CRITICAL INTELLIGENCE PROBLEMS COMMITTEE (CIPC) STUDY ON TERRORISM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84M00395R000600120006-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 1, 2009
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: April 28, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

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NSC Review Complete as Redacted.
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DCI/ICS 82-4222
28 April 1982
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
VIA: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM:
Director, Intelligence Community Staff
SUBJECT: Critical Intelligence PP lems Committee (CIPC)
Study on Terrorism
1. Action Requested: See Paragraph 4. L-1
2. Background: The attached CIPC study (Attachment A) contains, in my
view, valid recommendations and conclusions. These are strikingly similar to
those contained in earlier studies (e.g., the Critical Collection Problems
Committee 1977 Report: Intelligence Activities Against International
Terrorism). While it can be debated why the problems identified in 1977 still
exist, a key factor, I believe, was the lack of aggressive implementation of
the recommendations through an authoritative IC mechanism. The newly created
Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism (IICT) can serve as the IC
vehicle to take action on the recommendations, and I believe strong
encouragement from you would assist the IICT in its efforts. With this in
mind, I have attached a memorandum from you to the Chairman, IICT (Attachment
B).
In a similar vein, aggressive action is needed at the national level to
develop clear policy guidance and procedures for a USG counterterrorism
program upon which all concerned agencies can focus. Paragraph 5 of National
Security Decision Directive #30 (Attachment C) provides that the
Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism (IG/T), chaired by State, should have
responsibility to develop such a program. While this is a step in the right
direction, in all candor, similar efforts have been attempted in the past with
limited success. As far back as 1972 a Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism
(CCCT) was established by Presidential Memorandum. National level
organizational and management issues regarding USG counterterrorism efforts
were addressed in Presidential Review Memorandum/NSC 30 in August 1977. I
believe it would be useful for you to encourage action at the national level
and I have included a memorandum from you to Judge Clark to urge such action
by the IG/T (Attachment D).
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3. Staff Coordination: None required. Actions are based on coordinated
positions derived from the subject CIPC study. 0
4. Recommendations:
A. Approve c~'rcu_lation of the attached study to NFIC for review and
comment.
B. Upon receipt of NFIC views, approve and sign the attached
memoranda. F-I
Attachments: (4)
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21 April 1982
PROPOSALS FOR UPGRADING INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY EFFORTS
DIRECTED AGAINST INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ..................................... i
INTRODUCTION ................................................... 1
PROGRESS SINCE 1977 ............................................ 1
PRESENT ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT ............................ 4
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY CONCERNS AND INFORMATION GAPS........... 7
Concerns .................................................. 7
Gaps ...................................................... 8
CURRENT PRIORITY LEVELS ........................................ 9
COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS ........................................ 10
Analysis .................................................. 21
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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
International terrorism, which is both an intelligence and a
counterintelligence problem, poses a complex collection and analytic challenge
for the Intelligence Community. The numbers and diversity of terrorist
groups, the often sporadic nature and transnational flow of terrorist group
activities, and the worldwide dispersion of terrorist group operational areas,
makes it an elusive target. Because international terrorism is a government-
wide problem, it also poses an equally imposing management challenge--one
which has grown steadily as the Washington counterterrorism network,
particularly the non-intelligence portion of it, has expanded.
The individual departments and agencies of the Intelligence Community are
better equipped today to address the problem of international terrorism than
they were five years ago when the first study of this type was undertaken.
This has been a slow process, however, impeded to a considerable degree both
by organizational shifts in the Community and by inertia with regard to the
management aspects of the problem, the latter fueled by a lack of firm
guidance based on a well-defined national counterterrorism policy. The
increased priorities accorded the problem since 1979, as well as increases in
the threat itself, have fostered organizational shifts that have tended to
focus departmental efforts more on international terrorism and paved the way
for the direction of additional collection and analytic resources against the
problem. Moreover, a wide-ranging series of additional pertinent
enhancements, primarily in the collection arena, are presently either under
way or planned. F1
Despite these improvements, the Community's overall capabilities with
regard to international terrorism remain limited. This is due in large part
to the scope and nature of terrorism itself, but also to some extent to the
fragmented approach the Community continues to take to the problem. To be
sure, collection and analytic problems abound which additional resources, both
manpower and dollars, would alleviate. But there are long-standing questions
of coordination of effort--both within and outside the Community--that should
be resolved first in order to promote improved effectiveness and better use of
existing resources against the terrorism problem. The study group's
recommendations in this regard are outlined below:
A. The-Development of a Mechanism b Which Reporting From Non-
Intelligence Agencies is Routine made Available to the Intelligence
Community. The Community has spent considerable effort devising ways
in which its products can be sanitized for use by non-intelligence
elements of the US Government in support of counterterrorism. Many
of these elements, in carrying out their operational
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responsibilities, obtain information on international terrorist
activities which is not routinely made available to the Community.
Some of this information would probably fill gaps in the Community's
overall understanding of the problem. Resolution of this problem,
should it prove difficult, would be somewhat beyond the control of
the Intelligence Community. Until the promulgation on 10 April 1982
of National Security Decision Directive Number 30, which, inter alia,
establishes a national-level focal point for handling such
organizational issues, there existed no effective, authoritative
central mechanism to bring the intelligence and non-intelligence
elements of the government together to work out mutually supportive
programs such as this. This responsibility apparently now falls
within the purview of the Interdepar tal Group on Terrorism
chaired by the Department of State.
B. Establishment of a Community-wide Program to Exchange Intelligence
Production Plans on Terrorism. The production of comprehensive
studies and assessments of various aspects of the international
terrorist threat is essential to establishment of a sound and uniform
basis for both short-term and long-term US Government decisionmaking
in response to the terrorist problem. The CIPC study group believes
that the timing is right for establishing a formal program to
exchange production plans among Community members. It would provide
a focal point for the diverse terrorism-related production activities
of the Community but still preserve a healthy level of competitive
analysis. Such a program would tend to distribute intelligence
production across the Community to reduce unproductive redundancy and
create a channel for consensus on threat analysis. This program
should be coordinated by the Interagency Intelligence Committee on
Terroris ensure that production plans are geared to policy-level
needs. 7_~
C. Data Base Development. There is a need for early interagency
consideration of the Intelligence Community's overall data base needs
with regard to international terrorism and the degree to which these
needs can be met by common or shared data base facilities. As
Intelligence Community involvement in counterterrorism has grown, and
in the absence of any coordinated Community counterterrorism program,
there has been a proliferation of computerized data bases on
terrorism tailored to support departmental collection and analytic
needs. More are under development. These systems are largely
incompatible, impacting seriously on data sharing with regard to the
terrorism problem. There is general recognition at the working level
that considerable benefit could be derived from access to one
another's data base, or possibly from a computerized Community data
base on terrorism. It is also recognized that important departmental
and legal considerations will have to be addressed carefully in order
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to implement this recommendation.
E. Development of Community Contingency Plans. Little effort has been
devoted to the development of Community contingency plans for
handling either the collection or analytic aspects of a terrorist
event. The Dozier kidnapping pointed up the need for increased
interagency coordination in this area. A logical starting point in
such an effort would be to assign the DCI's Senior Review Panel the
task of doing a post-mortem on the Community's ability to respond to
that event, drawing, inter alia, from the various "lessons-learned"
studies and reviews undertaken by various departments. 0
F. Vigorous Follow-Up With Regard to Items A through E. The recent
establishment by the DCI of an Interagency Intelligence Committee on
Terrorism (IICT) fills a long-standing need for a Community
coordinating body to link together the diverse Community interests
concerning international terrorism. It should be the mechanism
through which the Community pursues items A through E. A major
weakness in past attempts to address similar issues has been lack of
follow-up. The Chairman of the IICT should be charged with reporting
monthly to the DCI, through the DDCI, concerning progress and
problems associated with the above. 7_1
G. Elevation of the DCI's Interagency Intelligence Committee on
Terrorism to the Status of a Permanent Committee of the National
Foreign Intelligence Council. Obtaining Community agreement on a
more coordinated approach to the terrorism problem will be
difficult. Many equities are involved and, despite being
specifically identified in NSDD-30 as the organization responsible
for focusing and coordinating interagency intelligence efforts to
counter terrorist threats, the Committee will not have the authority
to resolve the really "hard" issues. Elevating the IICT's status to
a permanent committee of the NFIC will enhance Community focus on the
problem, and give Committee efforts visibility at the highest levels
of Community management where resolution of the more difficult issues
should ultimately take place. F7
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I I
PROPOSALS FOR UPGRADING INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY EFFORTS
DIRECTED AGAINST INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
INTRODUCTION
In late February 1982, in response to a request from the Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs, the Deputy Director of Central
Intelligence asked the Critical Intelligence Problems Committee (CIPC) to
review the Intelligence Community's present efforts against the problem of
international terrorism and to develop proposals for upgrading these efforts
as appropriate. This study responds to that request. It assesses the
Community's progress in implementing improvements contained in an earlier
study bearing DCI approval, summarizes current strengths and weaknesses in our
present ability to support policymaker interests with regard to international
terrorism, and recommends specific measures that could be taken to further
enhance the Community's ability in this regard.
All NFIC principals with the exception of the Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy and the General Counsel of the Department of Commerce were
represented in Committee deliberations. The three Collection Offices of the
Intelligence Community Staff also participated in the study.
PROGRESS SINCE 1977
The Intelligence Community has studied the problem of international
terrorism in considerable detail over the past five years. The common theme
of such efforts has been that, although terrorism poses a complex collection
and analytical challenge for the Community, it poses an equally challenging
management problem for the US Government--one which has grown steadily as the
Washington counterterrorism network has expanded and as Agencies which
formerly had no stake in the business of counterterrorism are now very much
involved. International terrorism is both a foreign intelligence and a
counterintelligence responsibility. It is also an area in which foreign
aspects can have direct and serious repercussions in the domestic sphere,
especially on matters of concern to US agencies with protective security, law
enforcement, or regulatory responsibilities. F-1
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A baseline study of intelligence activities directed against the
terrorism problem was undertaken in 1277 by the DCI's interagency Critical
Collection Problems Committee (CCPC). It found the Community's effort
against international terrorism to be ". . . a fragmented one, neither tightly
organized nor closely coordinated in either its collection or analytical
aspects." According to the CCPC study, a more coordinated Community approach
would: provide much needed focus to departmental programs; promote better
organization of Community resources involved; enable rationalization of the
Community's work efforts; yield a better and more useful product at both
departmental and national levels; and result in improved and more
comprehensive support to US Government efforts to combat international
Progress toward achievement of these goals over the past five years has
been uneven at best, frustrated at the outset by internal Intelligence
Community events. Central to the course of action recommended by the CCPC in
1977 was the establishment under the CCPC of an interagency subcommittee on
terrorism devoted to addressing the most serious of the weaknesses identified
in the study. Though established in 1977, the subcommittee's efforts were cut
short by the formation of the National Collection Planning Office (NCPO) in
1978, an element of the then newly reorganized Intelligence Community Staff.
The NCPO charter was similar to that of the CCPC and the latter--which then
the DCI through the Collection Tasking Staff element of the IC Staff--
was viewed as redundant and soon became moribund. Although it was recommended
at the time that the CCPC subcommittee on terrorism be kept intact and report
directly to the DCI, deliberations concerning its fVture were clouded by the
delay in formally disestablishing the parent CCPC, and the subcommittee
withered from neglert~The NCPO had no dedicated effort directed against the
terrorism problem.
Factors external to the intelligence process contributed to the inertia
induced by the withering of the CCPC subcommittee on terrorism, thus providing
a further impediment to the establishment of the desired Community approach to
the problem. International terrorism is a government-wide problem. While
intelligence support is central to any successful counterterrorism effort, the
quality of such support is affected directly by the extent of cooperation and
coordination attained with the many non-intelligence elements of the US
Government having vested interests in--and the ability to report on--the
problem. There was during this period no effective, authoritative, central
mechanism to give national direction to an overall counterterrorism program
* Intelligence Activities Against International Terrorism, CCPC-D-3/77
June 1977.
** The CCPC was formally disestablished in December 1981.
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and bring the intelligence and non-intelligence elements of the government
together to work out mutually supportive programs. With no one focusing on
the management aspects of the problem at the national level, there was little
impetus to focus on them at the Community level, particularly prior to 1980
when international terror' still a relatively low-priority item for the
Intelligence Community.
In addition, there was during the period continued focusing of
policymaker attention on the crisis management and foreign policy aspects of
the terrorism problem almost to the exclusion of consideration of the need for
the establishment and maintenance of a credible threat assessment capability.
With policymaker attention thus riveted, there developed within the
Intelligence Community a perception of a lack of national-level concern with,
and policy for, a comprehensive US counter-terrorism program. This
perception, coupled with the low priority accorded the terrorism problem until
1979, resulted in limited resources being applied to the problem, and the
intelligence effort continued to be largely event-oriented and reactive in
nature. As a result, in the absence of a Community focus on the threat
assessment aspects of the terrorism problem, Intelligence Community
organizations tended to go their individual ways in development of
counterterrorism capabilities tailored to support for the most part
departmental needs. The scope and nature of terrorism--the numbers and
diversity of terrorism groups, the often sporadic nature and transnational
flow of terrorist group activities, and the worldwide geographical dispersion
of terrorist group operational areas--makes such an unfocused approach against
an inherently difficult target less than efficient and effective.
Some of the problems identified in the 1977 study have, of course, been
tackled successfully. Several legal issues relating to Intelligence Community
collection of intelligence information concerning international terrorism
identified in the 1977 CCPC study were examined by a panel of representatives
from the appropriate departments and agencies. By and large, those issues
were based upon ambiguities in the Executive Order and guideline provisions
that governed US intelligence activities at that time, as well as the then
uncertain application of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Acts. Since
that time, there have been two revisions of the Executive Order and its
implementing procedures and guidelines, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court has been created by law to authorize electronic surveillance for
intelligence purposes in the US, the Government's understanding of and ability
to deal with the requirements of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Acts
has much improved, and the Classified Information Procedures Act and various
agreements and understandings have been developed to regulate the handling and
use of intelligence information in law enforcement investigations and
proceedings. There are still rough points in existing implementing procedures
and these are being considered in the revision process that is now under
way. As a consequence of these developments, while the Constitution and
relevant statutes impose outside limits on the extent to which the
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Intelligence Community may collect and disseminate information by certain
techniques in particular circumstances, legal issues now appear to be of less
concern. Many of the legal considerations that were perceived to be
impediments have now been res and the adverse impact of those that remain
seems capable of resolution. 71"~
In addition, international terrorism assumed a much more prominent place
in the DCID 1/2 priorities listing, and since 1979 the priorities accorded the
problem increased substantially. Guidance to field collection elements also
underwent considerable improvement, and CIA initiated a conscientious effort
to reduce to the extent possible the tight controls on clandestinely acquired
information in order to provide wider dissemination to non-agency elements
coned with terrorism. Some basic data base improvements also were made.
PRESENT ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT
National Security Decision Directive Number 30, dated 10 April 1982, in
addition to establishing a national-level mechanism for managing individual
terrorist incidents, specifically identifies the Interdepartmental Group on
Terrorism (IG/T), chaired by the Department of State, as the national-level
organization responsible for developing overall US policy with regard to
international terrorism.* The IG/T presently consists of representatives from
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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D. C. 20505
DCI/ICS 82-4223
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, Interagency Intelligence Committee
on Terrorism
SUBJECT: Intelligence Community Counterterrorism Planning
REFERENCE: CIPC Study on Terrorism
- Attached
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1. The recommendations contained in the attached study are approved. I
look to your Committee to undertake the necessary action 'nitiate their
implementation, monitor progress, and keep me informed.
2. As an initial step, I request the preparation of an action plan for
implementing each of the first five recommendations (A thru E). The plans
should specifically indicate the responsibilities of the participating
agencies and include milestones for implementing actions. I would like to
review the action plans by 30 July 1982 and receive monthly progress reports
thereafter. The Committe be expected to provide a review of its overall
progress after one year.
3. Concerning the elevation of the IICT to the status of a permanent
committee of the NFIC (Recommendation G), I would like to review a draft DCID
in this regard as soon as possible. You should work out the details of this
with the Executive Secretary of the NFIC. F7
Attachment:
a/s
William J. Casey
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THE WHITE HOUSE
SECRET
r1EI.10RANTDUM FOR THE SECRETARYIOFNSTATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
THE DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION
THE DIRECTOR, FEDERAL EMERGENCY
MANAGEMENT AGENCY
SUBJECT: Managing Terrorism Incidents
The President has formally approved the attached National
Security Decision Directive on Managing Terrorism Incidents.
In order to ensure that the Terrorism Incident Working Group
is fully capable of executing its function, the group will
meet formally for the first time on April 20 at 2:00 p.m. in
room 305-of the Old Executive Office Building. Each agency
should identify a representative who can be called upon to
serve on the Terrorism Incident Working Group and who will be'
present at the meeting on April 20. Names should be presented
in writing by April 16 to Chris Shoemaker, NSC Staff.
FOR THE PRESIDENT:
William P. Clark
Attachment: NSDD 30
April 10, 1982
L 82_4#29
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SECRET April 10, 1982
NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION
DIRECTIVE NUMBER 30
MANAGING TERRORIST INCIDENTS
The United States is committed, as a matter of national policy,
to oppose terrorism domestically and internationally.
Efficient and effective management of terrorist incidents
is crucial to this commitment. Successful management of
terrorist incidents requires a rapid, effective response,
immediate access to institutional expertise, and extensive.
prior planning. Because of these requirements,
management of terrorist incidents of duration will be handled
in the following manner:
(1) Responsibilities. If the gravity of a terrorist incident
situation warrants, the Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs, at the direction of the Vice
President, will convene the Special Situation Group (SSG)
to advise the President with respect to decision options
on _appropriate policies and actions.
(2) The Lead Agency. The coordination of federal response to
terrorist incidents will normally be the responsibility of
the Lead Agency. The Lead Agency will be that agency with
the most direct operational role in dealing with the
particular terrorist incident at hand. it will coordinate
all operational aspects of the incident, including press
and intelligence. The Lead Agency will normally be:
The State Department, for international terrorist
incidents that take place outside of US territory.
The Department of Justice for terrorist incidents
which take place within US territory. Unless
otherwise specified by the Attorney General, the FBI
will be the Lead Agency within the Department of
Justice for operational response to such incidents.
The FAA for highjackings within the special jurisdiction
of the United States. {
The Federal Emergency Management Agency will be responsible for
planning for and managing the public health aspects of a
terrorist incident and recovery from the consequences of such
incidents.
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Review on 10 April 1988
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z-c istant to the President for National Security Affairs
11 resolve any uncertainty on ?the designation of the Lead
agency or on agency responsibilities.
(3)
The Terrorist Incident t?:orking_Group. To support the
Special Situation Group, a Terrorist Incident Working Group
(TIWG) will be established. This group will consist of
representatives from State, the DCI, DOD, FBI, FEMA and the
NSC staff, with 'augmentation from other agencies, as
required. The TIWG will be activated by the Assistant to
the President for National Security Affairs. It will be
chaired by a senior representative from the NSC staff.
The purpose of the TIWG is to provide the SSG with direct
operational support, to ensure interagency coordination,
and to provide advice and recommendations during an incident.
The Lead Agency will continue to manage the incident under
the direction and coordination of the TIWG and the SSG.
(4) The Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism. The
Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism (IG/T), chaired by
the Department of State, will be responsible for the
development of overall US policy on terrorism, including,
.Ln.ten atLa, policy directives, organizational issues, -
legislative initiatives, and interagency training programs.
(5) White House Operations Group. The White House Operations
Group, chaired by the Director of the White House Military
Off-ice, will have responsibility-for issues relating to
threats or acts of terrorism directed against the President
or the Vice President or senior US officials and protectees
as directed by the President. The NSC staff will effect
liaison between this group and the IG/T and TIWG.
(6) The Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism. The
Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism, chaired by
the DCI, will provide intelligence support to the SSG and
the TIWG. It will focus and coordinate interagency
intelligence cffforts to counter terrorist threats. In
anticipation of terrorist incidents, the Committee will
concentrate on threat alerts, trend assessments, and
required procedural improvements, such as more rapid
dissemination of critical information.-
(7) Planning'and Exercises. In order to ensure effective
management of terrorism incidents, prior planning and
exercise activity are essential. The Interdepartmental
Group on Terrorism will be the primary mechanism within
the US Government for planning and policy recommendations.
To ensure the development of an effective, coordinated
interagency exercise program, the Chairman of the IG/T
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appoint an Exercise Coc-nittee which will coordinate
"'will ,
nu t- ]'-Year e>:erc; se program and
_ _- -'r ?
r
i
review all multiple agency CounteLterrorADM
comittee will assure that the 'government's
i
s
Th
counterterrorism capabilities are maintained in a high
state of readiness and that duplication of exercises is
avoided. No multiple agency exercise at the national
level may be held without the recommendation of the IG/T
and the approval of the Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs.
This National Security Decision Directive supersedes all
previous inconsistent directives and instructions on managing
terrorism incidents.
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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington. D. C. 20505
DCI/ICS 82-4224
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable William P. Clark
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
SUBJECT: USG Counterterrorism Efforts
1. In an interim report to you on 22 March I provided a description of
Intelligence Community efforts to date against international terrorism, and I
indicated that a more detailed review of Intelligence Community activities
regarding this problem was being undertaken. The attached study by the
Critical Intelligence Problems Committee (CIPC) forwards the results of that
review. F__1
2. It is apparent from the candid conclusions and recommendations in the
CIPC study that the Intelligence Community can improve its efforts against
international terrorism in several areas through some management initiatives
and without significant shifts in available resources. I have taken steps to
implement the recommendations in the study and I will keep you informed of our
progress.
3. The study also notes a perceived lack of firm guidance for
intelligence in support of a well-defined national counterterrorism policy.
The manner in which the overall USG counterterrorism program is orchestrated
and managed of course has an impact upon the development and scope of the
intelligence support role. Though I welcome NSDD #30 (Managing Terrorism
Incidents) as a positive attempt to further clarify lines of authority and
jurisdiction at the national level, I strongly urge that the Interdepartmental
Group on Terrorism (IG/T) be charged to develop within a short time frame
clear policy guidance, procedures, and a general management architecture on
this subject for implementation by involved agencies.
William J. Casey
Attachment:
a/s
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2009/05/01: CIA-RDP84M00395R000600120006-7