MEMORANDUM ON LIBYAN TROUBLE-MAKING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000700760001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 12, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 4, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

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MEMORANDUM TO: C/NE/DDO/AIO
FROM: Chief/NESA/AI/M
SUBJECT: Memorandum on Libyan Trouble-making
1. Attached is the paper you requested cataloguing Libya's
subversive and terrorist activities worldwide. We have organized
it according to geographic areas and have included information
that generally characterizes the scope and nature of Libyan
activity.
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LIBYAN ACTIVITY WORLDWIDE
Beginning about 1975, Libyan leader Qadhafi adopted a policy
of subversive activity, coup plotting, and support for "national
liberation movements" in Latin America, Asia, Africa, and the
Middle East, as well as support for terrorist groups in Western
Europe.
-- His claims are grandiose; he not only wants to protect
vital security interests and maximize Libyan influence
abroad, but he believes he has a unique mission to
restructure society worldwide on the Libyan model.
-- Qadhafi has been unscrupulous in promoting these aims,
and a catalogue of offenses can be documented without
difficulty: three unsuccessful coups against Sudan and
ongoing attempts to unseat Nimeiri; three plots against
Tunisia, the most recent being the Qafsah raid in January
1980; a coup attempt in Niger in 1976; intervention in
Uganda in 1979; the occupation of Chad in 1980.
-- For all his activity, Qadhafi's policies have not been
conspicuously successful. Much of the problem is Libyan
ineptitude. The country lacks a foreign policy
establishment of any competence or depth; such expertise
as had been accumulated was largely frittered away when
Qadhafi began transforming his embassies abroad into
"people's bureaus" in September 1979.
-- Another factor contributing to Libya's lack of success is
Qadhafi's personal direction of Libyan policy, which is
consequently erratic, influenced by Qadhafi's need to
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seek the limelight, and occasionally more doctrinaire
than realistic. Qadhafi's personal abrasiveness also
alienates potential allies.
-- Despite Libya's impressive arsenal and improved
performance in Chad, Qadhafi has only limited ability to
use his conventional military forces to achieve his
sweeping political goals.
-- To the extent that Qadhafi succeeds in influencing the
behavior of his neighbors--and they do on occasion adopt
policies they would prefer to avoid, out of fear--he is
cashing in on his reputation for unscrupulousness and for
virtually universal activity. His reputation for free
spending is also an asset, although this is increasingly
modified by his neighbors' realization that be, frequently
reneges on his promises.
In Africa, Qadhafi's behavior has been somewhat more
circumspect for the past year as a result of his expectation that
he would assume that chairmanship of the OAU in 1982, and his
desire not to antagonize his African colleagues. His loss of the
chairmanship could result in an upsurge of Libyan subversive
activity in Africa. So far, increased activity has concentrated
primarily on Sudan and Chad.
-- In Sudan, Qadhafi is continuing his concerted efforts to
overthrow the Nimeiri regime. Libya is delivering
supplies of increasingly advanced weapons to warring
tribes in western Sudan in an effort to destablize the
government.
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In Chad, Qadhafi has stepped up support to Chadian
dissidents working for the overthrow of Habre. In mid-
January 1983, 12 Libyan SU-22 ground attack fighters were
deployed to the Aozou Strip (the northern portion of
Chad, claimed and annexed by Libya); these aircraft could
supply direct support to the rebels.
The presence of approximately 80 Libyan "advisers" in the
Central African Republic has increased tensions in
Central Africa. The Libyans have set up a military camp
outside of Bangui, and may be assisting Chadian
dissidents opposed to the Habre government.
In Niger, a key Libyan target in West Africa, Libya is
supporting Nigerien dissidents based in Benin, training
other dissidents inside Libya, and encouraging rebellion
by Tuareg nomads.
-- Libya's main ally in West frican subversion is Benin,
where the Libyan People's Bureau numbers almost 100
people; it serves as a transit and recruiting point for
West Africans going to and returning from Libya for
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-- The Libyans have attempted to increase their influence in
Togo through the funding of so-called "Islamic"
activities. An Islamic Cultural Center was opened in
Lome in March 1982, and in December Qadhafi paid all the
expenses for sub-Saharan delegates at an Islamic
Conference designed to trumpet his own ideas.
-- Libya has delivered tanks and-armored cars to Ghana in an
attempt to establish a "special relationship" there.
-- Libya typically tries to exploit its Islamic connection
in an effort to gain influence in Cameroon. In March
1982, security authorities there uncovered an effort to
infiltrate the army and distribute a tract praising
Qadhafi's "Islamic Legions." -
-- Somalia is a Libyan priority target. Libya and Ethiopia
are cooperating to train and equip a 3,000 man anti-Siad
Somali insurgent group, the Somali Salvation Front,
operating out of the Ogaden region of Ethiopia. Libya is
also training Somali dissidents at Sabha, inside Libya.
-- In Uganda, the minister of internal affairs in July 1982
publicly denounced Libyan support to the dissident
Ugandan Freedom Movement, and accused Libya of being its
paymaster.
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In the Middle East, Qadhafi continues to try to promote Arab
unity and the dimunution of Western influence, but his reliance
on terrorism and subversion has alienated virtually all of his
fellow Arabs. Two of his former allies in the Steadfastness
Front, Algeria and the Palestine Liberation organization, have
now fallen away, though Qadhafi is trying to promote the
formation of a rump front that would include only Libya, Syria,
South Yemen, and Iran. F
-- Libya is the second most important source--after Algeria-
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GF.C'RP.T
-of financial, diplomatic, and military support for the
Polisario Front guerrillas fighting against Morocco for
an independent Western Sahara.
-- Despite its previous association with Libya in the
Steadfastness Front, Algeria regards Qadhafi's
expansionist aims in North Africa with considerable
suspicion. Border disputes and rivalry for influence in
Mauritania and within the Polisario Front perennially
strain relations between the two. Libya's efforts to
revive the Steadfastness Front have been largely ignored
by Algeria since Qadhafi's boycott of the Fez summit in
September, which Algeria attended.
-- Despite Qadhafi's visit to Tunisia in February 1982,
which was supposed to effect a reconciliation between the
two countries,
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R RRT
Tunisia continues to view
Qadhafi with suspicion and hostility.
-- Since the late 1960s Libya has supplied money, arms, and
training to a variety of Palestinian groups including the
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine,?the
Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the
Popular Struggle Front, and the Front for the Liberation
of Palestine. Relations between Qadhafi and PLO leader
Yasir Arafat have been strained since Qadhafi publicly
blamed the Palestinians for surrendering to the Israelis
in Lebanon, declaring that they should have committed
suicide first. Libyan support of radical Palestinian
groups is continuing, however.
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-- The Libyans are still committed to their goal of
overthrowing Iraqi President Saddam Husyan--one of their
motives for supporting Iran in the Iran in the Iran-Iraq
war.
-- There were bitter media battles between Libya and Saudi
Arabia throughout 1982, particularly after Saudi
religious scholars formally branded Qadhafi an unbeliever
and a heretic in March.
two countries eased somewhat following Libyan overtures
to Saudi Arabia at the end of 1982; the Saudis did agree
to replace their Ambassador in Tripoli, but have not lost
their mistrust of Qadhafi's intentions.
-- Qadhafi would like to engineer the overthrow of Sultan
Qabus of Oman in retaliation for his support of the Camp
David agreements and for giving the US access to Omani
military facilities. Libya has on occasion provided
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limited military training and funds to the Popular Front
for the Liberation of Oman, based in South Yemen, and has
publicly proclaimed his willingness to support it with
money and arms. 0
Libya has been providing some financial and military
support for factions of the South Yemeni-backed National
Democratic Front, a collection of individuals and groups
that has been building a military and political base in
North Yemen in an effort to gain power there. F7
Relations between Libya and Iran had been strained
following the 1978 disappearance of the Shia Imam Musa
Sadr while visiting Libya, but improved when Tehran began
to seek allies after the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war.
Libya was the first Arab state to support Iran's position
in the war, and soon began providing modest amounts of
military supplies to the Iranians and to Iraqi dissidents
based in Iran. A memorandum of understanding for
cooperation in political, cultural, and economic fields was
signed between the two countries in December 1982.
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-- In 1980, Qadhafi reportedly offered Afghan Foreign
Minister Dost $3 million for the construction of a mosque
and an Islamic university. In February 1982, Afghan
officials announced publicly that Libya had promised to
finance several unspecified development projects in
Afghanistan. Libya (with Syria and South Yemen) voted
against the UN resolution demanding Soviet withdrawal
from Afghanistan.
-- There are an estimated 70,000 Pakistani professional,
skilled, and unskilled workers, including military
advisers, in Libya--perhaps as many as 100,000 if family
members are included. In the fall of 1981, relations
were strained over reports of some 3,000 Pakistani
workers, initially recruited as security guards, who had
been forced into Libyan military camps, trained in
guerrilla warfare, and readied for shipment to Chad and
other destinations; the Libyans agreed to return them to
Pakistan when the story came out. Relations continue
cool because of Libyan support, including training, for
the anti-Pakistan "Al Zulfidar" terrorist organization,
and because of Qadhafi's public criticism of Pakistan's
domestic policies and the US-Pakistan relationship.
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RF.C'RFT
Libyan activity in Latin America is largely motivated by
Qadhafi's desire to strike at the US by undercutting its
interests in its historical sphere of influence. Efforts are
still small-scale, and are focused on supplying Salvadoran
insurgents and on the English-speaking Caribbean.
Libya gave Nicaragua a loan of
$100 million and is providing economic and military
advice to the regime.
-- Libya has been attempting to make inroads among radicals
in the English-speaking Caribbean since 1979, recently
concentrating on Granada, where Qadhafi has worked hard
to cultivate the Bishop regime. The Libyans have
reportedly offered Grenada a four million dollar loan,
but Grenada has had difficulty persuading the Libyans to
implement past promises of financial support. Libyan aid
to the Grenadan government has thus far been slight, and
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included three fiberglass power boats equipped with radar
for use in patroling the coastline.
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-- There are some indications that the Libyans regard
Venezuela as a potential center of Libyan activity in
Latin America.
-- Qadhafi attempted to gain favor with Argentina by taking
its side in the Falklands conflict. The Libyan media
defended the Argentine position,
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S R .T
Libya's relations with West European governments reached a
low point in 1980, when Libyan hit squads murdered ten Libyan
dissidents in Rome, London, Bonn, Athens, Milan, and Manchester,
England. When Qadhafi abandoned the policy, West European
governments responded by seeking to maintain or improve their
ties with Libya, arguing that isolation would drive Libya more
firmly into the socialist camp.
-- Libya probably does not directly support West German
terrorist organizations, but groups like the Red Army
Faction and the Revolutionary Cells have received
training and aid from Libyan-backed Palestinian groups.
-- A Danish newspaper reported in February 1982 that the
Libyan diplomatic mission had sought to increase its
political influence in Denmark in recent months, and that
in cooperation with Denmark's Left Socialist Party, it
had launched a campaign aimed at smearing the US and
other NATO allies. Libya reportedly established a
Danish-Libyan friendship association whose chairman,
Danish author Arne Pettersen, was under indictment for
espionage in connection with the expulsion of a Soviet
embassy official accused of passing money to pro-Soviet
groups.
-- Libyan activities in Greece are expanding. Qadhafi gave
modest financial assistance to Prime Minister
Papandreou's Panhellenic Socialist Movement and other
leftist organizations, but official relations between
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S prRFT
Greece and Libya have actually deteriorated since
Papandreou took power, as a result of Qadhafi's attempts
to dictate policy and to link economic aid to the removal
of US military bases.
Libyan influence in Malta had been expanding until June
1980, when Prime Minister Mintoff rebuffed Qadhafi's
efforts to secure military facilities there and closed
Libya's radio station in Malta. In August 1980, Libyan
ships and aircraft forced the removal of a drilling rig
commissioned by Malta to explore in disputed waters.
Relations improved after a surprise visit by Qadhafi in
March 1982 and an agreement to refer the boundary dispute
to the International Court of Justice. Despite the ups
and downs in relations, Libya has continued to?use Malta
as an outlet for anti-US propaganda. Its Libyan Arab
Popular Office is putting out a series of anti-US
publications, which it distributes free, and a Libyan-
owned publishing company in Malta publishes anti-US
English language books and a weekly newspaper and
magazine.
Libya has tried sporadically in recent years to use the
economic ties that bind Italy and Libya to goad Rome into
backing Libya's policies. In 1982, the Libyans put
pressure on the Italian government by refusing to pay
large debts owed to Italian firms until Italy agreed to
purchase additional amounts of Libyan oil. [Libya has
also tried to foment anti-NATO feeling in Sicily, and has
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There have been Libyan attempts to manipulate the Italian
media by bribing newspapers to print interviews with
Qadhafi and articles favorable to his regime. The Libyan
news agency effectively controls a Rome-based private
television station that frequently broadcasts pro-Libyan
programs.
-- Libya is rumored to be involved with both Azorean and
Madeiran separatist groups; Qadhafi has publicly labeled
both archipelagos as "African" islands
under-Portuguese
colonial occupation.
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Libyan involvement in East Asia is small-scale, and largely
limited to support for dissident Muslim groups. Following
Qadhafi's trip to North Korea in November 1982, a Friendship and
Cooperation Treaty was signed between the two countries which
provided, among other things, for the exchange of military
intelligence and specialists; bound each side to try to supply
the other with any weapons it might lack; and committed each side
to render military and material support to the other in the event
of aggression--or even threat of aggression--by "imperialisms and
their minions." El
-- The Thai government is convinced that Libya is providing
training and financial support to Muslim terrorist bandit
groups operating along the Thai-Malaysian border.
According to the Thai colonel who is chairman of the
Thai-Malaysian Border Cooperation office, aid from Libya
and Syria to the terrorists passes through Indonesia and
Malaysia as well as directly to Thailand.
-- The Libyan embassy in Malaysia finances overseas studies
for Muslim secessionist students; there are rumors the
students receive guerrilla training while abroad.
-- Libya had been the most important arms supplier and
source of financial support for the southern Phillippines
Moro National Liberation Front for years. In late 1979,
however, the Filipino Minister of Labor visited Tripoli
and concluded agreements providing for a substantial
increase in the number of Filipino workers in Libya, as
well as Filipino involvement in several important joint
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construction projects there. Since that time, the arms
flow from Libya to the MNLF seems to have largely dried
up--though some officials involved in carrying out the
actual fighting remain suspicious. n
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SUBJECT: Memorandum on Libyan Trouble-making
DISTRIBUTION:
2 - Addressee
4 - CPAS/IMD/CB (No Further Dissem)
1 - C/PES
1 - D/NESA
2 - NESA/PS
1 - C/NESA/AI
2 - NESA/AI/M
DDI/NESA/AI/M I(4 Feb 83)
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