CUBA: MILITARY INTERVENTION CAPABILITIES IN CENTRAL AMERICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84S00897R000200010003-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 37
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 20, 2009
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: November 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Cuba: Military Intervention
Capabilities in Central ,
America
NGA Review
Complete
DIA review
completed.
Secret
November
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Secret
Errata Notice to recipients of Intelligence Assessment Cuba: Military Intervention
Capabilities in Central America, ALA 83-10179C,
25X1
Attached is the Key Judgments section of this Intelligence Assessment. The Key
Judgments page was not printed in all copies of the Assessment.
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Cuba: Military Intervention
Capabilities in Central
America
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Key Judgments Cuba, with the largest and best trained and equipped military in the
Information available Caribbean Basin, has the capability to deploy a substantial combat force in
as of 10 November 1983 Central America. We judge that Cuba's air and sea transport assets could
was used in this report.
move and logistically support a force of at least 25,000 troops, assuming se-
cure ports and airfields:
? A major airlift could deliver some 8,000 troops or 900 tons of supplies per
week-enough to support more than 10,000 troops-but would be
difficult to maintain indefinitely. Havana's normal several weekly flights
to Nicaragua could bring more than 1,000 troops per week.
? Sealift would be needed to deliver heavy equipment and, particularly in
the event of a large intervention, at least some supplies. Nicaragua's
small east coast ports could be used, but large amounts of equipment
could be delivered faster by going through the Panama Canal to Corinto
on the Pacific coast.
Havana could intervene in Central America with little or no warning.
Airlift alone could bring in several thousand lightly armed troops and, if
conducted on a small scale over several weeks, probably could not be
detected as part of a military intervention operation until Cuban units were
identified in-country. The supplies needed to logistically support these
troops also probably could be delivered relatively discreetly by merchant
ships. Obviously, if speed were of critical importance to Havana and a
major force were being assembled and transported as rapidly as possible,
our ability to detect the operation would improve dramatically.
While Havana could independently initiate a large-scale military move in
Central America, to maintain the effort it would need continued Soviet
shipments of fuel, munitions, spare parts, and other logistic support.
Moscow could directly and discreetly send this materiel on the merchant
ships that regularly visit Cuban ports. If Soviet logistic support were not
forthcoming and Cuba's military stockpiles proved inadequate, Havana
would have to divert such resources as fuel from the civilian sector and ac-
quire materiel such as ammunition and spare parts from alternate sources.
Cuban military capabilities are overwhelming in the Central American
context, and, assuming no US armed response, a large Cuban force
deployed there probably could defeat those of any country in the region.
iii Secret
ALA 83-10179C
November 1983
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Because Cuba's armed forces are oriented to conventional warfare, their
counterinsurgency capabilities-which would come into play if Cuba
intervened in Nicaragua-are less formidable but still impressive:
? The forces best suited for counterinsurgency operations would be air-
borne- and airmobile-trained units and lightly armed infantry troops
supported by helicopter.
? Although Air Force training appears adequate, effective air support
could be hampered by the shortage of suitable airfields, absence of
adequate radars, and Cuba's small number of helicopters.
? The Navy would play a more limited role, considering its small size and
the nature of likely operations in Central America.
In Nicaragua, several thousand conventionally armed Cuban troops could
provide effective static defense of many key installations. Cuban operations
against insurgent forces, however, would be hampered by terrain that
favors guerrilla warfare and the poor transportation infrastructure. To
succeed, Cuban forces-in concert with the Sandinistas-would have to
conduct an aggressive campaign with potentially heavy casualties, receive
accurate and timely intelligence on their elusive insurgent targets, and
provide logistic support to widely dispersed forces.
Regardless of events in Central America, over the next few years we expect
Cuba's overall military capabilities to improve as its forces grow more
proficient in operating new weapons and receive additional equipment-
such as the IL-76 heavy transport-from the Soviets. Havana's ability to
conduct an intervention operation will continue to be constrained by
Cuba's dependence on the USSR for materiel support. Moreover, we doubt
that Cuba could conduct any intervention operation involving more than a
few thousand troops in the face of US interdiction.
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Cuba: Military Intervention
Capabilities in Central
America
Directorate of
Intelligence
This paper was prepared by
Office of African and Latin American Analysis. It
was coordinated with the Directorate of
Operations
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Middle America-Caribbean
Division, ALA,
Secret
ALA R3-10179C
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Cuba: Military Intervention
Capabilities in Central
America
Key Judgments Cuba, with the largest and best trained and equipped military in the
Information available Caribbean Basin, has the capability to deploy a substantial combat force in
as of 10 November 1983 Central America. We judge that Cuba's air and sea transport assets could
was used in this report.
move and logistically support a force of at least 25,000 troops, assuming se-
cure ports and airfields:.
? A major airlift could deliver some 8,000 troops or 900 tons of supplies per
week-enough to support more than 10,000 troops-but would be
difficult to maintain indefinitely. Havana's normal several weekly flights
to Nicaragua could bring_ more than 1,000 troops per week.
? Sealift would be needed to deliver heavy equipment and, particularly in
the event of a large intervention, at least some supplies. Nicaragua's
small east coast ports could be used, but large amounts of equipment
could be delivered faster by going through the Panama Canal to Corinto
on the Pacific coastal
Havana could intervene in Central America with little or no warning.
Airlift alone could bring in several thousand lightly armed troops and, if
conducted on a small scale over several weeks, probably could not be
detected as part of a military intervention operation until Cuban units were
identified in-country. The supplies needed to logistically support these
troops also probably could be delivered relatively discreetly by merchant
ships. Obviously, if speed were of critical importance to Havana and a
major force were being assembled and transported as rapidly as possible,
our ability to detect the operation would improve dramatically.
While Havana could independently initiate a large-scale military move in
Central America, to maintain the effort it would need continued Soviet
shipments of fuel, munitions, spare parts, and other logistic support.
Moscow could directly and discreetly send this materiel on the merchant
ships that regularly visit Cuban ports. If Soviet logistic support were not
forthcoming and Cuba's military stockpiles proved inadequate, Havana
would have to divert such resources. as fuel from the civilian sector and ac-
quire materiel such as ammunition and spare parts from alternate sources.
Cuban military capabilities are overwhelming in the Central"American
context, and, assuming no US armed response, a large Cuban force
deployed there probably could defeat those of any country in the region.
Secret
ALA 83-10179C
November 1983
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Because Cuba's armed forces are oriented to conventional warfare, their
counterinsurgency capabilities-which would come into play if Cuba
intervened in Nicaragua-are less formidable but still impressive:
? The forces best suited for counterinsurgency operations would be air-
borne- and airmobile-trained units and lightly armed infantry troops
supported by helicopter.
? Although Air Force training appears adequate, effective air support
could be hampered by the shortage of suitable airfields, absence of
adequate radars, and Cuba's small number of helicopters.
? The Navy would play a more limited role, considering its small size and
the nature of likely operations in Central America.
In Nicaragua, several thousand conventionally armed Cuban troops could
provide effective static defense of many key installations. Cuban operations
against insurgent forces, however, would be hampered by terrain that
favors guerrilla warfare and the poor transportation infrastructure. To
succeed, Cuban forces-in concert with the Sandinistas-would have to
conduct an aggressive campaign with potentially heavy casualties, receive
accurate and timely intelligence on their elusive insurgent targets' * and
provide logistic support to widely dispersed forces.
Regardless of events in Central America, over the next few years we expect
Cuba's overall military capabilities to improve as its forces grow more
proficient in operating new weapons and receive additional equipment-
such as the IL-76 heavy transport-from the Soviets. Havana's ability to
conduct an intervention operation will continue to be constrained by
Cuba's dependence on the USSR for materiel support. Moreover, we doubt
that Cuba could conduct any intervention operation involving more than a
few thousand troops in the face of US interdiction.
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is highly problematic and, by design, is outside the scope of this paper.
This paper focuses on Cuba's capability to intervene with military forces in
Central America. Any Cuban decision to take military action would
depend on a number of factors, of which the most important would be
Castro's fear of provoking US military retaliation and the extent to which
the Soviets were willing to back Cuban military moves. Other consider-
ations would include the likely outcome of the operation itself, the
justifiability of its actions to the international community, and the
economic costs. The exact combination necessary to precipitate such action
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Key Judgments
Force Availability and Capability
The Logistics of Intervention 6
Cuban Military Operations in Nicaragua: Three Scenarios 9
Case I: Internal Security Worsens 13
Case II: Insurgent Threat Intensifies Moderately 14
Case III: Major Insurgent Challenge 17
Outlook and Implications for the United States 18
Methodology for Determining Cuban Force Movement and Logistic 21
Support Capabilities
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Figure 1
Major Ports
' Cuba
do Ban s
antiago
c~ 1
-I+ Guantanamo
(U.S. Naval Base)
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
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Cuba: Military Intervention
Capabilities in Central
America
In a broad sense, Cuba-by providing a wide range of
political and military support to revolutionary
groups-has "intervened" in most Latin American
countries since Fidel Castro came to power in 1959.
Only since the mid-1970s, however, when Castro sent
thousands of troops to Angola, have Cuba's armed
forces developed the capability to bring potentially
decisive military power to bear in a foreign environ-
ment. This capability has improved steadily as Cuban
forces have gained combat experience abroad, new
Soviet weapons, and additional airlift and sealift
support.
This paper examines Cuba's capability to intervene
with substantial military forces-introducing and
supporting regular combat units, rather than slightly
expanding the size or activities of the current Cuban
presence-in the troubled Central American region.
It first discusses the general factors that would affect
Cuban military capabilities regardless of the specific
circumstances under which Cuba intervened. These
include the availability of Cuban forces and their
capabilities, airlift and sealift resources at hand for
transporting these forces, and likely Soviet support. It
then outlines Cuban capabilities in greater detail, by
analyzing the force requirements, deployment times,
and logistic support necessary under three different
operational scenarios. While these scenarios focus on
potential Cuban military operations in Nicaragua,
they also broadly illustrate Cuban capabilities to
respond to similar challenges throughout the region.
Finally, the paper discusses the likely nature of future
improvements in Cuban military intervention capabil-
ities.
We believe Cuba's military-the largest and by far
the best trained and equipped in the Caribbean
Basin-could provide substantial combat forces for
operations in Central America if the United States
did not intervene. With formidable conventional war-
fare capabilities, the Cuban military would have little
difficulty defeating any of the region's indigenous
armed forces. In all likelihood, however, if the Cubans
intervened in Nicaragua, they would be combating
guerrilla forces, whose defeat would require an ag-
gressive counterinsurgency campaign with larger
forces and potentially higher casualties than Cuba has
borne in Angola.F____1 25X1
Limiting the ultimate size of any Cuban troop com-
mitment would be the difficulties of moving and
logistically supporting large forces off the island, and
the need-as Havana probably sees it-to retain the 25X1
bulk of its forces in Cuba for defensive purposes. As in
Africa, Cuban combat forces would be tailored to
meet the requirements of their mission, local terrain,
and nature of the enemy. Each type of Cuban force
available has particular strengths and weaknesses,
and thus varying suitability for the missions it could
be expected to conduct.
Ground
The Cuban Ground Forces, because of its size, could
provide the most substantial commitment. As in its
previous interventions, Cuba probably would draw
primarily from the army's thousands of reservists,
even for a relatively small intervention operation,
leaving the bulk of regular personnel at home for
defensive purposes. According to statements by Raul
Castro,
some 70 percent of Cuba's forces in Angola and
Ethiopia were reservists. Barring a major intervention
requiring large numbers of conventional weapons, the
army's inventory of most weapon systems probably
would be sufficient. Cuba has only small numbers of 25X1
some items that would be particularly useful in
Central America, such as light reconnaissance vehi-
cles, however.
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Table 1
Estimated Cuban Combat Forces Available
for Operations in Central America
Force Estimated Total Size
Component
Ground Forces 60,000 to 70,000 active-duty troops
in Cuba, about 40,000 in Africa.
Hundreds of thousands reservists;
more than 100,000 immediately
available.
Maximum Number
Available
for Deployment a
As many as 30,000, mostly
mobilized reservists.
Landing and Assault At least 1,500 lightly armed troops Nearly all.
Brigade plus unknown reserves.
Special Troops 2,500 to 3,000 lightly armed troops At least 1,500 to 2,000 active-
plus unknown reserves. duty troops plus reserves.
Air Force 18,500 personnel, with 675 pilots.
Operational combat aircraft in-
clude: about 120 MIG-21 and 33
MIG-23 jet fighters; 30 L-39 jet
trainers; about 40 MI-8, MI-17,
and MI-24 helicopters.
12,000 personnel, with 400 to 500
naval infantry and 70 frogmen.
Two Polnocny-class landing ships.
Two F-class submarines. One
Koni-class frigate. Numerous
patrol boats and minesweepers.
30 MIGs, primarily MIG-21s;
15 to 20 L-39s; and 10 to 15
helicopters.
All naval infantry and frogmen.
Two landing ships, and possibly
a few other combatants.
a The figures in this column represent a "worst case" scenario and
should be viewed as the maximum likely "pool" from which Cuba
probably could draw. We consider the simultaneous deployment of
all these forces unlikely because of the severe strain it would place
on Cuba's defensive and logistic capabilities.
Availability depends mainly on' mobili-
zation's impact on Cuba's economy.
Lightly armed troops could be airlift-
ed; heavy equipment must be shipped
by sea.
Airborne-qualified elite force; could be
quickly airlifted. On the basis of satel-
lite photography, dedicated airlift
probably includes about 20 turboprop
transport aircraft and several
helicopters.
Ministry of Interior elite force; could
be quickly airlifted. Trained for such
specialized tasks as airborne opera-
tions, sabotage, and using explosives.
Fighter deployment would be limited
to 20 or so at most, however, because
of Nicaraguan airfield capacities.
Overall availability primarily based on
acquisitions since late 1981 and num-
ber of aircraft assigned to training,
rather than operational, bases. Fight-
ers could fly to Central America; heli-
copters must be shipped.
Naval infantry equipped with at least
eight armored personnel carriers and
four light tanks. Each Polnocny can
carry 180 troops or six armored vehi-
cles with crews up to 1,500 miles.
Frogmen reportedly trained in explo-
sives, infiltration, and sabotage and
served in Angola.
Mobilized reservists probably would need several
weeks' refresher training prior to their deployment
abroad. While such training activity could provide the
first indication that forces were being prepared for
operations abroad, it would be difficult to determine
whether the reservists were intended for Africa or
about to embark on a new campaign in a country such
as Nicaragua-in fact,
even the reservists involved probably
last possible moment.
We judge that the army's equipment and training
prepare it primarily for conventional operations.
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Cuba's African Experience: Lessons for Central
America
Cuba's two previous large-scale military interven-
tions-in Angola in 1975 and Ethiopia in 1977-
illustrate how similar involvements might evolve in
the future and point out Cuba's potential strengths
and weaknesses. In both cases, Cuba's military com-
mitment progressed through three general phases:
transport resources were mobilized quickly and
both regular army personnel and newly activated
and trained reservists participated.
? Cuba effectively commanded the tactical operations
of both Cuban and foreign personnel on the battle-
field.
? The introduction of a small number of advisers and
technicians-less than 100-to assist in military
training and in the assimilation of newly delivered
Soviet equipment.
? The introduction of as many as several hundred
additional specialists-including tank drivers, ar-
tillery crews, and medical personnel-to assume
more vital combat support tasks as the security
situation deteriorated.
? The deployment of thousands of combat troops
when the military situation became critical.
The Angolan and Ethiopian operations were success-
ful in a number of ways and give the Cubans experi-
ence in many of the tasks they would have to perform
if intervening in Central America:
? The Cuban presence was decisive in assuring vic-
tory. Cuban units-bearing the brunt of the fight-
ing-conducted aggressive campaigns in unfamiliar
territory soon after their arrival.
? Cuba began an efficient troop deployment within
only weeks after deciding to intervene. Civilian
Weapons such as medium tanks and armored person-
nel carriers, and training that focuses on methodical
battles against comparably equipped opposing forces,
probably would enable the army to defeat the conven-
tional ground forces of any country in Central Ameri-
ca. Mechanized infantry and other armored units
would be suitable for controlling major population
centers and lines of communication, and could also be
used effectively in a static defense role, such as
? Using Soviet materiel support, Cuba established
adequate resupply networks.
additional high casualties.
Cuba's African adventures have not been without
problems, however. Cuba's conventionally armed and
trained military has had difficulty countering the
guerrilla threat to Angola that reemerged after the
successful conclusion of the conventional campaign.
Cuba also has been reluctant to become actively
involved in similar operations in Ethiopia against the
Eritrean separatists, probably for political reasons-
Havana could be perceived as opposing a legitimate
struggle for independence-and to avoid incurring
Like Angola, Cuban operations in Central America
probably would involve combat against guerrilla
forces, against which the Cubans could not fully
utilize their conventional force superiority and train-
ing. Moreover, we believe Moscow probably would
hesitate to provide the highly visible military support
furnished during the height of both African interven-
tions. In those cases, the Soviets not only helped
transport Cuban troops, combat equipment, and sup-
plies, but also deployed naval combatants in neigh-
boring waters.
guarding military garrisons and outposts, airfields,
and key economic targets. Unless supported by troop-
carrying helicopters, however, most army units would
be neither equipped nor trained for aggressive search-
and-destroy missions against insurgent-type forces in
the rugged terrain that typifies much of Central
America.
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In our view, Cuba's two airborne- and airmobile-
trained units-the Landing and Assault Brigade and
the Ministry of Interior's Special Troops-in addition
'to lightly armed regular infantry troops transported
by helicopters, would be best suited for conducting
small-unit operations against unconventional forces
and in reacting quickly to local disturbances in isolat-
ed areas. They also could be used to secure an
airfield-against light, local opposition-in prepara-
tion for the arrival of regular units. Both specialized
units, utilizing helicopters and small transport air-
craft, frequently practice paradropping troops and
occasionally cargo. Because these units are equipped
with only light weapons, they would need to receive
fire support from combat helicopters and army artil-
lery during larger operations. The effectiveness of
even "quick-reaction" units such as these in conduct-
ing counterinsurgency operations, however, would be
hindered by the difficulty of obtaining and quickly
communicating accurate intelligence on elusive insur-
gent targets, the mountainous terrain, a limited road
network, and the challenge of resupplying units oper-
ating far from their bases.
Air
Effective air support would be critical to the success
of any Cuban intervention operation. Cuba's Air
Force far outmatches any in Central America in
terms of size-it is larger than those of Honduras, El
Salvador, and Guatemala combined-as well as so-
phistication, training, and combat experience. In re-
cent years, deliveries of additional aircraft and more
advanced training have improved the ability of the
Effective air operations in Central America would be
limited by the number of suitable airfields, lack of
adequate radars for controlling air assets, and the
high level of maintenance and logistic support re-
quired. In addition, because Cuba's air assets are
limited, we doubt that Havana would divert more
than a token number of aircraft from their primary
mission of defending Cuba, unless the Soviets provid-
ed replacements. In Angola and Ethiopia, the Soviet
Union supplied all combat aircraft,
Of the several types of aircraft available, helicopters
would be best suited for counterinsurgency operations.
Cuba's MI-8 and MI-24 attack helicopters could be
used to bombard insurgent positions and to provide air
cover for ground troops and supply columns.
Transport helicopters could ferry troops and
supplies to remote areas, conduct reconnaissance, and
evacuate wounded. We judge, however, that Cuba's
helicopter resources would not be sufficient to support
large-scale counterinsurgency operations in inaccessi-
ble terrain. Cuba's inventory probably would be
adequate for a limited intervention totaling a few
thousand troops.
Cuba's late-model MIG-21 and MIG-23 jet fighters
have the range and speed necessary to react quickly
over broad areas, but would have to be based in
Nicaragua-the only friendly territory in Central
America-to be utilized effectively in the region.
Used in an air superiority role, the MIGs would be
more than a match for Honduras's early .1960s vin-
tage Super Mysteres-the most advanced fighter in
any Central American air force. The MIGs and
Cuba's L-39 jet trainers could effectively support
conventional ground operations as well, striking such
sizable targets as enemy convoys. The L-39s also
could be used to deliver bombs, rockets, or other
ordnance against insurgent positions. Cuban pilots
could have difficulty, however, locating and striking
the smaller, groups of personnel that typically would
be encountered in counterinsurgency operations.
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with Polnocny-class landing ship. Top right: Landing and Assault
Brigade paradrop training. Bottom right: Cuban Ground Forces
Naval unlikely to base naval combatants there. A few vessels
Primarily a defensive force, the Cuban Navy in any could be escorts for merchant ships transporting or
intervention probably would play a much more limit- providing logistic support to Cuban intervention
ed role than the ground or air forces. Considering the forces. In addition, the Navy's two specialized combat
Navy's limited size and the nature of potential opera-
tions in Central America, we believe that Cuba is
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forces-a naval infantry unit and a frogman contin-
gent-could participate in larger ground operations
aimed at seizing or securing specific targets in coastal
regions. Although Cuba's submarines have not yet
ventured beyond coastal waters, they have been
used to trans-
port small groups of uban frogmen in exercises that
simulated attacks on coastal defense positions.
The naval infantry is the largest component capable
of performing limited offensive missions
it has
conducted a number of amphibious assault landing
exercises this year, using the Navy's Polnocny-class
landing ships for the first time. Although the landing
ships can deliver a small combat force to distant
shores, in our judgment, the Cubans still lack experi-
ence in integrating all the complex factors involved in
conducting an amphibious assault landing operation
against even small-scale but determined opposition.
Moreover, we believe that providing the high level of
logistic, air, and naval support necessary for such an
operation would severely strain Cuba's merchant ma-
rine, Air Force, and naval combatant force. Conse-
quently, the landing ships would most likely be used in
a general logistic support role, transporting equipment
and supplies to areas already secured by Cuban or
friendly forces and resupplying remote locations that
lacked developed port facilities.
In our judgment, Cuba's airlift and sealift resources
are sufficient to transport and support even a large
intervention force in Central America-on the order
of 25,000 troops-assuming that Cuba had free ac-
cess to secure ports and airfields. As in previous
Cuban interventions, much of the transport responsi-
bility would fall to the civilian transport fleets. Aero
Caribe and Cubana Airlines control all of Cuba's
larger aircraft, and the merchant fleet includes the
vast majority of Cuba's sealift assets. These organiza-
tions are manned to a large extent by military reserv-
ists, which would make possible a rapid shift from
civil to military operations. Cuba's proximity to Cen-
tral America and the growth of its transport fleets in
recent years lead us to conclude that direct Soviet
participation in moving men or materiel would proba-
bly be unnecessary in most circumstances. Should
large military items need to be airlifted quickly by
heavy transports, however, direct Soviet support-
either by providing transport aircraft or by delivering
military equipment directly-would be essential, since
Cuba does not yet possess these aircraft
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Airlift
In our judgment, airlift operations would provide the
fastest and most secure means to transport troops and
supplies to Central America. Because the cargo ca-
pacities of Cuba's aircraft are relatively limited,
however, some supplies-and virtually all equip-
ment-still would need to be shipped by sea, particu-
larly for a major intervention operation.
Cuba has more than 70 operational transport aircraft
with the range to reach Central America, offering a
total capacity of about 5,500 troops or 700 metric tons
of cargo. The most suitable aircraft for supporting
military operations include Cubana's 11 long-range
IL-62-two of which are on lease from the Soviets-
and five medium- to long-range TU-154 jet trans-
ports. Each is capable of carrying 170 to 200 troops or
more than 20 tons of supplies. Cuba has 26 short-
range AN-26 aircraft-most of which belong to the
Air Force-which also would be appropriate for use in
Central America. Each can carry 30 paratroops, 38
troops, or nearly 5 tons of supplies; paradrop men or
materiel; and use short, unimproved runways.
Havana can choose from several options in conducting
an airlift. Factors that would be considered in the
selection process include the number and type of
aircraft available, the degree of urgency, the airfield
and tactical conditions in the host country, the
amount of secrecy desired, and the degree of Soviet
involvement. In our judgment, the most ambitious
airlift operation that Havana conceivably could un-
dertake and maintain would involve about 30 aircraft,
primarily AN-26s from the Air Force and IL-62s and
TU-154s from Cubana Airlines. In the absence of
armed opposition, about 8,000 troops or 900 tons of
supplies could be delivered in the first week and
nearly 7,000 troops or 800 tons of supplies thereafter.'
With minimal Soviet assistance-such as Moscow's
diverting to the operation its weekly IL-62 flight to
Havana and Managua, as well as assuming the
' Our calculations assume that each aircraft makes one round trip
flight daily, that none refuel en route, and that the serviceability
rate averages 85 to 90 percent during the first three days and 60
percent thereafter. For a detailed discussion of our assumptions and
responsibility for supporting operations in Angola-
Cuba could bring more than 10,000 troops or 1,200
tons of supplies the first week, and more than 8,000
troops or 1,000 tons of supplies thereafter. Roughly 50
percent more could be delivered if the IL-62s and
TU-154s were scheduled for two flights daily. Opera-
tions of this magnitude would face many impediments
common to large airlifts, however, such as unavail-
ability of aircraft and pilots, difficulties in keeping
aircraft on schedule, and inadequate air traffic con-
trol and ground support personnel in the receiving
country. The activity also would be detected almost
immediately.
Cuba could opt for a less obvious, but more time-
consuming, operation. By dedicating its several week-
ly flights to Nicaragua to a military airlift, for
example, Havana could deliver more than 1,000
troops or 150 tons of supplies per week. If two
TU-154s or IL-62s flew daily-a schedule maintained
for about 10 days each February and November to
rotate Cuban teachers in Nicaragua-more than
5,000 troops or 700 tons of supplies could be intro-
duced by the end of two weeks. Such an effort would
enable Cuba, undetected, to build up sizable forces-
as many as several thousand troops-over time and to
provide such logistic support as small arms, ammuni-
tion, and medical supplies. Havana would be unable
to supply by air other combat necessities such as
trucks or heavy equipment, however, or to use such a
small airlift to support logistically a major interven-
tion involving more than several thousand troops
Sealift
We believe that, considering the vulnerability of
merchant ships to a potential US blockade, Cuba
would rely less on open, large-scale sealift operations
than is typically the case for supporting a military
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Figure 3. Cuban Polnocny-class landing ship.
intervention. Sealift was the mainstay of the Angolan
buildup, for example, transporting 75 percent of
Cuban troops and virtually all equipment.
In Central America, however, we believe sealift would
be used more selectively to transport military equip-
ment and, depending on the size of the intervening
force, any logistic support beyond the capabilities of
Cuba's air transports. Individual ships also could be
used to covertly pre-position equipment and supplies
in Nicaragua, leaving combat personnel to be flown in
quickly when needed and significantly reducing the
amount of warning time available. It would take two
to three days for the initial ships to reach Central
America if east or Caribbean coast ports were used,
and up to two to three times longer to reach Pacific
ports through the Panama Canal. Going around
South America-a highly unlikely option-would
take more than one month.
Although virtually the entire Cuban fleet of nearly 90
oceangoing merchant ships theoretically would be
available, in our judgment, no more than 10 to 12
vessels-the maximum number used during the An-
golan buildup-probably would be necessary. To
transport large amounts of combat equipment and
trucks as rapidly as possible, Cuba would need to
utilize large vessels such as its eight El Jigue-class
merchant ships. Each has a service speed of nearly 17
knots, an onboard crane capable of handling 50 tons,
and capacity of more than 12,000 tons or about 1,500
troops. All have been used extensively to transport
men or materiel to Angola and would need little or no
modification to serve in a military support role. If less
materiel were involved or time were not as important,
in our view, the relatively short distances to Central
America would allow Cuba to turn to its many
smaller cargo ships-in the 5,000-ton range-which
could use many ports unable to accommodate large
vessels.
Havana has additional options in conducting subse-
quent logistic and resupply operations, which would
involve the shipment of only a few hundred tons of
supplies daily even to support a major intervention
force totaling 25,000 troops. Small coastal freighters,
with a capacity of up to 1,000 tons of cargo or a few
trucks, would be ideally suited for shipping materiel
to many of the region's smaller ports. In addition, the
Caribbean coast of Central America is within the
range of Cuba's two Polnocny-class landing ships.
Each could deliver a small amount of materiel-six
armored vehicles, about 215 tons of cargo, or up to
180 troops-to ports or, isolated beach areas, provided
that adequate roads were available for transport
support their forces' operations.
Without specific Soviet materiel support-contingent
on Moscow's political sanction for Cuban actions-
Havana's capability to sustain an intervention opera-
tion would be limited. Cuba depends almost totally on
the Soviets for combat equipment, spare parts, muni-
tions, and fuel. Although the Cubans could independ-
ently initiate major military action abroad, they
would rely on continued Soviet materiel deliveries to
We do not know the size of Cuba's military stockpiles
or how long Havana could support operations abroad
using only the materiel on hand. If the logistic support
needed were not provided by the Soviets, Havana
would have to divert such resources as fuel from the
civilian sector and attempt to acquire materiel such as
spare parts and ammunition from alternate sources.
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In our judgment, Moscow could directly and without
detection send Cuba the logistic supplies required for
a limited intervention-on the order of 5,000 troops-
on the arms carriers and other merchant ships that
regularly visit Cuban ports. Providing support to
substantially larger forces would require a more visi-
ble increase in Soviet shipping-arms deliveries to
Cuba could roughly double, for example, if the opera-
tions of 25,000 troops actively engaged in combat
were being supported.
The Soviets could take a number of additional meas-
ures to support Cuban operations. These include
sending pilots, technicians, or other military special-
ists to bolster Cuban defenses; directly shipping seem-
ingly innocuous-but nonetheless important-equip-
ment and supplies, such as trucks and fuel, for Cuba's
use abroad or, in the case of Nicaragua, shipping
small amounts of combat equipment ostensibly for use
by the Sandinistas; and taking over Cuba's regular
civil air or merchant fleet routes. Most of these
activities would probably be detected within a few
days to a week. We believe Moscow would be unlikely
to take such highly visible steps as deploying a naval
task group as a show of support to Cuba or openly
shipping large amounts of war materiel directly to
Central America for use by Cuban troops.
Cuban Military Operations in Nicaragua:
Three Scenarios
The success of any Cuban military intervention opera-
tion would depend largely on the specific circum-
stances under which Havana intervened and a host of
other variables. To illustrate the capabilities of Cuban
troops in various military situations, we examined
Cuban force requirements and capabilities to conduct
three different military actions related to security
conditions in Nicaragua. Although we tried to make
the cases realistic, they should be viewed as vehicles
for examining the capabilities of Cuban combat forces
to perform a variety of roles in any one of a number of
countries rather than as our assessment of the likely
course of events or the precise Cuban military re-
sponse to those events.
Our scenarios assume that neither the United States
nor Central American countries would interfere di-
rectly by interdicting Cuba's supply lines, mounting
cross-border attacks into Nicaragua, threatening
Cuba militarily, or pursuing other hostile actions. We
also assumed that the Sandinista government would
cooperate fully with Cuban efforts and that the
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Possible Expanded Cuban Military Presence in
Nicaragua
with-Nicaraguan units.
between March and mid-1983 Cuba had sent more
than 3,000 personnel-2,500 army regulars and re-
servists and 750 Ministr of Interior Special
Troops-to Nicaragua.
u an combat forces in Nicaragua cou
now tots nearly 3,500, in addition to an estimated
1,500 to 2,000 military and security advisers. We
also estimate that 5,000 to 6,000 Cuban civilian
teachers, construction workers, and other advisers-
many of whom probably have had some military
training and could be mobilized quickly if needed-
are present in Nicaragua.
unlike the majority of
military personnel already in Nicaragua primarily
engaged in advising and training the Sandinista mili-
tary-the arriving troops were sent to help the Sandi-
nistas counter anticipated insurgent operations.
all of the troops,
Soviets would be willing to provide whatever support
was necessary. No dedicated Soviet support for Cu-
ba's operations is assumed unless explicitly stated. F
In our analysis of the amount and nature of Soviet
support necessary, we assumed that current deliveries
to Cuba's military and economic sectors continued at
a normal rate. Thus, even if no specific Soviet support
were provided for the intervention effort, Havana
could draw from these resources to help support its
operations. The impact on an intervention of the
Soviets withholding or reducing their normal deliver-
ies to Cuba is impossible to quantify precisely, be-
cause the size and composition of Cuba's military
stockpiles, as well as the extent to which Havana
would be willing to draw from civilian allocations, are
unknown.
We believe that these Cuban forces could bolster
considerably Nicaraguan capabilities to combat in-
surgent units. Lightly armed, appropriately trained
army personnel and Special Troops would be well-
suited for conducting unconventional operations
against guerrilla forces. The contingent would be too
small and lightly equipped to enable the Nicaraguans
to defeat the insurgents, however, or to intervene
independently elsewhere in Central America.
imited number o combat aircraft and helicopters
could not provide an adequate level of air support.
? Internal Security Worsens. Cuban forces of about
3,000 to 5,000 troops are committed to help Mana-
gua control public disturbances provoked by Sandi-
nista repression and a deteriorating economy and to
provide static defense of key military and economic
targets.
? Insurgent Threat Intensifies Moderately. Cuban
forces totaling some 12,000 to 15,000 troops join
Nicaraguan military units in responding to a grow-
ing insurgent challenge.
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Table 3
Potential Operations in Nicaragua:
Cuban Capabilities at a Glance
Internal security worsens. 3,000 to 5,000 troops, primarily
conventional ground forces.
Insurgent threat intensifies 12,000 to 15,000 troops, pri-
moderately. marily lightly armed counterin-
surgency forces.
Major insurgent challenge; - "As many as 25,000 troops, com-
bination conventional/counter-
insurgency force, with air sup-
port.
Deployment Logistic
Time Requirements
At least two weeks 20 to 40 metric tons per day; two to
three dedicated IL-62 flights daily.
At least two to three weeks 100 to 180 tons per day; several IL-
62 flights daily or two or three
deliveries per week by coastal
freighter.
At least four weeks Approaching 300 tons per day;
sealift most viable, using several
weekly deliveries by coastal
freighter, or periodic deliveries by
larger merchant ship.
? Major Insurgent Challenge. Cuban forces ap-
proaching 25,000 troops are used in response to a
massive insurgent challenge, including a diversifica-
tion in insurgent tactics to include conventional
operations, which threatens the survival of the San-
dinista regime.
Operational Considerations
Regardless of the scenario, Havana's ability to move
large forces to Nicaragua and logistically support
their operations could be hampered by numerous
physical constraints:
? Nicaragua's terrain, like most of Central America,
is largely unsuited for conventional operations and
favors guerrilla warfare; particularly in the moun-
tainous central highlands and tropical Caribbean
lowlands, where most insurgent activities currently
are concentrated. Conditions for cross-country
movement of ground forces are poor, and few
parachute drop zones or helicopter landing sites for
airmobile forces can be found in the steep moun-
tains covered with dense vegetation or the marshy
coastal plains.
? Air operations also would be affected by these
terrain features and by reduced visibility during the
rainy season (May through October in the west and
May through January in the east). During the dry
season, blowing dust and smoke from burning fields
also could restrict visibility along the Pacific coast.
In addition, only three airfields currently could
support operations by combat aircraft. Sandino
International Airport in Managua is equipped for
sustained operations, and the airfields at Monteli-
mar and Puerto Cabezas could handle limited
operations.
? Except for the Pacific coast region, the ground
transportation network-as throughout Central
America-is of relatively limited capacity. Even if
the key bridges, passes, and other vulnerable points
could be secured, many roads would need nearly
continuous maintenance to remain passable under
sustained, heavy traffic, especially during the rainy
season. The rail system currently is barely adequate
for'normal civilian use.
? Nicaragua has only two ports on the Caribbean
coast that would be suitable for use in a Cuban
intervention operation, and both have limitations.
No roads connect the port of El Bluff with Nicara-
gua's interior, and direct access to the port is limited
to shallow draft vessels such as small coastal
freighters. Deliveries by large oceangoing vessels
must therefore be transshipped to.Rama, a small,
poorly equipped port located 100 kilometers up-
stream. The other Caribbean port, Puerto Cabezas,
can also accept only small coastal freighters, and
the road linking it with the west is still only partially
paved. To reach western Nicaragua, cargo delivered
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Figure 5
General Operating Areas of Insurgent Groups
North 'L
Pacific
Ocean
INSURGENT GROUPS
Democratic Revolutionary Alliance
Nicaraguan Democratic Force
Misura Revolutionary Front
Airfield
y Port
*-+ -~ Railroad
Pipeline
0 100
Kilometers
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necessardy`authprytative.:.+
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to either port must be trucked some 300 kilometers
on routes vulnerable to interdiction. Use of Nicara-
gua's primary Pacific coast port of Corinto would
require passage through the Panama Canal, adding
Havana would have to utilize both merchant ships
and aircraft to transport the intervention forces postu-
lated under each scenario. While aircraft could bring
troops and supplies, ships would be needed to deliver
their combat equipment and trucks. Therefore, unless
this equipment already had been pre-positioned in
Nicaragua or the Soviets were willing to deliver it
themselves, a Cuban intervention operation depending
on airlift alone would be limited to lightly armed
combat troops. A number of other considerations
would weigh against relying exclusively on airlift-a
major airlift is difficult to sustain, an airlift consumes
large amounts of fuel while delivering relatively small
amounts of cargo, and transport aircraft, like mer-
chant ships, are vulnerable to interdiction.
Case I: Internal Security Worsens
A variety of factors-such as heightened anti-Sandi-
nista sentiment among the civilian populace and
increased insurgent sabotage activity prompt a
marked deterioration in Nicaragua's internal securi-
ty situation. As a result of actions by the Sandinistas,
such as employing harsh measures against the Catho-
lic Church or such civilian organizations as labor
unions, widespread antiregime violence and civil dis-
order ensues. In addition, the insurgents increasingly
threaten key military and economic targets, as they
did in the September and October 1983 attacks on
Puerto Sandino-Nicaragua's only crude oil import
facility-and the October 1983 attack on the oil
storage facilities at Corinto.
We assumed that Cuban troops were called on to help
the Sandinistas defend important military and eco-
nomic targets threatened by either insurgent activities
or an increasingly hostile populace. Some key targets
that might require protection in this scenario include
Corinto, which handles 80 percent of the country's
oceangoing trade, the pipeline from Puerto Sandino to
the Esso refinery in Managua, and the thermal power
plant at Puerto Sandino. We judge that the Cubans
and Nicaraguans also would protect key bridges and
choke points on such important lines of communica-
tion as the Inter-American Highway and the transna-
tional road to Rama and would establish or augment
their military presence in municipalities that have a
history of antiregime unrest, such as Puerto Cabezas.
We estimate that a Cuban augmentation of about
3,000 to 5,000 ground troops and support personnel,
deployed in company- and battalion-size units
throughout Nicaragua, could be employed effectively
in a static defense role and to help Nicaraguan forces
combat unrest in urban areas. Such a force would be
equipped primarily with armored personnel carriers,
reconnaissance vehicles, and some artillery and anti-
aircraft weapons-all drawn from Cuban stocks-and
would be supported by large numbers of trucks and a
few transport helicopters. Although these forces, oper-
ating either independently or integrated with Nicara-
guan units, also could combat the insurgents to some
extent, in this scenario Havana would leave counterin-
surgency operations largely to the Nicaraguans, while
Cuban troops would assume much of the burden of
static defense of important installations and lines of
communication.
If Havana wanted to introduce this force as rapidly as
possible, we estimate that-although most of the
troops could be flown to Nicaragua in as little as a
week or so-a minimum of two weeks would be
needed to transport their equipment by sea. To deliver
its forces in this short a time, Cuba would have to use
about four merchant ships comparable to the El
Jigue-class, which would carry all the equipment and
as many troops as could be accommodated, and one
IL-62 flight daily for two weeks to transport the
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remaining troops.' At least three of the ships would
need to transit the Panama Canal and unload at
Corinto to complete the deployment within two weeks.
If the Cubans elected to send only one ship through
the Canal and sent other, smaller ships to ports on the
Caribbean Sea, more than three weeks probably
would be needed, even if both east coast ports were
utilized.
In terms of logistic support, the Cubans would have
little difficulty-the force would be small, its activity
level would be relatively low, and it would be garri-
soned primarily along the major lines of communica-
tion. Any operations conducted under this scenario
would be of limited scope and duration, with the units
quickly returning to their bases. We estimate that
about 20 to 40 tons of supplies would be needed per
day, depending on the level and type of activity.' In
'Our methodology for determining Cuban force movement capabil-
ities is presented in the appendix. Our estimates represent the
minimum times that various force deployments would take and
assume that the Cubans are loading and delivering their forces as
rapidly and efficiently as possible. We also assumed that Cuban
ships transiting the Panama Canal have only trucks or supplies as
deck cargo, and exhibit no external signatures-such as field
kitchens-that openly identify them as carrying an intervention
force. If the Cubans elected to introduce their forces more gradual-
ly, our estimated deployment times could increase severalfold, and
our ability to detect the operation on a timely basis would decrease
markedly.
' We calculated resupply requirements for four main categories of
materiel-ammunition, fuel and other petroleum products, rations,
and nontechnical items such as tents. The appendix presents our
methodoloeies for determining these logistic support requirements.
our judgment, Havana could readily supply this small
level of logistic support by drawing from the materiel
delivered as regular Soviet military shipments.
critical supplies.
We estimate that more than half of Cuba's logistic
requirement under this scenario would consist of fuel
and other petroleum products, some of which could be
provided directly by the USSR or possibly other
countries. Cuba's ability to supply fuel to its forces
would not be seriously affected by insurgent sabotage
of the crude oil import terminal at Puerto Sandino,
fuel storage tanks, or other components of Nicara-
gua's petroleum supply infrastructure. Only refined
petroleum products would be sent for the military
resupply effort, and Cuba would probably establish
separate military depots for storing its fuel and other
Should Havana resupply its forces solely by air, two to
three dedicated IL-62 or TU-154 flights daily proba-
bly would be sufficient to provide their forces' total
logistic needs. If the Soviets shipped the fuel needed,
the Cubans probably could resupply their forces'
remaining logistic needs with one flight per day.
Resupply also could easily be accomplished by sealift.
Vessels such as the Polnocny landing ships and coastal
freighters could transit directly to Rama and trans-
port adequate supplies with only one delivery every
week or so.
Case II: Insurgent Threat Intensifies Moderately
The Sandinistas are threatened by insurgent forces
numbering some 15,000 troops, which have increased
their combat effectiveness-through improved tac-
tics, command and control, and logistics-and have
expanded their activities to include frequent incur-
sions deep into Nicaragua and limited operations in
more populous areas. Increased popular support and
small-scale defections from Nicaragua's militia and
reserve units provide the insurgents with some of
their logistic needs, but they still depend on supply
lines through Honduras and Costa Rica for the bulk
of their materiel. Government forces face an increas-
ing challenge in trying to maintain the status quo.
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Nicaragua's Growing Insurgent Threat
Beginning shortly after the Sandinista victory in 1979
with a few poorly armed bands of former National
Guard members, the insurgency now poses an increas-
ing challenge to the Sandinista regime. The insurgent
groups have grown to include disaffected Sandinistas,
Miskito and other Indian groups, peasants, small
landowners, and laborers. We estimate the insurgents
total at least 10,000-and perhaps as many as
12,000-armed fighters and active collaborators,
comprising three main groups-the Nicaraguan Dem-
ocratic Force (FDN) operating mainly in northwest
and central Nicaragua, the Democratic Revolution-
ary Alliance (ARDE) in the south, and the Miskito-
Sumu-Rama Revolutionary Front (Misura) in the
northeast. The Sandinistas have incurred increasing
political, military, and economic costs because of the
insurgency, with many reservists and militiamen be-
ing called to active duty and scarce economic re-
sources diverted to military use.
The insurgents have demonstrated the capability to
mount guerrilla warfare operations such as am-
bushes, sabotage, and attacks on outposts. Their
activities have been largely confined to the remote,
relatively unpopulated northern and southern border
regions and Caribbean coast-areas where the cen-
tral government traditionally has had difficulties
maintaining tight control. In recent months, however,
central Nicaragua has been threatened as well, and
the insurgents have staged limited, quick-strike at-
tacks against such highly visible economic targets as
the oil terminal at Puerto Sandino-Nicaragua's
only crude oil delivery point. Although reserve and
We theorized that Cuba would send some 12,000 to
15,000 troops to Nicaragua to help counter this
insurgent threat before it grew substantially larger
and developed an extensive popular support base. The
bulk of the contingent would consist of lightly armed
infantry and airmobile troops supported by artillery,
light reconnaissance vehicles, and helicopters. Nicara-
guan Army and militia forces would play a critical
role; they would be responsible for defending secured
areas against the return of insurgent groups and for
conducting any small-scale, cross-border operations
militia units have borne the brunt of the fighting
against the insurgents, regular Army and Ministry of
Interior Special Troops increasingly have become
involved.
The insurgents' prospects for success are uncertain. It
remains unclear whether the FDN insurgents have
overcome the logistic problems that halted their
offensive in central Nicaragua last spring, and ARDE
has repeatedly stated publicly that logistic shortages
have limited its zone of operations. The insurgents
also have not yet demonstrated a capability to con-
duct coordinated attacks on multiple fronts, perma-
nently interdict main lines of communication, or
carry out other large-scale operations that would
increase dramatically their threat to the Sandinista
regime. The insurgents have yet to become a self-
sustained fighting force and remain dependent on
external sources for weapons, ammunition, and other
supplies. The potential for the groups to collabo-
rate-and thereby increase their effectiveness-is re-
stricted by their diverse goals and uncertain popular
support, and by the intense rivalries and animosities
between the FDN-whose top military leaders in-
clude former members of Somoza's National
Guard-and ARDE-led by former Sandinista lead-
er Eden Pastora. Moreover, the insurgents have yet to
gain large-scale popular support and build a political
infrastructure able to exploit the regime's repression,
for example, by orchestrating demonstrations,
strikes, or street violence in the major population
centers.
against insurgent supply bases. Cuban troops would
support any cross-border operations from within Nic-
aragua and-together with Nicaraguan forces-
would conduct counterinsurgency operations within
Nicaragua and patrol the borders to reduce the flow
of arms and men.
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We estimate the Cubans would need a minimum of
two to three weeks to transport the entire force-
including both combat equipment and trucks-to
Nicaragua if five or six large merchant ships were
sent via the Panama Canal to Corinto and three or
four dedicated IL-62 flights took place per day. If,
however, most of the equipment had been pre-posi-
tioned in Nicaragua or if the Soviets shipped directly
to Nicaragua the several hundred trucks we judge
would be needed, we estimate that the force could be
introduced in as little as two weeks or so, if Cuba were
willing to mount a major airlift.
Whether Havana would opt for such a potentially
visible and relatively fast troop deployment or for a
more gradual buildup of its forces would depend
largely on the situation in Nicaragua. In the absence
of a looming collapse of the Sandinista government,
we believe Cuba probably would prefer to take several
weeks to build its forces to the level postulated. For
example, Havana's intervention in Ethiopia-roughly
comparable to this scenario in terms of the number of
troops involved-was accomplished over nearly three
months, with the Soviets transporting all equipment
and some personnel. Using only ports on the Caribbe-
an coast, Cuba could complete the delivery of all
equipment, including trucks, within six weeks and still
have the option of airlifting lightly armed combat
troops to Nicaragua on short notice.
We probably would have some indication
that forces were being
rear possible operations abroad, especially if
speed were an important Cuban consideration.
precisely their ultimate destination or the timing of
their deployment. A troop airlift could be initiated
with little or no warning; how soon the activity would
be detected and identified as a military operation
would depend primarily on the number of daily flights
involved. As in the previous scenario, a more leisurely
introduction of forces could considerably reduce our
ability to detect an intervention operation on a timely
basis.
We estimate that a force of this size actively engaged
in counterinsurgency operations would consume an
average of about 100 to 180 tons of supplies per day.
Havana's ability to maintain this level of logistic
support indefinitely without additional Soviet assist-
ance is open to question. If the Soviets did not provide
this aid, Havana might be able to fill the gap by
diverting materiel from the civilian sector, curtailing
military training activity, drawing from its own or
Nicaraguan stockpiles, or developing alternate
sources of supply. If these actions were insufficient,
Cuba's combat capabilities probably would be some-
what reduced. Cuban forces probably would be able
to conduct limited, selective operations against the
insurgents, but would not have the means to wage an
agressive campaign indefinitely.
Sending the necessary logistic support would be con-
siderably more difficult than in our first scenario but,
in our judgment, probably within Cuban transport
capabilities. Sealift would provide the most efficient
resupply means-two or three shipments per week by
coastal freighter to Nicaragua's Caribbean coast
probably would suffice. Trying to rely on airlift
exclusively would be difficult, as multiple flights
would be needed daily, even if the Soviets shipped fuel
to Nicaragua directly.
The greatest challenge to providing logistic support,
however, would be the need to ensure that the sup-
plies-after reaching Nicaragua-were delivered to
the proper location in a timely manner and in the
proper mix and quantity. Cuban forces operating
against the insurgents might be away from their bases
for extended periods, and the bases themselves would
probably be far from main ports and air terminals.
Supplies, therefore, would have to be trucked overland
through rugged terrain on possibly unsecured roads.
Short-range transport aircraft or helicopters also
could be used to paradrop supplies to forces operating
in more inaccessible areas, but their use for routine
logistic support would be somewhat restricted. Air-
craft-especially helicopters-would need to be kept
available for higher priority missions and supplies
could be damaged or fall into enemy hands.
In our judgment, the Cuban contingent envisioned in
this scenario, in concert with Nicaraguan regular and
reserve units, probably would be able to reduce
substantially the postulated insurgent ground threat,
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but would have to overcome numerous potential oper-
ational difficulties. Cuban forces would need to estab-
lish small, defensible outposts, provide for secure
transportation and logistic support, and-together
with Nicaraguan forces-conduct an offensively
oriented counterinsurgency campaign yielding poten-
tially heavy Cuban casualties. Troops pursuing the
insurgents in mountainous terrain would have to
operate mainly on foot and carry few heavy weapons,
reducing their ability to bring the full force of their
firepower to bear. They also would need accurate and
timely intelligence on the locations and strengths of
insurgent units. The insurgents' familiarity with the
terrain and their ability to disperse into the country-
side and regroup at will also would complicate opera-
tions.
On balance, we assess that the Cubans' superior
command and control, combat experience, logistics,
and ground and air weaponry-coupled with the
manpower resources available to the Nicaraguan mili-
tary-probably would enable them to deny the insur-
gents permanent secure operating bases and to drive
many across the borders. Whether the insurgents
could later resume large-scale combat activities would
depend on such imponderables as the amount of
external support available to rebuild their combat
apparatus, the willingness of Honduras and Costa
Rica to provide safehaven, the ability of the Nicara-
guan military to prevent border infiltrations, and the
degree of popular dissent within Nicaragua.
Case III: Major Insurgent Challenge
As many as 25,000 Cuban troops-comparable to
Cuba's commitment in Angola-are dispatched to
uphold the Sandinista government in the face of a
sharp deterioration in internal security conditions.
The insurgents have approximately doubled in num-
bers, begun a conventional campaign aimed at seizing
and holding key municipalities and engaging regular
Sandinista forces directly, and-most important-
developed a unified political infrastructure that ma-
jor elements of the population can rally around. The
insurgents are able to travel throughout the country-
side at will, and government forces are unable to
depend on the lines of communication outside of the
main cities and towns. Nicaragua's regular military
units are plagued by desertions, and the militia is
undependable. The insurgents receive intelligence,
food, supplies, s4fehaven, and recruits from a gener-
Cuban forces intervening at this late stage would, at
the outset, face a number of formidable tasks. At a
minimum, Cuban troops-with only minimal assist-
ance from the Nicaraguan military-would have to
restore and maintain order in the key population
centers, establish secure lines of communication link-
ing these centers, and begin to conduct harsh, punitive
operations against the insurgents. They would need
large forces able to perform in conventional, counter-
insurgency, and static defense roles. The Cuban con-
tingent we envision would consist of conventional '
ground troops equipped with tanks and armored per-
sonnel carriers, lightly armed infantry and airmobile
troops, combat helicopters, and possibly MIG jet
fighters to provide air support.
The subsequent combat activities and longer range
missions of Cuban forces would depend largely on
Cuba's overall goals and objectives, as well as on the
insurgents' response to the intervention. If Cuba
intended to eradicate a firmly entrenched insurgency
such as this, an aggressive, large-scale military pacifi-
cation campaign-considerably more ambitious than
that presented in the previous scenario-would be
necessary. To prevent the insurgents from rebuilding
their forces in areas cleared by counterinsurgency
operations, Cuban forces also would need to reduce
insurgent border traffic and establish a presence in
cleared areas. Coupled with the military campaign
would be the even harder task of neutralizing the
insurgents' political infrastructure and reestablishing
administrative control
An intervention of this magnitude would be consider-
ably more complex and disruptive than smaller opera-
tions because of the number of units involved, the
large mobilization required, and the greater risk of
facing stiff opposition soon after their arrival in
Nicaragua. We estimate that, under the best of
circumstances, it would take Cuba at least one month
to transport a force of this size and composition to
Nicaragua. To deliver the force most efficiently,
several merchant ships would need to transit to
Corinto-where commercial activities would have to
be substantially curtailed for at least a few days
ally sympathetic civilian populace.
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during military unloading operations-concurrent
with a'monthlong troop airlift involving four IL-62
flights daily. Although Cuba theoretically would be
capable of such a rapid introduction of forces, we
believe that Havana probably would prefer a more
gradual deployment-a few months or longer-with
fuller utilization of Nicaragua's east coast ports. As in
the previous scenario, if a rapid infusion of personnel
were needed to stabilize the situation, Cuba could
airlift several thousand troops within a few weeks,
concurrent with sealift operations.
Havana would be hard pressed to conduct an inter-
vention of this size without Soviet assistance. Cuba's
inventory of ground weapons and helicopters would be
depleted substantially to provide the large amount of
equipment we estimate would be required. Cuba
would therefore have to receive some equipment-
particularly artillery and small armored reconnais-
sance vehicles-from the Soviets, either through ship-
ments to Cuba or directly to Nicaragua. Moreover,
resupply requirements could approach 300 tons per
day, depending on Cuban combat levels. If the Soviets
did not provide this logistic support, Cuban forces
could at most defend key targets against the insur-
gents and would be unable to actively pursue them on
a large scale
Cuba would have to depend primarily on sealift to
resupply their forces. Should Cuba be unable to effect
seaborne deliveries, the equivalent of more than 15
IL-62 and TU- 154 flights daily-exceeding, in our
judgment, realistic Cuban airlift capabilities-would
be necessary to resupply solely by air. Delays caused
by weather, harassment or sabotage at ports and
along land routes, or other uncontrollable factors
could complicate resupply operations, possibly result-
ing in reduced combat effectiveness among many
remotely deployed units. Even if the primary lines of
communication remained accessible, timely resupply
to large, dispersed forces actively engaged in combat
would be difficult at best.
A Cuban combat contingent of some 25,000-without
the support of both an effective Nicaraguan military
ally and the majority of the civilian population-
would be hard pressed, in our view, to simultaneously
combat the insurgents, secure cleared areas, and
prevent border infiltrations. In our judgment, Cuban
conventional operations probably could drive the in-
surgent units from more populated areas, or force
them underground, and allow the government to
reassert minimal authority. The substantial firepower
provided by weapons such as combat helicopters and
field artillery initially could inflict many insurgent
casualties and cause at least short-term demoraliza-
tion
In these circumstances, the insurgents would be likely
to withdraw to the extensive but relatively uninhabit-
ed mountainous interior, the border areas, and the
east coast, where they would resume guerrilla opera-
tions. They would be able to harass and inflict
casualties on Cuban and Nicaraguan forces, disrupt
such vital economic activities as agriculture and pe-
troleum refining, and impede travel on all but the few
major lines of communication. Unless Cuba and
Nicaragua augmented their forces substantially, em-
barked on a comprehensive military and civil pacifica-
tion effort, and successfully pressured Honduras and
Costa Rica to deny the insurgents access to their
territories, the insurgent force postulated probably
would be able to continue the guerrilla struggle
indefinitely.
Regardless of events in Central America, over the
next few years we expect Cuba's overall military
capabilities to improve as they grow more proficient in
operating new weapons and receive additional arms
and other equipment from the Soviets. The type of
force that Cuba develops in the future depends on the
kinds of equipment Moscow provides and Cuba's own
military priorities. A number of factors will influence
Soviet military deliveries, including the USSR's mili-
tary and economic needs, the requirements of Mos-
cow's other client states, the overall character of
Soviet-Cuban relations, the Soviet need for a military
surrogate, and the extent to which Moscow might
want to limit or expand Cuban capabilities. For its
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part, Havana would have to consider whether it
wanted to develop forces geared toward defeating a
guerrilla challenge abroad at the possible expense of
conventional warfare capabilities vital for defending
Cuba itself.
In terms of regional power projection, the introduc-
tion of the Polnocny-class landing ship in 1982 and
IL-76 cargo transport aircraft expected by early 1984
is particularly significant. These transport assets will
provide Cuba with increased flexibility to conduct an
intervention in Central America. With the IL-76,'
Havana would be able to fly in greater amounts of
cargo per aircraft than heretofore possible as well as
large combat equipment. Along with providing a
modest amphibious lift capability, the Polnocny land-
ing ships enable Havana to make logistic deliveries to
small ports and other locations that would be inacces-
sible to large merchant ships. Cuba would need a
substantial inventory of these assets, however, and
would have to expand considerably the training and
size of its Air Force and Navy to be able to use this
equipment to undertake operations against significant
opposition. We also expect the Cubans to -receive more
multipurpose systems like the MI-24 helicopter that
would be suitable for a wide variety of roles either in
Notwithstanding these improvements, however, we
believe that Cuban military intervention in Central
America would continue to suffer from important
limitations. Although capable of transporting a large
force to Central America, Havana still would remain
dependent on the USSR for such critical logistic
support as fuel and spare parts. In addition, the ability
of Cuban forces to intervene successfully in a hostile
country against large opposing forces will remain
limited, although small-scale assaults could be suc-
cessful in the absence of US interdiction. Moreover,
although Cuban forces in Angola may be becoming
more involved in counterinsurgency operations, Cu-
ban military training continues to emphasize large-
scale conventional military operations, which would
bear little resemblance to the guerrilla environment
facing Cuban forces intervening in Nicaragua-the
most likely country in Central America for direct
Cuban military involvement.
Should Havana decide to intervene militarily in Cen-
tral America, it could do so with little or no warning.
Airlift alone could bring in several thousand lightly
armed troops and, if conducted on a small scale over
several weeks, probably could not be detected as part 25X1
of a military intervention operation until Cuban units
were identified in-country. The supplies needed to
logistically support these troops also probably could
be delivered relatively discreetly by merchant ships. If
resupplying by air alone, however, the high number of
flights that would be necessary for all but a limited
operation could be readily detected. Obviously, if
speed were of critical importance to Havana and a
major force were being assembled and transported as 25X1
rapidly as possible, our ability to detect an interven-
tion operation would improve dramatically.
We doubt that Cuba could conduct any intervention
operation involving more than a few thousand troops
in the face of US interdiction. The extent to which
Cuban operations would be impeded would depend on
the kind and timing of actions taken. If the Cubans
were denied access to the Panama Canal, for example,
they still could transport and support even a large
combat contingent by using airfields and east coast
ports, although-in the case of Nicaragua-it could
take more than twice as long to deliver the force. If,
on the other hand, Havana were faced with a total sea
blockade and were utilizing airlift alone, it could
transport only lightly armed troops, supplies, and
possibly small amounts of equipment such as light
antiaircraft guns. Airlift could provide sufficient lo-
gistic support for an active combat force of several
thousand troops at most, and even that level of effort
would be a challenge to maintain indefinitely.
There would be little Cuba could do if they were
denied the use of both sealift and airlift. In these
circumstances, Havana would have to utilize those
forces already available in-country, supplemented by
mobilized reservists present in a civilian capacity.
Considering its recent experience in Grenada, we
believe Havana may try to increase covertly the
Cuban presence in Nicaragua as a precaution, in the
event it could not bring in forces under more critical
circumstances.
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Appendix
Methodology for Determining
Cuban Force Movement and
Logistic Support Capabilities
With more than 70 operational civilian and military
transports capable of reaching Central America, Ha-
vana can choose from several options in conducting a
military airlift. Factors that would influence which
aircraft were selected include aircraft and pilot avail-
ability, the type of operation being supported, the
amount of time available to prepare, the capacities of
host-country airfields, and the extent of secrecy de-
sired.
The Assumptions
Our estimate of which aircraft would be suitable and
available for a military airlift
Recognizing that Cuban planners might allocate
resources based on entirely different criteria, we
selected the aircraft on the following basis:
? Only aircraft that could complete a round trip
mission to any point in Central America without
refueling were included. This would save turn-
around time and reduce fuel requirements in the
host country.
For each scenario considered, we also assumed that:
? Neither the United States nor other countries inter-
feres with Cuban operations.
? Sufficient pilots and airfield support personnel are
available.
? The serviceability rate for the transports involved
averages 85 to 90 percent during the first three days
and 60 percent thereafter.'
? All airfields are secured and can accommodate the
number of flights involved; arriving personnel and 25X1
cargo can be readily cleared from the area by
ground transportation.
? No overflight clearances are required, and no refu- 25X1
eling is done in Central America. 25X1
? Unless stated otherwise, each aircraft makes one
round trip flight per day.
Cuba's Alternatives
To determine Cuban capabilities, we examined sever-
al hypothetical operations, ranging from an all-out
airlift involving Cuba's entire transport fleet to a 25X1
small-scale operation utilizing only the flights regu-
larly conducted at present.
In our judgment, the most ambitious airlift that
Havana conceivably could undertake and maintain
? The growth of Cuba's transport inventory in recent
years was analyzed to determine which and how
many aircraft might be in excess of Cuba's immedi-
ate needs.
We believe Cuba would maximize the use of military
aircraft to reduce potential hard currency losses from
diverting large numbers of civilian aircraft from
commercial service. Thus, we assumed that virtually
all of Cuba's AN-26s and only those civilian aircraft
routinely available on an ad hoc basis would be used
for a long-term, open-ended commitment.
Such an operation
could transport about 8,000 to 9,400 personnel or 900
to 1,200 tons of supplies the first week, and some
6,700 to 7,900 personnel or 770 to 1,000 tons there-
after. With minimal Soviet participation, about
10,000 troops or 1,200 tons could be transported the
first week and 8,400 troops or 1,000 tons thereafter.
' Serviceability rate is the percentage of aircraft capable of
performing a mission on any given day. It assumes that a prior
standdown of 10 days occurs for maintenance and other prepara-
tion, only unscheduled maintenance is performed during the
"surge" period (days one through three), and aircraft resume their
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The amount carried in either case could increase by
roughly 50 percent if the IL-62s and TU-154s were
scheduled for two flights daily.
It would be necessary for Havana to utilize both
merchant ships and aircraft to transport the interven-
tion forces postulated in our scenarios. We assumed
that merchant ships would carry all equipment and as
many troops as could be accommodated and that
aircraft would bring the remaining troops. The
amount of time needed to move each force would be
driven primarily by how long the sealift portion of the
operation took, which, in turn, would depend on such
variables as the size and composition of the force, the
number of merchant ships involved, and the Nicara-
guan ports used.
For each scenario, we assumed that:
? The United States or other countries do not
interfere.
? No equipment is pre-positioned in advance.
? The necessary ships, aircraft, and crews are readily
available, and encounter no delays en route by such
uncontrollable factors as weather.
? All ports and airfields are secured, military ship-
, ments receive priority, and equipment can be readily
cleared from delivery points by road.
Three representative Cuban merchant ship types-the
El Jigue-class and the smaller Camaguey and Pinar
del Rio-classes-were chosen to illustrate Cuban sea-
lift capabilities. All three types have supported Cuban
operations in Angola and would be appropriate for
transporting materiel to Nicaragua. Cuba also could
utilize many other ships. Those whose size and config-
uration are similar to the classes used as our examples
probably would have comparable lift capabilities,
although their precise equipment-carrying capacities
would have to be determined individually (see table
A-3).
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Table A-3
Selected Cuban Merchant Ship
Characteristics a
Ship Class El Jigue
Pinar
del Rio
Camaguey
Gross registered tons 9,400
3,000
2,300
Deadweight tons 12,680
4,100
3,200
Cruising speed (knots) 16.8
14
16
Heaviest onboard crane 50
capacity (tons)
25
10
Total storage space (square 5,950
meters)
1,900
1,940
a Ship characteristics, as well as the physical dimensions of military
equipment, are furnished in DIA Report DST-2050H-611-81, .
November 1982, Communist Military Sealift and Afloat Logistic
S
upport Forces,
Volume II, (Confidential).
To calculate the number of ships needed to transport
each force postulated in our scenarios, we:
? Determined the numbers and types of equipment to
be loaded and how much floorspace each item would
require. (Floorspace equals equipment item's length
times width, plus a standard "loading factor" of 20
to 40 percent to allow for unusable space.)
? Allocated equipment to each ship-taking into ac-
count the dimensions of the hatches and holds and
the available heavy lift capacity-until all equip-
ment had been hypothetically loaded. To the fullest
extent practical, combat equipment was concealed
below deck while trucks were carried in the open.
Allocated personnel-at a standard rate of 1.5
square meters of floorspace per man-to any upper
decks ('tween decks) that could not be utilized for
equipment. Supplies were allocated to similarly
unused lower holds and also were assumed to be
carried on vehicles being transported.
Table A-4
Sealift Movement Time Estimates
Activity a Minimum Time
Required b
Loading operations in Cuba (using Two ships per day
multiple ports if necessary)
Sea transit to
Corinto (via Panama Canal) Five days
El Bluff or Puerto Cabezas Two days
Unloading operations in Nicaragua
Corinto One to two ships per day
Puerto Cabezas One ship per day
El Bluff-Rama (includes Four to six days per
transshipping) El Jigue. Two to three days
per Pinar del Rio
Rama or Corinto to Managua One day
Puerto Cabezas to Matagalpa One to two days
area
a Many of the activities would be conducted concurrently.
b Fractions of days have been rounded.
Using the time assumptions presented in table A-4,
we calculated how long it would take to ship each
force to different Nicaraguan ports.' Hypothetical
shipments involving El Jigue-class ships were sent to
the Pacific coast port of Corinto and to El Bluff on the
east coast to determine the fastest route. Although
Corinto is farther from Cuba and involves passage
through the Panama Canal, materiel delivered via El
Bluff must undergo time-consuming transloading op-
erations onto smaller vessels for final shipment to
Rama, 100 kilometers upriver. The Camaguey and
Pinar del Rio classes were utilized only for deliveries
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to Nicaragua's east coast ports. El Bluff was used by
the Pinar del Rios, while Puerto Cabezas on Nicara-
gua's more isolated northeast coast was used for
deliveries by the Camaguey, whose shallow draft
would permit direct unloading.
We calculate that the Cuban force deployments in our
scenarios could be accomplished most quickly by
using Corinto, which is large enough to accommodate
vessels the size of the El Jigue and is near the main
land routes. Of the two Caribbean coast ports, deliver-
ies to Puerto Cabezas could theoretically be complet-
ed somewhat more rapidly than those via El Bluff to
Rama. In our view, however, El Bluff/Rama would
be the better alternative for a military sealift opera-
tion. They have been utilized for arms deliveries in the
past, and land travel through southern Nicaragua
would be more secure than in northern areas where
insurgent activities have been concentrated. More-
over, Rama is linked to the interior by Nicaragua's
only east-west all-weather road, which could support
the simultaneous movement of large numbers of
vehicles, and is closer to western Nicaragua than is
Puerto Cabezas.
Without effective logistic support, Cuban combat
operations would be severely retarded. To determine
Cuban capabilities to provide logistic support, we
estimated the tonnage of supplies needed daily for
each scenario and then calculated the number of
aircraft or ships required to transport these supplies to
Nicaragua.
Tonnage Estimates
The USSR currently provides virtually all of Cuba's
military equipment and logistic needs, and large
numbers of Soviet military advisers are present in
Cuba. Because of this and the involvement of Soviet
personnel in organizing logistic support for Cuban
intervention forces in Ethiopia, we assumed that
Cuban force planners would adhere closely to Soviet
guidelines to determine logistic requirements. Our
estimates were thus based largely on Soviet logistic
planning factors, modified as necessary to take into
account scenario-dependent variables.
Resupply requirements were calculated for four main
categories of materiel-ammunition, POL (petro-
leum, oil, and lubricants), rations, and nontechnical
supplies such as tents. For each scenario, ammunition
and POL accounted for the bulk-two-thirds or
more-of Cuba's logistic needs. Although Cuban
forces, according to military doctrine, would exploit
local resources to the fullest extent practical, we
believe that Cuban logistic planners still would have
to be prepared to provide their forces' total logistic
requirements if necessary. Moreover, local resources
are scant in Nicaragua, as well as throughout Central
America.
Ammunition. Of the four categories of materiel,
estimates for ammunition expenditures were most
sensitive to the operational assumptions of the various
scenarios and thus reflected the widest variation. To
calculate ammunition expenditures for ground weap-
ons, we first developed a range reflecting the number
of combat engagements that each type of unit would
experience during a typical two-week period for each
scenario. We then estimated how many "'units of fire"
would be consumed per weapon per engagement, by
taking into consideration the weapon type, the oppos-
ing force, and the presumed duration and intensity of
Cuban combat operations." Estimated "units of fire"
' We based our calculations on data derived from DIA reports
DDB-1150-1-83, August 1983, Soviet/Warsaw Pact Sustainability
Planning Factors for Frontal Operations and DDB-1150-1-78,
May 1978, Warsaw Pact Logistics Guide. The logistic planning
factors presented in these publications were formulated for conven-
tional operations in Central Europe and were therefore modified as
necessary to reflect our best estimate of resupply needs for'the
smaller scale operations presented in our scenarios.
10 "Unit of fire" is a Soviet accounting measure-upon which
planned or actual consumption rates are based-that refers to the
standard number of rounds allocated to a particular weapon type or
combat unit. The "unit of fire" of an assault rifle is 300 rounds, for
example, while that of a 122-mm field artillery piece is 80 rounds.
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Table A-5
Estimated Daily Logistic Requirements a
Scenario
Total
Needs
Internal security worsens.
20 to 40
12to23
lto3
6to10
2to4
Insurgent threat intensifies moderately.
100 to 180
30 to 60
35 to 75
25 to 30
10 to 18
Major insurgent challenge.
200 to 300
75 to 110
50 to 100
50
20 to 30
consumed were then converted to metric tons and
divided by 14 to determine daily ammunition require-
ments. Ammunition expenditures for helicopters and
fighter aircraft were based on standard consumption
rates per mission.
POL. POL requirements were affected primarily by
the number of vehicles involved in each scenario and
by the activity levels postulated. For each scenario, we
calculated daily POL requirements by first estimating
the number and type of vehicles involved and deter-
mining the "refill," in liters, for each." The "refills"
were then multiplied by estimated consumption fac-
tors-we assumed that 0.20 refills were consumed per
day in "inactive" units and 0.30 refills per day in units
engaged in combat. Forcewide totals were determined
and the resultant number of liters converted to metric
tons.
Rations and Nontechnical Supplies. Rations were
calculated at the flat rate of 2 kilograms daily per.
man. We assumed that the Cubans would obtain
water from local sources in Nicaragua. Nontechnical
supplies were estimated to comprise approximately 10
percent of the total daily logistic requirement.
Transport Requirements
After estimating the daily logistic requirement for
Cuban forces under each scenario, we determined the
number of aircraft or ships needed to transport this
materiel to Nicaragua. Our tonnage estimates were
first multiplied by a 40 percent "loading factor" to
account for the weight of any packing materials and
to allow for unusable space within the carrying com-
partment:
? For air resupply operations, we based our calcula-
tions on the capacity of Cuba's largest aircraft, the
IL-62, which can carry more than 26 tons. To
transport 100 tons daily, for example, an estimated
six IL-62 flights would be needed (100 tons plus 40
percent, divided by 26).
? Because the lift capabilities of Cuba's merchant
ships are so large and varied, and the vessels also
might be transporting nonmilitary items, our esti-
mates for the numbers of ships needed are less
precise. In general, we assumed that a fully loaded
coastal freighter with a deadweight tonnage of
1,000 tons probably could provide about 600 tons of
supplies per shipment.
" "Refill" equals a tracked vehicle's fuel capacity and the amount
of fuel necessary for a wheeled vehicle to travel 500 kilometers.
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