THAI MILITARY ACTIONS AGAINST NARCOTICS TRAFFICKERS

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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP85T00287R000600300001-4
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RIPPUB
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S
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11
Document Creation Date: 
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date: 
July 20, 2010
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1
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Publication Date: 
March 23, 1983
Content Type: 
MEMO
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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/21 :CIA-RDP85T00287R000600300001-4 en ra n e ige ce ency MEMORANDUM: FOR:. Nirs._Judy,Rouse - Office of Program Management Bureau of International Narcotics Matters Department of State - Thai-Burma border.in-1982:. 25X1 25X1 2. This memorandum was: prepared by Strategic ~~ 25X1 Narcotics Branch,:.International.Security Issues Division, Office of Global Issues and was coordinated with the Directorate of` Operations. 3. Comments- and-_ queries- are: welgome,and the Chief., :Stra.tegic: Narcotics. B Attachment: ranch,.: OGL. Thailand: Military Actions Against Narcotics .25X1 25X1- 25X1 -25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 ie , tra egic arcotics Branch, Tnternati~.nal. Security Issues Division, Office of Global Issues SUBJECT: Thai Military Actions Aganst.Narcotics- Traff ickers 1. The attached memgrandum,,Thailand: Military Actions Against Narcotics Traffickers, reviews Thai military actions against the SUA and other narcotics traffickers along the Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/21 :CIA-RDP85T00287R000600300001-4 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/21 :CIA-RDP85T00287R000600300001-4 OGI/ISI D/NAR,~ Distribution: 1 - Addressee 1 - Ch/ISID 1 _- Ch/ISID/NAR 8 - OGI/PS (March 1983) Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/21 :CIA-RDP85T00287R000600300001-4 25X1 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/21 :CIA-RDP85T00287R000600300001-4 c.enuai intenigence Rene} D:~R~E`C~OR~E- OLD ::fNT E.L LLCEyCE ~3- Afiar~Ch-:19-83. Thailand: Military Actions Against Narcotics Traffickers Summary Since January 1982,-Thai military aetians aimed at narcotics traffickers along the Thai-Burma border have done much to disrupt narcotics operations. The Thai actions against the narcotics trafficking activities of the Shan United Arrrry FSUA) and. other trafficking groups have inhibited the trafficking groups ability to operate freely in the border area but have not permanently affected the region's capability to supply Za.rge quanti-ties of narcotics to regional and international markets. Despite Thai antinareoties efforts, competing economic, political, and .security-demands coupZed._witlt the resiliency of narcotics traffickers keep prospects for controlling the=narcotics trade in addressed to the Chief;--.Strategic `Naric;oties'_Br.~nc~~, ~QCL.; Issues.. This analysis. is based. on information available as of 15 . March- 1983_.:___Comments and queries ,care; welcome and- may be ~ 25X1 International Security Issues Division, 0 ice o o a This memorandum ruse prepared by Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/21 :CIA-RDP85T00287R000600300001-4 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/21 :CIA-RDP85T00287R000600300001-4 SECRET theGolden.--Tra:ngae~ is. produc'e~d:?-~ The--a?rea .is~ idea .ly. sui.ted. to .? Narcotics Trafficking along the Thai-Burma Border The rugged area along the Thai-Burma border is the center of narcotics trafficking and heroin processing in Southeast Asia. Various ethnically based insurgent and warlord groups move raw. opium from-.grow-ing-areas in northern Burma to clandestine heroin laboratories at the border where most of the heroin exported from n arcot?rc's-= traff ft:3c~ng? KKY..__ Some_.returned.-_to__the-...goyernmerit~.fo:],.d_:wh~~e.'c~the~s~~moved warlord armies as-mobile .militias. Called Ka Kwei Yei (KKY), they were-given pa tents.-by the central. government to engage in smuggling in return fo`r~their commitment to~fight the Burmese Communist-"nsurgen.ts _-.; I~n the.:-early'19.70s-:, .Rangoon. outlawed: the- Chinese~~)=~:Army in northern~ Burma. ?-? After- the- war, -some- remained as KMT units- fighting--the-.Chinese--Comma-n-fists-while: others. turned:-to smuggling narcotics. .,In 1967, confronted with a Chinese backed Burmese Communist Party.:. insurgency,. Rangoon.~deputized 50 of .-these cu-ltivators :in~.Burma normally~~produce .500 to 600 tons of opium annualYy; and Thailand produces some` 50 to 70 tons per year. Much, of both crops is available for~expart. A good transportation system through Thailand:facilitates the transport of chemical supplies from well established sources in Malaysia and easy access to-both regional. and international markets for processed narcotics. Opxrnr:-supplies-:?are?--readily-ava-lable.?--~ Hilltribe-- government attacks. The rugged terrain along the and- often provides sanctuary border is difficult to police f of traf f cke-rs aga i ns t Both Burma and Thailand have far years ignored the border area and were in large part responsible for the establishment of the armies that subsequently turned.. to narcatics-trafficking in the area. During the Sino-Japanese~War and World War II many of these groups were mobili-zed into the Kuomintang .(Nationalist: deeply in.tQ_.naroQtzc~_t~a_#~_i~k:i_n~~~:_.a thr__vi_ng ...ndustry as the war -expanded. in Vietnam...: TIz"e Chinese Irreguhar` Forces- (CIF) and the - Shan -United Army.. (,S.UA~. eme-rged--. as . tlae.:: major trafficking .gr.oups, with operations- centered-~ i n Thai land:--- I?n:. 1975` the Burnra~ -Army -dealt a serious blow: to the trafficking activities of the CIF. . Subsequently the SUA emerged as the most important trafficking organization along the border, and by T981, according to US Embassy sources, it controlled 70 percent of the narcotics processing and trafficking in the Golden Triangle. Operating out of the fortified village of Ban Hin Taek, Thailand, the SUA also had military bases in northern Chiang Rai Province--to protect its largest refining complex in the Lao Lo Chai area--and in Mae Hong Son Province. 0 2 ecrn~m Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/21 :CIA-RDP85T00287R000600300001-4 .25X1; Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/21 :CIA-RDP85T00287R000600300001-4 Thai Military Actions _ The Thai government tole rated the operations of these trafficking groups because they provided a buffer against Communist encroachments. However, within the past few years, publicity detailing the intent of SUA. trafficking. operations and the-- loca-tio.n--of-: i.ts__.headgua.rte_rs:._: a.t_ .Ban. Hin Taek reflected. negative-ly.-_ori~ thy-.gove:rnmeri-t'`s-__comTTrr.tmenf to narcotics control. Cansegue.ntl:.y_ ,ixt J_anu?a~ry-~F9~82--the Tfa_zArmy-moved against :the--SUA ~._ .- -- headcluar.te_rs~at~Ban Hiri~ Tack in__ari ~~US~-isupported~ effort to drive - .. ~ zn the..,:- ki fi f ng c ~ tra the=S't'T1~out~,ot-Th-a?rraa'c~r"fib---na-rcotics=- regon. M'1'tar o erations against the Shan United ArTny (SUA) i during the year were: _ ;, i Y P continued throughout 1982. After the attack against Ban Hin Tack, the SUA fled into Burma but returned to Thailand within a few weeks, building a new headquarters only some 4 to 5 kilometers away: from Ban Hin Taek. The rapidity- with which the SUA attempted to reestablish itself inside Thailand apparently convinced Thai authorities of the need to regain control of its northern border. The Thai responded with a second military action in May which dislodged the SUA from Thailand. Although SUA families and dependents were allowed. to remain in Thailand. continued Thai .Army .presence in the border area has kept the SUA from infiltrating back across the border. Dther military- actions 'o --..;;~T,o,a mho cTTA farther into Burma. and inhibited .its ability to operate freely in the l,oraer aLCa. forced'-the SUA to relocate- to Doi Lang. when~special-.Thai~ ~. military---units when Taham-Prahan irregulars.-shutdown-_t e ~ . ~ - = : :_ ._ _ . :._ Lao--Lo- Chai":r.efinery--cornplex interdicted long established routes for :narcotics an . chemicals-r .destroyed _ a- number_.of_ ref iner.ies and forced: st t l i -'~ ea .. ng a d?rsrupt other_refine_ries to:~close thus .. temprY~-a-ri-~y-,~--narcot_ios--?p~-occt~ion - _. cfiestroy.ed---ma-ja-r`- cfremida-I `storage -sites. inside Burma ~a..,.~z,~rr-r~~.--2osks: a~_~_~g0-:-kcg-o#--=aceti.c~ anhydride, the - r~.~......~~.,...~. v_._~_--------~ - destroyed- in one- ope-ra-tion_: was `roughly_ ' valent -year'"s supply for -an---average- refinery.,: With the SUA and narcotics refineries inside Burma, the Thai government has redirected its efforts to other narcotics traffickers in the border area who were forced out of Doi Lang after the SUA takeover. For example, during a January 1983 military operation against the Muang Na area three traffickers from the Third CIF, were captured, documenting CIF involvement in narcotics. trafficking along the border. In the past the CIF had been careful in masking its narcotics activities in order to avoid the attention of the Thai government. .The CIF conducts 3 SECRET Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/21 :CIA-RDP85T00287R000600300001-4 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/21 :CIA-RDP85T00287R000600300001-4 5 r;c: x~~r most of its_ narcotics trading out of Chinese resettlement villages in Thailand's~Piang Luang area. Effects of Thai Actions Thai. -military operations have.--pushed :the- SUA from Thailand and:: Ftawe- dome- mtrclr- to--disrupt:- SUA traf f'.ick i ng -and re f i:ne ry ope~ratia~ ~~. Ho~e~er;~.-,the-- f:Zow=-at: raw.-:-op-ium. to the Thai-Burrna-. , border: ref:i.iie~es~ ands--t.tie-~ f.lo~:. of:; ~esro:n out-~of.. the< borde~r:~:.axea.-~ has not..:..been:~.pe~rmanentl~r-: affected::_..--.. - - Most.._:af_.: th.e.-_?,gh-tinge-,occurred_ away: from. key, PoPPy...9rowi-ng._ -- areas.. This milita-ry operations did not upset opium production in 1982 and probably had little impact on the 1983 crop. ? Heroin refineries are mobile and rudimentary. Most of the. ref:irieries closed down during military operations last year reportedly relocated deeper inside Burma and are back in~ operation.. of~ -refined : narcotics still= readily available in the..border:. routes: :_ The-se .:groups__were:.:: able__.to;. drawdown large.:,stocks .:_._ - traffickers, primarily the Chinese Irregular~Force, to expand their operations..Alliances have -been formed between the smaller trafficking groups and independents to assure access to opium supplies and security of.smuggling.,_ .25X1 25X1 25X1 area..as-_weIl-as.-use-cu-Trent -narcotics production,..to meet -~ - According.- to--US--Embassy reporting-,--enf.~orcementactivities against---chemc:a:l:.suppli.ers~.i.in:~.B:arigkbk- and against..-major-- _ :. receiv-i_ng:._pants=--a-Lang-_the--a~~d.er:erea ed: a shortage:=of - shortage--~and:~, concomitant-rises _ in_.. chemical -prices- forced chemcars,_at border._:ref-ine.r?l.e`.duri.ng e~a~l~ ~1E982:__ -.The ch.em-i_cal _.f:r-om-.dealers in India as well as. northern: Burmese cit China are=-nova-read:ily_ aval~ak~le-,.n for shipment to border refineries. - ~. ? Thai antinarcotics actions have disrupted long-established smuggling routes through Thailand. However,. military operations probably did not seriously upset the export, of narcotics from the border .area in 1.982. The use of alternative routes has kept opiates readily available throughout Southeast Asia. During. the past year, according to US Embassy sources, narcotics have bee n increasingly routed through western Burma into Bangladesh and India to satisfy local markets and for reshippment to 4 SECRET Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/21 :CIA-RDP85T00287R000600300001-4 ies: -25X1 25X1 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/21 :CIA-RDP85T00287R000600300001-4 25X1 the west. ': (cites the use'of Guangzhou 25X1 Province; China for shipping Southey t Asian heroin destined for Hong Kong. - 25X1 25X1 and the destruction. of a heroin. refinery` by the Malaysian police also `points to arise in narcotics activity. in the ..25X1 The military crackdown on the BUA has increased the . i nvolvement..,.in narcot>ics.-.traf f ick-ing.- of. the; Burmese Communist ~ -- -_ Party (BCP} which,~could`:--prove- to- be a more formidable opponent .~ - - . -. for.- both_ the-_-Thar-and:- the? Burmese. The- BCP has an estimated. ~ - .. ~- Military .pressure .against heroin. refineries along the. Thai-Burma:-border--:has:?apga?ren.tly. caused some?{-shift?~ in Yer.ai-n processing. to_.labor-a-tories _along the_ South Thailand/. M a lays i.a_~ ; bo r_de r:~_ shipments of--~narcot-res-by sea from.'..coves and - o ~ 's? ore?'sfianels along~s tfie--Tfia~' and Burmese~=-peninsula. to _? the~-Adaman Sea and the Gulf of Thailand are increasing. According to DEA sources, increased seizures of_,narcatics Emerging Problems to Narcotics Control armed_;atrength -of" IOFQ00 -to_ 12~;-a00- men-with.- a 30, OOO man - _- = , . . militia.': The. BCP controls large areas. of Burma, particularly in -- the northeastern Shan State, a major center of opium poppy ~ : cultivation. Narcotics trafficking by BCP elements prior to 197 8 appears to have been the?work of~individuals without. explicit "' approval. by the party leadership. ~ However, in 1978 and 1979, the. .: .. BCP appeared-to have.-:reso.rted- ta.-party-.-sponsored and centrally -? ?"= drected??cultvation- and-- tradin in o ium--ncludin association :. ~ -- wi th` the- SUA~ Dur~i ng_-1`98 2; : the BCP"'~ ._, .25X1 moved di~ect:Iy -in.to_:.=heroin process.ng:~and trafficking as _. chemicals .became- ava-=lab-Ie -throngh_Cfi.na_and:-:India. Another. proh-ler~r`; threatening narcotics control in the?-~f:uture- into: T-ha:~land=- at-_ almast=:- any pa