IN DETERMINING BROAD PRIORITIES FOR THE ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES IN PEACETIME AND WARTIME PLANNING, WHAT COMES FIRST: NATO OR SOUTHWEST ASIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85M00366R000100050023-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
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• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 17, 2008
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• Content Type: REPORT

? The security of western Europe and the a stance
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access
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to the security of the United States. 'IC the u I ;t~
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sustained buildup of Soviet capabiliti
and the heightened threat in Southwest.". U and _i
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to achieve all military objectives siau]. usly, ' 1 fl. ` {
our strategy will require difficult chili S: I .. 1.::
? Western Europe is vital to the U.S. bee !of~ its
contribution. For this reason, NATO and b LOCs {;.-;~
leading thereto are second only to the 'd Ise
of North America in priority for.globa ime
P1Ann ing
hence to the, U.S.) because the loss of.)
exposed to severe political and economic
in a major war-in-either or both theaters
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DISCUSSION PAPER
In determining broad priorities for
of resources in peacetime and Wartime
-what comes first: NATO or Southwest ' AiA?
Southwest-Asia is vital to the western 41
-be assumed that neither the West aor.,3
would be; able to obtain oil from the'Pe
?sp.cialiy for the first few months. .-;Cd
the region during wartime, however, would
either side a significant military adva]64'
k s
n both regions.
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Reason for-'extension: NSC 1.13(e)
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posture in both NATO and Southwest Asia'
face a situation that seriously threa
ability to deter or counter Soviet use cat
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LKU
iATO members are neither willing nor able!
Southwest Asia is exposed, and Soviet,
,posturing in region continues unabated.
of regional forces alone, no matter how
:Vould prevent Soviet military victory.` A
provide substantial combat power to Sou
contingencies. Yet the region is vital
western partners. U.C. rapid deployment
Vffars'.the'WSst the beat chance of prot
vital interests. i
posture in NATO requires a substantial ";i
The maintenance of a credible deterrent'
by all NATO members throughout tnl.s,
? O.S. cannot carry a disproportionate
protecting Western interests; burdenshar
regions is a necessity. However, if the!
less in NATO, European NATO will probably
less. The essence of the dilemma is that
United States does not have the resources
the gap in both NATO and Southwest Asia.
? There is a close strategic connection be
and Southwest Asia; a loss of access to
oil could severely strain the Alliance.
is also a likelihood that Soviet military
initiated in either theater would soon in
combat in both theaters.
? In order for the U.S. to maintain a credit
deterrent, the Soviet Union must be confio
with the prospect of a major conflict with
U.S. should it threaten the oil resources?
Gulf. To achieve this goal, the U.S. must
a large investment for capabilities which
? 'U.S. and NATO forces have significant ca
to deal with the Soviet threat to Europe
sans is not true in Southwest Asia.
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If the U.S. does less in NATO, either in
or in wartime planning, there is potentia
weakening NATO cohesion and for reinforci
European pressures for accommodation with
Sovt~4Mion. U. S. actions must. be sensi
Sovi~ efforts to divide the Alliance.
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altxibility; they can deploy and operate: n.
Our existing and programmed forces amphis zej
;- I
In order to meet a wide range of contingec a,
significantly ;contributes to this fl.xib tty.
. f4
f' ' 4. ,
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number of threat environments. Theacuace t
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DISCUSSION PAPER
TOPIC: -What military force capability should, e~teloped
to counter the Soviet threat to U.S. int.,,rs in
Southwest Asia (SWA) ?
expansion of the conflict beyond the r ion
and its supporting lines of common t n }
(LOCs). For this issue, the key U. rtisis
achieving U.S. wartime objectives i4}1 50C twest
Asia while seeking to limit the lD*1ihpod of
e
capability to have a reasonable as an!e;of
%icfficient
CONCLUSION: To acquire, by the and of the-decad
--l---~ 40 the only free wor'l ation
capable. of detgri ', in : the
vital interest a United 4
to Persian Gulf ' ii' is of
recognizes that;. astern acce$s
A. Underlying Strategic Concept: A deterrent and fighting
strategy is nece spry which
objectives are to maintain control.. aid
protect the Persian Gulf oilfields,!; sos-
shipment points, and lines of comma c[ion.
. I
region.
Deterrent component. Deterrence is the tier
cs cities (to include substantial and
e "m mil i presence in the Indian Ocean/Sou
Asia), with rapidly deployable forces, a
commitment to combat Soviet forces in the
and the potential for escalation.
global must be recognized and planned for.
offensives on other fronts where the U.S.
advantages. The potential for this contl
planning would be to prepare for executing
control over the Persian 'ulf. The third
in the region in order to prevent them is
the region in conjunction with allies and
to achieve U.S. wartime objectives. U.S.
would be committed to engage fully Soviet
U.S. forces would conduct military operati
to dissuade them from continuing their at
tier
inuou's
Wwe*t e
liar
Mater
Warfightingcomponent.- The second tier of
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1 A lesser force capability. For deterren
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Other options considered
would require greater reliance on the threat of IJ;l.,.!,,'ilitary
actions outside Southwest Asia. In the event detai e.3ice
fails, this would require execution of in-theater;; litary
action and counteroffensives on other fronts of c rR!U.S.
e
t.tion
advantage early on, in order to dissuade the Sovi
from continuing its attack.
2. A eater force capability clearly suffj
achieve U.S. wartime objectives without resort in ;,.,
o'
of the conflict beyond Southwest is and its sup
C. facts
? The United States has two primary security
in Southwest Asia: First, to prevent the
Union from acquiring political-military'
in the region; second, to maintain contin
*VTaV-Xhd sustain forms in Southwest aaP That
? The Soviet Union enjoys options of attack
? ~, *In " z~ to project and sustain -U.S. fore sI a `:
SoutllTwest Asia, the U. S. is dependent on ubstantial
support from intra- and extraregional all S! and
friends. There is a direct correlation been
the size of the planned U.S. force commit and:
the degree of required support.
Key Considerations
It is in the interest of the U.S. to liaii
scope of any conflict with the Soviet.Uni
However, due to the global military capab
of both superpowers and the in terrelatioi
strategic theaters, the likelihood that'
.Soviet conflict would expand beyond one`:
other theaters must be recognized and p
in any event, a U.S.-Soviet conflict in!
..,Asia will produce substantial escalatory)
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subiect to hostile Soviet action. ..I..
over lengthy lines of communication, are
Deployed forces must be reinforced aridl*ustained
actions worldwide to protect its vital;; terests:
These actions will include uobilizatioe and 4
from our aili.es.
and abroad. Similar actions can beea~ fed
nuclear and conventional forces, Dotn
h,aiahtened state of readiness for both trategie
If a conflict between the superpower:O' kes
place in Southwest Asia, the outcome; ld
have a critical ianact on the economi+e ; of
?hM U.S., western ,rope, and Japan.
? It is in the interest of the U.S. to y
U.S.-Soviet conflict to conventional means.~i
However, deterrence is enhanced by an'integfated
strategy which compels the Soviet Uniam-, , ? Ikon
probability of nuclear escalation ; d the
w4th tb-e
.
to rest inq. risks and costs. Additionally, gl~ographic
are linked.
? Our military Assessments indicate that, .
term, a successful in-theater defense againt a 11
determined Soviet attack cannot be achieved
? By acquiring visible, robust conventional wzfighting
capability, the United States can hope tb ;f strata
Soviet plans to establish iitical-mile '
this warfighting capability provides an* 11knative
to spiraling escalation or defeat.
E. The Bottom Line
? The threat of geographic escalation is
remain an essential element of U.S.?strat
is not a substitute for adequate military
? In the near term, existing Soviet advanta
that our warfighting strategy must necess
place significant emphasis on geogrephic{i
? The U.S. force capability established as,
for Southwest Asia will enhance deterrence
provide additional flexibility in the even
fails. Once fielded, we will have a beta
of preventing the Soviet Union from unde2
vital interests in the region without be
with the necessity to escalate the confl
mean
lation.
1 i
biacties T" V':
d' wil
etair~neq;
aced
Southwest Asia. T n n t r_ r n r-r ,1 .1 11 I
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HSSD 1-82, Part III, Section C
MILITARY OBJECTIVES
dissuade the Soviets from continuing their attack. this!: ji
context, the threat of counteroffensives elsewhere an
essential element of U.S. strategy, but is not a s 8itute
for adequate military capability to defend U.S. int,s'ests i t
the area in which they are threatened. Moreover, a;dBcisiofi
to expand a war geographically must take account of]the
secure early war termination on terms favorable to U.S.' and its allies. In doing so, the U.S. must plan, njunCtioa
with allies, for a successful defense in a global w =against
the Soviet Union and its allies. At the same time, `he U.S.
will seek to limit the scope of a U.S.-Soviet confl t to
the extent co?ensurate with protecting U.S. vital eresti..
Contingency planning should, however, include optio 94,..for
military force to achieve our political objectives
The wartime strategy of the U.S. is to emiy
A. ._Introduction
and allies interests. In lower order, non-Soviet ingen i;es,
we plan to rely on regional states and other friend ad
geographic expansion and nuclear escalation consider tions
are linked.
In contingencies involving direct Soviet c,gressicn,
the U.S. would expect to play a major role in defen U.S.
other fronts at least as attractive as ours, and t
racts that the soviet Union enjoys options of attacking on
common interests.
B. Priorities for Wartime Resource Allocat'io
Soviet Union and the interrelationship of strategic ' ateis,'
the likelihood that any U.S.-Soviet conflict Would d ,
Due to the global military capabilities o e
beyond one theater to other theaters must be recogn z anda
planned for. This does not mean that we must have h
apply our military power in the post effective way, is
an esta suing priorities for sequential operatio s nq
theaters to ensure that we, in conjunction with our ies,
capability to successfully engage Soviet forces s' l Sly'.
on all fronts. Rather, this means procuring balanc.d orces
d bli
the following priorities will apply for wartime pl, q:
the time of war will bear heavil on strategic deci i s,
, recognizing that the political and military situati a
force the U.S. to choose between initiating nuclear
accepting the loss of vital western interests. Whi
includes preventing the Soviet Union from being
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The highest priority is the defense.
America (including Hawaii, Alaska en
SLOCs), followed by the NATO areasa
LOC. leading there to.
The next priority is ensuring access
oil in Southwest Asia, followed byIdi
U.S. Pacific allies and the LOCs fcr
Indian and Pacific Oceans, and the'd
'other friendly nations in Latin Amer
Africa.
In areas other than NATO and Southwest Asia, U.S.a
will be designed to protect essential U.S. interest
'advantage of Soviet vulnerabilities,.and divert Sov
attention and forces from Europe and Southwest Asia
Priorities for peacetime resource allocation may
?correlate.to the above wartime priorities sincel":
emphasis on-specific capabilities may be required
C. Equitable Burdensharing. Many nations wi
standards equal to tU.S. contribute markedly Its
must be much firmer.in insisting upon increased d0f
efforts by affluent nations which possess the po'
more in the defense realm.
II. Regional Objectives
In the event of war with the Soviet Union,;
objectives provide only rough guidelines and stust,
in a. global perspective.
11. L'u~pe
.f'
f North
Caribbean
A the
The security of Europe is closely linke' tq t-bat
of the United States. The unprecedented challenges
Western security, coupled with a continuing growth
economic interdependence, mandate a firm commitment #y
war are dtiategy AT NATO. While 'lntra-Alliance prob s
such as burdensharing and anti-nuclear mosetnents ex j.it
will remain important that we continue to recognize t the,'
t'
.defense of Europe is vital to the national security: the
ill
United States.
`1ZAafategy MC14/3 stresses defense aloai-, 'the ?
initiation of nuclear escalation if NATO is losing cc venti
This nuclear linkage -- and uncertainty -- is import t tol
deterrence. Out the Europeans must not be permitted : ' use
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nuclear linkage as an excuse for not funding conv+e tonal
defense forces. Our policy should be to support 11(14/3,
while stressing that nuclear parity means a strong!con-
ventional defense is necessary for deterrence as w4ll'as for
defense. ,While improvements are required across 'the: dull
spectrum of the Alliance's military capabilities,?al$ajor
increase over current efforts is espediaily requix ' 'from
all other members with regard to conventional ca
pab,~4ty.
.
Without such an increase the nuclear threshold could--be
lowered and the Allies become more vulnerable to nuclear
threats as the Soviets continue increasing their ca abilities.
Additionally, NATO should enhance deterrence throuq ;`Moser
Allied coherence, and clearer expression of politic will.,
Within the context outlined above, the following;~r :4he
specific U.S. military objectives for the European lion:
Wartime Objectives
To protect the territorial integrity of stern
Europe.
To defeat a Warsaw Pact conventional it &'0 l iwith
conventional forces in a forward defense,!a~id to
deter Soviet use of chemical or nuclear: pons-M
accordance with current NATO strategy.
To fully engage all ra*TO members in the relict.
To be able to sustain a war at least as 'as
disrupting their LOCs, and fragmenting t cohesion
To weaken the Warsaw Pact's ability to wi el.war by
LOCS.
To establish and maintain control of Atl',
Peac ry Objectives
NATO's conventional defense capabilities:. le
.:also improving nuclear and chemical forces
?
To enhance deterrence through improvements
.of doing so increased contributions in of iareas`
of mutual benefit, to include Southwest As
'def t e of Western Europe and from Allies: ble
Tai e$e increased Allied contributions- ~. the ?
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To secure a more effective division of". ibor
within NATO through cooperative efforts', such as
Host Nation Support Agreements.
B. Near East/Southwest Asia. The United S'tates has
two'primary Zational security interests in the region. The
first is to prevent the Soviet Union from acquiring political-
military hegemony in the region. This requires that the
O.S. support the sovereignty of regional states tr'ndly to
the U.S. The second is to maintain continued acce4s to
Persian Gulf oil. This means that the U.S., in co ert with
intro- and extraregional allies and friends must, prepared
to meet threats of any magnitude, from internal ersion
to large scale Soviet aggression.
s
In this context, defense policy has three overridi objective
1. Deter Soviet overt military aggression and
Soviets, particularly in the East ra Medit1erranean, 'aiv
augmentation for the Southern Flank.
powerful state in the region, Israel's assistance uld be
of_ considerable benefit in the cu rse of a conflict w th the
be such stronger in FY 87 than today. As the'moet 'litarily
today than at the time of the 1973 war and projects that it'!vil
over any realistic combination of Arab foes. Theil Hest SNIE ;,I
.concludes that Israel's military superiority is muc ltronger
2. Maintain Israel's qualitative mill advantaaei
this conflict to become global must be recognised' `:planned
advantages. Throughout this planning process, the 'tentia1 fot
n
e p oprp
e or ex cuing ~,
counter -o fensives on other fronts where the U.S.
deterrence fails, we must plan to combat the Soviet in the
theater to dissuade them from continued aggression. !The
third tier o! n. 4P
a
se I av%" i is t e r f t'
RDJTF requirements. Our private pressure upon the for I,
realistic combined planning must be unremitting. S ond, if
extraregional allies and friends must be obtained;. lupport
Joint Task Force -- quickly into the region to pre nt a
Soviet fait accompli. Additional support from int -:;and
.demonstrate our ability to project the RDJTF -- Ra d Deployme:i
protect western access to oti. To @o tnls, U.5.::4e ense
planning has three tiers. First, we must plan for. d
3. Support moderate states against exte ` 1
aggression and subversion. This requires U.S. arms Iles to
help strengthpnjl*bstantially the self-defense caps isties:
Of key slates 1pthe region.
Southwest Asia. Additionally, they should be a#ed toy
the employment of U.S. forces. Allies will be expe td to
offer their facilities for the deployment of U.S. 'f rtes to.
q J[
l
tl
To accomplish these objectives for"' e'region,
the U.S. *Xpectz regional states to contribute toA eI'extent
possible to their own defense as well as assisting 'n supportin
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contribute militarily to meeting specific threats:i3f ;,such
participation would not substantially reduce their war
fighting capability in their home region and would provide a
beneficial contribution to the conflict.
Within the context outlined above, the following.;Or{e :'the
specific U.S.'military objectives for the Near Eajt,lSouthwesti
and South Asia region:
Wartime and Crisis Objectives ,:i Ei
To secure the oil fields, transshipment-iippnts and
sea lines of communications essential, to Western
security. (This includes threats of all p agnitude
from internal subversion to Soviet aggri6sSion.)
To preserve the independence of Israel,;d1l
To engage friendly regional states, West?'Alles
ution
and other extra-regional states in the
of our strategy.
Peacetime Military Objectives
To prevent Soviet hegemony and extension f,.influencei:
To acquire, by the end of the decade, sufficient
capability to have reasonable assuranceFlo `achieving;
Q.S. wartime objectives in Southwest Asia While
seeking to limit the likelihood of expansion of;the:,
conflict beyond the region and its suppq ing lines
of communication (LOCK).
To maintain Israel's qualitative military srivantage
over any combination of Arab foes. L1'. {
To support moderate states against extern
aggression and subversion. '
To ensure access to a network of military; ilities
in the region'for the rapid introduction .
sustainment of sizable U.S. forces.
- To obtain overflight, landing, bunkering`
a:
..acce 4 to enroute facilities for the depil~ment
V ? and pport of U.S. combat forttS:-- ! I-; '
To obtain military contributions (including
agreements for combat forces) from select Allies
in support of U.S. objectives in the regi? ;. '
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To maintain a strong naval presence in the area,
together with as substantial a presence land.as
can be managed given regional sensitivities and
,political constraints.
To increase peacetime planning with regional
.states for wartime contingencies, includiing;host
nation support, prepositioning and combat! les
for indigenous forces.
C. Far East. Our foremost peacetime objec*ie;in the
Far East is,inconjunction with our allies and,o' ;.;
friends in the region, to prevent the Soviet Union' from
expanding its influence in East Asia and the Pactf Asian
security relationships are fundamental to offsettin succ ss
fully Soviet global ambitions. U.S. strategy ina tAsia
and the Pacific is predicated on the stabiliainqq ationshipj
between two security anchors. One anchor in No tat As4a, j}
depends on cooperation among the U.S., Korea, and., Win, 6a ( !',
well as the U.S. relationship with China. The oche 7,inchor;
in the Pacific Basin binds the U.S. to Australia-,.- ;' Zea.and,
the Philippines, the somewhat more loosely to then:' ind4r.
of ASEAN. Continued U.S. and allied force impro Ats and;
strengthened U.S. security relationships are regiir d to {
establish and maintain an effective defensive netsxo
secured at both ends of the region. A direct U.S;t- v-iet i;
conflict in Asia is unlikely except in the context f.'a 1
global war. Therefore, although other contingenci in tae' is
region could involve U.S. forces in hostilities std t;of
U.S.-Soviet conflict, regional wartime objectives,' >?Asia
listed below are those supportiv$6of global wartime ` 'ectivesh;
Wartime Objectives r; 1 +!
- To maintain control of the Pacific lines
communication, including those to the._Pd
.Ocean,, dnd the bases needed to support
? ? atry. -
To fulfill commitments to the Asian allie
particular emphasis to protection of U.S.
the region, obtain allied support in the
and seek to. preclude a Soviet decision to
forces for use against NATO.
To have Japan provide for its own defense cluding:
SLOC and air protection to 1,000 miles, if possil
'contribute more broadly to regional defer 'efforts.;
To have the PRC maintain. military initiat
would fix Soviet ground, air and naval fo
the USSR's Far Eastern territories.
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Peacetime Military Objectives
time,Ycontributes more broadly to regiona' jdefensS.
To transform our relationship with Japan t',o an
active defense partnership in which Japans4gnifican
PRC in ways which maintain the PRC as a:;' wG terw4ght
{
To increase peacetime planning with our;a~lies for
becomp-
primarily by assisting the ROK.to
**If-suifficient in its defense capabili:;;
.defeating hostile forces., Enhance dete'l
and, if deterrence fails, assist the RoK
the Korean Peninsula to ensure stabilitT
to the Soviet union, enhance the durabi+i y,;of .
U.S.-PRC ties, and lay the foundation-14r closer
future cooperation as appropriate.
To maintain sufficient U.S. and allied;';a aagth,on
share of the responsibility for the commo
To have other regional states assume a;
and assist them in improving their capar#i
ulrxli'it. ? `
.To improve the support of regional states! r U.S.
power projection from the !lestern Pacific the
4nt the Soviet Union or Vietnam frni
To
ach eying a dominant presence in Southeast ItAsia
from which to foster actions inimical tp $t~tr
interests and those of our allies.
U. Western Hemisphere
hce,
ipreasl3
!I
1 ~f
`I
's
The defense of North America is this natip
primary security concern. Since World War II, defense of
the Western Hemisphere has meant that the U.S. woul i intain!
strategic nuclear deterrence, develop closer relati s with.
Canada and Mexico, and foster collective security' ijangement$
among Latin American countries. It is becoming inq asingly
clear that a secure hemisphere is no longer a foi+eq rte
conclusion. The U.S. must continue to build on iit fsts
shared with Canada and Mexico, while viewing Latin irica
not as a Third World area removed from the traditio 4 focus'
of U.S. strategy, but as a contiguous region whole re
bears directly on the security of the hemispherejas 1!whole.
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8 T 0 P
'a . lei I`? ~ '
Latin America, and especially the Caribbean;Central
''
American region, is an area with which we are closely
associated by virtue of our Gulf Coast and MexicanIbo' ers,
our dependence in Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands,land
Pana a
th
waterway - -"
e critical
trade and two-thirds'of our imported oil pass through 'the
O'
?
Caribbean. Moreover, in event of war, half of NAT
supplies would transit by sea from Gulf ports throu,q
Caribbean to Europe.
The South American continent is also afoof
major U.S.-interests. Though strategically less, pivotal to
us than the Caribbean, South America includes severa.
nations with which we enjoy long-standing close relations
and which are among our most important trade partners in
addition, the east coast of South America facesthe':;outh
Atlantic sea routes which represent a majorpetrol,'
lifeline for Europe and the United States.
Wartime and Crisis Objectives
and the continquous Caribbean Basin).
To defend North America (including Hawaii,]Al aska
To neutralize Soviet and other hostile fors in
~~`' lu
the Caribbean Basin.
con =i LOCs in the ribbean, South 'A!t$l "tic,
and South Pacific including the Panama Can-!'
interests.
against regional states by forces hostile ''b.S.
e PeacetimerMili y Objectives
To modernize the strategic air defense sys
North America.
To reverse Communist gains in El Salvador
Grenada and other areas in Latin America.
security of Caribbean Basin, South Atlantib,, d
South Pacific sea lines of communication + Iin
facilitating air and ocean movement. P i`I
countries in regional territorial defense, 14;ti the
To broaden regional military-to-military ctacts
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. Top CFA
.important, as a base for facilities from which bot *ir and
naval forces could operate to destroy Soviet nava1reats
Africa, or across Central Africa. it is also equal
struggle for control of the Middle East,' Africa, 4s rtant
as . airs*~in t_mrritnrv for the went of m&if r' ltatarn
oil from Africa and the middle ?rst. In case oflitarv
(and Libya) control over key African states and territory +
i..... ._.L.: ~~ rt.... rw..1 .i . w~- ..4 i ..? 41.a ~..~rl ,, ~~ wni we~.is Y t mwA
for the West is essentially preemptive: to deny,theSoviets
the Persian Gulf, make it of prime importance ini,econgmic
(and therefore political) terms; the military rsc ua~rement
oil), plus'itss strategic location astride the sea anos from
To increase the level and exercise to of U.S.
military presence in the region.:
t E. Africa. Africa's mineral resources (irid i ins
to the sea lines of communication in the Indian OcE
around the Cape, and the south Atlantic..
development of a climate of supportive Congressiona,X;4nd
elements currently available are economic, security, sistaace,
and
ions. Successfgpl implementation;
for minerals important to U.S., West European, and_, 4panese
industry, Africa remains an important area for the 'litical
contest of western and Soviet Bloc values in the:d
World. The West must counter, and the U.S. must pl y,'a
larger role in meeting, the Soviet/proxy challenge.: Principal
In peacetime, in addition to being a majo ,source i-
public opinion, and the restoration of substantial'
security" and covert action capabilities.
Wartime and. Gt3,sds Objectives
facilities access, logistical support,r~andpoperating,
To maintain, or acquire as needed, bass and
Soviet:or other hostile forces (especiall
in strategic locations in the region and
waters.
To employ air and naval forces to neutral
LOCs.
To protect access to and deny Soviet use
region's mineral resources, key facilitie
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Approved For Release 2008/10/17: CIA-RDP85M00366R000100050023-2
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Approved For Release 2008/10/17: CIA-RDP85M00366R000100050023-2
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Peacetime Military Objectives
To gain base access and transit rights:n'pro-
Western African states for the deploymer tt,, and
.'subsequent support of U.S. forces to Afri a,
-Southwest Asia, South Atlantic, and contiguous
areas and work to deny the Soviets simil Fjaccess.
To assist countries throughout Africa that`.are the
targets of Soviet proxy, Libyan and Ethiopian
aggressive, subversive or terrorist actz'o
#._/ _.
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Approved For Release 2008/10/17: CIA-RDP85M00366R000100050023-2