WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A011200020001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 2, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 10, 1975
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Secret
Weekly Summary
Secret
No. 0041 /75
October 10, 1975
COPY N~ 71
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~dEEKL'Y SU~AMARY, issued every friday rnarning by the
eveloPments of the week thraiph noon on Thursday. It
qtly ineludes material coordinated. with or Prepared
t~ffiee of Econamic Researchb the C}ffice of Strate~ie
ssreh, the {office of ~eograplsic and Cartac~raphic
arch, arciente and Tecf:noloay.
sulised se#xarately cis pedal FtePorts are listed in
Portugal: Military Dissidence
USSR-Portugal: Costa Gomes' Visit
Austria: Socialist Majority
10 Lebanon: Truce Shattered
10 Spanish Sahara: Moroccan Plans
13 Syria: Stiffening Posture
13 Angola: Getting Ready
14 Egypt: Student Critics
15 [3angladesh: Progress Report
lEi Nigeria: Promises, Promises
1 i Uruguay: The Piresidency
1& Argentina: Peron's Return
20 Latin America - US Relations
2l. Surinam: Toward Independence
CONTENTS (October 10, 1975)
USSR -East ermany: rea y
25X6
MIDDLE EAST
AFRICA
WESTERN
HEMISPHERE
EAST ASIA
PACIFIC
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USSR: HARVEST PROSPECTS LOWER
Widespread use of unripened grain for
forage, abandonment of low-yielding acreage,
and lower than expected yields in the European
USSR have sharply lowered prospects for the 1975
Soviet grain crop. Production will probably be
only 155 to 165 million tons, even worse than the
poor harvest of 168.2 million tons in 1972.
Moscow over the next year will be searching
world markets for large quantities of both grain
and meat.
With the harvest nearly completed, more
than 15 million hectares of the total sown area of
131 million hectares probably will not be
harvested as mature grain. The loss of pasture and
forage crops because of drought apparently led
the Soviets to cut a large area of immature grain
for green feed or to use the area for grazing
livestock. The wide range in estimated production
of 155 to 165 million tons reflects uncertainty
about yields on this acreage.
Reduced prospects for the crop worsen the
already serious situation in both grain and meat.
Moscow has so far purchased about 20 million
tons of foreign grain. A crop of 160 million tons,
for example, would still leave the USSR more than
30 million tons below requirements for this
marketing year, ending June 30, even if the
Soviets draw from their grain stocks.
Moscow cannot find this much additional
grain in the international market and is taking
steps at home to cope with the shortfall. Official
data indicate that slaughtering of livestock has
begun, with inventories of hogs, sheep, and
poultry falling noticeably. Although this action
will yield ashort-term benefit for the consumer, it
will have undesirable consequences.
? Because meat processing capacity
and storage are limited and the distribution
system is antiquated, substantial waste and
spoilage will result.
? To meet long-term plans, herds will
have to be rebuilt next year, jeopardizing
1976-77 consumption goals.
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Moscow almost certainly will contract for
large amounts of foreign meat next year. Ample
supplies will be available from Argentina,
Australia, and the EC. Purchases of 1 million
tons-double the 1974 level-would cost the
Soviets an Estimated $1 billion in foreign ex-
change and would provide a 7-percent boost to
Soviet domestic supplies.
The am~~unt of uncommitted non-US grain
that the Soviets can still purchase for delivery by
July 1, 1976 is only 3 to 3.3 million tons. This
assumes that traditional trade patterns are not
altered and current crop production forecasts
hold. The extent to which foreign exporters
oversell to the Soviets will reduce availability to
traditional customers. These customers would
seek to make up the shortfall by purchasing US
grain.
Of the total available supplies, only about
cane third, or 1 million tons, is wheat and- the
remainder, feed grains. The single most important
supplier is Argentina, with 1.3 to 1.4 million tons.
The Soviets and Argentines reportedly are
negotiating a new grain purchase. Supplies
available for shipment by July 1 from other origins
are more limited.
By October 1, the Soviets had purchased
some 20 million tons of grain-10.4 million tons of
US grain and 9.85 million tons from other sources.
In future negotiations the USSR will likely find
itself competing with East European countries for
the same supplies.
25X6
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SECRET
USSR -EAST GERMANY: TREATY
The 25-year friendship treaty signed by the
Soviet Union and East Germany on Tuesday is
another attempt by Moscow to legitimize the
division of Germany and to justify Soviet
hegemony in Eastern Europe. It may serve as a
model for the future revision of corresponding
treaties with other East European states.
The new agreement replaces a 20-year accord
signed in 1964 that was to remain in effect unless a
German peace treaty was signed or Germany was
reunited. The Soviets clearly believe that the
Helsinki agrec~ment is a surrogate for a German
peace treaty. wloreover, both the new friendship
treaty and 8'~rezhnev's remarks preceding its
signature make plain that the European status quo
is now considered frozen and that any possibility
for German reunification, peaceful or otherwise,
is out of the question. References in the treaty to
East Germany as a "sovereign independent state"
reflect both sides' desire that East Germany's
enhanced status be internationally recognized.
The treaty also includes language that asserts
the responsibility of all socialist countries to sup-
port, strengthen, and 'defend "socialist gains."
1~his language was used to justify the Soviet-led in-
vasion of Czechoslovakia and has come to be
known as the "Brezhnev doctrine." By theiir selec-
tion of these words, the Soviets are telling the East
Europeans that there will be no fund~rmental
change in thE~ir relationship with the USSR as a
consequence of Helsinki.
The Soviets may also have been trying to
reassure the East Germans that they need not fear
the consequences of progress at the Vienna force
reduction talka. The Vienna talks were discussed
when Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko visited
Prague and East Berlin in late September, ~rnd East
Berlin's coolness to force reductions was evident
from its failure to follow Prague in specifically en-
dorsing Soviet efforts. Differences also cropped
up during Soviet Defense Minister Grechko's
talks with his East German counterpart in Moscow
immediately :after the Gromyko trip. The East
German insisted that until "military detente" is
reached, the socialist community's military
strength must be increased. Recognition of East
German security nef~ds was also stressed by party
chief Honecker and his fellow travelers in Mos-
cow, although Honecker did let slip a qualified
endorsement of the limitation, but not reduc-
tion, of military forces in Central Europe.
At the same time, the citation of the
Brezhnev doctrinE~ and the great stress on
across-the-board cooperation in the treaty may
be intended by Brezhnev to quiet fears within the
Soviet leadership that the Helsinki agreement and
the Vienna force reduction talks will undermine
Moscow's grip on Eastern Europe. In an article in
Kommunist released on the eve of the Honecker
visit, Soviet Foreigi~~ Minister Gromyko clearly
stated that Moscow will raise the degree of its
cohesion with Eastern Europe to still higher levels.
If the new treaty with East Germany is intended as
a vehicle for reaching this goal, invitations to the
Czechoslovaks, Poles, and other East Europeans to
sign similar accords may be in the of-
fing.
USSR -WEST GERMANY: A LITTLE HELP
If one wants to be the West German
chancellor, he has to show people that he can
deal with the Russians. That essentially was what
Helmut Kohl, leader of the opposition Christian
Democratic Union, was up to during his recent
trip to the Soviet Union. By most accounts from
West Germany, Kohl seems to have achieved his
purpose-with a little help, probably inadvertent,
from the Soviets.
In the middle of the trip, Pravda published an
article severely criticizing Christian Social Union
leader Franz Josef Strauss, who was then being
feted in China. Kohi demonstrated his displeasure
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~,.,;~ SECRET
over the attack on his nominal political ally by
canceling his appointments for the following day,
but did not scuttle the trip. This earned him a
good press back home.
The Soviets claimed to be nonplussed by
Kohl's reaction, but it is not beyond them to have
intentionally run the article to test Kohl's mettle.
At the same time, they wanted to express their an-
tipathy to Strauss' political views. Indeed, Premier
Kosygin told Kohl that he agreed with the an-
ti-Strauss article 100 percent and would have
worded it even more strongly.
Kohl and other CDU members who accom-
panied him described his conversation with
Kosygin as frank, open, and constructive. Kohl
and Kosygin discussed Berlin and East-West Ger-
man relations, CSCE, MBFR, bilateral trade and
economic cooperation, family reunification, and
ethnic German emigration from the Soviet Union.
Kohl had not expected any breakthroughs, and
none was achieved. Indeed, the day after Kohl
left, Pravda published an article reiterating
customary Soviet opposition to West German ties
with West Berlin, and the Soviets are likely to re-
main cool to the prospect of a change of govern-
ment in Bonn.
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,~,
SECRET
y2
PORTUGAL: MILITARY DISSIDENCE
The survival of Prime Minister Azevedo's
government:, formed only three weeks ago, will
depend on whether the nation's leaders can curb
growing dissidence in the military rank. and file.
Rebellious Leftist units do not appear ready to give
in easily, and Azevedo may not receive enough
support from other government leaders to force
the necessary confrontation.
Military unrest has been centered in the ur-
ban areas of Lisbon and Porto, where the in-
fluence of the far left is strongest although by no
means dominant. In Porto, radical left-wing
soldiers toolk over a heavy artillery regiment early
this week in retaliation for the disbandment of
their unit last weekend by the chief of the
northern military region. The unit was broken up
after enlisted men voted to resist the transfer of
several leftist soldiers.
Units ire the northern region are considered
to be generally conservative. The situation in the
~_isbon region, however, is more serious; govern-
ment officials fear that leftist troops could take
over the caF~ital if they wished because there are
not enough loyal troops to prevent it.
Leftist activity in Lisbon has been spearhead-
ed by a radical light artillery regiment which
~alaced armed guards around its barracks-alle-
gedly to protect itself from a government move
to "annihilat:e" it. The unit commander, known to
have ties to the extreme left, has accused the
Socialists of trying to set up a rightist gov-
ernment.
The radical soldiers have banded together
nationally in such pressure groups as "Soldiers
United Will Win" and "Revolutionary ;Action of
Army Enlist+~d Men."
These groups are controlled by former prime
minister Goncalves and his pro-Communist
followers who hope to bring down the Azevedo
government through civil disorders. The military
groups haves received solid support from various
far left fringe groups who probably have donned
uniforms to give the impression of greater military
support in demonstrations.
The Communists kept a low profile during
the occupation late last month of radio and televi-
sion stations that tivas ordered by Azevedo in an
attempt to limit leftist influence in the media. At
that time, Azevedo's willingness to take decisive
action forced the Communists to either stand by
silently or risk breaking with the government. The
Communists now probably feel that the govern-
ment is losing strength, and party leaders are try-
ing to mend broken fences with the far left.
The Communists, therefore, are letting the
extreme left take the lead in challenging the
government, but the party is also clearly con-
sidering withdrawing all support from the present
government. In a statement last week, the party
said that order will return to the armed forces
only when all "reactionaries" are removed from
command positions. The Communists have also
contributed to current military unrest by joining
the protests of the light artillery regiment in
Lisbon and throwing their support behind the
steelworkers during their strike last Monday.
Azevedo's efforts to restore discipline in the
armed forces appear to be hampered because of
the President's lack of support. President Costa
Gomes-on his return from Moscow on October
5-appealed to the military to follow their com-
manders and not political leaders. He has not
backed up his rhetoric with any action, however,
and may privately be counseling Azevedo to
avoid a confrontation.
The rebellious soldiers will not back down
easily, and only a firm crackdown on dissident
elements-including the detention of key radical
leaders--appears likely to prevent the downfall of
the government. The extreme leftists have
learned over the past year and a half that if they
hold fast, their opponents will eventually back
down in order to avoid a conflict. The Com-
munists, who tend to side with whoever appears
strongest hope to benefit from the extremists'
strategy. Azevedo will need to show equal deter-
mination if he is to overcome this challenge to the
government's authority.
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SECRET --
USSR-PORTUGAL: COSTA GOMES' VISIT
Moscow treated the four-day visit of Por-
tuguese President Costa Gomes as a major event
and thereby demonstrated its desire to cultivate
ties with the Lisbon government. The Soviets'
ceremonious reception of Costa Gomes in-
evitably conveyed a degree of approval of the
Portuguese government, despite recent setbacks
for the Portuguese Communists; and it was this
aspect, rather than any tangible accomplishment,
that imparted some importance to the trip.
Costa Gomes met for two hours with General
Secretary Brezhnev and with several other Soviet
leaders, including President Podgorny, Foreign
Minister Gromyko, Defense Minister Grechko,
and Foreign Trade Minister Patolichev. The results
of the visit, primarily political, were reflected in a
joint communique and in a separate declaration
signed on October 3.
-Fhe declaration attaches "special impor-
tance" to the principles of national self-deter-
mination and noninterference in the internal af-
fairs of sovereign states, reflecting Soviet criticism
of Western "meddiing'? in Portugal. The declara-
tion, however, specifically notes that its provisians
do not affect existing international obligations,
presumably incauding Portugal's NATO com-
mitments.
Both parties pledged to hold regular con-
z;ul~:ations to develop Soviet-Portuguese relations
c>n political, economic, scientific, and cultural
matters. A reported agreement on long-term
economic cooperation may be the culmination of
year-long negotiations for Soviet economic
assistance to Portugal, but it appears unlikely that
Moscow has pledged substantial aid for any
specific projects. The Soviets evidently promised
to buy modest amounts of agricultural products
firom the Portuguese. Poland-where Costa
Gomes had visited before going on to the Soviet
Union-may give some work to the under-used
Portuguese shipyards.
While the visit to the USSR and related
agreements crease the potential for a further ex-
pansion of Soviet-Portuguese relations, they also
tend to stabilize the relationship by creating for-
mal institutions and procedures much like those
the Soviets now have with other Western nations.
The Soviets probably think that this kind of evolu-
tion will give them entree into Lisbon without
aggravating concern in the West over Soviet ad-
AUSTRIA: SOCIALIST MAJORITY
The Socialists in Sunday's election polled
just over 50 percent and won 93 seats in the
183-seat Austrian lower house. The main
challenger, the Austrian People's Party, got 80
seats and the small Liberal F'arty took 10 seats.
The breakdown is exactly the same as in the old
parliament.
The Socialists and the People's Party,
however; can claim a victory of sorts because
the redistricting of several seats prior to the
election had been expected to favor the tiny
Liberal Party. The Liberals' failure to register
marked gains, in fact, constitutes a major set-
back for them.. It is also. at least a psychological
blow to the People's Party, which had hoped to
break Socialist dominance of the government.
The majority won by the Socialists clearly
shows that the electorate retains confidence in
Chancellor Kreisky's moderate policies, which
it views as the best guarantee of political stabili-
ty and economic well-being.
Immediately following the election Kreisky
said that he vvould not form a coalition with
either opposition party, nor would he make
...any changes in his cabinet before next year.
The "new" government will be sworn in later
this month and parliament is ex ected to con-
veneon November 4.
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