IRAN: EXPORT OF THE REVOLUTION--A STATUS REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000700560001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 11, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 15, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

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Central Intelligence Agency
-I I-A
Washington, D. C. 20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
15 February 1983
Summary
The Khomeini regime is committed to spreading its Islamic
ideology and enhancing its role in international politics. (see
Annex) It perceives this, in part, as a struggle against US and
Soviet interests. From the Iranian perspective, no clear
distinction exists between its 'export of the revolution"--or
tabligat in an parlence--and so-called normal diplomatic
activities.
Close to home, Iran faces a major hurdle in exporting its
Islamic revolution due to the antipathy between Shia and Sunni
Moslems and between Persians and Arabs. Gulf states' Sunni Arab
majorities may prove to be a natural barrier to the spread of the
revolution. Still, the Iranians probably are convinced they can
overcome these sectarian differences and exploit the same popular
return to Islam and grievances against corruption and the spread
of Western, secular influences in the Gulf that led to the
downfall of the Shah. FI
This memorandum was prepared byl lof the Office of
Near East/South Asia Analysis. comments are welcome and may be
addressed to the Chief, Persian Gulf Division,
Copy j of
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Iranian leaders--both clerics and laymen--assert publicly
and privately that Iran's revolutionary experience provides
valuable lessons not only to Moslem communities, but to all
peoples "oppressed by Eastern or Western imperialism". They
consider worldwide propagation of their revolutionary Islamic
tenets and experiences a politico-religious obligation.
Tehran's international activities were unfocused and badly
organized until early 1982 when a degree of domestic stability
and higher oil revenues allowed the regime to devote more
resources to exporting its revolutionary ideals. The ill-fated
coup attempt in Bahrain seemed to emphasize to the regime the
need for greater central control over the types of activities and
methods it employed. Reporting from a variety of sources shows
that the ruling clerics still disagree on how aggressively
tabligat should be pursued, but not whether.
Our review of Iranian activities in 1982 shows that Tehran
is not limiting its efforts to export the ideals of its
revolution to any particular country or region. (see Annex) The
Khomeini regime, however, wants to play a leading role in
international forums as a leader of the Third World and has aimed
many of its activities at those countries. Public remarks of
Iranian leaders suggest they believe that their international
activities will enhance their hold on power in Iran by creating a
supportive global network of ideological sympathies and shared
economic and political interests and experiences.
Tehran's export of the revolution presents a twofold
challenge to US interests. First, Iranian leaders are exploiting
the appeal of their successes against the Shah, the West, and
Iraq to attract dissident groups and individuals of widely
differing ideologies. Iran provides training and support on a
significant scale for many of them. The activities of such
groups are likely to be directed against pro-Western governments
and individuals. Some may be aimed at US installations and
personnel.
Second, the Khomeini regime presents a broader challenge
through its increasingly sophisticated political maneuvering with
Third World governments designed to reduce US influence. Iran
uses its oil as a bargaining tool to gain political support or at
least neutrality from other countries. Iran's ability to assume
a leading role in international forums on behalf of the Third
World and against the US has been limited, but would be
strengthened by extended Iranian domestic stability and Tehran's
ability to dictate the terms of a settlement in its war with
Background
During the period between the fall of the Shah and early
1982, the Khomeini regime's efforts to expand its tips abroad
were largely unfocused and ineffective, according to
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overt information. To a large extent this
resulted from wide variations in the views of Iranian leaders
over how aggressively to pursue export of the revolution, or
tabligat. In addition, the chaos of the post-revolutionary
period allowed individuals and groups who had relationships with
foreign dissidents or Moslem communities to propagandize or
provide aid and paramilitary training with little or no central
control, according to reliable sources. The aborted coup plot in
Bahrain staged in December 1981 was arranged through such
standing contacts.
During this early period, when those supporting aggressive
tabligat clashed with those wedded to using diplomatic practice,
we believe the views of the more radical individual or project
usually prevailed. The most important brakes on the radicals
then were domestic problems, declining financial resources,
inexperience in running a government and operating in the
diplomatic arena, and difficulties in organizing activities
abroad and training programs at home.
Gaining Greater Control
By early 1982, the regime began to centralize, systematize,
and broaden its revolutionary program. It was aided in this by
the virtual elimination of the clerics' leftist and Westernized
lay rivals, growing cohesion of Iran's new "Islamic" system, and
burgeoning oil revenues. The appointment last November of the
new Islamic Guidance Minister, Hojjat ol-Eslam Khatemi, was part
of this consolidation process.1 In his first public statement
after taking office, Khatemi called for "a strategy for informing
the world's people about the Islamic revolution in keeping with
good taste and propriety." He added that every would-be Iranian
spokesman must have "security clearance" from his Ministry for
such activity.
Two weeks later the Prime Minister ordered the Foreign
Ministry to advise all missions abroad that no one without
specific authorization from Tehran was to be allowed to present
themselves to the local government or press as an Iranian
spokesman. The Iranian press noted that his order was in
response to "numerous cases" in which such activities had "caused
great harm" to Iranian interests.
1 The Islamic Guidance Ministry replaced the National Guidance
Ministry in August 1981. Its mandate is to oversee the
application of Islamic principles to Iranian affairs at home and
abroad. Khatemi's predecessor--also a cleric--resigned in August
1982, probably because of factional infighting.
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In December, the Iranian press reported an appeal to
Ayatollah Montazeri, Khomeini's heir apparent, by the head of the
Revolutionary Guard's Liberation Movements Department for
authorization to continue tabligat programs the Guard had
begun. Montazeri's subsequent, widely-publicized decree backed
him--the two are brothers-in-law--but also insisted that all such
Guard activities be coordinated with the Foreign Ministry. The
decree also indicated that an independent cleric-led panel might
have to be named to guide tabligat activities because of the
"bureaucratic problems"--read factional disputes--within
governmental organs. F__1
At about the same time the Iranian press also carried a
statement by President Khamenei calling for "clarification of
Iran's position toward all states". Ayatollah Montazeri told
reporters, however, that the Majles is unlikely soon to be able
to provide such clarification--presumably reinforcing his own
call for an interim clerical panel to provide guidance on foreign
associations.2
Disagreements Among Iranian Leaders
Still, significant disagreement seems to exist among Iran's
leading clerics over how aggressively to export their
revolutionary ideals,
Iranian leaders publicly advocate activities ranging
from propaganda to paramilitary training for dissident groups.
Leadership factions centering on this issue are not stable and
often fluctuate and compromise to avoid open and harmful
disputes.
2 We note the regime's lack of success in its efforts to
legislate resolutions to other issues controversial among the
ruling clerics--land reform, foreign trade nationalization, labor
relations. The regime has instead resorted to ad hoc regulations
and panels while prolonged negotiations among rival factions
continue.
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The most conservative interpretation of tabligat is
advocated by lesser clerical and lay figures who support only
international diplomatic activities compatible with traditional
Moslem practices, such as expanded contacts with clerics and
Moslem communities abroad. r
Most prominent Iranian officials, such as President
Khamenei, Majles Speaker Rafsanjani, Prime Minister Musavi, and
Foreign Minister Velayati, seem to take a pragmatic approach that
puts them between the more radical and more conservative
advocates. Overt information
indicate they generally believe that tabligat should be employed
to help reestablish Iran's international diplomatic and economic
relationships, to cultivate support wihin the Nonaligned Movement
and other Third World groups, and to improve domestic economic
and social conditions. Nonetheless, the exigencies of the
domestic power struggle, willo_f_$en lead them to support more
aggressive policies abroad.
Propaganda support. to regional Moslem groups seeking to
establish Islamic governments or active against Israel seems to
be the least controversial among Iranian leaders. Most leaders
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also are willing to aid some non-Moslem "liberation movements"
and Third World governments perceived to be anti-US and--more
recently--anti-Soviet. Diplomatic and economic contacts with
"anti-imperialist" regimes are now expanding rapidly. It has
recently broadened its diplomatic relations with China,
Nicaragua, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe and expanded its economic ties
with Brazil, Kenya, Sierra Leone, and Sri Lanka.
Methods
The Iranian clerics' tactics for exporting the revolution
are based primarily on those used successfully against the Shah
and range from normal diplomatic activity to coercion, such as
the public and private pressures Tehran is putting on Gulf states
to reduce their support for Iraq.
Iran also is likely to remain interested in active measures
and may employ them against Gulf governments in an effort to
establish regimes more amenable to it and more sympathetic to
local Shia populations. The most notorious effort in that
direction was the ill-fated coup attempt in Bahrain in late
1981. It was executed by supporters of aggressive export of the
revolution--apparently without official sanction by the Khomeini
regime.
When the plot was exposed, Tehran publicly supported the
Bahraini dissidents, but denied any Iranian involvement.
Although its objectives remain unchanged, Iran's recent
methods seem to focus on seminars, propaganda, and less
aggressive and flamboyant cultivation of local dissidents in the
Gulf states. The Khomeini regime exploits established religious
networks and focuses on students, teachers, and the urban poor.
I Tehran also uses cassette recordings
extensively in its proselytizing. It is expanding Iranian radio
and television broadcast facilities used to beam propaganda
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Iranian diplomats use their missions as propaganda and
recruitment centers, according to State Department reporting
Cleric-led delegations have fanned out
around the world to open contacts and explain the new Islamic
Republic. The Khomeini regime stages widely-publicized, expense-
paid conferences and seminars in Iran and abroad designed to
foster contacts and to spread its revolutionary experiences and
4
principles.
Tehran staged several well-publicized conventions in 1982.
In June, a "world conference of liberation movements" was staged
in Tehran. In the fall, Iran sponsored conferences in several
Third World capitals to indoctrinate with anti-Saudi and anti-US
propaganda participants in he yearly Moslem pilgrimage (Haj) to
holy sites in Saudi Arabia. In December, Moslem clerics from 40
nations convened in Tehran to "lay the groundwork for Islamic
governments throughout the world", according to Iranian press
accounts. At the same time, the Iranians staged Moslem "unity"
conferences in India, Kenya and Sri Lanka.
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- Many of these activities are sponsored by the Islamic
Students' Society, which was active during the anti-Shah movement
inside Iran and abroad. The Society seems to be controlled by
"students following the Imam's line", such as those who took over
the US Embassy in Tehran. Its members play a leading role in
some Iranian Embassies and Consulates abroad. ~
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Arab Moslem regimes remain suspicious of Iranian intentions,
in part, because of the Iranian clerics' desire to break the
Sunni Moslem hold on power in many of these countries and
establish a greater role for local Shia populations. Much of the
Iranian effort among Moslems is designed to reduce the influence
of Saudi Arabia, whose leaders the Khomeini regime sees as
corrupt Western lackeys.
Challenges to US Interests
The challenge of Iran's tabligat program to US interests is
twofold. First, a threat to pro-Western governments and,
possibly, US installations and representatives through support
for selected dissident groups and some terrorist activity.
Second, the reduction of Western, especially US influence
worldwide through creation of coordinated initiatives by Third
World states inside or outside of established international
forums.
Iran's continued substantial oil revenues, championing of
Islamic causes, and success in the war with Iraq give it the
image of a winner and allow it to attract, train, and support
like-minded dissidents. As Iranian officials charged with
responsibilities for agressive tabligat further develop expertise
and international contacts, they will be able to use their assets
more effectively to advance Iranian interests. The conservative
states of the Persian Gulf are a high priority target. The goals
are first to secure neutralism in Iran's war with Iraq, then to
alter policies, through intimidation if necessary, and finally to
encour of Islamic governments in the Iranian
mold.
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Meanwhile, the Khomeini regime's diplomatic maneuvering
among Third World regimes is persistent and increasingly
sophisticated. It has so far attracted little following besides
a few of the more radical Arab states. Iranian spokesmen,
especially President Khamenei, however, continue to propose
programs designed to appeal to Third World governments, reduce
the influence of Western governments, and assert Iranian
leadership in international forums. These include such things as
a multinational fund to underwrite the expenses of international
organizations from which the US withholds contributions, and the
encouragement of Moslem dissident groups to use the phenomenon of
revitalized Islam to weaken Western influences.
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SUBJECT: Iran: Export of the Revolution--A Status Report
NESA M 83-10033C
SC-00371/83
Distribution:
Copy 1 - DCI
2 - DDCI
3 - DCI/ExDir
4 - DCI/SA/IA
5 - Exec Registry
6 - State, Nicholas Veliotes
7 - State, Philip Stoddard
8 - INR/NESA, George Harris
9 - NEA/IRN, Ralph E. Lindstrom
10 - DOD, Paul Phayer
11 - DOD/ISA, Francis West
12 - DOD/ISA, Philip Mahew
13 - DOD/ISA, Maj Gen Richard V. Secord
14 - NSC Staff, Geoffrey Kemp
15 - Director, DIA
16 - Director, NSA
17 - JCS, Lt Gen Phillip Gast
18 - JCS, Asst to Chrm, Lt Gen Paul Gorman
19 - DOA, DCS/OPS, Lt Gen William R. Richardson
20 - DDI
21 - C/DDO/NE
22 - NIO/NESA
23 - NIO/GPF
24 - D/CPAS
25 - D/OIA
26 - D/SOVA
27 - C/PES
28 - C/NIC
29 - D/NESA
30 - C/NESA/PG/D
31 - C/NESA/PG/I
32 - C/NESA/PG/P
33-34 - NESA/PS
35 - CPAS/FLS
36 - PDB Staff
37-40 - CPAS/CMD/CB
41 - NESA/PG/I
42 - NESA/PG/D chrono
43 - NESA/PG/I chron
44 - SO/I:
DDI/NESA/PG/I:
(15 February 1983)
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