AFGHANISTAN: STATUS AND PROSPECTS OF THE INSURGENCY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000801430001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 18, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 22, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/18: CIA-RDP85T00287R000801430001-7
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Afghanistan: Status and Pros ects of the Insurgency
Talking Points for D/NESA
22 November 1983
Three and half years after the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan, the resistance has become an effective force that
Barring a drastic change in~Soviet policy, we judge the fighting
will continue near current levels over the next few years.
Despite improvements in weapons and training, however, we believe
the insurgents will lack the firepower and organization to defeat
major S
eL .__ 1 t _
oo
As a result of increased insurgent pressure, high-ranking
Soviet officials have recently expressed concern over growing
losses of equipment and men.
Large-scale Soviet and Afghan operations this spring and
early summer failed to weaken the resistance, and the
Afghan Government still controls about 30 percent of the
country--the same amount it controlled in July 1982.
New Soviet tactics to reduce combat losses have included
less effective, higher altitude air attacks and large
attack formations against even small insurgent groups,
which sharply limit flexibility.
-- The insurgents have expanded the war with attacks in and
around major cities, especially Kabul. The Soviets are
apprehensive over increasing guerrilla activity in
western Afghanistan and infiltration from Iran.
-- Insurgents have shown improved proficiency with
antiaircraft weapons, mortars, and grenade launchers, and
have improved intelligence collecting.
-- The Soviets have failed so far to rebuild the Afghan Army
into a force capable of effectively fighting the
Soviet costs in the war have been considerable, according to
estimates based on reliable reporting.
-- We estimate that over 17,000 Soviets have been killed or
wounded in Afghanistan. The Afghan Army has suffered
NESA M 83-10321
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50,000 casualties and nearly 80,000 men have deserted.
-- The insurgents have shot down or destroyed in attacks on
airfields some 375 (and perhaps as many as 500) Soviet
and Afghan aircraft (mostly helicopters), and nearly 150
more have been lost in accidents.
-- The Soviet aircraft losses in 1983 have significantly
increased over losses in 1982. We estimate replacement
costs for Soviet aircraft lost in combat and accidents
since the Soviet invasion at $1.5 billion.
-- Approximately 10,000 Soviet and Afghan armored vehicles
and trucks have been destroyed or damaged.
-- Direct Soviet costs in Afghanistan probably total around
$12 billion since the invasion.
Nevertheless, we judge the Soviets still find the costs
bearable and apparently believe that their relations with many
countries are recovering from the damage done by the invasion and
that in the long run they will overcome the resistance. We
believe there is no immediate prospect that the Soviets will
decide to reduce their military effort in Afghanistan.
We judge that the resistance fighters will become more
politically sophisticated and militarily effective in the next
two years, but they will remain vulnerable.
The most serious threat to the resistance is civilian
war-weariness and the loss of popular support over the
long term that would directly affect the will to continue
fighting.
Cooperation among insurgent bands has grown, but deep
ideological, political, and religious differences will
prevent resistance unification.
The Soviets and the Kabul regime are likely, in our view,
to continue and probably increase a wide variety of
covert and overt activities--such as arranging truces,
encouraging defections, and subverting groups--to exploit
ins
t
urgen
weaknesses inside and outside of Afghanistan.
There are some Soviet options--massive reinforcement of the
some 100,000 Soviet troops now in the country or a widespread
scorched earth policy against civilians--that might drastically
reduce the insurgency in the next two years.
-- Moscow would, however, be reluctant to assume the high
economic, political, and military costs as ociated with
these options, in our judgment.
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The Soviets have started a number of economic, educational,
social, and political programs in Afghanistan that they believe
25X1
will eventually
turn the country into a via
Soviet-dominated
communist state
Because of wide-
25X1
spread
however
insurge
, these
nt activity and opposition from the Afghan people,
programs have been implemented in only a few
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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/18: CIA-RDP85T00287R000801430001-7