CHINESE DIPLOMACY SINCE AFGHANISTAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000101090001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 1, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: MEMO

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Chinese Diplomacy Since Afghanistan
While concerned about the implications of events in South-
west Asia for regional security, China also sees the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan as an opportunity to counter detente
politics in the West, prod the United States into a tougher
anti-Soviet stance, and drive a wedge between the Third World
and the Soviet Union. China is seeking to capitalize on this
opportunity by lobbying for greater Western involvement in the
security of the region, offering its own assurances of support
to Pakistan, encouraging rapprochement between New Delhi and
Islamabad while attempting to repair its own ties with India,
and calling on the international community to aid the Afghan
In Southeast Asia, China remains as committed as ever to
waging a protracted struggle against Vietnam despite recent
indications that ASEAN support for its policy on Kampuchea is
eroding. In Northeast Asia, China continues to stress its
interest in maintaining stability on the Korean Peninsula
and its support for an increased Japanese defense effort. F 25X1
As a result of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and
the strong US reaction, China has reduced further its meager
relations with the USSR. The Chinese have signaled their
satisfaction with Sino-US ties and insist that they see the
relationship as "a major strategic decision" and not as a
"tactical move" born of expediency.
This memorandum was prepared under the auspices of the National
Intelligence officer for China - East Asia - Pacific by the
China Branch, East Asia - Pacific Division, Office of Political
Analysis, National Foreign Assessment Center. Comments and
queries are welcome and should be directed to the NIO/CH-EAP,
On f) O_ 10g_03
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Beijing believes recent American actions in Iran have
diverted world attention from the more important situation
in Afghanistan, which the Chinese see as having global impli-
cations. Beijing sees Moscow's action not as a defensive move
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Since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan at the end of
last year, Chinese attention has focused on the situation in
Southwest Asia. Sino-Soviet relations and Sino-Vietnamese
relations--traditional areas of high concern--have been rela-
tively static, although Beijing has been active in non-Communist
Southeast Asia, whose anti-Vietnamese resolve it fears may be
eroding. In recent months, China has continued to stress repeat-
edly
its interest in peace and stability in Northeast Asia. The
visit of British Defense Minister Pym in March underscored both
China's growing security relationship with the West and its
reluctance to move ahead with major arms purchases. 25X1
China views the recent events in Southwest Asia as both
a threat and an opportunity. While concerned about what these
events bode for itself and its friends, China has seized upon
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as an opportunity to counter
detente politics in the West, prod the US into a tougher anti-
Soviet stance, and drive a wedge between the Third World and
thviet Union--three key Chinese foreign policy objectives.
China's goal ultimately is to create an anti-Soviet front
in Southwest Asia that is supported by the West and open to
Chinese influence. The Chinese are prepared to pursue this
Z, objective over the long term and to resist tendencies in the
international community to reach an accommodation with the
Soviets.
Given the importance they attach to the situation in
Afghanistan, the Chinese are concerned that the United States
is too preoccupied with Iran. While sympathizing with the US
position, Beijing believes Washington must subordinate feelings
about the hostages to larger geopolitical concerns. Beijing
argues that measures that would destabilize Iran further--such
as economic sanctions or military action--only play into the
hands of the Soviet Union, the force in the region the United
States should be most concerned about.
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designed to ensure a friendly regime on its border, but as part
of a long-range drive to gain a warm-water port on the Indian
Ocean. China concludes that after "digesting" Afghanistan,
Moscow will pursue this end by supporting separatist movements
in the region, such as that of the Baluchis, exploiting the
chaos in Iran to bring a pro-Soviet party to power, or even
L threatening-military intervention in Pakistan and Iran. Ulti-
mately Moscow seeks to establish a stranglehold on the Persian
Gulf, control access to the Indian Ocean via the Straits of
Malacca, and thereby threaten access by the West and Japan to
Middle East oil. If Moscow succeeds, Beijing argues, the West
can only acquiesce in Soviet world hegemony or precipitate a
world war that Moscow is better prepared to wage. 25X1
China is particularly concerned that events in Afghanistan
will influence events in Southeast Asia, where it has a direct
security stake. It fears that acquiescence in Soviet actions
in Afghanistan will lead to acquiescence in the Vietnamese con-
quest of Kampuchea. China's public statements have 25X1
stressed that the two situations are twin aspects of a single
Soviet threat and must be met with equal determination. 25X1
Beijing believes that the outcome in Afghanistan will set
the tone in world politics for years to come and the Soviet
intervention poses a fundamental test. It sees the application
of the Brezhnev doctrine outside the Soviet bloc as a signal of
a more adventurist and bellicose Soviet foreign policy. Beijing
Z is concerned that fears of increased tension, domestic political
investment in detente, and a distaste for sanctions against
Moscow will lead Western nations to seek an accommodation on
Afghanistan that will only encourage Moscow to act coercively
elsewhere.
Regional Strategy
Beijing's efforts to exploit and check Soviet expansion
in Southwest Asia long predate the Soviet invasion. While it
has been pursuing the key elements of its current strategy with
consistency since 1978, the Soviet invasion has caused Beijing
to redouble its efforts. The key elements are discussed below.
Engage the West in the Region. Increased Western involve-
ment in the region's security, particularly on the part of the
United States, is at the heart of China's present strategy.
20 Beijing has been particularly eager that Washington provide
4 Islamabad with a security commitment as well as economic and
military assistance. The Chinese applauded when the United
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States announced it would resume aid to Pakistan.
Reassure Pakistan. China moved quickly to reassure Paki-
stan of its sunnort after the snviat- intarvantinn in Afrih,1anictan
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The Chinese have lobbied in the West extensively on
Pakistan's behalf, but Beijing's own commitment to Islamabad
falls short of Pakistani desires;
Encourage Regional Harmony. A newly stressed element in
China's regional policy has been to seek to improve its own
bilateral relations with India and Iran and to minimize regional
conflicts that complicate increased cooperation against the
Soviet Union. Beijing has publicly signaled its interest in
better relations with New Delhi, such as in its treatment of
India's National Day and its unexpectedly warm congratulations
to Indira Gandhi, an old adversary, on her reelection. Foreign
Minister Huang Hua pressed China's interest in improved ties
during his brief meeting with her in Salisbury in April. China
has also taken special care in its dealings with Pakistan to
avoid irritating India needlessly; for instance, China has been
silent on the Kashmir issue. Through public comments and pri-
vate contacts, Beijing is also laboring to refurbish its rela-
tions with Tehran and after many months of effort managed to
restore its ambassadorial presence there.
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and welcomed the economic sanctions imposed by Washington, and
has called on the West to provide "active" support to the re-
sistance,
including both arms and political support. 25X1
China's own effort on behalf of the insurgents is unclear.
Beijing apparently has sought Islamabad's assistance in su l in
Chinese aid through Pakistan.
Beijing sees the various schemes for neutralizing Afghan-
istan as a threat to its policy. 25X1
Bog the USSR Down in Afghanistan. While pursuing these
various efforts to develop countervailing forces against the
Soviets, China seeks to get the USSR bogged down in Afghanistan
and to extract from Moscow the greatest political price possible
for the intervention. Beijing has supported the Olympic boycott 25X1
aI
To counter the EC proposal China has put forward its own
plan. Its key points, however, are such that they virtually
preclude a political settlement: Beijing insists on a total
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SLC:RFT
Soviet withdrawal without conditions, self-determination for
the Afghan people, and active Western support to the rebel
forces in the meantime.
Policy Constraints
Despite the intensity of Beijing's effort, there are
fundamental constraints on China's ability to forge a firm
anti-Soviet front in Southwest Asia and to engage the West
in its support:
-- To the degree China strengthens Pakistan, it runs
the risk of impairing efforts to improve relations
with India.
Deference to New Delhi's sensitivities generates
suspicions in Islamabad.
China's support for a stronger US role in
region is opposed by both India and Iran.
China has little in the way of aid it can offer
as a positive inducement, while any display of
China's military strength is counterproductive.
China may also find that the key actors in its policy are
unwilling or unable to play their assigned role.
Pakistan. Islamabad is an increasingly weak link in
Chinese policy. The Pakistani domestic political scene is
currently quiet, but there is widespread discontent with
President Zia's rule, even among his military backers. The
ZO country is poor and militarily weak and its leaders are pon-
dering how to deal with the pressures from the West, Moscow,
and the nonaligned and Islamic world. Rather than readily
accepting the vigorous anti-Soviet role Beijing has hoped it
would play, Pakistan is attempting to strike the best deal it
can for itself. China's ability to strengthen its longtime
friend and shape its foreign policy will continue to be
limited.
Iran. The prospect that Iran will be able to play the
strong anti-Soviet role Beijing would like is even less clear.
The possibility that China will establish influence in Tehran
. in the near future is also remote. Beijing has little to offer
Iran in the way of inducements, and anti-Communist Islamic
fundamentalism will limit Chinese influence under the best of
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sent an ambassador to Beijing.
circumstances. China is using the few assets it can muster to
win influence in Tehran; it has maintained trade, sent a
Chinese Muslim delegation, and generally tilted toward Iran in
its recent media coverage of events there. Tehran, however,
still resents Beijing's support for the Shah, and has not yet
relations.
India. The prospects for significant improvement in Sino-
Indian relations are fair in the long run, but the chances of
rapid improvement in the near term are not great. There remain
a number of bilateral issues that divide the countries--including
a difficult border dispute--and a strong heritage of bitterness
in India stemming from the 1962 border war and subsequent mani-
festations of Chinese hostility. Beijing has been willing to
negotiate all issues. It now believes it is up to India to
reciprocate China's overtures of good will and invite Foreign
Minister Huang Hua to New Delhi. While the atmospherics are
better and while India has expressed interest in improving ties,
New Delhi has put off a Huang visit at least until the second
half of 1980 and has taken few concrete measures to improve
US connection.
United States. For China, the question of US will and
determination is crucial, and Beijing is aware that a variety
of factors complicate US involvement in the region. On the one
hand, it is pleased by the enhanced US presence in the Indian
Ocean and other military moves. On the other, it is aware of US
domestic factors, such as the elections, that could cause
"vacillation and hesitation" in implementing tougher policies.
Moreover, Beijing is aware that US involvement in Southwest Asia
is complicated by Pakistan's uncertainty about the value of the
The Chinese remain as committed as ever to waging a pro-
tracted struggle against Vietnam. The ASEAN position on the
Kampuchea question has grown slightly more ambiguous, and the
new government in Bangkok may be less willing--especially over
the longer term--to cooperate fully with Beijing in maintaining
the anti-Vietnamese resistance in Kampuchea. China continues to
provide military and diplomatic assistance to Pol Pot and to
oppose vigorously anything that might lead to a compromise solu-
tion. Although China has few illusions about Pol Pot's long-term
prospects, it believes that if Vietnamese influence--and by exten-
sion, Soviet influence--is to be contained in the region, existing
ASEAN support for Democratic Kampuchea (DK) must stand firm.
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SF.C'RET
Foreign Minister Huang Hua lobbied hard for these views
during his swing throw h Southeast Asia in mid-March but had
only limited success.
China has shown particular concern that the new government
will cut its clandestine pipeline to Pol Pot. Soon after
While in Bangkok, Huang will undoubtedly make a determined
effort to forestall any Thai overture toward Vietnam. He will
probably stress that Vietnam, not China, constitutes the most
serious and immediate threat to Thailand and that Bangkok risks
its security if it tries to reach an accommodation with Hanoi.
Huang also will probably bring promises of increased Sino-Thai.
economic relations, including more petroleum exports to
Thailand.
maintaining stability on the Korean Peninsula and that the
north does not pose a threat to the south. China's effort to
expand relations with the United States and Japan has strained
In talks with Americans, Japanese, and others, the Chinese
have sought to convey a message that they share an interest in
Sino - North Korean relations,
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Beijing has welcomed Pyongyang's recent initiatives that
resulted in the current North-South contacts, as they serve
China's interest in promoting stability on the peninsula.
on the south.
Beijing has stressed that reunifica-
tion is a long-term development that could require a hundred
years. The Chinese, moreover, have assured both the United
States and Japan that they will not support a northern attack
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There are limits to how far China can reorient its Korean
policy and maintain its leverage in Pyongyang. China is con-
cerned that the Soviet Union might attempt to exploit Sino-
Korean differences to increase its influence in Pyongyang.
LV While China has been receptive to indirect trade contacts with
South Korea Beijing continues to rule out any cross-recognition
formula. 25X1
In regard to Japan, the Chinese continue to stress the
importance of US-Japanese security ties based on the Mutual
Defense Treaty; they also are encouraging the Japanese to
strengthen their own defense capabilities.
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the resulting
stronger US military posture have caused China to reduce its
meager relations with the USSR while expanding contacts with
the United States. Political changes within China have rein-
forced this trend, and the Chinese have made a point of assert-
ing their commitment to a long-term, strategic relationship
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The Soviet invasion produced an immediate and sharp
reaction in China. The Chinese issued a rare Government
Statement, summoned the Soviet Ambassador to warn that China
considered its security to be jeopardized, and published
commentary likening the action to the 1968 invasion of
Czechoslovakia--an event that helped jolt China out of the
isolation of the Cultural Revolution.
Beijing did not at first go beyond heating up its
rhetoric against the Soviets, however, presumably wanting to
assess the American reaction to the invasion during secretary
Brown's visit to Beijing in early January. On the broader
strategic plane, Beijing also wanted to assess the depth of the
stronger US commitment to resisting Soviet expansionism. Both
in the course of the visit and afterward, Beijing signaled its
satisfaction, and the subsequent visit to the United States by
Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Wenjin and the projected Geng Biao
visit confirm the Chinese desire to regularize consultations
with the United States.
As a measure of its favorable assessment of the Brown
visit in particular and the response to Afghanistan in general,
Beijing indefinitely postponed the second round of political
L negotiations with the USSR expected to open this spring. This
ended the phase in Sino-Soviet relations, begun in April 1979,
that had for a time raised the prospect of improvements in
relations.
3'S
the net effect benefited the US effort.
China also decided to lend indirect support to the US
grain boycott of the Soviet Union. The Ministry of Foreign
Affairs reportedly asked China's foreign trade apparatus to
increase purchases of US grain to that end. Other evidence
indicates that China's traders were already attracted by
favorable market conditions resulting from the boycott, but
On 1 February, the Chinese announced their support for
the Olympics boycott and pledged to work with other countries
to shift the site of the games. This decision followed by less
than a week the US announcement of willingness to sell China
communications and other equipment having military application.
After the Deng-dominated party plenum in late February the
Chinese leadership went to considerable lengths to demonstrate
implacability toward the Soviets. Moreover, in an authorita-
tive expression of approval of the US response to Afghanistan a
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25 March People's Daily editorial said US-Soviet contention is
"irreversible" even though Washington occasionally "vacillates"
These developments were summed up in an interview that Deng
Xiaoping gave to an American journalist in circumstances loaded
with symbolism for Sino-Soviet relations. On the day the 1950
Sino-Soviet treaty expired, 11 April, Deng told the US reporter
that he was "satisfied" with US-China relations, which "are
due to American domestic politics.
no tactical move, no matter of expediency or short term duration
but a major strategic decision." Deng reportedly made no men-
tion of the Sino-Soviet treaty, but his remarks effectively
turned aside a vague Soviet public proposal, made earlier
In another anti-Soviet signal, the Chinese on 30 April
held a protest rally in a county along the USSR's Central
Asian border where an incident had occurred last summer. In
an apparent political gesture, the Soviets had chosen 14
-L February, the anniversary of the Sino-Soviet treaty, as the
date to return a Chinese citizen captured during the incident,
but Beijing pointedly used the rally to play up Soviet
the week, to reopen border or political negotiations.
The Chinese have not, however, completely surrendered
their maneuverability in the strategic triangle. Even as Deng
spoke in sharply critical terms of Soviet foreign policy, he
would not rule out reopening talks with Moscow sometime in the
future: "Of course, at an appropriate time when it is necessary,
there may still be some discussions." In this way China can
reopen a channel for communication with the Soviets to help
"perfidy."
manage tensions.
The Chinese have also continued routine state-to-state
dealings with the Soviets. Beijing sent a new Ambassador to
Moscow on 20 April, which was about the time he had been
scheduled to depart when his appointment first became known
in December. Ambassador Yang Shouzheng has had extensive
experience in Africa; we have no record of any previous work
on Soviet issues. Both Chinese and Soviet reporting of his
Similarly, trade talks are under way in Beijing. A
Chinese official in Moscow said in late March that the Soviets
have again failed to include in the annual trade list certain
items, including power generators and coal processing equip-
ment, that Beijing has long sought. The official ventured the
assignment was routine.
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likely soon.
"personal" view that the Chinese would retaliate by reducing
available exports for the USSR. No figures on actual quantities
proposed are yet available. An agreement nonetheless appears
Finally, in March Beijing reached its annual technical
agreement with Moscow on management of the navigation channels
in the rivers along their borders. This type of agreement has
become so routine that it would have significance in assessing
Sino-Soviet relations only if it were not achieved.
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arms deal.
China continues to open new doors and to expand old ties
with Western Europe, primarily to encourage a stronger, more
unified anti-Soviet stance, but also to obtain the technology
and goods necessary to modernize its civilian economy and armed
forces. So far, China has had only limited success in pushing
its hard diplomatic line; trade levels are generally increasing,
but except for a limited number of low-level, nonlethal mili-
tary equipment purchases, China has not yet concluded a major
Flying School.
The official visit in late March by British Defense
Secretary Francis Pym is indicative of the state of China's
putative military relationship with the West. No agreement was
reached on the longstanding negotiations for the sale of the
Harrier jump-jet--the Chinese cited its high price--and indeed
the British now seem to have all but given up hope for the deal.
The Chinese told Pym that China now seeks to modernize its own
existing military equipment and to acquire new technology rather
than make large purchases of the finished products. Nonetheless,
Beijing remains interested in military exchanges. The British
announced a Royal Navy port call to Shanghai in September and
an agreement for a future visit by the Royal Air Force Central
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