MEMO FROM RICHARD HELMS TO DIRECTOR CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE CONCERNING MILITARY TH
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CIA HISTORICAL RELEASE
PROGRAM
JUNE 2017
CENTRA 1
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
1 5 MAY 1962
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT
MILITARY THOUGHT: "On the Problem of the Tasks
of the Navy and Methods for Accomplishing Them",
by Admiral V. Kasatonov
1. Enclosed is a verbatim translation of an article which
appeared in the TOP SECRET Special Collection of Articles of the
Journal "Military ThoUght" ("Vbyennaya mysi") published, by the '
Ministry of Defense, USSR, and distributed down to the level of
Army Commander.
2. In the interests of protecting our source, this material
should be handled on a need-to-know basis within'your office.
Requests for extra copies of this report or for utilization of
any part of this document in any other form should be addressed
to the originating office.
Richard. Helms
Deputy Director (Flans)
Enclosure
APPIOVED FOR RELEASE
3 0 JUN 1992
AR 70-14
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Original: The Director of Central Intelligence
cc: Military Representative of the President
Special Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The Director of Intelligence and Research,
Department of State
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Director for Intelligence,
The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence,
Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
U. S. Air Force
The Director, National Security Agency
Director, Division of Intelligence
Atomic Energy Commission
National Indications Center
Chariman, Guided Missiles and Astronautics
Intelligence Committee
The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for. Intelligence
Assistant Director for National Estimates
Assistant Director for Current Intelligence
Assistant Director for Research andiReports
Plissistant Director for Scientific Intelligence
Director, National Photographic Interpretation Center
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COUNTRY
SUBJECT
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: USSR
DATE OF INFO :
APPRAISAL OF
CONTENT ?
SOURCE
MILITARY THOUGHT: "On the Problem of
the Tasks of the Navy and Methods for
Accomplishing Them", by Admiral
V. Kasatonov
October 1961
Documentary
A 1.el1able source (B).
Following is a verbatim translation of an article
titled "On the Problem of the Tasks of the Navy and
Methods for Accomplishing Them", written by Admiral
V. Kasatonov.
This article appeared in the 1961 Fourth Issue
of a special version of the Soviet military journal
Voyennaya Mysl (Military Thought). This journal is
published irregularly and is classified TOP SECRET
by the Soviets. The 1961 Fourth Issue went to press
on 20 October 1961.
Headquarters Comment: The Plat
page 2 was disseminated as
cle cited on
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On the Problem of the Task d of the Navy and Methods for
Accomplishing Them
by
Admiral V. Kasatonov
In Admiral V. Platonov's article "On the Tasks of
the Navy and Methods for Accomplithing Them,"* he cited
several important fflropositions about naval operations in
a future war. In our opinion, however, several of them
are debatable, and in connection with this we want to set
forth our opinion of them.
In examining the task of destroying carrier strike
large units, the author expressed doubt that their combat
activities would be carried out mainly on the open sea.
We think there is no basis for such a doubt.
In the opinion of Western military specialists, besides
the large units of fire oftrlauclear warheads (more than 100
nuclear bombs on each aircraft carrier), the strength of
carrier strike large units is precisely their great
maneuverability and their ability to deliver strikes with
nuclear weapons on a broad front. It is precisely for this
reason that they consider,carrier.strike large units_a more
reliable and stable means of combat in coMParidOn,4ith'dhOre'--
based aircraft and ground missile units.
? It is not without reason that the NATO command thinks
that ground airfields and areas of missile launch sites
can be reconnoitered even beforethe beginning.of combat
operations and subjected to powerful strikes by nuclear
missiles in the initial hours and minutes of a war. Carrier
strike large units however, are capable of performing a
maneuver, of 1000 km in one cilendar day in any direction
and are leSs vulnerable. For the present they cannot be
destroyed by missile strikes from the shore, and the
reconnaissance of carrier strike large units on the sea
hnd thig4.r'edting of submarines and aircraft against them
is a very complicated task.
* Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Militar
Thought", Issue Two, 1961.
g.
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The experience of numerous exercises of the carrier
strike fleets of the USA and the NATO joint naval forces
proves that the basic method of operations of carrier strike
large units is their delivery of strikes from areas on the
open sea. In particular, at the maneuvers of the NATO
joint armed forces which were held in autumn of 1960, air-
craft carriers participating in the general nuclear attack
delivered their strikes against very important objectives
of the "enemy" from a distance of up to 2000 km in a zone
with a front of tp-to 1700 km. Here the carrier strike
groups constantly maneuvered within the bounds of the
Norwet.am. Sea and combined the maneuver with measures
of radio silence in the networks of long-range radio
communication. The American 6th Fleet operated in a
similar way in the Mediterranean Sea.
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It is possible for the carrier strike large units
to put in :to shore waters, particularly into shore bases,
only in particular cases. Usually the carrier strike
groups put in to render direct support to ground troops,
particularly to put ashore an amphibious landing force.
For example, that was the-reason why the strike aircraft
carriers :entered the Aegean Sea in the final stages of
the concluding maneuvers of the NATO joint armed forcea(GVS)
in-4957 and 1960.
It should be borne in mind that by operating in, shore
waters with fiords, all other enemy ships can be camouflaged
successfully against the background of islands ok the shore,
but aircraft carriers will be exposed when their aircraft
take off. Besides that, they can be detected by intelligence
agents. As an example of this one can cite the constant
surveillance conducted by our and the British intelligence
during the past war of. the large German ships in the
Norwegian fiords. Under modern conditions, after having
been discovered in areas which are too small for maneuvering,
aircraft carriers can be destroyed with great accuracy by
nuclear strikes from missile troops. It is clear that the
enemy will try as far as possible to avoid such areas.
One cannot quite understand the author's idea that in
remote areas of the ocean, "carrier strike large units
can function only as cover forces for convoys or within
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the complement of hunter-killer groups of the antisubmarine
defense" (Page IL). As is well known, the carrier strike
large units, like the fleet strike force, are dmtended,
not to cover convoys but to deliver strikes against important
military, industrial, and administrative installations and
against ports and naval bases. They are also capable of
delivering strikes against ships and vessels on the sea.
From whom can carrier strike large units conceal convoys
in remote areas of tho ocean? It is obvious that such a
task could be given the carrier strike large units only
if the probable enemy coulde7expect attadks against his
convoys from large surface vessels, for exampllfrom aircraft
carriers. Because the probable enemy does not expect such
operations from us, one can suppose that he will not charge
the carrier strike large units with such tasks.
Covering convoys and carrier strike large units from
submarine strikes is carried out by carrier hunter-killer
groups which are especially raisSign:ea for this purpose,
and at the basis of these groups are not strike aircraft
carriers but aircraft carriers of the antisubmarine defense.'
By using the carrier hunter-killer groups, the enemy,
as was correctly noted by Admiral V, Platonov, of course
will strive to clear our submarines from the areas where
carrier strike large units are maneuvering. However, one
must not overestimate his capabilities for accomplithing
this task. The areas where the. carrier strike large units
are maneuvering are quite large and occupy hundreds of .
thousands of square kilometers. Moreover, one must .
inspect not only the areas of combat maneuvering but also
the areas where the strike fleet is formed, where Ships
are refueled, waiting areas for servicing, and areas with
the routes of the carrier strike large units and other
operational groups of the strike fleet. Even the successive
execution of preliminary searches in these areas to clear
them of submarines would require brining in tens of carrier
hunter-killer groups of the antisubmarine defense, and
this exceeds the bounds of the real capabilities of the
probable enemy, particularly if one considers that such
operations must be. carried out simultaneously in several
zones of the worloig ocean.
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For reliable, direct protection of carrier strike large
units and convoys operating in antiatomic combat formations,
one also must have a large number of antisubmarine forces
and weapons.
Despite the fact that our probable enemies have at
their disposal a developed shipbuilding industry, their
capabilities for building the needed number of ships and
planes of the antisubmarine defense to fight our submarines
are not limitless. These capabilities can be limited even
more as a result of strikes by missile troops and by missile
submarines against the centers of the shipbuilding industry
and the bases of the enemy's antisubmarine forces.
We are completely, aware that the operations of diesel-
electric submarines, particularly against carrier strike
large units and fast, strongly protected convoys, will be
conducted with great difficulties. However, even these
submarines will be able to operate successfully against
less fast-moving targets.
The operations of atomic submarines will undoubtedly
be more effective. The great maneuvering capabilities
and the enormous range of these boats make it possible for
them to be used to deliver strikes against carrier strike
large units not only in areas of combat maneuvering of
the latter and in the approaches to them but also on the
lanes used by the carrier strike large units in crossing
the ocean and on the approaches to distant bases across
the ocean.
Without being inferior in speed to aircraft carriers,
and exceeding the speed of the fastest convoys by 1.5 to
2 times, the atomic submarines can attack them from any
direction and avoid encounters with the hunter.-killer
groups of the antisubmarine defense which usually take
up positions in fOrward area ar7 of the movement of the
carrier strike large units or the convoy.
\
The use of atomic torpedoes increases even more the
,combat capabilities of the submarines, Incidentally, we
cannot agree in any way with Admiral V. Platonov in his
negative evaluation of atomic torpedoes, much less
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the long range ones (Page 9.0. The advantages of atomic
torpedoes are obvious. Thus, to destroy a ship of any
class, it is sufficient to strike it with one atomic
torpedo within a semicircle with a radius equal to the
radius of destruction of the given target. We note that
to destroy any ship such as a strike aircraft carrier,
we must hit it with no less than 8 to 10 torpedoes with
conventional filling. As a result of the fact that to
destroy a ship with an atomic torpedo, it is sufficient
not to guarantee striking the ship directly but in a
semicircle with a sizable radius, : . the probability of
destroying the target with this torpedo increases greatly
and in several instances approaches one.
Finally, one must keep in mind that in using torpedoes
with conventional charges, because of:their small radius
of destruction, the firing is usually done by four-torpedo
salvos, but in using atomic torpedoes the firing is done
with single torpedoes. Therefore, if a submarine replaces
conventional torpedoes with atomic ones, then with the use
of the same number of torpedoes, the number of possible
effective attacks increases by four times, i.e., the self-
sufficiency of a submarine in ammunition increases by four
times.
Considering the great self-sufficiency ?carrier
strike large units,which is reinforced by the,mobile.system
for supplying and servicing them.on the sea, the75A.pid:
efforts by our Navy must be directed at fighting them on
the open sea and ocean; at the approaches to probable
areas of combat operations, directly in those areas, and
also on the ocean lanes used by the carrier strike large
units from remote rear bases and at exits from those bases.
We think that by using and clearly organizing a
sufficient amount of forces and means of reconnaissance,
the successful operations of our forces -- submarines and
aircraft -- can and must be organized against the carrier
strike large units on the open sea.
L/4;It is also difficult to agree with the author of the
ticle on the evaluation which he gives of the long-range
possibilities of atomic aircraft (Page -4). In our opinion,
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the insufficient range at low altitudes and the low self-
sufficiency of modern aircraft, even the largest jet aircraft,
is a serious hindrance impeding their use in distant areas
of the ocean in coordination with submarines. The impossibility
of long flights at low altitudes to a considerable degree
causes the great vulnerability of modern aircraft to anti-
aircraft weapons.
Apparently, aircraft using atomic energy will be able
to fly for quite a long time at low altitudes and at any
distance from their airfields, and they will be shot down
much less frequently by antiaircraft weapons than were
their piston and jet predecessors.
According to .theol'.y, , the atomic airplane can become*
almost7.invulnerable and quite effective weapon of armed
combat on the sea in conducting combat operations against
a. carrier strike large unit, convoys, and missile-carrying
submarines.
One must keep in mind that a missile-carrying aircraft .
possesses a very Wuable feature -- in launching its
missiles it itself observes the objective of the strike !?
and directs the missile to the target, i.e., it operates
without any intermediate means, and becabseof.this,: errors
in determining the location of the target by reconnaissance
means are excludedsas well as.anyjnfluence on the accuracy
of the firing by the-iovemeht-. of the target during the
missile's flight. .
We basically agree with the opinion of Admiral
V. Platonov about the degree of threat from enemy missile-
carrying submarines and on the ways of combating them at
the modern stage of the development of our antisubmarine
defense forces and weapons. It is true that at the present
time the real strength in the fight against missile-
carrying submarines can be fast submarines of the anti-
submarine defense which are specially equipped to accomplish
this task... There is also no doubt abott. the methods of
combat operations of antisubmarine submarines proposed in
the article.
However, one cannot completely agree with the author
of the article when he says that there is no other way to
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combat missile-carrying submarines. In our opinion, the
use of a single weapon (the subbarinescof the antisubmarine
defense) in the struggle against such A formidable enemy
as missile-carrying submatines is an emergency measure
caused by the status and capabilities of the antisubmarine
forces and weapons at the given moment.
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Although possessing several indisputable advantages
in comparison with other forces of the antisubmarine
defense, the submarines of the antisubmarine defense also
have their shortcomings. The chief shortcoming is that
even with the sharp increase in the fahge'-of-.detection of
submarines by hydroqcouslia-means of surveillance, detailing
submarines of the antisubmarine defense for the reliable
accomplishment of this task must be excessively large and
must amount to not tens but hundreds of atomic submarines.
This, obviously, cannot be guaranteed for a comparatively
long time. Moreover, having predominance in the world.
ocean in surface and air forces, the probable enemy can .
use, in his fight against our submarines, besides his own
.submarines of the antisubmarine defense, surface ships,
dirigibles, and aircraft. of the antisubmarine defense
from land bases and from aircraft carriers.' This will
place our submarines of the antisubmarine defense in an
unequal position with the enemy submarines, and this
even further decreases the reliability of accomplinigg
the task of combating them.
On the basis of these considerations, it is extremely
desirable to bring in other forces besides the .
submarines of the antisubmarineldefense for the struggle
against missile-carrying submarines. These should be
forces which would be able as much as possible to compensate
for the shortcomings inherent in antisubmarine subinarines.
In this plan we do not share the very pessimistic
evaluation expressed by Admiral V. Platonov regarding
naVa1 aviation. It is obvious that, provided the means
of detecting submarines by aircraft are improved, and the
flight range of aircraft at low altitudes is increased,
aircraft will be able to increase the effectiveness of
the struggle against missile-carrying submarines in
coordination with submarines of the antisubmarine defense.
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Apparently, the new possibilities in accomplishing this
important task may take into account orbital means of
combat which are based on the use of artificial earth
satellites.
. In our opinion, the essence of the problem is to
create effective means for the distant detection of
submarines from the air which will make it possible to
employ for their destruction the most effective modern
means of destruction -- missiles with nuclear charges
launched from submarines or aircraft and possibly also
from shore launching mounts.
It would be incorrect to rule out the possibility of
creating other means of detection. Considering the great
seriousness of the threat of missile-carrying submarines
for our country and the other countries of the Socialist
Camp in the event a war breaks out, we must set such a
task before Soviet scientists.
Thus, as the bases for accomplishing the task of
combating missile-carrying submarines, we must place not
just one means of combat, but a set of means, the main
ones of which are submarines, aircraft, and possibly,
orbital means of combat.
In examining the task of combating enemy ocean
transportation, the author of the article maintains that
under-todern conditions the need arises to choose, as the
main objective for strikes by our forces, not transports,
but aircraft carriers (Page 8). We cannot agree with
that statement. In our opinion, it is caused by an
obvious overestimation of the capabilities of our probable
enemy to cover and defend his convoys. For this purpose
the enemy may use aircraft.carriers only within the
complement of carrier hunter-killer groups or for direct
safeguarding to protect only a relatively small number
of the most valuable convoys?: A considerable number of
convoys and transports will follow the ocean lanes without
cover by aircraft carriers. (We have already mentioned
that carrier strike large units have a very small bearing
on the direct protection of convoys.)
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Moreover, it is quite difficult to guarantee the
selective destruction of aircraft carriers among all the
ships and transports of a convoy, even from a purely
tactical viewpoint. It is obvious that submarines armed
with torpedoes will launch their torpedoes against the
nearest large ship or transport during an attack, and
strikes by mistiles with nuclear warheads from submarines
and aircraft must be delivered against the main body of
the convoy, i.e., against the transports, calculating on
destroying as many of them as possible. Ahy other solution
of the task is scarcely admissible.
Of course, when one has the opportunity to choose
between attacking either a transport or an aircraft
carrier, preference should be given to the latter.
However, in principle, the main objectives for strikes
by natal forces in combat with enemy ocean shipping,
just as previously, remain the transports with troops
and cargo, and the task of disrupting shipping can be
accomplished only by destroying a definite proportion of
the enemy's transport tonnage.
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