RANGOON BOMBING INCIDENT -- THE CASE AGAINST THE NORTH KOREANS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000402270001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 10, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 19, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

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Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
Rangoon Bombing Incident --
The Case Against The North Koreans
Confessions are still
lacking, but there is very strong circums an is ev.z ence linking
North Korea to the attempted assassination of President Chun in
Rangoon. The methods of operation and the equipment carried by
the ethnic Koreans apprehended by Burmese authorities following
the bombing are similar to those of numerous North Korean agent
teams that have infiltrated South Korea in the past. The radio-
detonated explosives used in Rangoon are similar to those used in
a North Korean attempt to assassinate President Park Chung Hee in
Seoul in 1970. The movements of a North Korean ship and North
Korean diplomats' familiarity with the Rangoon ceremony and the
physical layout of the site provide further circumstantial
SECRET NOFORN NOCONTRACT
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The Evidence
The bomb at the Martyrs' Mausoleum in Rangoon clearly was
aimed at the South Korean delegation.
-- Wreath-laying at this site is an indispensible
ceremonial duty for any visiting head of state, but
few high-ranking Burmese officials are normally in
attendance. Moreover, Burmese dissidents have not
displayed the technical sophistication apparent in
the 9 October bombing.
-- The three explosive devices used in the bombing were
attached to the roof of the mausoleum directly above
the area where the South Korean delegation would be
expected to gather.
The North Koreans had an excellent opportunity to survey the
scene and plan an operation. A delegation from North Korea's
Supreme Peoples Assembly visited Burma and performed the same
wreath- eremony less than two months before Chun's
visit. 25X1
Within the first three days after the bombing, three
individuals, identified by Burmese authorities as ethnic Koreans,
were engaged by security forces in the vicinity of Rangoon. The
violent resistance of these individuals--one Korean and at least
three Burmese were killed--and the fact that they were caught
moving south toward the mouth of the Rangoon River, suggest that
the Koreans were attempting to ate from Rangoon af25X1
having carried out the bombing.
A North Korean ship, the Tonggon Aeguk-Ho, was in port at
Rangoon from 17-23 September, unloading equipment for a North
Korean aid project-in Burma. The ship left Burmese waters
sometime after 23 September for Colombo, Sri Lanka, where it
reportedly remained until 6 October. The ship's location since
that date is not clear, but the timing of its arrival in Burma
would be consistent with the dispatch of an agent team.
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SECRET NOFORN NOCONTRACT
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25X1
25X1
Equipment used in the bombing and many items carried by the
suspects provide some of the strongest evidence against the
North. None of the equipment has been identified as of North
Korean origin, but it is similar or identical to gear used by
North Korean agents who have infiltrated South Korea. These
items include a silenced .25 caliber Belgian pistol, daggers, and
grenades. In addition, a Morse radio transmitter and Japanese
transistor receiver were recovered along with foods (rice powder,
canned meat, c a n d y b and me 14 1ne (pain killers, antibiotics,
salt tablets). 25X1
_. a eyldence
in hand does not readily implicate any group other than the North
Koreans. (C NF)
Numerous features o
the Rangoon operation are consistent with North Korean agent
operations.
-- Ne.arly all North Korean agent operations into South
Korea in recent years have been conducted by three-
man teams.
Rangoon now has publicly linked the captured Koreans to the
bombing, and Burmese investigators reportedly are virtually
certain that Pyongyang authored the attack. Domestic insurgents
are no longer under serious suspicion, and the most active
domestic group--the Karen National Union--quickly disavowed any
involvement.
resist cooperation.
-- Pyongyang's infiltrators have attempted suicide
using hand grenades when threatened with capture.
-- As with the suspects captured in Burma, infiltrators
from the North have been well-indoctrinated and offer
maximum resistance to capture or, when captured, 25X1
3
SECRFT NOFfRN NOCONTRACT
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The Record of Past Assassination Attempts
Although the Rangoon incident appears to be the first
instance in which the North Koreans have themselves carried out
an attempt on the life of a South Korean leader outside South
Korea, it has the earmarks of a North Korean agent operation.
Pyongyang has adopted, a wide variety of approaches to
assassinating South Korean leaders over the past two decades.
A 1968 attack on the Blue House was a military operation.
North Korean commandos were intercepted by South Korean security
forces in mountainous terrain immediately behind the presidential
mansion and in the ensuing fight all but one of the northerners
were killed. The lone survivor was imprisoned for a time but
subsequently he adopted a strong anti-P'yongyang line and was
taken on extensive speaking tours throughout South Korea.
An attempted assassination of President Park in 1970 was
very similar to the Rangoon bombing.
-- A terrorist reported by Seoul to be a. North Korean
was killed while planting a bomb at the National
Cemetery in Seoul.
-- The bomb was a remote controlled claymore-type
explosive, apparently with fragmentation pellets.
The device was placed under the eaves of the tile-
roofed Shrine Gate where President Park and other
high officials were scheduled to participate in a
wreath-laying ceremony three days later on 25 June--
South Korea's memorial day.
-- Equipment rec.Overed at the explosion site included
counterfeit South Korean identification documents, as
well as a North Korean-made pistol, battery, compass,
knife and field garb.
-- A cache of North Korean agent gear discovered 10 days
later in a mountain cave south of Seoul included
counterfeit South Korean IDs for three different men,
a rifle, machinegun, grenades, communications
equipment, medicine, exfiltration equipment, and
foodstuffs including cooked rice powder. M the
equipment was of North Korean manufacture.
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In August 1974 a disaffected young Korean resident in Japan,
Mun Se Kwang, entered South Korea under a Japanese alias and
attempted to shoot President Park at South Korea's national day
ceremony.
-- Although the President was not injured, Mrs. Park was
killed in the attack.
P'yongyang's Public Position
No group has claimed responsibility for the Rangoon bombing
and, despite the evidence, the North Koreans continue to deny
involvement in the incident.
- On 12'October, the North Korean news agency issued an
authorized statement that termed Seoul's charges as
"preposterous and ridiculou'" and declared that "we,
by nature, have never undertaken an act of terrorism,
nor will we."
-- The statement criticized President Chun for using the
incident to incite North-South confrontation and it
noted that North Korea was "on the highest alert."
P'yongyang has also been publicizing foreign statements
alleging that the South Koreans were responsible for the
incident.
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-- North Korean clandestine radio broadcasts have sought
to tie the attack to an unspecified "dissident group"
and have characterized the incident as "deserved"
punishment for Chun.
-- During the past year or so, these clandestine
broadcasts have sought to portray Chun increasingly
as a ruler exposed to constant danger from South
Korean dissidents and even from within his own
military estaoiisnment.
These same broadcasts in recent weeks have carried repeated
warnings--also attributed to dissidents in the South--that
President Reagan will face "stern punishment" if he visits
Seoul.
nrT .In l-n fl\1 ~Inl~n nn n. 02.
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SUBJECT: Rangoon Bombing Incident -- The Case Against the North
Koreans
Distribution List
1 - Paul Wolfowitz, EA/State
1 - Dave Lambertson, EA/Korea/State
1 - William McPherson, INR/EAP/State
1 - Gaston Sigur, NSC
1 - Richard Childress, NSC
1 - Eugene Lawson, Commerce
1 - Douglas Mulholland, Treasury
1 - Richard Armitage, Dir ISA
1 - James Kelley, ISA
1 - Commodore Stewart Ring, ISA
1 - C/OEA/NA/Korea
1 - C/OEA/NA/Japan
1 - OEA/CH
1 - OEA/SEA
1 - C/OEA/NA
1 - D/OEA
1 - C/Production/OEA
1 - Executive Director (7D55)
1 - DDI (7E44)
1 - DDI Registry (7E47)
1 - PDB Staff (7F30)
1 - OGI/TIC/ITB (2G11)
1 - C/NIC (7E62)
1 - NI0/EA (7E62)
5 - CPAS/IMC/CB (7G07)
2 - OCR/ISG (lH19)
1 - C/PES (7F24
1 - C/DD0/EA 5E1.0)
1 - FR_(3C29
DDI/OEA/NA/K 19 October 1983
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