INDONESIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00890A001100060031-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 27, 2006
• Sequence Number: 31
• Publication Date: June 24, 1959
• Content Type: BRIEF

Hpprovea r- or Keiease zuuyiu ii is : uiH-KUriyKuuoSjuHUU i iuuuouusi-a ,
NSC BRIEFING 24 June 1959
1. Latest political crisis in Indonesia continues with all political
elements awaiting President Sukarno's return next Monday from
current globetrot.
II. Present predicament caused when Constituent Assembly on 2 June re-
jected Sukarno's request for readoption of 1945 constitution which
would increase his powers. Army then banned all political activity,
A. Sukarno had requested 1945 constitution to promote his vague
concept of ""guided democracy's which he believes will somehow
simplify Indonesia's problems.
III. Only two major barriers holding Communists in check in Indonesia.
A. one is army which/ has generally maintained order in densely
populated Java where Communists have their major strength.
Army has obstructed Communist influence in government.
B. Second is Sukarno's current distrust of Communists and his
present willingness to depend on army for his principal sup-
port.
IV. On other hand three great problems face Indonesian government.
A. Energetic, well-organized Communist party now believed to be
largest in Indonesia; party avoids army repression by strongly
supporting Sukarno and is making significant progress at
village level.
B. Large-scale insurgency, most significant of which s provincial
J :i " NT NQ
rebellion in Sumatra and Celebes.
Approved For Release 2009/01/15: CIA-RDP79R0089OA001100060031-5
 Approved For Release 2009/01/15: CIA-RDP79R0089OA001100060031-5
C. Deteriorating economy which Communists can openly exploit
whenever army restrictions are removed and from which even now
they undoubtedly are winning sympathy and members.
V. In attempting to deal with these problems, Indonesian Government
is hamstrung by following:
A. Poorly organized and relatively ineffective non-Communist po-
litical parties.
B. ;ukarno's passion for power without responsibility, his disre-
gard of economic facts and his galavanting around the world.
1. Despite Sukarno's irresponsibility, however, his popular
position is unassailable as it derives from his identity
with the "national revolution."
VI Present impasse in Constituent Assembly is particularly unfortunate
because it puts Communist party in favorable position again.
A. Communists support his request for '45 constitution.
If Sukarno gets '45 constitution Communists will take credit
and will benefit in public mind from this association with him
and his embodiment of nationalism.
Approved For Release 2009/01/15: CIA-RDP79R0089OA001100060031-5
 Approved For Release 2009/01/15: CIA-RDP79R0089OA001100060031-5
-.00SOMMM-17 -I
vrrr, Economic situation has continued to deteriorate.
I` r FL i CT /_- p IN 92vu~~u
A. Deterioration I
inflation.
B. Chief pinch is among city dwellers--laborers, white collar
workers, and even armed forces, all groups which are major
Communist targets.
IX. Despite present difficulties, government heavily mortgaging future
by program of large-scale economic development and military pur-
chases from the Bloc.
Provincial rebellion goes on with little chance of either nego-
tiated settlement or decisive victory for either side in sight.
XI. Principal danger in situation is that army will be unable to con-
tinue its holding action against Communists.
A. Sukarno, in effort to get '45 constitution and "guided demo-
cracy," may use Communist support and tolerate increased Com-
munist activity, thereby seriously undermining army's position.
Approved For Release 2009/01/15: CIA-RDP79R0089OA001100060031-5