MEMO FOR THE SECSTATE, SECDEF, D/BUREAU OF BUDGET, D/CIA, U.S. INFOR, AGY. FROM JAMES S. LAY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R001100050010-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 63
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 17, 2003
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: February 23, 1961
• Content Type: MF

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Executive Office of the President
0 National Security Council
P Washington Ox?autive Registry
February 23, 1961
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director, Bureau of the Budget
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Director, U. S. Information Agency
The enclosed staff studies, prepared by the staff of the
President's Committee on Information Activities Abroad, are
transmitted herewith for information and such study as you may
deem appropriate.
Attention is invited to the fact that the enclosures were
not approved by the President's Committee on Information Activities
Abroad and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Committee
or any member thereof.
Only a limited number of copies of the staff studies were
made available for distribution.
JAMES S. LAY, JR.
Executive Secretary
R'k ~f' ypo
t.J- b3%
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SSECRFT
THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE
ON
INFORMATION ACTIVITIES ABROAD
aV,,,,,;,, 0 O ~y~ SXQN: ACTIV rIE$ 0F'
,Tune 20, 1960
*Compilation of draft pa.PerA Non, 1, 3, 5, 14, and 26,
B1C$ET
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This document is one of a numbs of memoranda[
prepared to assist The President's (c.:nittee on
Information Activities Abroad in its ieliberations.
The paper does not necessarily reflect the views
of the Committee whose conclusions a recommen-
dations are stated in its report to '.'ie President.
In some cases these memoranda h4-.,e been
prepared by members of the Committee'3taff; in
some cases on our request by persons to various
agencies of the Government; and in a few instances,
by outside consultants.
These papers treat only of matte -?s in which
the Committee has had a particular izerest. In
a number of cases, therefore, they ate! not
rounded and comprehensive treatments )f each topics
Nevertheless, we have decided to make them avail-
able within the Government with the t mought that
they may be of some use to operating )fficials
dealing with various aspects of info ,iation
programs and other foreign activities.:
Waldemar Nielsen
Executive xi rector
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Contents
Page
I.
General statement
1
II.
Policy committee coordination recommendation
2
III.
The Voice of America
3
A. Origins
3
B. Mission
3
C. Targets
4
D. Types of programs
4
E. Operations
5
tion of broadcasts
Rece
F
8
p
.
G. Audience estimate
9
H. Achievements
9
I. Provisions for policy control
10
J. Discussion of proposed directive
12
K. Recommendation
15
IV.
Armed Forces Radio and Television Service--
VOA relationships
16
A.
Backg
round
16
B.
Concl
usions and recommendations
19
V.
Radio L
Radio i
iber
n th
ty, R
e Ame
adio Free Europe, and
rican Sector (Berlin)
20
A.
Backg
round
20
1.
Radio Liberty
20
2.
Radio Free'Europe
23
3.
Radio in the American Sector
(Berlin)
28
B.
Statement of the problem 31
C.
Facts bearing on the problem 32
1.
Identity and scale of facilities
32
2.
Reception and credibility of
broadcasts
34
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D. Discussion 36
1. The development of differences
of opinion within the Govern-
ment on RFE/RL 36
2. Issues and problems 37
E. Conclusions and recommendations 43
VI. The Voice of the United Nations Command 47
A. Comment by the Department of State
B. Comment by Chief of Staff,
C.
D.
E.
U. S. Army
Comment by U. S. Information Agency
Summary
Recommendations
47
49
51
52
Private and religious broadcasting
A. Private stations broadcasting
abroad from the U. S.
B. Religious broadcasters
C. Summary
D. Recommendations
A.
B.
C.
62
62
62
63
63
65
USIA replies to Committee
s
questionnaire
65
Summary
70
Recommendations
72
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X. International television 73
A. Background 73
B. Available assets 74
C. Recommendations 75
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INTERNATIONAL, RADIO AND TELEVISION ACTIVITIES
OF THE U. S. GOVERNMENT
I. GENERAL STATEMENT
{ The table of contents indicates the scope of the inquiry with respect
to the effect of radio broadcasting and television upon world opinion on
which papers were prepared by the Committee Staff or submitted by U.S.
Government agency personnel at the Staff's request. These papers have been
grouped into this document; each major subject includes summary findings
and interim recommendations by the Staff. Some repetition occurs where
analysis of facts restates or brings together items appearing in background
sections.
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II. POLICY CONgMEE COORDINATION RECO14MVDATION
In our consideration of U.S. broadcasting activities thus far --
official, unofficial, amateur, military, religious, private and clandestine --
what most impresses members of the Staff is the need for developing the
Con cept of Orchestration and for strengthening the means of orchestration.
The Radio Broadcasting Policy Committee (RBPC) which already exists can
supply this coordination and guidance. It needs to be strengthened and
institutionalized. The means available to each agency in support of it will
probably require modest expansion. The RBPC would, as a result of our recom-
mendations, be concerned with a broader range of broadcast activities, in-
cluding all those above cited and in addition, television. (If only in an
advisory way with respect to private, amateur and religious broadcasts.) The
Radio Broadcasting Policy Committee should be redesignated the Radio and
Television Broadcasting Policy Committee (RTBPC). The RTBPC should include
m:.litary representation.
The RTBPC should be provided sufficient staff, part time or Ertl]. time,
to insure sufficient staffing of the problems which it must consider.. The
RTBPC should report semiannually to the Operations Coordinating Board.
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III. THE VOICE OF AMERICA
A. Origins
Voice of America began broadcasting February 24, 1942, in German, under
the Office of Coordinator of Information. By June of that year, the Office
of War Information was created and the Voice became its radio division. In
1945, upon abolition of CWI, the VOA was transferred by Executive Order to
the Department of State. The shortwave services of NBC and CBS, which had
started several years before the war and remained independent during the war
Y?
(an Gil censor insured coordination of the two services with VOA) were
absorbed by VOA. In January, 1948, with the passage of Public Law 402
Y.,
(Smith-Mundt Act), the International Information and Educational Exchange
Administration (IIA) was established within the Department of State with the
Voice of America as its radio service.
Finally, Reorganization Plan No. 8 of August, 1953, created the U.S.
Information Agency as an independent agency, with the Voice of America as
its radio arm.
B. Mission
A directive, issued by President Eisenhower through the National
Security Council,, told the U.S. Information Agency "to submit evidence to
peoples of other nations by means of communications techniques that the
objectives and policies of the United States are in harmony with and will
advance their legitimate aspirations for freedom, progress and peace."
Within this Presidential directive, the general guidelines under which
VOA operates are:
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a. While it must, as an official radio, clearly present and
explain the policies of the U.S. Government, VOA has an equal
obligation to present responsible public discussion of these policies.-
b. VOA attempts to present a balanced projection of the
American scene, preferring in doing so to reflect American thought
and institutions by acting as an observer, neither avoiding nor
unduly emphasizing problems which occur in American society.
c. VOA attempts to present accurate, objective and compre-
hensive news coverage.
VOA seeks to inform, enlighten, stimulate and to persuade. When neces-
sary, it counters hostile and erroneous information about the U.S. and its
policies. The emphasis, however, is on the positive character of U.S.
objectives and policies in keeping with the President's directive.
C. T argets
While VOA broadcasts in 38 languages (including English), this paper
deals only with broadcasts to the USSR and Soviet-dominated areas of East
Europe. Many people in these countries are presumably motivated to listen
to VOA because it reflects the official U.S. point of view. VOA does not
try to reach mass audiences but rather addresses itself to opinion leaders -
intelligentsia, upper and middle bureaucracy, youth (especially students),
and the higher military.
D. Types of Programs
VOA programming consists of news, commentary and analysis, and special
features. An average half-hour is devoted to half news and half commentary
and analysis or feature material, (cultural, economic, labor, women's shows,
youth shows, book reviews, some agricultural and religious shows, a small
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amount of music, but no programming designed simply for entertainment).
E. Operations
1. Technical. VOA broadcasts world-wide in 38 languages over 87
transmitters (57 at 10 overseas bases, and 30 at 7 U.S. plants) for a total
daily direct transmitter time of 505 hours. (The figure does not include
transmitter hours from U.S. "feeder" bases since these are intended for the
relay bases even though they may be heard in the target area.)
VOA broadcasts to the Soviet and Satellite area account for 223 trans-
mitter hours daily, or 44% of total transmitter hours for direct broadcasting.
VOA broadcasts daily to the Soviet area 15:30 hours of air time,
totaling 120:30 daily transmitter hours (originations and repeats). Broken
down, these are:
Daily
Air Time
Daily
Transmitter Hours
Russian
6:00
57:00
Russian to Asian SSR
1:30
10:30
Armenian
1:00
9:00
Georgian.
1:00
8:30
Ukrainian
1:00
7:30
Ukrainian to Asian SSR
:30
3:00
Estonian
1:30
8:00
Latvian
1:30
8:00
Lithuanian
1:30
9:00
Total - Soviet Area
15:30
120:30
To the East European area, VOA broadcasts 11 hours per day air time,
totaling 72:30 daily transmitter hours (originations and repeats):
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Daily
Air Time
Daily
Transmitter Hours
Albanian
1:30
5:00
Bulgarian
1:45
11:30
Czech-Slovak
2:00
15:30
Hungarian
2:30
17:00
Polish
2:00
14:00
Rumanian
1:15
9:30
Total -- East Europe
11:00
72:30
In addition, VOA broadcasts in French., German and English to these
areas (or which may be heard in these areas):
English
9:00
27:00
French
:30
1:30
German
45
1;4
10:15
30:15
2. Budget. The total operating budget for the Broadcasting Service
(VOA.) of USIA. for the Fiscal Year 1960 is approximately $17.5 million
(excluding Agency overhead and one-time construction costs). Of this amount,
approximately $11.9 million is spent on direct broadcasting in all languages.
The cost of direct broadcasting to Communist East Europe is estimated at
35% of the total cost of direct broadcasting, or approximately $4+.2 million,
as follows:
Soviet Area
(Russian, Armenian, Ukrainian., Georgian,
Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian)
SEC R E T
$2, 3.5,100
~2,100
$2)390..200
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Satellite Area
(Albanian, Bulgarian, Hungarian,
Polish, Rumanian, Czech-Slovak)
English to Satellite Area
$1,772,700
50,900
$1
823,600
Total, Soviet and Satellite $4,213,800
An additional $1.1 million may be applied to this $4.2 million figure,
representing 35% of undistributed VOA overhead costs, including Central
Program Services Division which provides news, commentaries and features
for use by these area desks.
3. Personnel. VQA employees total 1,576. Of this figure, 171
are directly involved in the production of programs to the Soviet and
Satellite areas (84 in the Soviet area and 87 in Satellite area programming).
While almost all of these employees are American citizens (only one alien
is employed in the Soviet area, and two in the Satellite area) almost all
are natives of the areas to which they broadcast.
In order to obtain some general idea of the total number of VOA personnel
involved in the production and broadcasting of Soviet and Satellite area
programs, however, a pro-rated estimate (even though inexact) may be made
from other related broadcasting activities, and general overhead personnel.
This would include program direction and policy control offices, Central
Program. Services such as Talks and News, Overseas Monitors, Relay Base per-
sonnel, etc.
By applying the general 35% figure (of total direct broadcasting) addi-
tional indirect personnel would amount to roughly 300 employees involved.
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in Soviet and Satellite broadcasting.
F. Receion of Broadcasts
Prior to the September, 1959, visit to the U.S. of Premier Khrushchev,
VOA broadcasts to the Soviet Area were heavily Jammed. (Heavy sustained
jamming against VOA programs began in April, 19+9.) A certain amount of
sporadic, selective jamming has continued since September, but no consistent
pattern has emerged. It has varied from language to language, with Georgian
and Armenian totally free from jamming till May 26, 1960 when the President's
speech was jammed. From the first revelation by Premier Fthrushchev of the
U-2 incident, and subsequent events, through the period of the collapse of
the Summit meetings in Paris, heavy jamming was resumed, though still on a
selective basis. This has continued, reaching a peak of total, blanket
jamming on May 26, the period of VOA's carrying, in translation, the text of
President Eis,enhower's address to the nation. Immediately on resumption of
the normal programming pattern, heavy selective jamming was once again in
force.
During the period of light janwing, the percentage of jamming of Russian
language programs dropped to as low as 10% but increased during May 5 through
31 period to as high as 90%.
English broadcasts to the Soviet and Satellite areas remain unjammed,
even during periods such as VGA's recent live transmissions, in English, of
the UN Security Council debate and President Eisenhower's speech.
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1.~
Saturation jasraning of VOA broadcasts to the Satellites continues, with
the exception of Poland and Albania. Poland stopped jan ing in 1956, but
the USSR jams Polish programs. Albania has never j atmned VOA.
G. Audience Estimate
tibile accurate audience estimates are extremely difficult to obtain,
Fome information is available. The Office of Research and Intelligence (IRI)
of the U.S. Information Agency recently estimated that the VOA audience in
the USSR for indigenous language broadcasts may range from one to four
million people and the audience within the Satellite area from five to nine
million.
It was also estimated that there are between one and two hundred
thousand listeners to VOA English programs in the USSR and between two and
three hundred thousand listeners in the satellites.
H. Achievements
VOA has received numerous indications of individual listening over and
above the regular escapee interviews, such as:
as Responses to specific broadcasts in letters, either
directly to the VGA, or often to individuals who have participated
in VOA broadcasts. These letters come from friends or relatives
who have heard the broadcasts,, or via friends or relatives who
are informed of these broadcasts by others.
b. Reports from travelers to these areas who have had occasion
to discuss our broadcasts with those who listen, or who, themselves,
have heard VOA broadcasts.
c. Surveys conducted among visitors from these areas or
participants in special events such as fairs and festivals.
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d. 13nbas sy and Legation reports.
Since the reduction of jamming of VGA broadcasts, and prior to the recent
U-2/Summit period,, Enbassy Moscow has reported a freer attitude among citizens
to admit to VGA listening.
However, in any consideration of "effectiveness" in these areas, a
variety of sources must be consulted, since any audience assessment is indeed
difficult where access to the listener is denied. Thus, in the final analysis,
technical measurements become more reliable measures of the ability to pene-
trate than isolated indications of listening.
A different kind, of achievement may be seen in the modest beginnings of
local placement of VOA-produced cultural shows. Radio Moscow has just
accepted two half-hour shows (Yale choir Russian-language concert and reportage
of the National Gallery and Smithsonian). E-nbassy Moscow was told it would
be informed of the exact time of nation wide broadcasts of these shows.
Negotiations are in progress to place VOA tapes on Radio Warsaw and Radio
Prague through the National Educational Television and Radio Council. Earlier,
Radio Warsaw played a VOA tape on Jerome Robbins' "Ballet USA", submitted
through USIS just prior to the appearance of that group in Warsaw.
I. Provisions for Polio Control
Daily guidance, both written and oral, is supplied VGA from the Agency's
Office of Plans (IOP) and is, in turn, provided throughout VOA by the Assist-
ant Manager for Policy Application in the Radio Manager's Office.
While a degree of autonomy is allowed foreign language service chiefs
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in the exercise of responsibility for their final product, this is limited
by standing instructions that this discretion is to be exercised within
certain defined limits:
a. The Central News Branch is the only source of news used
by the language services unless special authority is given by
either the News Branch or at levels higher than the service chief
for the use of other material.
b. Most feature material used by the language services is
originated in English by the Central Program Services Division.
c. Morning guidance notes prepared by the Central Policy
Office provide initial guidance on the treatment of the day's
news. These notes are issued to all supervisory personnel through
the service chief level and are discussed at a daily general
editorial meeting at the branch and division chief level chaired
by the Radio Manager and the Assistant Manager for Policy App.i-
c .t i on. They are discussed again at subsequent division editorial
meetings at the service chief level chaired by the division chief
and attended by a representative of the central policy staff.
Through the policy application staff, language desks are kept
informed of changes during the day. Other less timely policy
papers and briefings also provide the service chiefs with policy
background.
The exercise of discretion by service chiefs is reviewed on continuing
basis by:
as The supervisory personnel of the branch, the division,
and the Office of the Radio Manager, through discussions at
editorial meetings, review of daily content reports which list
the items and lineage used in actual broadcasts, and review of
monitoring reports.
b. The Central Policy Office, through the review by area
specialists of the daily content reports and the monitoring
reports. The latter reports are prepared by a multi-lingual
staff which reports to the Radio Manager and submits reports
based on actual listening to broadcasts or reading of air scripts.
c. The Program Review Board, which consists of the Radio
Manager and his key staff members and which periodically examines
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complete English translations of output selected at random,
d. USIA posts in the field, through monitoring of foreign
language broadcasts (direct listening or, where impossible due
to jamming, scrutiny of scripts regularly sent by VOA). The
posts transmit comments based on such monitoring.
J. Discussion of Proposed Directive
VOA has long felt the need for a basic document approved at appropriate
levels of government establishing the fundamental principles for the content
of its broadcasts. Broadcasting policy papers exist for Soviet orbit broad-
casts, and VOA receives a full flow of political policy guidance, but there
is no basic statement of mission such as that given by the President to USIA
in August 1953. Since VOA is a somewhat unique element within the Agency,
the President's statement applies only in the broadest terms, to its broadcast
operations.
To date, partly because of the lack of a formal statement of its broad-
casting mission, VOA has had a varying approach, being at times considered
an instrument of truth, end at other times, an instrument of propaganda.
Since 1953, as an outgrowth of the Jackson Committee report, a pxt:Vratic
philosophy gradually has developed within VOA, has never been formalized as
a guideline to VOA operators. The proposed VOA-prepared directive which
follows might help to eliminate the tendency for policy to change with changes
of personnel in key positions, and could provide a common base for both
State Department and USIA personnel in the formulation of day-to-day judgments.
Pro osed Directive to the Voice of America
The long-range interests of the United States are served by
communicating directly with the peoples of the world by an official
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radio, the Voice of America. To be effective, the Voice of America
must win the attention and respect of listeners. These principles will
govern VOA broadcasts:
1. As an official radio, VOA will present the policies
of the United States Government clearly and persuasively,
VOA will also present responsible discussion and opinion on
these policies.
2. VOA will represent America, not any single segment of
American society. It will therefore present a balanced and
comprehensive projection of significant American thought and
institutions.
3. VOA will establish itself as a consistently reliable
and authoritative source of news. VOA news will be accurate,
objective, and comprehensive.
The directive seeks to resolve the question whether VOA's role is
tactical or strategic, informational or propagandistic, immediate or long-
range. The philosophy of its authors is that adherence to the objective
long-range approach will be the most effective employment of this particular
U.S. broadcasting instrument.
VOA states that the proposed directive seeks to establish three points:
1. VOA recognizes its responsibility as an official radio
with the specific task of presenting and explaining the policies
of the U.S. Government. At the same time, as the voice of America,
it has an equal obligation to present responsible American -op -Mon
and discussion of these policies. The concept here expressed is
based on the desirability of reflecting America as it actually
exists and on confidence that an understanding of our democratic
processes by overseas audiences is of long range value to our national
objectives,
2. The same philosophy is the basis for the second requirement:
an accurate and balanced projection of the American scene. The
directive rejects the "showcase" approach in favor of a responsible
"mirror" approach. An accurate picture of the American scene will
build credibility for VOA and develop foreign understanding of the
strength of our institutions and confidence in our system.
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3. The third responsibility for VQA set forth is that of
accurate, reliable and comprehensive news reporting. The directive
accepts the belief that facts cannot be suppressed, that full
awareness of world developments is a gain for American interests,
and that full disclosure of our actions and policies will on balance
be to our advantage. As the faith and respect of listeners for
VOA grow, the content of its programs will have greater acceptance
and impact.
As far as the Coimaittee staff is aware, the approach taken is not
f'zndamentally contested in the Ebcecutive Branch, although occasionally there
have been differences within the Agency, and with various desks in the Dew
ypaa:tment of State on particular broadcasts, which, in an effort to be compre-
hensive, include material that the desk officers think would be better omitted
cr treated differently. Among such officials there is some feeling that the
VOA as an instrument of U.S.
policy cannot be ES continuously comprehensive and
objective as the VOA statement indicates.
There is also some congressional opinion which holds that VOA overdoes
objectivity. On the other hand, in a number of countries, VOA enjoys less
credibility than BBC because the latter is considered more objective.
The staff believes that a new directive clarifying the mission of VOA
would serve a useful purpose. The inclusion of language permitting discussion
of controversial issues and contrary viewpoints in the interest of credibility
16 desirable.
Such a directive should be issued to VOA by the Director of USIA, Con-
sideration might be given to modifying the pXop^sed Statetent -ty the Presidett
ds.2et forth hereinbefore and isfiuing it as a directive to VOA.
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Proposed Statement b r the President
In carrying out its responsibilities in accordance with pertinent
statutes and Presidential directives., the United States Information
Agency shall be guided by the following:
The purpose of the United States Information Agency
shall be to submit evidence to peoples of other nations by
means of conmiunication techniques that the objectives and
policies of the United States are in harmony with and will
advance their legitimate aspirations for freedom,, progress.,
and peace.
The purpose in the paragraph above is to be carried out
primarily:
1. By explaining clearly and persuasively to
foreign peoples the objectives and policies of the
United States Government, including where desirable,
discussion of controversial issues and contrary view-
points.
2. By depicting imaginatively the correlation
between United States policies and the legitimate
aspirations of other peoples of the world.
3. By unmasking and countering hostile attempts
to distort or to frustrate the objectives and policies
of the United States.
4. By delineating those important aspects of
the life and culture of the people of the United States
which facilitate understanding of the policies and
objectives of the Government of the United States.
5. Subject to the foregoing the VOA will establish
itself as a consistently reliable and authoritative source
of news. VOA news will be accurate and objective.
K. Recommendation
This Section III should be transmitted to the Director of USIA.
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I?. ARMED FORCES RADIO AND TELEVISION SERVICE - VOA REIATIONSI3IPS
A. Back rpund
The Armed Forces Radio and Television Service (AFRTS) maintains 204
radio and 33 TV outlets located in overseas areas where U.S, forces are
stationed. In general,, these stations operate on medium wave bands 15 to
18 hours a day. In addition, AFRTS originates daily short wave broadcasts
from New York and Los Angeles utilizing VOA transmitters.
Although these programs are designated for the information, education,
and entertainment of U.S. Armed Forces, they have a large "eavesdropping"
Free World audience estimated to exceed the million service listeners by a
ratio of at least 5 to 1. There are probably some listeners in the Curtain
countries contiguous to areas in which AMPS operates.
The Foreign audiences are attracted to AFRTS programs primarily by
entertainment programs, but a substantial number also hear news and educa-
tional programs. Both VOA and Defense believe foreign reaction to these
jrograms generally has been favorable, although there has been no specific
measurement.
Control of AFRTS programs is normally decentralized to the local military
commanders in whose area the outlet is found. The local outlets may determine
the program content within general Defense Department instructions covering
such matters as advertising, the avoidance of conflicts with commercial
interests, and the propriety and impartiality of news, political, and religious
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programs. No policy guidance is provided concerning the impact of AFROS
programs on foreign audiences. However, a large percentage of AFRTS programs
are developed under the direct supervision of the Department of Defense, and
screened for possible material which would be inappropriate for foreign
audiences. There is currently some use of VOA educational and news programs
on AFRTS, primarily at the initiative of local AFRTS stations.
The technical quality of local reception of AFRTS broadcasts usually
exceeds that of VOA due primarily to the local broadcast bands available to
AFRTS. Although VOA has recently increased its English language broadcasts,
the hours of such programs are far fewer than those broadcast by AFRTS in
the same areas.
There is some feeling that AFRTS programming should take into greater
account the existence of the foreign "eavesdropping" audience. Concern hea
been expressed that the young and politically inexperienced servicemen who
often determine AFRTS program content may not be able to judge possible
political implications, and that AFRTS news broadcasts may sometimes conflict
in emphasis with those of VOA.
It has been suggested that AFRTS be provided additional policy guidance
to increase the effectiveness of programs on foreign audiences and that this
guidance be mutually agreed upon between USIA and Defense. VOA has proposed
that AFRTS make limited but regular use of certain VOA. news programs and an
increased use of VOA educational features, on an attributed basis.
Current Defense policy is to design AFRTS programs solely to meet the
informational, educational and entertainment requirements of the service
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audience. The Department of Defense recognizes the existence of the foreign
audience but believes that if AFRTS programs meet the optimum requirements
of the service audience they will at the same time provide suitable programs
for the foreign listener. AFRTS is said to achieve a high degree of
credibility, in fact, because foreigners believe it represents Americans
talking to Americans and not Americans talking to foreigner4.
Defense believes that it is preferable not to use VOA news programs
over AFRTS since these programs are tailored for foreign audiences. They
cite the following points in support of their position:
(a). There is the possibility of Congressional opposition
to programs which could be interpreted as "propagandizing U.S.
servicemen". (VOA points out that there is also some Congressional
concern over "duplication" by AFRTS and VOA.)
(b). Some foreign governments might object if AFRTS appeared
to be used to influence the local population. (VGA doubts the
validity of this argument.)
(c). Conflicts could arise with U.S. commercial networks
and unions. This could be injurious to AFRTS which receives the
'bulk of its entertainment programs from the networks free of
charge. (VOA doubts the validity of this argument.)
W. Association with VGA might cloud the image of AF1TS
as "Americans talking to Americans" and injure the unique
credibility which this image provides. (VGA notes that AFR2S
is also a Government broadcasting service.)
The basic difference between Defense views and those of VOA appears to
be the degree to which limited use of attributed VOA broadcasts on AFETS
would tend to give the impression that AFRTS was attempting to influence
foreign audiences. VOA. believes it would not give this impression. Defense
takes the opposite view.
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B. Conclusions and Recommendations
1. The AFRTS is a major informational asset to the U.S., both
because of the scale of its network and its generally favorable effect on
foreign audiences.
2. The network must continue to aim essentially at a service
audience. Its greatest contribution., not only in its primary mission but
also in its effect on foreign listeners, will be to exemplify the very best
it American entertainment and public service broadcasting.
3. In order to preserve the AFRTS image of Americans talking to
Americans it is desirable to avoid openly identifying AFRTS with VOA.
However., some VOA educational programs can be used profitably to supplement
current AFRTS program sources and there may be occasions when the use of VOA
news broadcasts on AFRTS would be desirable. When such VOA programs are used
it is preferable that there be no reference in the broadcast to its origin.
li. Administrative arrangements should be made to assure that
responsible military commanders in the field are kept fully advised of current
political themes which can serve as guidance for AFRTS news broadcasts.
AFRTS officials should be alert to prevent the inclusion of material in
their programs which might have an undesirable effect on local foreign
audiences.
5. Closer relationships between Defense, USIA and State in
Washington and in the field should be established to obtain optimum impact of
AFRTS on foreign audiences. A Defense representative should sit on the Radio
and Television Broadcasting Policy Committee.
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G. EXAMINATION OF RADIO LIBERTY, FREE EUROPE, AND RADIO IN THE
AMERICAN SECTOR BERLIN
1. - RADIO LIBERTY
a. Origin, Radio Liberty (RL) was established on March 1, 1953 by the
American Committee for Liberation, an organization of Americans working in
conjunction with a "Political Center" of Soviet emigre groups and organiza-
tions. Although the "Political Center" soon broke up, RL continued its
operations, establishing additional transmitters in West Germany, and new
facilities on Taiwan and in Spain. RL is supported in part by funds raised
from the American people, and in part by the Central Intelligence Agency,
which controls its operations. Officially, the network is privately owned
and operated, and U.S. Government interest is supposedly known only to a
few key officials of the American Committee for Liberation.
b. Mission. RL's mission is to promote freedom for the peoples of the
Soviet Union and the replacement of the Communist dictatorship, by stimulatJng
and encouraging changes within the Soviet structure through evolutionary
rather than revolutionary means. Within this long term mission, RL endeavors
to break down the barriers isolating its listeners from the outside world,
to strengthen their faith in the eternal values of liberty, to fortify the
convictions of those consciously opposed to the regime, and to bring into
sharp focus subconscious opposition, to foster doubt and dissatisfaction
with existing inequities, and to develop a realization that real and per-
manent solutions to their problems can be found only in freedom froT Communist
control and the establishment of institutions of their own choice.
Inherent in the project is the concept that Soviet emigres will be
utilized in carrying out this mission. Even though the American Committee for
Liberation is no longer seeking and sponsoring unification of emigre groups,
RL speaks to the Soviet people in the name of free former Soviet citizens
and purports to be an emigre station.2 While emigres have no policy-making
or directional role, they participate in RL operations both as individuals
1 RL Policy Manual, Nov. 15, 195F sec: IAA pp.'1-2.
2 CIA summary paper, Radio Libey. Its_ Role and Operating Methods,
undated, Secret, p. 1.
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and as members of emigre organizations (without specific attribution as such
during broadcasts); thus RL is much more closely identified with emigres
than is RFE.
c. Targets. RL focuses its main program attention on those groups
having greatest opportunity or potential for influencing the future course of
the Soviet Union; the government and party bureaucracy, economic managers,
the technical elite, intellectuals and students. By providing Soviet citizens
with information and views on Soviet and Free World developments which are
suppressed or distorted in Soviet media, and by reporting on events which
belie official Soviet claims, RL endeavors to stimulate independent and dis-
sident thought among its listeners.
d. Types of Programs. RL's underlying message is that meaningful
progress depends on the rights of the individual, It analyzes political and.
social institutions and intellectual movements in free societies, suggests
possible alternatives to the existing Soviet system, and broadcasts the best
of traditional thought from Russian and minority group cultures. It does not
indulge in wholesale attacks on Soviet leaders or policies, incite to
-violence, nor engage in polemics or vituperation. While acknowledging (for
the sake of propaganda effectiveness) Soviet achievements, it points out the
limitations and the heavy human cost of many of them.
A typical RL broadcasting day would provide roughly the following break-
down of its program fare: 20% on political and economic policies within the
Soviet Union and the Sino-Soviet bloc; 32% with cultural, scientific and
other educational material from everywhere in the world, including such de-
velopments in the Sino-Soviet orbit which are not fully or accurately reported
in Communist media; the remaining 48% consists of newscasts, press reviews
and news features.
e. Operations.
(1) RL operates 9 transmitters in West Germany, 4 on Taiwan
(broadcasting to Soviet Asia) and one in Spain, with 4 more under construc-
tion. It also operates 7 technical monitoring stations and a news gathering
service similar to but smaller than that of RFE.
(2) RL broadcasts about 250 hours daily (1700 hours weekly) in lu
languages. Because of the need to penetrate jamming, its proportion of
original programs is lower than is that of RFE.
(3) The budget of the American Committee for Liberation is approxi-
mately $6.5 million, of which RL accounts for 600 or $4 million. Only a
small portion of these funds is raised by voluntary contributions; the great
bulk is furnished by CIA.
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f. Reception of Broadcasts. RL broadcasts are extensively jammed so
that on the average, programs are intelligible only 10-20% of the time.3
Despite this, and despite the fact that RL broadcasts do not reach large
areas of Soviet Central Asia, it is estimated that 5 to 20% of the people
with radios can, if they persist, hear RL broadcasts, and that RL does h ve
an audience of 500,000-1,000,000 people who listen at least once a week,.
It is more difficult to judge the influence of this audience and its
responsiveness to RL broadcasts. There are some indications that the audience
is composed largely of those who are already anti-Communist, or at least
strongly skeptical about the system; dedicated party members are less likely
to listen or to respond.5 While interviews with Soviet visitors to the
Brussels Fair (who were largely members of the elite), indicated that 92%
listened occasionally to RL or other Western stations, only 9% listened as
frequently as once a week. Their typically negative comments on both VQA
and RL leave no doubt about their opposition to "anti-Soviet propaganda".6
Thus RL reaches a smaller audience (and a different audience) than do BBC
or VOA, and may well lose something in appeal and response because of its
tone and nature,
g. Achievements. RL's achievements have been generally of two types:
announcements of happenings within the Soviet Bloc and timed criticism of
the regime. Among the former have been broadcasting news of the anti-Stalin
speech by Khrushchev in October 1956, of the ouster of the "anti-Party" group
from the Central Committee in July 1957, and of the trial and execution of
Nagy and Maleter in June 1958. The anniversaries of the dissolution of the
Constituent Assembly of 1918, and of the death of Karl Marx, were used as
occasions to attack the Communist regime,, while. the Pasternak affair afforded
similar opportunity to spread word concerning the shortcomings of the ruling
group in the Soviet Union.
h. Personnel. RL employs about 800 people, the bulk of whom work in
West Germany and Spain. As already indicated, while top management and
control posts are filled by Americans, most of the RL employees are emigres,
who are chosen for their linguistic ability, knowledge of life in the Soviet
Union, and professional qualifications. These emigres are particularly useful
3 IRI USIA, The Impact of Western Broadcasts in the Soviet Bloc March
1959,, Confidential, p. 18
4 Ibid., pp. 24-28.
5 lbid., p. 29
6 IRI USIA, The Impact of Western Broadcasts in the Soviet Bloc, March
1959, Confidential, p. 27. For extracts of comments see RL Analysis
Report //8-58, Nov. 14, 1958, Appendix B.
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because they can make comparisons of Free World and Communist institutions
based on first-hand experiences with both; on the other hand, they may well
contribute to the impressions voiced by Soviet visitors to the Brussels Fair
of "lack of understanding of present-day Soviet psychology", and of bias, 25X1
bitterness, and a tendency to "dig up the past".7
Two evaluating panels in Munich and one in New York regularly review
as-broadcast scripts for substantive content.
2. RADIO FREE EUROPE
a.. min. Radio Free Europe was organized in 1949 as the largest
operating division of the Free Europe Cotrmnittee, a nonprofit corporation
whose Board of Directors is composed of leading representatives of American
political, publishing, broadcasting and business groups. It is supported in
part by funds raised from the American people by the Crusade for Freedom
and in pert by the CIA. The network is officially a privately-owned and
operated system, and the support and control of its operations by the U.S.
Government is supposedly known only to a few key officials of RIPE.
b. Mission. As a major subsidiary of the Free Europe Committee, RFE
attempts to contribute to attainment of the following objectives:
(1) Loner,--term. Complete national independence of the
satellite states Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary,
Poland and Romania) and the Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia
and Lithuania) and the establishment by their peoples of
representative governments resting on the consent
7 RL Analysis Report 0-55., Appendix B,, Comments
5, 7,
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of the governed.
(2) Short-term. To bring about a loosening of the ties
between the Soviet Union and the regimes governing the nine
captive nations named above.
(3) Continuous. To bring about the progressive transfer
of power from totalitarian regimes to the peoples themselves
by maintaining in the peoples those dissatisfactions with
Communist rule which have forced liberalizing changes in the
years since Stalin's death and will fo ce further changes until
the goal of freedom has been attained.
EFE also endeavors to foster the cultural and economic orientation of
the captive peoples away from the Soviet Union and towards the West, and
encourages them to look forward to participation in moves toward European
integration.9
c. Targets. The targets of M are the "centers of influence" within
each Bloc country, such as party functionaries, intellectuals, journalists.,
manaa~ment personnel, youth and student leaders, worker and peasant leaders,
etc. It endeavors, in addition to providing basic news and. information
to the general population, to bring the different sectors of the intelli-
gentsia to a realization that their interests are, in some measure, at
variance with those of the top party leadership and conform, in varying
degrees, to mass aspirations for national independence, more personal freedom,
and a better life spiritually and materially.
d. T ,es of Programs. Within the general framework of gradual
liberalization, RFE broadcasts are designed to accomplish the following:
(1) Inform the people about happenings throughout the
world, especially of those verified events and situations
within each audience country which the regime censors or
distorts.
(2) Provide insights into the views and policies of
the Free World, with special emphasis on the views and
activities of the Western coalition and on the principles
of human rights and freedom of choice.
8 ssion of the Free Europe ommttteex. Aprilk, 195 , par. 1.
9 Ibid., par. 2a. ..
10 Mission of the Free Europe Committee, April 8, 1958, section on
Target Priorities, p. 1.
11 Ibid.
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(3) Promote effective liberalization by constructive,
selective counter-proposals to the satellite peoples rather
than by heavy stress on obvious wrongs.-2
The backbone of RFE's program schedule is approximately 10 minutes of
live news every hour, including news about events within the target countries
and other countries of the Soviet Bloc. In addition, there are daily com-
mentaries, special programs for youth, workers, intellectuals., Communist
Party members, etc., and cultural programs such as music., drama and enter-
tainment. EE's special contribution to American broadcasting operations
consists of three things:
(1) It provides detailed news of events in the Iron
Curtain countries and commentaries on those events.
(2) It provides a great deal of information concerning
political, economic and cultural developments in Western
Europe, relating these to common European aims and aspirations,
including those of the peoples in the East European countries.
(3) It presents material on the arts, the music, the
literature and other cultural developments of each country to
which it broadcasts.
e. erations. RFE operates 28 transmitters and relay stations located
in West Germany and Portugal, which together are on the air more than 2700
hours a week. Roughly, RFE broadcasts 20 hours daily to Poland, Czecho-
slovakia and Hungary, and 6 hours daily to Rumania and Bulgaria. Programs
are broadcast simultaneously over several transmitters in order to circumvent
Jamming, and at least once daily all transmitters are directed simultaneously
to each of the Eastern European countries in a jam-proof technique known as
the "saturation service".
RFE maintains., in addition to the broadcast facilities noted, a news
and information service with 10 bureaus in principal European countries, a
monitoring section which tunes in on more than 50 radio stations and teletype
news services behind the Iron Curtain., and a central newsroom which., using
material from, these and other sources,, compiles some 350,000 words of in-
formation each day.
The budget of RFE currently averages about 10.2 million dollars, and
represents about two-thirds of the total expenditures of the Free Europe
12 Evaluation of Current FEC Mission, February 18, 1960, p. 11.
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Committee. While no direct breakdown of sources of support is practicable,
CIA provides between of the funds expended by the Free Europe
Committee; on a pro ra-ca oasis., it would therefore contribute
annually toward RFE.
f. Rece,ation of Broadcasts. It is impossible to determine accurately
the size and nature of the listening audience in the satellite countries,
much less the impact on this audience of broadcasts by RFE. Nevertheless,
RFD, and interested U.S. agencies have made strenuous efforts to determine
both such technical factors as receptivity of signals, and such subjective
factors as the nature., size and reaction of the target audience. Measures
used have included monitoring from the border areas of RFE broadcasts.,
reports on radio receptivity by U.S. officials and other travelers within
the satellites, correspondence from people in Iron Curtain countries and,
above all, interviews with escapees from these countries. While the results
of these checks and surveys must be used with caution, there are indications
that about 45 to 50% of transmissions (and therefore 80 to 900 of RFE programs,
which are repeated three or four times) are received in rural areas, although
reception is considerably poorer in and near large cities)-3 These per-
centages are of course higher in Poland, where no jamming has taken place
since 1956, but jamming from outside Poland still interferes with trans-
mission and reception of RFE programs. From 80 to 90% of escapees and
refugees admit listening to EFE, which seems to comiand a larger audience
than either BBC or VOA, and while the number listening has declined since
the early high of 1951-52, the percentage of those listening is still remark-
able. If the percentage of listeners within the countries corresponds to
those registered by the surveys, as Government experts believe, FE must be
reaching millions of people in each of the satellite countries.11+
g. Achievements. From July 4, 1950, when it started broadcasting,
until the Polish and Hungarian disturbances of October and November 1956,
M'E conducted., among other, the following significant campaigns: dissemina-
tion of news on Stalin's illness and death in advance of coverage by the
regime stations; a similar "beat" on the East Berlin uprising; broadcasting
in 1954 the revelations of the high level Polish Police official and defector,
Colonel Ssriatlow, thus contributing significantly to the loosening of police
control; disseminating the Khrushchev "secret" Party Congress speech; and
the coverage and "play back" to the satellite populations of the story of
their own struggles against Soviet and Communist tyranny in 1956. Although
13 Fourth Annpual Conference on U.S. Broadcasting to the Soviet Orbit, 1957,?'
Confidential, pp. 5and ; ,
14 For a more detailed discussion of this evaluation, and for some of the
data on which the conclusion is based, see IRI/USIA, The Impact of
Western Broadcasts in the SovietBloc, Confidential., Sec. 1.
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during this period RFE openly espoused the cause of the Bloc emigrees, only
once was the tone and extent of its broadcasts seriously questioned. At
the time of the Hungarian revolts RFE broadcasting was alleged in some
quarters to have incited the Hungarians to a hopeless trial at arms; however,
a special report by a commission of the Council of Europe's Consultative
Assembly had this to say about the charge: "The accusation that P,F'E promised
the Hungarian people during their revolt military aid from the West was proved 2 5X1
to be without ground."15
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15 Report to the Consultative Assembl of the Council of Eu.ro e
April 7, 1957,, p. D
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3. RADIO IN THE AMERICAN SECTORJEERI
a. Origin. Radio in the Anericen Sector (BIAS) was created early
in 1946 because the USSR, disregarding the Occupation Agreement, refused
to allow the French, British, or Americans to use or share the facilities
of Radio Berlin, from which the Soviets were broadcasting Communist propa-
ganda. Initially BIAS was operated and directed by the U.S. forces in
Germany; however, it was subsequently placed under the control of the U.S.
High Commissioner and was, upon the dissolution of that office, transferred
to the United States Information Agency. It is funded and operated separately
from the Voice of America.
b. Mission. As the name indicates, the original function of BIAS was
to broadcast to residents of the American sector of Berlin. With the
progressive deterioration of relations with the Soviets, and after acquisi-
tion of more powerful transmitters, BIAS shifted its emphasis from the city
proper to the Soviet Zone of Germany and its 18,000,000 inhabitants. BIAS
broadcasts are concerned with explaining U.S. policy and presenting reliable
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news and factual information about the U. S. and the Free World. A main
objective of RIAS is to maintain the morale of the East Germans, oppressed
by the Communist regime under which they live, and remind them that they
have not been forgotten by the United States and the Free World. Likewise,
this station keeps alive the Free World and German culture which the Communist
regime seeks to stamp out and replace.
c. Targets, While RIAS has a mass audience, its programs are parti-
cularly designed to appeal to youth, farmers and workers, women and intel-
lectuals. News and political commentaries aim at exposing, criticizing
(and sometimes satirizing) Conmiunist policies and programs, while special
features are designed to keep intellectuals aware of Free World cultural
developments, to draw youth away from interest in Communist-organized acti-
vities, and to spread knowledge of non-conmiunistic educational theories and
techniques.
d. Tomes of _Pro rams. News and political commentaries are the main
types of programs. There are 25 regular daily ne'?rscasts, based on wire
service reports, plus news gleaned by the RIAS staff in Bonn and also from
the Voice of America. Especially significant are news roundups about what
is happening in the Soviet Zone itself, based on letters from listeners,
Soviet Zone publications, and interviews with visitors and refugees from
the Soviet Zone. Political commentaries on events behind the Iron Curtain
and. on topics such as international conferences, progress towards European
integration, and elections in the U.S. are featured, some in narrative form,
and others (such as Pinsel and Schnorchel) in the form of skits which
satirize life among Soviet Zone officials.
Educational programs, designed for the 10-18 age group, counter dis-
tortions in truth presented in Communist schools in the Soviet Zone. The
University of the Air series provides an international forum where respected
scholars in many fields, and from various countries, deliver lectures which
pierce the isolation from Free World thought of men of learning, professors
and university students in the Soviet Zone. Other educational programs
concern developments in Free World theories of child education, so that
parents and teachers can better resist the propaganda of Communist planners,
and thus RIAS devotes special interest to this category. Topics are selectei
for youth programs so as to draw interest away from the regimented political
indoctrination of Communist South groups.
Music programs keep alive among listeners all aspects of Free World
and German culture which the Consist regime seeks to stamp out; thus BIAS
broadcasts much recorded music, programs from international music festivals,
and music by its own dance band, chorus and youth orchestra. Drama is
presented in terms of contemporary and classic plays, produced by the drama
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division of RIAS, as well as acquired from West German radio stations for
rebroadcast. Entertainment in general is broadcast via quiz shows, serial
and dramatic skits, situation comedies. Most outstanding of these is the
Insulaner, a political cabaret troupe which has become famous all over
Germany.*because of its lightheartedness, poking fun at the stupidity, pom-
pousness and corruption of Communist officials and their orders. Other
special programs include those for women., parents, and children. Popular
science lectures bring the listener up to date in such complex fields as
space research and peaceful uses of the atom. Literary broadcasts review
current books, commemorate important literary events, and include narration
of whole chapters of books which are not available behind the Iron Curtain.
e. erations. BIAS broadcasts over one long wave, one short wave,
two FM and three AM facilities. Six transmitters are located in Berlin, two
in Hof, and one in Munich. In addition to using both American wire services
(AP E-rd UPI), BIAS has a correspondent in Bonn, and stringers located in
leading cities all over the world. Likewise, programs originate in the Voice
of America in Washington and are relayed to BIAS. A small number of programs
are purchased from West German radio stations for rebroadcast.
BIAS programs cost $3,360,1+00 in Fiscal Year 1960 and $3,387,193 in
Fiscal Year 1961. Of the FY 1960 total, $2,520,000 was alloted from appro-
priated funds, and the balance from other sources.
f. Reception of Broadcasts. An estimated 600 Jamming transmitters in
the Soviet Zone of Germany attempt to block the BIAS signal. BIAS gets its
message through by having two completely separate programs during peak
listening hours and by the use of several different frequencies on all wave
bands. Quarterly polls of the International Confederation of Free Trade
Unions (ICFTU) have shown a steady increase of listeners to BIAS, which now
regularly number around 65% of the total Soviet Zone population of 18,000,000.
(Since BIAS broadcasts are also heard in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania,
Hungary and Yugoslavia, as well as in West Germany, the average daily audience
is estimated at 6,000,000.) In their last poll, ICFTU indicated that BIAS
rated 72%, Radio Free Berlin 49%, Northt?rest and West Radio Network 52%,
BBC 220, Bavarian Network 15%, and Radio Luxembourg 9% in terms of popularity
among residents of the Soviet Zone of Germany. BIAS receives 250,000 fan
letters from its audience annually, and 85,000 of these letters come from
residents of the Soviet Zone of Germany.
g. Achievements. BIAS achieved significant stature during the Berlin
Blockade in 1948 when it sustained the morale of the beleagured citizens,
told, them where to go for food and shelter, and reported Communist efforts
to make life difficult for the Berliners. Since its founding, BIAS has,
at the request of the listeners, broadcast descriptions of more than 55,000
missing persons. These broadcasts were much more prevalent during the perioa
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from 1948-1953 than today, because immediately at the end of World War II,
there was a great search by Germans for missing members of their families.
As a result of such broadcasts more than 5,000 reunions were effected be-
tween missing persons and their families. Such BIAS activity has helped
make this radio station a significant and respected institution to its many
listeners.
h. Personnel. Programs of BIAS are for the most part originated and
produced by a permanent staff of about 470 Germans and 8 Americans. Addi-
tional programs come from part-time correspondents in many German and foreign
cities, from West German radio stations (which make reciprocal use of BIAS
.programs)., and from the Voice of America in Washington.
i. Provisions for Policy Control. RIAS is a major element of the
United States Information Service in Germany. The Country Public Affairs
Officer at the American Embassy in Bonn is responsible for the operation of
BIAS, and is also responsible for the transmission of United States policy
to that station. The United States Ambassador at Bonn is responsible for
the application of the policy as regards the Soviet Zone of Germany, Berlin
and West Germany. Policy direction at the BIAS station is maintained and con-
trolled by the American director and his seven American USIS officers.
It is incumbent upon BIAS to explain U.S. policies and positions with
precision and care, and to make certain that its tone and content are such
that the U.S. Government can accept full, responsibility for its programs. In
fulfilling this role, it is essential that BIAS broadcasts place greatest
emphasis on factual' information, straight news, and intelligent commentary;
OD exposition of U.S. policies and on a valid delineation of the values,
institutions and procedures which sustain life in the Free World.
The Director of BIAS has daily contact with the Public Affairs Officer
in Bonn on major matters concerning policy. A daily classified policy
guidance is transmitted from the Voice of America and this guidance clearly
indicates what the policy line is on major news and commentary output for
that day. The Ambassador has a final and deciding word on any matter of
policy or procedure that may possibly arise in normal or emergency matters
affecting BIAS and its output.
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VI. THE VOICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMM
A. COIF Iv1ENT BY DEPARTMENT OF STATE
In preparing these comments on the "Voice of the United Nations Command!
the Department of State asked the Embassy in Seoul for its estimate of the
value of VUNC activities. The general tenor of the Embassy's estimate, in
which the Public Affairs Officer shared, is favorable to the role being
played by V[7NC, judging it to fulfill a desirable function supplementary to
the Voice of America and capable of obtaining sufficient policy guidance
from the Embassy.
The Department recognizes the concern of the United Nations Command
with psychological warfare activities as an important means of carrying rut
its responsibilities for the defense of Korea against Communist aggression.
We are cognizant of the valuable contributions which VUNC has made to this
end and of its close cooperation with the Embassy at Seoul toward the achieve-
ment of U.S. foreign policy objectives in Korea.
Nevertheless,, the Department has some reservations concerning the
statu and current operations of VUNC:
1. As its name implies, VUNC purports to be the voice of a United
Nations instrumentality and its mission still seems to be conceived primarily
as a psychological warfare operation directed toward peoples of the Far East.
However, the support and direction of VUNC rest exclusively with the U. S.
Armed Forces. Neither the UN per se nor our allies in the UN Command have
any say in the policy determinations of VUNC broadcasting which is conducted
in their name. So far as we are aware, they have not raised questions about
VUNC; but it is not known whether they are familiar with its broadcast content.
This is an anomalous situation which could prove embarrassing to the U.S.
Government in its relations with our allies in the Korean conflict.
2. Headquarters of VUNC is in Okinawa; it also has an office in Japan
and another in Korea. Evidently, it attempts to take soundings on general
political and informational policy lines, at least from our mission in Seoul,
and to coordinate policy decisions with our Ambassador there. But its
general authority stems from and ends with the U.S. Department of Defense,
and its broadcasting policies depend largely on the area command. In view
of the fact that liaison is conducted with the Public Affairs Officer only
in terms of general guidance and, at best, the PAO hears or sees the broad-
cast material after the broadcasts have been made,, we are concerned that
there may be inadequate policy coordination.
3. With particular reference to Korea, VUNC addresses itself ostensibly
to the North Korean audience but privately regards its primary target (at
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least for the time being) as the population of the Republic of Korea. We
seriously doubt that these two audiences can be influenced by an identical
common approach.
4. VUNC assumes it has the task of assisting to guide (albeit dis-
creetly) political developments in the ROK, while it sees in this the
greatest opportunity it has had in years to influence developments in North
Korea. We doubt that the VUNC staff is competent to handle political inter-
pretation or that this is a proper role for an organ of the military arm
identified as such, especially when it is vulnerable to charges of inter-
ference in the sovereign affairs of the ROK and might, therefore, become
counterproductive. Moreover, with due regard for the readiness of our
mission at Seoul (including its USIS element) to provide VUNC with guidance,
its capacities to follow closely the VUNC output in Korea on political and
other topics are limited; and we have no indication that Embassy-USIS
guidance is being applied to the Chinese language broadcasts of VUNC --
which guidance, in any event, USIS Seoul is not qualified to give.
5. With regard to U.S. official broadcasting in its over-all pattern,
it is important that a single channel of activity such as that of VUNC be
adequately synchronized with other U.S. broadcast and information efforts.
We do not believe that access to documents containing political and informa-
tional guidelines witch happen to be available, together with advice from
one or several separate missions, suffice to meet this need. In the case of
VUNC there appear to be lacking (a) the means of basic policy coordination
and (b) a practical mechanism for comprehensively coordinated guidance on
sensitive or fast breaking developments.
With the meager information at hand on the current operations of VUNC
in terms of program content, audience impact, military needs, etc* it is
impossible to assess thoroughly the rationale for VUNC activities at the
present time in comparison with those of VOA. We are not in a position to
judge whether, in existing circumstances, there is a desirable supplementary
role for psychological warfare activities by VUNC and, if so, what differentia-
tion should be made between VUNC operations and other U.S. broadcasting
activities in the same target areas. So long, however, as VUNC operations
continue on their present basis, there is a problem of ensuring that one
set of broadcasting activities conducted by officials of the U.S. Govern-
ment, which relate to U.S. foreign affairs and foreign information policies,
shall be fully consonant with those policies and coordinated as closely as
possible among the agencies concerned.
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B. COMMENT BY CHIEF OF STAFF, U. S. ARMY
The Voice of the United Nations Command (VUNC) is an Army psychological
warfare operation. It began its radio broadcasting in the Korean language
in 1950 as the radio propaganda arm of the Commander-in-Chief, United
Nations Command (CINCUNC)/Command-in-Chief, Far East (CINCFE). After the
Chinese intervened in the Korean War, VUNC's programming was expanded to
include both Mandarin and Cantonese languages. Originally, the control
and operation of VUNC was vested in G-2, Far East Command (FEC) who was
responsible for all strategic psychological operations. Control and
operation of VUNC later was transferred to the Psychological. Warfare
Section, Hq Army Forces Far East, and still later to the Psychological
Warfare Section, Hq Army Forces Far East/Eighth U. S. Army.
In October 1954, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed CINCFE to
maintain a psychological offensive in support of the UNC's position.
UNC/FEC Operating Instructions, dated 1 January 1957, outlined the
responsibilities of FEC components in this regard. VUNC was one of
the important Army assets involved in the maintenance of the continuing
psychological offensive in support of UNC's position.
In mid-1957, the Pacific Command was expanded to include the Far East
Command area, now abolished. At the same time, United States Ari1w,
Pacific (USARPAC) was likewise expanded to embrace the former Army Forces
Far East, together with the Army psychological operations assets, including
VUNC. USARPAC, acting on the basis of CINCPAC Instructions 0031410.2,
dated 26 June 1958, and CTNPAC Operations Plan 70-60, has assumed the
former responsibilities of Army Forces Far East to provide psychological
warfare support to the United Nations Command, including the operation of
V[JNC.
The USARPAC agency charged with the programming and operation of VUNC
is the US Army Broadcasting and Visual Activity, Pacific (US.aAB&VAPAC).
Its headquarters is on Okinawa, and its operating detachments are in Tokyo
and Seoul.
VUNC programs its broadcasts in the same three languages used during
the Korean War fighting. The broadcasts must be prepared, however, with
the full knowledge that the programs intended for North Korean audiences
can and will be heard in South Korea, and that programs ostensibly intended
for Chinese forces actually will be heard in Manchuria and North China.
Approximately half of the VUNC programs contain news and commentary, prepared
in Tokyo; and the remaining VUNC programs are documentaries, drama, music,
and interviews with government leaders, professors and students on current
affairs, all prepared on tape in Seoul or Okinawa.
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VUNC broadcasts a3A planned to complement USIA's Voice of America
broadcasts. Since Voice of America programs include only one and a half
hours in Korean, four hours in Mandarin, and three hours in Cantonese to the
VUNC target area each day, VUNC broadcasts reinforce this coverage in an
area of vital importance to the military commander.
Continuing efforts have been and are made to maintain VUNC and Voice of
America on parallel policy exta for important issues. Approximately four
hours of USIA's press wireless service are available daily to the Tokyo
operating detachment for VUNC. USIA's periodic Information Guides., which
are dispatched to world-wide Army commands,, are sent simultaneously to
CINCUSARPAC, CINCUNC, and to the three operating elements of USAB&VAPAC.
In addition, the Tokyo and Seoul operating detachments maintain close liaison
with the U.S. Information Service posts at the respective American embassies.
In addition to executing the general support requirements of CINCUNC
as outlined in USARPAC's current Operating Instructions, VUNC programmers
are prepared to and do react as required in direct support of CINCUNC to
meet changing conditions and circumstances.
In short, VUNC broadcasts support USIA/UNC policies and fill a needed
role in countering very aggressive North Korean propaganda.
A true measure of effectiveness of radio operations is difficult to
assess. However, there are certain continuing indications that the range
and content of VUNC broadcasts do cause concern in North Korea and in China.
These indications are (1) North Korean defectors who agree that VUNC broad-
casts are being heard in all parts of North Korea; (2) Chinese radio jamming
devices that are used against VUNC transmissions; (3) texts of official
replies from Chinese and North Korean propaganda broadcasts, as monitored
by FBIS, that contain materials designed to refute VUNC statements and
charges; and (4+) Republic of Korea newspaper articles that praise VUNC for
its role in keeping its listeners informed of news developments.
Only an Armistice Agreement is in effect in Korea and, based on this
fact, CINCUNC is charged with the responsibility for the defense and
security of the Republic of Korea. In order to discharge effectively this
responsibility, it is mandatory that the Commander in Chief have adequate
resources instantly available to him; VUNC is one of these highly important
assets. In addition to providing current support to CINCUNC, the Voice of
the United Nations Command is the Pacific Command's sole strategic radio
broadcasting asset with a capability for reacting instantaneously to a
developed target audience in the event of resuwption of the conflict.
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C. COMMENT BY U. S. INFORMATION AGENCY
VUNC began operations during the Korean war and has continued to broad-
cast since then in Korean, Mandarin, and Cantonese under the general super-
vision of the Comander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, who commands all
U.S., Korean and allied forces in the Republic of Korea (ROK). VUNC head-
quarters, however, are in Okinawa, and most of the news copy is currently
made up in Tokyo for simultaneous broadcast from Japan and Korea. Recently,
the Japanese Government has found it "politically impossible" to have VUNC
continue its broadcasts from Japan over leased facilities of the Japan Broad-
casting Corporation, and arrangements are underway to make up the loss by
installing a new transmitter in Korea.
USIA is not, of course, in a position to comment on the military useful-
ness or effectiveness of VUNC. We assume that in Korea, where there is only
an uncertain armistice, it fills an operational and training need which is
unique to our military requirements overseas. (It is appropriate here to
note that VUNC is completely financed and directed by the U.S. Government as
a psytirar operation designed to "weaken the political foundations" of the
Chinese and Korean Communist regimes, "depress enemy morale", "weaken
obedience to Communist leadership", etc., as well as to promote "understanding
among those in the target group" of U.S. policies and actions. The other 15
nations which participated in the Korean war have no voice in VUNC's operating
policy and make no financial contribution to it.)
There are other aspects of VUNC which are of more direct concern to us.
These are:
1. The fact that the UN Command is in effect the U.S. Army and that
VUNC uses USIA materials would seem to necessitate that VUI`IC reflect overall
U.S. policy rather then something independent of this policy.
2. Although the USIA wireless file and some policy guidance which
originates in the State Department are made available to VUNC, there is no
assurance that this guidance is consistently followed or applied. Moreover,
much of this guidance is of a long-range nature and cannot provide "the line"
on fast breaking news stories. There is no practical way for USIA or VOA
to provide the necessary fast news guidance for VUNC's daily programming.
The problem of fast guidance to VUNC is of particular concern to USIA.
Here we have two radio stations, VOA and VUNC, known to be financed and
directed by the U.S. Government, addressing themselves to foreign audiences,
and yet not necessarily following the same "line". Perhaps nine times out
of ten the VUNC staff will handle news and commentary as the policy makers
in the Government wish it to be handled. It is that tenth time that concerns
us.
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3. VUNC addresses its output in the Korean language to all Koreans,
whether in North or South Korea. Since the emergency occasioned by Rhee's
overthrow, the primary audience appears to have become the people of South
Korea.
This must pose for VUNC's staff a number of problems. Thhre is the
implication in the broadcasts to South Koreans that the U.S. is intervening
in the affairs of the sovereign Korean people. Unless these broadcasts are
done with extreme discretion, an unfavorable reaction seems likely to arise
sooner or later from our friends in South Korea.
1 It is somewhat surprising that none of our allies in the Korean war
has raised questions about VUNC. We are speaking, we say, on their behalf
and yet they have no voice in what is actually said. In the interest of
allied solidarity, we should consider whether VUNC does not take some of
our friends for granted.
VUNC is not seen as a competitor of VQA. VOA will continue to broadcast
to Korea and the Chinese Mainland whether VUNC continues or not. Neverthe-
less, we have the phenomenon of two U.S. voices speaking both to the people
of South Korea as well as to the people of North Korea and Communist China.
The main issue as we see it is this: Does VUNC's contribution to the
mission of the UN Command outweigh the concerns cited above?
It may well be that VUNC should not only continue to broadcast but
should be expanded and strengthened. However, while a military need may
still exist for VUNC, the nature of its operation requires a clear inter-
agency understanding of the role it should play in the over-all U.S. Informa-
tion-propaganda-psychological program overseas.
In view of VUNC's present vulnerability as a misnamed military broad-
casting unit of the U.S. Government, its future should be decided at the
highest level after consideration of all pertinent factors.
D. SUMMARY
VUNC is presently a responsibility of the Commander-in-Chief of the
Far East under his instructions of October, 1951+, to maintain a "psycho-
logical offensive" in support of the United Nations Command position. It
began operating in 1950 in the Korean language and later expanded to include
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Mandarin and Cantonese. It is also heard in Communist China. Half of the
programs are prepared in Tokyo, the others are taped in Seoul or Okinawa.
Originally designed to influence North Korean audiences (and to support
specifically the military objectives of the UN forces), most of its listener-
ship is now South Korean.
The problem with respect to VUNC is to coordinate its transmissions
with U.S. policy and with the line of VOA and at the same time to carry out
its military support operation most effectively.
The Department of the Army reports that "continued efforts have been
and are made to maintain VUNC and VOA on a parallel policy axis on impor-
tant issues".
USIA states that "perhaps nine times out of ten the VUNC staff will
handle news and commentary as the policy makers in the government wish it
to be handled. It is that tenth time that concerns us." USIA believes that
"in view of VUNCts present vulnerability as a misnamed military broadcasting
unit of the U.S. Government, its future should be decided at the highest
level after consideration of all pertinent factors."
An inquiry by the Department of State into the subject is not yet
complete, but the Department considers that a need for sharper and more
timely pclicy coordination does exist.
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VT-NC's biggest audience is now among the people of South Korea. In
the new situation since the overthrow of Syngman Rhee this fact takes on
new importance. Extreme discretion is required in view of reactions which
might arise over U.S. expressions on Korean affairs. At the same time..
VUNC can be a most important means of U.S. influence in a fast-breaking and
precarious situation in South Korea. Outside South Korea, VUNCrs coverage
more than reinforces VOA which broadcasts only one and a half hours each
day in Korean, four in Mandarin and three in Cantonese. Since the VUNC is
ostensibly a United Nations voice the implications for the positions of our
Allies need also to be considered.
Whatever the military requirements for VUNC and its contribution to
military strength, the U.S. is in effect represented by two voices in this
critical area. The situation is one which requires clearer inter-agency
understanding on the role VUNC is to play in the over-all U.S. overseas
propaganda and a decision on whether it should continue to exist or should
be confined to a more specifically military field.
E. RECOMMEEDATIONS
That, in advance of a final report by the Sprague Coro ttee, the Radio
and Television broadcast Policy Committee, including military representation,
make a study of the problems of VUNC and VOA, including a review of broad-
cast content and of evidences of effectiveness; that RT3PC make recommendations
to NSC concerning policy consultation and guidance and the attribution of
responsibilities and missions between VOA and the Department of the Ainy; and
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That it consider at an early date especially the need to supply "fast"
guidance to VUNC, perhaps by bringing the Embassies at Seoul and Taipei,
and the Consulate General at Hong Kong, more closely to bear on program
guidance.
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VIII. PRIVATE AND RELIGIOUS BROADCASTING
A. PRIVATE STATIONS BROADCASTING ABROAD FROM THE U. S.
IGEI, "The Voice of Friendship", Box 887, Belmont, California, broad-
casts via one 50 kw shortwave to Latin America 28 hours per week.
WRUL, 1 East 57th Street, New York 22, N.Y., broadcasts 28:30 hours
per week via three 50 kw and one 20 kw shortwave transmitters: to Europe in
English, Swedish and Norwegian and to Latin America in English, Portuguese
and Spanish. It should be noted that U.S.I.A. underwrites 7 hours per week
(3:30 hpw each in Spanish and Portuguese) of WRUL Broadcasts to Latin America.
This contract will be terminated at the end of Fiscal Year 1960.
B. RELIGIOUS BROADCASTERS
Of approximately 18 Protestant missionary broadcasting stations around
the world, only six are of any significance in international broadcasting.
These are:
1. "La Voz de los Andes", Quito, Ecuador, broadcasting shortwave to
the Americas, Europe, West Indies and South Pacific in seven languages for
a total of 92 hours per week. Principle language is English (57 hpw to the
Americas, South Pacific and West Indies). Voz de los Andes also broadcasts
11:30 hpw in Russian to Europe and :30 minutes per week in LI-xainian.
2. EIWA - Monrovia, Liberia, broadcasts shortwave to Liberia, West
and Central Africa in English, French, Portuguese and 14+ African languages,
and to East Africa in Amharic and Arabic for a total of 111+ hours per week
(of which 67 hpw are in English and 32 hpw in African languages).
3. "Voice of Tangier". Morocco, prior to suspension of broadcasting
by the Government of Morocco in 1959, broadcast via shortwave, 4+2 hours per
week which included 3:30 hpw in Russian and 3:30 hpw in Central and East
European languages. This station is now off the air, but has announced
plans to relocate in Monaco to broadcast in 12 languages by June.
1+. "Call of the Orient", Manila, Far East Broadcasting Company, broad-
casts via shortwave "To Abroad" 123 hours per week including 7 hpw in
Russian and 37 hpw in Chinese dialects. This organization also operates a
service out of Okinawa for the I mkyus Islands.
5. "Voice of Righteousness", `Taiwan, broadcasts via short and medium
wave 133 hours per week in Mandarin to the mainland.
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6. HLIX, Inchon, Korea, broadcasts to North Korea., China and Soviet Far
East, via medium wave in English, Korean, Russian and Mandarin for 50 hours
per week.
C. SUMMARY
On the basis of consultation with personnel of the agencies represented
in the Committee, the Staff is of the opinion that the activity of private
short and medium wave radios (other than commercial networks) broadcasting to
abroad presents no particular problems and that no special machinery for
coordination between these stations and U.S. official policy is necessary.
The stations do not subtract from the effect of U.S. supported broadcasts.
They do not materially enhance the effect, although some of them, for example.,
I{GEI., Far East Broadcasting Company, carry unattributed VOA material which in
some areas significantly extends the range and coverage of our propaganda.
Two private stations, IGEI (Manila) and WRUL (Boston) and some eighteen
Protestant missionary broadcasting stations broadcast regularly. Of the
latter only six are significant in international broadcasting. USIA/VOA'
presently contracts with WRUL to provide thirty minutes each of Spanish and
Portuguese broadcasts to Latin America. It is intended to terminate this
contract at the end of Fiscal Year 1960. WRUL, however, is now providing a
channel for broadcasts to Cuba by Cuban "refugee groups" which are having
some effect.
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IX. AMATEUR RADIO
A. ~_USIA REPLIES TO COMMITTEE STAFF QUESTIOMIAIRE
Question 1: What indication can be given of the number of amateur
ham' radio conversations between the U.S. public and the people of the
USSR? The satellites? Communist China? The underdeveloped areas? (e.g.
number of "hams" in respective countries; number and duration of conversa-
tions, etc.)
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USIA Answer:
The declining sun-spot cycle should decrease the amount of time con-
tacts may be made between the U.S. and the USSR for the next seven years or
so,, and then start increasing again. In the meantime, all other factors
should make for more contacts when conditions permit. I would not look for
the USSR government to dry up communications until after it sharply cur-
tails travel by foreigners. The reasoning here is that the present relative-
ly liberal travel arrangements developed several years after the Russians
lifted the lid for amateur communications with the "western'world.
Question 3:
What can be said of the influence of these contacts on the opinion of
foreign peoples concerning the American people and United States policies?
USIA Answer:
Like institutional advertising, the effect is small in each instance.,
but cumulative and favorable., though I think only towards the people, not
towards the government or its policies.
Question 4:
What value have these contacts from the intelligence point of view?
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USIA Answer:
Very limited, if any. Exchanges during contacts are nearly always of
technical information relating to amateur radio,, generally information
which is available in radio publications and of no military or political
value. Weather information is occasionally exchanged but very,, very rarely
in sufficient detail to be of serious value from an intelligence point of
view. Discussions of political or economic factors between amateurs are
so rare as to constitute an outstanding exception to the rule.
A,uestion 5
Is there at present any system for exploiting, assisting or guiding
these contacts for either propaganda or intelligence purposes? What can
or should be done in this regard?
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USIA Answers to both questions:
To my knowledge there is no such system at present., nor any contem-
plated. The possibilities of using amateur radio contacts as vehicles for
propaganda have been seriously discussed at the USIA but considered im-
practical, at least for the present. From this point of view., a certain
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benefit accrues automatically from most contacts but only indirectly.
The Voice of America has hado, for several years, a quarter-hour weekly
program in the English language devoted to amateur radio and broadcast
world-wide. Its popularity is great judging from a constantly large mail
receipt. Although the basic program is in English, other VOA language_
services often translate portions of the basic program for use to their
respective areas of the world on a somewhat less frequent schedule.
The Office of Private Cooperation of USIA maintains contact with the
American Radio Relay League (the largest amateur radio organization,, by
far) within the scope of their responsibilities to support the People-to-
People Program, but has nc particular program developed in this connection.
Tentative efforts to devise such a program not long ago brought to light
the fact that, from a People-to-People aspect, American amateurs were
already engaged in all possible activities of this sort quite effectively
and support from the USIA was deemed unnecessary.
USIA Comment:
See USIA comment relative to VOA, above. Apart from this, no relation
is known, beyond the fact that it is considered likely that radio amateurs
are in a better position to listen to broadcasts from these stations
because of availability of good shortwave receivers, antennas, etc.
Question 8:
would you please furnish us with any further information or written
material which you think pertinent to the foregoing queries or any
reference to amateur radio activity which this Committee ought to consider
including in its report.
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None pertinent.
B. SUMMARY
Estimates of the number of amateur radio operators ("hams") in the
Soviet Union range from 10,000 to 100,000. The latter is the published
figure and includes student amateurs and listeners not yet licensed.
Possibly there are 30}000 licensed operators in the USSR as compared to
150,000 in the U.S. and 250,000 around the world. There is evidence that
100,000 conversations take place annually between amateurs in Russia and
the U.S.
China is reported to have practically no amateur radio, There are
perhaps 1,500 licensed operators in Poland and 21000 in Yugoslavia, No
estimates are available on other Iron Curtain countries.
The Sprague Committee staff has consulted about the use of these
contacts for intelligence or propaganda purposes with the Department of
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State, CIA, VOA, and, through the latter, the American Radio Relay League.
USIA reports that the "possibility of using amateur radio contacts as
vehicles for propaganda has been seriously discussed at USIA but considered
impractical, at least for the present."
The effect of such contacts on foreign opinion concerning the U.S. is
considered slight. "Like institutional advertising", says USIA, "the
effect is small in each instance but cumulative and favorable" in its
influence on individuals rather than on government or policies.
VOA has for years operated a very popular quarter hour weekly program
in the English language devoted to amateur radio interests and broadcasts
world-wide.
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X. INTERNATIONAL TELEVISION
A* BACIGROUND
1960 marks a turning point in the development of television. Up to
now,, television has been introduced and has expanded most rapidly in
highly-developed countries where entertainment has been the primary mission.
Now., however, television will spread to an important group of less-
developed and newly-independent countries. At least 12 of these may be
expected to inaugurate television broadcasting in Fiscal Year 3961 and
20 or so probably will do so in Fiscal Year 1962. Within a few years nearly
all countries will have television. In the great majority., programming and
transmission will be controlled by government.
None of these countries has the resources for a successful television
service in programming., management, or engineering., but for status reasons --
if nothing else -- they are determined to have it whether they can support
it or not.
The type of audience and the needs of the people in these countries
will result in a heavy emphasis on conveying basic information and instruc-
tion in hygiene,, food production, mechanical skills, community improvement.,
etc., to people who are largely illiterate. Entertainment and cultural
programs will be regarded as much less important.
In short, television in the less-developed countries will become an
important tool in teaching. For that purpose., television is effective,
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cheap, and adapted to their geographical conditions. It reaches out over
jungles, rivers, and impassable roads. It multillies ten thousandfold the
utility of each instructor. It allows demonstration of basic techniques to
a mass audience in a way that would otherwise be impossible except to very
small groups. However, the skill and know-how for doing this cannot be
found at present in these countries. They must turn elsewhere for help,
and at the present time the United States is uniquely equipped to provide
such help on a broad scale. The Soviet Union is far behind the United States
in experience in teaching by television.
A second basic aspect of the television situation is that we are stand-
ing on the threshold of another major technological break-through. It can
be assumed that regular intercontinental television will be a fact within
five years -- perhaps less -- and that within ten years "global TV" will
provide instantaneous audio and visual communication between the most distant
countries of the world. Technologically speaking, the necessary components
to achieve this now exists. The successful launching of Echo I, and its use
in experimental crossecoimtry television, is dramatic evidence of this.
B. AVAILABLE ASSETS
In respect to the development of educational television in less-develop-
ed countries the United States has important assets actually and potentially
available. Private foundations and educational institutions have put the
United States far in the lead in this field through a number of major
experiments.
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Within the government, the television service of the U.S. Information
Agency has developed valuable experience, particularly in giving programming
assistance to foreign television services.
The International Cooperation Administration, under the terms of its
mission, can supply equipment to foreign governments for television purposes.
ICA also is able to provide specialists to give on-the-spot guidance and
can bring foreign technicians to the United States for training.
The State Department Specialist Branch can send American experts abroad
for periods up to one year; and the Department's Leader Grant Program can
bring foreign specialists to the United States for periods of study.
In principle, the Development Loan Fund is not barred from financing
television systems overseas.
These potential resources, however, are not being used effectively.
Here, then, may be an area in which the United States, if it moves quickly
and with imagination, can do much to gain great credit for itself while
at the same time promoting stability end growth in less-developed countries,
all at relatively minor cost.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Because of the important new educational and informational possi-
bilities of television there is need for a coordinated government-wide
policy to define the United States interest in the future overseas expansion
of the medium. Respors-ibility for this might well be assigned to the
Radio- Television Broadcast Policy Com iittee.
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2. It is desirable that a working group be established -- perhaps
under the Operations Coordinating Board -- to insure the effective utiliza-
tion of available resources in support of a central policy.
3. Thought should be given to the development of more effective means
of cooperation between private and governmental agencies interested in
educational and international television. The continued active effort of
foundations and educationel institutions in this field is of the greatest
importance. Also,, the adequacy of present U.S. facilities for the training
of foreign nationals in programing and technical aspects of television
needs to be reviewed.
4. The prospect of intercontinental television in the next few years
requires that attention be given now to a number of the technical,, legal,,
and other problems which will arise:
a. An international agreement on video channels and audio
frequencies will be required, if a chaotic situation is to be
avoided.
b. Determination will have to be made of the role of USIA
and of private companies in the broadcasting of intercontinental
programs,
c. The possibility of a joint venture with friendly govern-
ments in putting communications satellites into space has been
suggested. Clear policy and careful plans will be required if
such a cooperative effort with any foreign country is to be carried
out.
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