AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000700540002-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 10, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: February 8, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
Top Secret
Afghanistan Situation Report
8 February 1983
Top Secret
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e ruary 1983
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Recent articles and lectures could be preparing the Soviet public
for a prolonged and costly involvement in Afghanistan.
IN BRIEF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
PERSPECTIVE
PAKISTAN: IMPLICATIONS OF AFGHAN REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT IN PUNJAB . . 6
Pakistan's proposal to move 200,000 unregistered Afghan refugees
from the North-West Frontier Province to camps in Punjab is a
measure of the increasing strain on the national government to
care for the large Afghan refugee population, estimated at more
than 2 million.
This document is prepared weekly by the Office of Near East/South Asia
and the Office of Soviet Analysis. Questions or comments on the issues
raised in the publication should be directed to
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Afghan Refugee Resettlement in the Punjab
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Comment: The free market money bazaar is an extralegal, but
integral part, of the financial sector of Afghanistan. It
probably finances more commercial transactions than the state-
owned banks. Money bazaar dealers are notoriously reticent about
revealing details of their freewheeling and profitable dealings.
Despite the criticism from the Khalqis and the potential
embarassment to the Soviets, the Afghan Government could use the
scandal to crack down on currency speculation, which takes
advantage of the differential between the bazaar rate and the
bank rate. The scandal, however, underscores corruption within
the Babrak regime and among Soviet officials in Afghanistan.
NEW CANDOR IN SOVIET DOMESTIC TREATMENT OF WAR
Komsomolskaya Pravda. acknowledged Saturday that three more
Soviet soldiers were killed in Afghanistan. Red Star carried an
article the following day comparing the Afghan insurgents to
Nazis, claiming they have killed thousands of Afghans in their
efforts to overthrow the regime in Kabul.
Last week, Soviet lecturers in Moscow were unusually frank in
acknowledging the blunders of the Afghan Communists during the
eras of both Taraki and Amin. They admitted that the "godless
Communist" Babrak Karmal faced an uphill struggle in attracting
support for his government's much more pragmatic policies in a
land where the economic level and class consciousness of the
people were low. Finally, the lecturers asserted that with the
US sending increasing amounts of aid to the resistance and
improving its military position in the region, Soviet national
interests required that the USSR continue to do its
internationalist duty in Afghanistan.
Comment: The Soviets have previously admitted only two other
fatalities in Afghanistan, and only a dozen articles over the
last three years have acknowledged the problems the Soviets face
there or indirectly hinted at Soviet participation in combat.
Most of these--such as those that appeared in Red Star in
December--were probably timed to counter Western press attention
to Afghanistan around the anniversary of the invasion.
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The two new articles, which came soon after a recent
conference of propagandists in Moscow, suggest that the more open
media handling of Soviet internal affairs will also apply to the
USSR's treatment of its Afghan problem. The comparison of Afghan
insurgents to Nazis and the invocation of a threat to Soviet
security interests are themes intended to appeal to Soviet
patriotism. The articles and lectures could be intended to
undercut domestic griping about the high costs of the war or
prepare the public for a prolonged if not intensified,
involvement in Afghanistan.
-- Press reports state that Afghan Minister of Defense Lt.
General Abdul Qader arrived in Moscow on 4 February... Qader has
met with Soviet Defense Minister Ustinov and probably talked
about Soviet aid and perhaps the Cordovez mission..
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PERSPECTIVE
PAKISTAN: IMPLICATIONS OF AFGHAN REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT IN PUNJAB
by NESA
Pakistan has proposed to move 200,000 unregistered Afghan refugees
from the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) to camps in Punjab in order
to relieve overcrowding and political and economic pressures in the
NWFP. The proposal is a measure of the increasing strain on the
national government to care for the large Afghan refugee population.
Punjabi officials have taken a strong stand on accepting no more than
200,000 refugees, only a tenth of the number estimated officially to be
We believe that the prospect of permanently integrating several
million Afghans into a society that has already absorbed huge refugee
flows, first at the time of partition from India in 1947 and again after
2 the separation of the eastern wing (Bangladesh) in 1971, could excite
Punjabi fears of inundation by still another wave of outsiders in areas
that have heretofore been little concerned with the Afghan troubles.
The US Embassy speculates that Pakistan is fast approaching the
saturation point for the total number of refugees that the country can
absorb without tearing its already fragile political, social, and
economic fabric. Islamabad is gambling that moving the predominantly
Pushtun Afghan refugees out of traditional Pushtun areas in the NWFP can
be accomplished peacefully and that resettlement in Punjab will proceed
with minimum damage to the province's social and economic well-being.
Although most refugees still believe that they will eventually return
home and Pakistani officials frequently reiterate this sentiment, we do
not believe that repatriation is likely in the near future given the
present state of war and politics in Afghanistan. The move to Punjab
will reinforce perceptions among all Pakistanis that the bulk of the
refugees will not return to Afghanistan, according to a US Embassy
analysis.
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Resettlement Plans
Approximately 6,000 refugees were transferred from the NWFP to Punjab
between 15 December and 12 January, according to a US Embassy report.
According to the Pakistani press, a total of 40,000 refugees are to be
moved by mid-April. Elaborate planning has been completed for
resettlement, camp administrators have been appointed, the campsite
prepared, and coordination with the United Nations High Commission for
According to US Embassy reporting,
sensitivities were involved in the
provincial government to move refugees
to a camp in a nonborder province.
relatively
refugee interaction with Punjabis and
province's economy.
to limit their impact on the
The Punjab government plans to concentrate the refugees in two
adjacent camps of 100,000 residents each. The first site, called
Islamnagar, was opposed by UN, government of Pakistan, and NWFP
officials who charged that it was too hilly and excessively hot and
lacked adequate water. Nonetheless, the Punjab governor insisted on
this location, and by the middle of December 1982, the US Embassy
reported that the land had been leveled, wells had been dug, home lots
had been laid out, and plans completed for the installation of
dispensaries, schools, mosques, shopping areas, and, in the longer term,
geodesic dome housing. Despite the ambitious plans, first arrivals were
to be issued only tents, quilts, kerosene stoves, and food rations, and
they were to have no amenities other than water.
For Islamabad, the overriding positive result of the transfer of the
refugees is the relief that it affords the NWFP, where land available
for refugee settlement is fast disappearing and pressures on the fragile
environment--notably on forest and water resources--are mounting. The
refugees sheltered in the official camps, representing about one in
every seven persons in the province, have nearly saturated the physical
resources of the area. The tens of thousands of unregistered refugees
not in camps and the few thousand a month still trickling into the area
from Afghanistan--who comprise the population to be resettled in the
considerable political and social
decision by the national and
for the first time from the NWFP
The location of the camp, in the
of Punjab was chosen to minimize
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Punjabi Concerns: Ethnic Conflict and Job Competition
We believe that social and economic pressures that the refugee
transfer will create are clearly of concern to Punjabi authorities, even
j though they are reluctant to acknowledge op ssible problems and want the
~
camps in their province to be showpieces.
By settling refugees in the Punjab, Islamabad loses the advantage of
the ethnic and linguistic compatibility that now exists between the
Afghan and Pakistani Pushtun populations in the NWFP. Although there
are some Pushtun-speaking people in. the new campsite area, the US
Embassy expects possible ethnic confrontations if the refugees leave the
immediate areas and compete for jobs with Punjabis. We believe that the
Afghan Pushtuns' distinctive cultural and ethnic behavior could also
spark conflict. They will not be able to blend easily into the
population of Punjabi-speaking areas, which, unlike the immediate border
areas where the refugees are now confined, have so far not had to play
host to Afghan tribesmen on yearly migration or as seasonal work-
seekers. The cultural and tribal setting that has madei feasible the
reception of the Afghans in the NWFP is absent in Punjab.
1,3
quickly return.
We believe that there is basis to Punjabi rumors, reported by Western
observers, that Afghans will displace locals in an already tight job
market. Refugees in the NWFP have already become a force in the labor
market there, according to local officials. They are employed in large
numbers on construction sites, on roadbuilding crews, and with local
transportation companies. In Baluchistan the government has attempted
to isolate refugee camps from local job markets in an effort to address
local Baluchi fear of becoming a minority in their own province.
Despite these efforts, the streets of Quetta are crowded with Afghans
(local officials estimate some 100,000 are resident) and, although
periodically rounded up by authorities and sent back to the camps, they
Western observers note further that the establishment of the camps in
Punjab is likely to be perceived by Pakistanis as a government move
toward de facto assimilation that will eventually result in a permanent
Afghan presence. We believe that complaints about the refugees may
become widespread and vehement. Even now newspaper editorials voice
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even though they are employed in the local economy.
concern that Afghans overcrowd public facilities such as hospitals and
bazaars, that they contribute to inflation and lower local living
standards, and that they receive free food, shelter, and medical care
e re ugees and control problems for the Pakistani Government.
Refugee Concerns: A Hostile Environment
The refugees' uncertain future will be further undercut, in our
opinion, as large numbers are moved arbitrarily from Pushtun areas into
potentially hostile areas. In our view, the added distance of the new
camps from the border and from Peshawar, where the resistance
organization headquarters are located, will make the Punjabi sites
particularly unpopular with the mujahadeen among the transferred
peoples. We do not believe that assurances from Pakistani officials
that families will be kept together in the new camps and that every
effort will be made to respect ethnic and tribal concerns will overcome
the reluctance of the refugees to move. We therefore expect the refugee
transfer to the new camps to create morale and adjustment problems for
th f
Outlook.
Our assessment is that popular resentment could be exploited by
opposition politicians as the presence of the largely Pushtun refugee
burden begins to fall on nontribal people outside the two border
provinces. As the politically dominant province in Pakistan, complaints
3 from Punjab about the refugees will be loudly heard in Islamabad and
could heighten already major concerns about the eventual outcome of the
refugee problem. The government will have difficulty limiting the
Afghans to a noneconomic role in Punjab, in our opinion, and conflicts
over job competition could present situations easily manipulated into
We believe refugee uncertainties of their future will be reinforced
and tensions among them more pronounced as thousands are arbitrarily
moved, underlining the full import of their dependence on Pakistani
decisions. Although we are sure the Pakistani Government is prepared
and able to enforce its will on refugee resettlement, Afghans are a
volatile people, well armed and troublesome, and could be a source of
tee.-,,..._ ,--? --~ - .. _
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