SOUTH VIETNAM: A NET MILITARY ASSESSMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T02095R000700080098-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 70
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 12, 2009
• Sequence Number: 98
• Publication Date: April 2, 1974
• Content Type: REPORT

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Secret
NSA review completed
State Dept. review
completed
South Vietnam: A Net Military Assessment
Secret
April
Copy No.
DIA review(s)
completed.
16
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April 2, 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
SUBJECT: SOUTH VIETNAM: A NET MILITARY ASSESSMENT*
KEY POINTS
--During the past year, both the Vietnamese Communists and the
South Vietnamese have improved their military capabilities.
Even so, a generally low level of activity is expected to
continue at least through May 1974, although the fighting
may become intense in some areas. With the forces they
presently have in South Vietnam, the Communists lack the
capability to make significant and lasting gains against the
GVN. The GVN is similarly incapable of making major gains
against the Communists.
--The situation would change rapidly, however, if North Vietnam
commits its strategic reserve to South Vietnam and infiltrates
sufficient manpower to bring existing units up to strength and
create a replacement manpower pool. In the event of a country-
wide offensive:
--Reinforced North Vietnamese forces would have the capa-
bility to regain control of Quang Tri City, perhaps
capture Hue, and make sizable gains in southern MR 1.
In MR 2, Kontum and Pleiku cities might fall, and in
MR 3, the Communists would make some temporary gains
north and northwest of Saigon.
--We doubt that the GVN would be able to stop the Commu-
nist offensive without the US providing large-scale
logistical assistance. Moreover, should the Communists
accomplish all of the above, the adverse psychological
impact might be more significant than the actual impact
on the military balance. As a result, a situation could
develop in which the GVN would be unable to regain the
initiative without the reintroduction of US combat air
and naval support.
This memorandum has been prepared jointly by the Central InteZ-
ligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Bureau
of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State.
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A. Since the cease-fire in January 1973, both the
Vietnamese Communists and the South Vietnamese have upgraded
their respective military capabilities. The North Viet-
namese have increased their combat forces, improved their
firepower position, and made extensive improvements to their
logistic system. The South Vietnamese, for their part, have
also strengthened their combat forces and have assumed re-
sponsibility for most of their logistic operations. As a
result of the large inflow.of US equipment into South Viet-
nam in the last weeks before January 27, 1973, the South
Vietnamese now have more tanks, artillery, and aircraft than
ever before.
Manpower
B. Communist regular combat forces physically located
inside South Vietnam have grown from 154,000 in February
1973 to an estimated 182,000 in March 1974. Since the cease-
fire, this force has markedly changed its orientation. Hanoi
has withdrawn two infantry divisions as well as six combat
regiments from northern MR 1. In addition, a third infantry
division was withdrawn in January just prior to the cease-
fire.* Partially offsetting these withdrawals, Hanoi has de-
ployed 12 antiaircraft (AAA) regiments into South Vietnam.
Moreover, owing to continuing infiltration and unit deploy-
ments, there also are more NVA combat infantry troops in South
Vietnam now than in February 1973. The North Vietnamese have
also reinforced their controlled areas with a large number of
tanks and field and antiaircraft artillery, creating a peak
firepower capability. They are clearly intent both on estab-
lishing a capability to protect those areas of South Vietnam
which they now control and on maintaining an option to resume
large-scale offensive action.
In terms of combat infantry alone, the North Vietnamese
currently have 12 infantry divisions deployed in South
Vietnam -- two of which have only one subordinate regiment
instead of the normal three -- compared to 15 divisions of
three regiments each before the cease-fire. They could,
however, move additional divisions across the DMZ and back
into northern MR .1 on short notice.
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C. On the South Vietnamese side, the GVN regular ground
combat forces are now some 52,000 men stronger than they were
in February 1973, having increased from 320,000 to about
372,000 men. These ground combat forces are supported by a
more proficient air force (VNAF) and effective artillery units.
Higher manning levels within South Vietnam's 13 infantry di-
visions account for 45,000 of the 52,000-man increase. The
remaining growth results from the upgrading of Regional Forces
(RF) into the regular combat structure. This was backed up by
the upgrading of some Popular Forces and local self-defense
forces into the RF structure. The following table compares
GVN and Communist regular combat forces by Military Region
and shows that the nationwide force ratio between the opposing
armies is basically unchanged from a year ago -- although it
has deteriorated (from the GVN point of view) in MR 2 and
MR 3, while improving in MR 4.
COMPARISON OF GVN AND COMMUNIST
REGULAR COMBAT FORCES BY MILITARY REGION*
MR 1
MR 2
MR 3
MR 4
TOTAL
March 1974
GVN
103,000
78,000
94,000
97,000
372,000
VC/NVA
84,000
37,000
39,000
22,000
182,000
Ratio
1.2
2.1
2.4
4.4
2.0
February 1973
GVN
89,000
68,000
75,000
88,000
320,000
VC/NVA
74,000
27,000
26,000
27,000
154,000
Ratio
1.2
2.5
2.9
3.3
2.1
Communist regular combat forces include personnel in combat,
combat support, and air defense units and local force com-
panies and platoons. In early March 1974, there were 140,000
Communist infantry troops and 22,000 air defense personnel
compared with about 125,000 and 15,000 in February 1973. GVN
regular combat forces include assigned personnel in ARVN/VNMC
ground combat and combat support units and regional force
battalions.
D. Barring major redeployments from North Vietnam, the
current balance of forces will remain fairly stable throughout
the remainder of the dry season. The relationship could be
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altered quickly, however, if Hanoi decides to deploy some of
its strategic reserve divisions from North Vietnaml, in con-
junction with those elements of the NVA 968th Infantry Di-
vision remaining in Laos, into GVN MR 1 or MR 2. In the south-
ern half of South Vietnam, however -- unlike March 1972 -- there
is no NVA/Viet Cong reserve force in Cambodia available for de-
ployment into MR 3 or MR 4, and the Communists could only shift
forces among MRs to alter the balance. The GVN is in a similar
situation countrywide. The ARVN now has no uncommitted strategic
reserve; any shifting of forces to one region can only be ac-
complished by reducing the force structure in another.
Firepower
E. The South Vietnamese have improved their armor, artil-
lery, and air capabilities; on balance, they hold an edge in
firepower assets countrywide. The withdrawal of US airpower,
coupled with the North Vietnamese buildup of armor, artillery,
and air defense forces, however, significantly mitigates the
GVN's advantage in firepower assets. Moreover, the Communists
now enjoy an advantage in long-range artillery, have a strong
supply apparatus, and have parity in tanks.
Logistics
F. While strengthening their combat position in South
Vietnam, the Communists also have achieved significant improve-
ments in their logistic posture. Following the cease-fire,
MR 559 -- North Vietnam's logistic and support structure in
southern North Vietnam, southern Laos, northeastern Cambodia,
and the western reaches of South Vietnam itself -- was further
reorganized to permit a more efficient, speedier transport of
supplies in a bomb-free environment. At the same time, the
Communists undertook a major road and POL pipeline construction
and improvement program in Laos and South Vietnam which per-
mits year-round deliveries to South Vietnam and2greatly en-
hances access to portions of the coastal region (see map on
Communist infiltration routes).
1 North Vietnam's strategic reserve consists of six divisions,
totalling some 40,000-50,000 men.
2 Over the past year, the Communists have constructed or up-
graded more than 1,000 miles of roads in South Vietnam and
extended their POL pipeline about 125-150 miles southward
through the Laotian Panhandle and western South Vietnam.
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 h l I
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Names and boundary rapresentatio
are not necessarily authoritative
Communist motorable route
Other route
Petroleum pipeline
South China
Sea
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G. This ambitious construction program did not interfere
with the continuing heavy pace of cargo shipments to the South.
The improvements to the MR 559 logistic system in the past
year, including the dispatch of 26,500 infiltrators to the
area, have given the Communists their strongest supply organiza-
tion and transportation network from North Vietnam to the south
ever. Moreover, they now have sufficient ordnance stockpiled
in South Vietnam to sustain heavy combat activity for at least
18 months.
H. The. South Vietnamese logistic command also has improved
steadily in the post cease-fire period. Moving from almost
complete dependence on the US for support of its forces, ARVN
now has total responsibility for the in-country distribution
and storage of supplies. In general, the performance of the
ARVN logistic system at the present fairly low level of hostili-
ties has been good. Current supply stockpiles, particularly of
military equipment and replacement parts, are more than adequate
for current consumption rates. Should major countrywide fighting
resume, however, the South Vietnamese logistic system would be
stretched to the limit and would probably be unable to handle
the infusion and distribution of the large amounts of materiel
required to support the GVN's combat forces. Even at the
present modest level of combat, there is a problem of getting
the proper mix of supplies to GVN forces on a timely basis.
Moreover, interregional distribution of supplies is hampered
by virtual autonomy of each MR commander, and ARVN remains
dependent on US civilian contractors for aircraft maintenance
and port management.
Intelligence
If early warning of a Communist
build-up for a major offensive is to be detected, it will
have to be through continued US intelligence collection.
Qualitative Factors
J. Since the cease-fire, the RVNAF has improved its
leadership through personnel shifts and additional training
and has become more proficient in using firepower. Serious
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 K. The Communists historically have been more disciplined,
tenacious, and dedicated fighters than the RVNAF. They too,
however, have their shortcomings. After the initial successes
in the 1972 Easter Offensive, the pressures of maintaining a
sustained offensive began to be reflected in less effective
leadership and a lack of coordination. Moreover, as the toll
of casualties mounted, they began to experience a reduction
in troop morale and the problems attendant with having to re-
place experienced cadre with those who possessed inadequate
formal military training. Since the cease-fire, the North
Vietnamese have taken measures to overcome these shortcomings,
including comprehensive training programs in both the North
and the South. In last year's fighting in Quang Duc and
Pleiku provinces, the Communists used infantry, armor, artil-
lery and AAA forces effectively, suggesting that they are
making progress in coordinating the actions of their forces.
problems still exist, however, especially those stemming from
inexperience in managing, supplying and maintaining a large
force in combat. Moreover, lack of coordination between dif-
ferent commands still impedes the RVNAF's fighting ability.
While efforts are being made to rectify these problems --
some of which already have been successful -- RVNAF still
needs more time to improve all aspects of its fighting forces
before it could be expected to handle a major Communist of-
fensive on its own.
Scenarios for the Remainder of the Dry Season
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Limited Activity: The Most Likely Scenario. Ac-
the North Vietnamese do
not plan to launch a major offensive in South Vietnam, at
least through the remainder of the 1973-1974 dry season.
offensive operations against selected targets. Similarly,
GVN tactical plans through the dry season will consist of a
mix of defense and offense. Under these circumstances, neither
side is likely to achieve substantial, permanent territorial
gains in the next few months.
M. Under this scenario, the outlook for MR 1, where de-
fensive lines have stabilized, is for a continued absence of
heavy combat activity. In MR 2, combat activity may intensify
be confined to the de tense of their territory and limited
Communist combat activity will
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in the central highlands as both sides contest territory along
strategic lines of communication (LOCs). Neither side, how-
ever, has a decisive edge, since ARVN's numerical superiority
in the highlands is partly offset by NVA firepower assets. In
MR 3, there probably will be some high points of activity,
largely confined to sapper attacks, attacks-by-fire and LOC
interdiction efforts. To the south in MR 4, Communist combat
activity will be handicapped by understrength units and a weak
logistic system.
N. A General Offensive Scenario. What would be the re-
sult if large-scale hostilities broke out again in South Viet-
nam in the next several months? Both the GVN and the North
Vietnamese would find it difficult to launch and sustain a
major offensive in the immediate future. Should the Communists
decide to do so, however, they would have the capability by the
end of April 1974 if they committed new divisions from outside
South Vietnam and substantially increased the current rate of
infiltration. Since they would be the aggressors and could
achieve local manpower or firepower superiority in chosen
areas, the unfavorable (to the Communists) nationwide ratio
of forces would not necessarily be a critical factor in their
decision. (In none of their earlier offensiveshave the Com-
munists had a favorable nationwide ratio of forces.)
0. Under this scenario, the North Vietnamese would launch
a countrywide offensive some time after increasing infiltration
and redeploying several infantry divisions from the strategic
reserve to GVN MR 1, where the weather will remain good from
now through August. If this worst likely scenario developed --
and US support were not provided -- the North Vietnamese forces
in northern MR 1 would regain control of Quang Tri City, and
gain additional territory in the southern part of the region,
probably including a provincial capital. The key to the de-
fense of MR 1 rests with the GVN's ability to resupply critical
areas if major land LOCs are interdicted. If the GVN were not
able to overcome resupply problems -- considering its limited
assets -- then Hue also could fall to the Communists. From
the Communist point of view, the destruction of the elite units
defending Hue would be as important as the capture of the city
itself. The Marines and Airborne are the GVN's strategic re-
serve, and if they were rendered combat ineffective, it would
undermine the GVN's overall defensive ability.
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P. In MR 2, one or both provincial capitals of Pleiku
and Kontum could conceivably fall into Communist hands, although
the fighting would be fairly even. North and northwest of
Saigon in MR 3, the Communists would temporarily gain addi-
tional territory, including several district capitals. GVN
forces, on the other hand, probably would not yield any sub-
stantial ground in coastal MR 2 or in MR 4.
Q. In sum, if the Communists launched a general offen-
sive, we believe that they would make some permanent terri-
torial gains. The GVN would probably be unable to stop the
Communist offensive without the US providing large-scale
logistical assistance. Given the near parity in the two
sides' physical capabilities, the outcome of any major Com-
munist offensive would be highly influenced by intangibles
virtually impossible to predict. For example, the resource-
fulness and effectiveness -- or lack thereof -- of individual
ARVN unit leaders under stress in the initial days of combat
could have a major impact on the outcome of the battle. More-
over, the adverse psychological impact of Communist successes
in the initial stages of an offensive might be more significant
than the actual impact on the military balance. Thus, a sit-
uation could develop in which the GVN would be unable to re-
gain the initiative without the reintroduction of US combat
air and naval support.
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DISCUSSION ................................... 1
MILITARY REGION ASSESSMENT ................... 1
Military Region 1 ......................... 1
Manpower Capabilities .................. 1
Logistic Capabilities .................. 2
Offensive Scenario ..................... 4
Military Region 2 ......................... 6
Manpower Capabilities .................. 6
Logistic Capabilities .................. 8
Offensive Scenario ..................... 9
Military Region 3 ......................... 11
Manpower Capabilities .................. 11
Logistic Capabilities .................. 12
Offensive Scenario ..................... 13
Military Region 4 ......................... 15
Manpower Capabilities .................. 15
Logistic Capabilities .................. 16
Offensive Scenario . ................... 16
ANNEX A: MANPOWER AND LOGISTIC POSITIONS OF NORTH
AND SOUTH VIETNAM
ANNEX B: STATUS OF NORTH VIETNAMESE AND SOUTH VIET-
NAMESE INFANTRY DIVISIONS
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1. This memorandum assesses the relative capabilities
of the two sides in South Vietnam by GVN Military Region
as of March 1974. The primary focus is on the remainder
of this dry season -- through May 1974. A detailed discussion
of the strengths and weaknesses of the North and South Vietnam-
ese manpower, logistic, and firepower positions is at Annex A,
and a discussion of the status of North and South Vietnamese
divisions is at Annex B.
Military Region 1
Manpower Capabilities
2. Since the cease-fire there has been a low level of
combat activity in MR 1, as both sides engaged in restructuring
their forces. Consistent with the tactical situation, the Com-
munists recently reduced their ground combat capability by with-
drawing a third infantry division; two left earlier in 1973, one
just prior to the cease-fire. They now have five infantry di-
visions -- one operating with only one regiment -- compared to
eight divisions just prior to the cease-fire. (See Military
Region 1 Map.) The North Vietnamese, however, have augmented
their air defenses by deploying antiaircraft artillery regiments
into the region. As a result of these changes, Communist forces
in MR 1 now total 84,000 troops, of which 18,000 are air defense
personnel.
3. At the same time, the combat strength of the South
Vietnamese regular ground forces has increased significantly
in MR 1. This has resulted from upgrading territorial forces
into the regular combat force structure and increasing the man-
ning levels of existing units. Thus, South Vietnamese regular
combat forces in MR 1 currently total some 103,000 troops, an
increase of some 14,000 over the past year.
4. The largest share of both combat force structures is
concentrated in Quang Tri and Thua Thien provinces. The Com-
munists have roughly 63,000 men -- including 33,000 infantry
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XOUT'H VIETNAM 1
50 Miles
.T.._.
50 Kilometers
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A NVA intantry division HO
? NV;y infantry regiment
A OVN infantry division HO
? OVN infantry regiment
Cornmuni>t moioratle route
Other route
-?- Peiroieurn pipeline
Railroad
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troops -- or about 75 percent of their total MR 1 regular combat
forces located in the two provinces. Two NVA infantry divi-
sions (the 304th and 325th) supported by 17 air defense, 1
armor, 3 independent infantry, and 5 artillery regiments are
deployed north and west of Quang Tri City. One NVA infantry
division (the 324B), supported by 2 artillery, 1 armor, and
2 infantry regiments, is deployed west and south of Hue.
Arrayed against the Communists are 64,000 GVN troops -- including
46,000 infantry troops -- which are deployed near Quang Tri
and Hue cities. Three GVN divisions -- the Marine, Airborne,
and 1st -- supported by a ranger group, an armor brigade, and
15 Regional Force battalions form a defense line protecting
major GVN lines of communication and population centers.
5. In southern MR 1, South Vietnamese regular combat forces
are about double the number of Communist forces. GVN forces
number about 39,000 men in two infantry divisions -- the 2nd
and 3rd -- three ranger groups, and 35 Regional Force battalions,
compared to the Communists' 21,000 men in two NVA infantry
divisions -- the 711th and 2nd -- supported by elements of
infantry, armor, artillery, sapper, and air defense units. The
711th Division is deployed in Quang Nam/Quang Tin provinces
and is targeted against the coastal lowlands, whereas the 2nd
Division's only regiment is operating in Quang Ngai.
6. Both Communist and South Vietnamese combat forces are
well rested and are at or near full strength, owing to the ex-
tensive lull in combat activity. Both sides could launch multi-
regimental attacks against selected targets. Despite an enhanced
firepower and air defense complement, the North Vietnamese
infantry force as presently deployed is not now large enough to
seize major population centers in MR 1. ARVN forces are in a
maximum defensive posture with their forces committed to the
defense of major cities and LOCs. Thus, despite their capabil-
ities for larger-scale actions, both sides now appear to be
planning to initiate only light combat activity in MR 1 for the
remainder of the dry season.
Logistic Capabilities
7. The Communists in MR 1, under the auspices of MR 559,
have continued to improve and expand an already strong logistics
base. Several roads feed into the region through the DMZ, some
of them now passable year round. Route 9 connects the roadnet
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with Laos and links the extensive logistic facilities established
at Khe Sanh, Cam Lo, and Dong Ha. To supplement the overland
system, the Communists have also refurbished a large land-water
transshipment facility on the Cua Viet River just outside of Dong
Ha. The logistic complex, now in operation for nearly one year,
primarily handles cargo transshipped from anchorages in the North
Vietnamese Panhandle.
8. The western highlands supply corridor, a network of roads
stretching from north of the DMZ to Loc Ninh in MR 3, 500 miles
to the south, was opened for limited traffic in late February
1974. This corridor is part of the more than 1,000 miles of
new or improved roads constructed in South Vietnam during the
past year, the majority of it in MR 1. Supplies will be shipped
down the highway directly from Quang Tri Province and either
stored along the route or sent farther south.
9. These newly constructed or considerably improved ar-
teries include Route 547 and Gorman's Road leading from storage
depots in the A Shau Valley to units of the NVA 324B Division
just west of Hue, Route 534 running to the Que Son Valley and
the NVA 711th Division, and Communist-designated Route 105 (GVN
Route 1404) extending from Kham Duc on the western supply route
southeastward through Quang Tin and Quang Ngai provinces. As
a result of new Communist construction since October 1973, this
last route now extends more than 100 miles and is motorable into
Binh Dinh Province in coastal MR 2.
10. In addition to the roadnet, the Communists have con-
structed large truck parks and numerous service and support
facilities, including some 1,800 structures in northern MR 1
alone -- capable of holding several hundred thousand tons.
They have extended their DMZ POL pipeline about 50 miles southward
from Cam Lo through Ba Long into the A Shau Valley, and estab-
lished extensive POL storage and distribution facilities in
these areas. These facilities, together with the pipeline, are
supported by an inventory of some 2,000 trucks in South Vietnam's
MR 1, which is several times the number available to the Com-
munists in early 1972.
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11. Supply activity along the western corridor has gen-
erally been light in MR 1 in the past few months, probably
as a result of the monsoon rains which sweep the area from
September through February. Similarly, seasonally wet weather
has restricted transport activity along lateral roads feeding
the interior of the region. Despite this relatively low level
of new supply deliveries into the region, most of the large
amounts of ordnance delivered last spring and summer probably
are still on hand, as Communist expenditure rates have been low.
Thus, Communist forces probably have sufficient stocks on hand
to support a sustained offensive for at least 18 months.
].2. On the GVN's side, logistics are not much of a con-
straint to ARVN forces so long as they maintain control of the
urban areas and well-traveled arteries in the coastal lowlands.
Movement along parts of this network, however, is likely to
be impaired by concentrated Communist interdiction efforts.
During an offensive, Route 1 linking Quang Tri City, Hue,
and Danang would be a prime target. Should the ARVN lose the
free use of this route, it would be forced to depend upon re-
supply by air and sea. If this occurred, ARVN's capability to
meet fully its resupply requirements in northern MR 1 would be
doubtful because of the GVN's limited air- and sealift capability.
As ARVN stockpiles were consumed, a supply shortfall -- particularly
of POL and ammunition -- could occur and might reach serious
proportions within a month or so, especially if there were a
high level of fighting elsewhere in the country.
Offensive Scenario
13. If the North Vietnamese launch a major offensive, they
would probably deploy at least three infantry divisions from
their strategic reserve and infiltrate sufficient personnel to
replace losses. Two divisions might be sent to Quang Tri and
Thua Thien provinces and a third to southern MR 1. These
divisions could move into place near key GVN strongholds with
relative ease because North Vietnamese air defense forces
would prevent VNAF from interdicting Communist infiltration
routes. Moreover, the commitment of North Vietnamese air as-
sets during the offensive probably would temporarily demoraj_ize
some GVN combat units and give the Communists the necessary of-
fensive momentum to move deep into GVN controlled territory.*
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14. The offensive scenario might unfold as follows: five
NVA infantry divisions supported by air defense, heavy artil-
lery, armor, and air would attack Hue from the north and west
with the mission of destroying the GVN's three best combat
units -- Marine, Airborne, and ARVN lst Divisions. To the
south, two divisions supported by artillery, armor, and some
air support would move into the populated lowlands of Quang Tin
Province and isolate Danang. Communist troops, including local
forces, would attempt to tie down the ARVN 2nd Division near
Quang Ngai City.
15. If the above happens, the GVN plans to fight a delay-
ing action from Quang Tri City and withdraw the Marine, Airborne,
and ARVN 1st Divisions from forward outposts to preplanned de-
fensive sectors around Hue. Successful implementation of
this plan requires the divisions to minimize their combat
casualties and for ARVN artillery units and VNAF to provide
adequate firepower protection for withdrawal. As attacking
North Vietnamese units become more exposed to GVN firepower
in the lowlands, their advance could be slowed somewhat.
However, without US air assets and logistical assistance --
which were available in 1972 -- the GVN would be hard pressed
to defend Hue. Indeed, the GVN's internal distribution prob-
lems, coupled with possible shortages of key military supplies
such as POL and small arms ammunition, could seriously limit
ARVN's ability to meet the Communist offensive throughout MR 1.
16. In the southern provinces, the ARVN 3rd Division,
which is currently defending the coastal lowlands, is likely
to withdraw to Danang. In such an event, Tam Ky City would
probably fall. The ARVN 2nd Division would defend Quang
Ngai City and attempt to send reinforcements to Danang.
Unless the Communist forces in Quang Ngai are reinforced,
ARVN probably would be able to prevent them from making any
significant territorial gains there.
17. On balance, the success or failure of a Communist
offensive in MR 1 would be determined in large part by the
NVA's ability to prevent ARVN from resupplying its major combat
forces, particularly in Thua Thien Province. This could be a
touch-and-go situation since ARVN is basically dependent on
land LOCs for its supplies; its air and naval assets probably
could not take up the slack if the major road arteries were inter-
dicted. If this occurred -- and the US did not provide the
necessary support to keep ARVN functioning effectively -- the
Communists would not only capture Quang Tri City, but also prob-
ably Hue and ,a provincial capital in southern MR 1.
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Military Region 2
Manpower Capabilities
18. In contrast to MR 1, the tactical situation in MR 2
for some time has been marked by periods of intense combat
activity -- mainly as a result of GVN attacks to prevent the
Communists from securing areas along strategic Route 14 -- and
main force unit deployments have been common occurrences. Last
summer, for example, the GVN began multi-regimental operations
into Communist areas of Kontum and Pleiku provinces. These
operations have been only marginally successful and have resulted
in heavy casualties for both sides.
19. The Communists, on the other hand, opened another
military front in Quang Duc Province and have reinforced the
western highlands. From September to December, the North
Vietnamese deployed nearly 5,000 men from GVN MR 3 in three
regiments -- the 271B and 205th Independent, and the 174th
of the 5th Division -- and smaller sapper and armor units.
The 174th Regiment with some 1,000 men, however, returned to
MR 3 in late February. The Communists reinforced the Kontum/
Pleiku area in January by deploying the NVA 232nd AAA Regi-
ment and the 9th Regiment of the NVA 968th Infantry Division
from southern Laos, and by infiltrating an armor group to the cen-
tral highlands. The GVN reacted in September by deploying the
ARVN 22nd Division from Binh Dinh to Kontum Province; the
ARVN 23rd Division and a ranger group moved to Quang Duc Prov-
ince in November.
20. With the increased deployment of Communist and GVN
forces to MR 2, regular combat strength of both sides has risen
since the beginning of the dry season. Communist combat forces
have increased from 31,000 to 37,000 in three understrength NVA
infantry divisions -- the 320th, 10th, and 3rd -- six indepen-
dent infantry, one artillery, and three AAA regiments supported
by elements of sapper and armor units. South Vietnamese combat
strength now totals 78,000 -- up 8,000 -- in two infantry divi-
sions, the 22nd and 23rd, seven ranger groups, one armor brigade,
and 82 Regional Force battalions.
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21, The current disposition of GVN and Communist combat
forces focuses on Kontum/Pleiku, Quang Duc, and Binh Dinh
provinces (see Military Region 2 map) .
22. In the Kontum/Pleiku area the GVN has a numerical
edge in combat forces, 32,000 against 18,000 Communist troops.
The NVA 10th Division,, an artillery, an independent infantry,
and two AAA regiments supported by armor forces are targeting
Kontum City which is defended by a regiment of the ARVN 22nd
Division and two ranger groups. The NVA 320th Division and
one independent infantry regiment supported by armor forces
oppose three regiments of the ARVN 22nd Division, two ranger
groups, and an armor brigade near Pleiku City.
23. In Quang Duc and Darlac provinces, there are about
13,000 GVN combat troops of the ARVN 23rd Division, a ranger
group, and three Regional Force battalions. This compares to
the Communists' 6,000 combat troops in one AAA and three
infantry regiments supported. by armor and sapper elements
Communist forces are deployed near the Cambodian border with
the mission of protecting the North Vietnamese road network
linking the central highlands with northern MR 3. The Communists
have forced the GVN to reduce its force structure in the
provinces of Kontum and Pleiku, but they have also reduced
their own threat to Saigon by withdrawing two regiments from
MR 3. The opposing forces in Quang Duc and Darlac provinces
are basically in a defensive posture although the GVN is at-
tempting to interdict Communist Route 14 in western Darlac
Province
24. In Binh Dinh Province, the balance of Communist and
GVN combat forces is about even The NVA 3rd Infantry Divi-
sion supported by armor, heavy artillery and other infantry
forces, numbers about 6,000 men compared to the GVN's 8,000-
man force of two ranger groups and 16 Regional Force battalions.
The 3rd Division -- with two of its three regiments under-
strength -- is now capable only of conducting limited attacks
against GVN outposts and temporarily interdicting GVN supply
lines.
25. The ARVN manpower edge in MR 2 is at least partly
offset by the Communists' use of their firepower assets.
The three North Vietnamese AAA regiments, plus armor and 130mm
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%"-,0 25 50 75 Miles
South
China
Sea
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MR 2
A NVA infantry division HO
? NVA infantry regiment
A GVN infantry division HQ
? GVN infantry regiment
Communist motorahle route
Other route
- :-- Railroad
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and 122mm field guns, now deployed in the central highlands
constitute the largest firepower commitment of the war to this
area. The presence of North Vietnamese AAA units is forcing
some VNAF LOC interdiction missions to fly as high as 20,000
feet, restricting their effectiveness. Moreover, Communist
130mm and 122mm field guns have been effective in slowing the
advance of GVN combat units into Communist areas west of Kontum
City.
26. On balance, although combat activity in the central
highlands may intensify, neither side has a decisive military
edge in the area. Communist military activity probably will
include efforts to occupy additional territory near Kontum City
while defending strategic Communist Route 14 and interdicting
ARVN supply lines in Kontum and Pleiku provinces. ARVN will
continue to launch forays into NVA held areas, but probably
will not have much success.
Logistic Capabilities
27. From a logistic perspective, the Communists in MR 2
are strongest in the highland provinces bordering Laos and
Cambodia and in coastal Binh Dinh Province. Recent road con-
struction leading into both areas and through much of the high-
lands has considerably improved their access to main forces.
Also, COMINT and photography have revealed large supply ship-
ments and heavy vehicle traffic -- the first since last spring --
into Kontum Province. These goods can be moved quickly down
the dual lane road extending through western Pleiku and Darlac
into Quang Duc Province.
28. As in MR 1 -- although to a lesser extent -- the
Communists in MR 2 have augmented their rear services forces
and inventory of transport vehicles along the dual lane supply
route, and have expanded storage and other facilities in western
Kontum and Pleiku provinces. As the dry season supply effort
continues, the Communists will replace stocks expended during
the fighting, enhancing their ability to launch and sustain
heavy tactical activity in all four highlands provinces in MR 2.
In addition, because main force units in the highlands are
located close to the new dual lane or other roads, forward
supply distribution and tactical troop deployments can be ac-
complished much more easily and quickly than previously.
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29. Communist forces in Binh Dinh Province reportedly
had a substantial part of their supply stockpiles damaged
by severe storms which hit the northern coast of South Vietnam
last fall. No serious shortages have been reported, however,
probably because no significant fighting has occurred. In
any case, Communist Route 105 through southern MR 1 now provides
the Communists" first motorable link between Binh Dinh Prov-
ince and the primary infiltration corridors from North Viet-
nam. With the use of this route during the dry season., they
could build a logistic capability for sustained offensive ac-
tion by the NVA 3rd Division,
30. Logistics will become a serious problem for ARVN forces
in the MR 2 highlands if the Communists sharply escalate the
fighting and attempt to capture the province capitals. Al-
though ARVN now has approximately three weeks of stocks in
place in the highland provinces, it relies heavily upon only
two major arteries to resupply these areas. These arteries --
Route 19 feeding Pleiku City from the coast, and Route 14 link-
ing Kontum and Pleiku cities -- are vulnerable to Communist
interdiction. Cutting these routes would make resupply of the
cities entirely dependent on airlifts, which in turn are vul-
nerable to Communist AAA fire,
Offensive
31. If Hanoi were to launch a major offensive in MR 2, at
least 20,000 infiltrators -- of which some 10,000 have already
been dispatched would be needed to augment understrength
combat units and to create an initial manpower reserve. Ad-
ditional infiltration, however, would be required to replace
losses as the fighting continued, Furthermore, the North
Vietnamese probably would shift the two remaining infantry
regiments of the 968th Division now in southern Laos to the
western highlands. Once accomplished, the Communists would
attempt to isolate Kontum and Pleiku cities by interdicting
Routes 14 and 19. The 10th and 968th Divisions supported
by armor, heavy artillery, and antiaircraft forces would at-
tack Kontum City, while the 320th Division would attempt to
tie down GVN forces near Pleiku City.
32. The GVN plans to respond to a major Communist of-
fensive by deploying the ARVN 23rd Division now in Quang Duc
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and Darlac provinces -- and possibly another ranger group from
Binh Dinh Province -- to Pleiku City. These forces combined
with the ARVN 22nd Division and four ranger groups supported by
VNAF would have to keep Routes 14 and 19 open to ensure resupply --
if Kontum and Pleiku cities are to be successfully defended. If
the North Vietnamese, however, deploy their antiaircraft and heavy
artillery weapons near GVN installations and LOCs and success-
fully interdict Routes 14 and 19, one or both of the province
capitals might well fall.
33. On the coast, a strengthened NVA 3rd Division would
move into the lowlands of northern Binh Dinh Province and
capture one or two district capitals as happened in 1972.
In the southern coastal provinces, the Communists would be
limited to harassing attacks and LOC interdiction activity.
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Military Region 3
Manpower Capabilities
34. Within MR 3 both sides have been resting and rebuilding
their combat forces and consolidating their respective geo-
graphic positions. Communist regular combat forces are now closer
to the populated areas north of Saigon than in 1972, when they
initiated their attacks from the border areas of Cambodia. Thus,
their proximity poses a greater threat to GVN LOCs and instal-
lations surrounding Saigon. In terms of numbers, however, the
Communist threat to this area has been reduced since October
1973 by some 4,000 troops with the deployment of infantry,
sappers, artillery, and armor to Quang Duc Province.
35. Currently there are about 39,000 Communist regular
combat forces in MR 3 -- some 13,000 more than at the time of
the cease-fire. Major units include an artillery, an antiaircraft,
and three infantry divisions plus nine infantry, sapper, and
armor regiments (see Military Region 3 map). The infiltration
of armor and antiaircraft and field artillery into the provinces
north of Saigon last year provides the Communists with more
firepower in the region than ever before. In early 1973, an
AAA division was formed in Binh Long Province. This new unit,
coupled with the continued availability of the SA-7 missile,
increases the threat to South Vietnamese air operations in
this area of MR 3, although the overall threat is less than in
northern MR 1 and the western highlands.
36. Opposing the Communists in MR 3 are some 94,000 South
Vietnamese troops in three infantry divisions, one armor
brigade, four ranger groups, and supporting artillery and
Regional Forces units. The government force increased by about
2,000 men in the past year, and now is roughly 2 1/2 times that
of the Communists. Moreover, it possesses an enhanced armor and
artillery capability. The GVN forces, however, are spread through-
out the region in defense of government-held territory. This
defensive posture permits the Communists to concentrate their
forces for selected thrusts against key targets.
37. Available evidence suggests that the Communists in MR 3
will be content this dry season with locally intense but generally
limited military activity. The fighting probably will include
ground and artillery attacks against GVN military facilities
such as POL and ammunition depots as well as against LOCs. The
Communists are likely to concentrate their activity in the
provinces north and west of the capital.
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MR 3
A NVA infantry division HO
? NVA infantry regiment
A GVN infantry division HO
61 GVN infantry regiment
Communist motoraule route
Other route
Railroad
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38. In Tay Ninh Province, the Communists have the NVA 5th
Infantry Division* along with one regiment each of infantry,
sapper and antiaircraft. The ARVN 25th Infantry Division is
responsible for defending the provinces of Tay Ninh and Hau Nghia
and maintaining secure LOCs to Saigon. Moving east, the NVA
7th and 9th Infantry Divisions, supported by a total of six
regiments of antiaircraft, armor, artillery, sapper, and inde-
pendent infantry, are targeted against Binh Duong and Binh Long
provinces. The ARVN 5th Infantry Division, two regiments of the
18th Division, and two ranger groups are the principal GVN forces
in these provinces. Another threat area lies east and southeast
of Saigon where Communist infantry, artillery, and sapper units
have required the positioning of a regiment of the ARVN 18th
Infantry Division and two ranger groups.
Logistics Capabilities
39. The Communists in MR 3 have not expended the large
quantities of ordnance amassed by the end of last dry season and
remain in a strong supply position, capable of supporting heavy
fighting. Although large-scale shipments to this region from
Laos and North Vietnam have not yet been detected, the supplies
may currently be moving south from Kontum Province along Communist
Route 14. Moreover, a new motorable road in extreme south-
eastern Cambodia has just been completed, connecting the Com-
munists' existing route structure in southern Cambodia with the
dual-lane corridor in western MR 2. The road, although sufficient
for current Communist needs, would be complemented by aditional
routes prior to any Communist offensive.
40. Inside MR 3 the Communists have considerably improved
their resupply system over the past year. Storage, communications,
and other logistics facilities have been constructed, and a
number of roads have been either built or upgraded. The key
roads include one leading from Loc Ninh, two crossing the Tay
Ninh-Binh Long provincial border, and another extending south-
ward from southern Binh Long Province to Binh Duong Province,
only about 30 miles north of Saigon. These roads will allow the
Communists to move their armor and artillery effectively, ease
troop and resupply movements, and lessen constraints on mobility
posed by the wet season should fighting continue beyond May.
Tenuous evidence indicates that at Zeast one regiment of
the 5th Division is redeploying from northwestern Tay
Ninh Province to Dinh Tuong Province in northern MR 4,
where the division operated from mid-1972 to ApriZ 1973.
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41. Seven COSVN Rear Service Groups (RSGs) operate the
transportation corridors in northern MR 3. Most of these RSGs
were activated in early 1972, .and since the January 1973 cease-
fire they have extended their areas of operation from rear bases
in Cambodia deeper into MR 3. They are now much closer to tacti-
cal forces in the region, which together with an improved trans-
port network add considerably to the Communists' capability to
support further fighting.
42. For the most part, GVN forces in MR 3 enjoy the use of
the extensive transportation infrastructure built initially
for commercial purposes. Logistics will pose no problem in
and around the urban areas the government now firmly controls.
ARVN's resupply links with outlying towns and outposts in
Phuoc Long, Binh Long, and Tay Ninh provinces, however,
are tenuous, and very likely many would prove impossible to
defend should the Communists initiate heavy offensive activity.
Offensive Scenario
43. If the Communists should decide to launch a major
offensive in MR 3, they would need to infiltrate some 20,000
combat troops in order to increase combat unit strengths and
establish an initial manpower pool. This could be accomplished
in April, if current infiltration levels to COSVN are maintained.
So far this dry season some 30,000 infiltrators have already
been dispatched to the southern half of South Vietnam.
44. During the initial stages of an offensive the Communists
probably would make significant tactical gains because their
units are in forward positions close to GVN population centers and
installations. The present deployments reduce Communist command
and control problems while affording the South Vietnamese less
reaction time than in 1972. Communist combat units probably
would exert heavy pressure against the province capital of Tay
Ninh City to tie down ARVN troops and prevent their use as
reinforcements against the main offensive thrust south by the
NVA 7th and 9th Divisions from Binh Duong Province along the
northern approaches to Saigon.
45. If the Communists penetrate the densely populated GVN-
controlled areas of Tay Ninh, Binh Duong and Bien Hoa provinces,
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they would meet increasingly strong resistance from ARVN regular
and regional forces. The GVN would have to shift forces within
the region and redeploy the ARVN 9th Division from MR 4. Although
the GVN could prevent the capture of Saigon, it would be forced
temporarily to give up additional territory to the Communists
north of the capital. The South Vietnamese, however, could be
expected to further reinforce the area in order to recapture
populated areas which they consider politically vital, even
at the expense of losing territory elsewhere in the country.
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Military Region 4
Manpower Capabilities
46. The balance of forces in MR 4 weighs heavily in
favor of the GVN. For the remainder of the dry season, the
Communists' capability for offensive activity there is quite
limited. Major Communist combat forces number 22,000 men
in two artillery and 12 infantry regiments and numerous local
force units (see Military Region 4 map). Communist units
in MR 4 are sorely understrength when compared with 1972 levels,
and more than 10,000 replacement personnel are needed to rebuild
existing forces. Furthermore, there has been no significant
improvement in the Communist firepower position over 1972 levels.
Some of the tanks and long-range artillery that deployed to the
COSVN area a year ago could conceivably move into northern MR 4,
but their effectiveness would be extremely limited by the open
terrain and numerous canals which crisscross the delta.
47. By comparison, the GVN has some 97,000 men in three
infantry divisions and one armor brigade, with supporting
artillery and a large number of regional force battalions.
Moreover, ARVN has continued to perform well in the delta and
has not only contained but reduced the Communist threat there.
The three-division force -- the 7th, 9th and 21st -- committed
to the delta is currently in relatively good shape, and neither
manpower shortages nor the quality of units appears to pose any
significant restraint on ARVN capabilities. In addition, ARVN
forces are supported by an air force that has provided effective
close air support in this area.
48. In the northern delta, the Communists have concentrated
one artillery and five infantry regiments in Dinh Tuong, Kien
Phong, and Kien Tuong provinces. These forces are opposed by
the ARVN 7th Infantry Division and a regiment of the ARVN 9th
Infantry Division, supported by regional forces, which have
succeeded in preventing the Communists from infiltrating the
more populated areas. Another large concentration of Communist
combat forces is in Chuong Thien Province, where an artillery,
a sapper and five infantry regiments confront the ARVN 21st
Infantry Division and a regiment of the ARVN 9th Division.
49. Until recently a third threat area existed in Kien Giang
and Chau Doc provinces along the Cambodian border, where the
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Gulf
of
Thailand
NVA infantry division HQ
NVA infantry regiment
GVN infantry division HO
GVN infantry regiment
Mfr
i.~
50 K ~ omelet
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understrength North Vietnamese lst Infantry Division operates.
Two of the division's regiments have apparently been dissolved
and their personnel assigned to reinforce the one remaining
regiment of the unit. This has reduced the Communist threat to
GVN forces in the area, consisting of one regiment of the ARVN
9th Division and regional forces.
50. The Communists, however, still are capable of launching
understrength, regimental-sized attacks in several areas, notably
in Dinh Tuong and Chuong Thien provinces. They could overrun
isolated district towns and outposts as well as temporarily
interdict GVN lines of communication, but would not achieve
any major permanent gains.
Logistics Capabilities
51. Logistically, the Communists also are in a much weaker
position in MR 4 than in the northern three regions. Although
relatively secure rear base areas have been established across
the border in southern Cambodia, few shipments have been detected
entering the delta over the past several months. Moreover,
the Communists' supply lines into the region are neither motorized
nor secure from ARVN interdiction efforts during periods of
increased hostilities. Such traditional means of transportation
as sampans and porters are still relied upon heavily. Large
fishing vessels reportedly have been used to deliver arms and
ammunition to Communist-controlled coastal areas over the past
year, but only in small quantities.
52. The Communists in MR 4 are strongest logistically
near the Cambodian border, in Base Area 470 in western Dinh
Tuong Province, and in the U Minh Forest on the western coast.
Sufficient stocks are on hand in these traditional strongholds to
support a continuation of the level of fighting which has pre-
vailed over the past several months and periodic highpoints, but
not much more.
53. The ARVN in MR 4 has the advantage of better supply
lines. Heavy sustained combat, requiring large amounts of
supplies for both sides, is less common than in the other MRs.
The protracted warfare style in MR 4 mitigates the positive
effect ARVN's logistics advantage may have on the overall balance
of forces.
Offensive Scenario
54. If large-scale military activity is initiated in the
other MRs -- particularly MR 3 -- the Communists would attempt
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to tie down the three ARVN divisions in MR 4, probably un-
successfully. The transfer of the ARVN 9th Division from
the delta -- as provided for in contingency planning -- would
permit the Communists to make some territorial gains in the
rural areas. There is little reason to suspect, however, that
they would achieve any greater success than they did in the 1972
offensive, when they were unable to capture any major population
centers.
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ANNEX A
MANPOWER AND LOGISTIC POSITIONS OF NORTH AND SOUTH VIETNAM
Manpower Overview
North Vietnam
1. The North Vietnamese Armed Forces (NVNAF) total about
660,000 men of which 285,000 are located out-of-country in South
Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. Hanoi's forces have continued to
grow despite the heavy losses suffered in the 1972 offensive,
increasing by an estimated 55,000 since the cease-fire. The
majority of the increase occurred in the growth of the com-
bat and rear services structures and the remainder was from
fleshing out existing Communist units. There also has been
qualitative and quantitative improvements in the South through
the increased deployment of longer-range offensive and de-
fensive weapons as well as better military equipment, leading
to a dramatic increase in North Vietnamese firepower.
2. The personnel increase in the NVNAF and the replace-
ment of most of the losses suffered in 1972 were drawn from a
population base of more than 20 million,* containing a man-
power pool of an estimated 1.3 million physically fit males
between the ages of 15-39. Within the aggregate manpower pool
there are an estimated 360,000 men in the prime age group of
17-25. Hanoi probably could induct 100,000 per year without
any drain on the aggregate reserve; thus, it has the ability
to increase its armed forces further while maintaining a regular
flow of infiltration to South Vietnam.
3. North Vietnamese induction since the cease-fire has
featured two distinct trends. In the first six months follow-
ing the signing of the agreement induction was particularly
light, as the Communists skipped their annual spring recruiting
There is some recently available evidence which suggests that
the North Vietnamese population may total about 26 million.
If so, all of the manpower figures in this paragraph would be
higher.
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drive. In August, however, the North Vietnamese launched a
substantial recruiting effort, traditional for the August-
September period. The second intensified recruiting effort
of the post cease-fire period started in January.
4. The induction effort this dry season is probably de-
signed to maintain a sufficient pool of trained manpower to
support planned infiltration while strengthening units that
have redeployed to North Vietnam. New inductees are probably
ready for infiltration in four to five months; thus, those
inducted recently would be unlikely to move south before
late spring.
Infiltration
5. Since September 1, 1973, Hanoi has sent some 71,000
troops to the southern war zones, about 14,000 fewer than
during the comparable period in the 1972/1973 infiltration
cycle. About two thirds of the total, or more than 48,000
troops, have traveled to Communist combat units in South Viet-
nam, while the remainder -- mostly rear services personnel --
have been sent to southern Laos and contiguous border areas.
As shown in the table below, total troop infiltration to major
Communist regions in South Vietnam thus far in the 1973/1974
infiltration cycle is substantially less than last year, but
infiltration to southern Laos and adjacent areas is more than
twice as great.
Starts of Troops
from North Vietnam, by Destination
September 1
- March 26
1972-1973
1973-1974
85,000
71,000
Military Region (MR)
Tri-Thien
26,000
2, 000
MR 5
9,000
8,000
B-3 Front
14,000
8,500
COSVN
25,000
30,000
Southern Laos/MR 559
11,000
22,500
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6. The dispatch of a large number of infiltrators to the
MR 559 area early in the dry season reflects North Vietnamese
emphasis on logistic activities and further refinements to the
transport system. Hanoi did not begin significant combat
troop infiltration to South Vietnam until mid-December -- more
than a month later than usual. This shift in the timing of
the departures from North Vietnam may reflect both the sharply
reduced travel time for infiltrators en route to South Viet-
nam and an apparent lack of urgency in completing the re-
building of understrength combat units.
7. During the remainder of the regular infiltration
cycle, North Vietnam probably will continue to send troops
to the B-3 Front and COSVN areas, where units are still under-
strength. A mid-November message suggested that between
55,000 and 68,000 troops would be sent to these areas. If
true, this would be more than sufficient to rebuild under-
strength units and establish a reserve manpower pool by late
spring.
8. Infiltration, however, probably will not be confined
to the southern half of South Vietnam. The recent resumption
of infiltration to VC MR 5 suggests that Hanoi is beginning
to dispatch troops to northern South Vietnam where the dry
season is now beginning.
9. Since the cease-fire, the Communists have sent a
substantial number of personnel from the south to North Viet-
nam. During 1973, some 45,000 exfiltrators were detected
moving through the Vinh area in North Vietnam, and thus far
in 1974, the rate of northward moving personnel has been in-
creased. Most of this year's exfiltrators have been sick and
wounded, although others, such as escort cadre who previously
accompanied infiltrators south and personnel being sent to
North Vietnam for training, also have been observed. The
large proportion of sick and wounded probably results from
the improved road system and the Communists' lowering of the
medical criteria necessary for a soldier to return home,
allowing a higher number of marginally sick and wounded to
return to North Vietnam.
South Vietnam
10. The Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) has a
current strength of over one million men and -- like the
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NVNAF -- its regular combat forces have continued to grow
despite battlefield losses. The assigned strength of regular
combat forces has risen to 372,000, compared to 320,000 in
February 1973, resulting primarily from a change in the strength
of ARVN/VNMC combat units from 194,000 to 239,000 in the last
quarter of 1973. Although now operating without US air and
adviser support, RVNAF capability has been enhanced by the ad-
dition of large numbers of aircraft, tanks, and artillery pieces.
11. On the population side, the manpower base for South
Vietnam -- 19 million -- is roughly comparable to that of North
Vietnam. South Vietnam has an estimated manpower pool of about
2 1/2 million in the 18-39 age group, and we believe that an
additional 175,000-225,000 young men reach age 18 each year.
This is more than sufficient to meet the GVN's annual induction
needs.
Combat Unit Deployments
North Vietnam
12. Since the start of the current dry season, the North
Vietnamese have reinforced their combat forces in South Vietnam
with some 9,000 troops in eight regiments -- five AAA, an in-
fantry, an artillery, and a sapper regiment. Only three of
the units -- the artillery and two AAA regiments -- deployed
directly into South Vietnam from the north; the remainder re-
located into the country from southern Laos and Cambodia. The
five AAA regiments and the infantry regiment deployed into the
western part of South Vietnam as part of a continuing effort to
enhance North Vietnamese defensive positions against South
Vietnamese air and ground operations along the Communists'
logistic corridor. These AAA regiments increased total post
cease-fire air defense deployments to 12 AAA regiments, totaling
some 10,000 men.
13. These augmentations, however, were offset by the with-
drawal from northern South Vietnam since late 1973 of the 320B
Infantry Division, an independent infantry, and three AAA regi-
ments. These withdrawals total some 11,000 troops. Earlier
in 1973 two other infantry divisions -- the 308th and 312th --
also redeployed to North Vietnam.
14. South Vietnamese unit deployments in recent months
have been aimed at reinforcing the central highlands of MR 2.
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During August and September, the ARVN 22nd Division with
roughly 13,000 troops deployed from Binh Dinh to Kontum and
Pleiku provinces in order to support ARVN 23rd Division opera-
tions into Communist territory west of Kontum and Pleiku cities.
In November and December, the ARVN 23rd Division with some
10,000 men deployed to Quang Duc Province to counter the
growing Communist threat. In addition, a reorganization of
the Ranger Command was completed in January and six ranger
battalions in MR 4 were deployed to MRs 2 and 1.
Strategic Reserve
15. Within North Vietnam there are a total of 10 in-
fantry and training divisions, the same number that was there
prior to the 1972 offensive. Four of these -- the 250th,
330th, 338th, and 350th -- in the past have always been com-
mitted to a home defense and training role. The remaining
six divisions, with some 40,000 to 50,000 troops, comprise
Hanoi's strategic reserves which can readily deploy out of
country (see Strategic Reserve map). During 1972, for ex-
ample, Hanoi committed seven strategic reserve divisions to
South Vietnam, four of which are still there. This sizable
drawdown in its reserves led to the creation of one new in-
fantry division, the 308B in mid-1972, and the regeneration
of an old division -- the 341st -- in the spring of 1973.
16. Hanoi also established a major new tactical head-
quarters in Thanh Hoa Province in 1973. The new headquarters
has three identified subordinate infantry divisions -- the
308th, 312th, and 320B, all withdrew from South Vietnam last
year -- plus artillery, armor, and engineer elements. The
new headquarters consolidates and improves the command and
control over Hanoi's strategic reserve forces in North Viet-
nam. It would also facilitate multi-divisional redeployment
to South Vietnam if Hanoi decided to resume major military
action. A redeployment to northern MR 1 could be accomplished
with little advance warning.
17. The South Vietnamese strategic reserves consist of
the Airborne and Marine Divisions, plus three ranger groups,
totalling some 35,000 troops. These "reserves", however, are
all committed -- the airborne and marines to MR 1 and the rangers
to MRs 2 and 3. In an offensive, the South Vietnamese would be
forced to redeploy their reserves or other forces* to the critical
areas.
.ARRVN contingency plans, for example, call for the redeployment
of the 9th Division from MR 4 in the event of a major offensive
in MR 3
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NAMES AND BOUNDARY REPRESENTATION 104
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NVA and ARVN Command aii3' Control
18. Besides rebuilding their combat forces numerically,
the Communists and South Vietnamese each have continued to
improve their command and control structures to meet the
changing priorities of a cease-fire environment. Above the
division level, there are few close similarities between the
North and South Vietnamese armies. In both cases, however,
formal lines of control run from a high command directly to
the MRs. The South Vietnamese MR commander normally exercises
tactical control over all ground forces within his region.
The Communist MR commander has the same authority, but in
some cases there are separate front headquarters within the
Communist MR which are directly subordinate to the high com-
mand. In this case, the front headquarters supersedes the MR
commander's tactical authority over a given area within the
MR.
19. At the division level and below, however, North
and South Vietnamese command and control organizations are
similar. Within a division, they both have support battalions
attached to the division headquarters and three infantry regi-
ments with three maneuver battalions each. In addition, ac-
cording to Table of Organization both have an artillery regi-
ment or equivalent as an organic part of the division. While
the South Vietnamese division has an organic armored cavalry
squadron, the Communist divisions do not. In the past, North
Vietnamese armor has been attached only temporarily to a divi-
sion for a specific mission.
Logistics Overview - North Vietnam
Military Imports
20. During 1973, the North Vietnamese apparently continued
to receive Soviet and Chinese military imports, possibly in
substantial quantities. Photography suggests that artillery
and armor have been shipped into North Vietnam during the past
year. For example, photography showed about
40 tanks parked between storage sheds at the Vinh Yen Armor
Training Center northwest of Hanoi -- tanks which had not been
there in early August, as well as the addition of at least 100
photography showed 80 possible light antiaircraft I and
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field artillery pieces less than ten miles from the Chinese 25X1
border. Finally, early November photography showed more than
25X1 200 light antiaircraft artillery pieces stored on one of the
main rail lines between the Chinese border and Hanoi.
21. In addition to the above items, the North Vietnamese
have also received some additional SA-3 equipment from the
Soviet Union since the cease-fire.* With the exception of
the SA-3 missile system, however, North Vietnam is not known
to have added any major weapons systems to its arsenal since
the cease-fire.
22. The absence of regular photographic coverage -- the
creased since the onset of the Communist dry season logistics
push. But some imports are clearly continuing to be received
by Hanoi, and these should be sufficient to replenish, at least
partially, the drawdown in stockpiles from supplies sent by
North Vietnam to its forces in the South.
impossible to determine if such imports have increased orde-
Communist Construction Activities
23. The Communist-controlled areas of South Vietnam have
changed radically owing to post cease-fire construction activity..
They are linked to North Vietnam by a greatly improved logistic
system. The "liberated" areas are no longer just remote bases
hidden under jungle canopy and served by foot and bicycle paths.
In many cases, they have become a series of strongholds united
by a net of new motorable roads, and some of them are supported
by new petroleum pipelines and coastal transshipment points.
There is at least one SAM-defended airfield.
24. In order to consolidate territorial gains, the North
Vietnamese moved swiftly after the January 1973 cease-fire to
upgrade their transport system in southern Laos and "liberated"
areas of South Vietnam. A system of interconnecting roads
tying the scattered enclaves together to permit rapid development
and a buildup of heavy weapon defenses was the most important.
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development. By early summer 1973, the first phase of this
access roadnet was completed. Communist vehicles can now
move with relative impunity from depots in North Vietnam,
Laos and Cambodia to front lines in MRs 1, 2, and 3. The
keystone of this developing road system is the ongoing con-
struction of two separate parallel north-south truck routes,
one leading along the western GVN border (Communist Route
14) and another extending through southern Laos.*
25. The two separate north-south road systems, located
on either side of the Annamite Mountains bordering Laos and
South Vietnam, apparently were built to mitigate the effects
of the varying monsoon rainy seasons, and to permit more de-
pendable vehicle access between major Communist base areas
and North Vietnam. During the summer monsoon season in Laos,
for example, vehicles could shift to the route through west-
ern South Vietnam, and then during the fall and early winter
months transfer back to the Laos system.
26. The onset of the 1973-1974 dry season caused a
seasonal and expected shift in Communist construction activity.
An accelerated tempo developed on the new dual lane system
in southern Laos, and work slackened on LOCs and facilities
in northern and central portions of South Vietnam where wet
weather prevailed.
27. Free from US air attack, the North Vietnamese concen-
trated their construction efforts on building a high-speed
supply corridor through the Laos Panhandle while abandoning
other routes. For example, photography as recent as mid-
February shows that with the exception of Route 9, which
leads into the Khe Sanh military complex, most of the former
major roads leading through southern Laos to the South Viet-
nam border have been abandoned.
28. The North Vietnamese resumed heavy truck traffic in
southern Laos during late November accompanied by a surge of
construction activity on the dual-lane road. This road now
extends into the western highlands and joins Communist Route 14
Construction methods to build these two roads are much different
than those used during the bombing period. The alignments
are mostly dual Zane to permit two way traffic and passing.
Segments are straight, grades are Zess step, the roadbeds are
well drained, and in a, number of areas roads have been graveled
or oil covered. Consequently the roads recover quickly from
the effects of monsoon rains.
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in Kontum Province. The Laotian pipeline system has also been
rapidly extended along the path of the new roadbed; by early
1974, it had reached the tri-border area.
29. There were two major developments associated with
the Route 14 system extending along the western GVN border.
A new major road in southwestern North Vietnam is to extend
about 95 miles from Mu Gia Pass southward through Quang Binh
Province to a juncture with Communist Route 14 near the DMZ.
Also, Communist road gangs probably have completed a Route
14 bypass road around an ARVN strongpoint at Duc Lap in Quang
Duc Province. This bypass leaves the dual-lane system ten
miles north of Duc Lap and extends southwest for some 30 miles
through the corner of Mondolkiri Province, Cambodia, before
joining Cambodian Route 14. Completion of this bypass road
closes the last link needed to complete a 500-mile through-
truck route from the North Vietnam border through Laos and the
GVN western highlands to the COSVN area.
1973-1974 Dry Season Supply Effort
30. The Communists' 1973-1974 dry season supply effort is
now in full swing. As in the past, it is a major effort which
is more than adequate to replace the supplies consumed by Com-
munist forces. Since early November, for example, Communist
units in the Vinh area have handled at least 15,000 tons of
all types or ordnance. In addition, about 10,000 tons of
cargo per month, mostly foodstuffs, have been shipped into
Dong Ha in northern Quang Tri Province. Route 9 has been
one of the main entry corridors for supplies entering Laos;
since the beginning of the year logistics units operating
along this corridor in Quang Tri Province have shipped or
stored possibly as much as 65,000 tons of cargo.
31. Deliveries from this area into Laos have resulted
in heavy traffic along the Communists' dual-lane road. Since
inid-November, almost daily aerial reconnaissance of the main
north-south supply corridor in Laos has shown an average of
several hundred trucks moving south. Unlike past years,
North Vietnam has been able to ship supplies the length of
the Laos Panhandle without having to shuttle supplies because
of the threat of aerial interdiction.
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32. COMINT has provided some indication of the magnitude
of this effort in Laos. During the December 7-25 period, one
logistics unit in Laos reported handling some 4,000 tons of
cargo, including 1,800 tons of ordnance. In early February,
COMINT detected plans to move some 12,000 tons of cargo from
southern Laos into the Group 470 area. This cargo, a signifi-
cant part of which is probably ordnance, is destined primarily
for the B-3 Front and COSVN areas of South Vietnam.
33. To support the heavier supply shipments in Laos,
Hanoi has redeployed major rear services elements from South
Vietnam. As early as September 1973, Hanoi transferred two
transportation regiments and a commo-liaison regiment from
South Vietnam into Laos to prepare for the dry season effort.
In January, elements of three additional transportation regi-
ments which had been in South Vietnam were identified operating
along the main supply corridor in the Laos Panhandle. More
recently, two major MR 559 elements -- Headquarters (Hqs.)
Group 470 and Hqs. Group 471 -- have relocated to support the
February logistics push. The Hqs. Group 471 deployed out of
western South Vietnam into southern Laos to a position about
35 miles southwest of Ban Bac along the dual-lane corridor.
Similarly, Hqs. Group 470 moved some 50 miles northward to a
location near the Hqs. B-3 Front in Kontum Province.
34. Rear services units probably will continue to move
supplies through southern Laos into South Vietnam for de-
livery to the B-3 Front and COSVN areas via Communist Route 14.
In addition, the North Vietnamese can be expected to resume
heavy supply shipments into northern South Vietnam on the
DMZ routes, once the dry season takes hold in that area. By
June, the Communists' resupply efforts will have placed NVA
forces in an even stronger supply situation.
RVNM Logistics
35. Since the cease-fire, the RVNAF logistics system has
made significant progress -- moving from complete dependence
upon the US military toward self-reliance in the allocation,
transportation, and stockpiling of supplies. A computerized
system for handling overall supply requisitioning is now
nearing completion and will further improve the receipt and
allocation of military equipment. A large number of South
Vietnamese technicians have been trained to replace the US
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military personnel who departed shortly after the cease-fire.
South Vietnamese Airforce (VNAF) airlift operations, which
play an essential role in South Vietnam's supply distribution
system, are currently providing sufficient supplies to about
30 ARVN outposts that are inaccessible by land LOCs. The
RVNAF still remains dependent upon US contract personnel for
aircraft maintenance and the operation of port facilities.
36. Adequate supplies are available to South Vietnam
to continue meeting RVNAF's logistic requirements at current
consumption rates. Because of US budget constraints over
the past year, however, ammunition and other military goods
have not been replaced on the one-for-one basis permitted
by the cease-fire agreement. As a result, stocks are being
drawn down from their January 1973 level. Supplies of ground
ammunition -- currently at 66 percent of the quantity avail-
able at the time of the cease-fire -- are equivalent to
7 1/2 months' supply at current expenditure rates, but only
1 1/2 months' supply at rates expended during the 1972 of-
fensive. Air munitions stocks are more plentiful, equal to
16 months' supply at current expenditure rates and 5 months'
supply at 1972 offensive levels. Current gross POL inventory
is about 33 days of supply at the consumption rate of 25,000
barrels daily, the amount required to combat an NVA offensive.
The POL, however, is provided on a contract basis, which would
allow sufficient POL during an offensive, but which must be
paid by US funding.
37. RVNAF stockpiles of weapons and other military
equipment are adequate for its force structure, and the RVNAF
currently has more and better aircraft, armor, and artillery
to combat a North Vietnamese offensive than it did in 1972.
Sufficient amounts of materiel, however, would not be on hand
to replace heavy combat losses unless US stocks were made
available. Stocks of in-country repair parts are adequate in
most cases for six months' supply at present consumption rates.
38. Although the RVNAF logistics system is capable of
coping with the present level of tactical activity, a North
Vietnamese countrywide offensive would present major problems.
It is doubtful that the system could handle the infusion and
distribution of large quantities of ammunition and equipment
necessary to replace expenditures and combat losses. Supply
shortages, particularly in POL and ammunition, would soon occur.
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39. RVNAF depends largely on trucks and other vehicles
to transport troops and supplies, and its transportation
units have performed well in the past year. The country has
an extensive roadnet, but many key routes are vulnerable to
Communist interdiction.
40. In an offensive, VNAF's air supply capabilities
would be deficient. At the current low operational rate
of cargo aircraft, VNAF could not carry out an airlift
comparable to the 1972 effort without US support. Moreover,
only about half of the 32 C-130 aircraft are normally opera-
tional at any one time. VNAF, in fact, will be pressed if
required to take on many more than the 30 or so areas cur-
rently needing continual air resupply.
41. An offensive would also surface shortcomings in
the RVNAF sealift capability. The South Vietnamese Navy
(VNN) now possesses only six landing ship tanks (LSTs) and
other vessels which are inadequate to perform such multiple
tasks as relocating major ARVN units and evacuating large
numbers of refugees along the coastline of northern South
Vietnam. Efforts are underway, however, to increase the
VNN's inventory of LSTs.
42. Other problems may arise from ARVN's failure to
develop an effective system of cooperation among the mili-
tary regions in the reallocation of scarce supplies. This
failure prevents the rapid transport of critically needed
supplies from one MR to another, even when the distance is
very short. Finally, it is also uncertain if US civilians
now supporting RVNAF in several key areas would remain if
heavy fighting developed.
Firepower Balance
43. The South Vietnamese still hold an edge in fire-
power assets over the Communists on a countrywide basis.
The withdrawal of US airpower coupled with the North Viet-
namese buildup of armor, artillery, and air defense forces,
however, has caused a major shift in the firepower balance
toward the Communists.
44. Hanoi's substantial commitment of tanks and artil-
lery in South Vietnam last year raised inventories to the
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highest level ever. The 130mm field gun gives the Communists
the advantage in long-range artillery in northern MR 1 and
in some of the other areas where these weapons are concen-
trated. Moreover, the sizable buildup of North Vietnamese
air defense units, coupled with the general availability of
the SA-7 missile, have served at least partially to compen-
sate for the GVN's dominance in the air.
45. The Communists and South Vietnamese are estimated
to have roughly the same number of tanks -- about 600. The
Communists have the edge in MR 1 and the central highlands.
Poor armor tactics on the part of the NVA, coupled with the
effective use by the South Vietnamese of numerous antitank
weapons, however, could offset this advantage, as occurred
in 1972.
46. The South Vietnamese artillery units, among RVNAF's
best combat forces, have a large numerical edge in artillery
with some 1,700 155mm and 105mm artillery howitzers plus 76
175mm field guns. Use of howitzers gives RVNAF effective
close ground support, although during an NVA offensive RVNAF
could be handicapped by resupply constraints. The North
Vietnamese are estimated to have some 350 122mm and 130mm
artillery pieces with fewer supply constraints. Because they
have fewer howitzers than the GVN, the Communists must rely
more on mortars and rockets for their ground support.
47. There are several factors which at least partly
offset the RVNAF's numerical artillery advantage. For ex-
ample, the Communists have more long-range artillery than
the GVN; and the 122mm and 130mm field guns are superior
to the 175mm with respect to accuracy, rate of fire, and
maintenance requirements. In addition, many of the North
Vietnamese AAA forces, particularly in northern MR 1, are
also trained to use their guns in a ground support role.
South Vietnamese combat units are located in fixed positions
on key terrain features which would give Communist artillery-
men the opportunity to concentrate their long-range field
guns on these positions. Such a concentration of firepower
might permit the North Vietnamese to achieve significant
tactical and territorial gains initially.
48. The VNAF is capable of significantly augmenting
GVN ground firepower in many areas of the country. Cur-
rently, VNAF has 304 attack aircraft with 255 jet and 49
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propeller aircraft -- which can be used for tactical support.
These planes are capable of flying about two-thirds of the
monthly number of close air support sorties flown by the US
and South Vietnamese during the 1972 offensive.
49. To counter this advantage in the air, the North
Vietnamese have built up within South Vietnam their most
formidable air defense structure of the war. This structure
currently consists of 23 regiments (22 AAA and one SAM) and
22,000 men. There are 18 regiments in MR 1, at least three
in western MR 2, and two in northern MR 3. The AAA weapons
of these regiments range up to 100mm in caliber. This force
represents a serious threat to VNAF which has been reluctant
to operate near concentrated North Vietnamese air defense
positions.
50. North Vietnam also has the ability to conduct air
operations in MR 1 to achieve air superiority there. Currently,
Hanoi has 210 jet fighters capable of such operations, although
only about one-fifth of these could be committed on a sustained
basis. These planes could be staged from any of the five air-
fields currently capable of handling jet aircraft in the North
Vietnamese Panhandle.* (See Strategic Reserve map.) Aircraft
flown from the southernmost airfield at Dong Hoi in Quang Binh
Province, North Vietnam, however, would greatly reduce the
South Vietnamese warning and reaction times and give the North
Vietnamese aircraft maximum time over target.
51,. In the event. Hanoi did commit its aircraft to the South,
the North Vietnamese air force would be particularly strong in
air-to-air combat. They have experienced pilots, along with
high quality radar and air controllers. In terms of providing
close air support, however, the North Vietnamese pilots are
inexperienced, and probably would encounter problems coordi-
nating attack operations with ground units.
52. In contrast, the South Vietnamese pilots are highly
qualified in close air support operations but have no air-to-
air combat experience. VNAF has had no combat experience in
ground control intercept operations, and its skill at actual
The airfield at Khe Sanh in western Quang Tri Province, South
Vietnam, could be made available as an emergency recovery
base, but it is not now capable of sustaining jet aircraft
operations.
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intercept operations is probably marginal. VNAF also would
have difficulty in a ground attack role in northern MR 1,
given the proliferation of AAA weapons and SA-2 missiles
there. Except for the AC-119 gunship, VNAF aircraft are not
equipped with radar homing and warning equipment and have no
jamming capability against electronically-controlled AAA guns
and SA-2 missiles.
53. VNAF air-to-air capabilities, however, will be
improved somewhat this spring. The first. shipments of the
higher performance F5E jet aircraft began arriving in March as
replacements for the F5A; the first F5E squadron will be
activated in May. The F5E is a faster, more maneuverable
aircraft than the F5A, with improved electronics equipment
and greater range or bomb load capacity. VNAF's main prob-
lems, however, will continue to be the lack of trained,
combat-experienced pilots, plus the lack of sufficient
ground support equipment.
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STATUS OF NORTH VIETNAMESE AND SOUTH VIETNAMESE
INFANTRY DIVISIONS
1. As a fighting force, the Communists are generally tough,
disciplined, tenacious fighters. For the most part, the cadre are
politically reliable and dedicated to the Communist cause. Leader-
ship within Communist units has generally been good, although the
cumulative attrition caused by the war has taken a heavy toll of
experienced military cadre. The Communists also have enjoyed the
advantage of usually being able to choose the time and place to
launch military action. This has allowed them to position forward
supplies on a battlefront and to make detailed plans of attack.
2. The Communists, however, also have their shortcomings.
For example, although they made initial gains in the heavy fighting
in South Vietnam in 1972, they failed to exploit these gains and
therefore lost their offensive momentum. The Communists frequently
failed to coordinate effectively armor, artillery, infantry, and
air defense forces. In addition, the North Vietnamese had a rela-
tive lack of experience in using various forces in combined actions,
and the attacking Communist units suffered severe losses from US
bombing and the heavy combat.
3. As the offensive continued and losses soared, other
deficiencies began to surface within the Communist military struc-
ture. Troop discipline weakened, and there were instances of low
morale. The loss of experienced leadership often forced the
Communists to promote troops with practically no formal military
training up through the ranks to leadership positions. While these
troops possessed combat experience, it resulted in cadre not knowing
how to react to rapidly changing battlefield situations. Moreover,
the quality of troop replacements arriving from North Vietnam was
seriously degraded due to the shortened basic training cycle and
immediate integration into combat units.
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4. North Vietnamese propaganda since the cease-fire indicates
the Communists are aware of these shortcomings. Training programs
in the North and South have been expanded, and they now concentrate
to a greater extent on preparing troops and cadre to fight a
conventional war with mixed forces. In last year's fighting in
Quang Duc and Pleiku provinces, for example, the Communists used
infantry, armor, artillery, and AAA forces effectively. Finally,
the Communists have had a year to rest and refit. Thus, although
they have not overcome all their shortcomings, it is likely that
the Communists have made progress in improving their overall
combat status.
The South Vietnamese
5. The Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) today
constitutes the largest, most well-equipped force in Southeast
Asia. In the year since the cease-fire and withdrawal of US
forces, the RVNAF has proven capable of defending GVN-controlled
territory. Indeed, in the fighting over the past year, the South
Vietnamese have generally been able to prevail over the Communists,
and the GVN now controls slightly more people and territory than
it did at the time of the Paris agreement.
6. The RVNAF, however, continues to face problems. They
stem to a large degree from inexperience in managing, supplying,
and maintaining a large force structure. Other difficulties arise
from low troop morale problems, corruption, and lack of inter-
regional cooperation. Efforts are currently under way within all
branches of the RVNAF to cope with these problems. Maintenance
and logistic operations are being improved through command emphasis
and increased training. Logistics and maintenance, however, will
continue to be a problem in RVNAF with the continued requirement
of US civilian technical support. Efforts are also underway to
improve RVNAF troop morale, but these are hindered by inflation
and extended deployment of units in areas distant from homes and
families.
7. Despite such problems, ARVN commanders have shown them-
selves adaptable in operating against Communist forces and have
proved proficient in using their available firepower assets. Not
a small part of this has included learning to operate without US
air support. Additionally, ARVN infantry divisions have conducted
extensive training over the last year, mostly by rotating individual
infantry battalions through division or national training centers.
An even more ambitious program is scheduled this calendar year.
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North Vietnamese Infantry Divisions
NVA 308th Division
9. The division currently is garrisoned in the Hanoi
area. The 308th is considered one of North Vietnam's best
infantry divisions, and in 1972, it spearheaded the attack
into South Vietnam's northern MR 1. After suffering heavy
losses, the division returned to North Vietnam in January 1973,
just prior to the cease-fire. Since then, it has been under-
going extensive training and is now at full strength.
10. The 308B Division and its three regiments currently
are garrisoned in Vinh Phu Province northwest of Hanoi. The
division was formed in Thanh Hoa Province in mid-1972 and
operated there until December 1973, when it moved to the Hanoi
area. The division originally had four regiments, two of which
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were deployed to Laos -- the 88th to north Laos in late 1972
and the 102nd to south Laos in January 1973. The 88th Regiment,
however, was resubordinated in mid-1973 to the 316th Division
and returned to North Vietnam with the division in December 1973.
The 102nd withdrew from Laos in late spring 1973. Neither the
88th or 102nd Regiment is known to have participated in any
significant combat operations while in Laos. The 308B is
currently operating at full strength.
NVA 312th Division
11. The division is located in its traditional garrison
area of North Vietnam's Thanh Hoa Province and has been refit-
ting and training since mid-1973. The 312th operated in northern
Laos from 1969 to early 1972, when it returned to North Vietnam.
After a brief period of rest, it infiltrated South Vietnam's
Quang Tri Province in mid-1972 and suffered heavy casualties in
the fighting southwest of Quang Tri City. The division with-
drew to North Vietnam in the spring of 1973 and is now at full
strength.
12. The 316th Division has been fighting in northern Laos
since mid-1960. During its tenure there,,the division head-
quarters functioned essentially as an administrative command;
it did not serve as a major tactical authority for its two
subordinate infantry regiments. In late 1972, the 88th Regiment
of the 308B Division was sent to reinforce battle-weary North
Vietnamese units in the Plaine des Jarres area and was resubor-
dinated to the 316th Division in mid-1973. In December 1973
the division headquarters and two of its three regiments with-
drew to Nghe An Province in North Vietnam where they are current-
ly located. The third regiment of the division continues to operate
in northern Laos.
NVA 320B Division
13. The division currently is located in Thanh Hoa Province
in North Vietnam. It deployed to northern MR 1 in the spring of
1972 and was responsible along with the NVA 325th Division for
the defense of Quang Tri City. After the GVN recaptured the city,
the division pulled back to the DMZ area where it continued to
operate until its withdrawal to North Vietnam in late 1973. Since
then, the unit is believed to have been refitting and training.
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NVA 341st Division
14. The 341st Division was reactivated with two regiments
in North Vietnam in the spring of 1973 and is garrisoned in
southern Quang Binh Province. The division had previously
operated from the DMZ area to North Vietnam's Nghe An Province
during the mid-1960s, but appears to have been dissolved in
1968. In December 1973, it acquired a third infantry regiment
from Quang Tri Province of South Vietnam. The current mission
of the division is unclear, but its location would permit a
rapid deployment to northern MR 1 with almost no advance warning.
NVA 968th Division
15. The division was established in January 1972 in southern
Laos, largely from existing North Vietnamese units. Prior to the
cease-fire, the division was tasked with securing Communist areas
there and protecting North Vietnamese infiltration routes through
the Panhandle. During the year following the cease-fire, the
division remained generally in-place and in a low-profile training
and refitting mode. In January 1974, however, the division's
most seasoned regiment -- the 9th -- relocated to the western
highlands of South Vietnam to provide additional security for
the Communists' new western supply corridor. Since then, there
have been indications that other elements of the division also
may relocate to South Vietnam.
In South Vietnam
NVA First Division
16. The division has operated along the Cambodian border
in the provinces of Chau Doc and Kien Giang of MR 4 since the
1972 offensive. Its primary mission is to secure infiltration
corridors leading into the delta from Cambodia. In 1973, however,
two of its three regiments apparently were dissolved, thus reducing
the threat to the GVN in the area. The remaining regiment continues
to operate in Kien Giang Province.
NVA Second Division
17. The operating area of the division has been Quang Ngai
Province of MR 1 since mid-1972. The division last summer
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resubordinated a regiment to the 711th Division in Quang Tin
Province and another regiment to the NVA 3rd Division in MR 2.
The 2nd Division has now been reduced to one reinforced regiment
operating southwest of Quang Ngai City.
NVA Third Division
18. Binh Dinh Province of MR 2 has been the division's
traditional operating area. Because of heavy combat losses
during the 1972 offensive, a regiment of the division was
disbanded in mid-1973 and replaced by a regiment from the NVA
2nd Division in MR 1. The division is now resting and refitting
its three understrength regiments in northwest Binh Dinh Province
and is reportedly having serious morale problems.
NVA Fifth Division
19. The division which has historically operated in MR 3
moved to Dinh Tuong Province of MR 4 where it operated from
mid-1972 to April 1973 before returning to Tay Ninh Province in
MR 3. Since that time it has been resting and refitting, and
at the same time, attempting to secure Communist territory in
southern Tay Ninh Province. The division poses a threat to Tay
Ninh City and GVN-controlled areas near Routes 1 and 22. There
are indications that at least one regiment of the division may be
returning to Dinh Tuong Province.
NVA Seventh Division
20. The 7th Division has been resting and refitting in
northern MR 3 since the cease-fire. The mission of the division
is to protect Communist-controlled territory near Route 13 in
Binh Duong Province and to attack targets in GVN areas. Since
the cease-fire, heavy artillery weapons and tanks have arrived
in the division's operating area from North Vietnam, providing
its units with greater firepower support than in 1972. The
division represents a major threat to GVN forces and positions
north of Saigon.
NVA Ninth Division
21. The division currently operates in western Binh Duong
Province in MR 3 and has not seen major combat activity for more
than a year. It was refitted in 1973 and represents a major
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threat to the northern approaches to Saigon. The division's
combat capability also has been enhanced by the deployment of
additional armor and heavy artillery to its area of operations
in 1973.
NVA Tenth Division
22. The 10th Division was organized in late 1972 in
Kontum Province of MR 2 from independent combat regiments
operating under the NVA B-3 Front. The division has success-
fully countered GVN thrusts into Communist territory north of
Kontum City since August and September. The division is current-
ly considerably understrength, but it has been conducting
training to upgrade the quality of its personnel.
NVA 304th Division
23. This division has a long history of combat in South
Vietnam and is currently deployed in western Quang Tri Province
of MR 1. It has not seen combat since November 1972. Its
primary mission is to maintain control of Communist-occupied
territory north of the Thach Han River, including the Khe Sanh
airfield and North Vietnamese logistics facilities along Route
9. Combat units of the division have conducted extensive train-
ing for the past year and are now probably at full strength.
NVA 320th Division
24. The 320th Division is located in western Pleiku Province
of MR 2 and is successfully defending Communist areas against GVN
operations. The division's regiments are currently understrength.
Since the cease-fire, the division has conducted extensive training
to improve its command and control and upgrade leadership.
25. The 324B Division is one of the most combat-experienced
divisions in the North Vietnamese Army. Since the cease-fire,
however, the division has been resting and refitting in western
Thua Thien Province and is now estimated to be at full strength.
Concurrently it has been conducting an extensive reconnaissance
of GVN military installations in the coastal lowlands of the
province. The division now controls two artillery and five
infantry regiments in Thua Thien Province west of Hue. Its
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mission in recent months has been to secure Communist areas in
the western part of the province and open infiltration routes
into the coastal lowlands.
NVA 325th Division
26. The 325th Division is located in northeastern Quang
Tri Province of MR 1. The division's mission is to provide
security for Dong Ha City and the Cua Viet logistics complex.
It also maintains an active reconnaissance of GVN military
activity near Quang Tri City. It has not experienced combat
for more than a year and is at full strength. The 325th Division
successfully defended the Cua Viet and Thach Han river lines
against heavy attacks by the South Vietnamese Airborne and Marine
Divisions in' late 1972.
NVA 711th Division
27. The division -- near full strength -- operates in Quang
Tin Province of MR 1 with the mission of protecting Communist
logistics facilities and infiltration routes southwest of Danang.
In early 1973, units of the division were suffering from personnel
shortages, morale, and leadership problems. Consequently,
one regiment was deactivated and a regiment of the NVA 2nd
Division was resubordinated to the division in mid-1973. The
division has been resting, refitting, and conducting extensive
training for more than a year.
South Vietnamese Infantry Divisions
28. The division is primarily responsible for defending
GVN-controlled territory west of Hue and is one of the best ARVN
divisions. Two of its four infantry regiments have experienced
high manpower losses in recent months because of malaria and some
combat activity. The current shortage of experienced leadership
in the division is being corrected by the implementation of
battalion- and company-level refresher training programs.
ARVN Second Division
29. The current mission of the division is to maintain
security in GVN-controlled areas of Quang Tin and Quang Ngai
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provinces and to deny the Communists access to Quang Ngai City.
Territorial forces and ranger units have been upgraded to oper-
ate with the division's infantry regiments, improving the defense
of the populated lowlands. Since the cease-fire, the division
has eliminated some pockets of Communist resistance in the low-
lands, while concurrently rotating its infantry battalions for
refresher training.
ARVN Third Division
30. The division has largely recovered from its April 1972
debacle in Quang Tri Province of MR 1. In the fall of 1972, it
successfully recaptured extensive territory in the populated
lowlands of Quang Nam and Quang Tin provinces. The division's
current task is to provide security for major population centers
near Danang and to protect principal ARVN installations and supply
lines. For more than a year, combat activity has been exception-
ally low, contributing to high morale and a significant improve-
ment in the strength of the division's combat units.
ARVN Fifth Division
31. The division is one of the government's poorest units.
It has sustained heavy combat losses in attempting to reopen Routes
13 and lA in Binh Duong Province of MR 3 last summer and serious
morale problems continue. Currently, the 5th Division commander
is attempting to reorganize understrength units and improve the
division's combat effectiveness. The division is in a defensive
posture, deployed in base camps astride Routes 13 and 1A. In
late March/early April, the division is scheduled to be withdrawn
for training, and the responsibility for its area of operations
is to be assumed by the ARVN 18th Division.
ARVN Seventh Division
32. The 7th Division is deployed in Dinh Tuong Province of
MR 4 with the mission of protecting GVN installations and popu-
lated areas along Route 4 between My Tho and Sa Dec cities. In
recent months, the division has successfully executed several
combat operations near traditional Communist infiltration routes
and base areas in Dinh Tuong and Kien Tuong provinces. The
division is well led, highly mobile, and is the most effective
combat unit in MR 4.
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ARVN Ninth Division
33. The 9th Division is primarily responsible for interdicting
Communist infiltration routes from Cambodia through the delta
provinces of Chau Doc, Kien Giang, Chuong Thien and Dinh Tuong.
The division is now slightly understrength because of desertions
and personnel replacement problems. The Joint General Staff (JGS)
has designated the division as part of the General Reserve, and it
will move to MR 3 if the Communists launch a general offensive.
ARVN 18th Division
34. The 18th Division has developed into the best MR 3
unit. It has primary responsibility for defending populated
areas and GVN lines of communication north of Saigon. The
division has been scheduled to replace the ARVN 5th Division
in Binh Duong Province with the mission of opening Route 13 to
Binh Long Province. Morale is high in the division and its
units are known to have a good rapport with the local population.
Moreover, the division is overstrength and recently was ordered
to discontinue recruiting. There has been an increase in security
because of its aggressive combat operations in conjunction with
territorial forces. The division possesses good leadership and
conducts regular rotational training of all combat units.
ARVN 21st Division
35. The division is deployed in the southern delta with the
mission of protecting populated areas. Although its operating
area has been reinforced by territorial forces, the division con-
tinues to be the weakest of the three GVN divisions in MR 4. it
has not made significant progress in opening new territory for
resettlement or closing Communist supply and infiltration routes.
The division continues to be characterized by poor leadership at
all levels of command.
ARVN 22nd Division
36. The traditional area of operation for the division is
in Binh Dinh Province where it was routed by the NVA 3rd Division
in the opening phase of the 1972 offensive. The division recovered,
however, and by the start of the cease-fire had recaptured most
of its lost territory. The division is now deployed in Kontum
and Pleiku provinces where it has primary responsibility for
defending the provincial capitals. For the past few months, the
division, reinforced by rangers and territorial forces, has been
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unsuccessful in its operations into Communist base areas in the
two provinces. The operations have been costly in terms of
manpower losses: two regiments are now considered only marginally
combat effective.
37. The division is now operating in Quang Duc and
Darlac provinces of MR 2 and has the mission of conducting
operations against Communist base areas along the Cambodia/
South Vietnam border. The former operating area of the division
was Kontum and Pleiku provinces where it successfully recaptured
Trung Nghia in the fall of 1973. Because of combat since the
cease-fire, it is judged to be marginally effective.
38. The division is currently at full strength and has
the mission of defending Tay Ninh City and protecting Routes 22
and 1 to Saigon. The 25th Division is augmented by territorial
forces, and this combined force proved to be highly effective
during the 1972 offensive. The division is now undergoing
extensive training.
39. The Airborne Division is one of the GVN's most effective
divisions. Although the division has been deployed in MR 1 since
April 1972, it continues to be part of the JGS General Reserve.
Since the cease-fire, airborne units have assumed a static defen-
sive posture in Thua Thien Province. The division has some morale
problems because of economic hardships faced by families of divi-
sion personnel living in the distant Saigon-Bien Hoa area. This
situation has been alleviated somewhat by rotating division
personnel to Saigon. Individual and unit refresher training is
conducted on a regular basis and unit manning levels are at
98 percent.
Marine Division
40. The Marine Division has distinguished itself as a
highly motivated, well-disciplined, and aggressively-led combat
unit. Although still part of the JGS General Reserve, the
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division represents the GVN's main line of defense in Quang Tri
Province of MR 1. Combat units of the division, supported by
territorial forces, are defending Quang Tri City and the coastal
lowlands of Quang Tri and Thua Thien provinces. Despite its
defensive mission, the division has maintained excellent troop
morale because of refresher training programs, frequent rotation
of units to Saigon, and effective civic action programs within
populated areas. Current manning levels have surpassed
authorized levels and recuriting has been temporarily suspended.
Ranger Command
41. A two-phase plan for the reorganization of ranger units
was completed in January. The Ranger Command now has 15 ranger
groups. Three groups, however, have been designated part of the
JGS General Reserve. The Rangers presently augment GVN forces
in the MRs. The combat performance of many ranger units has been
less than satisfactory because of a lack of equipment, poor
training, and poor discipline. To alleviate these problems, a
concerted effort is underway to improve individual and unit
training.
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Secret
Secret
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