ADMIRAL STANSFIELD TURNER INTERVIEW WITH DAN RATHER - 60 MINUTES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP05T00644R000100040008-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 34
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 5, 2009
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: February 3, 1981
• Content Type: REPORT

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PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF
3 FEBRUARY 1981
ADMIRAL STANSPIELD TURNER INTERVIEW
C.-' y'H L7 N R,9 W 2 - D ~I7~~/GT F-S
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DAN RATHER: Well, first I want you to take me on a
world tour. I'm told that you have a world tour that you want
to take me on. Let's take that tour.
[Asides]
RATHER: Where do you see the -- for rank-and-file
Americans in their living rooms; where do are the future poten-
tial trouble spots? And let's touch on important spots: Moscow,
Western Europe. Tell me what's at hand.
ADMIRAL STANSFIELD TURNER: I'd like to touch on three
that I think are long-range but very important fundamental prob-
lems for the United States, Dan.
The first one is, I think we've, as a world, underes-
timated the impact on world economies of the increasing price of
energy.
The second is, I think there's a real challenge for
United States leadership today in dealing with our NATO allies.
They are much more independent. They have much less confidence
in the United States than they did, perhaps, a decade ago.
And finally, I think we have to become more sophisti-
cated In our dealings with the Soviet Union. I believe we're
going to have to learn to have a grain embargo on the Soviets.
on the one hand, and sell them pipeline to build gas transmis-
sion systems on the other; on the one hand, to criticize them
[unintelligible] their invasion of Afghanistan, on the other
hand, to negotiate a SALT II. It isn't going to be all blacks
and whites.
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RATHER: Now, when you say our NATO allies don't have
the confidence in us they had 10 years ago; why is that? And is
one of the reasons such things as our failure with the desert
raid in Iran?
ADMIRAL TURNER: That certainly is contributory- But
I think, more important, they feel that the overall military bal-
ance has been shifting against us. I think they feel that U.S.
policy hasn't been constant enough -- hasn't been constant enough.
RATHER: Now, when you talk about NATO, do you include
France as part of NATO? They are not a NATO member.
ADMIRAL TURNER: Well, they're a member of NATO. They
don't participate on the military side. So; yes, I feel that
they're part of.,.
RATHER: You include them in that.
ADMIRAL TURNER: Oh, yes.
RATHER: What have been the other contributory factors
in the loss of confidence?
ADMIRAL TURNER: Well. I think that it goes to the
fundamentals of the economics. They don't see the U.S. economy
as strong as it was. in the past, as dominant in the world econ-
omy than previously. They saw us, in effect, defeated In Vietnam.
And they then saw this country take a hands-off position and
create a virtual vacuum Into which the Soviets could move after
Vietnam. And you saw them move into Angola, from there to Ethi-.
opia, from there to Yemen, Cambodia, and finally Afghanistan.
RATHER: I'm a little surprised to hear you say under
the heading. of "we have to be more sophisticated in our handling
of the Soviets," that we would. on the one hand, give them pipe-
lines. I would think you'd be unalterably opposed to that.
ADMIRAL TURNER: That s an exception to the rule, in
my book. Because I believe that the world is going to have trou-
ble bringing our economies out of recession for lack of adequate
energy supply. And therefore I think it's in everybody's in-
terest to produce as much energy, whether it comes from the Sov-
iet Union or Saudi Arabia, as possible.
RATHER: Well, haven't we already given the Soviets
much more of our technology than is'healthy for us?
ADMIRAL TURNER: Yes, I believe so. And I would not
want to transfer more high technology to them at this time.
RATHER: And you would.n't consider the pipeline high
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technology.
RATHER: Let s talk about a subject most people, or.
many people are tired of talking about, and that's Iran. It
.might be instructive if you could tell us in retrospect, from
your vantage point, what went wrong with American policy in Iran.
ADMIRAL TURNER: American policy in Iran. I think we
became too wedded. to the Shah. We felt that he could solve too
many problems for us,. We didn't recognize that we have a res-
ponsibility in the Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean area to insure the
flow of oil to the Free World from that area. Its vital to us.
It's vital to our allies. We never should have thought of trying
to turn that responsibility for keeping that safe over to anyone
else.
RATHER:- Which is basically what we did In the early
ADMIRAL TURNER: Yes. And I think that was a mistake,
and I think we are now caught short, because we have a vital
national interest in that area and we simply cannot bring ade-
quate mlIitary power to bear.
I'm not suggesting, Dan, that we need to fight there.
But I am suggesting that it's axiomatic, if you have a v-ital
national interest, you've got to be able to threaten or use mili-
tary force if necessary. If you can't, the Secretary of State
has fewer tools with which to handle the problem.
RATHER: Are you saying to me that if we were to make
a threat in that area now it would be a hollow threat?
ADMIRAL TURNER: It wouldn't be adequate to some of the
problems that might arise there.
RATHER: Again, we're talking from the standpoint of
hindsight., which is always a advantage. What else went wrong in
Iran?
ADMIRAL TURNER: WelI, in Iran overall, you have the
same problem you have in many lesser-developed countries with
oil resources even today. You have a high infusion of money and
you have a corresponding societal change that is taking place.
And It s very difficult to control. It's something that we don't
understand; I don't think the Shah understood, and it got the
best of him.
RATHER: Now, does Iran stand as an Intelligence fail-
ure, not just during your tour at the Central Intelligence Agency,
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but for American intelligence as a whole? Does it represent a
failure?
ADMIRAL TURNER: I don't really think so. I think
that's an oversimplification of the issue. And I'm not trying
to be defensive here.
I think that intelligence in this country, over a long
period of time, generally kept the policymakers aware that there
were problems developing in Iran. When you come to predicting
an actual revolution or coup, that's another thing, and it's much
more difficult, much-more problematic. But the real fundamental
issue is, were we telling the policymakers that there were diffi-
cult situations in Iran that were going to cause trouble in the
future? And I think we generally were.
RATHER: How could the C I A be so wrong i n its own assess-
ment of what was going on in I r a n ? W e l l now, keep in m i nd in
August of '77 -- I want to quote -- the CIA reported that, quote,
the Shah will be an active participant in Iranian life well into
the 1980s, end of quotation. That was in August 1977. And a year
later the CIA said, quote, Iran is not in a revolutionary or even
a pre-revolutionary situation, end quote. That was in 1978.
ADMIRAL TURNER: The report you're talking about is not
a CIA report. I've had that quoted to me before. That was a
draft which never saw the I ight of day. And it is not the CIA's
position that you've quoted there.
RATHER: It was not the CIA's position at that time?
ADMIRAL TURNER: It was not the CIA's position...
RATHER: Well, explain about that. You know the source
of that. It's a congressional source which describes it as a CIA
report. What you're saying, it's a draft -- it was a draft and
not a report.
ADMIRAL TURNER: That's correct. And I personally
rejected that draft, and so I know it is not true.
RATHER: Well, during that time, what was -- in general,
what was the CIA telling the American policymakers?
ADMIRAL TURNER: We were telling them that there were
all kinds of opposition'to the Shah, some on cultural: some on
religious, some on economic, some on political grounds.
What we did not predict was that all of these forms of
opposition would coalesce under the aegis of a 78-year-old cleric
who has been an expatriate for 16 years, and would become more
than the Shah could handle, when he had large military and police
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powers to back him up. In short, we thought that when the crunch
came and these dissident groups rose to greater power, the Shah
would step in at the right time and knock it down. He didn t.
Dan, I still don't know why. I suspect it may have had
something to do with his illness.
RATHER: Is it -- does it remain your view that had he
stepped in, had the Shah stepped in at that time, he could have
put it down; that there was a moment when, if he had chosen to do
so, he could have hammered it down?
ADMIRAL TURNER: Well. there certainly was. But the
time he faced that issue, as we understand it, it would have been
very, very bloody very, very painful to have done it. Had he
stepped in earlier, I think he could have.
But again, let me come back to the fact, there was a
societal change taking place in this country. It wouldn't have
been suppressed forever.
RATHER: What mistakes di.d the Central Intelligence
Agency make, and, more importantly, I think, the intelligence
community as a whole in this country make, vis-a-vis Iran? And
you've mentioned, that you didn't foresee these various elements
coalescing behind Khomeini. What other mistakes did the Intel-
ligence community make?
ADMIRAL TURNER: I think -- I think that s hardly a
mistake, even. I think that our analysis showed what was hap-.
pening, but we did not come to the conclusion that this was sud-
denly going to turn into a successful revolution.
Now we would like to have been able to predict that.
But I would suggest to you that if you measure the quality of
intelligence in any country against that kind of a standard:
you're going to come up with a low batting average. I think
predicting. those is 25 percent chance.
Again I go back to the point that what we should be
measured against is are we six or 12 months ahead of an event
like that, telling the policymakers that there is a problem and
what options they may have under those circumstances. Because
six or 12 months ahead of time, they can do something. If you
tell them that there s going to be a revolution tomorrow., its
too late, and that's of much less importance.
RATHER: I've heard -- and, now, let s try to set the
record straight -- French intelligence was predicting what hap-
pened well before. Is that true?
ADMIRAL TURNER: No. Well, if they were, they didn't
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tell us. I mean all of these other intelligence services who
claimed they had great insight into this were not telling anybody,
else about it if they did. I can't tell you what they were tal-
king about in their home camp. But the media, the academics,
the other intelligence services, none of them were on line that
this was as serious a problem for the Shah as it turned out to
be.
RATHER: Does that include Israeli intelligence?
ADMIRAL TURNER: Absolutely.
RATHER: Because one of the things I've heard is that
Israeli intelligence was telling our intelligence, look, this
was coming, and that we rejected it. Now, does that square...
ADMIRAL TURNER: That's absolutely false.
RATHER:. One of the most important questions to me
about Iran, and one that you would know about, is, was the take-
over of the U.S. Embassy in Teheran something done by local
militants and students, or was it something planned and done on
a larger scale? Were outside terrorists involved?
ADMIRAL TURNER: My best estimate at this point, and
we have a few fragments from the hostages who have just returned,
is that it really was an Islamic student movement. Clearly, any
movement like that gets infiltrated over a period of time [unin-
telligible]. I don't believe It ever got infiltrated to the
point it was controlled by outside terrorist-type people.
RATHER: The best available information indicates what,
If any., complicity by an international conspiracy?
ADMIRAL TURNER: Very little, or none. I don't have
any indication of that.
RATHER: You have no indication of that.
ADMIRAL TURNER: No.
RATHER: That would include the PLO.
ADMIRAL TURNER That's correct.
RATHER: And the Soviets?
ADMIRAL TURNER: Now, that does not mean that there
weren't students in there who had been trained by the PLO or been
to PLO camps, and one thing, in the course of their life. But
as far as directing and having a major influence on that, we
don't believe the Soviets or the PLO did.
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RATHER: Now, was -- unquestionably, there was some
confusion about that in the early days and weeks of the takeover.
ADMIRAL TURNER: Oh, yes.
RATHER: Were you at one time of the opinion that there
must be some international conspiracy involved?
ADMIRAL TURNER: No, I was not.
RATHER: What was the early read from your own people?
ADMIRAL TURNER: Our people initially believed that
this was a student movement of right-wing Islamic bent.
RATHER: And you think subsequently that that was proven
ADMIRAL TURNER: Yes I do.
RATHER: Now, the question gets important, as you know,
because the new Secretary of State, General Alexander Haig, who
you know reasonably well, said at his first news conference that
the Soviet Union is sponsoring and supporting and expanding Inter-
national terrorism throughout the world.
ADMIRAL TURNER: When the Soviets are willing to supply
arms to a country like Libya, which is obviously causing problems
in terrorism and many other ways all around the world, it's a
real troublemaker you have to associate the Soviet Union with
that type of activity. They are in complicity with the Libyans.
RATHER: Insofar as you can make out, were the Soviets
involved in the embassy takeover in Iran?
ADMIRAL TURNER: No. They were surprised about it, too.
RATHER: You think they were surprised as well.
ADMIRAL TURNER: Yes. Because, of course, their embassy,
as attacked a few weeks after ours, and repulsed by the Iranian
government.
The big issue here is the Iranian government did not
stand behind international law and protecting the diplomatic
premises
RATHER: Of the U.S.-Embassy.
ADMIRAL TURNER: Of the U.S.
RATHER: But they did to the Soviets.
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ADMIRAL TURNER: That tells us either that they awakened
in between and realized that they had to do this, or they were
preferential, in that case, to the Soviets.
Since then, however, even this dastardly government of
Khomeini has not taken a pro-Soviet stance. I think that's for-
tunate for us. They obviously aren't pro-American. They*re
trying to stay In between.
RATHER: Your best estimates of their chances of sur-
viving as a government.
ADMIRAL TURNER: Very low. Khomeini is incapable, with
his clerics, of bringing that country into order, running a suc-
cessful economy. He's bound to fall one of these days.
That doesn't mean we're going to suddenly have a pro-
U.S. or a pro-West government fall into place there. I think we
have to be patient. We have to realize that someday Iran is going
to recognize that they re going to need the support of the United
States because they're so threatened by the Soviet Union. And, of
course, the United States needs Iran too. So there is an area of
mutual interest here that will revive someday.
RATHER: Someday. But that day is [inaudible].
I recognize we're pretty far afield. But in your per-
sonal opinion, is that day going to be any time soon?
ADMIRAL TURNER: No. I think it's some time off. The
United States is going to have to be patient.
And in the interim, there's going to be a real risk, a
real risk that the Soviets may gain a dominant position in Iran
by subversion or by military force. And I think that's why we
have to be prepared to. use military force in that area if It's
absolutely necessary.
RATHER: And it's your judgment we're not now prepared
to do that.
ADMIRAL TURNER: We're making good progress and get-
ting ready. But I don't think we are there. I think, over a
period of years, we have neglected this type of capability in
favor of concentrating all of our interest and attention on the
military field on supporting the main front in Europe.
RATHER: Admiral, when the Soviets first moved into
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Afghanistan, was it your counsel to the President of the United
States at that time, based on intelligence information, that they
were making a push toward the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf?
ADMIRAL TURNER: Well, I'm not going to, even after
the fact, talk about specific recommendations to the President.
I think that's [unintelligible] he's entitled to his privacy
there.
I believe the Soviets went into Iran -- into Afghanistan
primarily because they saw a socialist-oriented government right
on their border about to collapse because it wasn't hacking the
job In the country. And I think they felt that was more than they
should tolerate. And I think they felt, based on the precedent
of Angola, Ethiopia, Yemen, Cambodia, that the United States would
not stand up very strong if they did go in.
RATHER: That's a different thing than making a push
toward the Indian Ocean and the historic desire for a warm-water
port.
ADMIRAL TURNER: Yes. I think that was a secondary con-
sideration. They certainly want that. They wanted it histori-
cally. And the fact that this opportunity was there that didn't --
that aided or abetted their willingness to go into Afghanistan.
But I believe the primary pressures were more local, more current
than that.
RATHER: Based on what you know, is it your opinion that
they're still interested in pushing toward the Indian Ocean, or
that they'll stop short of that?
ADMIRAL TURNER: The czars were interested in that, and
the Russian people are still the same, the Soviet people are still
the same today.
RATHER: I know you`re not a wagering man. But if you
had to bet, the Soviets move into Iran, or not?
ADMIRAL TURNER: I think that with their problems in
Afghanistan, with their problems in Poland, with their knowledge
that there would be an intense reaction from the United States
and the rest. of the Free World, they will.be very, very hesitant
to do that in the foreseeable future.
RATHER: Let's talk about Poland for a moment. Was
our intelligence wrong about Poland?
ADMIRAL TURNER: No, I think our intelligence was very
good about.Poland. We watched the buildup of the Soviet forces
there, to the point where in early December, I believe, they were
ready to go.. And we reported that.
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to go.
RATHER: In early December you thought they were ready
ADMIRAL TURNER: Yes, early to mid-December.
RATHER: Did you think the chances were strong that
they might indeed go?
ADMIRAL TURNER: Yes, I think they were.
RATHER: That Is, the Soviets invade Poland?
ADMIRAL TURNER: I still think the Soviets had every
Intention of going at that time.
RATHER: What stopped them?
ADMIRAL, TURNER: What stopped them was that this was
a quite different situation from the Czechoslovakian one because
there was so much attention and publicity to the possibility of
their coming in. The labor unions in Poland, the government in
Poland, the Catholic Church in Poland all saw this high proba-
bility of a Soviet invasion, when they all recognized that that
wouldn't do any one of their interests any good. So the willing-
ness to make some kind of an accommodation came up.
The Soviets, I think, because of all this publicity,
also recognized how damaging it would be to them politically;
and also it would be very costly to them economically.
So I think there has, since the height of the atten-
tion in early December, there's been a greater willingness on
.both sides to try to find some accommodation. But they haven't
found it for good yet.
[Asides]
RATHER: We were talking about Poland. Has the threat
of Soviet Invasion abated?
ADMIRAL TURNER: Oh, I think for the time being. But
it's my personal view, Dan, that the institution of free labor
unions in Poland and other steps toward more freedom have gone
further than the Soviets can tolerate. They must be counting
on the Polish government being able to
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II
RATHER: We were talking about Poland. Has the threat
of Soviet invasion abated?
ADMIRAL TURNER: Oh I think for the time being. But
it's my personal view, Dan, that the institution of free labor
unions in Poland and other steps toward more freedom have gone
further than the Soviets can tolerate. They must be counting
on the Polish government being able to walk those back, to erase
some of those gains that the freedom people have made in Poland.
I doubt that they're going to be able to. So I think the crunch
is going to come somewhere down the pike.
RATHER: If you think, in your words, the crunch is
going to come somewhere down the pike in Eastern Europe, that
strikes me as very dangerous for us, in terms of our own national
security.
ADMIRAL TURNER: I don t think it's that dangerous.
Anything like that can explode and be a problem. But it's mainly
a problem for the Soviet Union and how they re going to continue
to control their.Eastern European empire. If they have to go
into Poland it s going to tie down forces and it s going to cost
them a great deal of money, because they'll have to practically.
absorb the 20-some billion dollars of Polish debt. They II have
to run the Polish economy. And the Soviet economy is already in
trouble.
It's going to be a very costly thing, and will be a big
impediment to Soviet interference around the rest of the world.
RATHER: Now is this for our own propaganda uses that
we keep talking about the weakness of the Soviet economy, or is
based on what you consider to be hard facts gathered by intelli-
gence?
ADMIRAL TURNER: I think it's very hard facts. We ve
talked over the years about the Soviet economic problems.. I think
they really are much greater today.
But more importantly, they are systemic, not cyclical
economic problems. By that I mean they can't produce enough for
the consumers, who are the workers to induce the workers to work
harder, because there's no reward for it. And therefore.produc-
tivity is going down inside the Soviet Union. And when produc-
tivity goes down, they have less to provide to their consumers
and they're in a cycle that they can t break out of.
RATHER: Is this one reason they're so concerned about
ADMIRAL TURNER: Well, I think it's more, though that
they have to keep that Eastern European empire intact. That's
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their line of communication across to Western Europe and it's
utterly vital to them to hold Poland.
No, I think it's more a geopolitical problem with Poland.
RATHER: We hear a lot of talk -- and I'm interested in
what intelligence is telling us -- that the Soviet are very wor-
ried about their own Islamic population. We tend to forget there
are millions, 70 million or above, people of Islamic heritage in-
side the Soviet Union. What does our intelligence tell us about
how concerned they are about the Islamic revolution in Iran and
the circles that's creating throughout the area right on the
Soviet Union s border?
ADMIRAL TURNER: I don't see that as a major concern of
the Soviets. I think they have their own Islamic people under
reasonable control- I think it s a consideration, but a secondary
one to a much greater in Iran, the oil and the access to the warm
water.
RATHER: While we're talking about the Soviets I d
like to get back to Secretary Haig. I began this line of ques-
tioning a moment ago and I want to get back again.
Surely Secretary Haig knows what he's talking about,
as long as he was in the military as long as he's been in the
U.S. Government. And you've just completed four years as the
CIA Director. Could you pinpoint for us where and how the Sov-
iets have supported international terrorist activities. Now,
you mentioned Libya as one. Any place else?
ADMIRAL TURNER: No. I think I'll leave that to Secre-
tary Haig to support, because I think he's right that the Soviets
have encouraged revolutionary movements in many countries that
have ended up with some form of terrorism...
argument.
[Dog barking]
ADMIRAL 'TURNER: I d rather. let him buttress his own
[Asides]
RATHER: I asked you about the embassy takeover and the
comments that the Soviets fostered international terrorism. And
I'm asking you now to -- do you agree with General Haig that they
have done that?
ADMIRAL TURNER: Yes_
RATHER: I asked you for an example and you gave me
Libya. Any others that you can give?
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ADMIRAL TURNER: Well, I think they ve supported the
PLO. I think they've supported some revolutionary movements
around the world that have ended up with some form of terrorism.
RATHER: But again, is this a fact based on hard intel-
ligence, what you consider to be hard intelligence; that the
Soviets have helped to sponsor the Palestine Liberation Organi-
zation?
ADMIRAL TURNER: I think there's reasonable intelli-
gence that there have been lots of contacts between the two. And
there's certainly hard intelligence on the strong Libyan connec-
tion with the Soviets.
RATHER: How much of that can you tell me? What is
the connection between the Soviets and the Libyans and Libyan
sponsorship of terrorism?
ADMIRAL TURNER: Well, the connection between the Sov-
iets and the Libyans is in the supply or the sale of excessive
amounts of military equipment, far beyond what the Libyans can
possibly use on their own. And therefore the Soviets must cer-
tainly realize that the Libyans are going to put this to nefarious
employment.
RATHER: Any hard intelligence information that leaders
of the Palestine Liberation Organization or other terrorist groups
have been trained in Moscow or inside the Soviet Union?
ADMIRAL TURNER: Nothing I can discuss, no.
RATHER: And when you say nothing you can discuss..
respect that. But that leaves the clear inference that there is
such evidence in existence.
ADMIRAL TURNER: I wouldn't draw that inference. It
isn't necessarily the case. But there are limits even though
I'm out of the intelligence business Dan, as to what I can dis-
cuss.
RATHER: You see where the main thrust of this is that
it's serious, to say the least, when the Secretary of State says --
for that matter, the President of the United States says -- that
the Soviet Union lies and cheats; the Secretary of State says
they're involved in international terrorism. Those are very ser-
ious charges to make against a society and a people and a govern-,
ment.
ADMIRAL TURNER: live given you all that I can in backup
for that, within the limits of security.
RATHER: Well about the Libyan connection. Where does
that manifest itself? You say it's clear the Soviets have given
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the Libyans massive supplies of arms, you said an overabundance
of arms. But where does that manifest itself in international
terrorism?
ADMIRAL TURNER: Well, Libya has traditionally over
the years supported international terrorism. I will say that
it's gone up and down at different periods in their history.
They've been more and less active. I think they've become more
active in recent years.
RATHER: The scale is up.
ADMIRAL TURNER: Yes.
RATHER: Where has most of their activity been centered,
in Africa itself?
ADMIRAL TURNER: Well, no. It s worldwide not just
terrorism, but their interference. They're causing problems in
Central America. They're funding the Moslem liberation groups
in the Philippines. They're all over the world causing difficul-
ties.
RATHER: Well, let s talk about that as much as you
can, and first about Central America,.which is one of those areas
of the world obviously I wanted to cover. It comes as news to
me that the Libyans are involved in any way in Central America.
ADMIRAL TURNER: Well, the critical thing going on in
Central America today is the internationalization of revolutions
down there, the outside support that is coming for all these
revolutionary movements, in Nicaragua and El Salvador and Gua-
temala, and so on. And I think this is a very dangerous trend
for the United States, and one that's right on our back doorstep.
RATHER: Well, again, how much can you tell me about
that? You say the internationalization. How does that manifest
itself?
ADMIRAL TURNER: Well, I think you certainly recognize
that it's the Cuban hand, in funneling much of this equipment to
the revolutionaries, that has been much of the cause of the prob-
lem. Now, the'Cubans don't have the resources to provide much of
anything to anybody. Their economy s in very bad condition.
They're getting that from the Libyans, from the Soviets, others.
RATHER: Now, again, is this based on hard intelligence
fact? Because one will get some argument about this. The argu-
ment goes along the lines that the Cubans and Soviets get credit
for doing a lot more than they in fact do in Central America.
ADMIRAL TURNER: I think the argument is that what the
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Cubans have had to do has not been massive, but it's been cri-
tical. It s tipped the balance. In short, they didn't have to
provide great boatloads of arms to tip the balance in the Nicar-
aguan revolution, but what they did do for support was utterly.
critical to its success.
RATHER: What did they do?
ADMIRAL TURNER: They provided arms and advisers.
RATHER: Cuban advisers?
ADMIRAL TURNER: Yes.
RATHER: On the ground in Nicaragua, or are you talking
about training people back in Cuba?
ADMIRAL TURNER: I think more training. Of course
there are all kinds of Cubans in Nicaragua now.
RATHER: That s since the revolution.
ADMIRAL TURNER: Since the revolution. Yes
RATHER: Again in retrospect, what mistakes did we make
in Nicaragua?
ADMIRAL TURNER: Nicaragua is typical of the kind of
problem we are facing in many countries of the world. We want
to support the incumbent government, with whom we have relations
and who are doing a reasonable job, but we find it difficult to
encourage them to modernize and democratize their country as
rapidly as the'demand is coming from the left. And I think it's
an age-old problem. It's going to continue to be with us. And
I don't know an easy solution to it.
You can say in each instance, "You made the wrong judg-
ment. You didn't force them fast enough." If you force them too
fast -- maybe the Shah -- you have a problem also.
RATHER: Again in retrospect, did our intelligence fail
us in Nicaragua?
ADMIRAL TURNER: No. I think we indicated that there
were very deep problems there. I think we provided a good back-
ground for what was going on there.
RATHER: Including the shakiness of the Somoza regime?
ADMIRAL TURNER: Oh, yes. You only had to read the
newspapers, practically to know that, Dan. That was very appar-
ent to everybody.
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RATHER: Now I'm interested, as nearly everyone is
at least to a degree, in what's happening in El Salvador. And
I'm confused. On the one hand, the outgoing ambassador, US.
Ambassador in El Salvador, says it's his judgment that the amount
of arms coming in from the outside, from Cuba and elsewhere. has
been relatively small. On the other hand, I keep seeing reports,
some of which originate with the Central Intelligence Agency,
that the...
ADMIRAL TURNER: I hope you re not seeing the Central
Intelligence Agency reports.
RATHER: Not the reports themselves. But its very
obvious where they come from -- that the amount of arms that are
coming in there very strong.
Now for any citizen of this country this gets to be
very important. I mean where is the truth in this situation?
ADMIRAL TURNER: I think it's just like what we talked
about a second ago on the Nicaraguan situation. You don't have
to have huge supplies of arms in these kinds of situations. These
are very small countries. There are very small numbers of insur-
gents.
The whole question, in my mind. is the Cubans are fun-
neling equipment into El Salvador on a regular basis. But that,
again, is not big boatloads.
So I think the truth is in between what you're saying.
RATHER: From an intelligence community standpoint,
does the future look as dark in Central America as it does to
many of us outside the intelligence community?
ADMIRAL TURNER: Yes, I think it does. I think it's a
very serious prospect for the United States.
RATHER: What is that prospect?
ADMIRAL TURNER: The prospect is foreign-, Cuban or
Soviet, dominated regimes in some of those Central American coun-
tries. And the danger that poses to our friends, the Mexicans,
to the north, let alone to South America to the south.
RATHER: I'm a bit confused, because the Mexicans, they
seem to be very friendly with the Cubans. They have not, for ex-
ample, supported the current junta in El Salvador that the United
States Government is backing.
If it's a threat to the Mexicans. why haven't they been
more forthcoming in resistance?
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ADMIRAL TURNER: I think they were shortsighted on
Now clearly this is the problem we talked about a
minute ago: How strongly do support regimes of the general right
that are not democratizing as fast as is being demanded of them
of the left? The Mexicans are trying to encourage a movement
toward the center of these governments in Central America. One
can argue whether they're overdoing that. I think they are at
this time.
RATHER: What you don't like what you think you see,
at least the short-run future prospects in Central America.
ADMIRAL TURNER: No, I don't.
RATHER: ...You mentioned the Philippines. What's
happening in the Philippines?
ADMIRAL TURNER: Well, General Marcos as you know
has lifted martial law. I think that's an effort on his part
to regain some. popular support. We think -- I think the Marcos
regime is in good control of the situation there and will remain
so for some time to come.
RATHER: You don't see a revolution succeeding in the
Philippines any time soon?
ADMIRAL TURNER: Not soon. Clearly, there's opposition
on the left. Again, it's the same kind of situation we've dis-
cussed in Central America: a regime that is not moving to demo-
cratization, to greater liberties, greater freedom of the popu-
lation as rapidly as is being demanded. But I think he has the
horsepower to hold the situation under control for the time being.
RATHER: What are the chances that the Philippines
represent our next Vietnam?
right now.
ADMIRAL TURNER: Oh. I think that's -- that's low for
RATHER: The chances of that happening are low.
ADMIRAL TURNER: Yes.
RATHER: Now if you and I sit down and talk a year
from now, are we going to be saying, "Well, in the Philippines
and Central America we were as wrong as we were in Iran. We
thought In the Philippines that Marcos could hang on. We thought
Somoza could hang on in Nicaragua; and he couldn't"?
ADMIRAL TURNER: You wouldn't quote me a year from now,
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would you, Dan?
RATHER: You bet.
ADMIRAL TURNER: Well, I think -- I don't think a year
from now that we will be facing a revolution in the Philippines.
RATHER: Let's talk about Africa, Angola and Ethiopia.
Henry Kissinger has written -- this was after he, in
the opinion of some, had ignored what was happening in southern
Africa for a long time. But he has written that there was a
period in the mid-1970s when Angola represented a watershed. And
the fact that we did not resist a socialist regime taking over in
Angola led to the Cubans moving in and taking over there and in
Ethiopia.
Now do you agree with that analysis?
ADMIRAL TURNER: I think there's a great deal of truth
in that. I think'in the post-Vietnam period we made the mistake
of saying we didn't have vital national interests almost anywhere.
except maybe Europe; or of defining our vital national interests
only in terms of the intrinsic value of a particular country. And
who can say that Angola has any great value to the United States?
But the precedent that it set for the Soviets was very
damaging to us, and I think encouraged them to feel they could
go on to Ethiopia, to Yemen and Afghanistan.
RATHER: And what was that precedent?
ADMIRAL TURNER: The precedent.was that we stood back
and washed our hands of the people who stood for the kinds of
values, in general, that we've stood for, and let the Soviets,
with their Cuban surrogates, take over. This is the first real
instance in which the Cubans acted as surrogates for the Soviets.
It's a dangerous precedent, one that, of course, led to the de-
mise of -- or led to the control of Ethiopia that they now exer-
cise.
RATHER: [Unintelligible] Do you think if we had not
allowed the Cubans to move into Angola -- that's assuming [inau-
dible] -- that they would not be in Ethiopia today?
ADMIRAL TURNER: That's a very hypothetical issue, but
I think certainly the probability would be considerably less that
they would have been able to do that or had been willing to do
that.
RATHER: Now, based on your experiences with the Central
Intelligence Agency, where do we go from here in Angola? Is It
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19
- your belief, personal opinion that we should engage in covert
activities in that country?
ADMIRAL TURNER: I think at the present time the impor-
tant thing is to get the Namibia situation resolved, to the south
of Angola. Because if we can remove the.threat of South African
incursion into Angola from Namibia, then maybe we can begin to
get some kind of a more normal relationship going with the Ango-
lans, and they may be more willing to look at reduction of their
Cuban forces and so on. And I think that's the key to the area
right now.
RATHER: I want to make sure I understand you here.
There is a school of thought that what we shou Id do in our na-
tional policy should be to recognize Angola, work for a settle-
ment in Namibia, in hopes that that will influence the Angolans
to ask the Cubans to leave. Is that what you're suggesting?
ADMIRAL TURNER: No. I think that the probability of
getting 20,000 Cubans out of Angola overnight is very, very slim.
But I still think resolving the Namibian issue, so that you can
at least approach that problem, is the first step, and that we
should wait until we've solved that to decide whether we recog-
nize Angola or whether we go the other route of covert action,
and so on. One thing at a time. Let's let the thing settle down
a little bit.
RATHER: So you're not.prepared to recommend covert
action, a resumption of covert action at this time.
ADMIRAL TURNER: I think the political implications of
doing that probably outweigh what value you could do. I think
the rebel forces in Angola are surviving very well on their own.
They don't need a lot of support from us.
[Asides]
RATHER: I'm not sure I heard you correctly. Did you
say earlier that you thought the Libyans were active in trying
to stir up trouble in the Philippines? Or did you include the
Philippines in that list?
ADMIRAL TURNER: I did, yes. The Muslim problem in
the Philippines. I think the Libyans have been active in helping
fund that.
RATHER: Of course, many Americans tend to forget, or
never knew, that there is a large Muslim population in the Philip-
pines.
ADMIRAL TURNER: Right.
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RATHER: But it comes as news to me that the Libyans
have been involved in any way.
ADMIRAL TURNER: Oh, yes. I think that's very well
established.
RATHER: In what ways?
ADMIRAL TURNER: Mainly in providing funding. It's
too far away for much else.
RATHER: Providing money for revolutionary activity.
ADMIRAL TURNER: Yes.
RATHER: And in Central America?
ADMIRAL TURNER: Yes.
RATHER:.. I must say I'm surprised at that. One's accus-
tomed to hearing accusations that the Soviets are involved in
Central America and the Cubans. But the Libyans, I've never heard
that.
ADMIRAL TURNER: Well, I think the Libyans are more
nefarious than you, perhaps, Dan. I really am very concerned
about the direction in which Qaddafi is taking in a lot of coun-
tries. You know, what they've just done in Chad is very alarming
to [unintelligible].
RATHER: And just' to clean up, because we are [unintel-
I jible] subject in a moment. I don't want to leave -- you said --
yo:u said you said a l I you wanted to say about the PLO. But the
Palestine Liberation Organization, I think we're going to hear
more about it. It's obvious that the new Administration and Secre-
tary Haig have under review, at least, what our policy should be
toward the PLO.
Based on intelligence, not your own personal opinion,
but based on Intelligence, Is it a terrorist organizati'on, or is
it a moderate organization of desperate people, mostly refugees?
ADMIRAL TURNER: Well, the PLO is, of course, a very
amorphous organization with lots of sub-entities under.it. And
there are some radical terrorist elements under it that are obvi-
ously conducting activities, particularly in Israel.
I think Yasser Arafat, the titular leader of the over-
all organization, is a much more moderate person who has a much
more reasonable approach to the problem, much greater patience.
RATHER: And the PLO does or does not have elements
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trained in Moscow, or do we know?
ADMIRAL TURNER: I won't comment on that
RATHER: All right.
Now, let's talk about intelligence in the American
intelligence community, what's good about it, what's wrong with
It.
First of all, the -- my word, not yours -- the politi-
cizing of the Central Intelligence Agency. Now, this was founded
as a civilian agency. Now, when George Bush. a man of disting-
uished, but nevertheless a lifetime in politics, was appointed
the Central Intelligence Agency Director in the early 1970s, did
that not signal a politicizing of the agency?
ADMIRAL TURNER: I think what is critical is that the
Director, be he a former political figure or not, act in a non-
political way and, establish his credentials. And I think George
Bush did, as a nonpartisan person, someone who is not going to
provide intelligence to support the White House's preferences,
someone who i s w i l l i ng to stand up to and tell the President the
facts as he sees them.
RATHER: Whatever the fact turns out to be, isn't there
a danger that the perception will be that the agency is political.
when, for example, William Casey, everybody agrees, a good and
decent man with long service, but who helped run the Ronald Reagan
political campaign, winds up to be the Central Intelligence Direc-
tor, a lot of people are going to say it's politics.
ADMIRAL TURNER: Clearly, there is a perception problem
here. I feel confident that Bill Casey is going to overcome that
in the way he performs over a period of time.
You always have to remember that it's most important
that the Director and the President have a personal rapport, that
there is a feeling of confidence in the President's mind with the
man who's running the intelligence activities of our country.
RATHER: But there was a time, and not too long ago,
when what generally happened was an incoming President of one
party would make it his business to appoint a CIA Director who,
if he had any political affiliation, was clearly of the other
party, to make certain that even the perception of politicizing
was not there.
ADMIRAL TURNER: My particular suggestion, Dan, would
be I think it would be advisable for new Presidents to try to
live with the old Director for maybe six months. That would give
some continuity in the government, in the first place. And then
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the new President could determine whether he could develop a
rapport and a sense of confidence in the new Director. I think
that wou Id be a good way to go.
But I would emphasize again that I think the President
is entitled to have somebody in that job in whom he feels a great
deal of confidence.
RATHER: Admiral, you came out of a lifetime in the
Navy to the Central Intelligence Agency. When you first came
into the agency what was your biggest problem?
ADMIRAL TURNER: My biggest problem as that the Central
Intelligence Agency was about 30 years old when I arrived. And
you know when individuals like yourself and myself mature, when
organizations mature, they sometimes tend to become conservative,
stop taking risks, stop changing things, doing things in the old
way. And I think the Agency had sort of fallen into that. It
needed a reinvigoration, it needed some sort of a jolt. And I
believe that we've applied that, and today its a very strong,
innovative, healthy organization, and a very happy one.
RATHER: Now, from a personal standpoint, coming from
a naval command to the CIA, what surprised you the most?
ADMIRAL TURNER: I think maybe what surprised me the
most was the great pleasure in how similar the CIA was in its
responsiveness, just like the military. You ask them to do some-
thing, and by gosh they just go all out. They really are a most
responsive, most dedicated organization.
RATHER: And tell us of your relationships with the
President and the White House. Now, you had -- you were in Presi-
dent Carter's same class at Annapolis. Or at least you were at
Annapolis at the same time he was.
I got my job strictly on merit.
RATHER: [Laughter] I noticed that. But -- and I don't
think anybody would argue that. I don't mean to make light of
that. [Unintelligible] argue that you got the job on merit.
What problems did you have in,-- or did you have any? --
in getting through to President Carter and to the National Security
Council and to the White House?
ADMIRAL TURNER: Well, I had very little problem in
getting through to the President. I met with him weekly, at
least, and had full opportunity to say anything that I wanted.
But I would say there is a problem that I don't think
people appreciate. The intelligence, community provides a great
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deal more support to the Congress today than it ever did before.
And while the President is your master, the Congress demands a
great deal out of you.
RATHER:, That's one of the changes that occured in the
ADMIRAL TURNER: Yes, because of all the investigations
of intelligence. The Congress wants to know more. But in addi-
tion, I'm very pleased to say it's because other committees than
the Intelligence Committees of the Congress want to know what's
going on in the world. And we have to much to offer them. And
I think in the last few years our provision of substantive intel-
ligence to the Congress has multiplied manyfold. And they like
our product and they're using it, and it's very good for the
country.
But there is a conflict that arises here. Because the
Congress will sometimes say, "Well, you're just telling us.that
because it supports the President's policy." And sometimes the'
White House will tell me, "Why did you tell that to the Congress?
:t undercuts the,President's policy."
I can provide you press clippings about myself. One
start they'll say, Turner doesn't support the. President." On
the. other one they'll say, "Turner is the stooge of the Presi-
dent." And they, fortunately, I think, balance each other out.
RATHER: Your aim is that's a result of supplying what
the Congress wants, on the one hand, and, the other hand, sup-
plying the President what he wants.
ADMIRAL TURNER: That's correct. And it's a somewhat
new phenomenon, because of the greater congressional interest in
our product.
RATHER: Now, a new system of checks and balances was
supposed to be built into the CIA. as of the mid-1970s. Does that
new system of checks and balances work?
ADMIRAL TURNER: Oh, yes. Very well. I think one of
the things I'm most proud of is that we have established in the
last four years an entirely new relationship between the American
public and their representatives, the Congress and our secret
intelligence service, the CIA. We now are quite forthcoming with
the American Congress. They know what we do and why we do it.
At the same time, we have been able to work out arrange-
ments with them such that I believe we can preserve our capability
to do those secret things that are necessary for the security of
our country.
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What about the argument that says that because of that
system of checks and balances, the CIA has lost a great deal of
its effectiveness; and as a consequent, an increasing amount of
intelligence work has to be done by the military and is done by
the military?
ADMIRAL TURNER: Well, that's, I think, just totally
untrue, because the oversight process that has been established
applies to military intelligence just as much as to the CIA.
But don't let me give you my opinion, let me tell you
just one little story. Two months ago, after I knew I was leaving
the Central Intelligence Agency, I went to the top management,
and I asked the 8 or 10 top leaders to sit down, privately, with-
out me or my deputy, Mr. Carlucci, and write down what changes
they'd Iike to see made in the law, in the executive orders, in
the regulations, changes that would help us do our job better.
And, Dan, I can tell you I was pleased, but surprised. The list
was rather short and the items on it were not very substantial..
RATHER.:.- What about the continuing concern that many
citizens that the CIA remains too much of a watchdog on American
citizens, including American citizens in this country?_
ADMIRAL TURNER: Well, that's what this new oversight
process with the Congress and with an Intelligence Oversight
Board set up in the White House does to insure that that doesn't
happen. In short, we now have such oversight to be sure that
the CIA is not undermining the very society that we're trying to
defend. And I think the public can rest very comfortably on the
assurance that this oversight is thorough and gives them assurance
in this direction.
RATHER: Isn't the potential still there for a President,
If he's determined to do so, to use the CIA for his own political
or ideological purposes?
ADMIRAL TURNER: Well, a great deal, of course, depends
on the fortitude of the Director. But beyond that, if the Direc-
tor does things that are improper, as the result of pressure from
the White House, it's not going to be very long before one of
those oversight committees finds out about it and catches him up.
Or the Intelligence Oversight Board can receive complaints directly
from any of our employees without it going through me, or the
Director. And that's another very good check. Because, you know,
the Director can't carry out the President's orders all by him-
self. There are going to be other people involved. And somebody
is going to recognize that this is improper and call a halt to
it.
RATHER: What is -- simply put, what's the greatest
strength of our intelligence system?
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ADMIRAL TURNER: The greatest strength -- well, there
are two great strengths. One is the great technical capabilities
that American industry gives to us and put us far ahead, in satel-
lites and such things as this, of the Soviets.
But the second great strength is simply that we are a
free society. And therefore when information comes in and is
analyzed, you can come up with a conclusion in our intelligence
organization that is contrary to the White House or to anybody
in the government and you can put that forward. I'll bet you
can't do that in Moscow.
RATHER: Being a free society is, generally around
the world, considered a weakness when it comes to intelligence
gathering.
ADMIRAL TURNER: That's correct. Because the head of
the KGB can do an awful lot of things that I couldn't have done
as Director of Central Intelligence. But there's nobody in this
country who wants us to have that kind of authority, for just
the reasons you've mentioned a minute ago.
And it's not necessary to have that kind of autocratic
authority Dan, in order to do the job that we have to do.
I believe we've found the right grounds for assuring
the American public that we're not abusing the privilege of
secrecy, and yet having enough secrecy and being able to do
enough secret things to protect our country well.
RATHER: Is it true that the Soviets are better at
the spying business than we are?
ADMIRAL TURNER: No, I don't think so. They are stron-
ger. They do more of it, in terms of espionage, than we do. I've
never quite understood why, because we've published it all in Avi-
ation Week and places like. this for them, anyway.
But I believe we're more clever. I think we're more
adept at it. I'm really proud of the espionage activities of the
Central Intelligence Agency.
RATHER: Now, you're frequently accused of having down-
graded the human element of intelligence gathering, downgrading
the spy business, the epionage business, and upgrading the tech-
nology. Is that a fair assessment?
ADMIRAL TURNER: No, that's totally incorrect. Today --
I can't tell you all the details, but we have more human agents
working in more countries, producing more reports of better .
quality than we did four years ago. If I've downgraded it, It's
a heck of a lot stronger. And you can go out and ask the head
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of the human intelligence service, and he'll tell you the same
thing.
RATHER: Both in quantity and quality you think...
ADMIRAL TURNER: Absolutely.
RATHER: Then how did you get this reputation of being
a man who depended.so mightily on technology?
ADMIRAL TURNER: Well, in part, because when you make
technical decisions, they cost billions of dollars. And there's
obviously a lot of debate about it. And so people become unduly
focused on that and think, "Well, that's all that the Director
is paying attention to.,, You have to pay attention.to that kind
of financial expenditure.
RATHER: Now, a number of legislators say that American
counterintelligence activities have to be upgraded, must be up-
graded. Some, who consider themselves to be conservatives, go
further and say that communist agents have now infiltrated the
highest levels of U.S. government. Some even say the CIA itself
has been penetrated and infiltrated, and that there ought to be
a revival of Internal Security Committees in Congress.
How do you feel about all that?
ADMIRAL TURNER: I feel that the counterintelligence
activities of our country are on a much sounder basis, much
stronger today than they were six or seven years ago.
RATHER: Much stronger.
ADMIRAL TURNER: Much stronger. And, in part, that's
because there is today a very close relationship between the
Federal Bureau of Investigation and the CIA. And that did not
exist six or seven years ago. And that's absolutely essential
to the security of our country, from a counterintelligence point
of view. Director Webster is wonderfully cooperative, and we
have set up a teamwork that is unrivaled.
RATHER: I want to come back to that in a moment, but
let's stay on the point for right now.
Is it true that the Soviet Union has infiltrated upper
levels of the United States Government?
ADMIRAL TURNER: It certainly is not true, to my know-
ledge. One has to always say. "I don't know whether there's a
mole in our organization," because if you get complacent and
say there absolutely isn't, that's the way you're going to have
problems. But I have no evidence whatsoever. And the counter-
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intelligence cases that we have uncovered in recent years, three
of them were people who've been p.ut in jail because we uncovered
their activities. While I don?t like to lose the information
that we lost in these cases, at least I was pleased that they
were not high-level, they were not sustained-type penetrations
that really can do you damage.
RATHER: What about the revival of the Internal Security
Committees in Congress? Personal opinion. Is that necessary?
ADMIRAL TURNER: I don't think it's necessary at this
time at all. I think we have a good, strong counterintelligence,
activity. I've put a lot of attention and effort on it in the
last few years, and believe that it is in very good shape.
RATHER: I want to come back to something that you said.
You said that in counterintelligence that we're pretty good.
Again, the worldwide perception -- and this comes as no surprise
to you -- is that we are at worst when it comes to counterintel-
ligence.
ADMIRAL TURNER: No. I think the perception is that
we're at our worst when it comes to leaking information. And
that's the greatest threat to the intelligence activities of our
country today, more than counterintelligence, more than lots of
other things.
We have two problems. We have some traitorous people,
.like Philip Agee, who just go out and deliberately disclose all
the secret information they can get their hands on. And then we
have other people who just go leak things to the media. And both
of them are very serious problems because we lose confidence of
agents, we lose confidence of people in other intelligence ser-
vices with whom we work overseas.
RATHER: Now, you mentioned Philip Agee, and I don't
want to dwell on this. But [unintelligible] Philip Agee -- as
you mentioned, he's responsible for publishing the names of CIA
station directors and others involved in our intelligence oper-
ations overseas.
ADMIRAL TURNER: No question.
RATHER: You consider that to be a fact, that he's done
ADMIRAL TURNER: Oh, yes.
RATHER: Now, where the argument comes In is how serious
that Is. Mr. Agee, as I understand it, makes the argument, "Look,
the Soviets know who they are. Others know who they are. All we
did was publish Information that was readily available."
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ADMIRAL TURNER: Well, that -s not true, in the first
place. He's published a lot of information that was not readily
available. And in the second place, if you had been in Jamaica
last July, after one of Philip Agee's agents went down there and
put on Jamaican television the pictures, the addresses the tele-
phone numbers, and the license plate numbers of 15 people from
the United States Embassy, and if you were the one whose house
was shot up the next night, you wouldn't think Agee was an inno-
cent fellow.
RATHER:. And you said they're traitorous activities.
ADMIRAL TURNER: Yes. I consider...
RATHER: Did you use that word measuredly?
ADMIRAL TURNER: Yes.
RATHER: You know that you've been criticized for pre-
siding over the demoralization of the Central Intelligence Agency
[inaudible], that you dismissed a few hundred employees. One
CIA chief overseas was recently reported in print as saying,
quote, Turner has gutted the agency and created a disastrous
morale problem." Unquote.
How do you respond?
ADMIRAL TURNER: The morale was very serious when I got
there because of a l l the public criticism. The agency was in a
state of shell shock. The reductions I made were on the recommen-
dation of the agency. They weren't my idea. In fact, I cut the
recommendation by a third and reduced the number who were to be
dismissed. And it in no way gutted the agency. In fact, only 17
people were actually asked to leave.
Morale today is very good at the Central Intelligence
Agency. I think we had to take it, as I said earlier, through a
period of shock and change, adaptation to the new environment of
intelligence. And we've done that. The foundation is there for
the future today. It's on a good, solid course. And it's a happy
organization.
[Asides]
RATHER: You still have trouble recruiting.
ADMIRAL TURNER: No.
RATHER: This is not what I hear.
ADMIRAL TURNER: Our recruiting is just going along
very well. Last year we had 90,000 inquiries for a thousand
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placements. And last year we recruited into the human intelli-
gence service eight times as many people as we did four years
ago. And part of that is because we had to clean out some of
that deadwood at the top to make room for them. But.we're now
bringing in enough to be sure that we have a good human intelli-
gence service well out into the future.
RATHER: Fifteen-sixteen years ago, I had a conversation
with Richard Helms, then at the Central Intelligence Agency, who
said, "We," meaning the agency, "can get the cream of the cream
at the best colleges and universities."
Now, you talk about numbers. The quality must be down...
ADMIRAL TURNER: No, the quality is good. The quality
is high. I still think we get a lot of the cream.
Now, I will say that a lot of the Ivy League colleges,
who are so biased against government and military and intelli-
gence, don't provide us the input that they used to. But I think
that's been healthy. We've gone out and gone all across the coun-
try; and we get a much wider spread of applicants today and a very
good quality of people.
RATHER: What's the deepest problem of the Central
Intelligence Agency? What worries you the most about it?
ADMIRAL TURNER: I think the agency is on a good, sound
footing today. And I only am concerned that they have stability
and continue to grow along the lines that we've set in the last
few years. Because it's been a turbulent period. It's been
traumatic for the agency to make these adjustments to new over-
sight, to do the reinvigoration of its own attitudes and outlooks,
as I mentioned to you earlier. And I think those gains, those
changes that have been made are very vital to the organization,
and we must preserve them into the future. And that's the biggest
problem. .
RATHER: Well, one expects you to be, and I know that
you are, not just in terms of public posturing, but sincerely
within yourself, a supporter of the agency and what it does. But
as a citizen, long-range, talking about potential, what are the
dangers to this society of the Central Intelligence Agency?
ADMIRAL TURNER: There is always a conflict between
secrecy and openness in a democratic society. And you've got
to recognize that. But I believe that the checks and balances
that we've built in in recent years have been a very good assur-
ance to the American public that there won't be abuses of the
intelligence secrecy in the future. And yet I believe we have
preserved the capability to do what has to be done, despite this..
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RATHER: What's the greatest difference, in your opin-
ion, between the public perception of what life is like in the
CIA and what the reality is? And we all read James Bond, we all
read spy novels. What's the greatest difference between the
reality and the fiction?
ADMIRAL TURNER: Well, intelligence is a risk-taking
business, but not nearly as dramatic as it is in James Bond. You
know, some of the risks you take are, is that very expensive satel-
lite going to work when you get it up there? And you have to make
that kind of judgment. Other kinds of risks are, is it worth it
to the country to do something in a foreign nation that may endan-
ger our relations with that nation if they found out about it?
But it's a much more contemplative, much more studied
type of risk-taking than this derring-do kind of thing you see
in the movies.
RATHER: Do we depend too much on the machines?
ADMIRAL TURNER: No. You see, twenty years ago most
of intelligence was human intelligence. And along would come
these new technical systems that give you all kinds of informa-
tion. Now, what it s done is it's forced~a change in the way
you go about your human intelligence. Why should you send a spy
to get some information when you can get a picture of it from a
satellite?
And that's what's bothering some of the oldtimers who
are telling you that we're emphasizing technical intelligence.
It's a shift in style and technique, not a downgrading.
Can I give you an example?
ADMIRAL TURNER: Let's say with a photographic satel-
lite you see a new factory in Country X. Well, the next thing
you do is you turn the signals-listening people loose; and they
find out for you that that factory is talking to the nuclear
department in the government in the capital. Well, then you go
get an agent and you say, "Well, I want you to tell me, are they
talking to the nuclear power department or to nuclear weapons
department?"
Now some years ago you'd have to send that agent out
to find the factory, to find the connection, and then do this.
But now you can focus that agent because of the benefit of those
technical systems. And that's what's difference. It's not les-
ser importance. In fact, it's more important. You now really
use the human agent where he's most valuable.
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RATHER: Admiral, I know you must know many, and many
of them you can't talk about. But do you know any good spy stor-
ies?
ADMIRAL TURNER: [Laughter] No. I think it's very
incumbent upon intelligence professionals not to talk about that
side of their profession any more than they absolutely can avoid.
I think what we've tried to do in the last four or five years is
to make intelligence much more visible to our country, so that
people have confidence and are comfortable about what we are
doing and we have their support. And I'm very pleased that we've
regained that kind of public support in the last few years.
But the side of the organization we can't talk about
is how we collect our information. Because if you give it away.
you'll never get it again.
RATHER: Admiral, you've been generous with your time,
and I appreciate it.
Two last questions. The first: Looking ahead, on the
basis of what you know, what worries you the most in terms of
trouble spots in the world? Is it the Philippines? Is it Cen-
tral America? Where are we most likely to have the most trouble
in the next two, three, four years?
ADMIRAL TURNER: Iran...
ADMIRAL TURNER: Oh, yes. I'm very concerned about the
potential of Soviet domination or occupation of Iran. It would
be a catastrophe, I believe, for its effect on the whole Middle
East.
Secondly the Arab-Israeli issue. I.hope that we can
help them find a solution to that. Because as long as that's
unresolved, the Middle East is going to remain unsettled and a
potential trouble spot.
And thirdly the internationalization of revolution in
the Central American area that we talked about earlier. I'm quite.
concerned at this precedent and at this problem in our backyard.
RATHER: What question have I not asked you that I
should have asked?
ADMIRAL TURNER: I ve enjoyed this opportunity to be
with you on television, Dan. And the only thing I have left on
my mind is I sincerely hope that the American public has a feeling
of comfort and confidence in our intelligence activities today.
We've been through a turbulent period, but that s behind us now.
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And I do believe that we have laid a solid foundation for the
future, and that the American public can be confident that they're
going to have good intelligence that will support the national
interest of our country.
RATHER: Having said those are the last two questions
I see on my notes that I left two out.
Former Senator Mike Mansfield, and our Ambassador to
Japan, every time he's back in this country he tells reporters,
"You are under-reporting the story of the continuing pressure the
Soviet Union puts on Japan."
What, on the basis of intelligence, can you tell me
about that? Frankly, it doesn't sound like much of a story to
me. What's going on there?
ADMIRAL TURNER: Well, you know, it's very interesting
that there are four little islands off the north end of Japan
that the Soviets took after the end of World War II, and which
the Japanese have just been incensed about ever since. And the
Soviets won't give up these four little rocks that really don't
amount to very much. And it would do so much for their relations
with Japan if they did.
And I think that's indicative of what Ambassador Mans-
field is talking about. The Soviets have a very tough attitude
toward Japan and are keeping the pressure on them by things like
holding just these four little spits of land.
RATHER: Is it true, based on our intelligence esti-
mates, that the Soviets are less worried about the Chinese than
they were some time ago, because the Chinese army, from their
viewpoint didn't do well with the invasion of North Vietnam?
ADMIRAL TURNER: No, I wouldn't agree with that at all.
In point of fact, if armies don't do well, that's a lesson for
them, and you've got to be more worried about them, in some sense,
in the future. In fact, I'm worried about the Soviets and the
lessons they're learning in Afghanistan. They have not done ex-
ceptionally well there. But it's going to make them a little
better because they'll translate those lessons throughout their
army.
RATHER: Do you think they're still frightened of the
ADMIRAL TURNER: Oh yes. Now, they're not frightened
that the Chinese are going to attack them tomorrow afternoon or
next year. The Chinese don't have that capability. But when
you have diverted as many resources to defending yourself on the
Chinese border as have the Soviets in the last decade, you're
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worried. You're worried over the long run. You're spending
money for that, and it means you do have a true concern.
RATHER: Thank you.
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