REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT BY THE US COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP05S00620R000601470022-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 7, 2009
• Sequence Number: 22
• Publication Date: June 1, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2009/08/07: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000601470022-0 ~. a
QMR~
Approved For Release 2009/08/07: CIA RDP05SO062OR000601470022-0
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT "2oC,G,. #4 4. IV r
BY THE
US COMMISSION 'ON CIA
ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE
UNITED STATES
JUNE 1975
Chapter 1.
The Fundamental Issues
In iumounClllg the formation of this Commission, the President
noted that an effective intelligence and counterintelligence. capability
is essential to provide "the safeguards that protect our national in-
terest and help avert armed conflicts."
While it is vital that security requirements be met, the President
continued, it is equally important that intelligence activities be con-
ducted without "impairing our democratic institutions and funda-
mental freedoms."
Tae Commission's assessment of the CIA's activities within tae
ITnitecl States reflects the members' deep concern for both individual
rights and national security.
A. Individual Rights
The Bill of Rights in the Constitution protects individual liberties
against encroachment by government. Many statutes and the common
law also reflect this protection.
The First Amendment protects the freedoms of speech and of the
press. the right of the people to assemble peaceably, and the right to
pctitioll the government for redress of grievances. It has been con-
strued to protect freedom of peaceable political association.. In addi-
tion, the Fourth Amendment declares:
The right of the people to he secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated ... .
In accordance with the objectives enunciated in these and other
Constitutional amendments, the Supreme Court has outlined the fol-
lowing basic Constitutional doctrines:
1. Any intrusive investigation of an American citizen by the
government must have a sufficient basis to warrant the invasion
caused by the particular investigative practices which are utilized;
 4 Approved For Release 2009/08/07: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000601470022-0 5
Government monitoring of a citizen's political activities re-
quires even greater justification; -
3.,The scope of any resulting intrusion on personal privacy
must not exceed the degree reasonably believed necessary;
4. With certain exceptions, the scope of which are not sharply
defined, these conditions must be met, at least for significant in-
vestigative intrusions, to the satisfaction of an uninvolved gov-
ernmental body such as a court.
These Constitutional standards give content to an accepted principle
of our society-the right of each person to a high degree of individ-
ual privacy.
In recognition of this right, President Truman and the Congress-
in enacting the law creating the CIA in 1947-included a clause pro-
viding that the CIA should have no police, subpoena, law-enforcement
powers or internal security functions.
Since then, Congress has further outlined citizen rights in statutes
limiting electronic surveillance and granting individuals access to cer-
tain information in government files,,- underscoring the general concern
of Congress and the Executive Branch in this area.
B. Government Must Obey the Law
The individual liberties of American citizens depend on government
observance of the law.
Under our form of Constitutional government, authority can be
exercised only if it has been properly delegated to a particular depart-
ment or agency by the Constitution or Congress.
Most delegations come from Congress; some are implied from the
allocation of responsibility to the President. Wherever the basic au-
thority resides, however, it is fundamental in our scheme of Constitu-
tional government that agencies-including the CIA-shall exercise
only those powers properly assigned to them by Congress or the
President.
Whenever the activities of a government agency exceed its authority,
individual liberty may be impaired.
C. National Security
Individual liberties likewise depend on maintaining public order
at home and in protecting the country against infiltration from abroad
1 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1068 (18 U.S.C. Seca. 2510-20) and
Privacy Act of 1074 (5 U.S.C. Sec. 552a).
and armed attack. Ensuring domestic tranquility and providing for
a common defense are not only Constitutional goals but necessary pre-
conditions for a free, democratic system. The process of orderly and
lawful change is the essence of democracy. Violent change, or forcing
a change of government by the stealthy action of "enemies, foreign or
domestic," is contrary to our Constitutional system.
The government has both the right and the obligation within Con-
stitutional limits to use its available power to protect the people
and their established form of government. Nevertheless, the mere
invocation of the "national security" does not grant unlimited power
to the government. The degree of the danger and the type of action
contemplated to meet that danger require careful evaluation, to ensure
that the danger is sufficient to justify the action and that fundamental
rights are respected.
D. Resolving the Issues
Individual freedoms and privacy are fundamental in our society.
Constitutional government must be maintained. All effective and effi-
cient intelligence, system is necessary ; and to be eil'ective, many of its
activities must be conducted in secrecy.
Satisfying these objectives presents considerable opportunity for
conflict. The vigorous pursuit of intelligence by certain methods can
lead to invasions of individual rights. The preservation of the United
States requires an effective intelligence capability, but the preservation
of individual liberties within the United States requires limitations
or restrictions on gathering of intelligence. The drawing of reasonable
lines-where legitimate intelligence needs end and erosion of Con-
stitutional government begins-is difficult.
In seeking to draw such lines, we have been guided in the first
instance by the commands of the Constitution as they have been inter-
preted by the Supreme Court, the laws as written by Congress, the
values we believe are reflected in the democratic process, and the
faith we have in a free society. We have also sought to be fully
cognizant of the needs of national security, the requirements of a strong
national defense against external aggression and internal subversion,
and the duty of the government to protect its citizens.
In the final analysis, public safety and individual liberty sustain
each other.
Approved For Release 2009/08/07: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000601470022-0
 into ligence methods are use collect, . ?L 1
Approved For Release 2009/08/07: CIA-RDP05S00620R000601470022-0 [mates of another country's inten-
tions or future capacities are accurate or will not be outrun by unfore-
Chapter 2
The Need for Intelligence
During the period of the Commission's inquiry, there have been
public allegations that a democracy does not need an intelligence ap-
paratus. The Commission does not share this view. Intelligence is
information gathered for policymakers in government which illumi-
nates the range of choices available to them and enables them to exer-
cise judgment. Good intelligence will not necessarily lead to wise policy
choices. But without sound intelligence, national policy decisions and
actions cannot effectively respond to actual conditions and reflect the
best national interest or adequately protect our national security.
Intelligence gathering involves collecting information about other
countries' milita
bili
ry capa
ties, subversive activities, economic condi-.
tions, political developments, scientific and technological progress, and
social activities and conditions. The raw information must be evaluated
to determine its reliability and relevance, and must then be analyzed.
The final
od
t
"
pr
uc
s-called
finished intelligence"-are distributed to
the President and the political, military and other governmental
lead
ers according to their needs.
seen events. There are limits to accurate forecasting, and the use of
deception by our adversaries or the penetration of our intelligence
services increases. the possibility that intelligence predictions may
prove to be wrong. Nevertheless, informed decision-making is impossi-
ble without an intelligence system adequately protected from
penetration.
Therefore, s, vital part of-any intelligence service is an effective coun-
terintelligence program, directed toward protecting our own intelli-
gence system and ascertaining the activities of foreign intelligence
services, such as espionage, sabotage, and subversion, and toward
minimizing or counteracting the effectiveness of these activities.
Foreign Invasions of United States Privacy
This Commission is devoted to analyzing the domestic activities of
11
the CIA in the interest of protecting the privacy and security rights
of American citizens. But we cannot ignore the invasion of the privacy
and security rights of Americans by foreign countries or their agents.
This is the other side of the coin-and it merits attention here in the
interest of perspective.
Witnesses w~th responsibilities for counterintelligence have told the
Commission that the United States remains the principal intelligence
target of the c mmunist bloc.
The comm mists invest large sums of money, personnel and sophis-
ticated tech4ology in collecting information-within the United
States-on our military capabilities, our weapons systems, our defense
structure and our social divisions. The communists seek to penetrate
Intelligence gathering has changed rapidly and radically since the
advent of the CIA in 1947.' The increased complexity of international
political, economic, and military arrangements, the increased destruc-
tiveness of the weapons of modern warfare, and the advent of elec-
tronic methods of surveillance have altered and enlarged the needs for
sophisticated intelligence. Intelligence agencies have had to rely. more
and more on scientific and technological developments. to help meet
thew nnnrdc
Despite the increasing complexity and si
ifi
gn
cance of intelligence..
in national policymaking, it is also important to understand its limits.
Not- all information is reliable, even when the most highly refined
' The CIA is only one of several foreign intelligence agencies in the federal government.
Others Include the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the intelli-
gence branches of the three military services and the State Department's Bureau of Intelli-
gence and Research.
our intelligence services, to compromise our law enforcement agen-
cies and to recruit as their agents United States citizens holding sensi-
tive government and industry jobs. In addition, it is a common prac-
tice in communist bloc countries to inspect and- open mail coming from
or going to,the United States.
In an open society such as ours, the intelligence opportunities for
our adversaries are immeasurably greater than they are for us in their
closed societies. Our society must remain an open one, with our tradi-
tional freedoms unimpaired. But when the intelligence activities of
other countries are flourishing in the free environment we afford them,
it is all t}ie more essential that the foreign intelligence activities of
the CIA and our other intelligence agencies, as well as the domestic
counterintelligence activities of the FBI, be given the support neces-
Approved For Release 2009/08/07: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000601470022-0
 Approved For Release 2009/08/07: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000601470022-0
salT to protect our national Securi
ri ht,,' of , i ty anct to shield the privacy and
n
~. 1
Mlc.lli eitlzei1S from foreign intrusion.
The Commission lies received estimates that communist bloc intel-
ligence forces currently number well over 500,000 worldwide.
The number of coininuilist govcrnnlcilt officials in the United States
has tripled since 10G0, and is still increasing. Nearly 2,000 of them are
now in this country-and a significant percentage of them have been
identified as members of intelligence or security agencies. Conserva-
tive estimates for the number of unidentified intelligence officers
among the remaining officials raise the level to over 40 percent.
In addition to sending increasing numbers of their citizens to this
country openly, many- of whom have been trained in espionage, com-
munist. bloc countries also place considerable emphasis on the train-
ing, provision of false identification and dispatching of "illegal"
cents-that. is, operatives for whom an alias identity has been sys-
tematic ally developed which enables them to live in the United States
as American citizens or resident aliens without our knowledge of their
trite origins.
While making large-scale use of human intelligence sources, the
communist countries also appear to have developed electronic collec-
tion of intelligence to all extraordinary degree of technology and
sophistication for use in the United States and elsewhere throughout
the world, and we believe that these countries can monitor and record
thousands of private telephone conversations. Americans have a right
to be uneasy if not seriously disturbed at the real possibility that their
personal and business activities which they discuss freely over the
telephone could be recorded and analyzed by agents of foreign powers.
This raises the real specter that selected American users of telephones
are potentially subject to blackmail that can seriously affect their
actions, or even lead in some cases to recruitment as espionage agents.
Chapter 3
Summary of Findings, Conclusions,
and Recommendations
As directed by the President, the Commission has investigated the
role and authority of the CIA, the adequacy of the internal controls
and external supervision of the Agency, and its significant domestic
activities that raise questions of compliance with the limits on its
statutory authority. This chapter summarizes the findings and con-
clusions of the Commission and sets forth its recommendations.
A. Summary of Charges and Findings
The initial public charges were that the CIA's domestic activities
had involved :
1. Large-scale spying on American citizens in the United States
by the CIA, whose responsibility is foreign intelligence.
2. Keeping dossiers on large numbers of American citizens.
3. Aiming these activities at Americans who have expressed
their disagreement with various government policies.
These initial charges were subsequently supplemented by others
including allegations that the CIA :
-Had intercepted and opened .personal mail. in the United
States for 20 years;
.-Had infiltrated domestic dissident groups and otherwise
intervened in domestic politics;
-Had engaged in illegal wiretaps and break-ins; and,
-Had improperly assisted other government agencies.
In addition, assertions have been made ostensibly linking the CIA
to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy.
It became clear from the public reaction to these charges that the
secrecy in which the Agency nesessarily operates, combined with the
allegations of wrongdoing, had contributed to widespread public mis-
understanding of the Agency's actual practices.
Approved For Release 2009/08/07: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000601470022-0
 A detailed analysis of the facts h_ Approved For Release 2009/08/07: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000601470022-0
1 ry
zits
the
reat
a s
tablishin
a
n
t
t it
i
th
s
g
major
ty of the CIA's domestic activities comply
with
status -y authority. comply its
Nevertheless, over the 28 years of its history, the CIA has engaged
in some activities that should be criticized and not permitted to hap-
pen again-both in light of the limits imposed on the Agency by law
and as a matter of public policy.
Some of these activities were initiated or ordered by Presidents,
either directly or indirectly.
Some of them fall within the doubtful area between responsibilities
delegated to thq CIA by Congress and the National Security Council
on the one. hand and activities specifically prohibited to the Agency
on the other.
Some of them were plainly unlawful and constituted improper
invasions upon the rights of Americans.
The Agency's own recent actions, undertaken for the most part in
1973 and 1974
have
o
f
.
ne
g
ar to terminate the activities upon which
this investigation has focused. The recommendations of the Commis-
sion are designed to clarify areas of doubt concerning the Agency's
authority, to strengthen the Agency's structure, and to guard against
recurrences of these improprieties.
B. The CIA's Role and Authority (Chapters 4-6)
Findings
The Central Intelligence Agency was established by the National
Security Act of 19.17 as the nation's first comprehensive peacetime
foreign intelligence service. The objective was to provide the President
with coordinated intelligence, which the country lacked prior to the
attack on Pearl Harbor.
The Director of Central Intelli
e
g
nce reports directly to the Presi-
dent. The CIA receives its policy direction and guidance from the Na-
tional Security Council, composed of the President, the Vice President,.
and the Secretaries of State
d D
an
efense.
The statute directs the CIA to correlate, evaluate, and disseminate
intelligence obtained from United States intelligence agencies, and
to perform such other functions related to intelligence as the National
Security Council directs. Recognizing that the CIA would be dealing
with sensitive, secret materials
Con
r
,
g
ess made the Director of Cen-
tral Intelligence responsible for protecting intelligence sources and
methods from unauthorized disclosure.
At the same time, Congress sought to assure the. American public
ecret police which would threaten the
g
w
s
es
o
a
civil liberties of Americans. It specifically forbade the CIA from
exercising "police, subpoena, or law-enforcement powers or internal
security functions." The CIA was not to replace the Federal Bureau of
Investigation in conducting domestic activities to investigate crime or
internal subversion.
Although Congress contemplated that the focus of the CIA would
be on foreign intelligence, it understood that some of its activities
would be conducted within the United States. The CIA necessarily
maintains its headquarters here, procures logistical support, recruits"
and trains employees, tests equipment, and conducts other domestic
activities in support of its foreign intelligence mission. It makes nec-
essary investigations in the United States to maintain the security of its
facilities and personnel.
Additionally, it has been understood from the beginning that. the
CIA is permitted to collect foreign intelligence-that is, information
concerning foreign capabilities, intentions, and activities-from Amer-
ican citizens within this country by overt means.
Determining the legal propriety of domestic activities of the CIA
requires the application of the law to the particular facts involved.
This task involves consideration of more than the National Security
Act and the directives of the National Security Council; Constitutional
and other statutory provisions also circumscribe the domestic activi-
ties of the CIA. Among the applicable Constitutional provisions are
the First Amendment, protecting freedom of speech, of the press, and
of peaceable assembly; and the Fourth Amendment, prohibiting un-
reasonable searches and seizures. Among the statutory provisions are
those which limit such activities as electronic eavesdropping and
interception of the mails.
The precise scope of. many of these statutory and Constitutional pro-
visions is not easily stated. The National Security Act in particular
was drafted in broad terms in order to provide flexibility for the CIA
to adapt to changing intelligence needs. Such critical phrases as "in-
ternal security functions" are left undefined. The meaning of the Di-
rector's responsibility to protect intelligence sources and methods from
unauthorized disclosure has also been a subject of uncertainty.
The word "foreign" appears nowhere in the statutory grant of
authority, though it has always been understood that the CIA's mission
is limited to matters related to foreign intelligence. This apparent stat-
utory ambiguity, although not posing problems in practice, has
troubled members of the public who read the statute without having
the benefit of the legislative history and the instructions to the CIA
from the National Security Council.
Approved For Release 2009/08/07: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000601470022-0
 4_+?c .u;thin the United States directed e ? T-
ConClit _Approved For Release 2009/08/07: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000601470022-0 American citizens.
The e. idence within the scope of this inquiry does not indicate that
fundamental rewriting of time National Security Act is either necessary.
or appropriate.
The evidence does demonstrate the need for some statutory and ad-
ministrative clarification of the role and function of the Agency.
Ambiguities have been partially responsible for some, though not
all, of the Agency's deviations within the United States from its
assigned mission. In some cases, reasonable persons will differ as to
the lawfulness of the activity; in others, the absence of clear guidelines
as to its authority deprived the Agency of a means of resisting pres-
sures to engage in activities which now appear to us improper.
Greater public awareness of the limits of the CIA's domestic author-
ity would do much to reassure the American people. \
The requisite clarification can best be accomplished (a) through
a specific amendment clarifying the National Security Act provision
which delineates the permissible scope of CIA activities, as set forth
in Recommendation 1, and (b) through issuance of an Executive
Order further limiting domestic activities of the CIA, as. set forth in
Recommendation
Recommendation " (1)
Section 403 of the National Security Act of 1947 should be.
amended in the form set forth-in Appendix VI to this Report.
These amendments, in summary, would:
a. Make explicit that the CIA's activities must be related to
foreign intelligence.
b. Clarify the responsibility of the CIA to protect intelli.
gence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure.
(The Agency would be responsible for protecting against un-
authorized disclosures within the CIA, and it would be re-
sponsible for providing guidance and technical assistance to'
other agency and department heads in protecting against un
authorized disclosures. within their own agencies and de-
partments.)
c. Confirm publicly the CIA's existing authority to collect
foreign intelligence from willing sources within the United
States, and, except as specified by the President in a pub-
lished Executive Order,' prohibit the CIA from collection ef-
1 The Executive Order authorized by this statute should recognize that when the collection of
foreign intelligence from persons who are not United States citizens results in the incidental
acquisition of information from unknowing citizens, the Agency should be permitted to make
appropriate use or disposition of such information. Such collection activities must be directed
at foreign intelligence sources, and the involvement of American citizens must be incidental.
ln~eiilbr.t~..
Recommendation (2)
CIA from
h
e
The President should by Executive Order prohibit t
the collection of. information about the domestic activities of
United States citizens (whether by overt or covert means), the
evaluation, correlation, andndltre-
he storage of such information,
ports about such activities, a
with exceptions for the following categories of persons or ac-
tivities :
or being con-
ffiliated
,
a. Persons presently or formerly a
sidered for affiliation, with the
by the CIA to receive lclassi-
or others who require. clearance
fied information;
b. Persons or activities that pose a clear threat to CIA fa-
cilities or personnel, provided that proper coordination with
the FBI is accomplished;
c. Persons suspected of espionage or other illegal activi-
ties relating to foreign intelligence, provided that proper co-
ordination with the FBI is accomplished. appropriate
d. Information which is received incidental to CIA activities may be transmitted to an agency with appro-
priate jurisdiction, including law enforcement agencies.
and other brary sources such as
Collection of information
is not
newspapers, books, magazines
to be affected by this order.
Information currently being maintained which is inconsistent
with the order should be destroyed at the conclusion of the cur-
rent congressional investigations or as soon thereafter as per-
mitted by law.
The CIA should periodically screen its files and eliminate all
material inconsistent with the order.
The order should be issued after consultation with the National
Security Council, the Attorney General, and the Director of Cen-
tral Intelligence. Any modification of the order would be per-
mitted only through published amendments.
C. Supervision and Control of the CIA
.1. External Controls (Chapter 7)
Findings
The CIA is-subject to supervision and control by various executive
agencies and by the Congress. .
Approved For Release 2009/08/07: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000601470022-0
 Congress has established spec Approved For Release 2009/08/07
aa:d its secret budget within four small subcominittees.2 Historically,
t'':. se subcommittees have been composed of members of Con-
gress with many other demands on their time. The CIA has not as a
general 1-1170 received detailed scrutiny by the Congress,
The principal bodies within the Executive Branch performing a
supervisory or control , function are the National Security Council,
which gives the CIA its policy direction and control; the Office of
Management and Budget which reviews the CIA's budget in much
the same fashion as it reviews budgets of other government agencies;
and the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, which is
composed of distinguished citizens, serving part time in a general
advisory function for the President on the quality of the gathering
and interpretation of intelligence.
None of these agencies has the specific responsibility of overseeing
the CIA to determine whether its activities are proper.
The Department of Justice also exercises an oversight role, through
its power to initiate prosecutions for criminal misconduct. For a
period of over 20 years, however, an agreement existed between the
Department of Justice and the CIA providing that the Agency was
to investigate all~.l;atiolls of crimes by CIA involved Govcrlinlent money or Property milrloJ ees or agents which invol security. If, following the investigation the Agency determined ithat
there was no reasonable basis to believe a crime had been committed,
or that operational security aspects precluded prosecution, the case
was not referred to the Department. of Justice.
The Commission has found nothing to indicate that the CIA
abused the function given it by the ., ,
di
gen
e,
rectly in forbidden law enforcement activ
itIrs, and -
rehrcsented an abdication by the. Department of Justice
of its Statlit -
oiy rrSpoilsil)ilitics.
Conclusions.
'
mprovenle
in th
g
d
m
e con
ul
helpfpfu.
ressional oversight. system Woul
'T'he problem of
providing adequate oversight and control
while maintaining essential security is not easily resolved. Several
knowledgeable witnesses pointed to the _roint r____
z
Agency.
? model for congressional oversight of the
That Committee has had an excellent record of providing
effective oversight while avoiding breaches of security in a. highly
Sensitive area.
2
t
tShe two owo h hoouseuses ep . of the Appropriations Committees and the Armed Services Committees
One of the underlying causes of the problems confronting the
CL9, arises out of the pervading atmosphere of secrecy in which its
activities have been conducted in the past. One aspect of this has been
the secrecy of the budget.
A new body is needed to provide oversight of the Agency within
the Executive Branch. Because of the need to preserve security, the
CIA is not subject to the usual constraints of audit, judicial review,
publicity or open congressional budget review and oversight. Consequently, its operations require additional external control. The au-
thority assigned the job of supervising the CIA must be given sufficient
power and significance to assure the public of effective supervision.
The situation whereby the Agency determined whether its own
employees would be prosecuted must not be permitted to recur.
CIA-RDP05SO062OR000601470022-0
~
Recommendation (3)
The President should recommend to Congress the establishment
of a Joint Committee on Intelligence to assume the oversight role
currently played by the Armed Services Committees.3
Recommendation (4)
Congress should give careful consideration to the question
whether the budget of the CIA should not, at least to some ex-
tent, be made public, particularly in view of the provisions of
Article I, Section 9, Clause 7 of the Constitution.4
Recommendation (5)
a. The functions of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advi-
sory Board should be expanded to include oversight of the CIA.
.This expanded oversight board should be composed of distin-
guished citizens with varying backgrounds and experience. It
should be headed by a full-time chairman and should have a full-
time staff appropriate to its role. Its functions related to the CIA
should include:
1. Assessing compliance by the CIA with its statutory
authority.
2. Assessing the quality of foreign intelligence collection.
3. Assessing the quality of foreign intelligence estimates.
4. Assessing the quality of the organization of the CIA.
5. Assessing the quality of the management of the CIA.
6. Making recommendations with respect to the above sub-
jects to the President and the Director of Central Intelli-
gence, and, where appropriate, the Attorney General.
' See statement by Commissioner Griswold, Chapter 7.
"No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made
by Law; and it regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public
Money shall be published from time to time."
Approved For Release 2009/08/07: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000601470022-0
 Annrr , rl Pr r 4?clcacc 9(V Q/(R/n7 ? r iA-PniD rFgnnA, OnpnnnA 1'IA7(V177-n
o. The Board should have access to all information in the CIA.
It r?ould be authorized to audit and investigate CIA expenditures
and activities on its own initiative.
c. The Inspector General of the CIA should be authorized to
report directly to the Board, after having notified the Director of
C
t
l I
en
ra
ntelligence, in cases he deems appropriate.
Recommendation (6)
The Department of Justice and the CIA should establish writ.
ten guidelines for the handling of reports of crimi
l
i
l
na
v
o
ations
by employees of the Agency or relating to its affairs. These guide-
lines should require that the criminal investigation and the deci-
sion whether to prosecute be made by the Department of Justice,
after consideration of Agency views regarding the impact of pros-
ecution on the national security. The Agency should be permitted
to conduct such investigations as it requires to determine whether
its operations have been jeopardized. The Ageny should scrupu-
lously avoid exercise of the prosecutorial function.
2. Internal Controls (Chapter 8)
Findings
The Director's duties in administering the intelligence community,
handling relations with other components of the government, and
passing on broad questions of policy leave him little time for day-to-
day supervision of the Agency. Past studies have noted the need for
the Director to delegate greater responsibility for the administration
of the Agency to the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence.
In recent years, the position of Deputy Director has been occupied
by a high-ranking military officer, with responsibilities for maintain-'
ing liaison with the Department of Defense, fostering the Agency's
relationship with the military services, and providing top CIA man-
agement with necessary experience and skill in understanding particu-
lar intelligence requirements of the military. Generally speaking, the
Deputy Directors of Central Intelligence have not been heavily
engaged in administration of the Agency.
Each of the four directorates within.the CIA-Operations, Intelligence
Administ
ti
,
ra
on, and Science and Technology. is headed by
a deputy director who reports to the Director and Deputy Director
of Central Intelligence. These four deputies, together with certain
other top Agency officials such as the Comptroller, 'form the Agency
Management Committee, which makes many of the administrative and
management decisions affecting more than one directorate.
Outside the chain of commana, the primary internal mechanism for
keeping the Agency within bounds is the Inspector General. The size
of this office was recently sharply reduced, and its previous practice
of making regular reviews of various Agency departments was ter-
minated. At the present time, the activities of the office are almost
entirely concerned with coordinating Agency responses to the various
investigating bodies, and with various types of employee grievances.
The Office of General Counsel has on occasion played an impor-
tant role in preventing or terminating Agency activities in viola-
tion of law, but many of the questionable or unlawful activities dis-
cussed in this report were not brought to the attention of this office.
A certain parochialism may have resulted from the fact that attor-
neys in the office have little or no legal experience outside the Agency.
It is important that the Agency receive the best possible legal advice
on the often difficult and unusual situations which confront it.
Conclusions
In the final analysis, the proper functioning of the Agency must
depend in large part on the -character of the Director of Central
Intelligence.
The best assurance against misuse of the Agency lies in the appoint-
ment to that position of persons with the judgment, courage, and
independence to resist improper pressure and importuning, whether
from the White House, within the Agency or elsewhere.
Compartmentation within the Agency, although certainly appro-
priate for security reasons, has sometimes been carried to extremes
which prevent proper supervision and control.
The Agency must rely on the discipline and integrity of the men
and women it employs. Many of the activities we have found to be
improper or unlawful were in fact questioned by lower-level employees.
Bringing such situations to the attention of upper levels of manage-
ment is one of the purposes of a system of internal controls.
Recommendation (7)
a. Persons appointed to the position of Director of Central
Intelligence should be individuals of stature, independence, and
integrity. In making this appointment, consideration should be
given to individuals from outside the career service of the CIA,
although promotion from within should not be barred. Experi-
ence in intelligence service is not necessarily a prerequisite for
the position; management and administrative skills are at least
as important as the technical expertise which can always be
found in an able deputy.
' b. Although the Director serves at the pleasure of the President,
no Director should serve in that position for more than 10 years.
Approved For Release 2009/08/07: CIA-RDP05S00620R000601470022-0
 Recommendation (8) Approved For Release 2009/08/07: CIA-RDP05S00620R000601470022-0
a. The Office of Deputy Director of Central Intelligence ers from I: should bring in seasoned lawyers from rivate practice as well aseto hire
` reconstituted to provide for two such deputies, in addition to law school graduates without prior CIA experience; (2) occa-
act as heads of the Agency's directorates. One deputy would sionally assigning Agency lawyers to serve a tour of duty else-
the administrative officer, freeing the Director from day-to.
where in the government to expand their experience; (3) encourag-
day management duties. The, other deputy should be a military ing lawyers to participate in outside professional activities.
officer, serving the functions of fostering relations with the mili-
tary and providing the Agency with t h '
tary intelligence requirements. ec nical expertise .on miff- f
b. The advice and consent of the Senate should be required for
the appointment of each Deputy Director of Central Intelligence.
Recommendation (9)
a. The Inspector General should be upgraded to a status equiva.
lent to that of the deputy directors in charge of the four director.
ates within the CIA.
b. The Office of Inspector General should be staffed by outstand-
ing, experienced officers from both inside and outside the CIA,
with ability to understand the various branch
f
es o
Lite Agency.
c. The Inspector General's duties with respect to domestic' CIA
activities should include periodic reviews of all offices within the
United States.. He should examine each office for compliance with
CIA authority and regulations as well as for the effectiveness of
their programs in implementing policy objectives.
d.. The. Inspector General should investigate all reports from
employees concerning possible violations of the CIA statute.
e. The Inspector General should be given complete access to all
information in the CIA
l
re
evant to his reviews.
f. An effective Inspector General's office will require a larger
staff, more frequent reviews, and highly qualified personnel.
g. Inspector General reports should be provided to the National
Security Council and the recommended executive oversight body..
The Inspector General should have. the authority, when he deems
it appropriate, after notifying the Director of Central Intelli.
gence, to consult with the executive oversight body on any CIA
__ ..
activity (see Recom"
d
ati
en
Recommendation (10)
a. The Director should review the composition and operation
of the Office of General Counsel and the degree to which this '
office is consulted to determine whether the Agency is receiving
adequate legal assistance and representation in view of. current
requirements.
b. Consideration should be given to measures which would
strengthen the office's professional capabilities and resources in-
cluding, among other things, (1) occasionally departing from the
Recommendation (11)
To a degree consistent with the need for security, the CIA'
should be encouraged to provide for increased lateral movement
of personnel among the directorates and to bring persons with
outside experience into the Agency at all levels.
Recommendation (12)
a. The Agency should issue detailed guidelines for its em-
ployees further specifying those activities within the United
States which are permitted and those which are prohibited by
statute, Executive Orders, and NSC and DCI directives.
b. These guidelines should also set forth the standards which
govern CIA activities and the general types of activities which
are permitted and prohibited. They should, among other things,
specify that:
-Clandestine collection of intelligence directed against
United States citizens is prohibited except as specifically
permitted by law or published Executive Order.
-Unlawful methods or activities are prohibited.
-Prior approval of the DCI shall be required for any
activities which may raise questions of compliance with the
law or with Agency regulations.
c. The guidelines should also provide that employees with in-
formation on possibly improper activities are to bring it promptly
to the attention of the Director of Central Intelligence or the
Inspector General.
D. Significant Areas of. Investigation
Introduction
Domestic activities of the CIA raising substantial questions of com-
pliance with 'the law have been closely examined by the Commission
to determine the context in which they were. performed, the pressures
of the times, the relationship of the activity to the Agency's foreign
intelligence assignment and to other CIA activities, the procedures
Approved For Release 2009/08/07: CIA-RDP05S00620R000601470022-0
 Approved For Release 2009/08/07: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000601470022-0 21
used to, authorize and conduct the activity, and the extent and effect
of the activity.
In describing and assessing each such -activity, it has been necessary
to consider bot
th
t
'
a
activity
s relationship to the legitimate national
h
security needs of the nation and the threat such 'activities might pose
to individual rights of Americans and to a society founded on the
n
d f
ee
or government, as well as private citizens, tc obey the law.
1. The CIA's Mail Intercepts (Chapter 9)
Findings
At the time the CIA came into being, one of th3 highest national
intelligence priorities was to gain an understanding of the Soviet
Union and its worldwide activities affecting our national security.
In this context, the CIA began in 1952 a program of surveying mail
between the United States and the Soviet Union as it passed through
a New York postal facility. In 1953 it be
an o
i
pen
ng some of this mail.
g
The program was expanded over the followin
two d
d
g
eca
es and ulti
mately involved the opening of many letters and the analysis of en-
velopes, or "covers
" of a
reat
,
g
many more letters.
The New York mail intercept was designed to attempt to identify
persons within the United States who were coo
e
ati
p
r
ng tivith the Soviet
Union and its intelligence forces to harm the United States. It was
also intended to determine. technical communications procedures and
mail censor
hi
t
h
s
p
ec
niques used by the Soviets.
The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency approved com-
mencement of the New York mail interce
t i
195
p
n
2. During the en-
suing years, so far as the record shows, Postmasters General Summer-
field, Day, and Blount were informed of the program in varying de-
grees, as was Attorney General Mitchell. Since 1958, the FBI was
A 1962 CIA memorandum indicates the Agency was aware that the
mail openings would be vi
d
ewe
as violating federal criminal laws pro-
hibiting obstruction or delay of the mails.
In the last year -before the termination of this program, out of
4,350,000 items of mail sent to and from the Soviet Union, the New
York intercept examined the outside of 2,300,000 of these items,
photographed 33,000 envelopes, and opened 8,700.
The mail intercept was terminated in 1973 when the Chi
f P
e
ostal In-
spector refused to allow its continuation without an up-to-date high=
level approval
.
The CIA also ran much smaller mail intercepts for brief periods
in San Francisco between 1069 and 1971 and in the territory of Ilawaii
during 1954 and 1955. For a short period in 1957, mail in transit
between foreign countries was intercepted in New Orleans.
Conclusions
While in operation, the CIA's domestic mail opening programs
were unlawful. United States statutes specifically forbid opening the.1
The mail openings also raise Constitutional questions Lin er
Fourth Amendment guarantees against unreasonable search, and
the scope of the New York project poses possible difficulties with the
First Amendment rights of speech and press.
Mail cover operations (examining and copying of envelopes only)
are legal when carried out in compliance with postal regulations on
a limited and selective basis involving matters of national security.
The New York mail intercept did not meet these criteria.
The nature and degree of assistance given by the CIA to the FBI
in the New York mail project indicate that the CIA's primary pnr-
pose eventually became participation with the FI3I. in internal security
functions. Accordingly, the CIA's participation was prohibited under
the National Security Act.
Recommendation (13)
a. The President should instruct the Director of Central In-
telligence that the CIA is not to engage again in domestic mail
openings except with express statutory authority in time of war.
(See also Recommendation 23.)
b. The President should instruct the Director of Central Intelli-
gence that mail cover examinations are to be in compliance with
postal regulations; they are to be undertaken only in furtherance
of the CIA's legitimate activities and then only on a limited and
selected basis clearly involving matters of national security.
2. Intelligence Community Coordination (Chapter 10)
Findings
- Asa result of growing domestic disorder, the Department of Justice,
coordinated a series of secret units and interagency groups in an effort
to collate and evaluate intelligence relating to these events. These
efforts continued until 1973.
.The interagency committees were designed for analytic and not
mail.
r d the
starting in 1967 at the direction of Attorney General Ramsey Clark,
Approved For Release 2009/08/07: CIA-RDP05S00620R000601470022-0
 9,^ . .. .., . 22
operational purposes. TlleY were created as a result of White House
Dress-;re. which began in 1967, because the FBI performed only lim-
ited evaluation and analysis of the information it collected on these
events. The stated purpose of CIA's participation was to supply
relevant foreign intelligence and to furnish advice on evaluation
techniques.
The CIA was reluctant to become unduly involved in these commit-
tees, which had problems of domestic unrest as their principal focus.
It repeatedly .refused to assign full-time personnel to any of them.
The most active of the committees was the Intelligence Evaluation
Staff, which met. from January 1971 to May 1973.A CIA liaison
officer 4 attended over 100 weekly meetings of the Staff, some of which
concerned drafts of reports which had no foreign aspects.. With the
exception of one instance, there is no evidence that he acted in any
capacity other than as an adviser on foreign intelligence, and, to some
degree, as an editor.
On one occasion the CIA liaison officer appears to have caused a
CIA agent. to gather domestic information which was reported to the
Intelligence Evaluation Staff.
The. Commission found no evidence of other activities by the CIA
that. were conducted on behalf of the Department of Justice groups
except for the supplying of appropriate foreign intelligence and
advice on evaluation techniques.
Conclusions
The statutory prohibition on internal security functions does not
preclude the CIA from providing forei
n intelligence or advice on
g
evaluation feclulirlues to interdepartmental intelligence evaluation
organizations having some domestic aspects. The statute was intended
to promote coordination, not compartmentation of intelligence
The attendance of the CIA liaison officer at over 100 meetings of the
Intelligence Evaluation Staff, sonic of them concerned wholly with
domestic matters, nevertheless created at least the appearance of im-
propriety. The Director of Central Intelligence was well advised to
approach such participation reluctantly.
The liaison officer acted improperly in the one instance in
hi
h h
w
c
e
directed an agent to gather domestic information within the United
States which was reported to the Intelligence Evaluation Staff.
The liaison orncer was Chief of the CIA's Special Operations Group which ran Opera-
Von CHAOS, discussed in Chapter 11 of this Report.
R D P05S00620 R000601470022-0
Much of the problem stemmed from the absence in goverrlrllent
of any organization capable of adequately analyzing intelligence col-
lected by the FBI on matters outside, the purview of CIA.
Recommendation (14)
a. A capability should be developed within the FBI, or else-
where in the Department of Justice, to evaluate, analyze, and co-
ordinate intelligence. and counterintelligence collected by the FBI
concerning espionage, terrorism, and other related matters of in-
ternal security. .
b. The CIA should restrict its participation in any joint intelli-
gence committees to foreign intelligence matters.
c. The FBI should be encouraged to continue to look to the CIA
for such foreign intelligence and counter-intelligence as is rele-
vant to FBI needs.
3. Special Operations'. Group-"Operation CHAOS"
(Chapter 11)
Findings
The late 1060's and early 1970's were marked by widespread violence
and civil disorders-5 Demonstrations, marches and protest assemblies
were frequent in a number of cities. Many universities and college
campuses became places of disruption and unrest.. Government facil-
ities were picketed and sometimes invaded. Threats of bombing and
bombing incidents occurred frequently. In Washington and other
major cities, special security measures had to be instituted to control
the access to public buildings.
domestic disorder, the Director of Central Intelligence in August 196T
co-
CIA to collect
th
i
hi
,
e
n
t
established a Special Operations Group w
n influence on
i
f f
g
ore
. ordinate, evaluate and report on the extent o
domestic dissidence..
i
on
The Group's activities, which later carne to be known as Operat
CHAOS, led the CIA to collect information on dissident Americans
from CIA field stations overseas and from the FBI.
ation was to determine
h
O
per
e
.Although the stated purpose of t
there were any foreign contacts with American dissident
th
h
er
w
e
. groups, it resulted in the accumulation of considerable material on
domestic dissidents and their activities.
the Operation compiled some 13,000 different files,
ears
six
i
D
,
y
ng
ur
including files on 7,200 American citizens. The documents in these files
lated materials included the names of more than 300,000 persons
nd
re
a
and organizations, which were entered into a computerized index.
Approved For Release 2009/08/07: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000601470022-0
 24 Approved For Release 2009/08/07: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000601470022-0
This i; formation was kept closely guarded within the CIA. Using
this innforniation, personnel of the Group prepared 3,500 memoranda
for internal use; 3,000 memoranda for dissemination to the FBI; and
37 memoranda for distribution to White House and other top level
officials in the government.
The staff assigned to the Operation was steadily enlarged in response
to repeated Presidential requests for additional information, ulti-
mately reaching a maximum of 52 in 1971. Because of excessive isola-
tion, the Operation was substantially insulated from meaningful re-
view within the Agency, including review by the Counterintelligence
Staff-of which the Operation was technically a part.
Commencing in late 1969, Operation CHAOS used a number of
agents to collect intelligence abroad on any foreign connections with
American dissident groups. In order to have sufficient "cover" for
these agents, the Operation recruited persons from domestic dissident
groups or recruited others and instructed them to associate with such
groups in this country.
Most of the Operation's recruits were not directed to collect infor-
mation d
ti
ll
It was probably necessary for the CIA to accumulate an information
base on domestic dissident activities in order to assess fairly whether
the activities had foreign connections. The FBI would collect infor-
mation but would not evaluate it. But the accumulation of domes-
tic data in the Operation exceeded what was reasonably required to
make such an assessment and was thus improper. gather
The. use of agents of the Operation on three occasions to n ?
information within the United States on strictly domestic matters was
beyond the CIA's authority. In addition the intelligence dissemina-
tions and those portions of a major study prepared by the Agency
which dealt with purely domestic matters were improper.
The isolation of Operation CHAOS within the CIA and its inde-
pendence from supervision by the regular chain of command within
the clandestine service made it possible for the activities of the opera-
tion to stray over the bounds of the Agency's authority without the
knowledge of senior officials. The absence of any regular review of
these activities prevented timely correction of such missteps as did
occur.
omes
ca
y on Americ diidt Ob
anssens.n a numer of occa-
sions, however, such information was reported by the recruits while
they were, developing dissident credentials in the United States, and
the information was retained in the files of the Operation. On three
occasions, an agent of the Operation was specifically directed to collect
domestic intelligence.
No evidence was found that any Operation CHAOS agent used or
was directed by the Agency to use electronic surveillance, wiretaps
or break-ins in the United States against any dissident individual or
group.
kc?tiV?ity of the Operation decreased substantially by mid-1072. The
Operation was formally terminated in March 1974.
Conclusions
Some domestic activities of Operation CHAOS unla
full
w
y exceeded
the CIA's statutory authority, even though the declared mission of
gathering intelligence abroad as to foreign influence on domestic dis-
sident activities was proper.
Most significantly, the Operation became a ,repository for large
quantities of information on the domestic activities of American citi-
zens. This information was derived principally from FBI reports or
from overt sources and not from clandestine collection by the CIA,
an4'much of it was not directly related to the question of the existence
of foreign connections.
Recommendation (15)
a. Presidents should refrain from directing the CIA to perform
what are essentially internal security tasks.
b. The CIA should resist any efforts, whatever their origin, to
involve it again in such improper activities.
c The Agency should guard against allowing any component
.. (like the Special Operations Group) to become so self-contained
and isolated from top leadership that regular supervision and
review are lost.
d. The files of the CHAOS project which have no foreign intelli-
gence value. should be destroyed by the Agency at the conclusion
of the current congressional investigations, or as soon thereafter
as permitted by law.
1. Protection of the Agency Against Threats of Vio-
Findings
. The CIA was not immune from the threats-of violence and disrup-
tion during the period of domestic unrest between 1967 and 1972. The
Office of Security was charged throughout t.his'period with the respon-
sibility of ensuring the continued functioning of the CIA.
The Office therefore, from 1967 to 1970, had its field officers collect
information from published materials, law enforcement authorities,
lence-Office of Security (Chapter 12)
Approved For Release 2009/08/07: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000601470022-0
 Approved For Release 2009/08/07: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000601470022-0
other agencies and college officials before recruiters were sent to some
campuses. Monitoring and communications support was provided to.
recruiters when trouble was expected. -
The Office was also responsible, with the approval of the Director
of Central Intelligence, for a program from February 1967 to De-
cember 1968, which at first monitored, but later infiltrated, dissident
organizations in the Washington, D.C., area to determine if the groups
planned any activities against CIA or other government installations.
At no time Were more than 12 persons performing these tasks, and
they performed them on a part-time basis. The project was termi-
nated when the Washington Metropolitan Police Department devel-
oped its own intelligence capability.
In December. 1967) the Office began a continuing study of dissident
activity in the. United States, using information from published and
other voluntary knowledgeable sources. The Office produced weekly
Situation Information Reports analyzing dissident activities and pro-
viding calendars of future events. Calendars were given to the Secret
Service, but the CIA made no other disseminations outside the Agency.
About 500 to 800 files were maintained on dissenting organizations
and individuals. 'T'housands of names in the files were indexed. Report
publication was ended in late 1972, and the entire project was ended
in 1973.
Conclusions
The program under which the Office of Security rendered assistance
to Agency recruiters on college campuses was justified as an exer-
cise of the Agency's responsibility to protect its own personnel and
operations.. Such support activities were not undertaken for the pur-
pose of protecting the facilities or operations of other governmental
agencies, or to maintain public order or enforce laws.
The :Agency should not infiltrate a dissident group for security
purposes unless there is a clear danger to Agency installations, opera-
tions or personnel, and investigative coverage of the threat by the
P13I and local law enforcement authorities is inadequate. The.
Agency's infiltration of dissident groups in the.WI'ashingtoll area went
far beyond steps necessary to proteet. the Agency's own facilities, per-
sonnel and operations, and therefore exceeded the CIA's statutory
authority.
In addition. the .1gc'nc.v undcrtool: to protect other rovernnlent de
iiartments and arenc ies-a police function pt?ollibited to it by statute.
Intelligence activity directed toww?nl?d Ira ing from what sources a
domestic dissident group rc?cc'iy-es its financial support. within the
Approved For Release
}
u
ty r
The Office of Secur
so the
2009/08/07: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000601470022-0 " "lulu the A f*enc3. In dotnr ? ,
United States, and how much income it has, is no part of the authorized
security operations of the Agency. Neither is it the function of the
secu ' records on who attends peaceful meetings of such
Agency dissident to groups, compile or what each speaker has to say (unless it relates to
disruptive or violent activity which may be directed against the
Agency).
The Agency's actions in contributing funds, photographing people,
activities and cars, and following people home were unreasonable
under the circumstances and therefore exceeded the CIA's authority.
Zjrit.it certain exceptions, the program under which the Office of
Security (without infiltration) gathered, orgatlized and analyzed
information about dissident groups for purposes of security was
within the. CIA's authority.
The accumulation of reference files on dissident organizations and
e
their leaders was appropriate both to evaluate the risks posed to ~h and groups Agency and to develop an understanding of dissident
their differences for security clearance purposes. But the accumulation
b the
yi the h e AgAgenncycn's legitimate. oil domestic activities security needs tand therefore exceeddl
by
CIA's authority.
Recommendation '(16)
The CIA should not infiltrate dissident groups or other orga-
nizations of Americans in the absence of a written determination
by the Director of Central Intelligence that such action is neces-
sary to meet a .clear danger to Agency facilities, operations, e eor
agen-
personnel and that adequate coverage by
cies is unavailable.
Recommendation (17)
All files on individuals accumulated by the Office of Security in
the program relating to dissidents should be identified, and, ex-
cept where necessary for a legitimate foreign intelligence activity,
he destroyed at the conclusion of the current congressional inves-
w
l
b
.
a
y
tigations, or as soon thereafter. as permitted
5. Other Investigations by the Office of Security (Chap-
Clearance Investigations 01 Prospective
Employees and Operatives
Findings and Conclusions
conducts standard security tnvesti-
tine]
o
i
ter 13) .
 Approved For Release 2009/08/07: CIA-RDP05S00620R000601470022-0 9
Office is performing the necessary function of screening persons to
Whom it will make available classified information. Such investigations
are necessary, and no improprieties were found in connection with
them.
B. Investigations of Possible Breaches of Security
1. Persons Investigated
Findings
The Office of Security has been called upon on a number of occasions
to investigate specific allegations that intelligence sources and methods
were threatened by unauthorized disclosures. The Commission's in
quiry concentrated on those investigations which used investigative
means intruding on the privacy of the subjects, including physical and
l
i
e
ectron
c surveillance, unauthorized entry, mail covers and intercepts,
and reviews of individual federal tax returns.
The large majority of these investigations were directed at persons
affiliated with the Agency-such as employees, former employees, and
defectors and other foreign nationals used by the Agency as intelli-
gence sources.
A few investigations involving intrusions on personal privacy were
directed at subjects with no relationship to the Agency. The Commis-.
sion has found no evidence that any such investigations were directed.
against any congressman, judge, or other public official. Five were
directed .against newsmen, in an effort to determine their sources of
leaked classified information, and nine were directed against other
United St
t
i
i
a
es c
t
zens.
The CIA's investi rations of newsmen to determine their sources of
classified information stemmed from pressures from the White House
and were partly a result of the FBI's unwillingness to undertake such
investi
ati
TI
ons.
g
Ie FBI refused to proceed without an advance opinion
that the Justice Department would prosecute if a case were developed.
Conclusions
Investigations of allegations against Agency employees and opera-
tives are a reasonable exercise of the Director's statutory duty to pro-
tect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure if
the investigations are. lawfully conducted. Such investigations also as-
sist the Director in the exercise. of his unreviewable authority to termi-
nate the employment of any Agency employee. They are proper unless
their principal purpose becomes law-enforcement or the maintenance
of internal security.
The Director's responsibility to protect intelligence sources and
methods is not so broad as to permit investigations of persons having
no relationship whatever with the Agency. The CIA has no authority
to investigate newsmen simply because they have published leaked
classified information. Investigations by the CIA should be limited
to persons presently or formerly affiliated with the. Agency, directly or
indirectly. .
Recommendation (18)
a. The Director of Central Intelligence should issue clear guide-
lines setting forth the situations in which the CIA is justified in
conducting its own investigation of individuals presently or for-
merly affiliated with it.
b. The guidelines should permit the CIA to conduct investiga-
tions of such persons only when the Director of Central Intelli-
gence first determines that the investigation is necessary to
protect intelligence sources and methods the disclosure of which
might endanger the national security. .
c. Such investigations must be coordinated with the FBI when-
ever substantial evidence suggesting espionage or violation of
a federal criminal statute is discovered.
Recommendation (19)
a. In cases involving serious or continuing security violations,
as determined by the Security Committee of the United States
Intelligence Board, the Committee should be authorized to rec-
ommend in writing to the Director of Central Intelligence (with
a copy to the National Security Council) that the case be referred
to the FBI for further investigation, under procedures to be devel-
oped by the Attorney General.
_ .,