COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS OF THE VIETNAM AND LAOS SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T02095R000700080052-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 2, 2009
• Sequence Number: 52
• Publication Date: October 24, 1973
• Content Type: REPORT

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Tap Secret
NSA review completed
`~,~LLIGF.~,
~, ~ . f
Thirty-Fifth Report
COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS OF THE VIETNAM AND LAOS
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS
(This report covers the period from
17 October through 23 October 1973)
This memorandum has been prepared jointly by the
Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense.
Top Secret
25X1
25X1
DIA review(s)
completed.
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SPECIAL NOTE
Preliminary evidence received too late for in-
c:I~usion in the main body of this report indicates
that the North Vietnamese are planning to resume per-
sonnel infiltration to the central highlands and
southern South Vietnam on a substantial scale. Ac-
cording to an intercepted message of 22 October,
13,000 NVA troops destined for these areas are to
pass through southern Laos during November. No
regular infiltration groups known to be moving to
central and southern South Vietnam have been detected
since March 1973, but this new evidence suggests that
such groups wi11 appear in the near future. Commu-
nist forces in the COSVN area and the central high-
lands would need such a flow of infiltration to fill
out units already deployed and to build replacement
pools, if Hanoi were planning a significant level of
offensive activity there during the coming dry season.
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Thirty-Fifth Report
COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS OF THE VIETNAM AND LAOS
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS*
(This report covers the week from
17 October through 23 October 1973)
The Key Points
Some 2,000 infiltrators were noted moving south-
ward this week as Hanoi resumed the dispatch of
one group per day on 20 October.
Another Communist combat regiment has moved from
Cambodia into South Vietnam's MR-3.
The North Vietnamese continue to realign and re-
fine their command and control structure in south
Laos to facilitate the movement of both men and
materiel this dry season.
Particularly severe rains and flooding have cur-
tailed North Vietnamese logistic activity in the
North Vietnamese Panhandle, northern South Viet-
nam, and south Laos.
Communist rice shortages appear to be one reason
for North Vietnamese plans for military action
in GVN MR-3. Strictly in the economic sphere,
they are increasing their efforts to obtain rice
and other supplies.
Sizable quantities of armor and artillery--some
of which may recently have arrived from China--
have been sighted in storage areas near Hanoi.
Combat activity remained at low levels in both
South Vietnam and Laos last week.
* This report has been prepared jointly by the
Central Intelligence Agency and the Department
of Defense .
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The Details
NOTE: This is the thirty-fifth in a series of memo-
randa summar~.~ing evidence received during the report-
ing period of ~I~ Communist efforts to infiltrate new
manpower and m~l~,tary mate~?ie1 toward and into South
Vietnam, (~~) Communist-initiated combat activity in
violation of the Vietnam and Laos settlement agree-
ments, and ~I;T11 other developments affecting Commu-
nist military capabilities in Indochina.
~,---
I. Infiltration and Redeployments of North Viet-
namese Personnel and M21~.tary Supplies
A. Personnel Infiltration and Redeplo my ents
1. Hanoi apparently .intends to continue
sending regular combat infiltration groups southward
at the rate of one per day for the near term. A re-
port to this effect, was received and apparently con-
firmed during the past week, as three new regular
groups traveling toward southern Laos were identified
in North Vietnam. In addition, a fourth regular group
and one small special-purpose group were noted start-
ing southward, but the regular group--also moving to-
ward southern Laos--had previously been included in
our estimate.
2. As a result of these new groups, the number
of infiltrators starting south from North Vietnam this
week stands at some 2,000 personnel. Since the 15
June "second" ceasefire, about 26,000 infiltrators
have started south,, of whom some 24,000 have been
combat troops. In the nine. months which have elapsed
since the s~.gning of the original ceasefire agreement
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Communist and South Vietnamese Regular Combat Forces in South Vietnam
Regular Combat Forces
VC/NVA~
1. Includes VCJNVA personnel in ground combat, combat MR 2
support, and air defense units and local force companies and VC~NVA RVNAF
platoons.
1. RVNAF C:round Order of Battle. Includes assigned
personnel in ARVNJVNMC ground combat and combat
and Regional Force battalions. Although
ort units
,
supp
present for duty strength is no longer available, it is estimated 330th 23rd
to be about 85% of assigned strength, 10th 22n d
3rd Regional
429th Sapper 25th
Command 18th
9th 5th
7th Regional
5th Forces
"VC/NVA RVNAF
44th Special
Tactical Zone
Regional Forces
21St
9th
7th
86,000 89,000
325th VNMC
324B Airborne
320B 1st
304th 2nd
711th 3rd
2nd Regional
Forces
. ~Phoneti
Kt~1S" ~,.. oDin~ ~
Kien oni
Tuong:- An
n9i
~
Forces
.
~ V~
Vinh
Binh
VII
(luang `_
Nam
~,.. '"~'
;...~ E~uang ?'
BinF
Tub
`'~
1Khanh
.rt Haa;
Military region boundary
-?- Province boundary
?~ ICCS region boundary
0 25
I--~--~T
0 25 50
5b 75 Miles
-~
75 Kilometers
5X1
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on 27 January, over 76,000 North Vietnamese person-
nel, including more than 68,000 combat troops and
8,000 specialist.,s, have infiltrated southward. Over
51,000 of these personnel have started south since
27 January, while 25,000 were in the pipeline moving
southward as of that date. (ANNEX B,
contains a more detailed discussion of the
information pertaining to infiltration which was re-
ceived during the past week.)
3. Recent reports have confirmed earlier in-
dications that the NVA 367th Sapper Regiment was
leaving Cambodia. There is now good evidence that
as of mid-September, the regiment had moved from its
previous location near Phnom Penh to northwestern Tay
Ninh Province in South Vietnam. The regiment, as
well as other units, may have vacated former posi-
tions in Cambodia because of continued poor relations
between KC-VC/NVA units. The deployment of the reg-
iment also may be related to Communist plans to in-
crease tactical activity in Tay Ninh Province.
4. The relocation of the unit--estimated at
some 1,000 men--lowers VC/NVA combat strength in Cam-
bodia to about 2,000, compared. with an estimated
strength of more than 7,000 at the time of the Vietnam
ceasefire in January. Tn addition to the above, there
may be as many as 2,000 VC/NVA operating as cadre,
advisors and liaison with the KC. Similarly, VC/NVA
administrative services strength has declined from
around 30,000 in January to .a present strength of
about 18,000, as these units have also moved into South
Vietnam. The remaining combat strength consists of
the NVA 203rd Regiment and three artillery battalions.
The status of these units .is unknown, as mid-summer
reports of the 203rd's moving from Siem Reap toward
South Vietnam recently have been contradicted by other
reporting, and no recent information has been received
on the status or location of the three artillery bat-
talions.
5. Further restructuring of the Communist's
Rear Services organization in southern Laos was noted
during the reporting period. The headquarters of
Group 472--the regional authority responsible for
logistics and infiltration operations in most of the
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Laotian Panhandle--moved south from near Muong Phine
into an area midway down the Route 99 infiltration
and ~.ogistics corridor through southern Laos. Prep-
arations for this move may have begun as early as
August, but the headquarters did not actually move
until sometime between early September and mid-October.
The relocation of this headquarters is part of the
normal dry season preparations with such a sh~.ft oc-
curring around this period in past years. It re-
flects a Communist desire to gain greater command
and control over rear service units prior to the
beginning of heavy supply movements.
6. In related activity, the 574th Commo-Liaison
Reg:~ment has assumed responsibility for all commo-
liaison activities in southern Laos. To accomplish
this, personnel were shifted between battalions, and
several battalions were moved to different areas.
During the last dry season both the 572nd (now in
South Vietnam) and the 574th were responsible for
southern Laos. The current split in responsibility
probably reflects North Vietnamese intentions to in-
filtrate personnel both through Laos and western
South Vietnam.
B. Movement of Milattar~ Equipment and Su~~ lies
Indochina
7. For the second week in a row, heavy rains
from an unusually high number of seasonal typhoons
sharply restricted the Communist logistic effort
throughout most areas of the North Vietnamese Pan-
handle, South Vietnam, and south Laos? In the south-
ern Panhandle of North Vietnam, some units reportedly
moved their cargo to higher ground and took other
protective measures to guard against damage from
floodingm Even more severe problems were encountered
in northern South Vietnam, where widespread flooding
disrupted communications and in many cases caused a
cessation of all supply shipments among units. The
situation was little different in South Laos as one
unit near the Ban Karai Pass reported on 17 October
that all the roads in its area were impassable. An-
other unit farther south in the Panhandle reported
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-~Phum Sdo~
~Ach Romeas
lVinh~~,,r~rinh
]'.~,f,. Osmarc;a lien
Jl\~ Line
Gio'
Linh '.
~Dong Ha
a~d5 dpd'dA ang -..
Tr
=a~fraa
f
Mu Gia
Pass
?Warin
Chamrap
185
havane
w Bin Nto
Thuot .
Nam send boundary repres en ration
ere not necessarily authoritative
Military region
~~-=' International Commission
of Control and Supervision
region boundary
- Road
-~--~-*~~ Railroad 25X1
POL pipeline
0 25 50 75 Miles
t r r rJ
0 25 50 75 Kilometers
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on 19 October that :lt would take 10 days to clear
the roads for vehicular traffic.
8m The. particularly heavy rains and wide-
spread flooding this month clearly have disrupted
North Vietnamese dry season preparations and prob-
ably w~..ll interfere with the resumption of large
scale. supply shipments from southern North Vietnam
to Laos. The length of the delay will be a direct
.function of future weather patterns and the intensity
of Communist recovery efforts.
TI. Communist-In~,tiated Combat Activity ~,n South
Vietnam and Labs
9. ~n South Vietnam, the total number of Com-
munist-init.~,ated ceasefire violations reported by
the South Vietnamese Armed .Forces since 27 January,
15 June, and for the last week (17-23 Oct) are
shown below:
Military
Region
Total Since 27
January Ceasefire
Total Since 15
June Ceasefire (
La
17
st W
-23
eek
Oct)
Major
Minor
Major
Minor M
aj
or
Minor
MR 1
.1,402
4,905
377
1,546 2
4
111
MR 2
571
3,820
307
1,966 2
2
100
MR 3
570
4,139
1C8
1,563
8
94
MR 4
1,132
10,221
4,54
4,055 2
5
318
Totals
3,675
23,085
1,306
9,130 7
9
(87)
623(557)1/
1/ Denotes totals of prev~.,ous weeks
10. Some of these violations may have been in-
it.iated by GVN forces .rather than Communist farces,
and it is impossible in all cases to determine the.
actual instigator. The table above and the charts on
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the following pages, however, do show fairly accu-
rately the trend in the amount of combat that has oc-
curred in South Vietnam since the ceasefire. The
fact that a combat incident occurred at a particular
time and place is generally reported accurately by
the South Vietnamese, even though the question of who
started it may not always be treated in objective
fashion.
11. There was no significant military activity
in Laos last week.
III. Other Develo ments Affectin Communist Ca a-
b~ t es n Tn oc ina
A. Communist Rice Shortages in GVN MR-3
12. The worsening Communist rice supply situa-
tion in southern South Vietnam
apparent y 1s
a prime cause of reported Communist intentions to in-
tease significantly the level of military activity
in western GVN MR-3 in the near future.
of the offensive actions will be:
t e purpose
--To force ARVN into a defensive
posture so that the Communists can
obtain .rice crops.
--To protect rice crops in Commu-
nist controlled areas to insure an
uninterrupted rice harvest.
--To take counter action against
the GVN economic blockade which
has had same effect.
In addition to their planned military efforts to
alleviate the worsening rice ava~.lability situation,
the North Vietnamese are also planning to expand
their economic efforts (see B below.)
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(See Reverse Side of Page)
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~~~~~~~~ GtRJt-tlltt YIULA i iuna in ~uu ~ n
LAN-FEB Zao
0
200
MAR
APR
MAY
lUN
a
200
VIETNAM AS REPORTED BY RVNAF
(26 JANUARY THROUGH 31 JULY 19]3)
T I INS
1 O I S
"r?i111'(f 1I
K If~iiTfl~i.~.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31
"NEW"
CEASE-FIRE
JUL
i
'I
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AUG '??
?
2??
SEP ~??
OCT ~??
NOV '??
DEC ~??
LAN ~??
CEASE?fIRE VIOLATIONS IN SOUTN
VIETNAM AS REPORTED BY RVNAF
(1 AUGUST 19]3 TO THE PRESENT)
T~ i I ~I
ttf+H1'h~F~ Tli
,' Pf1Tl
~
~
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13. The rice shortage reportedly is the result
of a poor rice crop in Communist held areas as well
as the cessation of rice deliveries from the Khmer
Communists in Cambodia to South Vietnam. In the past,
Cambodian rice deliveries have met a significant
portion of the rice requirement of VC/NVA forces in
GVN MR-3.
14. The criticality of the situation was
underscored by a COSVN cadre at a policy briefing
when he reportedly stated that "Rice is now a life
or death matter, directly affecting our struggle in
1974." Whether that "struggle" be military or polit-
ical, the Communists must ensure that internal sup-
ply problems in MR-3 are solved if they hope to achieve
any substantial success. Nonetheless, the North
Vietnamese do have-the option--although it would be
unprecedented--of shipping rice from North Vietnam to
GVN MR-3 if a severe shortage persists.
B. Communists Press Economic Activities Dee er
into Sout ern 5out V etnam
15. Communist political and rear services cadres
are apparently undertaking a wide range of economic
projects designed to strengthen their hold on the
Ben Suc area of Binh Duong Province lust 30 miles
north of Saigon (see map).
the Viet Cong have ormu ate plans to build
several mills and plants during the coming year and
have already established a system of cooperative
stores for Communist cadre and military personnel in
the Ben Suc area. The Viet Cong also have been re-
cruiting laborers to work on the nearby Michelin rub-
ber plantation and are providing tractors, plows, and
farm tools to rear service units and civilians along
with instructions to increase food production. To
facilitate economic trading and the flow of supplies
into the area, the Communists have secured and im-
proved roads linking Ben Suc with rear bases along
the Cambodian border, and in early September report-
edly initiated a regular ferry service across the
Saigon River just north of the town.
16. In another development, major elements of
the Viet Cong Binh Duong Provincial Unit Headquarters
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had moved to the Ben Suc vicinity by mid-October.
These headquarters elements had continuously occupied
the same base area in eastern Binh Duong since at
least 1967, and such a move is without precedent, The
relocations at this time may be related to the
planning and preparation for economic activities
around Ben Suc.
17. The purposes of the Communists" economic
program are to increase the quantity of supplies they
are able to produce and collect locally and to gen-
erate polit~.,cal support among the South Vietnamese
population by making them economically dependent
upon the Viet Cong. Similar efforts to stimulate
economic development in Communist controlled ter-
ritory have been reported, particularly along the
Cambodian border in northern MR-3. But aside from
the purchasing of goods in GVN controlled territory
and the distribution of small loans to Viet Cong
sympathizers, the Communist economic activities
around Ben Suc are the closest to South Vietnamese
controlled territory and population centers in MR-3
reported thus far.
C. Communists Increase Coastal Infiltration of
Suppl es .into South V~.etnam's Lower Delta
18, Communist coastal resupply
deliveries to base areas along the western coast of
South Vietnam's southern MR-4 indicate an increase
in activity over the past several months. ~ ,
bodia. Reports of coastal offloading usually surge
at this time of year, however, as seasonal flooding
restricts the Communists' mobility along the land
routes.
shifted to sea transportat on ecause ARVN units have
interdicted the major overland corridor used to re-
supply the lower delta-from stocks in southern Cam-
19. The available reporting suggests that the
coastal shipments originate in Cambodia, where the
Communists control a substantial-part of the south-
ern coast.. Deliveries are most frequently made by
5 to 15-ton fishing vessels which offload onto
sampans about a mile offshore. The sampans report-
edly carry the supplies to nearby inland waterways
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for further transport to inland rear services. areas.
A large part of the cargo is apparently ammunition,
but in some cases troops are also infiltrated by
sea. Several weeks ago, for example, four fishing
boats reportedly landed in northern. An Xuyen Province
and unloaded an undetermined amount of 60-mm and 81-
mm mortar rounds and a company of troops, Because
the high volume of fishing traffic in this area makes
detections of vessels carrying illegal cargoes ex-
tremely difficult, such activities are likely to con-
tinue.
D. Recent Satellite Photography Results
Over North Vietnam
The mission showe sa.za e
quantities of armor an artillery in several storage
areas located north and south of Hanoi, With one
exception, however, there were no significant dif-
ferences between the current inventories and those
recorded in early August. About 300 field and AAA
pieces were seen at the Trieng Xen artillery park
40 miles southwest of Hanoi--an increase of about
100 pieces since August. This increase could re-
present either new equipment deliveries or an effort
by the North Vietnamese to centralize storage of their
artillery in the wake of the bombing halt. Ninety
percent of the Vinh Yen armored training center was
photographed. About 130 tanks were observed, some
40 more than when the complex was seen in early Au-
gust. Included were 24 Soviet T54/55 or Chinese
Type 59 tanks and 15 PT-63 tanks parked between
storage sheds. These tanks were not parked there in
early August and this in-turn suggests that these
tanks may have arrived fairly recently via rail from
China,
21. The photography d:id not provide any indica-
tions of recent military deliveries through the in-
ternational facilities at Dong Dang/F?ing-hsiang and
the port of Haiphong, although both areas showed con-
tinuing moderate levels of transfer activity. Partial
coverage of the Dong Dang Truck Parks showed some
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1,600 vehicles--mostly. cargo trucks. and miscellaneous
equipment in storage. This was about the same num-
ber observed in early August, although it was ap-
parent that some of the earlier inventory had since
been removed from the area.
22. Coverage of the DRV panhandle was sparse?
The Vinh rail yard and the nearby Hon Nieu coastal
anchorage both showed considerable transloading ac-
tivity. There also was an increase in stockpiles at
the Vinh rail yard, and a Chinese freighter and a
DRV tanker were anchored at Hon Nieu.
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Post-Ceasefire Infiltration of North Vietnamese
l to the South
1. The North Vietnamese will continue the
southward movement of regular combat infiltration
groups for an unspecified period of time. On 20
October, an intercepted message from Binh .Tram (BT)
8 in the Vinh area stated that one group per day-was
to be sent southward, beginning on the 20th. Al-
though no indication was provided either as to the
period involved or the composition or destination of
the groups, the receiver of the message was to "send
them out at 1800 :hours...to maintain secrecy." The
validity of this message was substantiated on 21
October, when Group 5086, consisting of-756 troops,
was observed entering the .infiltration pipeline in
the BT 8 area; and with the subsequent detection of
groups 5087 and 5088 in the same area. The strengths
of these groups, all of which are traveling towards
southern Laos, are considerably higher than normal.
2. During the past week, one other regular
combat group (5069) also was observed starting to-
ward southern Laos, but it was previously included
in our estimate as a "gap-filled" group and thus
does not represent any ~..ncrease in the level of in-
filtration starts. Finally, one small infiltration
group destined for northern GVN MR-1 and comprised
of about 25 admini.strati,ve cadre also was noted
entering the pipeline in North Vietnam.
3. Further evidence was received during the
past. week regarding the ultimate destination of some
of the personnel who recently have infiltrated south-
ward in 5~cacx - series groups. In an intercepted
enemy message between two unidentified elements of
Rear Services Group 473--which operates primarily in
northern MR-1 of South Vietnam--it was revealed that
some 150 of group 5083"s 612 troops were to be "turned
over" to the NVA 968th Infantry Division and to Rear.
Services Group 472. Another message intercepted
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between elements of the 572d Comoro-Liaison Regiment
on 2~- October revealed that the 5.33 members of Group
508; were bound for the 29th independent-Regiment
near Muong ~halaxzea These messages indicate- the
1~A .intend t.o keep up the strength of their combat
units in southern Laos and do not plan to withdraw..
them from Laos anytime soon.
4. l.n a related 19 October message, it was
revealed that some 30 groups were to move into the
574th Comoro-Liaison Regiment"s area of operations in
the southern part of the Laotian Panhandle to "re-
inforce the unit and the battlefield" over an un-
specified period of time. Thus far, intercepts have
revealed 26 groups heading toward south Laos. ,This
reference to the disposition of infiltrating troops
also suggests that they will be allocated to both
combat and administrative services units. Because
females are included in these 30 groups, however, it
is likely that some of the personnel to be received
by the 574th Regiment are specialists. Table 1 below
shows the pattern of total infiltration starts, in-
cluding specialists, since 1 January 1973, while Tab 1e
2 compares the southward movement of combat troops
since 1 September by destination with the same period
in 1972.
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Number of Personnel Entering the Pipeline
De
January
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
October 1-23
Total
20,000
10,200
8,250
1,925
7,175
2,200
3,650
2,200
7,000
11,825
, and Cambo ,a Since 1 ~7anua~?y 1973
Special-Purpose
1,600
2,100
2,250
1,200
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Comparative Starts b~ Combat Troops From
-North Vietnam, b~Deat~nat~.on
1 September - 23 October
1972
19'73
Total
12,000
18,500
MR Tri-Thien-Hue
9,000
2,000
MR 5
1,500
2,000
B-3 Front
0
0
COSVN
500
0
Southern Laos/MR 559
1,000
14,500
This table covers the ~,n~.~.ltrat~.on of North
Vietnamese troops to South V1.,etnam, Cambodia,
and southern Laosm 1:n~~,ltrators moving to
northern Laos are not includedo
Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000700080052-1
 Approved For Release 2009/04/08 :CIA-RDP78T02095R000700080052-1
Top Secret
Top Secret
Approved For Release 2009/04/08 :CIA-RDP78T02095R000700080052-1