PROCESSING AND DISPOSITION OF DOCUMENTS ACQUIRED BY US FORCES IN GRENADA
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP85B01152R000801010021-7
Release Decision:
RIFPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
3
Document Creation Date:
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date:
November 19, 2008
Sequence Number:
21
Case Number:
Publication Date:
November 15, 1983
Content Type:
REGULATION
File:
Attachment | Size |
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Body:
? Approved For Release 2008/11/19: CIA-RDP85B01152R000801010021-7 )1363
? TAP SECRET 16
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH I NGTON
November 15, 1983
NatLonat Secu&ity Dec.L4ion
Di,%ec.tLve Numbers 112
PROCESSING AND DISPOSITION OF DOCUMENTS
ACQUIRED'BY US FORCES IN GRENADA (S)
The documents acquired by US Forces in Grenada represent a
unique resource, which is of significant potential value to US
national security interests. It is vital that this resource be
protected and carefully utilized to obtain maximum benefit.
(TS)
Initial assessment of the quality and quantity of the documents
suggest that they will add substantially to our detailed
understanding of.the anatomy of the creation of a Soviet/Cuban
third world proxy. It is imperative that we ensure serious,
dedicated, and well supported exploitation of this material in
order to fully develop that understanding. In addition, it
appears that there is a significant amount of intelligence
information available in a variety of related areas. Finally,
public disclosure of certain of these documents could add to
public and allied understanding of this phenomena of Soviet/
Cuban foreign policy. Furthermore, it is likely that full
understanding of what is contained in this archive will not be
known until after dedicated -analysis of the material. This
long term analysis by the intelligence community could take
considerable time. (TS)
It is imperative that measures be taken now to ensure full
exploitation of all aspects and implications of this material.
Therefore, I direct the following actions: (S)
1: The immediate protection of all documents obtained in
Grenada. Each document will be copied, indexed, and cataloged.
The Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Director of
.Central Intelligence (DCI), shall ensure the assignment of
appropriate control procedures, and sufficient resources to
accomplish this task expeditiously. (TS)
2. Questions of the return or further disposition of the
documents in this archive shall be considered only after all
other issues concerning exploitation and other utilization have
been resolved. No documents are to be returned prior to my
decision on this matter. (TS)
NSC review completed.
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3. Within the next three weeks the intelligence
community will produce an all source analysis of information
obtained from Grenada on two topics: (a) the methods and
institutions used by the Grenadan regime to control the
population of Grenada from March 13, 1979 to October 24, 1983;
and, (b) the methods and organizations used by each of the
Soviet Bloc countries, Cuba, North Korea, Libya, and any other
non-Grenadan Marxist/Leninist groups to obtain influence in
Grenada and use Grenada for the export of subversion. This
analysis will be seen as a first look and will provide insight
for the larger indepth analysis to be described below. (TS)
4. An interagency mechanism for intelligence
exploitation shall be established. The DCI, in coordination
with the Secretary of Defense and in particular the Director,
Defense Intelligence Agency, who has custody of these
documents, shall develop a plan for the immediate and long term
interdisciplinary and intergeographic intelligence analysis of
this material. This review of the archive shall address at a
minimum the following considerations, topics, and issue: (TS)
Soviet/Cuban and Bloc modus operandi in
developing Grenada as a potential political and military base
against US interests. (S)
Detailed examination of the anatomy of the
development of a Soviet/Cuban proxy in the context of lessons
for US policy. (S)
Examination of how the New Jewel movement and
the government of Grenada worked together to discredit the US,
as well as governments, parties, and individuals friendly to
the US in Europe and Central America. (TS)
Full counterintelligence examination of these
documents as-they relate to the hostile intelligence-
threat. (TS)
Exploitation of cryptographic materials. .(TS)
Careful examination of US classified documents
found in the Grenada archive and investigation and exploitation
of the sources of these documents. (TS)
- Determination of which Central and Latin
American, European, and US organizations and persons had been
penetrated, controlled or influenced by Soviet/Cuban/Bloc and
Grenada. (TS)
- Forensic examination of the documents
themselves, e.g., the kinds of paper, ink, copy machines, etc.,
used and what these indicate about the Soviet/Cuban Bloc's
modus operandi in political action, active measures, and other
intelligence operations. (TS)
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Determination of the extent of Grenadian
involvement in international drug trafficking. (S)
5. An interagency-committee for public disclosure and
information shall be established under the Secretary of State.
It shall develop plans for the short and long term exploitation
for public information and political action. This shall
include plans to: (TS)
Build broad international understanding and
support for the concerns of the-Eastern Caribbean countries and
use this to project a better understanding for US supportive
actions. (S)
Expose the degree of Soviet/Cuban and Bloc
involvement in the internal affairs of a sovereign state. (S)
Expose the use of Grenada as a-base for
political, action and subversion in the region. (S)
Demonstrate communist use of Grenada asa means
to subvert and manipulate political and regional movements,
including the Socialist parties and Socialist international.
(S) .
- Demonstrate the human rights violations of the
Grenada regime and the concomitant Cuban role. (S) -
Develop measures to ensure the credibility of
the documents,. including access for US scholars and
journalists. (S)
6. Copies of all documents identified as having
potential value for public exploitation shall be made available
to this interagency committee. In accordance with the action
plans described above, this committee shall determine which
documents should be disclosed and how disclosure should be
made, and shall cause necessary implementing actions to be
taken. Disclosures shall be coordinated insofar as possible
with cooperating regional states-(e.g., OECS members,-Barbados,
Jamaica). (S)
T. The Secretary of State and the Director of Central
Intelligence, respectively shall provide interim reports on
implementation of the NSDD to the Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs not later than January 1, 1984,
and periodically thereafter. (U)
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