WEST AFRICA: PATTERNS AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE ISLAMIC REVIVAL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83S00855R000200010003-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 9, 2010
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: November 1, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
West Africa:
Patterns and Implications
of the Islamic Revival
Secret
ALA 82-10136
November 1982
Copy
217
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
West Africa:
Patterns and Implications
of the Islamic Revival
This paper was prepared b_ ' f the
Office of African and Latin American Analysis.
It was coordinated with the National Intelligence
Council and the Directorate of Operations. Comments
and queries are welcome and may be addressed to
the Chief, West-East Africa Division, ALA, on
Secret
ALA 82-10136
November 1982
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Secret
Overview
Information available
as of 15 October 1982
was used in this report.
of the Islamic Revival
West Africa:
Patterns and Implications
In our judgment, over the past 10 years there has been an increase in politi-
cal activity by Islamic groups and a significant increase in Islamic
consciousness among West Africa's approximately 60 million Muslims.
This has manifested itself particularly in Nigeria and Senegal through
changes in government foreign policies, a rising level of domestic violence,
and a proliferation of Muslim groups, ranging from those that support
present governments to those that reject West Africa's state system and its
leaders. We conclude that this resurgence of Islam, facilitated by the
effective missionary efforts of modern Islamic organizations, is benefiting
from increased urban migration and the related breakdown of other
A
25X
traditional institutions.) Islam is expanding --
rapidly into regions and among social groups that have previously ignored
or resisted it.
Saudis have had the paramount foreign role in the revival.
Both Saudis and Libyans have been involved in the West African Islamic
revival, primarily in the support of its fundamentalist aspects. The Saudis
support Islamic groups that are politically conservative but fundamentalist
in that they seek strict adherence to Islamic law and custom. The Libyans,
by contrast, fund radical fundamentalist groups whose political objectives 25X1
are primarily to promote regional political destabilization. Thus far, the
revival springs primarily from Saudi fundamentalism. In addition, Saudi25X1
influence is extended by millions of dollars each year in financial support.
In our view, the political impact of West African Islam has been limited
thus far by factionalism. Different groups respond to conflicting needs and
attempt to impose religious and political priorities on each other. Only a
few Islamic organizations have reached across social, ethnic, and regional
lines to play an important role in local or national politics. None has
succeeded in forming a significant international political following, and the
evidence does not indicate the emergence in the foreseeable future of an
"Ayatollah" to lead a regional political revolution.
Still, we believe that Muslim elitist voluntary associations, key fundamen-
talist organizations-both conservative and radical-and, to a lesser
extent, Islamic brotherhood groups will become increasingly involved in the
local politics of the region. The riots in Kano, Nigeria, in 1980 by radical
fundamentalists and increasing political activity by Islamic groups in
Senegal and Nigeria suggest a more activist role by West African
Muslims.
Secret
ALA 82-10136
November 1982
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Of most concern to West African governments, we believe, are the
developing radical fundamentalist groups, whose hostility to established
political and religious institutions has attracted Tripoli's attention and
support. These groups consist of such alienated elements as the urban
unemployed and radical students, who seek simple, often violent solutions
to the virtually intractable problems of West African societies. These
fundamentalists have been responsible for numerous short-lived violent
confrontations with local authorities in northern Nigeria.
We believe that over the next two or three years, the present Islamic revival
will not threaten either regional stability or West Africa's relations with
the West. The governments of the moderate secular states of the region are
in control of their Muslim populations, and the current Muslim leader-
ship-recruited from traditional, business, and government elites-is for
the most part hostile to Communist and Libyan interference in the region.
Beyond the mid-1980s, however, we believe a significant increase in
political activity by radical Islamic groups could affect not only local
political stability but also US relations with West Africa. Although a
government with Muslim leadership does not necessarily dictate Islamic
policies to its people, those states with predominantly Muslim populations
will find it increasingly difficult to resist pressures for a greater variety of
Islamic projects and institutions, such as a national Islamic court-
argument over which almost disrupted Nigeria's transition to civilian rule
in 1979-and state-supported Muslim schools. Yielding to such pressures,
however, risks reopening longstanding ethnic and religious jealousies and
provoking political violence.
Although Islamic regimes are not necessarily anti-Western, we believe the
emergence of a strong, regional fundamentalist Islamic movement-
whether politically conservative or radical-could also have important
implications for relations with the United States. For example, in Nigeria,
where the movement is strongest, we project that the growing influence of
religiously conservative Islam is likely over the long run to incline a
Muslim-dominated government to pursue policies that are less friendly to
the West. At the same time, we expect that some of today's militant
Islamic groups will eventually succeed in placing in positions of political
influence members with pronounced anti-Western prejudices. These biases
could complicate the degree of support Washington receives from Nigeria
and other African governments in international forums and for US
initiatives on regional and wider African issues.
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Evidence to date suggests that the Soviets, in the next two to three years,
will not be able to develop close ties with radical Muslim groups in West
Africa. Islamic leaders in Africa are offended by the Soviet intervention in
Afghanistan, and, like conservative Islamic leaders in the Near East, fear
Communist ideology in general. Over the longer term, however, we expect
the susceptibility of these groups to Soviet influence will increase, particu-
larly if there is a general growth in political instability in the area and if
the Soviets pay more attention to disaffected elements. We also believe
that, by being a source of instability, these groups indirectly serve Soviet
aims.
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Extent of Libyan Success
5
West African Islamic Groups
6
Voluntary Associations
10
Fundamentalist Groups
11
Radical Student Organizations
13
West African Islam and Regional Stability
13
Selected West African Islamic Groups
17
1. Senegal: Population Distribution
3. Nigeria: Muslim Distribution
4. West Africa: Muslim Distribution (foldout)
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West Africa:
Patterns and Implications
of the Islamic Revival
The Islamic Revival
In our judgment, the recent worldwide trend toward
increased political activity by Islamic fundamentalist
groups-marked by the revolution in Iran, the seizure
of the Grand Mosque in Mecca, religious riots in
Egypt, and the assassination of Anwar Sadat by
Muslim fundamentalists in the Egyptian Army-has
been paralleled by a significant increase in Islamic
consciousness through much of West Africa.' At a
time when other religions and political ideologies are
faltering in their missionary efforts, numerous aca-
demic studies and US Embassy reports show that
Islam is expanding rapidly. This expansion is encour-
aged by a flow of rural populations into cities where
Islam often replaces the traditional ties and patterns
of belief that are lost when people leave the land.
Embassy reporting indicates that Senegal's largest
Muslim brotherhood,' the Muridiya, for example, has
tripled since the 1960s from half a million members to
a million and a half members, with young people who
had previously rejected Islam and Muslims who were
indifferent believers joining up. West African Mus-
lims today number nearly 60 million or 38 percent of
the total population of the region.
In conversations with senior US officials, several
West African leaders have indicated their awareness
of rising Islamic consciousness in the region and its
political implications. This concern has been sharp-
ened by the willingness of Arab petroleum producers
to use their oil and money to obtain international
support on issues important to the Islamic world. A
number of sources indicate that Islam had little
influence on national policies in West Africa until the
rapid expansion of financial and political activities by
Arab oil producers and the impact of Arab-Islamic
and Khomeini.'
During the 1960s, for example, all states in the region
had diplomatic relations with Israel, received techni-
cal assistance from it, and generally supported Israeli
positions in the United Nations and the Organization
of African Unity. All the governments were secular,
and although some heads of state were nominally
Muslim, none played an important role in the world
Islamic community. By the early 1980s, however,
Islamic influence in West Africa clearly was on the
rise, in our judgment. All regional governments had
severed relations with Israel in response to Arab
pressure during or following the 1973 Arab-Israeli
war. West African political leaders, particularly
Sekou Toure of Guinea, Abdou Diouf of Senegal, and
Seyni Kountche of Niger, now travel frequently
throughout the Muslim world and have become highly
visible at international Islamic conferences. Niger
hosted the recent Islamic Foreign Ministers' Confer-
ence, the first such meeting that has been held in 25X1
West Africa.
In addition, the internal political climate of some
West African states is changing in response to the
growing strength of the Muslim community, accord-
ing to academic and government sources. We note
that West African leaders are facing a rising level of
violence associated with Muslim activity whether
their Muslim populations are large or small. In 1980
the French press reported an outbreak of rioting in the
relatively quiescent Islamic community in Freetown,
Sierra Leone, and an attack on police by villagers in
northern Cameroon despite tight government control
over the Islamic community. During the last two
' In this paper, West Africa includes Benin, Cameroon, Cape
Verde, Chad, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory
Coast, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra
Leone, Togo, and Upper Volta. See foldout map, figure 4, page 21.
(u)
' A Muslim brotherhood is a religious order whose followers are
' The nationalistic legacy of late Egyptian President Nasser was,
and continues to be, foremost among these external influences.
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years, fundamentalists among Senegal's highly orga-
nized and conservative Muslims have called for a
revolution, to be followed by the establishment of an
Islamic state. Press reports indicate that sporadic
intra-Muslim violence in Nigeria-which in Decem-
ber 1980 reached a peak in religious rioting in Kano,
the largest Muslim city in West Africa-has taken
thousands of lives over the last two years.
Press and US Embassy sources report that the rising
influence of Islam has spawned a proliferation of
Muslim groups through West Africa, ranging in
political orientation from voluntary associations that
support present governments to radical student groups
that reject West Africa's state system and its leaders.
We find these groups growing in numbers and influ-
ence and seeking international support for their pro-
grams from Muslim sources in North Africa and the
Middle East.
In our judgment, the West African region over the
long term probably will see an amplification of pres-
ent trends, characterized by increasing conversion to
Islam, government policies somewhat more influenced
by the interests of national and international Islamic
interest groups, and increasing use of Arab sources of
funding for both secular and religious institutions.
There will be greater demands on West Africa's
governments for economic support and for constitu-
tional approval of a variety of Muslim institutions like
Islamic courts and national ministries for Islamic
affairs
We do not expect much alteration in these trends even
in the unlikely event that Arab aid declines signifi-
cantly because of reduced oil revenues. The funda-
mentalist groups are embracing religious and political
issues that will probably continue to appeal to the
region's disadvantaged people even in the absence of
Arab money.
Arab Involvement
Saudi Arabia, as the fount of Islam and the site of
Mecca, has traditionally played a principal role in
fostering the self-awareness of West African Mus-
lims. In recent years, Libyan leader Qadhafi's politi-
cally radical fundamentalism has attracted many
among the younger generation, who seek dynamic but
simple answers to West Africa's growing economic,
social, and political problems. Because both leader-
ship and money are lacking or are scarce among
regional Muslim groups, the influence of Saudi Ara-
bia and Libya on West Africa's Islamic revival has
dwarfed that of all other Arab and non-Arab Muslim
countries. The kind and degree of impact that the
Islamic revival will have in the long term on the
governments and established elites of the area depend
largely on which of the two Arab influences-Saudi
or Libyan-becomes dominant
The Saudi Presence. Saudi Arabia has played the
principal foreign role in the Islamic revival in West
Africa. According to the testimony of members of the
West African Muslim community, as well as a num-
ber of academic and press sources, the roots of West
Africa's fundamentalist theology lie in Saudi Arabia;
the yearly pilgrimage to Mecca brings thousands of
West Africans into contact with Saudi fundamental-
ism. We believe that the Saudis seek to promote a
strictly conservative position on political as well as on
religious issues in West Africa.
In our view Saudi Arabia's extensive effort to support,
and increase its influence with, Islamic groups in
West Africa is in part designed to counter Libya's
activity. According to our estimates, Saudi aid-more
than $280 million in bilateral disbursements since
1974-far exceeds what the Libyans have provided.'
Riyadh also has been instrumental in setting up
trusts, voluntary associations, banks, and investment
groups. Evidence leads us to conclude that, in general,
the Saudis support groups whose leadership is sympa-
thetic to moderate African regimes and to Saudi
foreign policies. In Nigeria, for example, US Embassy
sources report that the Saudis use the Islamic Trust,
an association of leading political and commercial
' We estimate that of the $1 billion annually that the Saudis
provide through multilateral sources, about 20 percent goes to Sub-
Saharan Africa. We are unable to estimate how much of this goes
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figures who are close associates of President Shagari,
to provide millions of dollars for projects benefiting
the Islamic community. In Mali the Saudis directly
support the "Islamic Reform Movement," an associa-
tion of wealthy businessmen that is active in educa-
tion and social services. Similarly, in Niger the Saudis
channel assistance through "The Islamic Association"
that the Nigerien Government uses to unify the
Islamic community and protect it from Libyan sub-
version.
The Saudis have supported the Society for the Victory
of Islam (Jama'atul Nasril Islam) in Nigeria, which
draws its following from among young intellectuals
and civil servants. The Society works for the purifica-
tion of Islamic practices, directly condemning the
traditional Islamic brotherhoods for their mysticism,
saint worship, and acceptance of traditional pagan
superstitions. The JNI has obtained government ap-
proval to license Muslim preachers-and has the final
word on who may go on the pilgrimage to Mecca-
throughout many of Nigeria's federal states. The JNI
leadership also administers aid programs related to
the Muslim community and programs for disaster
relief, such as support for Chadian refugees in the
north. They have suggested the establishment of a
national ministry of religious affairs to coordinate
religious activities in the country
Saudi influence in West Africa was illustrated last
April when Riyadh called for the African Islamic
community to demonstrate unity over an attack on
Muslims in Jerusalem. US Embassy reports indicate
that in response the Malian Government and all
Islamic institutions in Nigeria closed for a day. We
conclude that Riyadh potentially could also use this
leverage to gain the support of West African Muslims
on Middle East or other international issues of inter-
est to Saudi Arabia
Qadha's Methods. US Embassy reporting through-
out the region indicates that Libya is taking advan-
tage of the Islamic revival to expand its political
influence south of the Sahara. Libyan leader Qadhafi
has openly encouraged Islamic groups in the ethnical-
ly complex populations of such countries as Mali to
agitate for secession. In our judgment, he wants
countries with a Muslim majority such as Nigeria to
eliminate the constitutional separation of church and
state as part of his plan for a trans-Saharan state 25X1
T ?L_._
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We believe that, as Egypt's Nasser did before him,
Qadhafi has used Islamic congresses and other inter-
national gatherings-such as the recently aborted
summit of the Organization of African Unity, and the
Islamic Committee for Economic, Cultural, and So-
cial Affairs, which met in January 1982 in Tripoli-to
impress his ideas of Arab/African unity and the 25X1
political role of Islam upon West African Muslim
According to US Embassy and academic sources, the
Nigerian Government fears that Qadhafi wants to
destabilize the country's Muslim north and encourage
the activities of radical fundamentalist groups such as
the followers of Maitasine Marwa (sometimes re-
ferred to as Yan Izalla), a revolutionary Islamic group
based in Kano and responsible for the Kano riots in
December 1980 that the government estimated tool25X1
several thousand lives. At the time, Nigeria expelled
all Libyan Embassy officials in the belief that Libyan
agents were involved in the 1980 disturbances. Later,
the Nigerians announced that no evidence of Libyan
involvement had been found. Kano has a long-
established settlement of ethnic Libyans that, at the
time of the riots, included the family of Libya's
Ambassador to Nigeria. Reliable US Embassy
sources indicate that at one time Libya also provided
funds to the People's Redemption Party, a radical
Islamic populist party that has won elections in the
States of Kano and Kaduna in Nigeria's Muslim 25X1
US Embassy reports indicate that elsewhere in West
Africa Qadhafi has used radiobroadcasts to appeal to
separatist sentiments among Tuareg and Toubou
Muslims in Niger and has supported fundamentalist
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Academic studies indicate that Qadhafi has given his
own cast to Islamic reform, reinterpreting the Koran
and redefining most Islamic law (Shari'a). The Islam-
ic revolution and state organization that he envisages
go far beyond the Koran, combining Islam with
socialism and Qadhafi's own idiosyncratic theories of
social organization and economics. Arab nationalism
is also a basic element in Qadhafi's ideology, and
Arabs would dominate the trans-Saharan Islamic
state he plans to create in Africa.
These theories are laid out in Qadhaft's Green Book,
which was inspired in title and content by Mao's
writings. Qadhofi has broadened the Shari'a to in-
clude customary law and aspects of Western law as
they apply to constitutional, procedural, criminal,
contract, commercial, and other law. He excludes the
bulk of Koranic law and custom developed by Islamic
scholars since Muhammad, discarding backward in-
stitutions such as slavery and concubinage and sub-
stituting his personal insights for traditional scholar-
ship as a source of authority. Qadhaft uses the Koran
only as it applies to strictly religious matters, such as
personal morality and ethics.
Qadhafi suggests that the future pan-Islamic state is
to be controlled by the masses through cell-like
popular committees with only a minor role for the
leader. Private wealth will be assumed by the state,
which will distribute it to the people in the form of
subsidies and social welfare projects. The people will
depend upon the central government for all their
basic needs.
Qadhafi has undertaken the role of supreme inter-
preter of Islam with a high estimation of his own
intellectual gifts and, according to academic studies,
seems to be evolving a mystical conviction that his is
a supernatural inspiration. He believes that his
"Third International Theory, " which unlike Marx-
ism has left a role for religion, will ultimately replace
all other ideologies.
There are many precedents in West Africa for initiat-
ing political change under the banner of religious
revival and reform. During the 19th century, militant
Muslim leaders, still revered as national heroes,
founded a series of theocratic states that upset estab-
lished patterns of rule throughout the region. In a
number of states, the independence movement of the
early and mid-20th century was closely allied with
elements of the Islamic community. Nasser remains
the prototypical Islamic nationalist for many West
African Muslims. Qadhaft has yet to sell himself as
Nasser's successor. Although his vision may seem
self-serving and illogical, our judgment is that his
philosophy appeals to many in West Africa who are
dissatisfied with economic privation, corruption, and
inequality and who seek easy solutions to their
problems.
extremism in Senegal. According to reports in the
French press, he has financed organizations like the
"Grouping of Democrats" led by Medina Soum-
bounou, a Mali national now living in Tripoli, which
promotes an "Islamic Coast Union" of Togo, Benin,
and Mali. Long before Tripoli's military intervention
in Chad in 1980, Libyan propaganda focused on the
subjection of Chad's Islamic northern tribes by black
non-Muslims of the south
We believe that most of Qadhafi's aid to the West
African Muslim community has been carefully tar-
geted for propaganda purposes. He volunteered to
build the central mosque in Niamey, offered 40
scholarships for Muslim students to President Toure
of Guinea, and provided training in Libya for a few
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highly visible fundamentalist radicals from Senegal.
In Benin the Libyans are building mosques and
providing Islamic/Arabic teachers, cash gifts, schol-
arships for study in Tripoli, and subsidies for religious
leaders. A department of Arabic studies is being
funded at the National University of Benin. We
estimate that Qadhafi disbursed $55 million between
1974 and 1980 in concessional aid to West African
governments and has given further assistance to indi-
vidual Islamic groups through the Libyan Arab For-
eign Bank. However, US Government observers have
found that expected Libyan funding for West African
Islamic groups often fails to materialize because
Qadhafi's policy emphasizes symbolic gestures with
maximum political visibility rather than supplying
large sums of money for more generalized assistance.
In our judgment, Libyan propaganda holds the great-
est attraction for the radical Islamic groups, which
are fervently opposed to modernization and to West-
ern values. Pronouncements by various radical leaders
indicate a desire to turn the clock back to a world
ruled by the fundamental precepts of the Koran and a
narrow interpretation of the Islamic code of law
(Shari'a). On the basis of their present performance,
these organizations probably will have the capability
of provoking conflict and violence within the Islamic
community
Extent of Libyan Success. It is our judgment that the
spread of militant Islam and Libyan influence has
been uneven. Deteriorating economic conditions have
prompted leaders of many West African states to
express to US officials growing anxiety over the
extent of domestic unrest and the potential for height-
ened Libyan interference in the internal affairs of the
region. To date, this fear of what might happen is
more significant than the impact of what has actually
occurred.
Statements by many West African Muslims indicate
that they view Qadhafi with caution, seeing him as
one in a series of North African Islamic intruders
who, as early as the 11th century, entered the region
only to be followed by soldiers, slave raiders, and the
like. Indeed, for West Africans, Islam has often been
associated with military conquest from the north and
with Arab racism. Memories of such events are still
fresh in the minds of peoples living near the Sahara,
including the Wolof in Senegal, the Bambara in Mali,
and the Djerma in Niger. There has been little if any
counterpenetration of Sub-Saharan culture into
North Africa, and we find that frequently a mutual
lack of understanding, dislike, and even disdain have
been the result. Nigerian Muslims, in particular, have
expressed to US officials resentment over the patron-
izing attitude of the Libyans toward Nigeria's creden-
tials as a major power in the international Islamic
community. We do not believe that this antipathy hn-
been substantially changed by participation in the 25X1
OAU, by talk of African unity, or by admiration of
North Africa's Nasser for his antiimperialist rhetoric
Reporting suggests that not every group or individual
accepting Libyan funding has, by any means, adopted
an active, or even supportive, role in Qadhafi's plans.
According to Embassy reporting, in 1973 Qadhafi
provided $3.5 million for the presidential campaign of
a Muslim candidate, Sangoule Lamizana, in Upper
Volta on condition that he work actively to create an
Islamic republic there. The candidate won, but the
plan was never realized. By the end of the 1970s,
President Lamizana was turning down Libyan de~25X1
opment aid because a significant portion of it was
being directed to Islamic projects such as schools and
religious institutions rather than for more important
economic and social programs. The President also
believed that the country's growing Muslim communi-
ty was becoming a political threat, a view shared by
the military. 25X1
Nevertheless, we believe that Qadhafi has met with
some success in his attempt to establish a foothold
among Muslims in West Africa. Embassy reporting
indicates that in Upper Volta, despite poor relations
between the military government and Libya, the 25X1
Libyan Mission in Ouagadougou is providing clandes-
tine financial support to the Islamic community and
im rovin Libyan cultural ro rams.
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League for the Elimination of Heresy, supported by
Libya, has spread rapidly in the last five years to
become the largest fundamentalist group in Nigeria.
The league has called publicly for the removal of
Nigerian Government leaders and has frequently
engaged in violence and confrontation with local
government authorities. Reliable US Embassy sources
within the Islamic community report the group is
spreading its doctrine along northern Nigerian trad-
ing routes into nearby countries like Mali, Niger, and
Benin. It is our judgment that if the Libyans could use
the league and other radical fundamentalist groups to
exploit economic and ethnic dissatisfactions the ensu-
ing violence could, over the longer term, endanger the
stability of several West African states
West African Islamic Groups
The Muslim community in West Africa with which
Saudi Arabia and Libya interact is divided into many
disparate local groups, each with its own leadership
and organizational structure.' Although some of the
larger Islamic organizations in West Africa-such as
the Muslim brotherhoods and the northern Nigerian
fundamentalist network-cut across social, ethnic,
and regional lines, in our view few of them have
succeeded in fully overcoming these divisions or in
crossing national boundaries. The groups are typically
defined by or organized around their leaders, the
occupation of their members, or their interpretation of
Islamic tradition. These organizations often respond
to different political stimuli, reflecting the sometimes
conflicting needs of peasants, small businessmen,
mystics, the elite, and the disestablished, rootless, and
volatile fringes of society
We find that the strength and nature of the particular
Islamic beliefs manifested by these groups often vary
along the generational lines of their adherents:
? The oldest generation of orthodox fundamental-
ists-who for the most part are no longer politically
active-tends to reject modernization and insists on
literal observance of the Koran as a prescription for
modern life.
? The middle-aged, Westernized reformers wish to
adapt Islam to the needs of the 20th century, while
the younger and more self-confident Islamic activ-
ists urge a mutual exchange between modern prac-
tice and traditional faith.
? The youngest and most radical tend to turn back to
the orthodoxy of the oldest generation and insist
again that society follow the dictates of the Koran.
The Islamic Brotherhoods. Numerous academic stud-
ies indicate that membership in either traditional or
reformed branches of the Muslim brotherhoods is one
of the most common forms of Islamic affiliation in 25X1
West Africa. Today, the brotherhoods furnish much
of the social fabric of rural life, providing social ties
for their members and education for their children.
They are organized into small groups of disciples
bound by personal loyalty to a teacher with a reputa-
tion for piety. The brotherhoods for the most part
preach a soothing, popular form of Islamic (Sufi)
mysticism.
Some groups represent particular ethnic interests. The
Muridiya Brotherhood in Senegal has actively sup-
ported Wolof tribal nationalism, although US Embas-
sy reporting indicates that its membership is now
broadening to include other ethnic groups. The
Qadiriya Brotherhood in northern Nigeria is dominat-
ed by the traditional Fulani tribal aristocracy, while
southern Muslims from the Yoruba tribe belong
primarily to the Ahmadiya Islamic group. Local
observers report that the rest of the West African
Islamic community, together with the Saudis, has
succeeded in barring the Ahmadiya from participat-
ing in the pilgrimage to Mecca because of its liberal
mix of Christian and Islamic practice and its worship
of the group's Pakistani founder, Ahmad, as a prophet
equal to Muhammad.
The Qadiriya Brotherhood, named after `Abd al-
Qadir al-Jilani of Baghdad who died in 1166, estab-
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lished itself peacefully along West Africa's principal
trade routes several centuries ago. It achieved its
greatest political influence in the 19th century, when
the Fulani religious thinker and political-military
leader, Usman dan Fodio, conquered the Hausa
States north of the Niger River. Traditional state
(emirate) structures established at that time continue
today within the northern states of Nigeria, and
traditional leaders there still follow Qadiriya doctrine.
Sokoto State in northern Nigeria is the center of
Qadiriya activity under the leadership of the Sultan
and is the home of Nigerian President Shagari. In our
judgment the brotherhood continues to support the
traditional, joint Hausa-Fulani leadership of Sokoto
State that has dominated the northern region.F_~
Academic sources show, however, that since the late
19th century the Qadiriya has been steadily losing
ground in West Africa to the Tganiya Brotherhood,
named for Ahmad al-Tijani, a Moroccan cleric who
died in 1815. The Tijaniya spread rapidly after the
Torodo (Fulani) warrior-leader Al-haj Umar founded
an Islamic state on the Senegal River with political
ties extending as far as the Niger. The brotherhood's
strong missionary effort and appeal to those leaders
seeking to break the power of traditional Qadiriya
authorities, such as the Sultan of Sokoto, have pro-
duced a marked increase in Tijani membership
throughout West Africa over the last 30 years. Ac-
cording to various US Embassy sources, a majority of
West African Muslims now belong to the Tijaniya
Brotherhood's largely autonomous national branches.
During the 20th century the brotherhoods have split
into subgroups largely because of pressures from
younger members for greater political influence. In
Nigeria, for example, conversations between local
observers and US officials indicate that the reformed
Tijaniya, led by young activist reformers under the
former Emir of Kano, Mohammadu Sanusi, has
achieved considerable political influence in Kano
State in the north because of its support for Aminu
Kano's faction of the People's Redemption Party
(PRP). Insistence by Tijaniya reformers on establish-
ing a federal Islamic court of appeals nearly caused
the collapse of the Constituent Assembly, elected in
1978 to draw up Nigeria's blueprint for civilian rule.
The Muridiya, a brotherhood founded in Senegal
early in this century, has attracted a majority of the
Islamic population there, according to US Embassy
reports. It has built up a formidable financial empire
in Senegal based on the commercialization of the
peanut trade and a shrewd investment of the brother-
hood's communal assets. Its members come mainly
from the peasantry, but US Embassy sources report
that university students and young intellectuals are
now joining as a rebellious gesture against both
modernization and their parents' Tijaniya affiliations.
25X1
US Embassy reports also indicate that the Muridiya
has undertaken an active political role in Senegal
under the leadership of Lahat Mbacke. Mbacke 25X1
claims to speak for all Senegalese members of the
Muridiya (1.5 million out of the total estimated
population of 4.5 million); Embassy sources report
that he is expanding his personal power. These same
sources believe that the Senegalese Government con-
sults the Muridiya on most issues of internal policy
and often is responsive to its views. Dakar, for exam-
ple, gave in to Muride pressure in the 1960s to
withdraw a tariff on the peanut crop, the principal
agricultural product of the Muride peasantry. Last
year the government backed away from community
development projects in Muride areas where social
and institutional change is seen as a threat to the
special privileges Muride leaders receive from their 25X1
peasant followers. Brotherhood leaders successfully
imposed their control on agricultural cooperatives in
the peanut-growing regions and have manipulated the
cooperatives' assets for their personal profit
We estimate that the influence of the Muridiya in 25X1
Senegalese political life probably will increase even
more during the tenure of the current President,
Abdou Diouf, a Tijani who pays careful attention to
the interests of both brotherhoods. He has promoted
cooperation between the brotherhoods and cultivated
Muride ties in what the US Embassy believes is an
attempt to avoid suspicions of favoritism toward the
Tijaniya. He also has exploited his position as an
Islamic leader; for example, he took a major role in
the proceedings at last year's Islamic Conference at
Jidda 25X1
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Figure 1
SENEGAL
Population Distribution
With its economy in disarray, we believe that Senegal
is ill-prepared to meet Muride demands for larger
shares of a diminishing economic pie. The restoration
during the late 1970s of a multiparty system in
Senegal has offered the brotherhood's leaders (mara-
bouts) many possibilities for political maneuvering,
but US Embassy sources expect them generally-to
support President Diouf in the 1983 elections
Persons per sq. kilometer
L Less than 10
10 to 20
20 to 50
50 to 100
100 to 1,000
Senegalese officials have expressed concern that dete-
riorating economic conditions would provide the
Libyans an opportunity to establish a foothold in the
country's mass-membership Islamic groups. There
have been indications in the French press that Libyan
money may be funding some Muride activities, al-
though the brotherhood denies this. In 1979, Ahmad
Niasse, the son of the founder of a small branch of the
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Figure 2
SENEGAL
Distribution of Islamic Brotherhoods
Tijaniya Brotherhood
less
over than
Tijaniya based in the Senegalese town of Kaolack,
attempted to establish a Libyan-backed political party
with a platform calling for an Islamic revolution in
Senegal. His group was immediately banned by the
government and he fled to Tripoli. He later returned
to Senegal and was disavowed by his Libyan support-
ers, who saw him as a barrier to relations with the
Senegalese Government.
In our view, the Islamic brotherhoods enjoy consider-
able political influence, particularly in Senegal, be-
cause of their size, their role as spokesmen for special
interest groups, and their newfound interest in cooper-
ating with each other. Until the early 1970s tensions
within the West African Muslim community resulted
mainly from efforts by the brotherhoods to recruit
members from each other's ranks. Recently, however,
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local US Embassy observers have remarked that the
brotherhoods have drawn together to resist newer-
and radical-Islamic groups that are siphoning off
large numbers of recruits. We believe that over the
long term the future of the brotherhoods depends
more on internal dynamics, particularly the emer-
gence of dynamic leaders, than on the availability of
foreign funds
Voluntary Associations. The Islamic voluntary associ-
ations are more politically significant than the broth-
erhoods mainly because of the personal wealth and
political connections of their leaders. Groups such as
the Union for Islamic Progress in Senegal, the Mus-
lim Cultural Center in Ivory Coast, and the Islamic
Trust in Nigeria draw upon privileged interest groups
with powerful political ties and access to international
sources of funding. US Embassy and academic
sources indicate that the internal organization of the
associations is fairly sophisticated-including execu-
tive boards and specialized committees for religious
affairs, estates, youth, and education. Branches in
major urban centers are common.
Academic studies indicate membership of the volun-
tary associations usually includes European-educated
professionals and government, military, and religious
leaders who have accepted modern Western practices
and who use the associations for mutual benefit and
cooperation. The groups also draw on plantation
farmers, successful businessmen, and those who con-
trol internal transportation networks. Members' Is-
lamic credentials usually include a trip to Mecca and
an elementary Koranic school education. Their dedi-
cation to the finer points of doctrine is often minimal,
and many drink alcoholic beverages openly, smoke,
and fail to observe the required fasts. Their prestige,
however, is enhanced by the title Alhaji-denoting
completion of a pilgrimage to Mecca-and by mem-
bership in an Islamic organization.
The associations secure money from a number of
Arab sources and invest it in projects of value to the
Islamic community such as mosques and schools.
According to US Embassy sources, Saudi Arabia and
Libya have each provided funding for association
projects in their competition for influence in West
Africa.
Islamic Trust in Nigeria-which includes a number
of senior government officials and close associates of
President Shagari-solicited funds from Libya for a
Muslim newspaper. The request was made even
though most of the group's support has come from
Saudi Arabia-some $13.8 million a year during the
1970s, according to our estimate. It is our judgment
that although the trust and other voluntary associa-
tions in West Africa-such as the Islamic Association
of Niger and the Islamic Cultural Association of
Cameroon-will take money from any willing Arab 25X1
donor, their conservative leadership tends to look to
the Saudis for guidance.
levels of government
in Nigeria, for example, the "Kaduna Mafia," an
elite group of business, political, and military leaders
in the important regional center of Kaduna, plays an
important role in the Islamic Trust. Founded by the
spiritual leader of Islam in northern Nigeria, Alhaji
Abubakar Gumi, the trust leadership includes Minis-
ter of Agriculture Adamu Ciroma, former Minister of
Internal Affairs Iya Abubakar, and the former man-
aging director of the newspaper New Nigerian, Ma-
man Daura. In addition, the mafia has maneuvered
promising young men into positions of power and acts
as an informal advisory group to Nigeria's President.
Although relations between the voluntary associations
and the traditional brotherhoods are generally cor-
rect, there is little
rapport between them because their purposes general-
ly diverge. The brotherhoods are oriented toward the
peasantry, while the associations provide a forum for
commercial and political elites. The latter are also
more involved in social welfare projects. We believe,
however, that both the brotherhoods and the associa-
tions, particularly in Nigeria, have united against
what they view as a growing threat to their political
and economic position by the militant fundamental-
ists.
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a network of Islamic organiza-
tions has gathered around Alhaji Abubakar Gumi, a
Muslim lawyer and preacher at the Kaduna city
mosque. These same sources claim that he is the first
West African Islamic figure to see the possibilities of
a radio and television ministry. The program
"Abubakar Gumi's Call" has attracted a wide fol-
lowing among young government workers and profes-
sionals, students, peasants, and the urban unem-
ployed, as well as members of the highest government
circles. Local observers believe that Gumi has estab-
lished himself as the intellectual and spiritual leader
of most of the principal fundamentalist groups in
Nigeria today.
Embassy reporting indicates that Gumi has a broad
range of political connections: the leader of the
north's principal opposition party, Aminu Kano, calls
Gumi his "teacher, " and President Shagari has sent
him as his personal representative abroad. In the
1960s when the Arabs began to invest in African
Muslim causes, Gumi succeeded, according to US
Embassy reports, in making himself the principal
distributor of Saudi largesse in Nigeria. With this
money he has sponsored a number of groups and
causes within the country.
The groups that Abubakar Gumi leads are varied in
purpose and political orientation, and in our judg-
ment their respect for Gumi and their identification
Fundamentalist Groups. The fundamentalist groups
range in size from small cell-like organizations to
groups with memberships in the thousands. We be-
lieve that these groups, regardless of their political
bent, are forging an increasingly important place for
themselves within West Africa's Islamic community.
Whether influenced by Saudi Arabia or courted by
Libya, they have adopted political roles that are often
25X1
with Islam are their only common bonds. Embassy
sources report that these groups include the Society
for the Victory of Islam and the Islamic Trust, which
support the government; the League for the Elimina-
tion of Heresy, which is critical of the government
and prone to violence; and the radical Muslim Stu-
dent Society, which calls for revolution and the
formation of an Islamic state.
Gumi himself publicly supports a unified Nigeria
governed through the present federal system. He
publicly advocates the establishment of a ministry of
religious affairs to regulate the three principal reli-
gious denominations in Nigeria (Muslim, Christian,
and Animist) and has registered his support for
government control of Muslim preachers. According
to US Embassy reporting, Gumi acts as a brake on
the more aggressive radical elements in the Nigerian
fundamentalist movement by publicly advising the
league and students to avoid violence in their deal-
ings with the government and other religious groups.
Embassy sources believe Abubakar Gumi wishes to
expand his influence as he broadens his following.
Through the league, he now has the opportunity to
transcend Nigeria's borders. He is in his sixties,
however, has many enemies among the traditional
ruling elite particularly in Kano, a center of the
Tijaniya Brotherhood-and the groups he attracts
lack cohesion.
hostile to established national regimes and traditional
elites. Academic studies and US Embassy reports
indicate that the alienation and isolation of these
groups from the centers of power create internal
solidarity, while their simple, otherworldly solutions
to complex problems strike a responsive chord among
the urban poor and radical students.
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In their public statements, the fundamentalists, often
called Wahabi, uphold an inflexible and puritanical
form of Islam, and in cases reject modernity and
Westernization as heretical innovations. The funda-
mentalists' denunciation of the brotherhoods and oth-
er groups as un-Islamic has provoked violence be-
tween orthodox and reformed Muslims that reached
its most serious proportions in 1980 with the riot in
Kano, Nigeria, and brief clashes in Ivory Coast,
Upper Volta, Sierra Leone, and other West African
countries. Even in Senegal, highly organized as it is
into strong Islamic brotherhoods, there is a small but
flourishing fundamentalist movement that is active in
Dakar and in surrounding villages.
In our view, the fundamentalist appeal lies in the
broad popular dissatisfactions among urban West
African Muslims with overcrowding and poverty. A
Nigerian Government inquiry showed that the follow-
ers of one leader, Maitatsine Marwa, used this discon-
tent to incite the Kano riot. In return for shelter and
food, these disciples-primarily rural migrants-sup-
ported Marwa's militant radicalism, rejecting modern
innovation and ownership of personal property and
attacking other Muslims as unbelievers. By 1980
Marwa had 10,000 followers in Kano and in other
areas of northern Nigeria.
In addition to attacking other Muslims, the funda-
mentalists have caused problems for West Africa's
secular governments by publicly criticizing them for
inefficiency, corruption, and Westernization. The
League for the Elimination of Heresy, with several
thousand supporters the largest fundamentalist group
in Nigeria, is one of the most radical of the Muslim
organizations and has close ties to Libya, according to
Embassy sources. Its public pronouncements have
focused on such religious and political issues as the
right to preach without government supervision, offi-
cial corruption, and the need to impeach Nigeria's
President. Informed members of the northern Nigeri-
an Islamic community say that the group is trying to
expand along Hausa trader networks through Upper
Volta, Ivory Coast, and Mali. The US Embassy in
Benin reports that the league has already established
a branch there with the help of funds from the Libyan
Government.
Secret 12
The term Wahabi, used for many West African
fundamentalist groups, comes from the name of an
Islamic revival and "purercation" that originated
some 200 years ago in Saudi Arabia. Academic
studies indicate Wahabi reform was imported from
the Middle East to West Africa during the colonial
period and was seen as a threat to political stability
by the traditional leaders of the Islamic brother-
hoods and by the colonial authorities. The French 25X1
systematically sought to stamp out the movement,
which identified itself politically with radical parties
such as the African Party of Independence in Senegal.
In West Africa, Wahabi fundamentalists oppose
Western cultural ideals introduced since the begin-
ning of the colonial period. They urge strict obser-
vance of fasting and the pilgrimage, and prohibit
smoking, drinking, and any mixture of Islamic ritual
with animist superstitions. They emphasize the unity
of religion and politics. They insist on the need to
enforce Muslim law, to purify (Islamicize) the state,
and to fight corruption. Non-Muslims are tolerated
but are not permitted to control the public life of the
Muslim community.
The Wahabi maintain a strict and narrow definition
of who is Muslim. For example, according to US
Embassy sources, Nigerian President Shagari, who
belongs to the Qadiriya Brotherhood, is viewed by
fundamentalists in northern Nigeria as a "bad"
Muslim because of his ties with the brotherhood and
his support for a secular, pluralistic state. They
maintain he should be removed from office by the
Islamic community, constitutionally or otherwise.
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Radical Student Organizations. According to the
press and US Embassy reports, the fundamentalist
challenge to West Africa's secular governments has
been joined in some states in recent years by radical
Muslim students who advocate a complete reorgani-
zation of national politics and society. Some of these
student and faculty groups, particularly in northern
Nigeria, represent an extreme anti-Western-and
anti-Christian-fringe of contemporary Islam. US
Embassy sources indicate these groups are trying to
extend their influence into the Islamic community as
a whole and have attracted the attention and support
of Libya and other radical foreign elements. At least
some students have received scholarships to Libyan
universities, and many returnees tell of military train-
ing for students who are encouraged to pursue anti-
government activities after returning home.
In April 1982, according to press reports, members of
the Nigerian Muslim Student Society and the funda-
mentalist League for the Elimination of Heresy joined
to occupy the central mosque in Bauchi State as a
gesture in condemnation of the traditional brother-
hoods, which they consider "un-Islamic." The inci-
dent involved the largest clash between police and
Muslim militants since the riots in the city of Kano in
December 1980. We believe that the takeover also
marked the first time that campus and off-campus
groups have worked so closely together in an antigov-
ernment demonstration. Local officials have indicated
rising concern that such cooperation will hamper their
ability to control student unrest as they have in the
past by closing the universities for extended periods.
We believe that the government's failure to rein in
these radical student groups will almost certainly lead
to an escalation of violence and antigovernment activ-
ity within the Islamic community.
religious change.
moving West Africa's Muslims from a force that is
apolitical to one that advocates radical political and
West African Islam and Regional Stability
Islamic history documents that whenever Islam served
as a catalyst for political reform, a single leader has
emerged from within the community to channel its
energies into revolutionary activity, military conquest,
and the imposition of Islamic law. In our judgment,
the present Muslim revival in West Africa has yet to
produce such a figure or an issue capable of overcom-
ing the ideological and ethnic divisions between exist-
ing fundamentalist groups or between Muslims divid-
ed by modern nation state boundaries. Nor, in the
short term, are these divisions likely to be overcome
and significant Muslim political cohesion achieved by
the appeal of one or the other of the now-competing
external influences-conservative Saudi and radical
Libyan. In the long term, however, we believe that if
networks such as that established by Abubakar Gumi
or organizations with the dynamic appeal of the 25X1
League for the Elimination of Heresy continue to
grow, they could become an important factor in 25X1
Nigeria and Senegal appear to us to be the West 25X1
African states where Muslim political activities have
the most visibility and the greatest potential for
unrest. Senegal's Islamic majority is organized within
the predominant Muridiya and Tijaniya brother-
hoods, and we believe that maintaining a careful
balance between the two groups is essential to the
country's political stability. Competition between
them strengthens the government's position, while the
government relies on brotherhood leaders for social
control. We believe this balance is now being threat-
ened by the Muridiya's economic success, growing
membership, and desire for political dominance. Sene-
gal's poor economic prospects suggest to us that
Dakar will be unable to fulfill the economic expecta-
tions of Muridiya members and that the brother-
hood's leaders could use their financial power to
challenge government policies.
In contrast to Senegal's highly organized Islamic
community, Nigeria's Muslim institutions exhibit
many of the same untidy characteristics that define
the country's exuberant political life. According to
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less than 10
10-30
30-50
50-70
70-90
over 90
Selected state
boundary
nv Selected tribe
0 100 Kilometers
l
0 100 Miles
NIGERIA
Muslim Distribution
US Embassy reports, the radical fundamentalists are
growing in numbers and could-if the growth contin-
ues-become a threat over the long term to the
stability of the north, where Nigeria's Muslim popula-
tion is concentrated. In our view the Kano riots by
followers of the Maitatsine Marwa symbolize-more
than any other development in recent years-the
importance of the Islamic revival. Although Embassy
reporting indicates that Nigeria's more aggressive
Islamic elements are too divided to mount a national
political challenge any time soon, we believe that any
significant further increase in Muslim self-awareness
will probably lead to stronger northern political and
religious demands on the central government. Such a
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development could eventually undermine the delicate
spirit of cooperation between the Muslim north and
the non-Muslim southern and central ethnic groups
that has sustained the Nigerian Government.
Embassy reports indicate that governments in other
West African countries-Cameroon, Mali, and Ni-
ger-already face ethnic and religious problems and
could be threatened by a politicized Islamic move-
ment. In our judgment, Qadhafi will continue his
efforts to use Islam as a means of ideological and
political access to the region. The model of revolution
he portrays in his Green Book and the example of his
own career have great attraction for Muslims living in
countries where corrupt and inefficient governments
are failing to keep national economies afloat or to
fulfill their promises to the people. However, we
expect that his ability to translate this sympathy of
views into influence within the West African Islamic
community will be limited by suspicion of his motives
among Africans, by local government vigilance, and
by Qadhafi's own financial problems, which affect his
ability to provide assistance.
US Interests
In our judgment, a highly politicized Islamic move-
ment could have important consequences for US
interests in West Africa. We believe that at least
some of today's radical Islamic groups will eventually
place in positions of political leadership members with
strong anti-US prejudices. An increased radical Is-
lamic presence could enhance Libyan opportunities to
destabilize various moderate, pro-Western govern-
ments-in Senegal, Niger, Cameroon, and Nigeria-
and could undermine the support Washington receives
from them on African and on international issues. In
addition, Washington's continued access to such re-
sources as Nigerian oil and the sophisticated telecom-
munications facilities in Liberia will be tested.
Of particular concern is the question of how Nigeria
will exercise its regional role should Islamic influence
increase within the government. Lagos has long had
pretensions to leadership in West Africa and in recent
years has generally supported Washington's African
policies. We judge that Nigeria's willingness to con-
tinue this support could be undermined by a signifi-
cant radical Islamic presence in the government that
might force Lagos into a more hardline position on
issues of importance to Washington, like the timetable
for majority rule in Namibia
Another potentially worrisome development for the
United States, in our view, is the involvement of West
African Islam in Middle Eastern problems. Local
observers report that Saudi money is financing the
voluntary associations and other fundamentalist
groups and that they in turn toe the Saudi line on a
variety of issues. We anticipate that Riyadh would not
hesitate to call on them for support-verbal or other-
wise-in any dispute with Washington over Israeli
actions in the Middle East. We believe that Saudi-
backed groups are particularly influential in Nigeria.
25X1
In our judgment, the Soviets will attempt to benefit
from any general increase in instability in the region.
We believe, however, that Moscow's ability to develop
close ties with radical Muslims is limited by Islamic
antipathy toward Communism and by Muslim objec-25X1
tions to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. We
know of no Islamic group within West Africa that
accepts Soviet assistance or advocates close ties to the
Soviet Union. We believe that the USSR might,
however, profit from the instability that could be
created by Libyan aid to such groups.
We believe that, in the short term, the efforts of the
Soviets to enhance their influence in the region also
will be limited by the dissatisfaction of several West
African Islamic leaders over the paucity and quality
of Moscow's assistance. Nigeria has kept Moscow at
some distance, in part because of an unsatisfactory
Soviet military aid program that has resulted in
numerous aircraft and other equipment failures.
Guinea's President Toure, for many years one of 25X1
Moscow's strongest African supporters, is seeking
economic assistance from the United States and other
Western governments while criticizing the Soviets for
their refusal to be more understanding of Conakry's
financial difficulties. Other governments that cite
Moscow's weak economic assistance as the primary
reason for turning back toward somewhat closer
relations with the West include Benin, Guinea-Bissau,
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Nevertheless, higher levels of instability resulting
from Libyan machinations in the region could open
more opportunities to the Soviets to influence the
Muslim community, particularly if Moscow targets
militant revolutionary groups like the Muslim student
associations or the League for the Elimination of
Heresy, for significant support. Moscow would also
benefit from the Muslim revival if it threatens West
Africa's moderate secular governments.
Developments related to the Islamic revival could-if
they materialized-lead to greater instability in the
region and jeopardize the ability of some governments
to remain in power:
? A dramatic increase in violence between Muslim
groups or between Muslims and Christians at the
time of major political transitions, such as elections
next year in Nigeria and in Senegal. The Society for
the Victory of Islam, nominally a moderate Muslim
group, has already called for a holy struggle (jihad)
to register Nigeria's Muslim voters and give them
paramilitary training in preparation for the 1983
elections.
? The fielding of candidates for national office by
Muslim religious groups, such as the Muridiya of
Senegal or the League for the Elimination of Her-
esy, which could lead to a struggle along religious
lines for political supremacy.
? Indications that militant Islamic groups are orga-
nizing across national boundaries to enlist Muslim
communities in neighboring states in joint political
action.
? Evidence of sustained intergroup cooperation at the
national level by Muslim organizations, such as that
which has occurred sporadically between student
and off-campus fundamentalist groups in northern
Nigeria.
? Expanding contacts involving West African Mus-
lims, Libyans, and Iranians, and the inability of
individual West African governments to resist such
activities.
? Increased activism by West African Islamic leaders
in international Muslim organizations on behalf of
Arab causes that conflict with US positions.
We believe that, in the short term at least, lack of
leadership, existing factionalism, and conflicting eth-
nic, social, religious, and regional interests will pre-
vent West Africa's Islamic groups from becoming a
threat either to the region's stability or its relations 25X1
with the West. Nonetheless, each development out-
lined above could come about from an intensification
of present trends
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Appendix
Selected West African
Islamic Groups
Nigeria
Qadiriya
Traditional branch
(population:
Brotherhood
The group's approximately 800,000 members are under the leadership of the
82.3 million;
Sultan of Sokoto. Membership consists largely of Fulani tribesmen of Sokoto
50 percent Muslim)
State and is scattered throughout Sokoto, Kaduna, Kano, Bauchi, and parts of
the Middle Belt. President Shehu Shagari belongs to the group that supports
the ruling National Party of Nigeria (NPN).
Reformed branch
The multiethnic, mass-participation group of some 9.5 million is based in Kano
State.
Tijaniya
Traditional branch
Brotherhood
Consists of about 1.9 million of the Fulani-Hausa tribesmen in Zaria and other
areas of northern states.
Reformed branch
Multiethnic, mass-participation membership of 21 million is based in Kano
city. Politically aligned with Aminu Kano's opposition People's Redemption
Party, a radical socialist party. Receives some Libyan support.
Society for the Victory
Founded in the 1960s by Alhaji Abubakar Gumi, a Hausa, who is the principal
of Islam
spiritual leader of Nigerian fundamentalism. Multiethnic membership includes
(Jama'atul Nasril Islam)
civil servants, traditional elites, and advisers to President Shagari. Supports the
ruling NPN and undertakes welfare activities and liaison with Muslim
community for the Federal Government.
The Islamic Trust
Founded by Abubakar Gumi; includes members of the Kaduna Mafia
representing commercial and political elites of the north. Membership includes
several top Shagari advisers. Since 1979, it has been the principal channel for
disbursing Saudi funds in Nigeria. It is politically aligned with the NPN.
League for the Elimination of
Largest fundamentalist group in Nigeria, numbering perhaps several thousand.
Heresy
Its youthful membership is prone to violence. It was originally based among
(Jama'atul Izlatul Bidi'a)
Muslims in central Middle Belt states and is now spreading to Hausa
communities in other West African countries. Some Libyan funding. Hostile to
Shagari government and traditional brotherhoods.
Muslim Student Association
Most radical fundamentalist group in Nigeria. Multiethnic membership;
strongest on two principal northern university campuses. Strongly opposed to
Shagari government, the West, traditional brotherhoods, and Christianity.
Seeking ties with other Islamic groups, particularly the League for the
Elimination of Heresy.
Followers of the late Maitatsine Marwa, a Cameroonian cleric in Kano city.
Membership estimated at 10,000 or more before riots in December 1980 in
Kano that took thousands of lives, including Marwa's. Established branches in
northern Nigeria that continue to be active. Militantly antigovernment.
Anwaru Islam, the Ansaudeen,
Yoruba Muslim groups formed during colonial period. Play an important role
and the Ahmadiya
in western region's policy of universal education. The Ahmadiya, the largest of
the groups, is a source of interethnic friction, and has been barred from the pil-
grimage to Mecca by Saudi and northern Nigerian Muslims due to doctrinal
disputes.
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Selected West African
Islamic Groups (continued)
Senegal
(population:
6 million;
82 percent Muslim)
Muridiya Brotherhood Mbacke branch
Bay Fal branch
Membership of about 1.5 million is largely from the Wolof tribe, but the
brotherhood is attracting other tribal groups, urban youth, and university
students. The Caliph General of the Mbacke branch, Lahat Mbacke, is
expanding his personal political power. This brotherhood is the single most
important economic force in Senegal and is consulted by the government on
most matters of domestic policy. Some alleged Libyan ties. Majority of the
military, including Army Chief of Staff, belong to the brotherhood. Will
probably support present government as long as the brotherhood's economic
demands are met.
Tijaniya Brotherhood Sy branch
Niassene branch
Tall branch
An estimated 1.3 to 1.5 million members are principally Wolof and include
university faculty, government elite-including President Diouf-small shop-
keepers, urban railroad workers, and some cattle herders. Until the last decade
it was the largest brotherhood in Senegal and is still consulted by the
government on most matters of domestic policy. The Niassene branch has
longstanding ties with reformed Tijaniya in northern Nigeria; one of its leaders,
Ahmad Niasse, a radical politician and fundamentalist preacher, was in the
past involved with Libyans.
Qadiriya Brotherhood Membership of about 300,000 is localized in southeast Senegal among Wolof
peasants. Little political influence.
Layenne Brotherhood Brotherhood constitutes about 20,000 wealthy members of Lebou tribe living in
Dakar and adjacent to Cap Vert. Politically insignificant.
Gambia Gambian Muslim Association Membership from all the brotherhoods. Although theoretically apolitical, the
(population: Association works closely with the government and the ruling party. Its
635,000; program emphasizes education and welfare.
90 percent Muslim)
Tijaniya Brotherhood Multiethnic membership of about 500,000 includes Mandingo, Fulani,
Wolof.and Soninke tribesmen and represents the majority of the Muslim
community. Some members have been recruited by Ahmad Niasse, radical
fundamentalist leader from Senegal, and still support his proposed Senegambi-
an Islamic state.
Niger
(population:
5.8 million;
90 percent Muslim)
The Islamic Association The only recognized Islamic organization in Niger. It is fully integrated into the
government structure and is used to assure that Islam retains traditional piety
and promotes national unity.
Tijaniya Brotherhood Active among Toubou tribesmen in the north but enjoys little or no political
influence.
Sanusiya Brotherhood A brotherhood founded in 19th century and supported by Libya. Has
established a minor presence among the Tuareg tribesmen around Agadez.
Qadiriya Brotherhood Has a modest following in urban areas. Not politically active.
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Selected West African
Islamic Groups (continued)
Mali Tijaniya Brotherhood Majority of brotherhood's membership is drawn from Mandingo and Fulani
(population: tribes in northwest (Kayes) and central (Bamako) regions. Follows mystic Sufi
7 million; practices liberally mixed with traditional animism. Informal ties exist with
80 percent Muslim) government through Malian Association for the Unity and Progress of Islam,
which a member of the Tijaniya leads. Brotherhood receives Saudi and some
Libyan support.
Wahabi Group was formally banned in 1979 but is still politically active. It is the most
important group economically because its membership includes Mali's wealthi-
est businessmen. Group has religious, commercial, and educational ties
throughout the Arab world, particularly in Saudi Arabia.
Qadiriya Brotherhood Few in numbers, little influence. Members are largely cattle herding Fulani
tribesmen in Timbuktu region.
Malian Association for the A government association organized to control the Muslim community and
Unity and Progress of Islam mediate disputes, particularly between Tijani and Wahabi membership.
Followers of Issa Dembele The only known dissident Muslim group in Mali. Preaches Malian nationalist
and socialist doctrines mingled with Islamic reform. Leader has traveled widely
in Middle East and is supported by regime's opponents and some Malians
studying abroad.
Cameroon Tijaniya Brotherhood The Tijaniya, under tight government control, has replaced in influence both
(population: the Qadiriya and Mahdiya Brotherhoods that earlier dominated the communi-
9 million; ty. The group plays no political role, although the President and key
15 percent Muslim) government officials are members. Wealthy businessmen and security forces
and army leaders belong to the brotherhood, as does the majority of Cameroon's
1.2 to 1.5 million Muslims.
Ivory Coast Association of Orthodox A conservative fundamentalist group of some 25,000, centered in Abidjan and
(population: Muslims of Ivory Coast with branches elsewhere. Founded in early 1960s, it is anti-Western and
8.5 million; (Wahabiya). antimodern; heavily influenced and funded by Saudis. Granted legal status by
25 percent Muslim) the government in 1976. Its members have clashed violently with traditional
Muslims.
Higher Islamic Council The official representative of Muslim community; an umbrella organization
that nominally includes all Muslims in the country.
Association of Muslim Students Fundamentalist group founded in 1975. It is represented at all university
branches and secondary schools, but as yet politically inactive.
Liberia National Muslim Council An umbrella organization founded in 1975; members keep a low profile
(population: politically and are supported on a small scale by Egypt, the Saudis, and a
2 million; variety of other Middle Eastern Arab states.
20 percent Muslim) Islamic Call Society A minor group of radical fundamentalists, receiving some funds from Libya.
Almost no political significance.
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Selected West African
Islamic Groups (continued)
Sierra Leone Sierra Leone Muslim Congress Founded in 1932, the group includes senior government officials. Supports
(population: education and gives aid to pilgrims to Mecca.
3.5 million; Sierra Leone Muslim Runs an Arabic cultural center in Freetown.
30 percent Muslim) Brotherhood Mission
Supreme Islamic Council Head of the Council is also a member of the ruling party's Central Committee,
but the group's chief activities are primarily religious education, not politics.
Ahmadiya Muslim Association Missionary organization supporting a number of schools.
Sierra Leone Muslim Men and The group, led by a charismatic preacher, Alhaji Ibrahim Turay, is growing
Women's Association rapidly. It is apolitical.
Sierra Leone Pilgrims Haja Danke Kabia, second wife of President Stevens, uses the Association to
Association channel assistance from Middle Eastern states to pilgrims to Mecca.
Benin League for the Elimination of A branch-numbering probably less than 100-of the Nigerian fundamentalist
(population: Heresy (Jama atu! Izalatul group. Partly financed by Libya. Militant Islamic fundamentalist philosophy
3.6 million; Bidi a) blended with political radicalism has proved particularly appealing among
15-20 percent traders of the Hausa tribe living in Cotonou. The only currently active Muslim
Muslim) group in Benin.
Upper Volta Tijaniya Brotherhood Led by the chief priests of Ouagadougou and Bobo-Dioulasso. All members-
(population: numbering about 1.9 million-are theoretically also members of the "Muslim
6.2 million; Community of Upper Volta," officially constituted in 1962 to service religious
35 percent Muslim) and social needs of Muslims. Because political activity is banned, the group is
nominally apolitical.
Fundamentalist extremists who emphasize mutual assistance; actively recruit-
ing among the urban poor. Their membership is estimated to range from 30,000
to 80,000.
Note: In instances where membership of groups is noted, the
numbers represent the most recent assessment by Embassy sources
and represent an order of magnitude rather than a reliable estimate.
In addition, the various groups listed do not always account for a
country's total Muslim population.
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WEST AFRICA
Muslim Distribution
Banjul
The Gambia i
less than 10
10-30
30-50
50-70
70-90
over 90
Western
Sahara
Maur
Monrovia Liberia
Gulf of Guinea
North
Atlantic
Ocean
/lam,
Nigeria
`' ibreville
L th y pia;;
', -:: Lade
cped
Yaountle
Figure 4
Central
African
Republic
Congo
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Secret
Secret
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