THE POSITION OF THE MGB/GOVERNMENTAL AND COMMUNIST PARTY POLICIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00809A000600020054-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 16, 2010
• Sequence Number: 54
• Publication Date: April 16, 1952
• Content Type: REPORT

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INFORMATION REPORT CD NO.
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THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION
1. All officers - Party members, candidates or Komsomol members, posted to
or from the HQ 12 Guards Tank Div report to the Political Branch in
order to be registered in the Party records or to obtain their Party
Transfer Authorizations. This registration concerns all officers including
MB officers serving with the Arty Counter Espionage detachments.
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(a) An MGB Officers' College is in Novosibirsk and is located in the
Ippodromskiy Region of the town. The Transfer Authorizations
were issued by the Party Organization of the Ippodromskiy Region
of Novosibirsk.
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SUBJECT
COUNTR i LSR/ Gerw*riiy (Soviets )
The Position of the tjB/Goverrsncntai and NO. OF PAGES 4
Conramiat Party Policies
NO. OF ENCLS.
IUSTED BELOW)
SUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO.
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SZ C' i:'T/S?]CLT^ITi IiT(:'aMATTOI'
(b) I the course in the Novosibirsk 50X1-HUM
College lasted at least two years, because cadets who completed an Officers'
School Courro of loss, than two years duration receive the rank of Jr Lieutenant.
(c) Training in the ho-,rosihirsk College was apeare.rt.ly on high level because the
senior C11R officers of t.hc-, 12 Tat;lc Div were highly impressed with the ability
1 and scope of knowledge .cf these two young, offi.cers.
3.I Ithe Army : r t to wAI-nusvu
say in personnel matters cc. i:eernh g 11-YID officers .osted 1?o the 'lrr.r all !
postings and transfers of MGB :;t>LCf are cirri-_d cut by the MGB Records and. Personnel 50X1-HUM
Department and officers are tran-:ferrccl from the 1,,GB to Lhe Army rand vice versa according
to the plans and directive,, giver, by the I''1Gll higher authorities. The MOB fears nobody
except the P~,.rty. The Part-- rank-`nd?-file realize very clearly how dangerous it is to
cross words with the MGB while the IOB are aware that e:t the highest level the leading
factor is the VKP (b) and that they are only a powerful tool of the Party. The result
is that MGB personnel and Party members show a whole ome respect for each other, though
watching each other closely, and they work. together whenever necessary and possible.
4. In the Army the Counter Espionage 1 : rs nnel is subor(linzated in Party matters to the
Army Political officers. The Political Officers are not O lone:1 to ask the MGB personnel
unnecessary questions, but they are obliged to check l in ? ll datails their Party records.
5. An MGB officer posted to the Army should without delay present his credentials in the
Political Branch of his unit. The F'?'rt.v Recorc'.s Instructor and the head of the Political
Branch check his Party doctusents including his I':.rty t.ranofer authorization (Otlcryepity-
elniy Talon), Party Membership Card ..1:d identity 1 a t ~. An MGB officer cannot refuse
to present his identity papers in the Foli.tical Blrarneh for all Party members are in-
structed and know very well that the Party Membership Card (Partiyniy Bilyet) can in no
circumstances replace an identity document and should. he supported by the usual Military
or civilian identity papers. Any person insisting that the Partbi].yet is his only
identity document would automatically create suspicion and according to the Party in-
structions should be arrested and handed over to the Security authorities.
6. The MGB nersonnel serving with th, Army (Counter Espionage Branch) continue to be con-
trolled by the 110B and very often, after varying periods. of service with the Army Counter
Espionage, return to the civilian branch of the. MGB.
7. Postings of Counter Espionage officers from the Army to the MGB or from one. Army unit to
another are secret. Even the Party Records instruc tci? does not know where an NGB officer
is posted, he is only told to which Party organization he should send the Party documents
and can perhaps guess approx mately where the MF.B man 'd . ~rht be. The posting of an. MGB
officer returning from the Army Group in. Garrany to "e MOB in the USSR in published
very briefly in Unit Orders, eg "Capt X after completing his service with the Soviet
Forces in Germany is lenvinr7 the unit. for continuation of his duties in the interior
districts of the USSR". (1)1. Prokhc z1ysnya '`::lnye .;hey SIuc 'by Vo Vnutryennikh
Okruga,kh SSSR). In the i:c,vement Order L,ie place cf destination is shown and never
a unit or organization.
8. There is a clear tendency in the Party instructions not to discuss or explain 'the
political and strategical. position of the Soviet troops in E ropce on any but the higher
levels of the '.7?med Forces personnel. 50X1-HUM
9. the Party realizes the positive and ne-::tivr, .rues of the situ,t?ion of the
Soviet troops in Central ,.,n(-I. South-E stern Europe as tluy c:xint at present and as they
would be in 'the event of war aid considers it undesirable to discuss or continent on these
problems on the lower levels.
10. The higher army commanders from Division upwards are i nforr:ed on strategical rind political
problems in the .spoci:_l lectures and conferences organized in the: Army Group PQ at
Potsdam. There it is emphasized the nc e:: ity of strong armed forces in Germany and
Poland which are the. guaranty for the currying into effect of the Soviet policy in
Central and Eastern Europe. It would be impossible to realize the policy of the Moscow
Government in Dirope without a strong Army Group in Germany supported by an Army Group
in Poland. The latter .secured also the Soviet lines ;,f colmnunicat?ioo between the USSR
and Germany.
11. For the musses of officers and soon inside the USSR and abroad, the ex-:l ..n,: tion of the
presence of Soviet forces in Europe is short and very simple: "Soviet Arm; Jl forces are
in Europe not as the conquerors of the n::w territories, 'their task is to ;secure our
victory and the freedom of the other rations". (Nye 7avoyevanye Novikh Tynrritcr i.i A
Dla Obyespyeehyenye, N,%?nhey Pobyedi I Svohodi Drrgilch Narodov;.
SECRET/SECURITY II;FCRM TICN
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~;i,CFET./: ECUTiITY IIFo r5'..:'T
12.
The policy cf the ITKP (b) 1?"?o,icow Govornmcnt Tr,l'_` 1s so-crilled "lihcrat
count
d
i
"
e
r
es
of Europe is Jr rri : ~.t me^su,e the conion of the policy towards the non-
Russian i.a.tionnl ,:r?cuprs -the iT,S1..
13.
In the Soviet Union the offi.ci,-.1 Farty policy is to d^v__'op c.nd cultivate a feeling of
unity and fr?iondshi
-
.p ar
ng ;::.1l rations of the Sovi': t illy; on, but the first place and the
leading role must he rc;eived for the hu.solan na.t.ion. The ''' ion notion is the "elder
brother" -in the family of Soviet 1;atior,s.
14.
The last war showed cle,:rly that. the Russian Stet. (Rvc,.'-c;y;: Gosudartvo) was strong
enough not onl
to
d
y
en
ure the ('c-rmeri invasion but also -?.i.n the war and extend the
frontiers of USSR and h,er influence or, such a lror ;~c?:_l;. ?r.
Russian history. never h tp; ,-ned before in
15.
16.
The Russian nation in the f:-.otor of cor.solid=ttoii of th?; other nations of the Soviet
Union.
As long as the various natior:s rf the Soviet Union we.- e h.,rc,,ncro: together into one nation
("Skolachivanye SSSR V Odi
I
"
17.
n
arod
) he Kremlin. :)roc,1 aime.:i thr equality of all nations and
could not give the Russi:n:l pride of place. on the c:ol;t,-ory they lot the Russians be
convinced that they were treated worse rand suffered more than , n- ether nation in the
Soviet Union.
World War II, 1941-19:45, t.??':; tl~-,, To:-t, -,ct of th?: to.-;th.-r of. Soviet nations
and the Russians
f
i
U
w
n
l
o
f
were o
ficially aroclairad the 1 c .: li,:n noticnn of he Union. There
s at present a strong tarclancy I.?:, extend the a,e-.rir.., of the i,,.,rci 111
krainians and Byelorus^ic.rls?. This tencleneY does Y? ies;.ternsn to include
t?:-4, ,'c:r to t},.e :?leste.rr, Ulcr?aini-ens
hom "the Polish masters (Polnld.ye Fony) converted to t.h-?ir rcli.c?ion". /Collector's
ote: This remark has its sI eci.;l iRni~'icrtnce he^:.li..;c the I':roel,:irr.tion of the
eading rol, of the Rus:si'in r.,-.1-ion, .the reorganizot?i.rr: r,f the Orthodox Church as a tool
f the regime and t.'.e ruthless, liouirlr-.t.ion of the fra:ate Church in the
ormer Polish territories follrt;a d cr.c after .Lno'hcr.7
18. The 1'oscow policy tow,,.-rds the. S, t?e11it;:; St.at;:; is vc::r si:.il: l Lr
national Itolitic Durin t r e i r,.t