NOTES FROM THE DIRECTOR NO. 39

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP05S00620R000601400023-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 5, 2009
• Sequence Number: 23
• Publication Date: February 7, 1979
• Content Type: MISC

Approved For Release 2009/06/05 :CIA-RDP05S00620R000601400023-6
Nofes from the Director No. 79
7 February 1979
STAT
IRAN
Over the past few weeks, much has appeared in the press on the so-called
"intelligence failure" in Iran. Blame has been directed at, among others, the CIA, the
State Department, the NSC, the President and our foreign policy in general. There is
much conjecture and theory but, unfortunately, little appreciation for what intelli-
gence can and cannot do.
Intelligence can tell you what happened yesterday and today. It can sometimes
alert you to what might happen tomorrow. But, given life's inconsistencies, the degree
individuals and nations are influenced by factors outside their control, and the
vagaries of chance, it cannot forecast the future with 100% accuracy.
Beyond that, political prediction is the most elusive and difficult aspect of
intelligence. Crops, armies, economic activity, etc., can be watched and counted.
With socio-political upheavals, coups, or even elections we can only make educated
guesses at best. The success or failure of such events is often a surprise to the
Approved For Release 2009/06/05 :CIA-RDP05S00620R000601400023-6
 Approved For Release 2009/06/05 :CIA-RDP05S00620R000601400023-6
participants themselves. Our own Presidential elections, where there are no secrets
and yet where predictions of the winner are often wrong, are a good example.
In the case of Iran, we would like to have done better. In fact, during last
summer and fall we were reporting religious, economic, social and political centers of
discontent. Individually they seemed within the capabilities of the government to
contain. What we did not foresee is that a monarchy which had effectively controlled
unrest for over 50 years would not act in time to do so again; and that a 78 year old
cleric, exiled for 14 years, would become the catalyst which would cause those
disparate opposition groups to suddenly coalesce. No intelligence service predicted
that; no newspaper columnist; no academic; nor the Shah; nor, I suspect, did
Khomeini.
We shall work to improve our political intelligence. Primarily, it will require
CIA, Defense, State and others with international contact to work more closely
together than ever before. But, in the meanwhile, do not despair of the criticisms you
see in the media. There has been-no failure of intelligence. We continue to collect and
produce the best intelligence in the world. And this one event is not a good measure of
the overall quality of our product.
STANSFIELD TURNER
Director
Approved For Release 2009/06/05 :CIA-RDP05S00620R000601400023-6