansion to manufacture new models. If this occurs,
construction at helicopter plants is less likely to be as reliable an indicator
of new helicopter production as it has been in the past.
Helicopters being designed now for introduction in the 1990s will be based
on early-to-mid-1980s technology. We have little information on how far
Soviet helicopter technology has advanced since the Havoc and Hokum
were conceived, but significant advances have been made in the United
States during the past decade. We believe, therefore, that the five- to 10-
year Soviet helicopter technology lag has not diminished appreciably.
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Summary
Programs and Production
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The Soviet Helicopter
Industry: Development
and Prospects
Development of the Industry
Russian scientists and engineers were leaders in the
early development of helicopter technology. Russian
writings reveal occasional research into the complex-
ities of rotary-wing flight as early as the middle of the
18th century. Although basic research continued spo-
radically, Czarist governments frustrated engineering
development of helicopters and other aircraft by
resorting to Western suppliers of airframe compo-
nents and engines for assembly in Russian factories.
The only exception was Igor Sikorsky's St. Petersburg
plant, dedicated to producing Russian-designed air-
craft. Sikorsky emigrated to the United States in
1919 and subsequently formed the nucleus of the US -
helicopter industry.'
After the Russian revolution, increased support for
aircraft development resulted in what the Soviets
claim to be the world's first flight of a "true"
helicopter in 1929. The helicopter prototype was
assembled by a team that started work in 1925 at the
Central Aerohydrodynamic Institute (TsAGI) in Mos-
cow. By 1940, according to Western literature,
TsAGI personnel had built and tested approximately
15 prototypes, but none of these were ordered into
production.
Stalin's purges and the approach of World War II
sidetracked helicopter development. In the late 1930s
Stalin imprisoned many of the USSR's key aircraft
designers-including several responsible for helicop-
ter development. TsAGI also cut back helicopter
design work to concentrate on development of fixed-
wing aircraft, which were believed to afford a more
immediate military application. After the institute's
relocation to Novosibirsk, few helicopter prototypes
were tested through the duration of the war. Even at
the close of the war Stalin's efforts to exploit 'German
know-how and equipment allegedly afforded little
benefit to Soviet helicopter designers because fighters,
bombers, and rockets received higher priority. By
contrast, Igor Sikorsky built and tested the first US
helicopter in 1939, and by the early 1940s the United
States was mass-producing light reconnaissance and
transport helicopters for the military.
Possibly impressed by the rapid Western advances, 25X1
the USSR moved quickly and forcefully to spur
helicopter development. Near the end of the war,
Stalin ordered a handful of key TsAGI designers to
set up experimental design bureaus (OKBs). Although
TsAGI continued to design helicopters through the
late 1940s, OKBs headed by Alexander Yakovlev,
Nikolai Kamov, and Mikhail Mil soon eclipsed the
institute and formed the nucleus of the modern Soviet
helicopter industry. Kamov's and Yakovlev's first
known designs-respectively, the KA-8, popularly
dubbed a flying motorcycle, and the YAK-100-were
not serially produced. According to Soviet literature,
Mil's first helicopter-the three-seat MI-1-was test-
ed only nine months after Stalin ordered it developed
in 1948, and it became the first Soviet helicopter to be
produced in large numbers
Still dissatisfied in 1951, according to published
Western sources, Stalin summoned the three helicop-
ter designers to the Kremlin, accused them of ignoring
the potential of the helicopter, and claimed that
Soviet helicopter development had fallen too far be-
hind that of the United States. The next day he
ordered Mil to design a 12-passenger helicopter and
Yakovlev to design a 24-seat craft-both within one
year.
virtually unlimited funds were allocated, personne
were increased severalfold, the workday extended
from eight to 12 hours, and engineers and workers
paid double wages. In touring the OKB's engineering
spaces, after he was ordered to supervise the project,
KGB chief Lavrentiy Beriya would ask what worker
had distinguished himself and then hand the "innova-
tor" a wad of bills on the spot. Under these conditions,
the OKB completed the first preproduction prototype
of the MI-4 medium transport helicopter in just seven
months.
The Mil OKB's success with the MI-4 established it
as the leading Soviet helicopter design authority, a
position it subsequently strengthened. In the mid-
1950s, Yakovlev ceased helicopter development to
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Mikhail Mil: Father of the Modern
Soviet Helicopter Industry
Figure 1
Growth of Research and Development Facilities
At the Mil and Kamov Design Bureaus, 1963-83
0 1963 65 67 69 71 73 75 77 79 81 83
Mikhail Mil graduated from the Novocherkassk
Aviation Institute in 1931 and subsequently was
employed in research on helicopter aerodynamics. In
1947, Stalin ordered him to become the chief design-
er of a newly created experimental design bureau for
helicopters. Under his leadership, the bureau devel-
oped a greater variety of helicopters than either the
Kamov or Yakovlev design bureaus, and Mil helicop-
ters soon accountedfor the majority of Soviet heli-
copter production. Mil was highly effective in mobi-
lizing resources to meet program deadlines.
Mikhail Mil is said to
have coined this guidance for subordinates: "Make it
simple, make it reliable, make it rugged, and make it
work. 1
concentrate on fixed-wing aircraft. Kamov main-
tained efforts to offer a range of helicopters, but
unsuccessful competition with Mil forced Kamov's
retrenchment by the late 1950s into a small niche in
the industry-mostly development of special-purpose
coaxial helicopters for shipboard use.' Mil's success
Z Helicopters based on ships must be compact, to take up minimal
flight deck and hangar space. The short tail boom without a tail
rotor, a feature characteristic of the coaxial system, allows them to
meet the space requirement. All but one of Kamov's helicopters
that were serially produced have been used by the Soviet Navy. F
allegedly stemmed in part from his single-minded
determination to meet customers' performance re-
quirements and program deadlines, the classic charac-
teristic of the conservative Soviet weapon designer
(see inset, "Mikhail Mil: Father of the Modern Soviet
Helicopter Industry"). The Mil OKB's dominance has
persisted into the 1980s, after Mil's death and re-
placement by Marat Tischenko in 1970 and Kamov's
death and replacement by Sergey Mikheyev in 1971.
since 1963, Mil
facilities have grown at a rate unprecedented for
Soviet design bureaus, while the Kamov facilities have
stagnated (see figure 1).
The Mil and Kamov design bureaus rely on a variety
of R&D organizations to support helicopter develop-
ment, most of them located in the Moscow area (see
figure 2). Four leading aviation industry research
institutes work on basic helicopter technologies:
TsAGI on airframe design; the Central Institute for
Aviation Motor Building (TsIAM) on small air-
breathing engines; the All Union Institute for Avia-
tion Materials (VIAM) on high-strength, lightweight
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Figure 2
Soviet Helicopter Research and Development Facilities and Manufacturing Plants
Rostov
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Kramov DesiBureau
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Mil Tes rrea MiI,E ape mental
Lvubertsv.
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materials; and the Scientific Research Institute of
Aviation Technology (NIAT) on manufacturing
equipment and new production processes. Numerous
design bureaus develop key subsystems, such as the
Izotov and Soloviev bureaus for engines. Mil's own
facilities are located on Rybinskaya Street (design), in
Tomilino (assembly and test of prototypes), in Lyu-
bertsy (tests), and in Bykovo (ground tests of propul-
sion and fuselage components). Kamov's facilities are
located at Lyubertsy (design and assembly of proto-
types) and the Primorskiy Heliport on the Black Sea
(tests). Although probably more than 100 organiza-
tions participate in helicopter development, the Mil
and Kamov bureaus-as general designers-are held
responsible for ensuring that the final product meets
the customers' performance specifications.
Since the early 1950s the Mil and Kamov design
bureaus, reflecting longstanding relationships com-
mon in the Soviet defense industry, have generally
used different helicopter production facilities. Mil
helicopters are produced at Ulan Ude Airframe Plant
99, Arsenyev Airframe Plant 116, Kazan Airframe
Plant B-387, and Rostov Airframe Plant 168, the
largest Soviet helicopter production plant. Kamov
helicopters are produced at the Kumertau Airframe
Plant, the smallest and newest Soviet helicopter plant.
In 1963, helicopter plants accounted for roughly 10
percent of Soviet aircraft assembly floorspace. Since
then, floorspace at Soviet helicopter plants has grown
at about 4.6 percent per year, compared to about 1.9
percent for fighters and 2.7 percent for bombers and
transports combined. As a result, the share of helicop-
ter production floorspace in the Soviet aircraft indus-
try rose to approximately 14 percent in the early
1980s.'
The Transportation Equipment Works in Swidnik,
Poland, also produces Mil-designed helicopters and
has, in effect, become an adjunct to the Soviet
helicopter industry. Manufacture of Soviet helicopters
began in Poland during 1955, when some MI-1 light
helicopter production was transferred from the USSR
to Swidnik. This plant supplies all the light helicopters
Soviet Control Over the Polish Helicopter
Industry: The Swidnik Plant
The Polish Transportation Equipment Works, the
only non-Soviet Warsaw Pact facility manufacturing
a Soviet-designed helicopter, has been producing the
the Soviets control production schedul-
ing and the terms of sale:
? The USSR buys approximately 280 of the 300
MI-2s produced each year.
? The prices set by the Soviets do not cover Polish
production costs.
By relying on the increasingly antiquated Polish plant
to supply their requirements for this simple system,
the Soviets have been able to forgo MI-2 production
and modernize their own plants for newer, more
sophisticated helicopters.
Inadequate investment in the Swidnik plant also
strengthens the Soviet hand by frustrating Polish
desires to earn hard currency by exporting helicop-
ters. During the 1970s, the Poles wanted to export the
MI-2, but it used too much fuel to be competitive in
used by the Warsaw Pact (except Romania).' Main-
taining the late-1950s-vintage MI-2 in production for
' Another East European plant, located in Bravsov, Romania, also
builds helicopters. These helicopters-the Alouette III and Puma-
were designed by the French firm Aerospatiale and are produced
under license. The helicopters are deployed in the Romanian Air
Force but are not exported to the USSR or any other Warsaw Pact
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so long has impaired modernization of the plant and
has afforded the Soviets considerable control over
plant operations (see inset, "Soviet Control Over the
Polish Helicopter Industry: The Swidnik Plant").
Programs and Production
We have identified 23 major Soviet helicopter devel-
opment programs since the late 1940s, all but two of
them undertaken by the Mil or Kamov design bu-
reaus. Seventeen of these helicopters were serially
produced, usually in several variants, accounting for
estimated cumulative production of about 23,000
Soviet helicopters. About 5,000 Soviet-designed light
helicopters also were produced in Poland. Three of the
23 identified programs were canceled, but the pattern
of design bureau activity and helicopter designators
suggests that additional programs were commissioned
and aborted before production, especially in the 1940s
and 1950s. Figure 7 (a foldout) presents the helicop-
ters, their mission, and our estimates of development
and production periods and total production (see inset,
"The Soviet Helicopter Development Process").
Development efforts in the 1950s concentrated on
increasing carrying capacity and improving the oper-
ating efficiency of general purpose transport helicop-
ters. The first generation of Mil, Kamov, and Yakov-
lev helicopters-the MI-1, MI-4, KA-8, KA-10,
KA-15, KA-18, YAK-100, and YAK-24-all used
piston engines. Total annual production of these
piston-engine models rose throughout the decade,
reaching an estimated 800 to 1,000 helicopters per
year by the late 1950s.
Even as production of these systems grew, designers
at Mil were applying turboshaft engine technology to
the first of the next generation of helicopters, the
heavy-lift MI-6, then the world's largest helicopter.
Subsequent adaptation of the turboshaft engine to the
light MI-2 and medium MI-8 helicopters afforded
substantial improvement over their piston-engine
predecessors in range, payload, and operating ceiling.
The move to turboshaft engine technology also con-
tributed to the 1950s restructuring of the Soviet
helicopter industry: Kamov's first attempt with a
turboshaft engine-the heavy-lift KA-22-lost out in
Figure 3
Soviet Helicopter Production, 1965-83
In the 1960s, helicopters became established in vari-
ous civilian and military transport missions. Produc-
tion of Mil's highly successful MI-2 and MI-8 ac-
counted for much of the substantial growth of Soviet
helicopter production through the 1960s and into the
1970s (see figure 3). The two helicopters account for
roughly 50 percent of Soviet helicopters produced
since the early 1950s. Aeroflot used the MI-8 exten-
sively to transport passengers and freight to lightly
populated outposts in Siberia and other remote areas.
The MI-8 also figured prominently in supporting
growing military emphasis on mobility in ground
forces operations.
In the 1960s, Mil and Kamov also were expanding the
horizon of helicopter applications, pursuing develop-
ment of systems for military ground attack and naval
missions. Development of the MI-24 Hind, the Sovi-
ets' first multirole battlefield helicopter, was spurred
a competition with the MI-6.
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The Soviet Helicopter Development Process
We estimate Soviet development periods by combin-
ing our analyses of fragmentary evidence on individ-
ual programs with our understanding of the Soviets'
highly standardized development process. The pro-
cess (see table) begins with the issue of a Tactical
Technical Requirement (TTT) by the Ministry of
Defense to the Ministry of the Aviation Industry
(MAP). MAP in turn issues the TTT to the helicopter
design bureau it believes to be most capable of
successfully fulfilling the requirement. The TTT
specifies the helicopter's intended role and desired
performance characteristics.
The helicopter's design is elaborated through several
stages:
? The bureau prepares an Advanced Design, which
outlines those TTT requirements that the bureau
believes it can meet and illustrates the proposed
general configuration of the helicopter. Subsequent
negotiations culminate in a government decree and
Technical Assignment (TZ), documents that offi-
cially authorize the development program and pro-
vide funding through flight-testing. The Technical
Proposal provides additional detail governing
agreed technical specifications.
? During Concept Design (Eskizny Proyekt)-trans-
lated as concept, preliminary, or draft design, the
bureau undertakes or commissions design work on
the fuselage, transmission, avionics, weapons,
in part by the effectiveness of US attack helicopters in
Vietnam. Able to carry up to 28 troops as well as
deliver weapons, the Hind set a number of speed
records in the early 1970s and has been highly
effective in Afghanistan. We estimate that about
2,600 MI-24s have been produced, roughly 10 percent
of cumulative Soviet helicopter production. Kamov, in
turn, concentrated on developing ship-based helicop-
ters with coaxial-rotor systems. Kamov's major 1960s
development-the KA-25 ASW helicopter-was not
judged to be highly effective by Western analysts
because of its limited range and sensor capabilities.
and engines and fabricates scale mockups of the
helicopter and components. Designs and mockups
are reviewed by the ministry, the customer, and a
research institute.
? After official approval, solutions to any remaining
engineering problems are worked out in Technical
Design.
? Complete blueprints and material and production
technology specifications are completed in Working
Design.
Fabrication of helicopter prototypes consumes con-
siderable resources. The first prototypes manufac-
tured at an experimental plant undergo both static
and flight-testing. If successful, additional helicop-
ters are manufactured at the intended series produc-
tion plant. Following state acceptance tests, the heli-
copter enters trial production
When the Soviets commit a developmental helicopter
to series production, they authorize the capital ex-
pansion and tooling necessary to assimilate the de-
sign into production. This usually occurs at the end
of Technical Design. Expansion of a helicopter pro-
duction facility therefore normally indicates that a
new or substantially modified helicopter is scheduled
to enter production. On average, construction of new
floorspace at helicopter plants begins five to seven
years before the start of series production.
In the 1970s, Soviet helicopter designers undertook
development of an array of new systems that incorpo-
rated significant advances in key subsystems. Proba-
bly as a result of growing sophistication and complex-
ity, development time has increased from the six to
seven years characteristic of the 1950s and 1960s to
10 or more years:
? The Mil bureau developed the MI-26 as a replace-
ment for the MI-6, with considerable assistance
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Soviet Helicopter Development Stages Impact of Western Technology: The MI-26 Halo
When the MI-26 was unveiled for the first time in the
West at the June 1981 Paris Air Show, some analysts
were intrigued by the main rotor gearbox. Generally,
Soviet transmissions do not match the performance of
W
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ecause t
ey are
eav
er-a
verse
y
Tactical Technical Require- Ministry of Defense defines opera-
ment (TTT) tional requirements for new affecting power-to-weight ratios. The new transmis-
helicopter sion in the MI-26, however, weighs about the same as
Advanced Design Design bureau creates conceptual
designs and illustrations
Technical Assignment (TZ) Government and client authorize
development program and funding
through flight test
Technical Proposal Bureau elaborates requirements
not shown in TZ
Concept Design Bureau documents basic design,
commissions subsystem develop-
ment, and builds full-scale mock-
up
Technical Design Design is elaborated and finalized
Working Design and Pilot Bureau produces working draw-
Model Production ings, fabricates prototypes, and
completes static tests. Flight tests
begin
Pilot Lot Production Helicopter production plant manu-
factures prototypes for test
Plant produces batch under serial
production conditions
from acquired Western technology (see inset, "Im-
pact of Western Technology: The MI-26 Halo").5
the Mil design
bureau is routinely supplied with Western compo-
nents and US design information, which benefit all -
Mil development work.) Other Mil helicopters, or
Mil-inspired Polish helicopters, are still in
development.
? The Kamov bureau developed the KA-27 ASW
helicopter, a substantial improvement over the
KA-25, and also has a system in development.
Production trends demonstrated the dominance of the
Mil bureau, as it accounted for roughly 90 percent of
'The MI-26, with load-carrying capability one-third greater than
that of the largest Western helicopter (the US CH-53E), has set
the one in the MI-6, yet it transmits twice the power.
Tischenko-leader of the Mil OKB-claimed that
his bureau developed the gearbox indigenously.
ment and production of the gearbox were greatly
aided by Western technology.
the Soviets bought
prototype plant in Tomilino.
computer software and capital equipment from a US
firm for designing and building prototypes of the
MI-26 transmission. The software sold to the Soviets
enabled Mil to compute better estimates of gear
engagements and stresses, as well as geometric sur-
faces and tooth profiles. Software was also provided
that helped the bureau select and set up production
tooling. In addition, the Soviets purchased one spiral
bevel gear cutting machine that was installed in the
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the Western technology was 25X1
used to make spiral bevel gears for the main rotor,
intermediate, and tail rotor gearboxes. Forward and
aft right-angle reduction gears in the main gearbox 25X1
are spiral bevels as well as several others in the tail
shaft reduction system. The Tomilino plant also
fabricated all of the other gears in these transmis-
sions using equipment acquired from West German
and Swiss companies.
Without the Western technology,
Mil would have been unable to meet the minimum
payload requirement specified by the Ministries of
Defense and Aviation Industry.
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all helicopters produced during 1965 to 1983. The
number of military customers also grew, up from
nearly 25 percent of the market in the mid-1960s to
approximately 90 percent in the early 1980s. Overall,
we estimate the Soviets have produced about 16,000
helicopters domestically since 1964, second only to
US production of more than 20,000 over the same
period
Soviet helicopters now in production are relatively
simple to manufacture, and long production runs
afford major economies. Analysis of helicopters now
deployed indicates that they would be about a third
less expensive to manufacture in the United States
than are Western designs for comparable missions.'
This economy is a result of the Soviets' generally
conservative design strategy and emphasis on incre-
mental modernization and improvement between
successive generations. We believe the more substan-
tial advances incorporated in the systems now in
development will drive costs up at a more rapid rate
than the Soviets experienced with earlier helicopter
advances. This would be in line with the major cost
increases associated with the newest generation of
fixed-wing aircraft.
Helicopters in Development
Three Soviet helicopters are in late stages of develop-
ment-attack helicopters designated Havoc and Ho-
kum by NATO and the Sokol W-3, a light-to-medium
transport helicopter to be built in Poland. All are now
undergoing flight tests, and we estimate that each
should reach initial operational capability by the late
1980s. These systems, along with the MI-26 heavy-lift
transport and KA-27 ASW helicopter that recently
entered production, will fulfill all basic helicopter
missions except for those of the medium-lift general
purpose transport and light observation helicopter.
However, analysis of system trends
suggest that a follow-on to the 1960s-vintage
medium MI-8 may be in the early stages of develop-
ment, and Polish statements suggest that Swidnik also
is developing a new light helicopter, possibly a follow-
on to the MI-2.
The Havoc, Hokum, and W-3 incorporate technical
advances over their predecessors in most of their
major subsystems and should afford significantly
improved performance in most respects. Most of the
advances are in electronics and the application of
advanced materials (including composites). Our analy-
sis of these systems-especially the Havoc, for which
we have the most information-suggests that Soviet
helicopter technologies and designs lag US designs by
five to 10 years. The systems in the mid-1970s
incorporate technologies applied in US designs during
the late 1960s (see inset, "The Soviet Lag in Helicop-
ter Technology").
Havoc. The Havoc, carrying the Soviet designator
MI-28, is a dual-engine attack helicopter, probably
equipped with a new target acquisition system but
using a basically conventional airframe. Two Havoc
prototypes with different target acquisition systems
were first observed and photographed during
flight tests (figure 4). As a dedicated attack he icopter,
we believe the Havoc will augment but not totally
replace the multirole Hind
vulnerability.
The Havoc's design, plus advances in key subsystems,
should make it more capable in attack missions than
the Hind. The absence of a cargo bay cuts size and
weight, but the Soviets do not appear to have sought
further reductions with extensive use of components
made from composite materials.' The lighter weight
Havoc, designed for agility, will enable crews to use
low-flying tactics and terrain for cover and thereby
improve firing accuracy and reduce detectability and
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We estimate the USSR lags the United States in
helicopter technology particularly in composite ma-
terials, small turboshaft engines, and advanced ther-
mal-imaging equipment-by five to 10 years. We base
this judgment on a comparison of these subsystem
technologies incorporated in Soviet and US helicop-
ters now in flight-testing.
Composite airframe components have outstanding
resistance to fatigue and have strength-to-weight ra-
tios better than those of aluminum, steel, or titanium.
An important exception is compos-
ite blade construction; the USSR is perfecting the
capability to construct composite rotor blades with
performance comparable to that of US blades.
Small, lightweight helicopter turboshaft engines are
capable of higher turbine temperatures and pressure
ratios, thereby increasing power and reducing fuel
consumption.
the USSR is developing these engines but is 25X1
considerably behind the United States because of
difficulty in manufacturing hot-section components,
such as combustors and turbine blades, vanes, and
disks. The Soviets-by their own admission-are
nearly a decade behind in applying mass production
technologies for some of these components.
Thermal-imaging devices used in target acquisition
and night-vision systems permit helicopters to fly
close to the ground and engage targets at night
without artificial illumination. The USSR lacks ade-
quate manufacturing technology to support large-
scale production of silicon crystal components and
solid-state electronics used in these devices.
the USSR is expected to deploy a
new forward-looking infrared (FLIR) system in the
late 1980s, limiting the impact of the US lead.
The US lead in technology has not prevented the
Soviets from deploying systems that equal US system
performance in some characteristics-especially
speed and payload. However, US advances in other
characteristics provide clear advantages-
The Havoc's target acquisition system represents its
major technical advance. The Hind cannot fight
effectively at night because it needs artificial illumi-
nation of targets with flares or floodli hts
The target
acquisition system being tested on the Havoc Al
variant probably uses magnified direct-view optic
equipment-as deployed on the Hind-or a low-light-
level TV. On the basis of analysis of hand-held
photography, we believe the system on the A2 variant
is a FLIR. A FLIR on the Havoc would give it
substantially improved night and bad weather capa-
bility over that demonstrated by the Hind.
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We believe that other Havoc advances will serve to
increase survivability and operating efficiency:
? Vulnerability to enemy fire will be reduced by
engine exhausts that appear to be designed to
suppress emissions that draw heat-seeking missiles
and possibly by the use of composites or higher
strength materials in rotor blades. The metal blades
of the MI-24 frequently collapse when hit once or
twice by bursts from heavy machineguns.
the Moscow Scientific Research
Institute of Light Alloys has been developing rotor
blades using a range of composite materials since
the early 1970s.
? Crew safety and helicopter survivability in a crash
will be enhanced by a new trailing-arm landing
gear. Conventional Soviet landing gears perform
poorly on hard landings.
? Efficiency will be improved by the use of new
engines, with a maximum power rating of 1 200
shaft horsepower (shp), or
1,400 shp, according to Western performance as-
sessments. In either case, evolutionary advances in
engine technology, such as increasing compressor
pressure ratios and higher turbine operating tem-
peratures, probably have resulted in an engine that
has lower specific fuel consumption and higher
power-to-weight ratios than the TV3-117 engines
used in the MI-24.
Advances in design and subsystem technology may
have contributed to delays in the Havoc program.
development proceeded rou-
tinely from about 1975 until about 1980, when two
prototypes were fabricated at Mil's Experimental
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Figure 5. Hokum helicopter
during fliehl-testine- o-
bertsy.
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The Hokum may be capable of several missions, but
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the Havoc suffered an attack helicopter: 25X1
from a serious structural weakness that required the
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bureau to redesign the lower fuselage. The problems
apparently were resolved when we
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a prototype for
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static tests. Iwo months later, we identified a proba-
ble flight test prototype on the ground, F
Barring further delays, we believe the Havoc should
reach initial operating capability by 1987.
will be produced at Arsenyev Airframe Plant 116.
Production for the Ground and Air Forces is likely to
continue through much of the 1990s.
Hokum. The Hokum, carrying an unknown Soviet
designator, is a dual-engine coaxial-rotor helicopter
probably intended for an attack role. We first identi-
fied a Hokum in ground photography during a flight
test in May 1983, and we later observed one in
he Kamov area of the Lyu-
bertsy test center (see figure 5). The Soviets have built
at least two prototypes.
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? A camouflage paint scheme observed on a Hokum 25X1
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helicopter.
? In 1983, Mil-designed helicopters were being tested
with tactical air-to-air and air-to-surface missiles at
Primorskiy, heretofore associated only with Kamov
helicopters. Testing may have been supporting
weapons integration for a Kamov design.
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A naval version, either in an attack role or as an ASW
platform, remains a possibility because of Kamov's
longstanding relationship with naval aviation and
because of the testing at Primorskiy. The Primorskiy
testing with air-to-air missiles, along with a target
acquisition system different from the Havoc's, sug-
gests the Hokum may have a primary air engagement
role as opposed to the Havoc's ground attack role (see
inset, "Tactical Missiles for Soviet Helicopters," F_
We believe the Hokum is comparable with the Havoc
in technology, although we have almost no evidence
on the Hokum's major subsystems. Because both
entered development about the same time and be-
cause of aircraft industry practices, advances from
indigenous research and technologies acquired from
the West probably would have been available to both
bureaus. Moreover, comparison of the bureaus' earlier
helicopters that started development at about the
same time demonstrates use of comparable material
and manufacturing practices.
the Hokum probably has a more
advanced rotor design. Rotor blades swept at the tips
reduce blade drag, noise, and vibration, and the
probable use in each blade of at least one elastomeric
bearing in place of conventional bearings improves
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The MI-24 Hind-the Soviet's most advanced opera-
tional attack helicopter-can engage aircraft using a
nose-mounted Gatling gun and can attack ground
targets with A TGMs, bombs, and rockets. In a
dogfight, the weapon operator must use a Heads-Up-
Display that shows an aiming circle for the gun
corrected for crosswind, target motion, and bullet
drop. In the case of a bomb run, the operator uses the
display, determines bombsight settings, and operates
a bomb release computer, while the pilot keeps the
helicopter on course. Several missiles
may enable Soviet heli-
copters to carry out attacks with more accurate and
probably more easily launched air-to-air missiles
(AAMs) and tactical air-to-surface missiles
(TASMs).
The missiles, ount-
ed on Hip and Hind helicopters, could be new designs
or established models orginally developed for fighter
aircraft. Existing Soviet AAMs and TASMs are
independently guided by infrared, laser, or radar
seekers-allowing the launching aircraft to react
more quickly during combat. While the Soviets may
use AAMs and TASMs on the Hip or Hind, they may
also be used on the KA-27 Helix or the new Havoc or
Hokum.
reliability and maintainability. The blades also proba-
bly are made of composite materials. Our perform-
ance estimates indicate that the Hokum will be faster
than the Havoc and will have impressive maneuver-
ability at high speeds.
Like the Havoc, the Hokum program probably has
taken longer than previous development efforts. We
believe that development probably began in the mid-
1970s, based on the likely availability of Kamov
resources, freed at that time from work on the KA-27.
The Hokum's attack role, unusual for Kamov, along
with its impressive performance, suggests that the
bureau may be making a comeback under chief
designer Sergey Mikheyev. Mikheyev's first effort,
the KA-27 ASW helicopter, was judged by Western
analysts to be a substantial improvement over its
KA-25 predecessor. The Hokum's attack role indi-
cates that the Kamov bureau may be broadening its
customer base, expanding beyond the Navy to also
service the numerically greater demands of the
Ground or Air Forces. Direct competition between
Mil and Kamov would be a departure from Soviet
weapon development practices that have prevailed
since the mid-1960s
.
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W-3. The W-3-called the Sokol by the Warsaw
Pact-is a light- to medium-weight transport helicop- 25X1
ter developed at the Transportation Equipment Works
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specifications or the W-3 in 1974 and oversaw
subsequent development according to standard Soviet
procedures. We believe the W-3 will replace the MI-4
helicopter, which was phased out of production in
1967.
We think the technology incorporated in the W-3 will
be similar to that incorporated in Western helicopters
first deployed in the mid-1970s. The W-3's major
technical advance is use of fiberglass-epoxy compos-
ites in the main rotor, tail rotor, and horizontal
stabilizer. The W-3 will carry about the same payload
as the MI-4, but weight savings and improved engine
efficiency should give it a longer range.
Deficiencies in Soviet support and Polish production
technology have delayed W-3 series production. The
W-3 has been undergoing flight-testing since 1979,
longer than the Havoc or Hokum.
the Poles experienced difficulty in
obtaining from the Soviets the parts and design
assistance needed to fabricate prototypes. Shortcom-
ings in Swidnik manufacturing facilities caused the
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composite rotor blades to be poorly constructed. In
flight-testing, the main rotor blades tended to twist
and eventually break off.
_J the problems with the composite blades were so
serious that the W-3 may be initially certified with
metal blades.
If production technology difficulties have been re-
solved, the Sokol will probably be the first of the
helicopters now in development to be deployed-
probably in 1986. the
maximum production rate will be 300 a year, the
same as for the MI-2. Like the MI-4, the W-3 is likely
to be procured by all major Soviet military services
and sold to selected arms clients
Probable Medium Transport. We believe the Soviets
probably have a program under way to develop a
follow-on to the widely used MI-8 medium transport
helicopter,
Estimated annual
production of the 1960s-vintage MI-8 at Kazan has
declined since the mid-1970s, suggesting the Soviets
plan to cut back the size of the MI-8 fleet and free a
portion of the plant for retooling of a follow-on
system.
We have little firm evidence on the probable design or
technical features of the next generation of medium
transport helicopters
second tilt-rotor craft-designated the MI-32-was
being designed and would be able to carry 30 troops.
The tilt-rotor concept combines the best performance
features of the helicopter and the fixed-wing airplane:
engines and prop-rotors are vertical in the helicopter
mode of operation and are tilted forward in the
airplane mode. Tilt-rotor craft demonstrate roughly
twice the speed and ceiling and three times the range
of a conventional helicopter using the same amount of
fuel.
We believe these efforts represent either authorized
development programs or merely a research project to
demonstrate the feasibility of the new tilt-rotor tech-
required approval by a panel composed of representa-
tives of the Ministry of the Aviation Industry, the
military client, and other technical experts. We be-
lieve that most Soviet programs that are not selected
for series production are terminated at this point.
If the programs had been approved in the late 1970s,
our experience of prior helicopter development sug-
gests that flight-testing would have begun in the early
1980s. US analysts judge that tilt-rotor craft are
within Soviet capabilities; but because the Soviets
frequently use design inheritance,, their responses to
advanced technical challenges like tilt-rotor craft
usually result in prolonged development cycles. Ac-
quisition of mature Western tilt-rotor technology
probably has a high priority.
Prospects
We believe the more advanced helicopters recently
deployed or now in late stages of development will
meet the Soviets' basic helicopter requirements
throughout the mid-1990s, enabling Mil and Kamov
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to concentrate on upgrades and modifications.
Mil plans to develop
a new attack helicopter different from the Havoc, a
small piston-engine trainer, and a replacement for the
MI-10-a version of the MI-6 that can accommodate
especially wide or long cargoes. The Soviets are also
likely to continue evolutionary improvements in other
helicopters, such as the MI-8/MI-17 and the MI-24.
the
Soviets may perceive requirements for improved lift
capabilities, ranges, and weapon suites in these heli-
copters. Improvements could include composite blades
or more advanced versions of the existing engines and
We believe helicopter production will increase over
the next five years as the Havoc, Hokum, and other
new or recently introduced systems are assimilated.
The Mil and Kamov design bureaus also will continue
to grow, but Mil will not sustain the explosive growth
of the 1960s and 1970s. The relative standing of the
bureaus is unlikely to change, although Kamov may
be experiencing a resurgence and broadening of its
customer base. We believe Soviet helicopter assembly
capacity also will grow more slowly than in the past;
of the new helicopters, only the Hokum is likely to be
produced in substantially new facilities. In the indus-
try as a whole, the Soviets will probably place greater
emphasis on retooling existing production facilities. If
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weapons.
Any new systems commissioned for development in
the early 1980s would have been based on then
current Soviet technology and will reach IOC in the
early-to-mid-1990s. Since the Havoc-probably in-
corporating mid-1970s technology-the Soviets have
continued research on major subsystems.
we
judge it unlikely that they have appreciably closed the
five- to 10-year lag in the application of advanced
helicopter technology.
The Soviets' problems in implementing more modest
advances in the Havoc-for example, using composite
materials-make it unlikely that they have since
closed the technology gap. We believe systems reach-
ing IOC in the 1990s will reflect largely evolutionary
advances in technology.
this occurs, construction at helicopter plants is less
likely to be as reliable an indicator of new helicopter
production as it has been in the past.
continuing the pattern of the early 1980s.
similation of future designs disruptive and difficult,
Series production is likely to be the greatest challenge.
The Soviets are moving toward components that
require close tolerances, need state-of-the-art materi-
als processing and coating techniques, and use ad-
vanced testing equipment. Soviet plants-despite the
Soviets' continued acquisition of Western technol-
ogy-will remain deficient in precision-controlled ma-
chine tools and large quantities of sensitive testing
equipment. Such deficiencies probably will make as-
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