WHO'S CALLING THE SHOTS IN MOSCOW?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000900160001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 17, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 9, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/17: CIA-RDP85T00287R000900160001-7
Iq
Duplicate of C05183811: DIF (opted to release
postions)
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/17: CIA-RDP85T00287R000900160001-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/17: CIA-RDP85T00287R000900160001-7
9 September 1983
SUBJECT: Who's Calling the Shots in Moscow?
1. Because the recent KAL shootdown is highly damaging to Soviet world-
wide interests--INF, relations with Japan, etc.,--it has raised questions
regarding civilian-military relations in the USSR and the question of who is
in charge in Moscow. In view of the adverse impact on the Soviet "peace
offensive," does it illustrate an increased influence exerted by the military
in Soviet policymaking circles? Does it reflect an effort by the military to
undercut Politburo decisions--for example, to forestall arms control
initiatives?
2. The majority of Soviet leaders, both civilian and military, have
been willing to see their relations with successive US administrations
deteriorate rather than significantly alter their policies, particularly in
the Third World. US resistance to these policies, including a military
buildup in response to the Soviet defense program, perhaps helps explain the
current testiness of Moscow's behavior in a number of areas. It may well be
that the Soviets would have shot down the Korean airliner even if detente had
been in full bloom. It is easier, however, to act aggressively when there is
not so much to lose, and certainly to react with a maximum of bellicosity
after the event.
3. It is not surprising that the political and military leaders share a
common outlook on the nature of the external environment. It is an outlook
rooted not only in their perceptions of the external world, but also in the
personalities of the current Soviet leaders and in the decisionmaking
structure itself.
Copy 10 of 33
This memorandum was prepared byl Ithe Office
of Soviet Analysis, Current Support Division. It has been coordinated with
the National Intelligence Officer for the USSR and Eastern Europe. Comments
and queries are welcome and should be addressed to Chief, Strategic/Internal
Branch, CSD,
_25X1 25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/17: CIA-RDP85T00287R000900160001-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/17: CIA-RDP85T00287R000900160001-7
I I
4. Two key figures in the formulation of Soviet policies and spokesmen
for the regime are Foreign Minister Gromyko and Defense Minister Ustinov (and
earlier, Marshal Grechko). These leaders have made direct inputs into
Politburo decisions since 1973, and their influence has grown during the past
decade, along with that of their political ally, Andropov. Gromyko, in
particular, has a reputation for obduracy in international affairs, and it is
possible that a good deal of Soviet assertiveness in foreign affairs since
1975 can be attributed to his influence.
5. The military, in the persons of Grechko and then Ustinov, have had
two quite different personalities representing their interests in policymaking
councils in the past decade, and it is not clear that they have both spoken
with equal vigor and effectiveness in defense of the military's needs.
6. Andropov has taken some pains to project an image of flexibility and
"reasonableness" in his approach to international affairs
and certainly has
played a key role in formulating and implementing the USSR's more forward
foreign policy of the past decade. In addition, he must give due account to
the views of his allies, Gromyko and Ustinov, not to mention other older
Politburo leaders who began their political careers when Stalin had Proclaimed
the Soviet Union under a siege of "capitalist encirclement."
7. Moreover, Andropov (like Brezhnev before him) has actively courted
the military. A number of professional military officers and defense-
industrial managers have advanced in military and political rank under
Andropov's aegis. To some extent, of course, this may reflect Ustinov's
influence with Andropov, but to all appearances Andropov has promoted military
men because he needs their support.
8. Another factor contributing to the commonality of civilian and
military outlooks in the Soviet Union is the direct involvement of Andropov
and other political leaders in military-strategic policymaking. Andropov
heads the Soviet Defense Council and is de facto Supreme Commander-in-Chief.
9. Andropov reportedly is well informed on the details of arms
negotiations, and it should not be surprising that he appears to appreciate
the professional military's concern for the threat that deployment of Pershing
Its in Europe would pose for Soviet command and control, as well as for Soviet
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/17: CIA-RDP85T00287R000900160001-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/17: CIA-RDP85T00287R000900160001-7
strategic forces and territory. His proposals to reduce the SS-20 force,
including some dismantling, probably were worked out with the military well in
advance and made in the knowledge of the Soviet military's capability to
compensate with other systems.
11. Different rules of the game appear to apply in the case of Soviet
submarines operating in restricted waters off Nordic countries. Here, local
commanders probably are carrying out an intelligence activity within general
guidelines set down in advance by the civilian-military authorities in
Moscow. The embarrassment caused by occasional disclosures of their
operations apparently has not dissuaded Moscow of the activity's usefulness in
the present international environment, because the submarines are continuing
their forays.
12. In brief, it is the political leadership that calls the shots, while
the military acts in concert to implement orders. Both the political and
military leaderships, sharing a common outlook on the need for fast reaction
in an increasingly dangerous and threatening world environment, appear to be
comfortable with the arrangement, wherein the military has considerable
flexibility to operate within general rules laid down by the political
authorities. In this situation, the military hardly will be gainsaid by the
political leadership in such incidents as the KAL shootdown because they are
playing by the rules.
13. This arrangement helps to explain the extraordinary tenor of
Moscow's rebuff of Western demands for an apology in the KAL case. Combined
with the USSR's increased military strength, it also suggests that militant
obduracy can be expected in US-Soviet relations in general, and in crisis
situations in particular, as long as the current crop of Soviet leaders and
the present defense decisionmaking process remain in place.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/17: CIA-RDP85T00287R000900160001-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/17: CIA-RDP85T00287R000900160001-7
SUBJECT: Who's Calling the Shots in Moscow?
Distribution:
Copy
1-5
- Addressee
6
- DDI Action Staff
7
-
SA/DCI
8
- Charles A Briggs, ED/DCI
9
- Senior
Review Panel
10-14
OCPAS/
IMD/CB
15
NI0/US
SR-EE
16
DDO/SE
/0
17
C/ACTS
18
D/SOVA
19
DD/SOV
A
20
E0/SOV
A
21
C/CSD
22
CSD Ch
rono
23
C/TFD
24
C/PAD
25
C/SFD
26
C/EAD
27
C/DID
28
C/SED
29
D/OCR
30
C/PAD/
D
31
SA/CS
32
C/CS/E
33
AC/CSL
34
CS/S/
35
CS/S (Typescript Chrono)
SOVA/CS/S/
(9 Sep 83)
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/17: CIA-RDP85T00287R000900160001-7