A REVIEW OF RECENT MILITARY HERALD ARTICLES ON MOUNTAIN WARFARE

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• Publication Date: March 1, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

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Central Inoftenoe Agncy
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
1 March 1983
/92
A Review of Recent Military Herald Articles on Mountain Warfare
Summary
Soviet attention to the problems of combat in mountainous
regions has increased significantly over the past year, but a
recent spate of articles in Military Herald does not appear to
have broken any new ground in terms of doctrine or the tactics
for mountain warfare. The articles make few direct references to
the Soviet experience in Afghanistan, and in general, suggest a
Soviet unwillingness openly to confront the specific nature of
that war. Efforts to prepare and train troops for mountain
operations are assessed by the Soviets to be inadequate.
NOTE: This memorandum was prepared in the Office of Soviet
Analysis Comments and queries are
welcome and may be addressed to Chief, Theater Forces Division,
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Introduction
1. The purpose of this paper is to review a group of
articles which appeared in the monthly journal of the Soviet
Ground Forces, Voennyi Vestnik (Military Herald), during 1981-82,
and which discussed various aspects of m tary operations in
mountainous terrain. The number of such articles published has
increased dramatically over the past year--from an average of 4-6
articles per year during the period 1960 to 1980, to 32 articles
in 1982.
2. This paper will first offer general considerations
concerning the articles in question and will then discuss some of
the significant issues raised (and omitted) by the authors.
Finally, conclusions will include an overall assessment of the
articles as well as problems which the articles reveal. Synopses
of the articles are included in an annex.
General
3. The introduction of Soviet ground and air forces into
Afghanistan in December 1979 and subsequent combat operations in
that country have clearly forced the Soviet military
establishment to focus greater attention on the conduct of
operations in mountainous regions. Not only is the terrain in
Afghanistan different from that of Central Europe, but the enemy
faced by the Soviets and the type of war being waged in the Hindu
Kush are essentially different from standard NATO-Warsaw Pact
considerations which dominate Soviet (and Western) military
thinking. Reflections of this were bound to appear in Soviet
military publications as perceptions and appreciations of the
situation in Afghanistan became more clear (and more immediate)
to Soviet commanders and military writers.
4. The articles reviewed herein, and particularly the
tremendous increase in their quantity during the latter half of
1981 and the first half of 1982, do indicate that the Soviet
military is trying to come to grips with the war in
Afghanistan. One indication of this is the fact that the 1982
thematic plan for Voennyi Vestnik (published in January 1982)
stated that one of t e primary issues to be addressed throughout
1982 would be the preparation of forces for operations in
mountainous regions. This emphasis was underscored in the
January 1982 issue with the publication of a special, 7-article
section devoted to the conduct of an offensive in the
mountains. Finally, one of the articles made reference to a
directive from Soviet Minister of Defense Ustinov to improve the
preparation of forces for mountain combat. This is clearly a
subject whose time has come.
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5. Having noted this, however, it must also be admitted
that, in general, the articles under consideration do not make
specific reference to Afghanistan or to the presence of Soviet
forces there. Rather, the articles claim to draw upon combat
examples from World War II and experience allegedly gained from
exercises in the USSR.
6. There are, however, a few interesting exceptions which
do portray Soviet forces "training" in the mountains of
Afghanistan. The May 1982 issue featured an article on Soviet
airborne forces entitled "From an Afghan Notebook," which
depicted airborne units engaged in both combat "training" and
"hearts and minds" efforts to assist the Afghan people. The
September 1982 issue carried another article on airborne
"training" in Afghanistan ("Maneuver in the Mountains: on the
Ground in Afghanistan"). The October 1982 issue in a photo
section under the caption "On the Ground in Afghanistan," showed
a motorized rifle sub-unit in the field with a political
officer. This was the only direct reference to the presence of
motorized rifle troops in Afghanistan. Finally, the November
1982 issue also contained an article on airborne forces
activities under the heading "On the Ground in Afghanistan."
Discussion
7. While most of the articles reflect common themes and
concerns, several are particularly significant in their own
right. By far the most important article was contributed by
Colonel General Yu Maksimov, the commander of the Turkestan
Military District (TKMD). Maksimov's piece, "Mountain
Preparation of the Forces," headed the January 1982 issue's
special section on offensive operations in the mountains and is
of significance on at least three counts. The article is the
longest (four full pages of text) and Maksimov is the most senior
officer to author any of the articles. Finally, as commander of
the TKMD, Maksimov has been intimately involved with the Soviet
effort in Afghanistan since December 1979; he is certain to be
among the most knowledgeable senior officers in the Soviet
military on the subject.
8. A central tenet of Maksimov's article, which is
supported by other authors as well, is that the basic principles
of all arms combat are applicable to operations in mountainous
terrain. The Soviet view remains firm that all regular forces
can operate successfully in mountain conditions given adequate
training and preparation. There is not, in this view, any
requirement for the creation of special, non-standard units
(e.g., mountain warfare units).
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9. The basic form of combat envisaged by Maksimov consists
of company and battalion operations (including night operations)
combining frontal assault with supporting envelopments and
flanking attacks and close coordination with tactical air
support. The use of air assault tactics at company and battalion
strength is recommended as is the tailoring or task organization
of units for particular combat tasks.
10. This "task organization" concept is perhaps the most
interesting feature of the tactical discussions reflected in the
Voennyi Vestnik articles, and Maksimov's points are echoed by
many other authors. This task organization involves the
reinforcement of motorized rifle or airborne companies or
battalions with tanks, artillery, engineer and other specialized
support (e.g., automatic grenade launchers, flamethrowers, etc.)
to accomplish a specific mission. Examples of common groupings
include: motorized rifle battalion, tank company, artillery
battalion, engineer platoon; motorized rifle company, tank
platoon, mortar battery, engineer platoon; airborne company,
mortar platoon, engineer squad. The extent to which such
groupings have been employed in Afghanistan suggests a
significant degree of Soviet flexibility, willingness to
experiment and determination to adapt the existing force
structure to the specific requirements of mountain warfare.
11. Two other main concerns are addressed by Maksimov and
shared generally by the other authors. One is a recurring
emphasis on the need for initiative on the part of commanders,
who are exhorted to display decisiveness and audacity and to
avoid the use of stereotyped tactics. Although these
considerations are hardly unique to the conduct of mountain
operations (and Soviet authors have long conceded their
importance), the nature of mountain combat, involving smaller
units operating independently, poses the requirement more
urgently and at a lower level of command.
12. Closely related to this is the concern over proper
preparation of the troops for mountain warfare. This has to do
not only with overcoming the technical problems of handling
equipment and operating weapons in the mountains, but perhaps
more so with physical and especially psychological conditioning
(or "hardening") of personnel for this kind of warfare. Maksimov
and other authors repeatedly allude to such considerations as the
isolation of small units on operation, the ever-present
possibility of enemy ambush, and the demanding nature of the
terrain in order to stress the requirement for proper training
and acclimatization. To assist in this effort, a number of
mountain training centers have been established to provide the
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environment in which units can prepare for mountain warfare.
Interestingly, none of the articles suggested that these centers
had a mission of training individual replacements (for units in
Afghanistan); only unit training from company through regimental
level was noted.
13. Apart from Maksimov's piece, two other articles were of
special interest; both concerned airborne forces "training" in
Afghanistan. Besides being among the few articles which
explicitly acknowledged the presence of specific Soviet forces in
Afghanistan (para 6 above), these articles also contained several
insights not commonly noted in the other contributions. "From an
Afghan Notebook" in the May issue spotlighted the performance of
a company level Party secretary at the most critical point in the
"training battle." Although not unusual in itself, this
portrayal did emphasize the supplemental role (i.e., supplemental
to normal military authority) which the Party plays in
maintaining discipline and cohesion in military units. This is a
factor which should not be underestimated in the type of war the
Soviets are fighting in Afghanistan.
14. The September 1982 article "Maneuver in the Mountains:
on the Ground in Afghanistan" was significant as it appeared to
reflect the most direct experience from actual combat in
Afghanistan (although, as ever, couched in terms of
"training"). Emphasis was placed on surprise, initiative of
junior commanders, use of diversionary tactics and the necessity
for constant and effective reconnaissance. Additionally, the
article was notable (and true to the Afghan context) in the
"admission" that, even when tactics are well devised and carried
out, the enemy sometime manages to escape.
15. The remaining articles, while not as interesting
individually, were of some value collectively in providing
additional insights into current Soviet thinking on mountain
operations. One of the most prominent and common tactical
features discussed involves the use of flanking detachments
(obkhodiashchii otriad) of company or battalion size to operate
against the flanks and rear of enemy positions in conjunction
with other forces attacking from the front. These flanking
detachments are task organized as discussed previously (para 10
above) and operate either on foot or are air assaulted into
position. Both motorized rifle and airborne troops are depicted
in the air assault role. The use of such detachments is by no
means a new development in Afghanistan, however; for example, the
Soviet Military Encyclopedia (vol 5, 1978) discussed the
employment of suchdetachments as a normal feature of combat in
the mountains and other difficult terrain.
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16. Engineer support featured prominently in several
articles, primarily in the importance of ensuring safe passage of
friendly forces along mountain roads. To accomplish this task,
movement support detachments are created to clear the roads in
advance of the main forces. Again, however, this does not
reflect any new development (Soviet Military Encyclopedia, vol 6,
1978).
17. Chemical support emphasized not only radiological and
chemical reconnaissance, but also encouraged the extensive use of
smoke and flamethrowers in mountain operations. One of the
tactics suggested was the use of smoke pots dropped from
helicopters.
18. As might be expected, the use of helicopters featured
prominently in the articles. The authors envisage helicopters
providing especially valuable support for reconnaissance
(including chemical reconnaissance), troop carrying and
resupply. Interestingly, however, there was little mention of
helicopters for close air support, for casualty evacuation, for
communications relay or for convoy support--all of which are
important roles which the helicopter should be expected to
perform.
19. The most conspicuous omission in the articles as a
whole was any real discussion concerning close air support
(rotary or fixed wing) to the ground forces. Also missing from
the discussion to date were such considerations as defense of
friendly base areas (e.g., air bases, communications sites, etc);
measures for population control; and psychological warfare (apart
from the basic "hearts and minds" assistance projects). In a
more general sense, there appeared as yet to be a reluctance
openly to confront the nature of the war in Afghanistan and to
examine how this war differs from mountain operations in the
context of some more general war as against Nazi Germany in the
Caucasus. While such differences can hardly fail to have escaped
the Soviets' notice over the past three years, attention to them
is lacking in the Voennyi Vestnik articles. This may well be
because the perception of and attention to such differences
involves more a matter of strategy than of tactics.
Conclusions
20. Although it is clear that the war in Afghanistan has
forced the Soviets to pay greater attention to the problems of
warfare in the mountains, the recent spate of articles in Voenn i
Vestnik does not appear to have broken any new ground in terms o
doctrine or tactics. Basic doctrine continues to hold that all
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regular forces are capable of operating effectively in the
mountains; specialized formations are not required. Tactically,
the articles emphasize well-worn principles of sub-unit
operations; attack along multiple directions; use of air assault;
employment of flanking detachments; constant reconnaissance; and
encouragement of initiative in junior commanders. In the Soviet
perception, the key to successful operations in the mountains
lies in effective preparation and training of the troops--to
include technical, physical and psychological.
21. As is common in the Soviet military press, the Voenn i_
Vestnik articles reveal a broad range of deficiencies. Perhaps
the most basic is that efforts to prepare and train troops for
operations in the mountains are assessed as inadequate; most
other shortcomings follow from this. A selection of these would
include: inadequate maintenance of vehicles; poor conduct of
reconnaissance; lack of initiative and employment of stereotyped
tactics on the part of commanders; inability to locate and
suppress enemy mortars; improper minelaying and mineclearing
operations. If there is any common theme underlying the authors'
attention to such deficiencies, it is probably a concern over the
vulnerability of Soviet forces to ambushes in the mountains, and
perhaps a perception among the authors that Soviet forces are
taking more casualties than they should be in Afghanistan.
22. A proper sense of perspective is difficult to maintain
both for Soviet and Western analysts. The fact that the war in
Afghanistan is currently "the only war the Soviets have" tends to
inflate its military significance unreasonably, particularly
considering the small proportion of the Soviet armed forces and
defense budget actually committed to Afghanistan. Nevertheless,
the recent Voennyi Vestnik articles do indicate the increased
attention the Soviets are devoting to operations in such
mountainous climes. The difficulty for the Soviet military
establishment will consist in achieving a realistic balance
between the requirements of the limited war in Afghanistan and
the other more serious and pressing military problems facing the
USSR. To a certain extent, it does appear that the Soviets are
managing to keep the problems of Afghanistan in perspective: of
the 32 articles appearing in 1982, nine were included in the
January issue alone, while only 10 articles appeared from June
through December. This would suggest that, while the Soviets
have focused increased attention on these problems, they do not
intend to allow the situation in Afghanistan to dominate Soviet
defense planning.
6
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ANNEX: Synopses of Articles
AUGUST 1981
1. "Actions of a Movement Support Detachment in the
Mountains" (p.28): Discusses creation of a strong engineer
detachment to insure passage of friendly forces; this unit moves
directly behind the recce troops. Recommends use of aerial recce
(helicopter) and photography prior to movement of forces on the
ground.
2. "Taking Account of Mountain Conditions" (p.31):
Chemical support in mountain operations. Defense against weapons
of mass destruction incuding enhanced radiation weapons.
Requirements for chemical recce more complex in mountain
conditions; use of helicopters for chemical and radiological
recce. Importance of individual and unit training in NBC defense
because of the likelihood of isolation of small detachments.
Encourages use of smoke for masking friendly troops and use of
flamethrowers in the assault echelon (i.e., in attacking strong
points, key terrain).
3. "On the March and in Battle in the Mountains" (p.34):
Maintenance and technical preparation of a motorized rifle
battalion for march and offensive operations in the mountains.
Repairs and evacuation of damaged equipment. Use of helicopters
to bring supplies and spare parts where use of vehicles is not
feasible. Formation of a repair-evacuation group; but
shortcomings in evacuation of damaged vehicles from "combat"
(i.e., training situation portrayed).
4. "Target Recce in the Mountains" (p.44): Difficulties of
locating and suppressing enemy mortars and snipers; a particular
problem during the march. Importance of observation and taking
the enemy under fire first. Admits great inadequacies in this
area which must be worked out during the next training year
(i.e., 1982-83).
5. "An Artillery Battalion as Part of a Flanking Detachment
in the Mountains" (p.66): Such detachments consist of motorized
rifle or tank units reinforced with artillery, engineers and
other special troops as required. Their goal is to maneuver to
the flanks or rear of enemy defensive positions. Recommends
attachment of a helicopter with an artillery observer to such a
detachment to conduct route recce, locate targets and direct
artillery.
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OCTOBER 1981
6. "At Night in the Mountains" (p.31): Operations of
airborne forces under these conditions are difficult but
possible. One of the most important roles for these forces is
seizure of mountain passes in the enemy rear. Portrays an
airborne company reinforced with a 120mm mortar battery in this
role. Troops fight dismounted with BMD providing fire support.
Attention also to defense of mountain passes against heliborne
assault.
7. "The Mountains are Easily Understood by the Capable"
(p.40): Laments the sad state of preparation and training of
company and platoon level officers for operations in the
mountains. Discusses organization of classes and exercises at
battalion level to provide remedial training.
8. "Radio Communications in the Mountains" (p.83):
Principles of radio communication are the same in mountains as
elsewhere, but careful attention must be given to the technical
peculiarities in this kind of terrain. Mentions that a number of
training centers have been established to train personnel (by
implication not only signals troops) for mountain operations;
these courses still referred to as "experimental."
JANUARY 1982 (Special Issue on Offensive Operations in the
Mountains)
9. "Mountain Preparation of Forces" (p.12): The basic
principles of all arms combat are applicable to operations in the
mountains. The basic features of successful combat in the
mountains include sub-unit operations combining frontal assault
with supporting envelopments and flanking attacks and close
coordination with tactical air. Stresses requirement for
initiative, surprise, decisiveness and audacity. Mentions
mountain training centers for tactical and physical preparation
of troops (training at battalion and regimental level). Use of
air assault tactics at company and battalion strength. Emphasis
on task organization (example: motorized rifle battalion, tank
platoon, artillery battalion, automatic grenade launcher platoon,
two squads flamethrowers and engineer detachment). Other
tactical considerations include use of night operations, flanking
detachments and the importance of constant recce. Emphasis on
proper training and acclimatization of troops as leading to an
increase in their psychological conditioning (i.e., rendering
troops better prepared for isolated operations in the
mountains). Mentions an Ustinov directive to improve the
preparation of the forces for mountain combat.
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10. "A Reinforced Motorized Rifle Battalion Attacks in the
Mountains" (p.16): Operations of a motorized rifle battalion
reinforced with an artillery battalion, tank company, engineer
platoon and chemical defense personnel. Exceptional importance
for successful attack placed on the actions of an air assaulted
flanking detachment; a motorized rifle company in the battalion
second echelon given a secondary "on order" mission to be
prepared to act as a flanking detachment. Stresses requirement
to secure not only the main objective but adjacent key terrain as
well. Attack continues even though communications temporarily
disrupted. Importance of timing the commitment of the second
echelon properly; advice to commit as late as possible (after
seizure of initial objectives).
11. "A Mortar Battery in an Advance Party" (p.21): Value
of mortars in mountainous terrain.
12. "For Successful Actions" (p.27): Engineer support in
the mountains.
13. "With High Reliability" (p.30): Signal support in the
mountains.
14. "Chemical Support in the Mountains" (p.32): Includes
discussion on use of smoke to screen movement of forces in the
attack, including those forces acting as a flanking detachment.
Means of delivery for smoke include dropping of smoke pots from
helicopters. Also encourages use of flamethrowers.
15. "In the Mountains and Foothills" (p.37): Airborne
battalion assault to destroy a warehouse and temporary
airfield. Use of maneuverable parachute.
16. "Air Defense Troops Before and During Battle" (p.44):
Air defense of a motorized rifle regiment in the mountains. In a
training situation in which the "weather" precluded enemy air
attacks, air defense weapons used against ground targets. This
is apparently not a favorite pastime of air defense officers.
17. "A US Battalion Defends in the Mountains" (p.89):
Based on open source literature from the Western press.
FEBRUARY 1982
18. "A Security Detachment (Zastava) in the Mountains"
(p.26): Examines actions of an advance party on the march and in
a meeting engagement. Detachment consisted of motorized rifle
company reinforced with tank platoon, mortar battery and engineer
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platoon. Task force commander was the motorized rifle battalion
commander.
19. "A Battalion Captures an Objective in the Mountains"
(p.34): Operations of an airborne battalion to destroy nuclear
missiles and seize key terrain in the rear of enemy forces in
conjunction with frontal assault by other troops. Battalion
reinforced with mortar battery, air defense platoon and engineer
platoon.
20. "Training Was Conducted in the Mountains" (p.68): Air
defense forces participation in a combined arms field training
exercise.
21. "Target Practice in the Mountains" (p.75): Planning
and conduct of marksmanship training in the Transcaucasus
Military District.
22. "Actions of Engineers in Mine Clearing of a Mountain
Road" (p.78): Operations of a movement security detachment.
Security provided by a motorized rifle platoon and mortar
battery.
MARCH 1982 (Special issue on defense at night; however, no
articles specifically oriented to operations in the mountains.)
APRIL 1982 (Special issue on breakthrough of anti-tank defense)
23. "A Company Attacks in the Mountains" (p.78): Planning
and organization for a company level tactical exercise in the
mountains at night. Motorized rifle company reinforced with tank
platoon and mortar battery.
24. "Minelaying in the Mountain" (p.84): Notes
deficiencies in training which lead to improper laying of mines
easily cleared by the enemy. Requirement to mine not only the
main path, but alternate routes as well. Recommends use of a
"non-standard" explosive "VV" (type of powder produced during
WWII) on footpaths every 250-350 meters.
MAY 1982
25. "The Tactical Training Area of a Mountain Training
Center" (p.34): Describes a training center in the Central Asian
Military District equipped for all arms training, live firing
exercises and specialized physical training (e.g.,
mountaineering). Emphasis on small unit operations and mutual
support of units separated from one another. Also emphasis on
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employment of flanking detachments, usually operating on foot.
Motorized rifle troops operating in an air assault role.
26. "From an Afghan Notebook" (p.38): Shows airborne
forces engaged in "hearts and minds" activities (e.g., building
roads, providing medical treatment). Also discusses airborne
troops participating in tactical "exercises" in Afghanistan,
including attack and defense. A company Party secretary
portrayed as platoon leader in the most dangerous position during
a "training battle." Emphasis on attack of enemy strongpoint
from two directions. Also concern for security in the rear of
friendly troops.
27. "To Service Military Equipment in the Mountains in an
Outstanding Manner" (p.43): Requirements for proper vehicle
maintenance and operation of vehicles. Preparation of a
motorized rifle battalion with tanks attached for march; march
interval between vehicles set at 25-30 meters along dangerous
sections of road.
28. "Use of the Bulletin 'Meteosrednii' for Firing in the
Mountains" (p.65): Technical article on the use of a
meteorological publication with the above title by artillery
units.
29. "Tank Firing in the Mountains" (p.79): technical
article on tank gunnery.
30. "Artillery Firing in the Mountains" (p.92): Based on
Notes the reduced
open source material from the Western press.
effectiveness of flash and sound ranging and increased role of
aerial reconnaissance in the mountains. HE fragmentation noted
as the most effective ordnance in these conditions.
JUNE 1982 (Special issue on the summer training cycle)
31. "If the Target is Low-Flying" (p.77): Air defense
forces acquisition and identification of low-flying aircraft in
the mountains.
JULY 1982
32. "On a Mountain Marchroute" (p.62): BTR driver training
on mountain roads.
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AUGUST 1982
33. "Exercises in the Mountains" (p.84): Article written
by a Bulgarian general on Bulgarian army training in the
mountains. Emphasis on thorough planning and preparation;
physical conditioning; live fire training; technical preparation;
and psychological hardening of personnel.
SEPTEMBER 1982
34. "The March in Mountainous-Taiga Terrain" (p.37):
Organization and preparation for march by artillery units in
difficult terrain including mountains, taiga and marshy areas.
35. "Maneuver in the Mountains: on the Ground in
Afghanistan" (p.44): Discusses "training" by airborne forces in
Afghanistan. In one exercise, an airborne company assigned the
task to raid and seize an enemy position in a canyon. In another
exercise, a company, reinforced with a mortar platoon and an
engineer squad tasked to operate as a flanking detachment;
emphasis on the capability of airborne forces to function in this
role. Stress placed on the requirement for junior commanders to
show initiative; the necessity to achieve surprise; to avoid
stereotyped tactics; to conduct constant recce. Suggestion to
use diversionary tactics (shifting forces from flank to flank
across the enemy front) to screen the movement of a flanking
detachment to the enemy rear. Also an "admission" that even when
tactics are well devised and executed, the enemy sometimes
manages to escape.
OCTOBER 1982 (Special issue on offensive operations in built-up
areas)
36. "On the Ground in Afghanistan": Photo section showing
troops in Afghanistan: parade, public works projects and
motorized rifle troops in the field with a political officer.
37. "Fire Control in the Mountains" (p.84): Technical
article for air defense forces.
November 1982
38. "On the Ground in Afghanistan: Trial by March" (p.
36): Describes airborne forces preparations and difficulties in
conducting a march under mountainous-desert conditions in
Afghanistan. Emphasis placed on proper maintenance and correct
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handling of equipment and on an appreciation of climatic factors
affecting personnel.
39. "More Complex Conditions--More Stressful training" (p.
39); Discusses battalion-level training of officers for
operations in mountainous conditions. Attention devoted to
tactical training (especially developing an understanding of the
terrain), physical conditioning, proper and effective use of
equipment and psychological "hardening."
December 1982
40. "Airdefensemen on Exercise in the Mountains" (p.74):
Air defense sub-units night march and establishment of firing
positions in the mountains to repulse enemy air attack (fixed
wing and helicopters).
13
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/02 : CIA-RDP85T00287R000801920001-3
MK Urr11,1RL UZOL VIYLT
SUBJECT: A Review of Recent Military Herald Articles on
Mountain Warfare
External Distribution
1. DIA/DBIB
2. DIA/DB1B2
3. DIA /DB1B2
4. Col. Dwayne Lundgren, Threat Manager, TRADOC
5. Col. David Hottel, Commander, IT AC
6. Mr. Robert Wooldridge, ITAC/SRD
7. NSA/A235
8. Lt. Col. Fred Myer, ACSI/OAMI/FRT
9. Lt. Col. Richard Culp, ACSI/DAMI/FRT
10. Lt. Col. Dennis Quinn, ACSI/DAMI/FIR
11. Mr. William Beuch, ACSI/DAMI/FRT
12. Ms. Alice Norris, ACSI/AF
13. Maj. Michael A. Olen, USA SSD, Fort Sill, Okla.
14. Maj. Edward E. Thurman, HQ CAORA, Attn: ATOR-CAS-SP,
Ft. Leavenworth, KS 66027
15. Col. Huba Wass de Czega, HO CAORA, ATTN: ATOR-CAS-SP,
Ft. Leavenworth, KS 66027
16. Col W. Hanne, US Army War College, Carlisle, PA
17. NSA/A231
18, NSA/A233
19. NSA/A234
20. Capt. (P )-Thad Evans, Threat Manager, Ft. Sill, OK
21. Lt. Col. George Limbaugh, Threat Manager, Ft. Benning, GA
22. Maj. William Voth, Threat Manager, Ft. Rucker, AL
23. Maj James Sprayberry, Threat Manager, Ft. Knox, KY
24. Lt. Col William Westendick, Threat Manager, Ft. Gordon, GA
14
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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STAT
STAT
STAT
STAT
STAT
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/02 : CIA-RDP85T00287R000801920001-3
run vrriZinI 64L. vm-i
Internal Distribution
25.
26.
27.
28.
29-33.
34.
35.
36.
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38.
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SOVA/CSD
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SA/DCI
EA/DCI
DDI Action Staff
Senior Review Panel
OCPAS/IMD/CB, Rm. 7G15 Hqs.
D/SOVA
NIO/GPF
OIA/LFD/WP
Chief,
Chief,
Chief,
Chief,
Chief,
Chief,
Chief,
Chief,
Chief,
Chief,
Chief,
Chief,
Chief.
OSWR/0
OSWR/0
/EI/SI
S/GPW
S/DP
SOVA/TFD
SOVA/TF/A
SOVA/TF/G
SOVA/TF/N
SOVA/TF/0
SOVA/CSD
SOVA/CS/E
SOVA/DID
SOVA/EAD
SOVA/PAD
SOVA/SED
SOVA/SFD
SOVA/SF/E
SovnirFio (Ch
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/02 : CIA-RDP85T00287R000801920001-3