ANGOLA: MILITARY GEOGRAPHY OF UNITA S SOUTHEASTERN STRONGHOLD

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85S00315R000300120002-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 21, 2009
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: December 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of - - Secret
Stronghold
Angola: Military Geography
of UNITA's Southeastern
t- Lt" LitY/;!UE;tf>?` f;'Y
It r U M ? t , 7
NGA Review Complete
Secret
GI 84-10212
December 1984
Copy 4 14
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Angola: Military Geography
of UNITA's Southeastern
Stronghold
This paper was prepared by
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Geography Division, OGI, on
Secret
GI 84-10212
December 1984
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Secret
Angola: Military Geography
of UNITA's Southeastern
StrongholdF__-]
Key Judgments Insurgents of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
Information available (UNITA), with an estimated 35,000 armed men, claim the southeastern
as of 23 October 1984 third of the country-an isolated, sparsely populated region the former
was used in this report.
Portuguese colonial rulers called "the land at the end of the world." This
region has been an effective haven, training base, logistics center, and
headquarters for Jonas Savimbi's insurgents. Although a recent govern-
ment military offensive into the region failed, we believe ground assaults
and air attacks against some of the more than 30 UNITA base camps are
likely. But climatic factors suggest that, once the wet season has begun
(usually by November), major ground and air operations would be extreme-
ly difficult until at least April.
Military and insurgent activities in Angola are strongly affected by
geography. Long distances from government-controlled areas to insurgent
strongholds, poor transportation routes, and seasonally bad weather are
important considerations in assessing the feasibility of military operations
in the region. This study analyzes the key geographic factors affecting
existing and potential military and insurgent operations in the southeast.
iii Secret
GI 84-10212
December 1984
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Key Judgments
The Setting
Vegetation
Hydrology
Government Positions in the Region 6
Climatic Data, Mavinga (Southeastern Angola) 2
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 Figure 1
Angolan Government and UNITA Strongholds
Luanda
Congo
Brazzaviiie
ZAIRE
~._ - lOuibala
CUANZA( SUL
Y~AMalanje
Ca(-longo,
' 7uvelai
Baix
Lon(
Major Angolan ) Major UNITA
garrison base
Major Cuban
garrison
?- Province boundary
'Railroad
- Road
LUNDA
SUL
~er9uc.~
Luena
CUANDO
CUBANGO
MOXICO
ACangamba
'Cuito
~ Cuanavale
I +?l+ Mavinga
Rit., }~\
UNITA area of
operation
200 Kilometers
100 200 Miles
Zaire
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Angola: Military Geography
of UNITA's Southeastern
Stronghold F - - - ]
The Setting
The southeast is the most sparsely settled and the
least economically developed part of Angola. Al-
though the region (comprising most of the provinces of
Moxico and Cuando Cubango) is as large as Montana
and represents more than 30 percent of Angola's total
land area, it contains only 5 percent of the population.
All of the active oilfields, diamond mines, coffee
plantations, and railroads and practically all of the
hard-surfaced roads and airfields are elsewhere. The
southeast is remote from major political and popula-
tion centers; Jamba,' UNITA's main headquarters, is
more than 1,250 kilometers (km) from Luanda.F_
25X1 Invading Angolan Government forces must contend
with many logistics problems and face an enemy more
familiar with the terrain. Although the region is
mostly scrub and grassland (with elevations ranging
from about 1,800 meters in the north to about 1,000
meters in the south), it is difficult to cross because of
numerous streams and rivers and lack of roads.
Debilitating heat and humidity and torrential rains
also combine to create an environment hostile to
large-scale military operations.
Population
Few people inhabit this remote region. Moxico Prov-
ince has only one person per square kilometer while
Cuando Cubango has only one person per 2 square
kilometers. Most of the people live in small villages
along major rivers, such as the Rio Cuando and Rio
Cubango. Areas away from the rivers are practically
uninhabited exce t for scattered nomadic bushmen.
The dominant ethnic group is the Ganguela; lesser
groups include the Xindonga, Khoisan, and Ovambo.
These people were formerly nomadic gatherers and
hunters, but most now live in protected villages, which
UNITA calls "liberated areas." They keep cattle and
raise crops such as maize, cassava, and a wide variety
of vegetables; much of their produce goes to the
insurgents. Many of the UNITA adherents in the
UNITA was founded by Dr. Jonas Savimbi in 1966.
It was one of a number of liberation movements
embroiled in bitter fighting not only with the Portu-
guese colonial powers but also with each other. After
the Portuguese relinquished control of Angola in
1975, the war continued between insurgent groups
including UNITA and the Popular Movement for the
Liberation of Angola (MPLA). The MPLA, with the
aid of Cuban troops and Soviet weapons, finally
gained control of the capital and most of the country,
but UNITA continued guerrilla warfare.
After a series of defeats in 1976, Savimbi's ragged 25X1
army retreated to safety in the southeastern bush for
a long training program. Early operations included
hit-and-run raids on nearby targets to secure its
safehaven and the promotion of a guerrilla campaign
in the central highlands. Since then UNITA has
methodically established control across a large part
of the Angolan countryside and has isolated govern-
ment-held towns. Though at first strictly a guerrilla
organization, it has more recently been employing
semiconventional forces. During the past two years,
UNITA has expanded its operations into central and
northern Angola.
UNITA has established a system of collective farms
and has provided extension services to villages in the
southeast. In exchange for one day's labor each week,
peasants can borrow tractors and oxen for plowing
private plots. UNITA also has programs in educa-
tion, medicine, and technical services.
Angola has never had.
UNITA is backed by the largest of Angola's ethnolin-
guistic groups, the Ovimbundu of the central and
southern part of the country. UNITA spokesmen
claim that the insurgents are also gaining support of
other ethnic groups, especially the Chokwe, Gan-
guela, and Ovambo. Many observers believe UNITA
could win a majority in a free election-something
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1977 October UNITA launched over 100 attacks within
three weeks and repeatedly cut the Ben-
guela Railroad.
1982 November UNITA began a six-month offensive, vir-
tually doubling its territory while expand-
ing operations in central and northeastern
Angola.
1983 August UNITA captured the government garrison
at Cangamba in the first major battle
using conventional forces.
November UNITA began another major six-month
campaign.
1984 March UNITA captured and briefly held Sumbe
in the first raid on a provincial capital.
April UNITA car bombing in Huambo killed a
number of Cuban advisers.
May UNITA began another military campaign;
fighting intensified in the northern
provinces.
Table
Climatic Data, Mavinga
(Southeastern Angola)
Daily Mean Temperature
Mean
Precipitation
Mar
29
84
16
61
18
7
Apr
29
85
13
56
2
1
May
28
82
7
45
2
1
Jun
26
78
4
40
0
0
Sep
32
90
11
53
0
0
July UNITA blew up a major oil pipeline in the
first raid into the Cabinda enclave.
August Increasing evidence of plans for govern-
ment invasion of UNITA-controlled
territory.
Vegetation
The region's vegetation-mostly savanna and scrub
with isolated deciduous trees-has an important influ-
ence on military operations. It is a barrier to vehicles
and can provide camouflage. Seasonal changes
strongly affect the degree of concealment. The trees,
region were recruited among the Ovimbundu of An-
gola's central highlands and brought to the region for
training and inclusion in the insurgents' military arm.
six months.
UNITA has won the support of the inhabitants. The
organization maintains well-run education and health
services in the region. Journalists have written about
bush schools that provide for the basic educational
needs of small children and about more sophisticated
technical schools for older students. According to one
journalist's report in late 1983, UNITA also claimed
to have five central hospitals, 22 regional hospitals,
and almost 200 dispensaries and to have given free
medical treatment to 67,000 persons over a period of
mainly baobabs and spiny acacias, are generally less
than 10 meters high; during the dry season they are
leafless and conceal little from the air. The savanna,
consisting mainly of elephant grass, also offers only
limited concealment in the dry season. However,
during the wet season the thicker vegetation provides
much better cover for guerrilla ambushes. Most
UNITA base camps have been near streams, where
vegetation is densest.
Weather and Climate
The climate is tropical, normally with a distinct wet
season (November through March) and a dry season
(May through October) (see table). For the past two
years, however, drought has probably prevailed over
the southeast. Extrapolation from data in adjacent
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Figure 2. UN/TA leader Jonas
Savimbi and his bodyguards.
Figure 3. Shooting instruction
amidst typical savanna and
scrub vegetation.
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countries shows that precipitation for the past two wet
seasons was only about 50 percent of normal. Thus,
the logistic and military operating environment may
have been somewhat better than usual.
Dry and wet seasons affect government and insurgent
forces differently. Dry-season conditions, when dirt
roads are firm and vegetation cover light, favor
conventional military and counterinsurgent opera-
tions. In contrast, the wet season favors the insurgents
because of better cover and concealment from the
more abundant vegetation, difficulties for vehicular
and troop movements, and poor flying conditions.
June, July, and August are virtually rainless and the
best time for a major invasion
An invasion during October is possible, but after the
wet season begins, usually by November, miry soils
and flooded rivers and streams limit conventional
military operations. Movement over the primitive
roads and tracks is difficult. For example, in late
March 1984 a group of journalists was brought to
Jamba from an airfield at Coutada do Mucusso; the
160-km trip along bush tracks in torrential rains took
over 10 hours.
Rainfall in the region decreases from an annual
average of about 120 centimeters (cm) in the north to
only 50 cm in the south along the Namibian border.
The highest temperatures, reaching 30 degrees Cel-
sius or more, occur from September to November.
Insurgents complain that the engines of their captured
Soviet and East European trucks often burn out in the
severe heat
Hydrology
Rivers and streams form the only major topographical
obstacles to vehicles and people. Most of the large
rivers rise in the uplands just south of the Benguela
Railroad and flow southeasterly into tributaries of the
Zambezi River or into the swamps of northwestern
Botswana. The three principal rivers, the Rio Cuban-
go in the west, the Rio Cuito in the center, and the
Rio Cuando in the east along the Zambian border,
although less than 20 meters wide in their upper
reaches, are over 150 meters wide in their middle and
lower courses. Thus, crossing becomes increasingly
difficult downstream to the southeast. Streambanks
are steep in many places and sometimes thickly lined
with reeds and trees. Bottoms in the lower reaches are
generally mud and sand and in the upper reaches are
mostly rock and gravel. Flooding is common along
most streams during the high-water period (Novem-
ber through March). Perennial swamps are found
along the Rio Cuando south of Rivungo.
Surface Transportation
The region's unsurfaced roads, tracks, and trails could
not support sustained heavy military traffic. Most of
the roads parallel major rivers. During the dry season
the river banks themselves are sometimes used as
roads. All of the roads south of 15 degrees latitude are
classified on Angolan-produced maps as "dirt, suit-
able only for cross-country vehicles." Travel along
them, even by four-wheel-drive vehicles, is slow.
Because of sandy soils, late in the dry season the roads
are rutted and difficult to cross and during the wet
season they are miry and practically impassable
The better roads, which invading government forces
would use, are mined and closely watched by the
insurgents. Burning government vehicles have recent-
ly been seen on some of these roads. The two paved
roads into the region lead southward to Chiume in the
east and Menongue in the west. The road southward
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Figure 5. UNITA troops cross-
ing the Rio Cuando in a motor-
boat.
from Chiume leading to Luiana on the Zambian
border, however, is a 4-meter-wide unimproved dirt
road, which floods during the rainy season. The road
eastward from Menongue is hard surfaced as far as
Longa but then deteriorates into a 4-meter-wide
unimproved dirt road to the garrison town of Cuito-
Cuanavale. At least one of the government's military
convoys using this road employed heavy-lift transport-
ers to carry a small number of tanks to Cuito-
Cuanavale. The road continues east and south
through Mavinga all the way to Neriquinha where it
joins the Chiume-Luiana road. Two poor dirt roads,
also of low capacity, follow the Rio Cubango and the
Rio Cuito. Away from the rivers, the roads turn into
trails usable only by four-wheel-drive vehicles.
When moving to the north, UNITA guerrillas follow
a series of overland routes, nicknamed by journalists
the Savimbi Trail. These routes, consisting of tracks
and trails, connect farther north with unpaved roads
and eventually with the few paved roads leading to the
Benguela Railroad. UNITA engineers are improving
the Savimbi Trail by clearing vegetation and con-
structing rudimentary bridges and catwalks across
streams and swamps. But movement on the trail is
still slow and arduous. Although suitable for infiltrat-
ing guerrillas northward, it would not support large
convoys of heavy military equipment. Although gov-
ernment forces might attempt to use this route, they
lack familiarity with the system and would be highly
vulnerable to ambushes.
None of the rivers of the southeast are navigable by
large boats, but UNITA has used dugout canoes to
transport men and supplies on some of them. UNITA
has also used rubber boats for ferrying troops across
rivers. A journalist's report of one such crossing
indicated that in a marathon 52-hour operation 1,200
insurgents were transported to the other side of a
river, 20 at a time in the boats.
UNITA Installations
Over the past two years, more than 30 UNITA base
camps have been identified
These camps range in size from the large Jamba 25X1
headquarters to small staging bases near government-
held towns or garrisons. The camps serve housing,
training, storage, and logistic support functions for
UNITA. Insurgents infiltrate personnel and supplies
from the camps into central and northern Angola.
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operations.
Additional camps probably are being constructed
beyond those in the southeast as UNITA expands its
rivers throughout the southeast.
Jamba consists of two adjoining camps just south of
the Biongue River about 30 km north of the Namib-
ian border. The camps are a combined military base
and large civilian-inhabited village that together cover
over 20 square km and reportedly have a population of
as many as 10,000. Jamba is the largest and most
highly developed complex of UNITA bases. Two
other large camps immediately north of the Namibian
border, Mucusso and Babwata, are the primary con-
duits for South African supplies to UNITA. The
remaining camps are scattered along streams and
Five graded-earth airfields in the UNITA-controlled
part of the region can accommodate light and medium
aircraft. Coutada do Mucusso, the principal airfield,
has been upgraded recently;
journalists say light planes
have used this airfield. UNITA in the past showed
25X1 little concern about possible airstrikes, but it now
employs rudimentary air defenses and has antiaircraft
guns and SA-7 missiles protecting some of its base
camps and other facilities.
Government Positions in the Region
The Angolan Armed Forces (FAPLA) 2 have built up
large concentrations of troops along the major lines of
communication surrounding the southeast and have
recently deployed combat aircraft at nearby airfields.
A substantial part of the Angolan Army is stationed
along the Benguela Railroad to defend the line and to
interdict UNITA movement northward. The provin-
cial capitals at Menongue and Luena are the main
government centers and the largest garrisons. Both
are served by all-weather airfields capable of support-
ing operations by combat aircraft. Cuban troops are
stationed at both centers.
Ground operations directed against the main UNITA
bases are conducted from the main garrison at Men-
ongue. Any large-scale movement would probably be
detected by UNITA, which has interdicted convoys
on the road leading eastward, and government troops
would find it difficult to protect their supply lines.
I The overall strength of the Angolan Armed Forces is about
100,000 men: the Army has about 35,000; the Air Force, 2,000; the
Navy, 2,000; and the People's Militia, 60,000. Cuban troops in
Angola probably number as many as 35,000 and Soviet adviser
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Airfields in Southeastern Angola
Coutada do Luengue (16?42'10"S 20?16'00"E).
UNITA controlled. South of Rio Luange. 130 km
north of Angolan-Namibian border. Approximately
1,800-meter graded-earth runway.
Coutada do Mucusso (17001'01"S 21018'08"E).
UNITA controlled. 110 km north of Angolan-Namib-
ian border. Approximately 2,500-meter graded-earth
runway, of which about 1,700 meters is serviceable.
Recently upgraded. Airfield to which visitors to
Jamba are brought.
Cuito-Cuanavale (15 ? 10'28"S 1901 0'04"E).
Government controlled. 2 km north of Cuito-Cuana-
vale, an Angolan/Cuban garrison. Approximately
2,300-meter runway, probably asphalt. Being upgrad-
ed. Runway being extended.
Luena (11 ? 46' 06"S 19 ? 5 3' 5 2"E).
Government controlled. 2 km northwest of Luena and
the Benguela Railroad. Approximately 2,400-meter
asphalt runway.
Mavinga (15?47'15"S 20?22'15"E).
UNITA controlled. 230 km north of Angolan-Namib-
ian border. Approximately 2,400-meter graded-earth
runway. Probably not operational.
Menongue East (14?38'25"S 17?41'45"E).
Primary government airfield in southeast. Supports
provincial capital and main garrison in region. Only
airfield capable of supporting operations by fighter
aircraft and transports. Approximately 3,600-meter
all-weather asphalt runway.
Tandue (16?52'40"S 17?59'50"E).
UNITA controlled. 10 km south of Savate. Approxi-
mately 1,500-meter graded-earth runway.
Topa (16?12'30"S 17?40'50"E).
UNITA controlled. 75 km south-southeast of
Cuando. Approximately 1,500-meter graded-earth
runway.
Government air attacks either in support of a ground
invasion or as a primary mission are possible. The
airfields at Menongue, Luena, and Cuito-Cuanavale
controlled by the Angolan Government forces would
be the probable staging airfields for attacks into
UNITA territory 25X1
Government airstrikes would be most feasible against
the UNITA camps closest to government bases, such
as the Luassingua River base camps west of Cuito-
Cuanavale and the camps south of Mavinga. Air-
strikes against main bases near the Namibian border
would be more difficult because of long distances
from the probable staging airfields; Jamba is about
600 km from Menongue. Also, action against facili-
ties close to the Namibian border could bring South
African retaliation. Any government air attack
against UNITA would be a psychological blow to
both the insurgents and their peasant supporters.
Most parts of the region present few obstacles to air
operations. The flat-to-rolling plains covered by grass
and scrub offer numerous potential airdrop zones and
sites suitable for landing assault airplanes and heli-
copters. FAPLA, however, does not have many of
these aircraft and cannot transport large numbers of
troops.
Conclusions and Prospects
If government forces were to attempt new incursions
into the southeast during the next few months, they
would risk operating in the extremely difficult condi-
tions that a break in the current drought would bring.
The usually rainy period from November through
March could present formidable logistics problems for
a large-scale invasion. Therefore, we believe any
major ground operation against UNITA in the south-
east is unlikely before April. Moreover, because of its
vastness, remoteness, and conditions favoring uncon-
ventional warfare, we believe that the southeast would
be difficult for government forces to control even
following a successful invasion
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Airfields in Southeastern Angola
Coutada do Luengue (16?42'10"S 20?16'00"E).
UNITA controlled. South of Rio Luange. 130 km
north of Angolan-Namibian border. Approximately
1,800-meter graded-earth runway.
Coutada do Mucusso (17001'01"S 21018'08"E).
UNITA controlled. 110 km north of Angolan-Namib-
ian border. Approximately 2,500-meter graded-earth
runway, of which about 1,700 meters is serviceable.
Recently upgraded. Airfield to which visitors to
Jamba are brought.
Cuito-Cuanavale (15 ? 10'28"S 1901 0'04"E).
Government controlled. 2 km north of Cuito-Cuana-
vale, an Angolan/Cuban garrison. Approximately
2,300-meter runway, probably asphalt. Being upgrad-
ed. Runway being extended.
Luena (11 ? 46' 06"S 19 ? 5 3' 5 2"E).
Government controlled. 2 km northwest of Luena and
the Benguela Railroad. Approximately 2,400-meter
asphalt runway.
Mavinga (15?47'15"S 20?22'15"E).
UNITA controlled. 230 km north of Angolan-Namib-
ian border. Approximately 2,400-meter graded-earth
runway. Probably not operational.
Menongue East (14?38'25"S 17?41'45"E).
Primary government airfield in southeast. Supports
provincial capital and main garrison in region. Only
airfield capable of supporting operations by fighter
aircraft and transports. Approximately 3,600-meter
all-weather asphalt runway.
Tandue (16?52'40"S 17?59'50"E).
UNITA controlled. 10 km south of Savate. Approxi-
mately 1,500-meter graded-earth runway.
Topa (16?12'30"S 17?40'50"E).
UNITA controlled. 75 km south-southeast of
Cuando. Approximately 1,500-meter graded-earth
runway.
Government air attacks either in support of a ground
invasion or as a primary mission are possible. The
airfields at Menongue, Luena, and Cuito-Cuanavale
controlled by the Angolan Government forces would
be the probable staging airfields for attacks into
UNITA territory 25X1
Government airstrikes would be most feasible against
the UNITA camps closest to government bases, such
as the Luassingua River base camps west of Cuito-
Cuanavale and the camps south of Mavinga. Air-
strikes against main bases near the Namibian border
would be more difficult because of long distances
from the probable staging airfields; Jamba is about
600 km from Menongue. Also, action against facili-
ties close to the Namibian border could bring South
African retaliation. Any government air attack
against UNITA would be a psychological blow to
both the insurgents and their peasant supporters.
Most parts of the region present few obstacles to air
operations. The flat-to-rolling plains covered by grass
and scrub offer numerous potential airdrop zones and
sites suitable for landing assault airplanes and heli-
copters. FAPLA, however, does not have many of
these aircraft and cannot transport large numbers of
troops.
Conclusions and Prospects
If government forces were to attempt new incursions
into the southeast during the next few months, they
would risk operating in the extremely difficult condi-
tions that a break in the current drought would bring.
The usually rainy period from November through
March could present formidable logistics problems for
a large-scale invasion. Therefore, we believe any
major ground operation against UNITA in the south-
east is unlikely before April. Moreover, because of its
vastness, remoteness, and conditions favoring uncon-
ventional warfare, we believe that the southeast would
be difficult for government forces to control even
following a successful invasion
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