LATE STAGE INDICATORS OF INSURGENT SUCCESS: EL SALVADOR, GUATEMALA, AND THE PHILIPPINES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84S00558R000200100002-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 32
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 29, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: March 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Late Stage Indicators
of Insurgent Success:
El Salvador, Guatemala,
and the Philippines
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G! 83-10073
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14. Government willing to seriously negotiate sharing of power with rebels.
A. Generally observed when a government concludes that it is losing
ground to an insurgency and hopes, through negotiations, to salvage
what it can; entails compromising authority and should not be
confused with amnesties or other tactics aimed at weakening the
insurgency.
B. Evidence may include:
a. Overt or covert overtures to rebel leaders proposing a meeting with
government negotiators.
b. Government propaganda stops personal attacks against rebel lead-
ers; conciliatory public stance taken.
c. Captured rebels are released as show of good faith.
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IV. Progressive Loss of Government Coercive Power.
11. Military plots or coups against the government.
A. In themselves may not benefit insurgency, but, in conjunction with
other indicators, this indicator often points to government loss of
domestic support and coercive power.
B. Because of the inherently secret nature of a military plot or coup
against a government, analysts will usually have to rely primarily on
clandestine reporting for evidence.
12. Armed guerrilla forces multiplying in size.
A. Reflects insurgent success in recruiting and organizing; presupposes
that increases are large enough to seriously decrease the ratio of
soldiers to guerrillas; some theorists posit a 10-to-1 ratio as necessary
for victory, but diverse factors, such as availability of helicopters and
degree of popular support, can significantly lower this ratio depending
on the local context.
B. Evidence may include:
a.
b. Increasing frequency of guerrilla attacks or reports that guerrillas
are attacking with bigger units.
c. Guerrillas expanding their geographic areas of operation.
d. Growing guerrilla demands for food and supplies from civilian
population.
13. Lack of sufficient government troops for counterinsurgency.
A. Troops typically described in reporting as overextended or stretched
thin; suggests declining government commitment, inadequate re-
sources, or lessening domestic support.
B. Evidence may include:
a. Military officers privately conceding that they do not have enough
troops to launch counteroffensives against guerrillas.
b. Inability of the army to protect key communications links or other
strategic points from rebel sabotage or attack.
c. Growing army difficulty in replacing casualties or attracting new
recruits.
d. Army abandoning large areas of the countryside to guerrilla
control without attempting to defend them.
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8. Escalation of guerrilla/terrorist violence.
A. Entails either greater frequency and intensity of violence or a geo-
graphical expansion of areas subject to attack; does not signify control
of territory.
B. Evidence may include:
a. Increasing inability of government to provide basic services because
of sabotage, ambushes, strafings, and other violent assaults against
its personnel or installations.
b. Public or private statements criticizing government for failure to
contain spread of violence.
c. National commerce, transportation, or agriculture disrupted.
d. Failure of government security measures to prevent an increasing
number of spectacular acts of urban terrorism.
9. Increasing inability of government to protect supporters/officials from
violence.
A. Often accompanies a general escalation of violence; selective assassina-
tions of government supporters are conducted to undermine confidence
in a regime.
B. Evidence may include:
a. Government facing increasing difficulty in replacing local officials
who have been assassinated by guerrillas or have fled in fear of
assassination.
b. Growing popular reluctance to publicly voice support for the
government or participate in government programs in fear of
insurgent reprisals.
c. Growing number of middle and upper class individuals applying for
visas to leave the country.
d. Public media or private government reports stating that rural areas
increasingly are without proper authorities.
10. National economy increasingly weakened by insurgent activity.
A. Concerned specifically with those negative economic developments
that can be traced directly or indirectly to insurgent activity.
B. Evidence may include:
a. Disruption of the planting or harvesting of key crops.
b. Disruption of the transportation and communication networks.
c. Capital flight; major curtailment of domestic and foreign credit and
investment.
d. Increasing unemployment as a result of guerrilla sabotage of
industry, trade, and agriculture.
e. Growing government expenditures and indebtedness to finance
counterinsurgency operations.
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B. Evidence may include:
a. Termination or curtailment of military aid or sales.
b. Cancellation or curtailment of cultural and educational exchanges
or economic assistance.
c. Antigovernment voting or speeches in the United Nations and other
international bodies.
d. Former ally establishes contact with rebel leaders or invites them to
visit country.
6. Increasing international support for the insurgents.
A. Can be crucial militarily; most revolutionary insurgencies become
internationalized, with rival foreign powers supporting the government
or the insurgents.
B. Evidence may include:
a. Foreign governments overtly or covertly providing increasing mili-
tary or financial aid to rebels.
b. Formal recognition of insurgents by foreign governments or grant-
ing of diplomatic status.
c. Voting or speeches in international organizations favoring insurgent
cause.
d. Establishment of an internationally recognized rebel government in
exile or a domestic liberated area.
e. Neighboring countries allow use of their territory as a refuge or
staging area for guerrilla war.
III. Progressive Loss of Government Control Over Population and Territory.
7. Significant expansion of territory under insurgent control.
A. Involves insurgent replacement of government administration, not
necessarily military control; often observed during final six months of
successful insurgency; however, some groups have triumphed without
ever establishing control over territory.
B. Evidence may include:
a. Insurgents openly collect taxes, food, or supplies from local popula-
tion.in an expanding area.
b. Insurgents openly recruit combatants or supporters in an expanding
area.
c. Insurgents enforce their own system of justice-including execu-
tions-in an expanding area.
d. Government forces unwilling or unable to reenter areas lost to
insurgents.
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A. Most governments, of necessity, have foreign ties that are suspect, or
can be made suspect, to large sectors of the public; revolutionary
insurgents invariably seek to exploit this and portray themselves as
foremost nationalists; Communist revolutionaries generally downplay
or ignore Marxist-Leninist ideology in favor of wide-reaching national-
istic appeals.
B. Evidence may include:
a. The populace believing Communist nationalistic propaganda and
discussing it seriously.
b. Success of the insurgent movement in associating itself with a
popular, nationalistic symbol, as was the case with Nicaragua's
Cesar Agusto Sandino.
c. Public condemnation in the media and in speeches of the govern-
ment's foreign ties.
d. Intellectuals, politicians, or religious leaders publicly or privately
blaming the government's foreign ties for national economic and
social problems.
4. Insurgent co-optation, incorporation, or elimination of other major opposi-
tion groups to the government.
A. Goal is to present the nation with only two choices: the government
and the insurgency; a political broad front, incorporating moderate
opposition into the insurgency, is a favorite strategy, but the same
polarizing goal can also be pursued through assassinations and
intimidation.
B. Evidence may include:
a. A broadly based front group is established by the insurgents and
becomes the principal voice of opposition to the government.
b. Moderate political, business, or religious leaders privately or public-
ly express support for the insurgency.
c. Insurgents or their front groups gain key positions in labor unions,
churches, political parties, or student organizations.
d. Violent government repression against both moderates and radicals.
II. Progressive Withdrawal of International Support for the Government.
5. Withdrawal of foreign support by specific, critical allies.
A. Affects the capability of a government to finance and equip a
counterinsurgency campaign; politically, loss of foreign support may
also affect domestic support; often observed during the final six
months of an insurgency.
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Appendix
Indicators of Insurgent Victory 8
I. Progressive Withdrawal of Domestic Support for the Government.
1. Withdrawal of support by specific, critical segments of the population.
A. Includes elites and, varying with the local context, other politically and
economically important sectors such as labor unions and churches.
B. Evidence may include:
a. Public criticism, including newspaper advertisements, by important
businessmen, churchmen, and labor leaders.
b. An increase in politically motivated strikes.
c.
2. Growing popular perception of regime illegitimacy.
A. The populace's belief that the present regime does not have the right to
rule can precede insurgency, reflecting governmental incompetence or
corruption, or result from insurgency, reflecting governmental weak-
ness or indiscriminate repression.
B. Evidence may include:
a. Growing number of acts of civil disobedience.
b. Inability of government to rally popular support for its policies.
c. Increasing government reliance on violent repression.
d. Populace blaming government for natural disasters.
e. Increase in jokes and public derision of national leaders or
institutions.
3. Popular perception of insurgents as more nationalistic than the
government.
' The table in this appendix summarizes the results of applying the indicators to the five historical in-
surgencies surveyed and lists our confidence levels for each judgment. South Vietnam is an exception to
the general observation that the final year of a successful insurgency is marked not only by indicator
shifts from "no" to "yes" but also by higher levels of confidence in the judgments. We believe that this
is due in large part to the combination of the insurgents' long-term strategy of gradually increasing
pressure on Saigon and the commensurate increase in US military and economic aid. A narrative
summary of the historical analysis upon which the table is based is available on request.
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At a force strength of 160,000 men, the Philippine
military is large enough to achieve its military objec-
tives against the insurgents. The major problems
appear to be ineffective deployment, poor counter-
insurgency strategy, and deteriorating relations be-
tween civilians and soldiers in areas of insurgent
activity. Although Marcos has displayed some interest
in co-opting rebel leaders, this flexibility does not
signify a willingness to compromise his authority or to
negotiate seriously with the insurgents.
Implications for US Foreign Policy Interests
US political, economic, and military support for the
Salvadoran Government was a major factor in the
insurgents' loss of political momentum, despite a
continued high level of violence. Indeed, we see no
evidence yet that the insurgents have been able to
translate some recent military successes into greater
internal political support. In the absence of continued
US assistance, we believe the insurgency would gain
renewed internal political momentum. Likewise, fail-
ure by the Salvadoran Government to implement
promised reforms would likely boost the appeal of the
guerrilla movement.
The insurgency in Guatemala may be at a decisive
stage. The Guatemalan Government has attained a
substantial advantage over the insurgents, but it may
not have the resources to maintain its present high
level of military activities and civic action. If the
government ultimately proves unable to deliver on its
promises to the Western Highland Indians or to
maintain its highly visible presence in the countryside,
the guerrillas will be in a better position to exploit
disillusionment and reinvigorate their insurgency. De-
cisions by the United States either to provide or to
withhold assistance will be of major importance to the
outcome of events
The Philippine insurgency, although growing, never-
theless may remain at a relatively low level of intensi-
ty for years. We believe that the United States has
adequate time and options to pursue political and
economic initiatives designed to head off the long-
term insurgent threat. However, complacency is un-
warranted because-as demonstrated by the cases of
Batista and Somoza-one-man rule is particularly
vulnerable to a coalition of opposition groups and
unexpectedly rapid insurgent victory.'
' A recent CIA assessment of the overall conditions in the
Philippines concludes that although the Marcos regime is not
immediately threatened, "many ingredients for political instability
are present ... including deteriorating social and economic trends,
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Figure 3
Revised Philippine Estimates of
New People's Army (NPA) Strength, January 1983'
0
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Sea
Southern
Mindanao
a Estimates,of NPA full-time guerrilla strength are based on official
Philippine intelligence reports which tend to underestimate the
problem.
arty of the Philippines.
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Philippine protesters demand
nationalization of "industries
controlled by foreign monopoly
capitalists," call for an end to
arbitrary arrests, and condemn
a "massacre" by government
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Guerrilla violence, however, increased nationally dur-
ing 1982-83, as confirmed by press, liaison, US
Embassy, and official Philippine Government reports.
According to the Philippine Defense Ministry, the
NPA assassinated 142 government officials and civil-
ians during the first six months of 1982. This repre-
sents an increase over the past year, suggesting new
government inability to protect supporters and offi-
cials. Despite this general intensification of violence,
the guerrillas remain highly selective in their assassi-
nations of government supporters or officials, usually
targeting individuals considered by the local populace
as especially corrupt or brutal.
Insurgent propaganda often focuses on the economic
grievances of the people and the weak economy, which
has devastated the real income of the rural populace
(comprising about 70 percent of the national popula-
tion). A major cause of this situation-the drop in
world prices for coconut products, sugar, and other
key agricultural exports-is beyond government con-
trol. However, critics of the Marcos regime charge
that government monopolies and marketing policies
exacerbate the negative impact. Also, many foreign
and Philippine commentators condemn the agrarian
reform program for allowing large landholders to
avoid compliance, while small farmers receive insuffi-
cient technical and financial aid from the government.
The guerrillas have not yet engaged in systematic
sabotage to worsen economic conditions and hasten
demoralization and loss of faith in the government.
Government Coercive Power. The armed forces are
favored by Marcos and are strongly supportive of his
regime. We believe that military coup plotting is
unlikely to occur in the near future, despite a poten-
tially divisive generation gap in the military between
junior and senior officers.'
Military solidarity with the government, though, has
not prevented the steady increase in guerrilla activity
throughout the Philippines. The growing guerrilla
challenge suggests that, although insurgent forces are
not multiplying rapidly, they are gradually gaining
strength and,
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Catholic clergymen-the Church probably is the most
influential social institution in the Philippines-are
becoming more politically active. In both private and
public statements, clergymen have stated that grow-
ing political activism by the Church is a reaction to
the worsening economic situation of the rural popula-
tion and the inability or unwillingness of the Marcos
regime to overcome these difficulties. Many moderate
nuns, priests, and bishops have become openly critical
of the government's social and economic policies.
We believe that this radical fringe, however, poses no
immediate threat to the government; the increasing
anti-Marcos sentiment of mainstream Church opinion
is, in our view, a greater danger.
local government officials are aware of the
growing public disenchantment with the Marcos re-
gime. In recent meetings, these officials conceded that
military abuses-coupled with the government's cor-
ruption, inability to provide adequate services, and
failure to stem worsening economic conditions-are
alienating the populace. They warned that support for
the NPA is growing and that, in free elections for
local officials, NPA-backed candidates would win in a
number of localities.
The insurgents are attempting to blame many of the
nation's ills on the Philippines' economic and political
relationship with the United States. We believe, how-
ever, that they have failed to create an anti-US mood
or to establish themselves as more nationalistic than
the government. Likewise, the insurgents have neither
co-opted nor eliminated other significant opposition to
the government. Marcos's continuing refusal to allow
viable moderate opposition to his regime, nonetheless,
may ultimately force many moderate non-Commu-
nists into an insurgent broad front (as occurred in
Nicaragua and South Vietnam)
International Support for the Government. President
Marcos has been considerably more effective in han-
dling international relations than either his Guatema-
lan or Salvadoran counterparts. Besides maintaining
the support of the United States-his principal for-
eign ally-he has headed off potential problems with
Muslim countries over the domestic Muslim rebellion.
here was no major
during 1982-83.
Government Control Over Population and Territory.
the Communist
insurgents do not yet consider themselves able to
establish complete control over specific areas. Certain
islands, notably Samar, contain regions where govern-
ment administration historically has been tenuous,
and local bandits and guerrillas act with relative
impunity. These areas do not appear to have expanded
during 1982. In certain regions, a situation typical of
prolonged insurgencies seems to be emerging in which
the government rules by day and the guerrillas rule by
night, but this does not signify the complete replace-
ment of government administration required by our
indicator.
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military superiority over the insurgents,
his
that the Marcos regime is generally perceived as
illegitimate. Nevertheless, there are danger signs that,
over the long term, point to an increasingly serious
inability to stem the general deterioration o living
standards is alienating increasing sectors of the popu-
lation. The government is not immediately threat-
ened, but if it fails to arrest this progressive withdraw-
al of domestic support, we believe that the challenge
of the Communist insurgent New People's Army
(NPA) will be strengthened
Domestic Supportfor the Government. On the basis of
diverse sources, we believe that the degree of alien-
ation among critical segments of the population cur-
rently is not strong enough to warrant the conclusion
that a major withdrawal of support is taking place or
' The NPA is the military arm of the clandestine Communist Party
of the Philippines/Marxist-Leninist. We do not deal with the
Muslim Moro insurgency because it is essentially an ethnic rebel-
lion that seeks local autonomy or secession, not national revolution.
threat to the government.
Embassy and press reports suggest that businessmen
are growing restive, in part, because the growth of the
foreign debt and the resulting International Monetary
Fund restrictions are slowing economic activity and
affronting nationalistic sentiments. Prestigious news-
papers regularly publish articles decrying the degen-
eration of the Philippines into a neocolony. However,
US Embassy reporting and contact with the Philip-
pine business community lead us to conclude that
Marcos himself is generally not being held personally
responsible for the sick economy
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over growing Indian support for the creation of local
civilian militias. In their public statements and propa-
ganda leaflets, the guerrillas confirm that they have
set a high priority on destroying this innovative, self-
defense program. The ability of the government to
protect Indian militiamen and their families could be
crucial in determining ultimate victory or defeat in
the Highlands.
The climate of fear and uncertainty produced by
guerrilla violence is having a profound impact on the
national economy. According to Embassy reporting,
agricultural exporters are finding it difficult to secure
adequate financing for the cultivation and harvest of
crops-the basis of the national economy. Key farm
exports of coffee, sugar, bananas, and meat dropped
21 percent in 1982. Tourism, formerly a major source
of income for a wide variety of social groups, has
declined drastically-from $141 million in revenues
in 1980 to an estimated $24.6 million in 1982. The
destruction of roads, bridges, and buses has disrupted
traditional commercial relations between the Indian
peasantry and provincial towns.
Government Coercive Power. The March 1982 mili-
tary coup against the regime of General Lucas and his
fraudulently elected successor, General Guevara-
which ultimately brought Rios Montt to power-has
had both negative and positive consequences for the
government's ability to use coercion. The coup re-
vealed deep divisions within the military establish-
ment potentially detrimental to efficient action
against the guerrillas as well as to the security of the
government. On the positive side, the new regime of
born-again Christian Rios Montt is placing an un-
precedented emphasis on reducing official corruption
and human rights abuses. As a result, international
press accounts and Embassy reporting agree that the
government appears to have emerged from the coup
with greater legitimacy and public support.
be-
tween 1979 and the beginning of 1982, the guerrilla
armed forces multiplied from several hundred to as
many as 4,000. During the latter half of 1982,
the number of armed guerrillas had been reduced
to as few as 2,000. One cause of this apparent
decrease could be the intensified military operations
against guerrilla camps begun under President Lucas
and continued by Rios Montt.
As in El Salvador, the ongoing military offensive is
hampered by a lack of sufficient troops to accomplish
the dual objective of protecting towns and finding and
destroying guerrilla bands. US Embassy and press
reporting indicates that 5,000 veterans and new re-
cruits-raising total troop strength to 22,500-were
called to active service for a special six-month tour of
duty ending in December 1982. Their number was
augmented by the expansion of armed Civilian De-
fense Forces (CDF). During 1983 Army strength has
been maintained at the 1982 level through new
recruitment drives. Nonetheless, we believe that the
number of army troops and armed CDF is still
insufficient to overcome the logistic difficulties posed
by rugged, isolated terrain and a lack of adequate
transportation and communication equipment. Not-
withstanding this deficiency, there has been no serious
suggestion that the government is willing to compro-
mise its authority or negotiate in earnest with the
rebels.
Philippines
In contrast to the situations in El Salvador and
Guatemala, data from the Philippines show a slow but
steady weakening of the government. Although Presi-
dent Ferdinand Marcos continues to enjoy great
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International Support for the Government. Neither
the government nor the insurgents have made major
gains with regard to international support during the
past year. Although the human rights issue had
caused a serious rift between Guatemala and the
United States and a decline in Guatemala's interna-
tional standing, this problem subsided under the new
administrations in Washington and Guatemala City.
Nonetheless; no major increase in support for the
government has materialized. We observed no in-
crease in foreign aid to the insurgents during 1982,
despite their well-organized, worldwide propaganda
of the reverses suffered in the Western Highlands, we
believe that Havana is dissatisfied with the guerrillas'
performance and that the Cubans consider an escala-
tion of guerrilla activity to be counterproductive at
Ithe total
area under insurgent control has decreased during-the
past year. Although certain areas have become a
depopulated no-man's-land, the government has suc-
cessfully established a strong presence in important
Highland communities that a year ago were contested
or controlled by the insurgents.
Even though guerrilla violence has decreased overall,
the rebels have massacred Indian men, women, and
children in Highland villages supporting the Army or
the establishment of civilian militias. Until 1982 the
guerrillas had usually avoided such actions. We be-
lieve that the new insurgent tactics betray a concern
this time.
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Guatemala: Chronology of Significant Events
January 1980 Occupation of Spanish Embassy by leftist radicals and Indian peasants provokes
police attack in which protesters and hostages are killed; Spain breaks diplomatic
relations; international media condemnation of Guatemala grows substantially
February 1980 Guerrilla violence intensifies, highlighted by attacks on Defense Minister and
national police chief.
military capabilities are seriously damaged.
Security forces conduct most successful urban operation to date, seizing extensive
network of ORPA safehouses and arms caches in Guatemala City; ORPA
and large-scale sweeps against insurgent-controlled areas.
Gen. Benedicto Lucas, brother of President Fernando Lucas, is named Army
Chief of Staff and initiates new strategy of more mobility in the western highlands
September 1981 Seeking to regain lost momentum, ORPA stages most spectacular operation to
date; 200 to 300 guerrillas attack and overrun the departmental capital of Solola,
killing the governor.
January 1982 EGP guerrillas attack and overrun the military garrison at San Juan Cotzal,
killing three officers and nine soldiers; this rebel victory apparently goads the
Army into undertaking a systematic campaign to reestablish government author-
ity in that area of the western highlands; Guatemalan guerrillas formally declare
the establishment of the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Union (URNG).
February 1982 The Army announces the formation of three new battalions as part of expanding
March 1982 Gen. Anibal Guevara, handpicked protege of outgoing General Lucas, is elected
President of the republic amidst a general outcry of electoral fraud; Guevara is
ousted by a military coup, and a three-man junta is installed
June 1982
July 1982
September 1982
The junta is dissolved and Gen. Efrain Rios Montt becomes President; amnesty is
offered to the guerrillas.
A formal state of siege is imposed and counterinsurgency efforts against the
guerrillas in Western Highlands are intensified.
Guatemalan social classes and ethnic groups.
A 30-member Council of State is inaugurated with the unprecedented participa-
tion of 10 Indians; this advisory body is designed to give representation to all
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Domestic Support for the Government. Guatemala is
notorious for its political conservatism. Notwithstand-
ing the almost indiscriminate repression by the de-
posed regime of Gen. Fernando Lucas, the most
politically important sectors of society did not em-
brace the revolution.
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Guatemala
The guerrillas in Guatemala have recently suffered
setbacks." Numerous interviews with military person-
nel and civilians in the Western Highlands indicate
that the guerrillas have lost control of certain areas to
the Army, as well as the support of a substantial
number of Highland Indians that formerly provided
them with food, recruits, and intelligence. In certain
respects, however, the conflict in Guatemala is at a
critical stage because the guerrillas are attempting to
thwart innovative counterinsurgency measures being
implemented by the government; the success or fail-
ure of these government measures probably will have
a crucial impact on the course of the insurgency.F_
During 1981 the indicators pointed toward a deterio-
rating situation. In 1982, however, particularly after
the March coup, several indicators changed in favor
' The three main Guatemalan guerrilla groups are the Guerrilla
Army of the Poor (EGP), the Revolutionary Organization of the
People in Arms (ORPA), and the Rebel Armed Forces (FAR).F-
Brig. Gen.
Efrain Rios Montt is eliciting support from such
critical segments as military officers and religious
leaders. Consequently, we conclude that this indicator
is not now present.
Insurgent propaganda has sought unceasingly to por-
tray past and present Guatemalan governments as
tools of US imperialism. On the basis of Guatemalan
press and Embassy reporting, we believe that shrill
accusations of CIA and Green Beret participation in
counterinsurgency have lost credibility within the
country, partly because of the publicly known differ-
ences between Guatemala and the United States over
human rights. Moreover, the relatively favorable dis-
position of the present US administration toward
Guatemala does not include significant military sup-
port. Even more than in El Salvador, the guerrillas
have failed to represent themselves as the true nation-
alists. We believe that government propaganda has
successfully depicted the insurgents as dupes of for-
eign Communists.
The insurgents also have failed to co-opt or eliminate
other groups in opposition to the government. The
strongest political challenge to Rios Montt comes
from political parties of the far right and hardline
military officers who completely repudiate any
thought of collaborating with leftists. Moreover, the
killing of moderate opposition leaders undertaken by
the deposed Lucas regime-which appeared to be
polarizing the country for the guerrillas-has largely
been halted by Rios Montt. Moderate opposition
groups, notably the Christian Democrats, evidently
are still concerned over the possibility of repression
and have not begun to challenge authorities publicly
Nevertheless, we see no signs of significant co-opta-
tion or incorporation of moderates by the revolution-
ary movement, despite the insurgents' international
propaganda efforts
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Figure 2
Guatemala: Major Areas of Guerrilla Activity
Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP)
Rebel Armed Forces (FAR)
Revolutionary Organization of the People in Arms (ORPA)
All areas of guerrilla activity are not shown.
Guerrilla control Is confined to relatively small
areas and is not shown.
North
Pacific Ocean
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
i
Ch~ty~~I5 ~~ )
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Garcia, not Magana, and did not immediately threat-
en civilian rule. CIA and DIA analysts disagree,
however, on the portent of this mutiny for future
stability; CIA analysts believe there is serious under-
lying conflict between various factions in the military.
Reflecting the general loss of insurgent momentum
last year, the size of guerrilla armed forces apparently
remained stagnant during most of 1982. We conclude,
that guerrilla numbers stood at an estimated 4,000 to
5,000 combatants. The current escalation of insurgent
military operations, coupled with doubts within the
US Intelligence Community about whether this repre-
sents greater mobility and effectiveness or a greater
number of guerrillas, has led to a revised estimate of
4,000 to 6,000 combatants. Even if guerrilla force
strength has grown to 6,000, such an increase does not
meet the minimal doubling of manpower required by
the indicator, multiplying guerrilla forces
qualified officers and sufficient funds, as well as the
absence of a national military training program,
probably will hamper any rapid expansion of the
armed forces.'
Despite these military problems, the present govern-
ment seems confident that it will eventually prevail
against the insurgency, and thus far has shown no
willingness to compromise its authority by seriously
negotiating a sharing of power with the rebels. The
political and economic reforms maintained by the
present regime do not represent concessions to the
insurgency. Although some government officials have
publicly stated that they would like to establish a
dialogue with the rebels, we believe that there is a
consensus among rightist hardliners and moderates in
the government to refuse to negotiate a sharing of
power with the insurgents.
' Basic military training varies among the military zones, depending
on local conditions and the directives of the individual zone 25X1
commanders. An integrated national basic training program exists
on paper, but it is not being implemented because of the need to put
recruits into combat as soon as possible. Most receive "on the job"
The 30,000-man Salvadoran military still is too small
to conduct effective military operations throughout
the country, as in the delays in retaking the isolated
town of Perquin in July and again in October 1982,
after it was occupied by the guerrillas. A lack of
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Figure 1
El Salvador: Insurgent Areas
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative
Guatemala
Ahuachapan Cabanadr'
O Insurgent concentration
o Insurgent base camp
- Overland arms route
Government Coercive Power. The Salvadoran military
has demonstrated that longstanding institutional be-
havior can be altered. Despite a liberal period during
the 1960s when the Army backed certain political and
social reforms, the military establishment in general
served to preserve the status quo and uphold the
oligarchy throughout most of this century. Neverthe-
less, since October 1979 the Salvadoran Army has
gradually become the strongest guarantor of socioeco-
nomic reform and democratic innovation in the coun-
try. This change was epitomized by military support
of the 1980-82 junta led by Christian Democratic
0 abet!,// -Yiihted
leader Jose Napoleon Duarte-a victim of blatant
electoral fraud by the Army in 1972. In the intense
political negotiations following the 1982 election, the
Army clearly demonstrated its commitment to accept-
ing civilian rule.
plotting against the Magana regime. The brief, recent
mutiny of an important provincial commander and his
battalion was directed against Army Chief of Staff
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International Support for the Government. The 1981
French-Mexican declaration calling for a negotiated
settlement of the insurgency, coinciding with intense
debates in the United States over human rights
violations by Salvadoran Government forces, threat-
ened a general withdrawal of support for the govern-
ment by critical foreign allies. The 1982 election,
however, dramatically enhanced El Salvador's inter-
national standing and facilitated continued US sup-
port along with new aid from Venezuela and else-
where.
Although we cannot monitor precisely the flow of
Cuban and Nicaraguan military aid to Salvadoran
guerrillas, we believe that the overall strategy calls for
a moderate but sustained level of aid with the volume
of arms shipments fluctuating periodically, depending
on tactical needs. Before the March 1982 election, for
example, the volume of military aid evidently in-
creased, only to decline afterward to its previous level.
Government Control Over Population and Territory.
During 1980 the military' capabilities of the Salvador-
an guerrilla movement steadily improved, and in
January 1981 the insurgents launched a "final offen-
sive" that included countrywide attacks against cities
and military targets. Although that offensive succeed-
ed in attracting great international publicity, it failed
to achieve its two principal goals: the decisive defeat
of government troops and the sparking of a popular
uprising. Subsequently, government military capabili-
ties improved, and until October 1982 the guerrillas
were unable to strengthen their hold on either popula-
Diverse press reports now concur, however, that the
guerrillas have strengthened their military position in
several areas and escalated their attacks on govern-
ment forces. Our intelligence survey of successful,
past insurgencies suggests that it is important to
distinguish between an increase in guerrilla military
operations and an expansion of insurgent-controlled
territory, that is, territory where insurgent adminis-
tration has replaced government administration. On
the basis of sometimes conflicting unclassified and
classified evidence available at this point, we conclude
that, despite the heightened violence, a significant
expansion of insurgent-controlled territory has not
taken place.
Nevertheless, the insurgents have recently proclaimed
a liberated area in northern Morazan Department.
They have maintained a strong presence in that
mountainous area for years, taking advantage of its
isolation from the national capital as well as its
proximity to arms sumggling routes and staging areas
across the adjacent Honduran border. In our view the
proclamation is motivated primarily by propaganda
considerations. A similar situation exists in northern
Chalatenango Department, where the insurgents have
not declared a liberated area. We believe that, if the
military continue to concede control of these areas,
the insurgents may then be in a position to expand
their hold on population and territory in these two
departments.
Despite the overall stalemate, the insurgents are
wreaking havoc on the national economy; the continu-
ous destruction of powerlines, the sabotage of national
transportation and communication networks, and the
burning of vehicles are serious blows that affect all
social classes. The agricultural sector also has suf-
fered significant disruptions in certain regions. A
major result has been the loss of foreign and domestic
investment sorely needed to stimulate economic
growth and provide jobs
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October 1979 Military coup overthrows Gen. Carlos Umberto Romero; coalition junta of
military and moderate leftists declares intention of instituting basic reforms.
January 1980 Moderate leftists abandon the coalition junta en masse; a second junta is created
by an alliance of the military with the Christian Democrats; guerrilla organiza-
tions establish a federation of political front groups, the Revolutionary Coordina-
tor of the Masses (CRM).
March 1980
April 1980
May 1980
November 1980
Christian Democratic leader Jose Napoleon Duarte joins the second junta;
agrarian, banking, and commercial reforms are announced; Archbishop Oscar
Arnulfo Romero is assassinated while celebrating mass in his cathedral.
The Democratic Revolutionary Front (FDR)-a broad front incorporating moder-
ates and radicals into the revolutionary movement-is created; guerrilla warfare
begins in earnest.
Salvadoran guerrilla leaders meet in Havana and create the Unified Revolution-
ary Directorate (DRU).
formally announced.
The top leaders of the FDR are kidnaped and assassinated; establishment of
guerrilla alliance Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) is
January 1981 The FMLN launches a nationwide 'final offensive" which is defeated by
government forces; the United States begins a major military assistance program
for Salvadoran Government.
August 1981 French-Mexican declaration recognizes the insurgents and calls for negotiated
settlement.
March 1982
May 1982
October 1982
Massive turnout for election of new Constituent Assembly, despite widespread
insurgent violence, signifies serious political and psychological blow to the
insurgency; Duarte loses bid to remain in power.
New provisional government is installed; appointment of President Alvaro
Magana underscores military desire to offset conservative influence in the new
Constituent Assembly.
negotiate; Magana refuses.
Guerrillas launch military and political campaign to pressure Magana regime to
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Salvadoran President Magana
and his cabinet distribute land
El Salvador
Although the insurgent Farabundo Marti National
Liberation Movement (FMLN) has escalated violence
significantly in the last four months, current trends in
our indicators do not point to a short-term insurgent
victory. During 1981 indicators in all four categories
were evident in the data, suggesting that the insur-
gents were within a year of victory. Dramatic
changes, including a considerable infusion of US
military, economic, and political support, coupled
with the successful holding of elections, set in motion
a chain of events favoring the government during
much of 1982. The guerrillas have remained a potent
force, however, and are attempting, through height-
ened military operations and international propagan-
da, to turn events to their advantage
Domestic Support for the Government. Between 1972
and 1979 the Salvadoran Government steadily lost
legitimacy with critical segments of the population,
including influential priests, politicians, and the lead-
ers of labor unions and peasant leagues. Reforms
implemented by the military-Christian Democratic
junta during 1980-82 and maintained by the present
regime reversed this process. According to State
Department reporting, the initial doubts of labor and
peasant leaders about the commitment of the Magana
administration to reform have in part been overcome,
and some progress has been made in reconciling
conflicting demands for both greater reform and
retrenchment.
guerrilla movement still has not recovered politically
from the popular repudiation of the insurgency repre-
sented by the massive election turnout. The success of
the election and the resulting increase in the legitima-
cy of the regime indicate that the insurgents have
failed to cast themselves as the only practical alterna-
tive to an unacceptable government. The election also
suggests that the insurgents have failed to establish an
image as the foremost champions of nationalism.
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Table 1
Application of Indicators to Current Insurgencies (1982-83 Data) a
I. Progressive withdrawal of domestic support for the government
Withdrawal of support by specific,
critical segments of population
No (3)
No (2)
No (3)
Growing popular perception
of regime illegitimacy
No (2)
No (2)
No (3)
Popular perception of insurgents as
leading nationalists
No (2)
No (2)
No (3)
Insurgent co-optation, incorporation,
or elimination of other major
opposition groups to the government
No (2)
No (2)
No (3)
II. Progressive withdrawal of international support for the government
Withdrawal of foreign support by
specific, critical allies
No (3)
No (3)
No (1)
Increasing international support for
the insurgents
No (3)
No (3)
No (2)
III. Progressive loss of government control over population and territory
Significant expansion of territory
under insurgent control
No (2)
No (1)
No (3)
Escalation of guerrilla/terrorist
violence
Yes (1)
No (3)
Yes (2)
Increasing inability of government to
protect supporters/officials from attacks
Yes (3)
No (2)
Yes (2)
National economy increasingly weakened
by insurgent activity
Yes (1)
Yes (1)
No (1)
IV. Progressive loss of government coercive power
Military plots or coups against the
government
No (2)
Yes (1)
No (1)
Armed guerrilla forces multiplying in
size
No (2)
No (1)
No (3)
Lack of sufficient government troops
for counterinsurgency
Yes (1)
Yes (2)
No (1)
Government seriously
negotiates sharing of power with rebels
No (2)
No (1)
No (1)
Confidence level of judgments:
(1) High-strong or abundant evidence; data overwhelmingly sup-
ports judgment.
(2) Medium-adequate evidence; contrasting information or con-
flicting trends may exist, but bulk of data supports judgment.
(3) Low-weak or insufficient evidence; although data support
judgments, there is significant conflicting information or evidence of
opposing trends.
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No single indicator can provide conclusive evidence of
a trend favoring an insurgent victory, and all indica-
tors need not be present for a government defeat to be
in progress. For example, three out of the four
indicators in the category concerning loss of govern-
ment coercive power were observed in the final year of
the Rhodesian insurgency; the fourth indicator, mili-
tary plots or coups against the government, never
appeared. Of further significance:
? Although a small number of indicators may be
evident for years before a situation becomes critical,
in general, a majority of indicators in each of the
four categories will be observed only in the last year
of a successful insurgency.
? While insurgencies can remain inconclusive for
many years, they also can take dramatic turns and
progress rapidly from an apparently incipient stage
to final victory. The revolutions that overthrew
Batista and Somoza could have been defined as
incipient two years before victory.
? Because the indicators sometimes appear in the last
two years of a successful insurgency-not just in the
final year-the level of confidence in reaching
conclusions about whether indicators are present is
important for assessing trends. In the final year, the
confidence level generally is higher than in the
preceding year, reflecting a stronger trend and more
obvious evidence from diverse sources (see table in
the appendix).
Although we devote considerable attention in this
study to the progression of events characteristic of the
final stage of successful insurgencies, this progression
is not inevitable. Effective government countermeas-
ures can block the evolution of an insurgency and shift
its momentum. Indeed, the same indicators may be
used in reverse to evaluate the effectiveness of coun-
terinsurgency efforts.
Reports about the Malayan insurgency in the early
1950s, for example, indicated that the government was
beginning to lose control over population and territo-
ry. The insurgents increasingly attacked government
supporters, sabotaged plantations and other economic
targets, and seemed to be expanding their activities
rapidly in certain rural areas. The appeal of the
insurgency to the Chinese segment of the population
threatened to divide the country and undermine the
legitimacy of the government. The situation exhibited
a potential for insurgent victory
Yet effective British countermeasures arrested further
development of the Malayan insurgency. Addressing
the insurgency's interrelated facets with determina-
tion, competent personnel, and adequate funds and
manpower, the government instituted a successful
strategic hamlet program. Civilians were effectively
protected from guerrilla violence, and agriculture was
safeguarded from disruption. At the same time, gov-
ernment political and propaganda initiatives undercut
the insurgents' ethnic appeal, thereby preventing a
violent confrontation between Chinese and Malays.
These measures were a critical complement to a
successful military strategy in which small unit opera-
tions destroyed guerrilla bands or drove them into
uninhabited jungles.
The Malayan example underscores our belief that the
indicators should be used primarily for short- and
medium-term analysis of a current situation, not long-
range projections. Ideally, the indicators would be
applied to data at regular intervals, preferably on a
quarterly basis.
Applying the indicators approach to the Salvadoran,
Guatemalan, and Philippine insurgencies, we con-
clude that none is in a final phase (see table 1). In all
three cases, no indicator shows a significant progres-
sive withdrawal of either domestic or international
support for the government. Furthermore, in no case
is a majority of indicators evidencing a progressive
loss of government coercive power. Only in El Salva-
dor do we see an overall, progressive loss in the
category of government control over population and
territory
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systematically compared raw and finished intelligence
on insurgencies occurring in divergent political, cul-
tural, and military contexts, including Cuba, South
Vietnam, South Yemen, Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), and
Nicaragua. To help distinguish developments peculiar
to the final year of a successful insurgency, we also
examined intelligence reporting on two cases-Ma-
laya (now part of Malaysia) and the Philippines in
1950-53-in which strong guerrilla movements
peaked and then were defeated. To gauge the progres-
sion of events and isolate with greater clarity those
that were most significant near the end, we also
investigated the penultimate year of the five success-
ful insurgencies. Since our intention is to warn of
insurgent victory in a revolution that is a critical
threat to the government, we did not investigate the
early or middle stages of these insurgencies.
To define the last year, or final phase, of an insurgen-
cy, we had to determine the precise moment of
insurgent victory. The dramatic flight of a Batista or
Somoza, immediately followed by the insurgents'
entry into the capital, is only one type of ending.
Acknowledgment of defeat also can be a protracted
process, as in the gradual triumph of the rebels over
the British-backed government in South Yemen. The
end of an insurgency, moreover, is not necessarily the
moment when the guerrillas actually assume national
power; insurgent victory sometimes is the point at
which there is consensus that the government's cause
is lost and the regime decides to negotiate seriously
with the insurgents or a third party. The two-year
periods of the successful insurgencies surveyed were:
? Cuba, December 1956-December 1958
? South Vietnam, March 1963-March 19651
? South Yemen, November 1965-November 1967
? Rhodesia, December 1977-December 1979
? Nicaragua, July 1977-July 1979
2 Although the Vietnamese insurgents did not take power until 10
years later, we include South Vietnam during this period for several
reasons. The Vietnamese National Liberation Front is a model of
modern revolutionary organization, and it is highly useful to
compare and contrast other triumphant guerrilla movements with
it. Even more important for our purposes, trends in 1963-65 favored
the insurgents. In 1964 diverse intelligence reports concluded that
Saigon was progressively losing control over the countryside. In
early 1965 it appeared that Saigon would eventually fall if a major
increase in external assistance were not forthcoming. We use
March 1965 as a cutoff date because thereafter the introduction of
significant US ground forces and large-scale US air attacks against
In deciding which cases to analyze, we focused exclu-
sively on revolutionary insurgencies in which an orga-
nized insurgent movement attempted to overthrow a
government and impose a new social, political, and
economic order. Insurgent or terrorist movements that
were entirely urban based are not considered, nor are
tribal or other insurgencies with limited goals such as
local autonomy or secession. We believe that revolu-
tionary insurgencies generally pose the greatest
threats to US foreign policy interests.
Through our observation of historical cases, we have
discovered a common pattern of behavior and events
as governments battling insurgencies weaken and fall.
This pattern comprises four categories of develop-
ments:
? Progressive withdrawal of domestic support for the
government.
? Progressive withdrawal of international support for
the government.
? Progressive loss of government control over popula-
tion and territory.
? Progressive loss of government coercive power.
These categories include a total of 14 interrelated and
mutually reinforcing indicators of prospective insur-
gent victory (see appendix). The interrelationships and
overlap of the indicators are crucial to our analysis
because, in our view, victory in an insurgency is the
outcome not only of armed violence but also of
economic, political, and social and psychological de-
velopments that are importantly influenced by one
Historically, the indicators have not appeared in any
single order; nor is there clear evidence that one or
several indicators are consistently more important
than others. For these and other reasons, the indica-
tors should not be thought of as determining a specific
outcome. We are not saying, for example, that with-
drawal of foreign support for a government causes
insurgent victory. We have observed, however, that
withdrawal of foreign support by major allies general-
ly occurs during the final year of a successful insur-
gency.
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Late Stage Indicators
of Insurgent Success:
El Salvador, Guatemala,
and the Philippines
The Instability and Insurgency Center, OGI, is pro-
ducing a series of studies in which a set of indicators
is systematically evaluated to provide a degree of
rigor and comprehensiveness to the analysis of politi-
cal instability. The sets of indicators used in the
individual studies vary according to: (1) the time
frame of the study-short term (six months or less),
intermediate term (seven months to two years), or
long term (beyond two years); and (2) whether the
analysis concerns generalized political instability or
one of its subsets, such as militarily organized insur-
gency or regime collapse. In this paper we are con-
cerned with indications that an insurgency will be
successful within one year.
Insurgents can fight inconclusively for decades, but
they also can seize national power within an unexpect-
edly short period. Only three months before Cuban
President Fulgencio Batista's overthrow, for instance,
an intelligence analysis concluded that "at no time ...
has the rebel movement seriously threatened the
Batista regime." Given the speed with which Third
World regimes battling insurgencies can collapse, the
identification of specific warnings or indicators of
insurgent victory is important. We applied 14 indica-
tors of an insurgent victory within one year to the
ongoing insurgencies in El Salvador, Guatemala, and
the Philippines to determine whether any one of these
insurgencies is close to victory. These indicators are
derived from an analysis of five successful insurgen-
cies and two unsuccessful insurgencies
To obtain indicators, we first investigated the unclas-
sified literature on revolutionary insurgencies that
have occurred since 1950. We found that academic
theories and models of successful insurgency typically
are highly general and speculative and often based on
assumptions that are valid in some cases but not in
others. Much recent writing takes as a model the
patient Viet Cong strategy of gradually exerting
control over rural villages and expanding a support
network for prolonged guerrilla war. Indicators of
insurgent success derived solely from the Vietnamese
case, however, are not applicable to insurgencies such
as that of Nicaragua's Sandinistas, who were able to
win without a supportive rural infrastructure. Our
objective is to discover indicators of near-term insur-
gent victory that may be applied systematically to
revolutionary insurgencies, regardless of the particu-
lar strategy being employed.
The unsystematic use of case histories in developing
general indicators is subject to criticisms of selectivity
of data and irrelevance because of changing world
conditions. We believe, however, that a systematic,
comparative examination of a number of divergent
cases, using unclassified and classified data, can
provide a solid foundation for deriving indicators of an
impending insurgent victory. Clearly this approach
cannot yield exact scientific predictions. We believe,
though, that the empirical observation of develop-
ments peculiarly common to the final phase of past
successful insurgencies and relatively absent from
unsuccessful insurgencies is a good basis for assessing
whether a current insurgency is near victory. Not
least, this process makes explicit assumptions and
formalizes criteria that analysts may already be em-
ploying implicitly and unsystematically.
Focusing on the final year of five historically success-
ful insurgencies, we sought to identify specific types of
generally common developments. In retrospect, these
developments-14 in all-constituted warnings of in-
surgent victory.' To avoid the subjectivity and exces-
sive speculation of the unclassified literature, we
appeared in four cases, and three were observed in three cases.
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Key Judgments
The Intelligence Problem
Methodology
The Indicators
Assessment of Current Insurgencies
3
Philippines
14
Implications for US Foreign Policy Interests
19
Indicators of Insurgent Victory
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Late Stage Indicators
of Insurgent Success:
El Salvador, Guatemala,
and the Philippine
Key Judgments Through a detailed study of seven past insurgencies, we have identified a
Information available pattern of common behavior and events that occur in the last year of
as of 10 March 1983 successful insurgencies. Through an analysis of this pattern, we have
was used in this report.
developed 14 indicators, divided into four categories, that are intended to
gauge the prospects for an insurgent victory.
This analytic framework was used to assess the insurgencies in El Salvador,
Guatemala, and the Philippines. We believe-on the basis of applying the
indicators to both open and classified information of the past year-that in
no case are the insurgents close to victory. Trends in the three countries
vary greatly, however:
? Situation Fluid in El Salvador. In all four categories of indicators-
domestic support, international support, control over population and
territory, and coercive power-the government made significant gains
during 1982. The insurgents, however, continue to pose a grave threat.
They have recently stepped up their attacks and strengthened their
military position in several areas.
? Counterinsurgency Progress in Guatemala. The government retains im-
portant advantages in countering the guerrilla war. Moreover, although
guerrilla violence continues, Rios Montt's innovative counterinsurgency
measures have reversed the momentum of the insurgency in favor of the
government. Continued counterinsurgency success will depend, to a large
degree, on the government's financial and administrative ability to
sustain its new programs in the Western Highlands.
? Gradual Expansion of Insurgency in the Philippines. Although President
Ferdinand Marcos continues to enjoy overwhelming military superiority
over the insurgents, domestic support for the government is declining.
Poor economic performance and Marcos's inability to bring about
improvement are contributing to the public's dissatisfaction with the
regime. Exploiting this discontent politically, the insurgents are gradually
escalating the level of violence.
iii Secret
GI 83-10073
March 1983
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+tf`~i E+rp Directorate of secret
Late Stage Indicators
of Insurgent Success:
El Salvador, Guatemala,
and the Philippines
This assessment was prepared by
the Political Instability Branch of the Office of Global
Issues. Comments and queries are welcome and
may be addressed to the Chief, Instability and
Insurgency Center, OGI,
This paper was coordinated with the Directorate of
Operations.
Secret
GI 83-10073
March 1983
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Table 2
Application of Indicators to Past Insurgencies a
Preceding
Year
1. Progressive withdrawal of domestic support
for the government
Withdrawal of support by specific, No (2)
critical segments of population
Growing popular perception Yes (3)
of regime illegitimacy
Popular perception of insurgents No (3)
as leading nationalists
Insurgent co-optation, incorporation or No (2)
elimination of all other major opposition
to the government
IL Progressive withdrawal of international
support for the government
South
Vietnam b
South
Yemen b
Final
Year
Preceding
Year
Final
Year
Preceding
Year
Final
Year
Preceding
Year
Final
Year
Preceding
Year
Final
Year
Yes (2)
Yes (2)
Yes (2)
Yes (2)
Withdrawal of foreign support by No (2) Yes (2)
specific, critical allies
Increasing international support for Yes (3) Yes (1)
the insurgents
III. Progressive loss of government control over
population and territory
Significant expansion of territory No (1) Yes (1)
under insurgent control
Escalation of guerrilla/terrorist Yes (3) Yes (1)
violence
Increasing inability of government to No (2) Yes (3)
protect supporters/official from attacks
National economy increasingly weakened by No (2) Yes (1)
insurgent activity
IV. Progressive loss of government coercive
power
Military plots or coups against the Yes (1) Yes (2)
government
Armed guerrilla forces multiplying in Yes (2) Yes (1)
size
Lack of sufficient government No (1) No (3)
troops for counterinsurgency
Government willing to seriously negotiate No (2) No (3)
sharing of power with rebels
a Confidence level of judgments:
(1) High-strong or abundant evidence; data overwhelmingly
supports judgment.
(2) Medium-adequate evidence; contrasting information or con-
flicting trends may exist, but bulk of data supports judgment.
(3) Low-weak or insufficient evidence; although data support
judgments, there is significant conflicting information or evidence of
opposing trends.
I Inconclusive-evidence is so weak, insufficient, or contradictory
that a useful judgment is not possible.
b Two-year periods surveyed were:
Cuba, Dec 56-Dec 58;
South Vietnam, Mar 63-Mar 65.
South Yemen, Nov 65-Nov 67;
Nicaragua, Jul 77-Jul 79;
Rhodesia, Dec 77-Dec 79;
Applies to black majority of Rhodesian population.
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