SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL FOR CONGRESSIONAL BRIEFING ON AFGHANISTAN-PAKISTAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000701030001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 13, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 4, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

_ ' I Hrllljll Ill L 1 ilUJ
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SECRET
4 May 1983
MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Chief, DDO/NE)
Chief, DDI/NESA/PAB
SUBJECT: Supplemental Material for Congressional Briefing
on Afghanistan-Pakistan
Per your request, attached are contingency answers for
selected questions likely to be asked by Congressman Long at the
forthcoming briefing. The first set of answers includes a brief
analysis of the Indo-Pak military balance and relevant maps and
tables. Also attached are talking points that generally describe
the roots of Pakistan's position at the UN-sponsored negotiations
on Afghanistan.
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Supplemental Material for Congressional Briefing
on Afghanistan-Pakistan
- Original
- NIO/NESA
- D/NESA
- C/NESA/SO
- C/NESA/SO/P
2 -MESA/PS
~- OCO/IMD/CB
1 - SO/P Chrono
DDI/NESA/SO/PI
5May83)
2
SECRET
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C I I
CONTINGENCY ANSWERS FOR CONGRESSIONAL QUESTIONS
A. Deployment of Pakistani Forces
1. Although most Pakistani ground forces are garrisoned
closer to India than Afghanistan, this reflects the history,
topography, and infrastructure of the country and the nature
of the Indian threat and not a benign attitude by Islamabad
toward the Soviets. Fourteen of Pakistan's 18 divisions are
located to defend against India:
-- India is Pakistan's historical adversary and the two
countries have conflicting claims in the Kashmir.
-- Many Pakistani officials believe that India wishes to see
Pakistan dismembered into weak, ethnically-based states.
-- India's forces opposite Pakistan are larger and better
equipped than those of Pakistan.
-- Pakistan has no strategic depth opposite India. Most of
its principal cities (including Lahore, Islamabad, and
Rawalpindi) and major lines of communication are within
100 kilometers of the Indian border. A major
breakthrough by Indian forces would immediately threaten
Pakistan's most important political, cultural, and
economic assets. Consequently, Pakistan's military
strategy emphasizes a forward defense, which requires
that the bulk of its forces be deployed opposite India.
-- The transportation and logistic infrastructure of the
country is more developed in the east and can better
support large military forces than the less developed
west.
2. The four Pakistani divisions located opposite
Afghanistan (two in the North-West Frontier Province and two
in Baluchistan) are supplemented by approximately 50,000 men
in the paramilitary Frontier Corps.
-- Pakistan has considerable strategic depth in the west and
has adopted a strategy of defense-in-depth opposite
Afghanistan. The deployment of its Army in the west
supports this strategy, in which Pakistan would have time
to move reinforcements from east to west before Afghan or
Soviet forces could threaten vital Pakistani assets.
-- The Frontier Corps defend the border and are only lightly
armed, but they have good knowledge of the country and we
assess their ability to harass and slow Afghan or Soviet
forces to be good.
-- The rugged terrain in much of Pakistan's west is not
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( I I
conducive to a rapid advance by armored forces and we
believe it would cause Afghan or Soviet forces
operational and logistical difficulties.
3. Even with Pakistan's arms modernization, we assess that
India's military superiority over Pakistan will grow through
the 1980s:
-- Since 1980, India has purchased more than $6.1 billion of
Soviet arms and $2.7 billion of West European arms,
including modern tanks, fighter aircraft, and naval
vessels.
-- Deliveries of these weapons will continue through the
1980s and will exceed by far the arms for which Pakistan
expects delivery.
-- Pakistan's armed forces have serious command-and-control,
training, and logistics deficiencies, which limit their
effectiveness, even with the acquisition of new weapons.
B. F-16 Deployment
all of Pakistan's
F-16s will be based at Sargodha Airbase, which is roughly
in the center of the country. The six F-16s so far
delivered are at Sargodha. The F-16s at Sargodha could
easily respond to military threats in either the east or
west.
C. Refugee Burden on Pakistan
1. The some 2.8 million Afghan refugees in western Pakistan
are becoming an increasing economic burden on Islamabad:
-- The Pakistan Government estimates its 1982-1983
assistance costs for the refugees was $555 million from
its own coffers, a sizeable burden for a counLiy with
serious economic problems. International relief
organizations have supplied an additional $250 million.
-- The Afghan refugees--the largest refugee population in
the world--compete with the local Pakistani population
for jobs and scarce grazing, water, and land rights, and
the incidence of violence between the two groups has
increased in the last year.
-- The Pakistan Government has also given aid to the local
inhabitants commensurate with that given to the refugees
in areas where resentment towards the refugees is
particularly high.
2. The Afghan refugees are also becoming an increasing
threat to Pakistan's political stability:
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The refugees have been involved in recent disturbances in
the volatile tribal areas along the Afghanistan border.
Pakistani officials believe that even minor disturbances
between the refugees and the local population, or between
rival refugee groups, could provoke increasingly frequent
and serious incidents.
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 Ii, ' I I C' 1111 11IN:II III 1' I 10111 11
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Pakistan anc(andia:
)isposition of Major Ground Units:
Pakistani Indian
it & Corps headquarters
s y~ per`
T yY
M
Baluchistan
Armored division
Infantry division
Mountain division
Independent armored brigadei
Ceas ..
--'?~-,'-Fi.n 1 ine
a n
mab3d- . j C
? LRipon
Raw ralpindi ~
,iEQR,F'V
Jhelurtl?,j \\Akhnur ? dhampur
Nw~:. Nagrota d
Mangla~ , Jammu
Kharian ?
~r< Sialkot ?pathankot
Gujranwala'
In
Jodhpur
Chandimandir .
Ambala.- :-7n
A13hha? - -
.Am
Bhatinda
it
Type-59 (China) 750
M47 (USA) 275
';,Total 1.025
.~';?, yx, lVr 'rte 385
" lcc jr'`'# 1.125
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Vijayanta (India)
T-54/T-55 (Soviet Union)
T-72
Armored vehiclesa
Field artilleryb
Jullundu& -- -1-11,
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Figure 3:
Pakistan and India: Current and Projected
Military Forces
Note change in scale
I India
Pakistan
Combat Aircrafta
1i
E .;'
'--`
a Dnes not include combat capable irJInces
and Jui'ttatt in resetse storatte.
b Does not include tanks in reserve sloratte.
`.d6162 12-62
Secret
MIG 23
60
100
Jaguar
45
100
MIG 21
300
350
MIG 27
100
Mirage
40
Others
265
50
Total
735
740
F-16
6
40
Mirage Ill/V
75
100
F-6
150
80
Canberra
10
T-72
150
600
T-55
900
700
%i.aNanta
1200
1500
Total
2250
2800
51.48A5
180
300
Type
750
1000
M-47
150
A MMX-30
100
Total
1080
1400
Armored
10
12
Mechanized
2
6
Infantry
102
105
Total
114
123
Armored
8
10
Infantry
64
68
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Talking Points
THE AFGHANISTAN TALKS: Pakistan's Objectives
The UN sponsored talks provide Pakistan both with a way to
test Soviet intentions in Afghanistan and maintain international
support for its position on Afghanistan, but we doubt Islamabad
is ready to shift its stand on the issue in ways that would
damage US interests.
-- A political settlement acceptable to the Zia regime would
have to permit the voluntary return to Afghanistan of the
approximately 2.8 million Afghan refugees in Pakistan.
Islamabad knows the refugees will not return home unless
the Soviets first withdraw their troops. Islamabad might
accept the retention of a token Soviet force in Kabul,
but it will insist that all other Soviet forces leave.
-- Pakistan has consistently refused to recognize the Babrak
regime or deal directly with it. Islamabad knows that
recognition is its trump card. It"is doubtful that it
would play it until a pull-out of Soviet troops is
largely completed and most of the refugees have returned
to Afghanistan. It will also press Kabul to accept
Pakistan's version of the long--disputed border between
the two countries.
Islamabad supports the Afghan insurgents in order to make
it more difficult for the Soviets to consolidate their
hold on Afghanistan and meddle in Pakistan's restless
borderlands. Further, an active insurgency is crucial to
Pakistan's diplomatic campaign to keep Afghanistan before
world opinion as an issue that can be settled only by the
withdrawal of Soviet troops.
The insurgency and the UN talks enable Islamabad to maintain
high levels of support for its position on Afghanistan in the UN,
the Islamic Conference, and the Non-aligned Movement. This
support strengthens Pakistan's position, at any future bargaining
table, mitigates Soviet pressures, and reassures influential
domestic constituencies in Pakistan that want Islamabad to show
more flexibility. , ` ?
-- Pakistan keeps its channels open to Moscow to reassure
the Soviets that Islamabad has not closed off all its
options in-dealing with them. Islamabad will avoid a
break with Moscow because it worries that the West will
in time forget about Afghanistan or reach an agreement
over Pakistan's head as part of a larger East-West
settlement. Of more immediate concern, we judge, is the
possibility of greater exposure to Soviet pressure if the
US-Pakistan relationship breaks down over Pakistan's
nuclear program.
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-- The refugee problem inside Pakistan has become a major
concern to Islamabad. Rising local resentments and
concern in the Army that the Afghan refugees will become
a permanent burden for Pakistan have added a note of
urgency to Pakistan's search for a political settlement.
Zia and his advisers will have to balance these pressures
with the strong support their Afghanistan policy receives from
conservative religious parties and well-armed Afghan insurgents
at home and vital friends abroad, such as Saudi Arabia, China and
the US.
-- Pakistan would find it more difficult to maintain its
strong stand on Afghanistan if relations with the US
broke down or Beijing appeared ready to trade Afghanistan
for a settlement on the Sino-Soviet border. So far,
however, the Sino-Soviet talks have produced meager
results and China's support for Pakistan has remained
firm. The US connection has begun to produce for
Pakistan--as the arrival of the first six F-16s attest--
although Islamabad will be watching.. to see if aid for
Pakistan passes Congress this spring.
-- Some Pakistani officials advocate a more flexible
position on Afghanistan so Islamabad can better confront
Pakistan's real enemy, India. Growing Indian military
pressure could strengthen this view, although for now Zia
has succeeded in reducing tensions with India by engaging
New Delhi in a dialogue on a nonaggression treaty.
India-Pakistan relations remain unstable, however, and
Islamabad is increasingly concerned about an Indian pre-
emptive strike on its nuclear facilities.
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