INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS DEVELOPMENTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00912A001800010021-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 12, 2009
• Sequence Number: 21
• Publication Date: September 28, 1977
• Content Type: NOTES

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Secret
DEA Review Completed
International Narcotics Developments
S TREA has not reviewed. Processed IAW CIA TREA arrangement letter dtd 4/11/08.
State Department,DHS reviews
completed
Secret
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INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS DEVELOPMENTS
28 September 1977
THAILAND: Narcotics Dominoes Begin to
Fall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
BURMA-THAILAND: Strained Relations Hamper
Antinarcotics Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
AFGHANISTAN: UN Sponsors Crop Substitution
for Opium Poppies in Helmand Valley. . . . . . . . 8
EAST-WEST GERMANY: Substantial Flow of
Illicit Narcotics Through Berlin . . . . . . . . . 9
NOTEWORTHY POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS:
1. Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2. Thailand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
BRIEFS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
INTERESTING READING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
This publication is prepared by analysts in the Directorate of Intelligence for
specialists in the Washington community who are interested in international nar-
cotics matters. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to the
authors of the individual articles or to
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THAILAND: Narcotics Dominoes Begin To Fall
The impact of Burmese and Thai antinarcotic efforts
is beginning to be felt south of the Burma border. Ref-
erences have been made to a chaotic narcotics market in
Bangkok because of erratic supplies of processed nar-
cotics. Traffickers have been overly cautious on sales
despite availability, and only small quantities are being
sold to established buyers. Some traffickers, however,
have dropped prices in order to reduce their stocks. In
general, prices for most narcotics had increased in Au-
gust because of high commission payments and the departure
of ma.iy major traffickers from Bangkok.
Suppression activities by the Thai Government in
south Thailand have pushed the price of No. 4 heroin
there to higher levels. Traffickers, fearing possible
heavy financial losses from seizures, are refusing to
sell heroin in more than one or two unit lots. Prices
of No. 3 heroin at the Thai-Malaysian border have also
risen as a result of a temporary suspension of cross-
border shipments because of intensive border searches
by Thai and Malaysian customs personnel.
There are indications that the major financiers of
the narcotics traffic may be shifting their support to
less hazardous products such as gem stones. Although
such moves may be contributing to the present crisis,
the prospects of high profits will no doubt attract
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BURMA-THAILAND: Strained Relations Hamper Antinarcotics
Cooperation
A mutual interest in the interdiction of the nar-
cotics trade out of northeast Burma into northern Thai-
land had prompted some efforts toward greater cordiality.
These were undermined last June, however, by Burmese de-
tention of a Thai helicopter that had intruded into Burmese
airspace. Admission by the Thai pilot that he had landed
inside Burma several times previously supported Burmese
suspicions of connivance by local Thai officials with
Burmese narcotics trafficking organizations along the
border. Burmese officials are well aware that narcotics
traffi.ckers in Thailand have no helicopters of their own.
Burmese annoyance has been fed by Thai failure to follow
through a promised investigation of the helicopter inci-
dent.
Thai-Burmese relations are now at their lowest ebb
in several years and show little indication of early im-
provement. Historic animosities have been revived by
the Thai conviction that the Burmese Government's home-
grown socialism smacks of Communism and by Burmese an-
noyance over contacts by some Thai officials with Bur-
mese political exiles, ethnic insurgents, and opium
traffickers.
Burmese feathers were ruffled anew last month by
the search of the person and baggage of a Burmese Cabi-
net Minister transiting the Bangkok airport. The Thai
have offered no explanation, and the Burmese see the
incident as a calculated aggravation.
The Burmese have been disturbed most recently over
reports that a Thai. gunboat will be assigned to accom-
pany Thai fishing boats poaching in Burmese waters off
Burma's southern coast. Burmese determination to seize
the gunboat if the Thai carry through with the reported
plan could result in a confrontation from which, for
reasons of national pride, it would be difficult for
either side to disengage.
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AFGHANISTAN: UN Sponsors Crop Substitution for
Opium Poppies in Helmand Valley
The United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control
(UNFDAC) has begun the ground work for a crop substitu-
tion program to replace opium poppy as a source of income
in the upper Helmand Valley of Afghanistan. Although
opium poppy cultivation is illegal in Afghanistan, the
government is unable, and in some cases unwilling, to
enforce the ban. The proposed UN program has so far not
gone beyond preliminary surveys, but UNFDAC believes that
a feasible program can be developed and sold to both
Afghanistan and foreign aid donors.
Significant poppy-growing in the Helmand area began
fairly recently, but the opium production there probably
would be great enough to meet the entire demand of the
US addict population. Most of the opium grown in
Afghanistan is smuggled abroad, with the bulk Going to
neighboring Iran.
The Helmand Valley program, if successful, could
have more impact than UNFDAC's current efforts in the
more remote and less developed Badakhshan Province,
where opium is more important to the local economy and
crop substitution would be more difficult. A significant
part of the crop in Badakhshan, is also consumed locally.
The Helmand Valley is much more accessible to enforce-
ment authorities than Badakhshan. Some cynics have com-
mented that the main UNFDAC effort there--an addict
treatment center--if successful, could give the province
more opium for export.
Success for the. Helmand project would probably en-
courage the Afghans to cooperate in similar projects
in other areas. Nevertheless, the UNFDAC program for
Helmand is still on the drawing board, and it could be
years before any significant decrease in opium production
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T h,: r o u g Ber in
The West Berlin Government is urging West Germany
to request East German assistance in reducing the flow of
hard drugs moving through East Berlin into the city's
western sectors. This would be possible under Article 6
of the East-West German health accord. The drug problem
has become a major issue in West Berlin and is complicated
by the many legal technicalities of the Berlin question.
Prospects for East German assistance are dim.
Large numbers of persons, many of them Turkish mi-
grant workers, arrive at East Germany's Schoenefeld Air
port, board S-bahn at the airport, enter East Berlin,
and then cross directly into the Western sectors. Smug-
glers are increasingly using the Berlin route because it
is safer since the crackdown by Dutch authorities in
Amsterdam.
The West Berlin West German request for help is
not likely to yield significant results. The East Ger-
mans are not likely to admit that hard drugs are passing
through East Berlin. They do not. consider this their
problem and would probably regard charges of East German
complicity as a Western slander campaign. The East Ger-
mans, moreover, earn needed hard currency by offering
cut-rate airfares to Schoenefeld, and they are attempting
to funnel as much of the Berlin civilian air traffic as
possible through Schoenefeld.
There are also problems on the West Berlin side.
There is little hard evidence as to what proportion of
the drugs entering West Berlin comes via Schoenefeld as
compared with other routes. West. Berlin does not have a
comprehensive drug-control program. West Berlin is also
boxed in because effective drug controls at the East-West
Berlin sector boundary would impede traffic and give the
boundary the appearance of an international border, some-
thing the Western allies cannot permit. West Berlin,
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however, could establish controls at S-bahn stations
away from the sector boundary.
If the East Germans were to assist West Berlin in
its drug campaign, it probably would be through an un-
publicized effort spurred by payments of hard currency
for East German "assistance." East Germany might also
go along if it perceived that some of the drugs were
staying in East Berlin. There is no evidence of this,
and pushers would rather have hard currency than East
German marks.
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NOTEWORTHY POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS
(Editor's Note: These items, produced for
another CIA publication, do not deal specifi-
cally with the international narcotics situa-
tion. They are included here, however, be-
cause they concern developing situations that
could impact on the international narcotics
control effort.)
MEXICO: Holding Down Wages and Prices
Mexican President Lopez Portillo has scored the
most striking success of his nine-month tenure by holding
wage increases to 10 percent. This achievement, indis-
pensable to the government's economic stabilization pro-
gram, already has helped reduce the inflation rate signif-
icantly--from 3 percent in January to 1 percent a month
by April.
The Mexican labor movement has features that distin-
guish it from labor movements elsewhere in the developed
and developing worlds. Rather than a broad horizontal
grouping stressing the class interests of workers, it
is a complex of vertical patron-client relationships
geared to the benefits that each individual worker can
obtain from loyalty to his immediate labor leader.
The lower ranking labor leaders dispense favors to
workers and provide loyalty to the next level of leader-
ship. At the top of this pyramid is the leader of the
Confederation of Mexican Workers (CTM) and ultimately
the President of Mexico. The rank-and-file judge the
effectiveness of a labor leader at any level more by his
ability to secure benefits for individual workers---a job
for a relative, a small loan, or help on a problem with
the police--than by his ability to raise wages for the
mass of workers.
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The average worker correctly perceives that wage
increases are granted by the President in response to a
wide range of influences, not forced by acts of the labor
movement. Strikes often are simply tools of the govern-
ment to bring management into line with government labor
policy.
Although labor is considered one of the three offi-
cial sectors of the ruling party--along with the peasantry
and the "popular" (middle class) sector--the degree of
presidential control over the movement varies greatly
from union to union. The unions of the CTM, for example,
are usually under the firm control of the government
party. Many other unions, without direct CTM affilia-
tion, are secretly controlled or influenced by the govern-
ment. Still other unions, such as those involved in re-
cent university and steel strikes, are largely independ-
ent. Because of continued efforts by the government to
co-opt these unions, it is difficult to determine the
exact degree of independence of the non-CTM unions at
any given time.
The President is constrained to use Fidel Velasquez,
the 77-year-old leader of the CTM, as his principal agent
in labor matters. "Don Fidel," loyally serving seven
successive presidents, has dominated labor politics,
though not labor policy, for 40 years. With respect to
long-term political influence, he is often described
as the most powerful man in Mexico. This was demonstrated
when former President Echeverria tried to undercut
Velasquez' power base and emerged the clear loser.
When Echeverria came to power in 1970, he was widely
regarded as a political hard-liner, largely insensitive
to working-class problems., He made an early and continued
effort to change this image, in part by raising minimum
wages.
Most nonunion labor, outside of agriculture, receives
the minimum wage; the wages of organized labor, which
makes up 30 percent of the nonagricultural labor force,
are usually somewhat higher. Although union wage in-
creases are nominally determined through collective bar-
gaining, they in fact closely follow the minimum wage
guidelines set by the President.
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Echeverria had two political goals in view when
he adopted his wage policy: to establish his credentials
as a populist President, and to wrest control of the
unions from Velasquez by appealing to the workers as a
class through increased wages and benefits. Patron-client
relationships remained stronger than class interests,
however, and Velasquez continued in firm political con-
trol of the labor movement. The defeat cost Echeverria
considerable prestige and influence in Mexican political
circles.
Echeverria's wage policy also had serious conse-
quences for financial stability. Wage restraint, which
had long played a key role in Mexico's strong economic
performance, was allowed to erode after 1972. Pay set-
tlements in the manufacturing sector went from 9 percent
annually in the early 1970s to 12 percent in 1973 and
25 percent in 1974. By then, wage push had become an
increasingly important factor behind Mexico's rapid in-
flation, especially since labor productivity was rising
only 2.5 percent per year. In 1975-76, higher wage costs
accounted for most of the 33-percent rise in domestic
prices. The resulting loss in international competitive-
ness eventually led to a 45-percent depreciation of the
peso in late 1976.
In imposing his austerity program--which, like pre-
Echeverria economic policies, relies heavily on wage
restraint--Lopez Portillo has worked closely with Velas-
quez. An increase in the minimum wage granted on 1 Jan-
uary 1977 was 10 percent, the lowest increase in four
years. Furthermore, organized labor pledged to hold
negotiated wage increases to the same percentage during
the first six months of the new administration.
Union wage settlements, for the most part, have
honored the pledge. In cases where management was will-
ing to grant higher settlements, the government has
stepped in to limit wage increases to 10 percent. Velas-
quez' cooperation has been crucial in maintaining labor
discipline while wage increases were being trimmed.
Lopez Portillo's stabilization efforts have been
aided greatly by his skillful handling of key strikes
by non-CTM unions at the national university and at
Fundidora Monterrey, one of the nation's largest steel
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mills. In the university case, the administration nego-
tiated patiently with union leaders, whose demands in-
cluded a 20-percent wage increase. After the union
went on strike on 20 June, the government undercut public
support for the walkout through a well-orchestrated media
campaign and, on 7 July, Federal District policemen swept
onto the campus. The government's skill in this opera-
tion allowed it to reassert control of the university,
avoid public outrage, and maintain the 10-percent ceiling
on wage increases--all told, an impressive victory.
The government's success in holding down wages has
had an immediate effect on the inflation rate. Consumer
price inflation, which averaged 33 percent at an annual
rate for the first three months of 1977, slowed to a
15-percent annual rate during the April-June quarter.
The government should be able to hold wage settle-
ments close to the 10-percent level for the remainder of
1977. If this pattern can be maintained, the government
stands a good chance of slowing inflation to about a 10-
pe,rcent annual rate or less in the months ahead. Even
though labor's pledge to Lopez Portillo expired in June,
the slowing of inflation is undercutting advocates of
higher wage settlements or a general wage increase later
this year. A wage settlement early last month for Pemex,
the government oil monopoly, still adhered to the 10-per-
cent guideline.
Unions representing most other government workers
will probably accept a similar increase in negotiations
now getting under way. Most labor leaders are publicly
urging restraint on their union members. There is no
indication, that unions that have already reached settle-
ments this year are considering reopening negotiations.
Dissident groups--especially leftist students out-
side the national university-Tare likely to press for
higher wages,-subsidies, and scholarships in the coming
months, but the President can probably meet these chal-
lenges without major damage to his policy.
US Treasury Department analysts believe that, while
Lopez Portillo has been reasonably successful in holding
wages in check, the evidence that he was pressed into
announcing an end to the guideline in June portends
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greater difficulty in limiting demands for future wage
increases. These analysts also believe that prospects
for continued labor stability depend heavily on Lopez
Portillo's yet unrealized goal of creating jobs by stimu-
lating private-sector investment.
Over the longer term, Lopez Portillo's greatest test
will come when Velasquez leaves the scene. Velasquez'
death or retirement could lead to a succession struggle
in which important members of the ruling party, both
inside and outside the labor movement, line up against
each other. Rivals for top union posts would be more
likely to look up to the party leadership than down to
the workers for their support, but a serious breakdown
in labor discipline would be likely in the absence of
Valasquez' cementing influence. A major party split
would undermine the President's power in all areas--and
what power remained would have to be expended in politi-
cal fence-mendin rather than in stabilizing the economy.
THAILAND: Military Still Restive
The Thai military's continuing dissatisfaction with
the civilian regime it installed last October underscores
the tenuous stability of the Thai political scene. The
military has clearly not been content with the structure
and leadership that emerged following its assumption of
a stronger role last October. The anticipation since
then of further change has created an atmosphere that
breeds constant political maneuvering by political leaders
unhappy with the current situation but unable to reach
a consensus for change.
The Army's unhappiness with Prime Minister Thanin
surfaced soon after he took office following the collapse
of parliamentary government a year ago. Thanin had a
reputation as an incorruptible jurist and staunch con-
servative and had written and lectured on counterin-
surgency--seemingly excellent credentials for a civilian
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front man for the military. Thanin and his cabinet, how-
ever, have proven less malleable and less compatible than
the military leaders anticipated.
Thanin's inflexibility and doctrinaire political
views have caused increasing friction with his more
pragmatic government colleagues both in the military and
in the civilian bureaucracy. The Prime Minister has
toned down the harsh anti--Communist rhetoric that marked
his early weeks in office, but his open hostility to
Thailand's Communist neighbors has conflicted with the
country's postwar foreign policy of accommodation.
Thanin's suspicions of Vietnam--an exggerated pro-
jection of general Thai concern--have slowed progress
toward normal diplomatic relations with Hanoi. The close
relationship of key Thai leaders with the regime on
Taiwan has annoyed the Chinese because they believe
Bangkok is attempting to foster a two-Chinas policy.
The government's initial crackdown on dissidents
was welcomed by most Thai, who were fed up with constant
disorder. The populace now seems increasingly concerned
that the government is excessively intolerant and that
the controls it has imposed on the press, labor, and
educational institutions are too severe. Moreover, there
is general awareness that the Thanin government has been
no more effective than Thailand's parliamentary regimes
in dealing with the country's problems, despite the
absence of the earlier turmoil.
The members of Thanin's cabinet were selected be-
cause they were reputed to be men of integrity. Most
have proven to be mediocre administrators who have
alienated the bureaucracy. Their efforts are underminded
in part by the entrenched opposition of powerful men who
see the vigorous campaign Thanin has waged against cor-
ruption as a threat to their political and financial
interests.
The aggressive and outspoken Minister of Interior,
Samak Sunthorawet, in particular, has become anathema to
the military. His ill-considered statements last winter
on alleged Vietnamese plans to invade Thailand embarrassed
the government, and his continuing promotion of contacts
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with Taipei runs counter to the general consensus in the
military that good relations with Peking are in Thailand's
best interest.
Samak has run his ministry forcefully and independ-
ently, and has stepped on toes in the process. Thanin,
however, has stubbornly refused to jettison Samak or
any other member of his cabinet--a position that has
increased the frustration of his critics.
Pressure to remove Thanin has been building in the
Army for several months, but a number of considerations
have deterred the military leaders from acting:
-- They have no obvious candidate to succeed Thanin.
There appears to be no civilian who is both will-
ing to serve and acceptable to all parties.
Admiral Sa-Ngat and General Kriangsak--the key
military leaders---have indicated they are avail-
able,. but there is no firm evidence that military
support has coalesced behind either.
-- The military leaders fear that returning to
direct military rule would strain relations
with the US and alienate the Thai public.
Admiral Sa-Ngat is retired from the Navy and
General Kriangsak--now Deputy Supreme Commander
of the Armed Forces--reportedly is willing is
retire if he were made Prime Minister. With
either man, a civilian facade could presumably
be preserved, but it would be tenuous.
-- There is no clear-cut issue that could be used
to justify removing the Prime Minister abruptly.
Despite the general dissatisfaction with Thanin's
style, his "clean" image still seems to appeal
to many people in the country.
-- In addition, King Phumiphon has been reluctant
to abandon Thanin, and the military leaders
probably would not move against him without the
King's concurrence. The degree to which
Phumiphon was involved in the selection of
Thanin to head the government is unclear, but
Thanin has been considered by many to be the
King's man.
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Recent reports, however, suggest that Phumiphon may
have concluded that the constant infighting between
Thanin and the top military leaders has undermined the
Prime Minister's capacity to govern effectively. The
King also appears concerned that competition for royal
support by the various factions is tarnishing the image
of the monarchy as an impartial symbol of national unity.
It thus seems likely that the longer the present situ-
ation continues, the more willing the King will become
to accept a government shakeup, especially if the military
can present a united front.
Already the generals seem reassured that their pro-
motions will be forthcoming--Kriangsak probably to
Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces and Yot probably
to Deputy Commander of the Army--and earlier tension
has subsided. Any move against Thanin in the near future
now seems unlikely. Over the longer run, however, Thanin's
chances for survival are poor. It is clear that his
support among military leaders has significantly eroded.
Kriangsak, who is one year away from compulsory
military retirement, has emerged as a determined candidate
for Prime Minister,
individual in the military hierarchy--a well-prepared and
broadly experienced staff officer who has shaped policy
in many areas, both foreign and domestic.
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He clearly is the most capable
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At the same time, his background as a staff officer
is a drawback. Kriangsak has not traveled the traditional
route of Thai military strongmen--commanding officer of
the First Division and then of the First Army, and finally
Army Commander. Although Kriangsak is respected, some in
the Army oppose his becoming Prime Minister, and this
opposition could prove an insurmountable obstacle.
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ARGENTINA: Argentine authorities reportedly will soon
undertake a survey to determine whether papaver
somniferum is being illegally cultivated. Argentina
is one of a number of countries in South America
with conditions suitable for the production of
opium poppies, which were legally introduced during
World War II to prevent shortages of medicinal
opiates when normal supplies of opium were cut off.
Poppy cultivation, provided it is properly licensed,
is still legal in Argentina. Official statistics
of the Argentine Secretariat of Public Health showed
that in 1971 358 hectares of opium poppies were
legally harvested and refined into over 30 kilo-
grams of opium used by the domestic pharmaceutical
industry. None of the 23 growers who were licensed
to produce opium last. year, however, has filed for
a renewal of a growing permit. Believing that the
growers plan to continue illegally, the Argentine
Federal Police are working with the Air Force to
determine the location, scope, and production capa-
bilities of the illegal cultivation. Arrests of
growers and eradication of their fields are antici-
PERU: According to a Peruvian news article last week,
the National Coca Enterprise (ENACO) will soon under-
take a coca production study in the departments of
Junin, Ayacucho, and San Martin--the country's
traditional coca growing and consuming areas. ENACO
reportedly has informed coca producers in the three
areas that they will be required to submit compre-
hensive figures on annual production. A nationwide
survey will be made after the preliminary studies
are completed. A six-week pilot study has already
been completed in Huanuco.
According to the US Embassy in Lima, the results of
this latest effort to obtain more exact figures on
coca cultivation in Peru are likely to be less com-
prehensive and less reliable than previous surveys.
The most recent US estimate for annual coca leaf
production in Peru is 25 million kilograms (25,000
metric tons). Taking into consideration legal
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exports and indigenous consumption, this estimate
suggests that approximately 34 metric tons of re-
fined cocaine hydrochloride could be produced each
INDIA: The 750 grams of heroin recently seized in New
Delhi reportedly originated in the Golden Triangle
of Southeast Asia and had been smuggled into India
from Burma. The US Embassy in New Delhi reports that
it has no information which would indicate that
opium conversion to heroin is taking place in India.
With an annual crop of about 1,000 tons, India is
by far the largest producer of licit opium in the
world. Despite India's strict opium control system,
as much as 10 percent of the legal crop may be
leaking into illicit channels, but
the bulk of any sucn leakage
is absorbed domestically in India. Limited amounts,
however, may be escaping from India into Sri Lanka
and the Arabian Peninsula. Some may also be smuggled
PS SNIN 77-020
28 September 1977
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Treatment of Drug Addiction by Acupuncture (HONG KONG)
--TNDD,* No. L/7368, 14 September 1977, pp. 17-
30. (An article by Raymond Yao entitled "The
Needles That Cure" which recently appeared in
the Far Eastern Economic Review Limited. The
article discusses the outpatient acupuncture
and electro-stimulation (AES) treatment center
for drug addiction which has been established
at a Hong Kong hospital.)
Drug Abuse Tied to Economic Development (MALAYSIA)
--TNDD, No. L/7368, pp. 40-42.
Humane Help for Heroin Addicts (CANADA)--TNDD, No.
L/7368, pp. 62-63. ("British Columbia . . . has a
compulsory treatment program for its 10,000 heroin
addicts. it is the first of its kind in the
Western world and is patterned on a successful
Japanese plan initiated in 1963.")
Investigation of Irregularities in Drug Samples
(COLOMBIA)--TNDD, No. L/7368, pp. 71-77.
"Thailand Connection Trial" Ends, Top Drug Traffickers
Convicted (ISRAEL)--TNDD, No. L/7368, pp. 111-114.
(This article deals with "the seizure of the
largest shipment of heroin to date in Israel and
the conviction of Israel's two foremost drug
traffickers.")
University President Interviewed on Drug Traffic
(FRANCE)--TNDD, No. L/7368, pp. 116-122. (A
translation of an article in Le NouveZ Observateur
by Gerard Petitjean.)
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28 September 1977
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Heroin Trade Booms in Britain (UNITED KINGDOM)--TNDD,
No. L/7368, pp. 126-128. ("Officially, Britain
had only 2,932 addicts at the end of 1976. But
. . the Coordinator of the Standing Conference
on Drug Abuse (an unofficial organization). . .
suggests a total of between 5,000 and 7,000.")
Increased Turkish Role in Drug Trade Reported (WEST
GERMANY)--TNDD, No. L/7368, pp. 133-134. (Ac-
cording to the Federal Criminal Police Bureau
in Wiesbaden, ". . . as late as 1976. . . more than
80 percent of the heroin confiscated in Germany had
been imported from the Far East, predominantly by
Chinese and Malysian couriers, while this year more
than 60 percent of the confiscated heroin has come
from the Middle East and has been brought in by
Turks.")
Worsening Drug Situation Reported (WEST GERMANY)--TNDD,
No. L/7368, pp. 135-137. ("In 1978, the govern-
ment wants to start: a new program, with which
youths endangered by drugs can be enlisted and
attended to as early as possible. Emphasis is
now on prevention."')
Berlin's Drug Problem Examined (WEST GERMANY)--TNDD,
No. L/7368, pp. 138-140. ("In the first 7 months
of this year, as many as 54 persons have died
from drugs in Berlin--as many as the entire pre-
vious year.")
PS SNIN 77-020
28 September 1977
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