THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS OF SOUTH AFRICA: ORGANIZATION, STRATEGY, AND COMMUNIST TIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000401950002-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 13, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: July 21, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

.7T~l.itr.1'
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Central Intelligence Agency
Washington. D. C. 20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
21 July 1983
THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS OF SOUTH AFRICA:
ORGANIZATION, STRATEGY, AND COMMUNIST TIES
Summary
a
The African National Congress, the principal anti-South
African insurgent group, has a long history of ties to the
Communist Party in South Africa. Since at least the 1960s, pro-
Soviet Communists have been well-represented in the ANC's
leadership and have exerted considerable influence on it,
especially with regard to military strategy. The ANC's heavy
dependence on Soviet Bloc military aid is an important source of
leverage for the South African Communist Party.
The Communists in the ANC leadership--along with moderate
oldtimers--have chosen to restrain a faction of young black
nationalists who are eager to begin a terrorist campaign directed
against white civilians. We believe that the recent car bombing
in Pretoria by the ANC may signal a new phase in strategy, and
that this new phase may represent a compromise between the two
factions in the Congress.
-- In the near term, we think that the ANC is unlikely to
engage in indiscriminate terrorism.
We believe it will, however, strike government targets--
especially security-related facilities and security
personnel--more frequently than in the past. In addition,
its efforts to avoid civilian casualties probably will be
less stringent, or--as in the car bombing incident--non-
existent.
This memorandum was requested by Frederick Wettering, Director of African
Affairs, National Security Council. It was prepared by the
Office of African and Latin American Analysis. Assistance was provided by the
Office of Central Reference. Comments and questions are welcome and should be
addressed to Chief, Africa Division, ALA
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The Communist Party in South Africa and the ANC have been
intertwined during most of the last 60 years. The ANC was formed
om osed mainly of tribal
in South Africa.
We believe that Moscow and the South African Communist Party
are realistic about the limited prospects of the ANC's military
campaign because of Pretoria's substantial security resources. In
our view, this enhances their interest in using the ANC's appeal
among blacks to in control of the growing black labor movement
1 -1
ins of the Relationship Between the ANC and the Communist
Party in South Africa
in 1912 as a black reformist group c p
in Communist
chiefs and educated elite.
(CPSA), which was founded black
920saaftermthesgoand vernment infiltrating
enacted a
same year, began rr
mid11
organizations in the 1928, 1,600 of the CPSA's
s
l
aw
series of discriminatory
. o4: them members of the ANC.
1,750 members were black, many
The CPSA's initial success in gaining influence within the
ANC came to an abrupt halt in 1930. After a visit to Moscow in
1927, ANC President Josiah Gumede triggera conservative
backlash in the ANC by advocating a program of ivil
disobedience. Gumede wast r camaignln 1930, ir nternal
to a slow-moving reformist campaign.
and a purge of socialists by
dissension over political strategy
pro-Moscow radicals almost caused the demise of the CPSA. Its
membership dropped from 3,000 in -29 it in 1931, and the
party was moribund for more
The CPSA experienced a revival in the 1940s, when some of
its members rose to prominent positions in other organizations.
J.B. Marks, a Colored CPSA member in the ANC hierarchy,
major strike by the African Mine Workers' Union in 1946. Strong
efforts by Marks and other CPSA members on behalf of blacks
tightened the links between the ANC and the CPSA and gained the
its
.
latter organization new recru
The revitalized CPSA suffered a temporary setback when it
Partyannounced(NP) in
was banned by the National
two years after the NP came Black Communists who
dissolution one month prior to its banning. while Communists
had not previously done so now joined
of other races infiltrated existing organizaioiseandhestablis ed
new ones. Former CPSA members secretly t
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SACP) .
renamed it the South African Communist Party (S ats
for Congress
1953 and renam 40f De ocr tist They also achieved dolaorganization the
SACP and the
The
(COD)--a parallel, legga ear earlie including
whites--that had been formed a ethnicallY-based groups-- lint o COD controlled a ctheltiongressAlliance" by taking over joint
the ANC--known as
working committees.
A major Split in the ANC in the lateithinstreflected in part
the growing influence of the Communist list cks
s wi
th miorganization, t Congres
white
broke with the ANC and uemeahatenonnblack--esp y
in 1958-59. The PAC arg
Communist-domination of the Congress Alliance was reinforcing
black African servitude.
African government banned both the ANCuand the PAC
The South
ille riots of 1960.
'Suth Africa
3
ev
shortly after the Sharp to generate income inside o
bility
the ANC lost its a
re direc 1 to the SACP.
mo
and be an to turn
ame
at a crib al
t
we believe the aid c
time for the ANC and was instrumental in tying ~e ANC to
-P.
SA
members--
NC and SACP members--
rised of leading A
command--comprised launched a campaign of sabotage
A high
directed the military wing,
Thosrs inshort-lived campaign
s in 1961. lice terminatdSAthe CP leade
ombing 1963-65.
wiose a e mem es of arrests ANC and their organizations. tsca. The
members of the ANC and SACP hierarchies who escaped d
during this peril
dragnet went into exile to rebuild the
was able to expand its influence oc
largely ontactsCo tside of South
because the SACP had o de of operating
a Africa tund.thlnA 1966nd was more experienced
the-
3 a "Congress consiliaiivewithmittee11 was
e rgro
established in London to coordinate
Congress Alliance.
The ANC officially opened its membership to non-blacks in 1969, but influential white Communists who joined apparently
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chose initially to maintain low profiles and work through black
SACP members in the ANC hierarchy.
3-3 F
6
The ANC attempted to attract greater levels of external
support in the early 1970s, but was largely unsuccessful until
the Soweto riots in 1976. Thousands of young blacks fled South
Africa in the wake of the riots and joined the ANC.
Moscow, probably believing that the riots signalled an
extended phase of violent unrest in South Africa, increased its
militar aid to the ANC.
9
conducted some 105 attacks in the last four years.
Bolstered by the new aid and recruits, the ANC launched
another campaign of bombings and attacks in 1980 to increase its
support among South African blacks and to focus international.
attention on the grievances of South African blacks. The ANC has
Current State of SACP Influence on the ANC
Today, the SACP and the ANC maintain separate organizational
structures. This helps to play down the image of a
Communist/Soviet-controlled ANC, but the two organizations openly
describe their relationship as an "alliance."
Overlapping Organizations
The SACP--a semi-secret party based in London with a strong
pro-Soviet line--remains well-r resented in the ANC's
leadership.
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enerally known that the
is
g
it
I
majority of the ANC ranonand file is comprised of -ideologues, antiSCommunistee
working comforte
categories of blacks: n
ate socialis
m
d
b
s weo
arx
t
,
s
er
ism-Lenin
M
tionalists, and mo
na
with Communists but do not fully em
especially its doctrine of atheism.
SACP influence on the ANC's activities outsideiof Southun by
Africa is more difficult to discern. which works primarily out of
-called political wing,
ore than 30
i
'
n m
s so
the ANC
radio
Lusaka and London and has representatives
political wing is responsible for producing r
countries. The a anda literature, raising funds,
propaganda, distributing prop 9
litical protests abroad. In its
fficial
and organizing po
pronouncements, the political wing frequently moderate
o
socialist policy of the Soviet Union, but lists only
soccialist aims for the ANC rather than strictly adhering to a
*
Marxist-Leninist line.
broaden its internal and intern"
*This is compatible with ANC tactics on philosophy. Since its inception,
specific
ANC has avoided officially adopting a c ideology probably to
tional support.
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Communist Assistance to the ANC
The ANC's heavy deendence for1theBSACPforThelSoviet
aid is an important sou
Union, East Germany, and Cuba are virtually the onl su Hers of
training and arms to the ANC toda .*
military
The Soviet Bloc provides other assistance as well.
-- The Soviet union gives financial support to the ANC
aid.
*Although we can confirm that the Soviet Bloc is virtually the sole
source of ANC military aid, we do not know the exact extent or value of this
**The ANC's main sources of funds and non-military support, however, are
the Scandanavian states, the World Council of Churches, and various other
international organizations.
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-- Most ANC literature is printed in East Germany.
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The Period of Restraint
Since the ANC resumed its military campaign in 1980, Slovo
has directed attacks by the military wing against energy and
transportation targets, government buildings, and security
personnel and facilities. The low rate of casualties in 1981 and
1982 supported the ANC's claims at the time that it planned its
attacks to avoid harm to civilians: 28 civilians were injured
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and 5 were killed* during 78 operations(7 security personnel were
killed and 14 injured in the same period).
Some 60 of the incidents during 1981-82 were bombings and
about 85 percent of these occurred at night, primarily in
unoccupied buildings or on isolated railways. Daylight bombings,
on the other hand, often occurred only minutes before a crowd was
expected or after a train had passed. The pattern of these
"close calls" suggest that they were intentional. and designed to
increase media coverage.
We believe that the ANC's operational restraint during this
period reflected the leadership's concern that the organization
might not survive a series of determined South African
counterattacks against ANC personnel in neighboring countries.
The cautious attitudes of moderate oldtimers and Communists in
the ANC may be a result of lessons learned in the early 1960s
when a concerted effort by the government almost wiped out both
organizations. The Communists also may be concerned that a
campaign of indiscriminate violence would trigger a South African
response which would threaten various states in the region where
the Soviets enjoy footholds.
Possible Shift in Strategy
The car bombing by the ANC on 20 May in downtown Pretoria
may signal. a sharp change in the group's policy of avoiding
civilian casualties. The car bomb--designed to inflict
casualties rather than damage buildings--was detonated during
rush hour outside of Air Force Headquarters. More than half of
the 200 injured and 19 killed were civilians, many of them
whites. In addition, the US Embassy reports that on 9 May Durban
police defused a bomb--identical to the one used in Pretoria--in
a heavily traveled area near a public airport with Air Force
facilities.
Signs of Compromise
We believe that the ANC's apparent shift in strategy may
represent an internal "compromise." The South African raid on
Maseru last December, in which about 30 ANC personnel were
killed, probably was the most important single factor that could
*Two of the deaths were by assassination--a former ANC member labeled
"traitor" and his wife; another victim who died in a bombing may have been the
AMC member planting the device.
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the
l r in
We believe that the Communists an Maseru ~aadasthe "last
viewed the ANC's leadership may have
d- straw" and subsequently yielded to the black militants'
longstanding demand for harsher tactics, but without sanctioning
14 indiscriminate terrorism. In itscommuniques ackon the car bombing, t 1 the ANC emphasized that the target South African Air Force Headquarters and the Directorate of
military intelligence.
a
A
Pros ep cts
The p-ANC Relationship
Despite the tensions, the ANC and the SACbewilleutdoubtedly
continue their symbiotic relationship if only
alliance facilitates the ANC's access to Communist assistance.
the pro-Soviet faction.
We expect non-Communist ANC leaders
alternative sources of military aid to offset the influence of
to continue to seek
The SAC?, for
its part, recognizes the vallue of its ties to the ANC--the
popular opposition group among South 1-1- . -i ni-innshiT).
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 Military Strateg
We believe that, in the short term, Slovosecuritynrelated
plan attacks against state targets, primarily
ecially among white
facilities in urban areas. Cwilllincsea essep Moreover, we believe
security personnel, probably
-
that the ANC's efforts to avoid
as invtheacarabombingsincident-lnon-
esxtringent in the future, or is against government officials
existent. Assassination attempts
cannot be ruled out. Black emilitants
begssatisfiedtiithathenegade
leadership's cautious strategy
Lf
The ANC'S increasingly hostile rhetoric against US aadtacks
Western policies in general may eventually be matched by
against Western businesses and The vigorously
condemned the US policy of const " n has
accused the US of playing the leading role in perpetuating
apartheid.
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Focusin
on Black Unions
s fully recognize
=like
d
er
believe that ANC and SACP lea
that their organizations are a long way from posing a real threat
to white control of South Africa, and that the current terrorist
campaign will not soon evolve into a aeicy. Both th
organizations have shown remarkable resilience, pat two loan for
determination to stay with a long campagn. As the
promote their goals, they .seem to have focused
other ways to increasingly on the growing black labor movement in South
have openly endorsed the
in sympathy with the ANC; several of the more militan
ANC's political aims.
1JQ 1I. ------ June ANC Acting President Tambo presbls
membe19rs8of3
political action, notably among
is the ANCs first priority.
trade unions,
Many workers undoubtedly are strongly
t unions
We believe that the Sovmelitaryocahave mpaignubecauseuofthe long
term prospects of the ANC's
Pretoria's capable security resources. In our view, this
enhances their interest in using the ANC's appeal among blacks to
1-r- movement.
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The main vehicle for SACP entry into the black labor
movement is the South African Congress of Trade Unions(SACTU),
based in Lusaka, Zambia. Founded in 1954, SACTU today operates
in self-imposed exile and acts in our view as the labor arm of
the SACP. The president of SACTU, Stephen Dlamini, is an SACP
member, and SACP literature in recent years has vigorously
3d promoted SACTU as a key organization in the black labor
movement.
31
unions.
On balance, however, we believe that neither the ANC nor the
SACP has had any substantial success so far in achieving direct
influence in the black trade unions. Union leaders, for their
part, are highly sensitive to the dangers that explicit
connections of this sort would pose to the survival of individual
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A CHRONOLOGY OF TIES BETWEEN THE ANC AND
THE COMMUNIST PARTY IN SOUTH AFRICA
1912 South African Native National Congress is established
3 and later renamed as the African National Congress.
1915 Leftists split with South African Labour Party and
ue I TCT.1 F-
3 Form International Social i a - T.ca
g
1921 ISL members, many of whom had a special interest in
the black labor movement, and other leftists form the
2 Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA). The CPSA
joins the Comintern and complies with Soviet orders
to concentrate on gaining control of white trade
unions.
1922 Mine owners trying to offset declining gold prices
precipitate a violent strike by announcing plans to
lay off more highly paid white employees and replace
J them with blacks. The CPSA initially supports the
miners' campaign, over which it has little direct
control, but becomes disaffected after white miners
1924 Pact by the Labour and Nationalist Party gains them
an electoral victory. New government enacts a series
of discriminatory laws, some of which entrench white
labor privilege. CPSA subsequently shifts its
3 attention to recruiting black members and
infiltrating black organizations. Main target is the
Industrial and Commercial Workers Union of Africa
(ICU). Begun as a trade union of black dock workers
in 1919, the ICU grows in the 1920s and becomes a
attack black workers who remain on the job.
1926 CPSA's four members on the ICU's National Executive
mass political movement with well over 100,000
members, eclipsing the ANC during this period.
Committee lead the left wing of the ICU in calls for
a more militant program. The remainder of the ICU
leadership responds by expelling all CPSA members
from the ICU. CPSA focuses on the ANC as a result.
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1927 ANC President Josiah Gumede attends the aBrussals
Conference of the League against Impe unsuccessfully
visits the USSR. Upon his retuof, demonstrations,
lobbies for a new ANC strategy of
and close ties
pass
strikes, tax boycotts,
with the Soviets.
1928 New directive from Comintern states that, in response
to the "united white front arrayed against the non-
the CPSA must work towards establishing "an
whites,"
independent Native Republic--with full guarantees for
minority groups--as a stage towards a workers' andly
peasants' government." Many in the CPSA (especial
former ISL members) object the classse
they prefer to g A
of workers" rather than as a "persecuted race."
however,
pro-Moscow group of ultra-leftists,
eventually gains control and purges the CPSA of black
members and whites with ties to trade unions. The
purge is sparked by a Comintern directive which
accuses all socialists of not being "true
revolutionaries."
1930s CPSA is virtually moribund despite abandonment of its
? ANC continues to follow a slow-
ultra-left line,
moving reformist campaign after Gumede loses
reelection bid in 1930.
1941 CPSA membership increases after Hitler invades the
3 Soviet Union. Black Communists gain new footholds in
^
1944 A group of young black nationalists--disgusted with
the lack of progress resulting from the ANC's
3 moderate tactics--form the ANC Youth League. Most
Youth Leaguers are initially anti-Communist and
in
role for whites to play
there is
believe that
for
the struggle
1946 J.B. Marks, a Coed
.na;nr strike by y
1948 7Z Afrikaner-based National Party comes to power.
am ational Conference anfor
1949 Youth Leaguers dominate ANC
of Acton" that calls
through
push
strikes, and boycotts.
3
ivil
c
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1950 Suppression of Communism Act bans the CPSA and also
gives the government wide powers to counter extra-
parliamentary opposition groups. CPSA announces its
3 dissolution one month prior to passage of the act.
Portions of the organization continue to operate
underground; three years later the South African
Communist Party (SACP) is formed.
1952 The ANC and the Communist-led SAIC join in a
"Defiance Campaign" of passive resistance, which
reflects the growing influence of Communists and
Youth Leaguers in the ANC. Defiance Campaign is
aimed at changing six "unjust" laws, including the
Suppression of Communism Act.
1952-55 Congress Alliance is formed between the ANC, the
South African Colored Peoples Organization, the South
African Indian Congress, the Congress of Democrats,
and the South African Congress of Trade Unions. A
3 "Congress of the People" is held in 1955 and a
"Freedom Charter" is adopted that lists the basic
aims of the movement. Later that year, the
government arrests 156 Congress Alliance leaders on
treason charges. The defendants eventually gain
acquittals, but the six-year trial consumes the
energy of the Congress Alliance, which loses its
earlier momentum.
1958-59 Black nationalists, angered by the influence of white
the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC).
1960
The government bans both the ANC and
the Sharpeville incident.
1961 The ANC forms a military wing--Spear of the Nation--
-3 and launches a campaign of sabotage bombings. F_
1962 The SACP draws up a new Party Program and adopts as
short-term objectives the goals listed in
Congress Alliance's Freedom Charter.
1963-65 A series of mass arrests cripples the ANC and weakens
3 the SACP. Among those captured and sentenced to life
imprisonment are ANC President Nelson Mandela and
SACP Chairman Bram Fischer. ANC and SACP leaders who
escape the dragnet go into exile to rebuild their
organizations.
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1969 ANC opens its membership to non-blacks
3 conference in Morogoro, Tanzania.
1976 ANC recruits thousands of young blacks fleeing South
Africa in the wake of the Soweto riots and trains
1980-83 -_I The reinvigorated military wing of the ANC renews its
_$I y- n}}arkinn SPeurity
them for service in the military wing.
targets and bombing symbols of apartneia.
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SUBJECT: The African National Congress oo f SouihtAfrica:
Organization, Strategy, and s Ties
External Distribution:
Original - Requestor Director, Office for
1 - Ambassador Robert M. Sayre,
Combatting Terrorism, Department of State
1 - Chester Crocker, Assistant Secretary of State,
Bureau of African Affairs
1 - Amb. Frank Wisner, Deputy Assistant Secretary,
Bureau of African Affairs
1 - Leonardo Nehrer, State, INR/Africa
1 - DIA
Internal Distribution:
1 - DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - Executive Director
1 - SA/DCI/IA
1 - DDI
1 - ADDI
1 - NIO/Africa
1 - NIC/AG
1 - PDB Staff
1 - C/DDI/PES
1 - DDI/CPAS/ILS
1 - D/ALA
2 - ALA/PS
1 - ALA Research Director
4 - CPAS/IMC/CB
8 - Division Files
DDI/ALA/AF/S (21 July 83)
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