BRIEFING PAPERS FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE'S TRIP TO PAKISTAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000800760001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 19, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 14, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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14 September 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Office of East Asian Analysis
Chief, South Asia Division, NESA
SUBJECT: Briefing papers for Secretary of Defense's trip
to Pakistan. 25X1
Attached are several short items that we drafted in support
of the Secretary of Defense's trip to Pakistan. Ron Zwart of
DOD/ISA and of NESA have already coordinated on the
substance and format of the papers.
25X1
25X1
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SUBJECT: Briefing Papers for Secretary of Defense's trip to
Pakistan 25X1
Distribution:
Orig - Addressee
1 - D/NESA
1 - DD/NESA
1 - NIO/NESA
1 - C/PES
4 - CPAS/IMD/CB
2 - NESA/PS
1 - C/SO/NESA
4 - C/PAB/SO/NESA
1 - Chrono
DDI/NESA/SO/P (14 Sept 83) 25X1
25X1
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Central Intelligence Agency
Washington. D. C. 20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
14 September 1983
Afghanistan: Status and Prospects of the Insurgency
Three and a half years after the Soviet intervention in
Afghanistan, the resistance has become an effective force that
controls much of the country
Barring a drastic change in Soviet policy, we judge the fighting
will continue over the next few years because existing Soviet
forces will be unable to destroy the resistance. Despite
improvements in weapons and training, however, we believe the
insurgents will lack the firepower and organization to defeat
major Soviet units.
Soviet costs in the war have been considerable, according to
our estimates
-- We estimate that over 16,000 Soviets have been killed or
wounded in Afghanistan. The Afghan Army has suffered
50,000 casualties and nearly 80,000 men have deserted.
This memorandum was prepared by the South Asia Division,
Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis, in preparation
for the Secretary of Defense's trip to Pakistan. Information as
of September 12, 1983 was used in preparation of this paper.
Comments and queries are welcome and should be addressed to
Chief, South Asia Division
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Nevertheless, we judge the Soviets still find the costs
bearable and apparently believe that their relations with many
countries are recovering from the damage done by the invasion and
that in the long run they will overcome the resistance. We
believe there is no immediate prospect that the Soviets will
decide to reduce their military effort in Afghanistan. 25X1
We judge that the resistance fighters will become more
politically sophisticated and militarily effective in the next
two years, but they will remain vulnerable.
-- The most serious threat to the resistance is civilian war-
weariness and the loss of popular support over the long term
that would directly affect the will to continue fighting.
-- Cooperation among insurgent bands has grown, but because
of deep ideological, political, and religious differences,
we do not foresee a united resistance movement emerging in
the next few years.
-- The Soviets and the Kabul regime are likely, in our view,
to continue and probably increase a wide variety of covert
and overt activities 25X1
to exploit 25X1
insurgent weaknesses inside and outside of Afghanistan.
There are some Soviet options--massive troop reinforcement
or a widespread scorched earth policy against civilians--that
might drastically reduce the insurgency in the next two years.
-- Moscow would, however, be reluctant to assume the high
economic, political, and military costs associated with
these options, in our judgment.
The Soviets have started a number of economic, educational,
social, and political programs in Afghanistan that they believe
will eventually turn the country into a viable Soviet-dominated
communist state Because of wide-
spread insurgent activity and opposition from the Afghan people,
however these programs have been implemented in only a few
areas.
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Central Intelligence Agency
Washington. D. C. 20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
14 September 1983
Pakistan: Steadfastness on Afghanistan
Pakistani leaders view the Soviet presence in Afghanistan as
a strategic threat. They believe 25X1
the Soviets want to gain permanent overland access to the Persian
Gulf and the Indian Ocean littoral. They are worried that Moscow 25X1
will increase its political and military pressure on Pakistan
once it has consolidated its hold on Afghanistan.
they are concerned that Moscow will collaborate
with India to neutralize and divide Pakistan--perhaps by a 25X1
combination of external military pressure and subversive meddling
in Pakistan's unstable domestic politics. 25X1
We believe Pakistan continues to engage the Soviets in
periodic talks on Afghanistan for a number of reasons:
-- The UN-sponsored talks provide Pakistan both with a way to
test Soviet intentions in Afghanistan and maintain
international support for its position on Afghanistan.
-- Pakistan keeps its channels open to Moscow because it
worries that the West will in time forget about
Afghanistan or reach an agreement over Pakistan's head as
part of a larger East-West settlement.
-- The refugee problem inside Pakistan has become a major
concern to Islamabad. Rising local resentments and
concern in the Army that some 3 million Afghan refugees
will become a permanent burden for Pakistan have added a
note of urgency to Pakistan's search for a political
settlement. So far, however, relations between the Afghan
refugees and locals--who belong to the same ethnic group--
have been peaceful.
This memorandum was prepared by the South Asia Division,
Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis, in preparation
for the Secretary of Defense's trip to Pakistan. Information as
of September 12, 1983 was used in preparation of this paper.
Comments and queries are welcome and should be addressed to
Chief, South Asia Division
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SECRET
We doubt Islamabad is ready to shift its stand on the issue
in ways that would damage US interests. So far in the indirect
talks at Geneva, Pakistan has remained steadfast in its
insistence that a political settlement is contingent on a
withdrawal of Soviet troops. According to
statements by senior Pakistani officials:
-- Islamabad supports the Afghan insurgents in order to make
it more difficult for the Soviets to consolidate their
hold on Afghanistan. An active insurgency is crucial to
Pakistan's diplomatic campaign to keep Afghanistan before
world opinion as an issue that can be settled only by the
withdrawal of Soviet troops.
-- A political settlement acceptable to the Zia regime would
have to permit the voluntary return to Afghanistan of the
Afghan refugees in Pakistan. Islamabad knows the refugees
will not return home unless the Soviets first withdraw
their troops.
-- Pakistan has consistently refused to recognize the Babrak
regime. Islamabad knows that recognition is its trump
card. It is doubtful that it would play it until a pull-
out of Soviet troops is largely completed and most of the
refugees have returned home.
-- Pakistan's current policy on Afghanistan receives strong
support from conservative religious parties'at home and
vital friends abroad, such as Saudi Arabia, China, and the
US. Pakistan's strong stand on Afghanistan and its
support for an active insurgency enables it to argue more
effectively with the Saudis, the US, and China that it
needs and deserves enhanced diplomatic, economic, and
military support.
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Central Intelligence Agency
Washington. D. C.20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
14 September 1983
Pakistan: Implications of Military Commitments to Arab States
Pakistan's approximately 18,000 military personnel stationed
in the Middle East and North Africa are becoming an important
vehicle for achievement of Islamabad's foreign policy goals.
Pakistan has reaped significant benefits from the program,
according to our analysis:
-- Salary remittances have provided an economic boost.
-- Islamabad has acquired new sources of arms procurement.
-- Pakistan has become one of the largest non-Arab recipients
of financial support from the oil-rich Arab states.
-- Pakistan's military personnel have gained valuable
training on advanced Western and Soviet military
equipment--including Soviet aircraft--which has given them
a better understanding of the capabilities of the Indian
Air Force.
We believe the military assistance, however, also carries
risks:
-- The longer the Pakistani troops stay abroad, the greater
the risk that Pakistan will become embroiled in local or
regional conflicts to which it is not a party.
-- Pakistan's international image is tarnished by charges
that it provides "soldiers for hire" to radical regimes
such as Libya.
morale within the armed forces
could be damaged by the disparity between overseas and
domestic salaries and by discrimination against Pakistani
Shia personnel by the recipient countries.
This memorandum was prepared by the South Asia Division,
Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis, in preparation
for the Secretary of Defense's trip to Pakistan. Information as
of September 12, 1983 was used in preparation of this paper.
Comments and queries are welcome ans ould be addressed to
Chief, South Asia Divisio
SE'. CrtEm
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SECRET
We judge Pakistan will continue and may even expand its
military ties with the Middle East in order to ensure Arab
political support and economic assistance. In our view, as long
as Pakistani personnel demonstrate competence and Pakistan
maintains a stable and moderate government with Islamic
credentials, there will be a market for its military personnel in
the Middle East and North Africa. We believe that concern over
external and internal threats to stability brought on by the
strife in Lebanon, the continuing Iran/Iraq conflict, and Iran's
Shia religious fanaticism might well prompt the Gulf states to
request even larger foreign military contingents.
Our analysis suggests, however, that several factors could
slow an expansion of military ties or lead to a reduction in
requests for military assistance:
-- The limited capacity of the recipient countries to absorb
more military personnel.
-- Competition from other states to supply military advisers.
-- The risk that Pakistan could be drawn into regional
conflicts.
The limited number of skilled technical personnel in
Pakistan.
The United States generally benefits from Pakistan's
military assistance program. Cooperation between Islamabad and
the Arab States strengthens the military establishments of
moderate governments while dampening Pakistan's financial demands
on the United States and minimizing the US visibility in this
sensitive region. Only in the training of Libyan pilots and
small numbers of Palestinian guerrillas do Pakistan's military
ties run counter to US interests. We assess that a setback to
the military assistance program, accompanied by a reduction in
Arab economic assistance to Pakistan, would increase political
and economic strains in Pakistan and increase Islamabad's
requests for US economic and military aid.
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Central Intelligence Agency
Washington. D. C. 20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
14 September 1983
Pakistan-China-US: Arms Technology Transfer
We believe Pakistan will probably safeguard the new US arms
it receives to protect the arms supply relationship unless major
strains develop in relations with the United States. Pakistan
still considers its relations with China more durable than those
with the United States and in the past has given Beijing access
to western arms technologies. Nonetheless, Pakistan regards
advanced US weapons as the key to its military modernization and
wants to continue the security assistance program,
-- Islamabad is aware of US concern about unauthorized
transfers of US weapons to China and has signed a General
Security of Military Information Agreement with the United
States.
-- The resolution last winter of the ALR-69 radar warning
receiver issue to Zia's satisfaction and the delivery of
the first F-16s has stren thened Islamadad's faith in the
US security relationship.
Pakistan has close military ties with China that
include a past history of transferring
French arms technology and agreements with Beijing on joint
weapons development and technology exchange.
-- During his visit to Beijing in November 1982, President
Zia signed an agreement that contained provisions for
Chinese-Pakistani cooperation in weapons development and
production.
This memorandum was prepared by the South Asia Division,
Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis, in preparation
for the Secretary of Defense's trip to Pakistan. Information as
of September 12, 1983 was used in preparation of this paper.
Comments and queries are welcome and should be addressed to
Chief, South Asia Division
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We believe Pakistan will protect US arms technology as long
as the US security relationship is perceived in Islamabad as
providing tangible benefits. Major strains in relations with the
United States over the nuclear issue or new disputes on arms
agreements could undermine Islamabad's confidence in the United
States and threaten the security relationship, possibly causing
Pakistan to share US weapons or technology with China. Even if
US-Pakistani relations remain strong, however, there is a risk
that China at some point will gain access to Pakistan's US arms,
F_ I
given the intimacy of Pakistan's ties to China.
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Central me igenc AAgency
Washington. D. C.20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
14 September 1983
Pakistan: Prospects for President Zia
President Zia ul-Haq is coping successfully with the current
disturbances in Pakistan--the most serious threat to his rule so
far.. We believe his regime's capable handling of serious anti-
government rioting in Sind Province coupled with the
unwillingness of Pakistanis in other provinces to join the
protest movement increase the chances that Zia and the Army will
continue to guide Pakistan's political future for at least the
next one to two years.
-- Zia's authoritarian regime has avoided overly repressive
policies, though it has dealt firmly with organized
demonstrations. It has given the country more than six
years of domestic stability and substantial economic
progress.
-- Zia also has dealt effectively with external threats. He
has stood up to the Soviets on Afghanistan, while keeping
channels open to a negotiated settlement; he has improved
relations with India; and he has succeeded in gaining
major economic aid and arms assistance from the United
States.
The President ultimately depends on the Army to remain in
power. Most senior officers support Zia's plan for a phased
return to civilian government and a permanent oversight role for
the armed forces
-- No ruler, however, can be certain of the Army's support if
it is called upon to put down civil disorders, particu-
larly in the all-important province of Punjab.
Zia's main opposition, the Movement for the Restoration of
Democracy (MRD), a coalition of eight opposition parties, is 25X1
This memorandum was prepared by the South Asia Division,
Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis, in preparation
for the Secretary of Defense's trip to Pakistan. Information as
of September 12, 1983 was used in preparation of this paper.
Comments and queries are welcome and should be addressed to
Chief, South Asia Division
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poorly organized and so far has lacked both a popular issue or an
effective leader to galvanize a nationwide anti-Zia campaign.
-- The protest movement in Sind Province this summer was
launched largely by the Pakistan People's Party of former
Prime Minister Bhutto. The PPP has strong support in
Sind, Bhutto's home province, and succeeded in rousing
violent protests by playing on local grievances against
the Punjabi-dominated government and Army.
-- The PPP has substantial support among the urban and rural
poor of Punjab, but has found it difficult to mobilize
this support in the absence of a strong leader. Most of
the PPP faithful look to Bhutto's daughter Benazir, but
she has been kept under house arrest for the past two and
one-half years.
President Zia has promised to hold provincial and national
elections by March 1985, amend the Constitution to create a
strong presidential system, and withdraw martial law. His
statements suggest he will bar hostile opposition parties--
including the PPP--from participating in the elections. These
parties and some influential interest groups believe they are
losing ground under Zia and could coalesce against him.
Given the right circumstances, we believe a nationwide
opposition movement could arise rapidly and with little
warning. In such an event, the Army probably would replace Zia
with another general who would negotiate a return to civilian
rule on terms the Army could accept.
-- In our view, the Army would attempt to preserve the
present US-Pakistan relationship, but if a Pakistan
People's Party government succeeded in taking over, US-
Pakistan ties, as well as Pakistan's stand on Afghanistan,
probably would be significantly weakened.
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Central Intelligence Agency
Washington. D. C.20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
14 September 1983
Pakistan: Perceptions of Relations with the US
US-Pakistani relations have improved since 1980, but these
gains are fragile. The two nations' Afghanistan policies and
caution regarding Soviet aims in South Asia are convergent
interests. However, US arms
embargoes in 1965 and 1971 plus the temporary suspension of
economic aid in 1979 have convinced most Pakistanis that
Washington is an unreliable ally.
25X1
Pakistani 25X1
officials in general are receptive to expanding contacts with the
US.
-- Few Pakistani officials believe, however, that the US
would support Pakistan if it were attacked by India, and
there are doubts about US willingness--and capability--to
come to Pakistan's assistance in the event of a Soviet
attack. some army officers
believe Zia has placed too much trust in Washington and
believe that the US may again abandon Pakistan after the
Afghanistan conflict is resolved.
-- According to Pakistani officials, the sale of advanced
weapons is the yardstick by which Islamabad measures US
support. The F-16s are especially welcome and are
crucial symbol of the US commitment to Pakistan.
Popular perceptions of the US are more ambiguous
-- US military and economic assistance is widely publicized 25X1
and appears to have made a positive impact. However, most
Pakistanis reject US Middle East policy, which they charge
This memorandum was prepared by the South Asia Division,
Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis, in preparation
for the Secretary of Defense's trip to Pakistan. Information as
of September 12, 1983 was used in preparation of this paper.
Comments and queries are welcome and should be addressed to
Chief, South Asia Division
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SECRET
is biased in favor of Israel. Many are suspicious that
the US remains hostile to Tehran because it cannot
tolerate a "truly Islamic government" and believe Pakistan
would be subject to similar pressure should it follow
Iran's example.
-- Many Pakistanis, including those with ties to the military
and the bureaucratic elite, condemn US policy on nuclear
nonproliferation as applied to Pakistan. They assert it
is intended to prevent the development of domestic nuclear
power facilities and to retard Pakistan's ability to
achieve economic independence. They reject as
hypocritical US claims it is attempting to stop the spread
of nuclear weapons and point to Washington's willingness
to continue assistance to India, which has exploded a
nuclear device.
-- Zia's political opponents are attempting to exploit US
military and economic assistance to portray the President 25X1
as a US puppet. Politicians on the left and center
repeatedly assert that Zia could not survive without US
support. Scattered anti-American incidents occurediduring
recent anti-regime demonstrations in Sind Province.
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