POSTWAR TACTICAL TRAINING DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET ARMY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00809A000600010219-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 20, 2011
• Sequence Number: 219
• Publication Date: February 13, 1952
• Content Type: REPORT

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/20 :CIA-RDP80-00809A000600010219-4
-#LASS~FICATIOId SECRB`P/SLL~T'.7'".' _~ ~~'FORMATIOI~~ , -
CENTRAL lNTELLiGENCF AGENCY REPORT
B fV ~O R M /4'B? I O IV I~ E ~~1 i~~~'
COUNTRY USSR/Gc~rmar>f
PLACE
ACQUIRED
DATE
ACQUIRED
DATE OF
IA51 ~ 1~1 Q
Postwar Tactical Training
DevelopmenFs in the Soviet Army
SUPPLEMENT TU
REPORT N 0.
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F,TAT#
ARMY
Trailing is basically that of World War IT, modified by the experiences
of World War II. As an examplo, during World War II tar;lcs were of ton employed
alone without the immediate~suppor't of infantry, and of course nlanv tanks were
lost. Tn the postwar era, the basic doctrine is that tanks must always
be accornpar~ied uy infantry and that infantry must always be supported by
+.anlcs. Therefore, the mayor stress in training is placed on the employ-
ment of tarlc-infantry toams and cooperation between thr2 branches of se:?vice.
the emr~loyment of tank and mechanized forces
published in two volumes between 1945 and 1946
~"e still the "Bible" for training and employment of tank and
mechanized forces. However, from time to ti*~~e the Service Acaderu.cs, in
cooperation with tho General Staff, publish periodic information bulletins
for the information of officers. This publication is cla,sified "secret91
and therefore does not get widespread dissemination to the troops, but is used
as a basis for changes in training programs.
CLASSIFICATION SL;~~RBP~S~CURITX TP1I'ORMATIOPI-~-~~~
-.-- ~-,---1-,.
The Gener-a.i Staff Sections are very mucl-~ award of the va7_ae of
?dorld Nar IT histories in determ:i sing what errors i?rere made in the, iicld,
and the I'rur:ze Academy is malting detailed studies of World War IT tactics.
Dlaturally, many of these studies a-?e used to confirm tllo validity of tactics
in particu7.ar situations. W12ore thore are stud3.es cf glaring tactical or
strategic orrors, training directives are published in the periodic informa-
tion bulletins to bring them to the attention of all officer. s. P'o^
example: certain tactical1 errors wt,ich the German Gonera.1 Staff rowld
to be rather common in Soviet unii?.~; of division size and lower, were
pointed out as an ?xamplc, of errors which m:i~;ht benefit considerab]_y in
future warfare; apecifica].ly~ i:hs l,oorly coordinated make-up of march
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/20 :CIA-RDP80-00809A000600010219-4
 ~ Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/20 :CIA-RDP80-00809A000600010219-4
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socials within a division size unit on the anproFCh march, which ir: many cases the
Germans took sdvant~.re of ir. ?r-.:i.rirg initial ra,'T~e;:;.a~'e during; a meeting ei~ga;ement.
'T`:is of course is not Soviet field mai,ual dactrirs lut wes a result of poor road
nets c.rd i~nnas:~ihl.e f,e~~r-~;r. Posi.tive s.ctio;: i:~ being taken i;o improve continuity
rind compactness of march ,serials.
Subordinate corrm-anders are urged to oxploit to the fu1.'lest any local saccess,
whereas prevl.ously, ea-ploitirr~ or. pvrsvir.~ units were ~iven certain objectives to
reach at ~ ~ u >o~~:d to hn1.t. I?ow tactical doctrine nrescribcs no such
a pecvlia.r~ ty noted b~* the
lirti.ts.
German officers during; k~or1~~ War IT, ~. c_L _s, a a.cl~. cf c~ecp penetrai'ion on the p~.rt of
units suborc?.~nato to the divisicn. So consistent was this peculiarity that the
Germans could expect the Soviet tank forces of battalions and regiments to slop
some four to five kilometers behind the lines a!'ter achievS.ng a ~eneL'i?ution. `Chis
peculiarity did ex~_st as it 4fa6 co: ~on1y ea.lled for in operation orders but rowadays
there is no such 13m_1t placed o~; exploiting unit3.
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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/20 :CIA-RDP80-00809A000600010219-4