AUSTRALIA: FALLOUT FROM NUCLEAR ISSUES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84S00928R000100140002-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 29, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: October 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Secret
Australia:
Fallout From
Nuclear Issues
Secret
EA 83-10199
October 1983
COPY 2 8 4
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Australia:
Fallout From
Nuclear Issues
This paper was prepared byl 25X1
of the Office of East Asian Analysis. 25X1
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Southeast Asia Division, OEA,
Secret
EA 83-10199
October 1983
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Australia:
Fallout From
Nuclear Issues
Key Judgments Prime Minister Hawke's handling of nuclear issues is creating domestic
Information available and foreign policy problems that promise to complicate his conduct of
as of 14 September 1983 government business at least over the next year.
was used in this report.
Hawke's advocacy of a nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific will muddle
relations with Australia's ANZUS partners, the United States and New
Zealand, which see the proposal as unnecessarily aggravating regional
nuclear fears that are as deep seated as they are overblown. The proposal
has already revived the reservations of South Pacific islanders over the
unrestricted passage of nuclear-powered or nuclear-armed warships and
aircraft, a major US concern.
Hawke's domestic problems over nuclear issues go deeper and-because of
widespread antinuclear sentiment-threaten to be more enduring. His
proposal of a nuclear-free zone set off leftwing criticism in his own Labor
Party of the "hypocrisy" of pushing the zone while ignoring party strictures
against mining and exporting uranium from the largest reserves in the non-
Communist world. As the government moves ahead in devising a uranium
policy, the issue will force Hawke to balance the emotional arguments
against exporting uranium with the practical considerations of creating
jobs, earning foreign exchange, and forgoing investments totaling nearly $1
billion. Hawke's announcement, expected by the end of October, in favor of
uranium mining-made without benefit of party review-is, in our judg-
ment, certain to set off an extended domestic row.
iii Secret
EA 83-10199
October 1983
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Figure 1
South Pacific Forum Members
N. OREA
> S. KOREA
Macau
(PO T) OT81wan
Hong Kong.
(U.K.)
JAPAN
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands
(U.S.)
WESTERN
SAMOA
Niue
(N.Z.)
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
UNITED
STATES
Haw, -I
STATES
North Pacific.
Ocean
n SOLOMON
's" JSLANDS
a
VANUATU eR
New\
Caledonia
(FR.)
'? K I R I S A T I
NEW
ZEALAND
Cook
Islands
IN.Z.)
French
Polynesia
(FR.)
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Australia:
Fallout From
Nuclear Issues
Seizing the Initiative
A major element of the Hawke government's foreign
policy is the proposal for a South Pacific nuclear-free
zone. The proposal was presented to the annual
meeting of South Pacific Forum heads of government
that Australia hosted in late August.' Canberra's
stated intention was to get Forum members to agree
to a proposal that caters to their antinuclear
sentiments yet satisfies the strategic interests of Aus-
tralia's ANZUS partners. According to the US Em-
bassy, Canberra sought to preempt other Forum
members-like politically erratic Vanuatu-from
presenting a radical formulation that would cause
difficulties for the other members and for the
has been conducted underground since 1976.2
In recent years there has been a tendency in the South
Pacific to condemn all nuclear activity and not to
distinguish between weapons testing and other
aspects, such as increased use of nuclear-powered
vessels and disposal of nuclear waste. Antinuclear
sentiment reached a zenith last year when Fiji and
Vanuatu banned US naval vessels from their ports,
after both publicly rejected the US policy to neither
confirm nor deny the presence of nuclear weapons on
US ships.
ANZUS allies.
Although blanket condemnation of nuclear activity
has eased some over the past year in favor of concen-
tration against the French nuclear testing program,
enough antinuclear sentiment persists to have led the
Fiji Government to agonize at length before lifting its
ban on nuclear-powered ships last July. While the ban
was under cabinet consideration, Fiji declined to allow
a proposed visit of a nuclear-powered US Navy ship,
even though the cabinet had agreed in principle to lift
the ban, according to the US Embassy.
The 1983 Forum Meeting
At the Forum meeting on 29-30 August, the island
countries accepted the Australian nuclear-free zone
proposal only in part. They agreed with the concept of
a nuclear-free zone but balked at the free transit of
nuclear ships and military aircraft as inconsistent
with the concept. In a move adverse to US interests,
The concern underlying the Australian proposal is
opposition to nuclear testing and the storage and
disposal of nuclear material in the Pacific. The pro-
posal, however, specifically upholds the principle of
freedom of navigation and overflight in a provision
designed to safeguard the free passage of nuclear-
powered or nuclear-armed US Navy ships and of
military aircraft. The proposal is a follow-on to an
idea Deputy Prime Minister Bowen floated last year
when he was shadow foreign minister and Labor was
not yet in office. The Labor government, anxious to be
seen in the forefront on arms control and disarma-
ment, considers a South Pacific nuclear-free zone as a
way to embellish its domestic and international cre-
dentials. The government took another step in this
direction recently by naming an Ambassador for
Disarmament, whose job the government apparently
envisions as primarily titular
nuclear testing program in Micronesia from 1946 to
1962, antinuclear sentiment has been perpetuated by
the French testing program in French Polynesia,
which began in 1966 and continues, although testing
The Regional Mood
Canberra believed its proposal would be well received
in the South Pacific, where antinuclear sentiment is
strong and longstanding. First stimulated by the US
' The 13-member South Pacific Forum comprises the nine
independent South Pacific island nations-Papua New Guinea,
Fiji, Solomon Islands, Western Samoa, Vanuatu, Tonga, Kiribati,
Tuvalu, and Nauru-plus the New Zealand dependencies of Niue
and the Cook Islands. Australia and New Zealand participate
because of their proximity and longstanding ties to the South
Pacific and because the islanders look to them as continuing sources
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the islanders specifically reserved for themselves the
"sovereign right" to decide the question of access to
their ports and airfields by the vessels and aircraft of
other countries.
According to State Department reporting, the Austra-
lian initiative revived the idea of port bans that had
been laid to rest when Fiji lifted its restrictions on
nuclear vessels. Australia's draft had sidestepped the
issue, an omission its ANZUS partners saw as a
major flaw. The Australians, according to the US
Embassy, wanted to avoid any implication of infringe-
ment on the sovereignty of the proud young island
nations. Failure to address the port access issue,
however, in our judgment, encouraged the islanders to
believe they could benefit from the ANZUS security
guarantee even while placing restraints on the armed
forces of the protecting powers, namely the United
States. The islanders' attachment to the port access
issue takes on added seriousness in light of growing
opposition in Australia to port calls by US Navy ships
and the ambiguous statements of some Labor govern-
ment officials, despite the government's official sanc-
tion for the visits.
Despite its failure to secure a Forum consensus in
favor of the nuclear-free zone proposal, the Hawke
government has served notice it plans to try to come
up with a formulation acceptable to the islanders at
the Forum meeting next year. In our judgment, this
persistence will give unnecessary attention to the
issues of free navigation and port access.
According to State Department reporting, continued
attention to a nuclear-free zone may formalize and
institutionalize regional antinuclear sentiment among
the South Pacific island nations even more than it is
now. Although the Forum agreed in principle to the
concept of a South Pacific nuclear-free zone at its
annual meeting in 1976, it has not pushed the idea
since and was content to limit protests to special
nuclear activities seen as threatening.
observers to the test site on Mururoa Atoll. The
islanders turned aside the French invitation, and
Australia made its acceptance conditional on an
endorsement from the Forum meeting which, as most
observers expected, the islanders did not grant.
Nonetheless, Australia and Papua New Guinea later
decided to join the New Zealanders in accepting the
French invitation. According to the US Embassy, the
government in New Zealand, although continuing to
join in regional protests against the tests, privately
believes they are safe and that confrontation with
France will only harden French resolve to continue
the testing program
Reaction From New Zealand
The Muldoon government was unenthusiastic over the
Australian proposal from the start because it saw it as
going "too far too fast" in solidifying regional antinu-
clear sentiment. The New Zealanders, according to
the US Embassy, believe that a zone without enforce-
ment capabilities is meaningless and that there is no
leverage to use to force the French to cease nuclear
testing. Enforcement, argue the New Zealanders,
would require accession of the major powers, and the
Soviet Union might be tempted to give its assent only
to gain an entry to the South Pacific so far denied to
it, one that could open the way for it to work on the is-
landers to impose restrictions on US military activities
in the area.
According to State Department reporting, Wellington
made its reservations known to Canberra and proba-
bly aired them informally at the Forum meeting.
According to press accounts, Australian persistence in
pressing the issue caused an unprecedented level of
contentiousness in an organization that sets great
store on consensus and is uncomfortable with contro-
versy. In a thinly disguised jab at the Australians,
Muldoon remarked after the Forum meeting that it
had become more difficult to follow the tradition of
We believe the timing of Australia's proposal was
inopportune, coming just when France was making an
effort to allay regional concerns over its testing
program. French presidential emissary Regis Debray
recently toured South Pacific nations to explain the
program to local governments and invite them to send
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A forceful leader who has led his National Party to
three consecutive electoral victories, Muldoon dis-
plays a dynamism and aggressiveness uncharacteris-
tic of low-keyed New Zealanders. His government,
trying to deal with New Zealand's serious economic
problems, faces a major challenge in national elec-
tions in late 1984.
Although a strong supporter of ANZUS and second
to none in his admiration for the United States,
Muldoon-who is outspoken to a fault-is quick to
criticize US policies he sees as not in accord with the
close bilateral relationship
Muldoon shares his countrymen's occasional irrita-
tion with the sometimes overbearing manner of their
Australian neighbors. He and former Australian
Prime Minister Fraser did not get along, but Mul-
doon appears to have considerable respect for Prime
Minister Hawke.
Wellington is con-
cerned that its negative view of a nuclear-free zone
will damage New Zealand's traditionally easy rela-
tionship with its island neighbors.
More than that, Hawke's revival of the nuclear issue
creates unwanted domestic political problems for
Muldoon, who faces a tough fight for reelection late
next year. The nuclear question is a volatile one in
New Zealand, and antinuclear sentiment is wide-
spread and spans the political spectrum. Muldoon
scoffed at the attempts of the Labor government that
preceded his to create a South Pacific nuclear-free
zone that would have included restrictions on nuclear-
powered vessels and, therefore, feels he cannot logi-
cally support even the more moderate Australian
proposal, according to the US Embassy.
Muldoon underscores his staunch support for the
ANZUS alliance by permitting visits of US nuclear-
powered warships to New Zealand ports, something
the former Labor government did not permit. In view
of strong local fears of nuclear contamination, how-
ever, he carefully spaces such port calls. The visit in
August of the USS Texas, the first by a nuclear-
powered US warship in 15 months, set off disruptive
protests. In feeling forced to speak out against a South
Pacific nuclear-free zone just after weathering these
protests, Muldoon, in our judgment, probably believed
Hawke gratuitously gave him added political burdens.
Domestic Backlash on Hawke
Besides creating problems for his New Zealand coun-
terpart, Hawke's nuclear zone proposal has also
brought him difficulties with his own Labor Party.
According to the Embassy and press reports, party
leftists, along with members of the small third party
that holds the balance of power in the Australian
Senate, have decried the "mind-bending hypocrisy" of
Hawke's advocating a nuclear-free zone while disre-
garding party policy against mining and exporting
Australian uranium. There is a strong domestic opin-
ion that international sales of Australian uranium
could contribute to nuclear proliferation, despite strin-
gent end-use controls. For his part, Hawke has been
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on public record for several years that he believes
Australia's vast uranium deposits should be exploited
for economic benefits. (See Appendix.) He has
charged his critics in the party with blindly adhering
to dogma to the detriment of economic benefit to
Australia.
The uranium issue flared anew last June with revela-
tions that the government had given permission for
new contract negotiations with several US electric
power utilities, a step clearly at variance with the
1982 Labor Party resolution permitting only the
honoring of existing contracts before phasing out
uranium production. Continuing sales to France de-
spite the French nuclear testing in the Pacific has also
raised the hackles of antiuranium groups. Hawke
initially refused to link sales and French testing,
despite arguments that uranium sold to France
"comes back in the form of nuclear tests in our
backyard." At one point, his critics talked of a vote of
censure in party councils, but Hawke's decision in late
June to suspend shipments to France until October
1984 appeased them temporarily. Opponents of urani-
um are still exercised over plans to develop a huge
deposit of copper, uranium, and gold at Roxby Downs
The uranium issue is the main division between
Hawke and party critics, according to the Embassy,
and there is little doubt that the Hawke government
has acted in clear violation of existing Labor Party
uranium policy. The government's proposed uranium
mining and export policy is under cabinet study and
promises to be Hawke's most nagging domestic prob-
lem, one he unintentionally compounded by taking up
the cudgels for a South Pacific nuclear-free zone.
According to press reports, critics vow to make a "hell
of a row" over uranium in the current session of
Parliament. Opposition to changes in the restrictive
uranium export policy is not limited to the Labor
Party left wing but includes many moderates both
within and outside the party as well, according to the
Embassy. As the domestic debate heats up, some
customers, such as West Germany and Japan, have
become uncertain about Australia's reliability as a
supplier. According to State Department reporting,
the French, however, are not unduly concerned about
the cutoff of shipments, saying they will obtain urani-
um from other exporters.
A Continuing Headache
The nuclear-free zone proposal will probably be a
much less enduring domestic political problem for
Hawke than the uranium issue. The proposal sits well
with the party left wing, which seized on it only as a
handy club to attack Hawke on uranium. We believe
it will be accepted as party policy because it meshes
with the Labor government's commitment to arms
control and disarmament. On the other hand, Canber-
ra's compulsion to push a South Pacific nuclear-free
zone seems certain to introduce a discordant note in
ANZUS.'
The uranium issue promises to be intractable. The
dispute shows all signs of being protracted, and we
believe there is no easy out for Hawke. The govern-
ment's uranium policy .review is near completion, and,
according to the Embassy, Hawke will probably an-
nounce his choice of options by the end of October.
According to Embassy reporting, his recent state-
ments in Parliament strongly suggest that he will
choose in favor of uranium mining, including Roxby
Downs. If this turns out to be the case, it is certain to
set off an acrimonious party debate because, among
other things, the policy would sidestep a party review.
Hawke has public opinion on his side. A recent poll
showed that fully two-thirds of Australians, including
57 percent of the Labor Party rank and file, favor the
development and export of Australian uranium. Any
decision to maintain the party position of phasing out
the industry, in our judgment, would almost certainly
bring protests over the loss of jobs and export sales.
'Although Hawke has consistently reaffirmed his support for
ANZUS, both during the recent election campaign and since
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Australian cartoonist depicts
French lack of concern over
Hawke's suspension of uranium
"Keep zem. I go zomewhere elze. "
Nonetheless, considering the vehemence of minority unrealistic, especially with the intensity of opposition
opposition to uranium production, a government deci- views. In our judgment the uranium issue will contin-
sion that falls short of shutting down the industry ue to bedevil Hawke for the rest of his term and
seems certain to ensure prolonged and high-pitched complicate his efforts to contain party infighting and
attacks by the diehard opposition. to lay the groundwork for the next federal election 25X1
In any event, we believe Hawke wants to have the
uranium issue behind him before the next policy-
setting biennial party conference in July 1984, near
the midpoint of his three-year term. This now seems
campaign in early 1986. 25X1
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Figure 2
Uranium Mines
1 Indonesia '.e/
og~
? A Ctoongarra
?Jahiluha
Timor ~~
Sea ,{~-.r'~ C'h,
Ashmore and
Cartier Islands
(Austi.)
Western
Australia
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AYeelirrie
Arafura
Sea
Gulf of
Carpentaria
Northern
Territory
A ~uStra~la
Alice Springs
souh
us r-Iir
Great Australian
Bight
o Operating mine
A Planned mine
Torres
Strad
pLLa
New G
Cairns'
Bea Lc a `-' T Coral Sea
Islands
Townsville ,y(AustQ
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(closed)
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1 ~
anberra 6F 118.
r tC It, Territory
Victoria_
?MeJb'ourn 'u
O Bass
Strait 'a
Tasman
Sea
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Appendix
Uranium in Australia
Mine
Location
(State)
Recoverable
Reserves
(tons)
Projected
Annual Production
(tons)
Jabiluka
Northern Territory
200,000
3,000
Koongarra
Northern Territory
11,000
900
Yeelirrie
Western Australia
NA
2,200
Roxby Downs
South Australia
NA
3,000
Ben Lomond
Queensland
4,000
NA
Lake Way
Western Australia
4,000
500
Australia has the largest recoverable uranium re-
serves in the non-Communist world: 314,000 tons.
The future of uranium remains bright at a time when
Australia's other mineral commodities face lower
production rates and depressed earnings. When the
large Ranger mine in the Northern Territory came
into full production last year to join the Nabarlek
mine, total Australian output rose 50 percent to 5,300
tons annually.
Australia lacks a domestic market for the uranium-
it has no plans for nuclear power generation-and
thus nearly all production is exported. Export earn-
ings increased sharply last year, tripling to US $420
million. Uranium has become Australia's fourth-
largest mineral export earner, behind coal, alumina,
and iron ore.
Although the government of former Prime Minister
Fraser strongly endorsed the development of the
uranium industry, it was constrained by widespread
Australian reservations over contributing to nuclear
proliferation. As such, his government was forced to
move slowly and approved development of new urani-
um mines in 1977 only after a stringent 10-point
policy on nuclear safeguards with foreign buyers had
been developed.
The Labor government's policy of not permitting new
uranium export contract discussions until a uranium
policy is established has effectively brought develop- 25X1
ment to a temporary halt. Thus, six uranium mining
projects now await development-including the huge
Roxby Downs mine-which could triple Australia's
production capacity. In addition, the South Austra-
lian Labor government-with Canberra's approval-
recently canceled two small uranium projects. Ac-
cording to the US Embassy, however, both were of
doubtful economic viability and were to use a new, 25X1
environmentally controversial extraction process.
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In our judgment, the six projects waiting approval
would provide a badly needed boost to the depressed
Australian economy, including massive investments
totaling about US $900 million and in time creating
hundreds of millions of dollars in export earnings.
Although the highly mechanized uranium industry
would not provide many jobs directly, some additional
employment would be created as an offshoot. At the
new uranium mining town of Jabiru, for example,
some US $90 million has already been spent on
housing and community facilities-all of which pro-
vide numerous job opportunities.
We believe Australia risks seeing one or more of these
projects permanently canceled during the next year
because of concerns about the government's new
uranium policy. According to the US Embassy, the
persistent political problems could drive off foreign
mining companies whose capital and marketing skills
are essential. Even though the Hawke government is
expected to announce the new uranium policy later
this year, we believe uncertainties about new uranium
mining activities will persist until the new policy is
addressed at the Labor Party's next national confer-
ence, scheduled for mid-1984.
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