INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS DEVELOPMENTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00912A001800010016-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 19, 2009
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: July 20, 1977
• Content Type: NOTES

J /O
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP79T00912A001800010016-3
P. r. r P, t
International Narcotics Developments
State Department review completed
DOJ Review Completed.
Secret 202
PS SNIN 77-015
20 July 1977
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP79T00912A001800010016-3
 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO01800010016-3
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO01800010016-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP79T00912A001800010016-3
INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS DEVELOPMENTS
20 July 1977
CONTENTS
GOLDEN TRIANGLE: Expansion of Impure Morphine
Base Production and Trade . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
COLOMBIA: Strengthening Narcotics Control
Efforts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
NETHERLANDS: Fighting the Drug Traffic. . . . . . . 9
NOTEWORTHY POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
1. Pakistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2. Thailand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3. North Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4. Turkey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
BRIEFS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
This publication is prepared by analysts in the Directorate of Intelligence for
specialists in the Washington community who are interested in international nar-
cotics matters. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to the
authors of the individual articles.
PS SNIN 77-015
20 July 1977
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP79T00912A001800010016-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO01800010016-3
Northern Shan State: Impure Morphine Base (PITZU) Refineries and Destinations of Shipments
during January-June 1977
-"tn,laiouil~j
Lake f/
BURMA
Mandalay, -"'
S4an /stc\
hall
ang
!
Chiang
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO01800010016-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP79TOO912AO01800010016-3
GOLDEN TRIANGLE: Expansion of Impure Morphine
Base Production and Trade
Production of, and traffic in, impure morphine base
(pitzu) increased during the first six months of 1977 in
the Golden Triangle.
many aci -
sties located on the Burma-Thailand border at normally
produce heroin have also shifted to converting raw opium
into impure morphine base. This is apparently an effort
to reduce the bulkiness of their narcotics inventories
and facilitate storage.
Six of the privately owned refineries in the northern
Shan State are located in areas under the control of the
Kachin Independence Army (KIA). The KIA protects these
facilities and in return collects taxes on their opera-
tions. A considerable portion of the base produced in
these refineries has been purchased by the Shan United
Army (SUA) and placed in storage in the northern Shan
State. The SUA has been the only organization purchasing
bulk quantities of impure morphine base since the end of
February. Previously, most private traffickers attempted
to market their base in the Lashio area with very limited
success and at low prices.
Despite large-scale purchases by the SUA since Feb-
ruary, the bulk of the impure morphine base shipments to
the Thai border has been transported by private traffickers.
During the first six months of 1977, a little over 4 tons
of impure morphine base was shipped out of the northern
Shan State compared to 3 tons for the same period of 1976.
April 1977 was the high point for these shipments when some
3 tons departed from the north.
A large part of the impure morphine base reaching the
Burma-Thailand border is believed to have gone into storage.
As of the beginning of April at least 1.5 tons was reported
to be in storage of which about one ton was under control
of the SUA.
PS SNIN 77-015
20 July 1977
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO01800010016-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO01800010016-3
SECRET
The increased emphasis on the production and trade
in impure morphine base probably results from the desire
by traffickers, particularly the SUA, to reduce the risk
of interdiction by the Burmese army. Conversion of raw
opium into impure morphine base reduces the bulk and
allows the use of porters, the currently preferred method
of transporting.
The SUA caches of impure morphine base were a major
target of the recent Mohein III operation conducted by
the Burmese army. It garnered only insignificant quan-
tities of morphine base, apparently because these stocks
were transferred to the Thai side of the border and con-
cealed in new locations.
PS SNIN 77-015
20 July 1977
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO01800010016-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP79T00912A001800010016-3
COLOMBIA: Strengthening Narcotics Control Efforts
Relations between Washington and Bogota appear to
have been strengthened--at least with regard to joint
drug control efforts--as a result of last month's meeting
between First Lady Rosalynn Carter and President Lopez.
Since then, Lopez has met with other US envoys and drug
experts to discuss the narcotics problem in Colombia. A
number of positive developments have already begun to
unfold.
At Lopez' urging, the US has agreed to give the
Colombians $3.7 million worth of equipment, including
three helicopters, to try to curb the flow of cocaine
and other drugs to North America. Lopez also has agreed
to a meeting this week with high-level officials from
Washington to discuss the sensitive issue of drug-related
corruption in his government.
The emphasis in all of the narcotics dialogues has
centered primarily on the cocaine problem. However, in
the wake of recent widespread media coverage in Colombia
on the extensive cultivation of marijuana in the Guajira
region, Lopez has specifically requested US technical
assistance for a herbicide spray eradication program
similar to the one currently under way in Mexico.
Colombian police officials estimate that as many as
30,000 hectares of marijuana may be under cultivation.
Preliminary reports from a US drug control expert indicate
that 90 percent of the crop would be susceptible to
aerial spraying without danger to humans or legitimate
agricultural crops. A pioneer in aerial spraying, Colom-
bia has the necessary equipment, chemicals, and personnel
to launch its own eradication campaign. It is likely,
however, that the initial request for technical assistance
from the US will be followed by a request for financial
and material support as well.
Although marijuana eradication has a low priority
for the US, it is a major concern to the government of
PS SNIN 77-015
20 July 1977
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP79T00912A001800010016-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO01800010016-3
SLCR ET
COLOMBIA: Major Drug Producing Areas
CANAL
ZONE
Marijuana
growing area
L IG(J DE
, AIM I R I C.' 1 ll f(~
NETHERLANDS
ANTILLES
WILLEMSTAD
V E NE Z U E L A
CAQUETA
PERU
\VAUPS
150
KILOMETERS
PS SNIN 77-015
20 July 1977
GUAINiA
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO01800010016-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO01800010016-3
SECRET
Colombia in terms of domestic abuse, political embarrass-
ment, and as a major contributing factor to the lawlessness
of the Guajira region. In view of the growing evidence
of opium cultivation in Colombia, there is a possibility
that at some later date the US may find it desirable to
encourage the Colombians to initiate aerial spraying
against the poppy fields and even coca bushes elsewhere.
While coca is not grown extensively in Colombia,
local traffickers might be constrained to increase cul-
tivation--particularly if crop substitution programs and
more stringent enforcement measures in Peru and Bolivia
result in a reduction of coca leaves.
~An eradication cam-
paign in Colombia against marijuana would not only set a
precedent, but also allay suspicions and fears of both
official and public sectors about possible deleterious
effects of a larger scale herbicide spray program.
PS SNIN 77-015
20 July 1977
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO01800010016-3
 25X6 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO01800010016-3
Next 2 Page(s) In Document Denied
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO01800010016-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO01800010016-3
SECRET
NETHERLANDS: Fighting the Drug Traffic
Dutch police believe their efforts to control the
domestic heroin trade are paying off. The campaign has
included strengthened drug squads, record drug seizures
by police and customs officials, and tougher penalties
for trafficking. According to Amsterdam Police Commis-
sioner Toorenaar, however, the single biggest factor in
shutting down the heroin flow has been a program to de-
port illegal Chinese residents.
The legal Chinese community in Amsterdam numbers less
than 2,000 people; by November 1976, there were also
10,000 illegal Chinese, many of them involved in narcotics
smuggling from Asia. Since the police crackdown began
in November the number of illegals has dwindled to about
1,000. At the same time, the price of a gram of Chinese
heroin--"brown sugar"--rose markedly, a sure indication
that supplies were being cut off. The Dutch also intend
to cooperate with other European narcotics officers to
ensure that the deported Chinese do not turn up elsewhere
on the continent.
Although the Dutch have shied away from directly
committing money to the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse
Control (UNFDAC), they have joined the international fight
to reduce drug supplies. In June, the Dutch government
announced the financing of a research project at the Inter-
national Trade Center aimed at finding markets for agricul-
tural products coming from UNFDAC's crop replacement pro-
grams, particularly those in Thailand. Development Coopera-
tion Minister Pronk also said he intended to give money
through the UN Development Program to projects that include
crop replacement in Pakistan and Afghanistan.
PS SNIN 77-015
20 July 1977
9
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO01800010016-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP79T00912A001800010016-3
SECRET
NOTEWORTHY POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
(Editor's Note: These items, produced for
other CIA publications, do not deal specifi-
caZZy with international narcotics. They
are included, however, because they concern
developing situations that could impact ad-
versely on the international narcotics con-
trol effort.)
PAKISTAN: Prospects for Elections
Pakistan's new military government has stated re-
peatedly that it will hold elections in early October
and that it will surrender power to civilians soon
thereafter. The process, however, may prove consider-
ably more difficult than the generals expected when they
seized power two weeks ago. Chief Martial Law Adminis-
trator Zia-ul-Haq said in a press conference last week
that the law and order situation would have to be "per-
fect" to hold a fair election. The military has already
taken steps to limit expected campaign violence. The
campaign will be relatively short, some activities such
as processions will be banned, and the military is try-
ing to collect weapons from potential demonstrators.
Whether the campaign is violent enough to force cancel-
lation of the election will depend more on the politi-
cians than on precautions the military takes.
There has been speculation that former Prime Min-
ister Bhutto--whose followers could create widespread
turmoil--might seek to prevent the election. One strat-
egy open to Bhutto is to boycott the election and thus
to present the military with a choice between cancella-
tion and a meaningless vote. Many Pakistanis believe
Bhutto is certain to lose, and he might reason that an
extended period of military rule is to his advantage.
Bhutto now seems prepared, however, to contest the elec-
tion--with "imperialists and reactionaries" two of his
main targets. The US, which he has accused of interfer-
ing in Pakistani politics, could well be one scapegoat.
PS SNIN 77-015
20 July 1977
10
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP79T00912A001800010016-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO01800010016-3
SECRET
With the military coup, the opposition Pakistan Na-
tional Alliance gained its original demands for Bhutto's
removal and a new election. The alliance, however, is
suspicious of Zia, who was generally regarded as Bhutto's
man and who has made some public statements since the
military takeover that could be interpreted as favoring
Bhutto. Speculation that the coup was actually ordered
by Bhutto is probably baseless. Even if Bhutto and Zia
were acting together, pressure on Zia from other senior
officers would probably prevent him from carrying out
his part of the deal.
The opposition will regard Zia's willingness to
carry out several promises as indications of his sincer-
ity. Zia promised to withdraw troops now fighting pro-
opposition tribes in Baluchistan province. Bhutto's
party swept this opposition stronghold in the last elec-
tion after the opposition boycotted it asserting that a
fair election there was impossible. Zia, however, quali-
fied his promise, saying that the withdrawal should not
be so precipitous as to create a vacuum. The military
might move too slowly to satisfy the Alliance.
Zia also promised soon to release leading politi-
cians from both sides who are still in custody. He may,
however, try to delay as long as he can in hopes of post-
poning the unofficial opening of the election campaign.
Some opposition leaders are unhappy with Zia's decision
not to release Khan Abdul Wali Khan, a leading opposi-
tion figure who was jailed in 1975 on charges of plot-
ting the secession of the two provinces along the Afghan
border. Zia has announced that the Federal Security
Force will be reorganized, but the opposition will want
major changes in this paramilitary organization generally
regarded as loyal to Bhutto--if not its disbanding. Zia
has also appointed a respected judge as chief election
commissioner. The opposition will judge the commission
more by the other members--not yet named--and the exact
powers given the commission.
Even if the military does hold an election, the re-
sults may give it second thoughts about handing over
power. An Alliance victory would threaten to give con-
trol of the two frontier provinces to politicians whom
many in the military regard as separatists. A close
PS SNIN 77-015
20 July 1977
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO01800010016-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP79T00912A001800010016-3
SECRET
race, or a surfacing of the deep differences among the
nine parties in an Alliance government, would threaten
instability. A victory by Bhutto would raise charges
of collusion between Bhutto and the army, and the Alli-
ance might take to the streets again.
At this stage, the military seems determined to
hand over power, and no senior officer now seems to
have any desire to perpetuate military rule. Despite
the difficulties it could face, the military will prob-
ably make every effort to establish civilian rule, even
if both the election and the new government have serious
flaws. It is possible, however, that by October the
military might conclude that either the election or the
subsequent transfer of power will have to be delayed.
General Kriangsak of Thailand: Rising Star or Burning
Meteor
General Kriangsak Chamanan, deputy supreme commander
of the Thai armed forces, has emerged as one of the key
figures in the military-civilian group now governing
Thailand, and there are signs that he harbors ambitions
for even greater political power. But it is questionable
whether he has enough support within the politically
factionalized Thai army to become the strongman the army
appears to be seeking.
Since the death in April 1976 of General Krit Siwara,
the Thai military strongman and former acting supreme
commander of the armed forces, the Thai military has
lacked a dominant personality. Krit had the support of
politicians, businessmen, and the military. He exerted
considerable behind-the-scenes influence on military and
political affairs and was the only soldier with enough
prestige to have had any real chance of planning and
executing a military takeover. His control of the army
PS SNIN 77-015
20 July 1977
12
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP79T00912A001800010016-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP79T00912A001800010016-3
SECRET
and commitment to the civilian government, moreover,
protected Thailand's democratic "experiment." Krit's
death inaugurated a period of instability within the
armed forces marked by factional maneuvering on the part
of several key leaders.
Although the pre-emptive coup of October 1976 by the
armed service chiefs demonstrated some unity at the senior
command level of the military, the members of the mili-
tary council, which was established to guide and control
the civilian government, almost immediately began jockey-
ing for influence. Moreover, those right-wing elements
frozen out of power by the October coup have since been
plotting from the sidelines; on March 26 General Chalat
Hiranyasiri attempted to seize the government. This ef-
fort was foiled when only a small. fraction of the military
would support him.
Continuing unhappiness within the middle ranks of
the military led to the unprecedented, but unsuccessful,
attempt by several junior officers in early June to
pressure army Commander in Chief General Soem Na Nakhon
into forcing Prime Minister Thanin to make changes in
his cabinet. The army would like to replace Thanin, who
has proven too rigidly doctrinaire for their taste; at
a minimum, they are determined to force out some of his
ministers.
Within the unsettled atmosphere of military infight-
ing, aggravated by a glaring lack of both military and
civilian leadership, it is natural for everyone to be
looking for an individual with the charisma or a network
of loyalties to pull it all together. Is Kriangsak
the one?
Kriangsak was one of the central figures in both
defusing the March 1977 coup attempt and the events of
early June. As secretary general and perhaps the most
intelligent and dynamic member of the Prime Minister's
Advisory Council (PMAC)--the principal instrument through
which the Thai military supervises and controls the Thanin
cabinet--Kriangsak's views on most issues are likely to
prevail.
Kriangsax s power an in uence have been growing since
October 1976, and that he may now see himself as prime
PS SNIN 77-015
20 July 1977
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP79T00912A001800010016-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO01800010016-3
ministerial timber. It is not clear how he proposes to
realize this ambition, if indeed it is a serious goal.
Kriangsak is likely to be appointed supreme commander
of the armed forces on September 30, 1977 and is not
scheduled to retire until. September 30, 1979. Should he
desire to retain power after 1979, he would have to de-
velop a strong independent power base from which he could
barter for an influential position in the government.
Kriangsak has actively supported Thanin during the
eight months he has held office, arguing for patience
in the face of growing army hostility, but in recent
weeks he has grown outspokenly critical of the Prime
Minister. The eroding support for Thanin within the
military and among the public, combined with Kriangsak's
newly apparent dissatisfaction with the Prime Minister,
argues for some rearranging of the government in the
near future. The King's continuing support of Thanin,
however, is a major obstacle to any effort to remove him.
Kriangsak would have difficulty gaining the pre-
miership or even a role in Thai politics equal to Krit's.
First, he does not have the broad military support
essential to a successful bid for power, nor does he
have any troops under his direct control. Military
coup leaders have traditionally come out of the army's
First Division--the Bangkok garrison. A coup attempt
without the support of the Bangkok commanders is not
likely to succeed, as General Chalat discovered. In
order to organize a coup attempt, Kriangsak would have
to form an alliance with one or more of the Bangkok area
commanders. Second, he is not as popular as Krit was
within the military. Kriangsak would have to overcome
the distaste of many important army officers, whose ani-
mosity would probably grow as his power increased. Fi-
nally, the King, whose backing is now virtually essential
for anyone making a bid for power, is reportedly not in-
clined to support an abrogation of the current Thai po-
litical system and a return to direct military rule.
These factors will confront Kriangsak should he make
a bid for greater and extended power in Thailand. None
is insurmountable, but each poses problems and may, at
a minimum, cause his consolidation of power to be spread
PS SNIN 77-015
20 July 1977
14
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO01800010016-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO01800010016-3
SECRET
North Korea: A Review of Its Connections With
Terrorist, Subversive, and Insurgent Movements
North Korea hit the headlines and acquired its pub-
lic reputation as a patron of terrorism and subversion
in 1970 and 1971.
--In March 1970, nine Japan Red Army (JRA) members
hijacked a JAL aircraft with the express intent
of going to North Korea. Pyongyang gave the nine
asylum and retained the YS-11 craft.
--In March 1971, Mexico revealed that it had un-
covered a subversive group, the Revolutionary
Action Movement (MAR), whose members had been
trained in and received financial backing from
North Korea. When the MAR was broken up, it was
apparently about to embark on a program of syn-
chronized terrorism.
--In April 1971, Sri Lanka expelled the North Korean
embassy and suspended diplomatic relations in
response to government suspicions that Pyongyang
was helping fund a then-current insurgency. Some
reports claimed that North Korea had obtained the
funds through its local black-market operations.
While Pyongyang neither invited nor welcomed the JRA
hijacking, the developments in Ceylon and Mexico grew out
of established government policies. By 1968, North Korea
was inviting foreign groups and individuals to receive
guerrilla warfare training in Korea and was directing its
missions in the free world to maintain contacts with local
underground movements. The training program and the cul-
tivation of contacts among subversives and terrorists
continue today, although North Korea has been more cau-
tious in recent years, seeking where possible to avoid
actions that might threaten state-to-state relations.
The Motivations
There is no record--either public or private--that
Pyongyang applauds or intentionally supports the acts of
PS SNIN 77-015
20 July 1977
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO01800010016-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO01800010016-3
transnational terrorism executed by such groups as the
JRA or the fedayeen. Yet North Korea offers material
aid to these groups, as well as to a host of other groups
and individuals that are inclined to use violence. In
general, this willingness to deal with terrorists, sub-
versives, and insurgents reflects the desire of a commu-
nist state to prove its revolutionary credentials.
There are other motivations as well.
--Expertise in commando and guerrilla training is
one of the few salable commodities or services
that North Korea has. The training of terrorists,
particularly on the scale conducted in Korea it-
self, serves as a form of material foreign aid
and may also be a currency earner for Pyongyang.
--Contacts with terrorists and subversives are a
natural by-product of North Korean efforts to
strengthen party-to-party relations with commu-
nist movements abroad. This is particularly ap-
plicable in areas, such as Latin America, where
communist parties are not legitimate.
--Dealings with underground groups intertwine with
North Korea's wide--scale blackmarketing and drug
trafficking abroad, a practice that appears de-
signed primarily to finance diplomatic operations
overseas.
--Many subversives supply North Korea with desired
support--especially in the formation of friend-
ship societies and the publication of propaganda--
for furthering Pyongyang's political objectives
abroad.
--Pyongyang may believe that its contacts with the
JRA will eventually prove useful in its own cam-
paign of subversion against South Korea. Pyong-
yang has been willing to employ tactics of terror
against Seoul, but North Korea views these acts as
a domestic matter quite removed from international
terrorism.
Record of Contacts
North Korea's most extensive dealings with a terrorist
group have been with the Popular Front for the Liberation
PS SNIN 77-015
20 July 1977
16
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO01800010016-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP79T00912A001800010016-3
SECRET
of Palestine (PFLP). This group apparently first at-
tempted to secure military and financial assistance in
1969, but it was not until September 1970, when George
Habbash visited North Korea, that Pyongyang agreed to an
aid program.
In the Persian Gulf area, North Korea in the early
1970s apparently supplied small quantities of weapons
and foodstuffs to the Popular Front for the Liberation
of Oman, a South Yemeni supported insurgency group active
in the Dhofar region of Oman until December 1975. A small
number of Dhofari rebels may have received training in
Korea.
Korean involvement with the Somali-sponsored insur-
gency against the Ogaden region of Ethiopia grew out of
a July 1970 visit to Pyongyang by Vice President Abokar.
Dealings with Latin American extremists have covered
both personnel operating in their home countries and
others living in exile. In a number of cases, Cuba--with
which North Korea has close working relations--has facil-
itated the contact. Among the groups that are reported
PS SNIN 77-015
20 July 1977
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP79T00912A001800010016-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO01800010016-3
SECRET
to have received training in Korea are the communist
parties of the Dominican Republic, Colombia, and Guate-
mala, the National Liberation Army (ELN) of Colombia,
and the Marxist-Leninist Revolutionary Nucleus (MLRN)--an
exile group based in Europe. As of mid-1976, North Korea
was using its trade mission in Lima for contacts with the
Peruvian Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR). Buenos
Aires suspected, but was unable to develop hard evidence,
that North Korea was using its embassy to materially aid
local guerrillas. These suspicions contributed to the
Argentinian decision to break relations with Pyongyang
in June.
North Korean relations with the JRA are a subject
of particular confusion; the scope of contacts is often
exaggerated. There is, for example, no basis for oc-
casional press reports that Pyongyang offered asylum in
three major acts of JRA terrorism. It only gave asylum
in the case of the March 1970 hijacking from Japan.*
Eight of the nine hijackers were still in North Korea
as of late 1976,** but there is no good information link-
ing their presence there to recent Korean dealings with
the JRA. Pyongyang's major contacts appear to be handled
via meetings between activist Taketomo Takahashi and Yi
Chol-ho, second secretary at the North Korean embassy in
East Berlin.
Nondirective Support
Although reports of North Korean intent to target
the JRA or other terrorists against South Korea surface
*In January-February 1974, during the prolonged seizure
of a SheZZ Oil refinery in Singapore by two Japanese and
two Arabs, the terrorists requested safe haven at the local
North Korean consulate. The incident ended abruptly, how-
ever, before a response from Pyongyang was received. North
Korea played no role--during or after--the JRA's seizure of
the French embassy in The Hague in September 1974.
The whereabouts of the group leader, Takamaro Tamiya,
cannot be confirmed. There are several reports citing
his alleged presence in Europe.
PS SNIN 77-015
20 July 1977
18
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO01800010016-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO01800010016-3
ack.n t i
with nearly predictable regularity, evidence does not
exist to support a view that Pyongyang can direct the
activities of any of the extremists to whom it offers
material aid and training. In fact, this lack of direc-
tive support is the most outstanding characteristic of
North Korea's performance as a patron state of interna-
tional terrorism. Pyongyang does rely on the use of sub-
version and terrorism to advance its reunification scenario
vis-a-vis South Korea, but in these endeavors it uses its
own citizens or members of the pro - North Korean Chosen
Soren (Federation of Koreans Resident in Japan).
North Korean support to terrorists and subversives
abroad is an integral part of government policy on for-
eign relations, but Pyongyang does not essentially view
international terrorist activity as a useful tool for
advancing its key policy interests.
TURKEY: New Coalition Government
Turkish Prime Minister - designate Demirel has ap-
parently reached agreement with two small right-wing
parties to reassemble the "nationalist front" government
that held power prior to the country's recent parlia-
mentary election. In a press statement July 19,
Demirel, leader of the Justice Party, implied that the
coalition parties have apportioned ministerial portfolios
and that only the relatively straightforward matter of
matching names and positions remained to be addressed.
He said he hoped to present a cabinet list to President
Koruturk July 20.
If events flow as smoothly as Demirel hopes, Turkey
could have a government by the end of the month. Despite
his dislike of National Salvation Party leader Erbakan,
who will be part of the coalition, Koruturk would have
little reason not to approve Demirel's cabinet, because
the three parties in the coalition control a majority of
seats in the lower house. After receiving presidential
PS SNIN 77-015
20 July 1977
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO01800010016-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO01800010016-3
approval, the government would then have a week to pub-
lish its program, and parliamentary debate and a vote
of confidence would ensue.
Turkey's closely divided electorate will not greet
the announcement of a Demirel government enthusiastically.
Many in Turkey have reservations about the country being
governed again by a coalition that during more than two
and a, half years in power proved largely incapable of
focusing on the country's many problems.
The leader of Turkey's largest labor confederation
said last week that if the Demirel government won a
vote of confidence he would lead a general strike until
it fell. There are other indications that the left is
already chafing at the prospect of several more years
of rightist rule.
PS SNIN 77-015
20 July 1977
20
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO01800010016-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP79T00912A001800010016-3
SECRET
THAILAND: Thai Narcotics Suppression Police on July 14
arrested a major narcotics trafficker and in a re-
lated raid seized over 140 kilograms of heroin and
morphine. A Thai police official described the
drug seizure as the biggest ever made in Thailand.
The man arrested is described as one of the top
traffickers in Thailand and reportedly was involved
in an international drug ring for over 10 years.
This arrest and seizure is another indication of
the seriousness with which the Thai government is
attacking the drug problem.
THAILAND: Next month Thai authorities will burn 284
kilograms (625 pounds) of heroin seized in drug
trafficking cases during recent years. According
to a Thai official the heroin was confiscated dur-
ing 1973 and 1974. Other seizures are still under
investigation and will be destroyed later. A ton
of morphine base is being held for possible sale
to pharmaceutical companies.
TURKEY: The opium poppy straw harvest is continuing on
schedule with continuing indications of a bumper
crop. In some areas, storage space is already be-
coming a problem. In one growing area there are
reports that the poppy capsules are smaller than
usual and are turning black. Too much fertilizer
and too little rain may have been the cause of
these unexpected phenomena. The possible effect on
the morphine content of the poppies is under study,
but as yet there is no indication of serious concern.
The extent of the problem is not known.
PS SNIN 77-015
20 July 1977
21
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP79T00912A001800010016-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO01800010016-3
SECRET
ECUADOR: Earlier this year the passage of a Supreme
Decree law constituted a major breakthrough on the
destruction of seized drugs in Ecuador. According
to the new law, only a small sample of confiscated
drugs is to be held for the courts, while the rest
is tagged for immediate destruction. This was one
of the US' objectives in the 1977 narcotics assis-
tance program for Ecuador. Previously there had
been numerous instances in which confiscated drugs
were resold by corrupt officials. Apparently, how-
ever, the various Ecuadorean enforcement components
charged with drug control have complied with the
governmental decree in every case since its promul-
gation.
NORWAY: The government of Norway has given $5.4 million
from its Development Aid Funds to the UN Fund for
Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC) to help reduce illicit
opium production in Burma. The funds will be used
to help finance the UN's crop substitution program
in Burma over the next five years. Apart from the
US contributions, this is the largest single pledge
to the Fund since its inception in 1971, and is
viewed by US representatives in Geneva as a signif-
icant breakthrough in UNFDAC efforts to solicit
contributions for the Fund. The $6.5 million UN
pilot program in Burma includes plans to get Bur-
mese farmers to replace opium cultivation with
other crops and animal breeding.
ITALY: Police at Rome's Leonardo da Vinci International
Airport recently confiscated 1,433 pounds of hash-
ish, worth more than $2 million, aboard a
Pakistani jetliner. The plane had arrived from
Karachi with a stopover in Damascus, and the drugs
were discovered during a routine check of the plane
by police "sniffer" dogs. The "hash" was found
hidden in 10 cases which purportedly contained
souvenirs bound for Sweden.
PS SNIN 77-015
20 July 1977
22
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO01800010016-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP79T00912A001800010016-3
SECRET
400 Kilograms of Confiscated Heroin To Be Burned (THAI-
LAND)--TNDD*, No. 308, July 1, 1977, p. 9.
Police Seize Two Cocaine Laboratories, Break Up Gang
(CHILE)--TNDD, No. 308, pp. 17-18.
More on "World's Largest" Marijuana Plantation (COLOMBIA)--
TNDD, No. 308, pp. 21-25.
Tapia: Priavte, Public Corruption Encourages Drugs (MEX-
ICO)--TNDD, No. 308, pp. 34-35.
Amsterdam Faces Increase in Drug-Induced Crimes (NETHER-
LANDS)--TNDD, No. 308, pp. 51-54.
Effects of Drug Addiction Recounted (BRAZIL)--TNDD, No.
309, July 8, 1977, pp. 24-30.
Marijuana, Weapons, Traffickers Seized in Sonora (MEXICO)
--TNDD, No. 309, pp. 45-46.
Seizures of Heroin, Opium, Hashish in 1976 Reported (IRAN)
--TNDD, No. 309, pp. 58-60.
Heroin Smuggling Ring Smashed in Sydney (AUSTRALIA)--TNDD,
No. 310, July 14, 1977, p. 2.
Japanese Police To Launch Massive Antidrug Drive in July
(JAPAN)--TNDD, No. 310, p. 16.
Seizure of Marijuana, Weapons in Maranhao (BRAZIL) --TNDD,
No. 310, pp. 43-44.
PS SNIN 77-015
20 July 1977
23
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP79T00912A001800010016-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP79T00912A001800010016-3
SECRET
Poor Prosecution Record Against Traffickers Probed (COLOM-
BIA)--TNDD, No. 310, pp. 46-49.
Furniture Factory Fronts for Traffickers (COLOMBIA)--TNDD,
No. 310, pp. 50-53.
Drug Addiction Is 8.3 Percent Among Youths (COLOMBIA)--
TNDD, No. 310, pp. 71-73.
Cuzco Invaded by "Hippies" (PERU)--TNDD, No. 310, pp.89-96.
(Colonies in the Sacred Valley become a "drug
paradise.")
PS SNIN 77-015
20 July 1977
24
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP79T00912A001800010016-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO01800010016-3
Secret
Secret
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO01800010016-3