PRESS CLIPPINGS NOVEMBER - DECEMBER 1978

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP05S00620R000501310001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 217
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 28, 2009
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 20, 1978
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

STAT
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IIW
- &el
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W r+a L C L L1.LI "K w"i l.IC1- a.---.-----.
Clt Director Stansfield Turner has evidence of Cuban involvement?
testified before- congressional
committees - in secret - to show . ,.., ,,Perhaps national security con-
what he calls a "preponderance" of - sic4erations prevent the administrati-
evidence to support the President's on from revealing all its evidence, or
contention that Cuba was actively sources for it. But surely there are
involved in the invasion of. Zaire. some hard facts available which will :
meetings with leaders of Congress in Cubans know the extent of their_in-
'
the White House to convince them he 'volvement in-the invasion, as do t
had the facts`?' to '`support his Russians. The White House is mi-
,statements .again in secret. _ ssing an excellent opportunity to gain
support from third world nations by,`
fi ~itifa*:,. demonstrating Cuba's culpability
The secret nature oirthese briefings publicly:'
Pos p ::
es a roblem 'The President has p
been asked 'to substantiate' his' }More important than world opinion
le fact the American
sim
tries, at
the
third world cou
b
h
:
p
n
arges.
y
.c
'.:-
least some of -whom seem. genuinely' people are entitled to know the Jacts,-
to want the truthfrom,' conflicting up to the very - narrow point - of
claims. Why should not they and the security precautions, if any really
American ,people ' be' shown hard apply. in this case..
e vide nce
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SALT LAKE CITY TRIBUNE
16 June 1978
,/ - Produce `Smoking Gun'
When Richard Nixon was claiming does not convince beyond reasonable
executive privilege and fighting to doubt.
keep the presidential tapes from. There was a time when the public -
public disclosure, it- ? was.- ? widely 'would -take a chief executive's word
assumed that the tapes must contain without serious question. That time is
damaging 'evidence or the president., -long gone and Mr. Carter Wednesday'
wouldn't try so hard to conceal them.. 'conceded -as, -much. Despite going
President- Carter'. ,now'- yfaces . a manes, the president has a credibili-
similarsituation : He' has-. the.:. ty Problem.." If ; he.. has a - "smoking
Soviet Union and Cuba of aiding, and gun' with which to "convict" Fidel
abetting the recent invasion of Zaire's Castro, he should lose ''no time
Shaba province And visa=In hand.,TheBI-is
supposed to?;be consulted 6f& th .
visa iriasned::overseaa;`buut`sometimes,
according to'~ several"knowl"edgeabie.
officials;;the, visa is-issued firsts- .
The.foreigs_visitor woiad'haveto_
refused ,'admission if'-he or she-were
held to fall under Secti6ns'-2T`ar,29,
but the bm eau keeps losing those ar=
guments
Officials agree this could change in
light' of.President Garter's'- reported..
approval of ;a reorganization plan that'
won ld,"aniong`other~things shift the;
decision niaking4uthority for-visa ap-~
plications from state_fo the'.immigra-
tioa'service; Yet 'that is whe're' it "sup-
posedly; has :beent'all'along-as'far as
the'-'security pro'visions'- ..are.. con-
cerned.. u.. ,
"Th'etwa"_'anestio sou'_vj`'got',to,
ask are; what is the-guy planning` to'
do and is it-:agairist the law or is it
subversive to the' national -security,"
says ?a. State.. Department official:
"Even;7 when .you're dealing -with.,,
specifte- internal security 'statute;: you'`
can run into-perfectly legitimate-dif-':
fering views;: especially onf-'ac tivi
subversives-to the -national, security.."'
During- the, House.4ebate, .Burlison
declared that _the;.FBL"does not, as
matter. of ,policy request exclusion of:
all identified-off puspected intelligence
officer'.': leaking ;ta;.enter, the TJnited;-
States;-'.but administration
dials contend the bureau is still too;
r
skittish- :*-?a
"On a' few of tlie`se [visas1 'reallg
very limited ' number; the ' FBI will ob:
ject," siys`INS-'spokesman--Silas-
Jervis. ' ' We - have , to weigh ' betwee
the recommendations:' The last-' f
years; it's ? gone-. i favorxot ' State i
Their reasoning ha: "'seemed more"
compelling."',. 9 mv^31:1::' ":
Even so,: the House=voted 312 to'6O.
to require-reports of::cgntested'admis=.
sions from the : attorney general.-
..Bo-land assured his colleagues. that ;the-
House Intelligence..Committeehad" no.
intention of becoming, ahother HUAC,
and agreed -to require the reports oa>;y
for fiscal :1979 c..:. s::.~.+.? :>
The committee 'may not even get I
that much. Director of Central Intelli-
gence Stansfield Turner is writing a
letter to Senate -Intelligence Commit-
tee Chairman Birch Bayh (Ddnd.) to
express the administration's opposi-
tion to the provision. According to a
Justice Department lawyer, the re-
quirement as passed by the House
doesn't make much sense anyway.
"The language is all screwed up,"
he said. "If you read it carefully, it
asks the attorney general to tell Con-
gress when aliens who fall under See-
tions 27 or 29 have been admitted to
the United States. But if they fall un-
der Sections 27 or 29, they can't be ad-
mitted. As -the legislation stands now,
it asks -the attorney general to report 1
those instances to-Congress where the J
attorney general has violated the I
law."'
. . tiax
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ARTICLE ADPEARED
ON PAGE A- 9
5 July 1978
robs . ` gnt an `Media Mani pulation' by FBI'
-I:ardaer J i. ;meson 'Act 'by the Seattle Coalition - KIXI of - anybody else has done any-
r wrwaiW. awc wru.., ; . : ;;to Stop ;Gowernment Spying.:, thing wrong."
Tway ? congressional . , xhb sea Tbs-; memo, dated Match 16, `1973, "K management did not make
have besnr asked..?inInvestigate. FBI and. sent tromthe Seattle,FBI office. any. arrangements with the FBI," Ja
"
manipulatton;of'tht media" as?part rrtp;~Miaaeapoliy alluded.-to a forth, oob en continued. Asked If Stuart
of the' groundwork toy-domertig Intel ;, eo rstura; aaignment to, Wounded a member of management
aigeneeo~chaetesp,~Iegislstion. _ xn ~$nee for Clarence.?McDanieL a radio , he was now director, Jacobsen
.Citing tthe bureau's ap;pan asi reporEer forstation: BISI In Seattle, . -insisted, "Ia the strictest sense of the
,of an na aadlo.newsman is the .`Aoiordia~'to the memo, McDaniel,. .word no." - _ ;. -
:19?3 ~laneaiean~~adiaa.. oacapstlon Qf mbo was",WghlTtrusted by' the Indians
nWouaded iKa 3S.$:(the: Caater'f r ;at=;Wounded;'Base,::wad expected ."fo
9Nationa1 3w&0 i6&,
askedfor'beontinua :: furnishing complete cover
an inquiry in separate letters to. Sea.- age' to T= and was "unaware that
`James, AbQ (DS.D.)- .and .Rep. hlsatories-,are not, being, publicized
Don Edwari~ ... i t' ,;* ;r euim f>i Yoll-of 'that -the, intelligence infor'
;?1 'This daztgerons-iaterterencs bYthe -:matioa-aM his tapes are beans--fure-
rBI.with the,Iegit nste'collectionnished the FBI.
. iews`;is dearly a- violation -of':the'-
any ,..? -~ specific information is
rightt'of. freeadom otthe, press' as gam needed by,FBI, K XI willing to-pass.
nt,";th* i4+,
anteedb}~t a il
Ftrwmeadme ,as normal duty assign-
said the' Waded Knee dent ,,meno''a ded.:referenee; to FBI," 'the'
Abourezk'is chairman of the Senate. memo added.
a~udfeiar~'~`sabaQmmlltee :on adminis McDaniel ? said he was unaware-.of .
trative, prsetf -. -and- :procedur aM' thiaauntil seoently.:"It's kiM af;rids
Bdwardir. is cbitrmah~ the House,!,' ulou_ really;. he uaid~ !!1'ht aadians
PJudiciary2snbcolsnmittee~on elvif and J: want'sd to;get. their ?story.;ouL:.:`s;?.
,ionstitutio - fights.- Both aubcom, --,There-was no reason or this 'I Spy,
nsitteeur.1alpern dabmitted,,, should , business,'
look intoi~i~i-esnded?Bnee? episode `.The arrangement with the FBI .was
'sand'' other peiadble instances -of :the reportedly made by then = .news
FBI'r accomplice who used it.
against an unnamed "innocent person."
Considering ; some oft the: - revelations
about CIA "dirty tricks"'.=-in recent years, -
the Soviet account can't:- automatically be
dismissed as bogus. Nor is there reason to
think that U. S. spies have fallen behind
in the use of electronic bugging equip-
ment. Much of our information about So-
viet military installations,.. industries and'
agriculture comes from orbiting- reconnai- ~
sance satellites: But there is still a role for
.`spooks,'.'. disguises and radio transmitters
no, bigger than your thumbnail.
. There. are limits, however, to what a
nation can reasonably be expected to tol-
erate. The Soviets clearly went beyond the
limit- when, for years, they bombarded our
embassy in Moscow with microwave. radi-
ation. Whether this, was intended to. foil
U. S... surveillance and communication
equipment or to enhance Soviet bugging
has never been made clear. But the radi-
ation. evidently . did affect the health of
some. embassy personnel, though they re-
grettably weren=t told so by the State De-
partment at the2, time. The radiation was-
substantially' reduced after the U. a com-
plained two years ago.
During the latest flap, the - Russians
have again- gone beyond--tolerable= limits,
but in a manner that's laughiible.
blockad-
ing seems that, in debugging and ing the tunnel to our embassy, U. S. work-
ers gummed up -the heating, system of a
nearby. apartment building. The' Soviets
demand that. we pay for the damage- I
That's a bit much, even for the Rus-
sians. Americans have learned to expect
cries of wounded self-righteousness when-
ever the Soviet Union is - caught with its
hand in the cookie jar. But we needn't
learn to like it.
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TERRE HAUTE TRIBUNE (INDIANA)
15 June 1978
The crippling -oL the, FBI and
CIA by-" post-Watergate
re onss and restrictions ;-
seems to have encouraged, the
Russians tostep up their spying.,
activities :against- this country,.
open ' society in contrast witl
much more closed - Communist
nations that keep up with every
foreign visitor. Detente has
increased the - opportunity for
surveillance of this country by
as many of OF feared it : would::.;:... '4`i And. in Washington, there are Communist. agents entering as
The recent,'discovery- of,,--an*-?, more'Cbmmunist spies at work ::diplomats, businessmen,
electronic eavesdropping device;w - `tban~:~:F there... are American .journalists, students. or tourists;
In the chimney of the American = counter-intelligence agents 40 U.S. ports are ope& to Soviet
Embassy in Moscow is the latest available to - watch them, ships, which bring 26,000
in a rash of. Soviet espionage";.'
efforts to . be? uncovered:. ' U.S.---
officials- recently- warned of an.
elaborate electronic-.Installation
at the Sovietr:consulate: in San.::;'
In. New York, two Soviet
citizens employed by the United
Nations were arrested recently
for allegedly receiving classified
information on U.S. anti-
submarine warfare systems.
'.according to. John Barron, an- '. Russian crewmen ashore each
number '-of Soviet and other ' Inasmuch as the Soviet Union
.Communist-bloc intelligence: --never :,ceases-.' to- regard the
Francisco,. which,. . 'it -is.. feared, agents- in the United States is ? United States -as' its greater
monitors internationaLtelephone reliably .reported to have antagonist, it is only natural that
traffic "going aut-?; from., increased 50 percent since 1972 this country should be the chic
microwave broadcasting towers and is now estimated to be 8o0 in target of its vast espionage
atop, an,:_?akland: building. number. system. And it is only natural
:Similar concerns; have been Aside from the' FBI-CIA that- our instinct for- self.
-voiced. about*.:: microwave convulsions, the United States is 1 preservation should call for
monitoring by ,Soviet consulates :: ate an, intelligence-gathering more effective countermeasure'
:pn the East'Coast; disadvantage because it is an than:.those -we now perceive. I
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ARTICLE Appc&aM
ON PACE Fi.
THE BALTIMORE SUN
1 July 1978
Military intelligenceboost eyed
Washington (Reuter)-Thor Pentagon and rise gradually to $190 million. $198
tentatively plans to increase the budgets million and ;208 million is 1982,1983 and
of its two main intelligence arms by a to- 1984, respectively.
tai- of nearly $500 million? government Undec.the guidelines the NSA budget
sources said yesterday. --_.,.would.,drop. to. $1.36 billion in 1981 then
The soarcft ? said the- Defense: Intell . ` run at about $1.54 billion a year for 1982,
gence Ageneg budget would increase from -1983 and 1984, the sources said...
$130 million in 1979 to $249 million in `114- e- sources said the "bulge" in the
1980 and the National Security Agency 1980 DIA budget was for-a- new. long.
budget would go from $L08 billion in 1979 sought headquarters building for the agen-
ts $1.42 billion is 1980.; . i cy, : whole, more than .4,000 employees
-The DIA coordinates military-:n ntelli-. - work at scattered location throughout
genre for the secretary of defense and top Washington.
nuIitary officer,. The NSA monitors for-.
eign.communieation from satellites land
and 'sea-based radio,- transmitters, , and
breaks foreign codes, ?:
The preseatt?budget -figures for. both
agencies are. contained in. White House
guidelines to the Defense Department for
the preparation of the 1980 defense budget
that will be sent to Congress in January.
The guidelines project: that the DIA
budget would drop to $167 million in 1981
Them was no word on- what the NSA
budget increase was for. .. ? - -
- The new DIA building will cost around
$100 million; the sources said. The money
had been is the 1979 budget but was takes
out at the last moment and it was possible
the same..thing may happen agaia.this
year, the sources said.
They said a large part of the agency
presently was housed in an aging World
War, II wooden building, where the sag-
ging floors no longer would bold sufficient
numbers of safes for secret documents,
The new building would afford a sym-
bol of permanence to the DIA. which a
House of Representatives intelligence !
committee said two years ago should be
abolished.
The committee said some of the DtA's
functions should be given to its rival,. the
Central Intelligence Agency. But Presi-
dent Carter, in his reorganization of the
nation's intelligence activities earlier this
year, preserved and even strengthened the
DIA's role.
The Home committee also had recomn.
mended that the National Security Agency
be separated from the Pentagon and be
made a civilian agency. {
Estimates on how much the United
States spends annually on intelligence
vary from $4 billion to $10 billion, depend-
ing on what is included.
The higher estimate would include op.
erational money for spy satellite& surveil.'
lance planes and other equipment.
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ANAHEIM BULLETIN (CALIF.)
23 June 1978
Taxpayers' money.*
A matter._of__trust
A group charged?wilh_the responsibili ty of tak-
ing care. of money entrusted to.their control is
always expected to act in a wise and judicial
manner. Most of these do meet expectations and,
when any fail?people. react swiftly to manifest
their concern. This is readily discernible in all
areas except the political.
If one of these private groups should tell the
people who supply the funds: "We have approved
a tremendous, but undisclosed, amount of money:
for unspecified operations of a unit .which in the
past has performed in 'a manner' open to seriou
questioning'' what would be the reactions
This is exactly what House members did as they
issued the tralk~teuigen a Agency (CIA) and
eight other agencies a blank check.They. voted.
323 to 43 to authorized the funds (without knowing-
the amounts involved) just on the basis of a com-
mittee recommendations. Also the amounts and
uses were- not specified.
Besides the. CIA, the legislation authorized
funds for the Pentagon, State Department,. De--
fense Intelligepce Agency, National Securit
Agency, Treasury Department, Energy Department, the FBI and the Drug Enforement. Ad-
ministration.
A member. of the recommending committee
said, "Secrecy was necessary because, if the
enemy knows what our programs are, it virtually
destroys our intelligence programs."
When wetake a close look at the list of agencies
involved we have cause to wonder just who the
enemy is? Could it be beleaguered taxpayers who
might rise upon revolt?:.;', t 4
One of the few opponents, Rep. John J. Seiberl-
ing, D-Ohio, said, "Since the authorization is
blank, I intend to vote blank. I simply intend to
vote present, and I recommend'you all do too."
Rep. James Johnson R-Colo., said the legisla,
tion and classified documents made. available to
members under strict security measures "tell us
absolutely nothing about what the intelligence,
community is doing. I think we are reverting to
the old days when the CIA was given a blank.
check. I felt the information in the classified
material was absolutely useless."
"Members who vote for the bill are granting a
blank check to spend a lot of money by peole who,
in the past, have not warranted that kind of
trust," Johnson said.
It is intruguing to note that the Department of
Energy is listed among the recipients of those
intelligence funds. We have often wondered just,
what this agency. was really doing. It certainly
has not added anything discernible to our energy
We are aware that individuals sometimes take
on other jobs as a cover while engaged in under-'
cover operations. ? But we hardly 'expected the
ihighly touted new energy agency would be cast in
the role of a double agent.
Congress is supposed to assume the responsibil-
ity for all of us as it allocates our tax money. We
should expect that it do so in a wise and judicial,
manner. If members of Congress cannot be en-
trusted with knowledge of where-and how funds .
are to be spent, how can we trust those who will
spend it?..
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LEWISTON TRIBUNE (IDAHO)
13 June 1978
Most of, the critics of the CIA claim' they don't
think the, agency sho s necessarily,
just changed. This is not the view of John Stockwell;
a former CIA operative in Angola,:.who- says, iii
effect, who needs it? Stockwell would simply abolish
the Central Intelligence Agency on the grounds that
ere evidently Is no way to get the CIA out of the
business of monitoring;, the political activities of
American citizens. The agency is told not to do that;
It assures everybody that it is no longer doing that;
and-then, when required by a court order-to say . for;
certain whether it is doing it or not, it confesses that
it is beyond redemption and turn its legitimate in-
telligence gathering functions over to somebody else.
While this. approach may seem. radical to some,
the CIAW'continues unwittingly to: make it Increasing-,
ly palatable.` Just the other day, for:exampletthe CIA
acknowledged that it still;: maintains if. network of
'
f faculties,
secret- informants' on' university
presumably to report on the political activities and
utterancesrof=college students and teachersrsz, .
Do we need this kind of surveillance?. Of course
not. We not only don't need: it,, we can'tafford it. But'
It. is prudent to assume -that 'itwill go. on doing;;
overseas regardless of the.wishes'of Congress,?the
State: Department, the Department of Justice or the
agency_ar any given moment..
Time and event3 may yet prove Stockwell right'.-
-,.Meanwhile,. more; of, us ought to be asking., that,
question,:about_ the_.CIA..; Who needs.it?. 1.-
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?Ankletoil refused to contmedt on
the Kissinger Investigation, say-
Ing, "I won t talk about that now.
As part of the CIA Investigation,
the circumstances of Angleton's
celebrated December 1974 firing
are being reopened. Colby said
Angleton was fired because it was
discovered that, as part of his
counterintelligence efforts, he was
ille;ally opening mail on a regular
basis.
CIA investigators discovered
that Angleton was operating under
signed orders of every director
starting with Allen Dulles during
the Eisenhower years and ending
with Richard Helms.
Widespread reports that Angqle.
ton headed domestic spying activi.
ty in the late "f,lb and early '70s
are contradicted by a top-secret
memo made available to the Sun.
day News Journal.
It is dated May 19,'I900, and Is
from Jerris Leonard, a deputy
general In the Nixon administra.
lion's Justlte Department, to
Richard Ober of, the.CIA_White-
'House staff,~'wh6 coordinated ac;
`tlvitieS betw en the Nixon admin.
-lstration and Helms. The memo
said the CIA should assist in moni-
toring radical students, collecting
damaging informatin about the
students and seeing what commu-
nist connections they might have.
A note at the bottom of the
memo front "DCI" (director of
central intelligence - at that
time. Helms) said there was no
need to Inform anyone at the CIA
of these plans. especially the eoun-
terintelligence staff which Angle?
ton headed.
While the question of who might
have been the mole has not been
answered, the Senate Intelligence
Committee is beginning its inves-
llgatin with the questioning of
Angleton. Helms and Colby. `,
Angleton confirmed that he
would appear before the commit.
tee, and said, "I am willing to de-
fend my record any place, In
closed or open session."
Perhaps the most telling part of
the CIA s attitude toward Angle-
ton in Its Investigation can be
found in the fact thatjthe ex-wife of
,Angleton's.top aide was called out?
of;rclirement.to:ald.in the probe.
CordellgRocca, ex-wife of Angle. 1
ton's deputyandeonhdlnl; Ray
mood Rocca,hrd also worked for
Angleton. Rocca, who resigned
when Angleton was fired, Is re-
ported ill with a blood disorder.
uted to this story :110trla
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 STAT
?_ IWO
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t a AP EAPZQ NEV YORK TIMES
ON PAG 12 JULY 1978
A Bill to Revise Charter
Of CI.A.. Termed Vague
WASHINGTON, July 11(UPI)-Three;
peace groups told the Senate today that a
proposed revision of the charter of thei
Central Intelligence Agency was sod
vague that it.might not prevent the recur,
rence of spying abuses.. ; ;,
The_ Senate. IntelligenceCommittee is
considering legislation to revisethe agen-
cy's 1947: charter to define. what it may
and may notdo- _ - ,;
But, today-'s- witnesses said, that the
proposal fall short, and that failure to in-
clude specific prohibitionswould open the
door to greaterabuses than those that oc-
curred in the , '
The Amevkm Friends-:Service:Cotn-
mitteeoa Quaker: group,. said that nothing.
less than, abolition-,of the intelligence.
agency would protect Americans against
being spied upon by their Government... .
Ethel,' T8ylor.'national coordinator, of
Women Strike for-Peace, said that C.I.A.
use of informers in political organizations.
should' be- prohibited, and old tiles col-
lected bytheagency destroyed., ;::,-
RichardGutman,, lawyer for the Chica-
go-based Alliance:. to. End Repression,
said that. domestic.. counterintelligence
activities should, not be: undertaken un-
less "based upon concrete evidence" of
criminal espionage, sabotage or treason.
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ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-2
THE WASHINGTON POST
12 July 1978
;Ages
C rte~r - ? led No
.
?~_$s.Kee}ti~.:'s,p~`i:ti:'~~,'tirr..~:~ .~ ~' - -
ure 1
WASHINGTON (AP}_Representa armed services. The files show a pat-i
t&ves ot', organizations, under- surveil, , tern of, surveillance- that included
land by the CIA and :pI during $A* ` openitzg o# mail- between con~itte -
1960s and early 19TOs: said yesterday emplayesi and pegani t foreism a
that convesaionaL tries, be ii& ? s. < -
p oposals far a;newc ... Ethel Taylor, head of the+ Women'
-intelligenp? agency ebarteemill, not s . StrikeforPace; which urges in
prevent future- abuses.,.The? testified ,-
before tionaldiaarmament, said her FBI files
they Senar iati` Co show she had' been wader surveillance
mutes w v ~.
Louis W z# Mint.,-t , ,-. since 19bds, v.r4 wRe d`-~s ~- z+:!
Sclsaelderi,ezecutive, sac- Chicago. attorney Aichard, 1i Cut.
, retary oL the; Amerfean; Friends, Serv- min,..who. repre ents. 18? organizptio
ice Committee?(Qualaers}..said bi,:,or= ;-,chat contend theygwere undersurveil
ganization.liadd.Obtained lo,()00~.-pages lance during, the. 196g,.Desaocsstfc Na_
of files kept on- the Friends: byr.'various ..,- --tional `Convention and-. later; said- all
goverIIment.-agenttee4- ludin~F.the :.r.: C)AA _coveroperation3 is;: the. UIIit
CIA,-the. FSI,, the;.SLate: Pe9artment, States. as abroad should be pro
In teraaHee~ig5ervic~e. andtheitedthat w8' are 'concerned'
about -cover's?generar classification;
the:-New York.'Times, and the'WasM
ington Post-over long-erioil
time,," Goldwater
The white-House officialsaid2that.
no, single story-- or news' organization
-on~~?ess
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ARTICLE ,APP ARM
ON PAGE /
12 July 1978
what's News-
Reliable ia*Wga ce:sooirees are drying
up because they fear confidential informa-
tion will be leaked to news media, President
Carter complained Is. a. meeting with key.
Congressmen. A Whitt - House official
stressed that Carter pledged to continue sup-
plying classified informat ss to Congress
and acknowledged that the .administration
also was responsible for some leaks.
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?_ IWO
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cials that Cuba had played a vital role in
facilitating the incursion.
C.I.A. Confidence a Surprise
"We all thought that Cuba was some.
how involved in the affair." a participant
related# "but some people seemed sur-
prised that the C.I.A. seemed so sure of
its information.' ,.i
Immediately after*--the meeting- Mr.
Aaron, upon-discussing the issue with
other White House officials, including the
Presidential press secretaryted, Jody Pow-
ell, is said to have instruc the State
Department to. inform reporters of. the
C.I.A. finding. At the State Department's
noon press briefing. that day, Tom Res-
ton. a spokesman, announced that. "it is
now our understanding that the insur-
gents in Shaba Province have been
trained recently by Cubans." Later in the
day Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance, in
a background briefing, said that he was
not aware of Cuban; involvement but that
his press aide may have seen more recent
information.-?,-
The State +:.
Department statement led to
immediate denials by Cuban officials and
Dakota. Administration spokesmen con.
tinued to contend that Cuba had played a ;
direct role in supporting the attack, and
on May 23 Mr. Reston told reporters that
new information confirmed the Adminis-
tration's case.... _
On May 24 Mr. Aaron, Mr. Powell,
Hamilton Jordan, Mr. Carter's assistant,
and the Deputy Secretary of State. War-
ren M. Christopher, drafted a statement
on the Cuban role for Mr. Carter. At a
news conference in Chicago the next day
he reiterated the charge that Cuba had
trained and equipped the Katangans and
asserted that it had done nothing to re-
strain the attack.
:- .The CaseCould Go Eltber Way
- - In.retrospect. intelligence specialists
acknowledge that they were troubled by
those statements. One official with close
access to information available to the
White House at the time said: "After'
looking at it, I realized it was possible to
make the case either way. The guy who
was briefing the President had a big load
on his shoulders." An official in another
George mcGovern_ Democrat' of South j formation agency cramsated. The evaluating Pesiden
-
munition for the White House. Admiral
Turner is known in the Government as
ambitious and keenly interested in policy
matters. Earlier in May he had evidently
cooperated with White House officials in
pursuing the possibility of resuming!
American aid'- to Covert! anti-Marxist
groups in Angola.
Still other off id als suggested, suggested, hothat Admiral Turner, lacking great ex-
i perience in intelligence questions, might
not have t recognized what one specialist I
grayness of these types of
cases.t?
was probably right, but the evidence just
wasn't there to back him up."
Asked way the Administration went out
on a limb late in May, some officials said
I it reflected the inevitable White House
tendency to shape intelligence to fit poli.
cy. "The Cuban thing came along just at
the right time," one explained. Referring
to Mr. Carter's national security adviser,
he went on, "The President was in trou-
ble in the polls for not standing up to Mos-
cow and Havana while Brzezinski and
others were getting increasingly upset by
events in Africa...
Others also argued that top intelligence
aides, particularly Admiral Turner, were`
perhaps too eager to provide political am -
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o
- &el
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ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-2
THE WASHINGTON POST
8 July 1978
-taton- Against Bell Is
Irniporarily
. Attorney, General Griffin B. Belk
won a round yesterday in his fight to'
prevent disclosure of secret FBI
formant
A.federal appeals-` court' Judge, 4r
New : York temporarily suspended a
lower court order-holding: Bell in cone
tempt of court.:to-allow. time. for -a*'-.
appeals court panel:, to.review;-tho,
the "exceptional".nature of the cast.
led him to- conclude..Bell? w'as?_ en
battle between -the attorney genera
backed by U.S.- District Court Judge:
Thomas& P. Griesa, will not be settled'
until - this- fall when.. the - 2nd Circuit
starts its.next session:..
The SWP" and `its: youth affiliatei~
been. seeking,,to _review raw inform
ment foriallegedly illegal FBI spying.
Bell ? has: argued that turning. over
the, .l8 ' IIles=an ? action ordered, by
Griesa in May-' 1977 would break gov-
ernment?. promise tof, eonfidentiali
to informants.
fact,- ? expressed- sympathy-j with: ? Bell's
position-last year, but said'It simply
could' not, 'review 'hiir':intermediate
"discovery"` 'order r.-.The' :SupremeN
tempt of.. court 'for refusing tq.,obey
his order.
Bell said he was willing to be. field
In contempt if that-were necessary to
get appellate review of the inform-
ant -issue.
Gurfein said yesterday- that he was
issuing an'oral opinion because of the
"legitimate public.: Interest" in - the
case. "Everybody will be better 'off if
there is appellate review," he said.
If the SWP' attorneys win, the judge
said, they "will-nave' a solid base-t on
which to. proceed,,-i,.'.If they lose,: we
will have prevented- an untimely spill-
ing of the 'beans. in a situation that
does not require- it- and which is irre
parable ii~ its terms."
Gurfein said he thought- it -1m Impor-
tant that appellate' courts "straighten I
out this entire question of informer's
privilege." Giving .it up too easily, he
said, "may in certain cases result in
assassination and death."
The judge likened the current con
frontation to the one in which Presi-+
dent Nixon sought and was granted
immediate review of a lower-court or-'
der that he turn over the Watergate
tape recordings. so he wouldn't have
to be held! in contempt to trigger an
appeal.; ...~ ; . ,
Gurfein' said 'that In "normal" court
proceedings the government "is enti-
tled.'to=nespecial privileges beyond
that i Uhe ordinary citizen, and that.
remains true,"-'`,But he. added that the
current case involved' air "instituttoaai
confrontation'' between the- highest
echelons of the executive branch ands
.the judiciary."...,
'The judge;took.pains to say, he was
not prejudging.the.merits of the case
and - that he recognized - the impor-
tance of the SWP Position._ , ;,
"I decide simply that there is~merit
in Mr.' Fiske'sargument that the $ov-
ernment has the right to appeal." Rob-
ert B. Fiske Jr. -is the U.S.'attorney in
New York who,. argued 'the case.. for,'
the government..,,.;
Special ',, corespondent John Ren-
reedy contributed to this article
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ARTICLE Ap E '7 8 JULY 1978
BELL IS GIVEN.STAY:
OF CONTEMPT ORDER
Attorney GenerakWins Legal Del;y
Pendingg Appeal-of.a Ruling in'
}
Case Involving Informers.
,. , .;r,, ,',:may:. ?. ., ...~
f.. 7
ByARNOLD H. LUBASH
Attorney General Griffin B. Bell won a.
stay yesterday of an. order holding him in.
contempt. oLcourt for refusing to release
informer files in a $40 million suit by the
Socialis Workers Party. _ -
`' After two-hour hearing in Manhattan;
the stay ; was. issued by Judge Murray`I
Gurfein:of the United States Court. of Ap.
peals for the Second Circuit 'Judge ,Gur-~-
fein stayed -the one-day.contempt-order.
pending; the Government's appeal .of" the.
dispute,:.-which, he termed "an;.historic
-confrontation."' Y / ?
Robert: B:=Fiske Jr`;the United State
Attorney'wfio' argued= for- Mr. Bell;`said
that the stay "means that, as of now, the
Attorney- General is-not- in contempt-!'
and addedthatit would be "damaging for
the Attorney General and for the country
'.__ n
if he continued to be in contempt._
-Legal-experts said that the stay tempo-
rarily-lifted the contempt for- practical.
purposes because no sanctions can be im-
posed while it is in effect, but that the At-
torney General might technically'remain
in contempt until the contempt order was
reversed. ;~=',r;
Court Ruling . Likely .
The appeal to the appellate court could
take several. weeks, with the-case head-
ing eventually for the United' States Su-
preme Court:
Margaret Winter, an attorney for. the
Socialist. Workers'. said she was -"disap-
pointed'." by" the. stay, because it. would
prolong the case, but added that "the im-
., portant thing is that we ultimately- get
these, files" as evidence that the Govern-
inent illegally-used informers.to disrupt.
,."the-political' activitiesof..the Socialist
Workersa +~rs ,
f On Thursday, Federal District-Judge
Thomass'P : Griesa- held- the -Attorney
General In.. contempt' for. his-refusal to
give the Government's files on 18uniden-
titled ihfortners:to attorneys- for.the So-
cialist, Workers.. The- files represent=a:
sample of 1,300 informers' who spied on
y
the small 1 rotskyist part
Judge Griesa.said he was prepared to
-consider'.. ?"mr~beer:,;drastic., sanctions"
against the Attorney General, including
possible Imprisonment, to compel .disclo.-
sure
Confidentiality Held Crucial
'In arguig fo' a stare of the tontcinipt.
?or`der; Mr.;'Fisk' toldJudoe Cui fern yes
?ter4ay?thardlsc'.osur6 of the files would
;violate the:crucial- conffidentiality,of in-'
formers'and'cause"'incalculable harm to
thenation's ability toprotectitself ''?
x Mr. Fiske contended that "there was a
precipitous rush to contempt to-this case"
'because Judge Griesa had not explored
,alternative sanctions; which could forfeit
part of,the.,sttit.in-favor, of the.,Socialist
Workers, inskead of resorting to con=
ctemptvh,
"I suppose," Judge Gurfein interject-
ed, "the ultimate- sanction in this--case
would be awarding $4( million to the So-
cialist Workers Party.". ? ..z ,
The Government's contention that the
contempt : order- was. "unprecedented
was disputed by Miss Winter in her argu
?ment against- the: stay_ She'cited. a1951
-case. in which., the- Acting,... Attorney
'General and the Secretary of Commerce
were held in contempt for refusing to re-
turn some stock at the end of a civil case.:
"As far. as we.-.know,'. Miss, Winter
added, "no other Cabinet official has ever
been held incontempt. '?
'Evidence Called Indisperisible,
-:She argued that the Goveriunent's f
formers, had used: burglaries. and other.
criminal tactics" against the Socialist
Workers; adding that the 'informer. files
(contained indispensible evidence because
'&.we don't know what kind of harm the
Government was inflicting on
":Judge
sessed 'secrets; because of their preious work.. It ture that I. meet a friend of his, Valerri Petukhov,,
seemed obvious,- however, that. the4 intelligence who-.was interested in parapsychology as a side-
value of ,such-information had long perished; since- line to. his main Job-in pharmaceuticals..Petukhov,
none of these refusedniks had.worked at all for over who made contact with me first through Scharansky
five years. and.. then, directly himself, gave me the article on?
Morerimportant; the' capricious use of. the--""state the Moscow street a year ago. That was when rwas
secrets". excuse-to refuse an: exit visa to!~a former seized by police
workevin the,Soviet.M#l c and, Men t;Instilute;: fo Petukhov was part of a trap; It now seems certain,
.
exampletaeemed worth a stocy;.l Dissident- sources as well as Western diplomats is-
Further Scharansky and.others had already' com- ter reported that he was "commended" by the Com-
piled long lists of'refusedniks and had'transniitted munist. Party branch of .his drug institute for
them to their supporters in the United States.and "unmasking" me as a spy: So whatever "secrets"
Britain to elicit public suppprt for their cause.,' may be hidden in extrasensory perception were, in
The-lists. showed that.: some, of.-the..sama~wor all likelihood, never. available for "worming out"
places atwhich-that refusedniks supposedly had reW from:him< .. _ . -:7
+zr'crss+
ceived "secret information,"'such as the Institute o
the. Chemical Ministry, were sometimes officially
classified as open, or non-eeciet,by Soviet officials.
The Soviets'did'thiswhen they, wanted to bay ad
vanced technology equipment like computers from
Western Europe and, the United States, technology.
that Western. governments would not sell ta'any
thing'"but."opee. iastitutes j- t,, :~.
For example,'. Jews who worked on three
"oceanographic research vessels" had been, denied
permission-to-emigrate` on. the grounds-that they
"learned their' secrets t att. therm; former wont
places." This suggested that the research vessels
were actually spy
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ARTICLE , tutu .Ju THE NEW YUKK TIMES
ON PAGE 14 July 1978
A Spectacle of dear
By Tom Wicker
The conviction of Aleksandr Ginz-
burg and the trial of Anatoly
Shcharansky constitute an attack on
freedom itself. They remind us once
again that this supposed superpower,
fearing its own people more than any
foreign adversary, permits them not
even the most limited human rights of
.belief and expression., But the trials
also make frustratingly clear how lit-
tle the United States can do to change
this depressing condition, not just in
the Soviet Union, but for so many of
the world's people..
What are human., rights.. anyway?
One of our most cherished documents
defined them admirably : "life,
liberty and the pursuit of. happiness.
Later, the Bill of Rights specified such.
freedoms as those of speech and reli-
gion. And * still another . generation
that canceling the shipments would
hurt this countr
y's economic interests
without altering Moscow's human
rights policy (or lack of one) -ignores-
the symbolic power of gestures, and
may -even underestimate Soviet tech-
nological reeds.
Nevertheless, such American action
would be unlikely to have the direct ef-
fect of helping Soviet dissidents now,
parti `arty since the Soviets probably
would feel-compelled- to -make- some
blustery response. The same would be
true of the more extreme action advo-
cated by a few - that the United
States break off the SALT negotia-
tions. Most of this talk is probably for
voter consumption in the .United
States, since such a position seems
clearly self-defeating.
It is also-ironic in the extreme, if
really prompted by concern for human
rights. Life is the most basic of all
added that guarantee of -,due process human rights, listed first in the Decla-
of law" without which. rights become ration of Independence. And life is she.
empty generalities, ultimate concern of the arms limita-
Whatever "rights may be prom- tion talks, because the Soviet Union
ised to Soviet citizens, their. Govern- and the United States, with. their . nu-
ment permits no due process,to guar dear arsenals are the greatest threats
antes theta; instead, due process is to life in all its history:
being mocked in the so-called trials of What sense does it make,"therefore,
Mr. Shcharansky and- Mr. Ginzburg.* to break their connection, tenuous as itd
tee from the eyes of theworld. . be penalized by such an act of folly?
That these shameful proceedings , The American and Soviet peoples,.and
lieve they must counter dissent and . The hard truth is that the United
stamp it out if possible-., _They are. States has little power to affect human
hound to 1
.L-.
- --- - .. -
now
such
will make it' more difficult. for Con-
gress, owingto-American revulsion, to -
? rati fy a sensible. SALT agreement or
? take any.other step to improve Soviet.
IN THE NATION"'
American relations rights in the' Soviet Union- Cambodia
e bu
...., ____-. -..~....p
t...
serious material losses-for -- ----- .. an a d e example, ., . should, holdup a moral standard to
cancellation of the
_a . __-_ - _ - -- -
la
p
n ex
A
- South
i.
from this country to the Soviet Union., ca, for example-- American actions
Since Preside
t C
h
n
arter
as . publicly may have at least the indirect effect of
denied Soviet allegations -that, Mr. improving human - rights conditions,-
Shcharansky was a spy for the C.I.A.,, and these actions should flow from our
d
an
personally appealed for the trea- heritage. In countries heavily depend-
d
..d
son charge to b
--- -- - - -- -- - -
ropp
e
his
precisely that charge is an almost cal- Korea, the Philippines.,, Chilefrontt.,M Carter -.
.? ?
. far
merit
B
t
u
hh their disregard or all these - greater effect, if strongly pursued.
consequences- n
t
---- -i- --
o
to
p
robriu m of the world, demonstrates , But the. United States itself is they
underlines the near-helplessness of the . concern for. human rights, the one:
about it. protection of the Bill of Rights, s
and other exchaftges seems clearly the extension of equal economic oppor
warranted, not merely asa rebuke but tunity to all classes and colors of citf
as a substantive step - that might at zens these are the first human
greater, concern, for Ameriparr-read leg run their greatest service even to
State wt's reported[
^~' psa~~3 er G :. A,>rsa.hmilll
on civil
it "Prmecntorial" in nature. Only su_ it against the Government_
evidence obtained during the prosecu. The F. Socialist workers contend that
torial Period. was ruled-inadmissible,. the" F.B.I used its so.called "inform
but that -was enough. to convict Mr.. ~ illegally. to disrupt party acdvi_-
Humphrey. - , ties. To prove these charges, it needs
Attorney General Griffin Bell seems to know their identities; Federal
deliberately to have sought. In this J~~ T P. Griesa' first ordered
case- to validate the use of warrantless Mr. Bell to provide- a small sampling
wiretaps by the Government in foreign. Of informers' names, then held him in
intelligence cases-Yet, a bill has been. contempt of court when he refused to
passed by the Senate and' is Pending in contempt o.. A higher court has stayed the
the Houseto require judicial warrants coorder, pending resolution of
even for foreign intelligence taps
t Mr. Bell's appeal
ju
.
s
,
as they are already required for taps I Are police informers to be given an
used in criminal and domestic intelli- I ce munrty no one else can claim? Re.
gene case. '
M
r. Bell has Pledged the Carter Ad.
ministratoa to abide by the pending
legislation; but the Humphreay case
IN THE NATION
raises troubling questions about that
commitment. Besides, tbe.wiretap bill
is in trouble in the House and may not
Pass - in which case, approval by the
appeals courts of Mr. Humphrey's
conviction would leave the Govern-.
meet with greatly expanded wiretap
and Pi secUt
' ---------
i
F A.F. "informers" the ally
were. errs ere actually
agents provocateurs in-,civil
rights bombings and other cases.. And
anyway. what gives the- Attorney
General, any more than the rest of us,_.,
the right to decide which court orders
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NEWSDAY
23 June 1978
A One-Sided Hearin on CI Censors hip
Tm certain. you're- en route - to Rich-
mond,"..a -federal judge told a_ defense -at-
torney this week in Alexandria, Va. "I'll
show'you the way. Its right down Route I-
95.". __ _ ._..
1. -
Richmond' Where .the U.S.. Court of
Appeals for the-Fourth-Circuit is; located,
and, Distric Tudge`_ Oren .Lewis pointed
the defense: attorney there in no uncertain
terms: 'An: appeal was all but guaranteed"
-
by the judge's blatant bias against defect-.-
dant,Frank Snepp, an ex-CL ..agent.who.s
had published. a highly critical bookabout~
ther,.agency's performance--, in. Vietnam
.::
without' obtaining pnor approvaL3~~ ~_
Snepp . stands- accused of violating his
contract with:-the CIA which the govern-
ment-contends covers any= publication in-
volving the agency, whether classified- in
formation~.is. _divulged or- not. Even the
government doesn't claim that Snepp's
book, contains: secrets oi classified. data
not already revealed by -the CIA itself :
Talk about a kangaroo court. The facts
were_not ia:_ dispute;;-Judge Lewis told
Snepp, and; denied . him a `jury- trial: He
then-7informed- Snepp'a lawyer that:=:the
evidence. "won. -make ` any difference."
And - . apparently- it didn't Lewis ruled -
against Snepp_after a da~r and-a-half. trial
peppered ' tfii,dmomtiona and scoldinga
of.the:-defe idant; He woaldn't-even allow,
the defense, to * ? e `CIA director.
Stansfield`:.Turner, who testified. for. the
prosecution:=In short, the trial 'was so. one-
sided' thati~t thirst hi"-..been an embar- ='
The questions raised in the Snepp case
are serious ones that merit more than eur-
sory- attention, not just by the courts but -
by_the administration; Congress, the CIA'
and.the public. Judge Lewis obviously had::
his mind made up before.- the trial began; -
we hope the`appeals court will s end: the_~ -
case -back fora fair hearing:-
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MERIDEN RECORD-JOURNAL (CONN.)
23 June 1978
Bad:,: day for the defense
It was a bad` day'for the defense in lion," terming the defense's- view of
Alexandria, Virginia.. the meaning on "classified" a mere
That's where- Frank. Snepp,. former matter of semantics-He shut off a line
C.I.A. agent,- is on trial in Federal.Dis- of questioning by defense attorneys,
trict Court for ; publishing his book, saying that "We are not going to make
"Decent Intervals without benefit of = the C.I.A. be-exposed to -any more
thari'tYgMve been." r~ .~ .
C.I.A. clearance: ;.Y
what made. the daygrim for Snepp- The role of the American judictary
and his attorneys: was, the attitude, of ; is to serve- as an impartial referee ar a
District.. Judge ;Oren.. Lewis. The ex trial.: The aim. of even-handed justice,
C.I.A. operative:t_is: ` accused, by the :1 ; from .the account. of the. Alexandria
government.. of breach. of his promise trial so far, seems to have` been mis-
of secrecy by. publishing his account of . sed by Judge Lewis. Rather than pro-
the last days of they American pre 'viding a calm, reasoned atmosphere,
sence in Saigon.- :The government is- he, appears to be behaving like.. a
asking that. as. punishment. all, litigant himself and adding to the chill--
royalties. received from- the -:book be ing effect of the government's lawsuit.
given to the government-. Even the darkest of days may have
It's a civil case: not a criminal trial,. a silver lining:- by showing his colors
and consequently the- -rules are so early and so clearly during the pro-
somewhat different from the pro- cedings, Judge Lewis
for defense. well be ap-
cedural safeguards required by the- . ing the groundwork
Constitution in -a, prosecution. There,.. , peal. The wages of
reversals. sin, after,
I
are many; however,, who. feel that. the all, are appellate government's case against Snepp , ;comfort. perhaps, but at this poirit, it
should be a persecution, as well as a seems about all Snepp and Company i
--__-- .-d Jude ?nT saris appears have_,,
to be one of them.
a right to divulge-classified informa-
dispute. He indicated that "nobody has
rulings," the judge: threw out the de-
fense's request fora. jury trial. on the
grounds that there were no, facts- in
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PHILADELPHIA BULLETIN
26 June 1978
Telling CIA tales
We hope the time never comes when
people of conscience in our government
stop "blowing the whistle" on the mis-
takes and misdeeds of those in authority..
That's an aspect of the trial of Frank
Snepp, a ? former Central Intelligence-
Agencyt analyst.. which should make us
all uneasy.
At the same time, we Americans sim
ply have to. begin to ask ourselves if we-
can _- continue , to have. an . intelligence ,
agency at all `unless there-Are some....
guidelines as to, the way that' whistle 1*,
blown and these are followed.
Mr.. Snepp, "after, eight. years in th-
CIA, resigned and wrote a book critical .
of-the agency's' alleged failures during--
the American evacuation of Saigon. in
1975. He didn't submit the book for CIA
clearance despite a "secrecy agree. ual ex-employe, should pass on this.
meat" The CIA and. the Justice Depart The federal judge in this case has not
yet, formally ruled, but he has said that
meat have sought in a breach olc~ntract
he thinks Mr. Snepp deliberately and wil-
suit W take away his profits from the
book as damages.
Mr. Snapp has contended that he
wasn't obligated to~submit his. book for
review as he didn't- disclose clasaifed
information. He says. he wrote the book
"because I thought the CIA should learn
from its mistakes." He think that if he
loses the case there'll be a CIA that
"marches in bureaucratic lockstep" and
fully breached a contract and breached
the public trust and "did it for money.
7~,~~This reference to what the judge called,
M .Snepp's "ill-gotten ga~," howvw,
may also be a painful reminder of how
many public servants, far more highly
placed than Mr. Snepp, made a good deal
more money out of writing about their
betrayals of government- and actual
crimes than he has made out of criticize
iinmuae to criticism from former ing CIA's errors
employes.,.. ~
Still, the CIA, tattered and tore from But we keep coining, back to the basic
years of disclosures and criticisms, is ob. point that our society must continue to
viously seeking to reestablish control and -'work-'towards proper,_ oversight in this
discipline that it regards as essential: to sensitive' area of intelligence activities
the: conduct of an- intelligence operation. and there are now congressional commit.
Even when an employe doesn't reveal tees charged with this responsibility. -
classified information in- a publication, The whistle-blowers on. intelli
and the Government doesn't contend bir. matters should be -able to - rely. on so= con.
Snapp did;. It can be and. is argued that gress- for correctioos.We hope that-'
the Agency task rather than the ind1vid c Teasingly they era - and will
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MISCELLANEOUS
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U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT
17 JULY 1978
AR77CLE ApPxA.RED
ON PAGE
letters-j
to the Editor
National Security Agency
Your cover story on the National Se-
curity Agency.-fjune 26) was well writ-
ten and informative. Despite this, I
would rather that it had not been pub-
lished. Exposure of the actions of the
FBI and CIA led to a curtailment of
their intelligenee-gathering capabili-
ties. I hope your article does not result
in a cry for similar restrictions on the
operations of the NSA.
GREG Fu
Falls Church, Va.
AMMME APPEARED
OM PAGE LO
Washington
nM1~i o~3p@T@ o
Friends say CIA Director Stanfield 1
Turner is still simmering over the
way the White House handled the
charges of Cuban( complicity in the
invasion of Zaire. To refute denials
from Fidel Castro, presidential aides
tried to pressure the CIA to release
more and more intelligence indicat-
ing Cuban involvement-even at the
risk of revealing secret intelligence
methods and sources that would com-
promise the agency.
Kremlinologists are speculating that
high awards recently handed out to
three prominent Soviet surgeons of-
fer clues to what ails Soviet leader
Leonid Brezhnev. One of the special-
ists is a heart expert, another a kidney
expert, the third a urologist. -
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ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH
3 July 1978
A..World At Risk
The U.N. General Assembly's Special Ses- World countries, unable to dramatize the link-
sion on Disarmament opened last month in an age they saw between disarmament and devel-
aura- of hope and idealism and has now passed opment, thereafter played little part in the work
into history in ambiguity at best. Its final docu- of the session, although they were largely re-
ment was a vague and pious declaration of the sponsible for convening it in the first place.
obvious dangers of nuclear weaponry. Indeed in Even that .champion of peace and disarma-
some quarters the session has been dismissed went, India, made no effort to press for a mora-
as an outright failure. In.. that view, nothing torium on the testing of nuclear weapons and a
constructive -really happened; the world is just. i, ban on their use.
as dangerous for one and all as it was when the But there were some positive achievements.
session began six,weeks ago. And to a consider- ,ane of the most significant was the assembly's
able extent, that may-well be a realistic reading decision to enlarge its Commission on Disarma.
of the condition' of the world if not of the ses-' went to'include France and China, both nuclear,
sion's positive potential:.-' ` powers,, and to provide for a system of rotating
One of the difficulties that the meeting faced leadership to replace the joint Soviet-American
was the failure ?of ;the superpowers -to take it leadership that in' the 19_ years-of the group's
seriously - of at. least to give the appearance existence has produced'not disarmament but
that they accorded it the highest possible priori-. svastly,. expanded armament throughout- the
ty. Neither. President Carter nor Soviet leaden world..France-- and China had previously re.
Brezhnev put in an appearance, and that cast a fused to participate in the work of the commis:
shadow of impotence over the proceedings;'To .. sion because of. superpower domination. They,
be sure, the U.S-_ and the Soviets were locked, now have an opportunity to show if they can do
into their own bilateral negotiations over strate? any better.
gic arms and significant associated matters. ' The prospects are hardly encouraging. A
The latter include laudable efforts to ban nucle- - Central. Intelligence Agency study made publicl
ar tests, to prevent an arms.race in outer space, the-other day played up the substantial increase
to curb the threats of chemical and radiological in military spending that can be" anticipated
warfare, to limit: military activity in the Indian _ from the Soviets in the next few years. It made
Ocean and to achieve a reduction in force levels no mention of the Pentagon's spending plans,
in Central Europe, where more than 1.5 million
armed men face each other on either side of. the
Iron Curtain.
Still, these vital issues,, touching the lives of
all the people of the world, not merely Americans- or Russians, were being negotiated ac .
some distance from the ?U.N'. session, which iir
fact was largely irrelevant to their resolution.
Hence it is not surprising that most of the Third
but one can be sure that they will be anything
but modest, even if a strategic arms agreement
is buttoned up in Geneva next month. For in
setting new ceilings on strategic weaponry, that
agreement will be a license for both sides to
build up to them. That will be better than
an
uncontrolled race to mutual extinction. But it
will be a long way from what the disarmament
session was supposed to be all about.
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THE WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)
ARTICLE APPEARED 13 July 1978
ON PAGE C-1
01101
~COmmentaiy
Hugh SWey (WDVM-9) N . -' It is true that there is
lessyaeed. todayforsecrecy- thaw we used to think. It
also?is;true-that we need to. watch the FBI and the CIAO
more closely. But there must be some method by w
we can inform ourselves of those who would damage o
destroy_our society; There-must be some trust- placed
in our publrc servants to use theepwer, we give; them
correctly
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Jtu19 r RlL' j.. V V ZJ An.La K
28 June 1978
Spying between the superpowers.
WILLIAM COLEY, who headed the CIA from ambassadors and are expected to be free soon to
~i ~I 1973 to 1978` doesn't think highly of todayb ? -return home
Soviet spies He says they lack ideological fervor.
The Russians offer "some guy $5,000 or $15,000 for _ - - ? Spying Is a tit for tat business between the two
secrets. They'l get odds and ends that way, but they ' superpowers,, with agreed on protocol in case of
. .r released the other's spies without undue publicity.
This time, however, the United States, for undis.
How true! Take the two Soviet employees of the closed reasons, . blew ? the whistle immediately on
United Nations who were arrested in New Jersey .VallkAleksandrov Enger and Rudolph Petronovich.
on charges of buying defense secrets from a "US. Chernyayev. naval officer. The data they got . was worthless
because the American was cooperating with the Soviet President Leonid Brezhaevs edginess is FBL The Russians didn't know when to come is understandable-in light of his problems with China
from the cold. " - _ and Western criticism of his imperialist aspirations
in Africa. But we believe the espionage arrange-
So we think an exchange. of this pair for meats between Moscow and Washington will return
American businessman Francis Crawford is a good-. to the status quo without harm to detente. President
deal Crawford was hnpzisoned in Moscow on Carter echoed our feelings when he said he believes
obviously trumped up currency charges iir retalia- Brezhnev wants peace. "We're too strong a nation to
lion for the New Jersey arrests The three have. be pushed around.' We want .to be friends with the
been released in custody of their respective.. Soviets' -
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RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH
7 July 1978
The Priorities of
By Cord Meyer
Counterintelligence
WASHINGTON - In the wake of the South
Korean scandals, Congress wants more
scrutiny of what the intelligence agents of
friendly governments are up to in this country.
The problem is how to devote more attention
to the "friendlies" when the "unfriendlies" are
so busy. In calling for closer attention to the
secret operations of our allies in the United
States, theSenateIntelligenceCommitteetakes
pains to stress that Soviet espionage poses a
much more serious and continuing threat.
The American counterintelligence network is
stretched tight by the ubiquity of Soviet and
satellite officials on long-term assignments.
Serving as diplomats, members of the U.N.
staff, trade representatives and news cor-
respondents, these officials form inindispen-
sable base for Soviet espionage operations.
This roster of communist visitors has been
steadily expanding. It totals now about 2,200of-
ficials, including some 300 Russians who are
members of the U.N. Secretariat In New York.
The latter do not enjoy diplomatic immunity,,
but they are not impeded by the travel restric-
tions which bind Soviet diplomats. A Russian
diplomat who has defected to the British has
recently identified a fresh covey of Soviet agents
among U.N. staff employees in New York and
Geneva.
American counterintelligence experts regard
some 40 percent of all the Soviet officials in this
country as known or suspected intelligence
operatives. A similar percentage of the East
European personnel is believed to be responsive
to their respective intelligence services. Ex-
perts can only guess at the intelligence pre-
occupations of the 5,000 Soviets and 6,000 East
Europeans who come here each year as mem-
bers of visiting delegations. In addition, some
21.000 multiple entry visas were granted In 1977
to the crews of Soviet ships under a 1972
agreement.
Within this large population of potential spies,
it is the job of the actual agents to recruit
American citizens and to maintain secret con-
tact with them. As recent court cases have
revealed, the Soviet objective is to collectawide
range of highly classified information on ad-
vanced military technology and Americanplans
and intentions worldwide.
AGAINST THIS THREAT, OUR first line of
defense is the FBI, which has under the law
the primary responsibility for keepingclean the
Augean stable caused by the presence of so
many Soviet operatives. Using physical and
electronic surveillance, the evidence of Soviet
defectors and the cooperation of Individual
citizens, the bureau has the unenviable, difficult
task of catching Soviet spies and their American
agents before serious damage has been done.
How well is the FBI now performing this vital
counterintelligence function? There is no doubt
the efficiency and morale of the bureau has been
hurt by misuse of presidential authority and the
past abuses of some of its officials. The pending
prosecutions and disciplinary actions will leave
lasting scars, but the good news is that the FBI Is
beginning to recover from these shocks.
On coming to office, Attorney General Griffin
Bell was wholly unfamiliar with the complex
world of counterintelligence, but he and his
bright young assistants have proved quick lear-
ners. After along search, Bell has found in Judge William Webster a first-rate FBI director who is
getting full support in rebuilding the morale of
the bureau. '
The FBI counterintelligence experts have
been encouraged by their award of the highest
financial priority in the Justice Department's
new zero-based budget. Bell has stood firm in a
recent court case in defending the confidential-
ity of informants. In contrast to former.Attor-
ney General Levi, Bell has been giving FBI
agents prompt and definitive guidance to
resolve doubts on what theycan legallydo under
the new regulations designed to protect in-
dividual rights.
On counterintelligence issues, Congress is
shifting at last from the sins of the past to the
needs of the present. Both Senate and House In-
telligence committees have earned good
reputations for preserving security, and Justice
is concentrating highly classified Information In
these two committees to limit the congressional
leaks that have been so damaging.
Much work remains to be done by Justice in
working out with Congress a new legal charter
for the intelligence community. One problem is
to protect civil rights while allowing the In-
telligence agencies to do-their work without
crippling restrictions. Justice lawyers agree
that gaping loopholes in the obsolete and con-
flicting espionage laws need to be closed.,
The counterintelligence resources now
available are so fully challenged by the present
scale of Soviet espionage operations that Bell
plans to tell Congress that surveillance of the
"friendly" agents will require more funds.
01:,78, Field En terprises Inc.
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o
- &el
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ARTrCLE APPEARED
HUMAN EVENTS
29 JULY 1978
Soviet Civil Defense
CIA Report
Boomerangs on Culver-
Sen. John Culver (D.-Iowa), who scored a meager
20 per cent on the American Security Council's
1978 national security'voting index, has released a
Central Intelligence Agency study that disproves
the dovish- lawmaker's vigorous effort to downplay
Soviet civil defense efforts.
In his version of the report which he requested.
Culver said in a prepared statement that while
civil defense represented "a significant national ef-
fort" on the part of the Soviet Union, the program
"is by no means sufficiently effective to encourage
the Soviets to risk starting a nuclear war."
Culver also said: "While crediting the Soviet
Union with a major, ongoing civil defense pro-
gram, this report demonstrates that those efforts
are not sufficient to prevent millions of casualties
and massive industrial damage in the event of a nu-
clear war. In short, Soviet programs are not enough
to tip the strategic balance against us."...
'While Culver's assessment of the report is
technically correct,.the report, nevertheless, is
far more alarming than the frenetic Iowan arms
controller suggests. Moreover, the study is all
the more disconcerting, since the CIA, under
Stansfield Turner, is considered especially at-
tuned to the wishes and whims of the head-in-
the-sand defense stance at the White House.
Despite all the dovish statements emanating
from the Administration, however, the CIA report, makes clear that, under favorable conditions, the
Soviet Union could, because of its civil defense
.program, reduce its casualties in a nuclear ex-
change to "the. low tens of millions." In World War
II, the Soviets lost 20 million people.
What is also undeniably clear is that the Soviets
are engaged in a massive program, which, in effect,
totally undermines a major assumption upon which
we have based'our arms negotiations with the Rus-
sians. That assumption is that each side will abide
by the "Mutual Assured Destruction" doctrine;
that is, that each side will leave its population cen-
ters vulnerable to an atomic attack, so, supposedly,
neither side will dare launch a first strike for fear of
a lethal, retaliatory blow. - r
While the United States adheres to this
doctrine in a theoretical way, we have also sys-
tematically dismantled our air and missile defenses
for the precise purpose of assuring-the Soviets that
we are abiding by the doctrine in a very practical
way as well. But though we are making our citi-
zenry increasingly vulnerable to an atomic assault,
the Soviets-this CIA study proves-are engaging
in a gargantuan effort to shield' their. population
from the effects of an atomic war.
Says the report: "Civil defense activities are di-
rected by a nationwide civil defense organization
consisting of over 100,000 full-time personnel lo-
cated at all levels of the Soviet government and
economic structure.... A sustained effort has been
made to provide blast shelters for the leadership
and essential personnel. . . .
"
Assuming a U.S. retaliatory blow following a
Soviet first strike, the CIA remarks:
? Under worst conditions for the USSR, with
only a few hours or less to make final preparations,
Soviet casualties would be well over 100 million,
but even in this scenario, "a large percentage of the
leadership elements would probably survive." ? If
? With just a few days for final preparations,
casualties "could be reduced by more than 50 per
cent; most of this reduction would be due to evacu-
ation, the remainder to shelters." - -
? Under the most favorable conditions for the
USSR, including a week or more to complete ur-
ban evacuation and then to protect the evacuated
population, "Soviet civil defenses could reduce
casualties to the low tens of millions."
Completely contrary to the thrust of Culver's
contention, then, the CIA study-undoubtedly
tailored not to incite the White- House-is a very
disturbing document.
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P,RTICI+E U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT
pN PAGE_,,.,1.X-
31 July 1978
Woridgrain\
How good is the Soviet Union's highly touted civil-defense program?
Not goad enough for its leaders to feel safe in starting nuclear war,
according to a mid-July Central Intelligence Agency report. Here's why:
Casualties in sudden conflict would run to 100 million. Tens of millions
would die even with a week's warning to evacuate urban centers. Further-
There's enough blast-shelter space to save 110,000 top officials, 12 to 24
percent of the work force, up to 20 percent of the total population. But . . .
Moscow has no way of preventing massive damage to vital industrial plants.
It's easier to protect people than to defend a nation's economic sinews.
The conclusion set forth by the CIA's experts: "We do not believe that the
Soviets' present civil defense would embolden them deliberately to expose the
U.S.S.R. to a higher risk of nuclear attack."
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ARTICLE tPP ARE
4N- PAGE'
NEW YORK TII3
24 JULY 1.978
Issue and Debate I
Trade and. Foreign Policy:
Will Export Controls Influence Moscow?
ny RICHARD BURT
SprculmT etwvYarltTiros
WASHINGTON, July 23- President
Carter's. decision last week to cancel
the sale of a computer and impose con-
trots on the export of oil technology to
the Soviet Union has touched off a
controversy over whether trade curbs
should be used as a diplomatic tool.
The President's move was designed
to underline American displeasure
over trials of Soviet dissidents and the
treatment of American journalists in,
Moscow. As described by White House
officials, the imposition of controls on
oil equipment is also meant to give Mr.
Carter leverage in disputes with the
Soviet . Union, ranging ? from rights
violations to foreign policy differences.. -
Yet a host of questions concerning
the linkage strategy remain to be re-
solved, in particular. ; whether the
threat of denying trade is effective in
the case of the Soviet Union.
:Link to Arms Talks Ruled Out
Until recently, American officials
had spoken only in vague terms about
using trade to influence policy; in a, with the Soviet Union, sought to induce
speech at Wake Forest University last Congress to remove high tariffs on the
March. for instance, Mr; Carter said a import of Soviet goods and to have the
Soviet military buildup and other ac- Export-Import Bank grant credits in
*rvities in Africa could jeopardize tech- the hope that Moscow's increasing de-
Lological and economic ties. - - pendence on American trade would in-
But Mr.. Carter's unwillingness to hibit aggressive behavior abroad.
link Soviet policies to the talks on the Mr. Nixon's effort was blocked by.
limitation of strategic weapons led his Congress, where Senator Henry M.
security advisers in the White House to Jackson, Democrat of Washington, led
search for economic pressures that a movement to make lower tariffs and
could be used. __ _A:.. +--- - -- -
State Department and the Commerce
Department, but the recent trials of
dissidents fostered Congressional sup.
port for economic sanctions. By plac-
ing oil technology on the list of corn.
modities subject to expert controls- Mr_
?---- ~'^ about 10 times as much as case by case. Andyet . they export-
officials remain
divided over whether and how he ed, with grains needed to'replenish.
should use his power.
Background 4?
After this linkage had been made part-
of the 1974 Trade Act, -Moscow re-
nounced the 1972 trade agreement.
The volume of trade grew, nonethe-
less, reaching a peak of SZ.3 billion in
poor harvests making up about 60 per
cent of imports from the United States.
i. ` Moscow has also, been buying indus-
TMNmYaRrims/h1yr1? 1!1{
Union has emerged as a powerful mili-
tary power, its persistent economic -
problems offer opportunities for lever.
M. White House officials are narticu-
larT .
tral rte igence a e
aides say that the United
States should not help Moscow expand
.oil production without political cones.
sions. Such a strategy is feasible, it is
said. because the United States has a-
corner on the world market for ad-
vanced oil technology. This is also said
to be the case with advanced comput`-
ers.
In making the case for a linkage poll-'
ey, the White House officials say that
the United States should-use a-carrot-
and-stick approach, rewarding the
Soviet Union for moderate- behavior
?and penalizing it for what the United
States regards as aggressive acts.
lh'the first two decades after World of $600 million in 1976. Lately,- the
War II, the United States, in effect; con- Soviet Union has' been purchasing
ducted economic warfare against the . growing amounts of advanced'oil tech-
Soviet Union. The transfer of advanced nology, needed to increase the rate of
technology was prohibited and exports recovery of its increasingly tight oil
of many other products required gov-
ernment approval. The 1969 Export Ad-
ministration Act removed most of
these barriers and the Nixon Adminis-
tration, under its policy of detente, .
gave Moscow access to American tech-
nology, prohibiting only .
items that were judged to have direct
military application.
Behind President Nixon's support for
increased-trade was the belief of his na-
tional security adviser, Henry A. Kiss-
inger. that the Soviet Union needed
American help to spur an inefficient
economy. The Republican Adrriinistra-
tion, in concluding a 1972 trade accord
sources. The Commerce Department Case Against Controls
estimates that oil-related sales could
be $1.billion over the next three years. Export controls are criticized from
several perspectives. State
Depart-
,S mans officials, for example, question
whether Moscow would be willing to
Advocates of export controls contend pay a- political price for American '
that commerce should not be detached trade. They note that when Senator .
from other currents in the Soviet- Jackson - succeeded in linking trade
American relationship. The United , benefits with emigration, Moscow sim-
States, they say, links trade with other ply lost interest. The Soviet Union, they -
issues when dealing with allied nations, say, may have an appetite for technolo.
such as Japan or West Germany, and - gy, but it is unlikely to alter its policies
there is,no reason that deals with the at home or abroad- to obtain it.
Soviet Union should be exempt. , . . These officials, together with some i
They also note that while the Soviet members of Congress, also wonder'
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whether the White House, having i
achieved controls on exports, could
fend off domestic pressures opposed to
controls. They point to the Ford Admin-
istration's experience during the 1976
civil war in Angola, when the Govern-
ment threatened to cut off grain ship-
ments to Moscow because of its mili-
tary support for one of the factions in
the conflict. The Administration was
unable to carry out the threat because
of political objections from farmers.
Commerce Department officials say
that, in many cases, other Western na-
tions could step in to fill the gap created
by a decision tol deny a particular
product to Moscow. The Soviet Union
already' does far more business with
the modern industrial economies, of
West Germany and Japan than with the
United. States. The officials say that the
United States' present edge in comput
ers and oil equipment is vanishing. For
a linkage policy to work, other Western
nations would have to be induced to.
cooperate, and the officials believe this
would be almost impossible.
Finally, Secretary of Commerce
Juanita M. Kreps and her top.-aides
fear that new licensing procedures will
add to the maze of restrictions that now
hinder a growth in exports and under-
mine the -competitive position of
American industry. -
Outlook
Although Mr. Carter has canceled
the computer sale and imposed con-
trols on oil technology, he said at a
news conference last week that no fur-
ther steps were planned.
. While the Administration is unlikely
to cancel any deals in the immediate
future, another Soviet . crackdown
against dissidents or enhanced activity
in Africa could once again create pres-
sures for retaliatory action. A central
question;that needs to be resolved is ex-
actly what- Soviet behavior the United
States is attefnpting to influence. The
experience of the Jackson amendment
demonstrated the problems of linking
trade to emigration, 'and there is:
general agreement that, if a linkage.
policy is to work, the?United States
- must specify what Soviet actions could
bring on economic sanctions.
Moreover, if economic diplomacy is
to be effective, there must be a suffi-
ciently large volume of trade to which a
leverage policy could be applied in the
-first place. But to raise the volume of
Soviet-American trade to anywhere,
near the level attained by other major
Western nations would probably re-.
quire the lifting of current restrictive
legislation, which Congress is in no
mood to approve. It is questionable;
furthermore; whether the Soviet Union
would risk building up trade with the
United States in face of an expressed
policy that Washington would use its
economic clout if the strategy de-
mands. -
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APTiCJE APPEARED NEW YORK TIMES
26 JULY 1978
site can deliver to a target and in the com-
bined explosive power of land-based and
submarine-based missiles.
By now, the report says, the Russians
have achieved equality or advantage in
additional fields including the number of
submarine-based launchers, the total
number of long-range missiles and bomb-
ers, the ability of land-based missiles to
destroy hardened targets, and the ability
to retaliate after sustaining a strike.
Report Covers the 1960-82 Period
1 Strategic Arms
vantage of 3 to 1 in the overall total of
multiple warheads in 1982, the report,
says. The advantage is greatest in sub-
marine-launched missiles - 9 to 6. In
land-based missiles, the- Russians have
an edge of 7 to 2.
Submarine-launched missiles Is
another category where the American ad-
vantage is endangered. The Russians are
known to be making efforts to develop
and deploy multiple warheads for their
By DREW MIDDLETON
Special to The New York Times
The Soviet Union has attained or is
moving toward superiority in 10 of 13
strategic nuclear forces and weapon sys-
tems, according to a report sponsored by
the Defense Nuclear Agency.
The report said the United States' ad-
vantage in submarine-launched missiles
with multiple warheads and in interconti-
nental bombers could be eroded by the
Soviet [.(onion's development of such war-
heads for ifs submarine missiles and the
inclusion of a controversial bomber,
known in the West as Backfire, in its
strategic calculations. '
The report was prepared by Santa Fe
Corporation of Alexandria, Va., for the
Defense Nuclear Agency, which is the De-
fense Department agency charged with
nuclear weapons management. The cir-
culation of the report, according to offi-
cials in the Defense Department, has irri-
tated Administration aides who fear that
it may undermine public support for a
new agreement Iimting strategic arms.
Defense Department Views Differ
Officials characterized the report as a
valuable academic study that did not re-
flect Defense Department views. Those
views are that a Soviet edge in some
areas, such as explosive power of mis-
siles, has been offset by American quali-
tative improvement, including missile
accuracy.
By the late 1960's, the report states, the
Soviet Union had achieved equality in
numbers of land-based missile launchers,
in multiple warheads for land-based mis-
siles, in the weight that a land-based mis-.
when the United States' advantage in all
fields was unquestioned, to 1982, when the
Russians will have drawn well ahead in
all but three areas. Discussing trends in
American and Soviet strategic nuclear
forces, the report lists the forces in which
the Russians hold an advantage.
In total numbers of long-range missiles
and bombers, it says, the Soviet Union
will have an advantage of.2 to 1 in 1982.
This includes an edge of 3 to 1.in land-
based launchers and 6 to 1 in submarine-
based launchers. The United States will
preserve a lead of 3 to 2 in bombers. -
The report points out that Soviet anti-
ballistic missile forces, defensive radar
systems and air defense forces are su-
perior to those of the United States,
which, in fact, has no ABM system.
The report also states that if the Back-
fire bomber were included in the overall
picture, the apparent United States ad-
vantage in bombers would be eroded. The
Americans contend that the Backfire can
fly intercontinental missions; the Rus-
sians insist it has only medium range.
Soviet weapon . Accordin to intell?
en sources t e Russians are eve oe-
i new hea land-based missi a to r
place the SS-11, whose warhead was estt=
mated b.% the West at I to 2 megatons.
By 198, the report estimates, the Rus-
sians will also have an advantage of 3 to 2
in _ "hard-target kill capability." The
capability to "kill a hard target," that is,
a hardened missile silo, is a key element
in the strategic balance.
Measure of Retailiatory Capacity
It is a measure used as an indicator of
counter-force capability. The American
assumption is that a first strike in a nu-
clear war would be launched by the
Soviet Union. Consequently the resist..
ance of American silos in-which the
United States' most advanced land-based
missile, the Minuteman, is housed is cru-
cial to the ability to launch a second, or
retaliatory, strike. -
The report found that the Soviet Uniott
by 1982 will have a hard-target kill capa-
bility against strengthened silos of 3 to Z.
This advantage covers silos strengthened
The United States will maintain an ad- to take art impact of 1,000, 2,000 and 3,OQO
-- - pounds per square inch.
The report states that the Soviet Union
also will have an advantage by 1982 in the
counter-military potential of land-based
and submarine-based missiles. This'
potential is the ability of a nuclear force
to retaliate after sustaining a strike.
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ARTICLE 4PPFARE'D NEV YORK TIMES
S~ 28 JULY 1978
Snepp's Lawyer Calls U.S. Unfair:.,
Speciai a Th. New Yo, Times
WASHINGTON, July 27-A lawyer for
Frank W. Snepp 3d, the former Central
Intelligence Agency. official who was
found by a Federal District Court to have
violated his secrecy oath with the agency,
said today that the Justice Department
was being' patently unfair" to Mr. Snepp
in seeking an immediate payment- of
money.damages .that,. 'would bankrupt
him.' e , }y. ..a ` .._.
In a motion to the - same', judge Who
ruled-that Mr. Snepp had violated his
oath by writing-a book, "Decent Inter-
val,"- that' was -critical -of -the agency's
performance in the evacuation of Saigon,
the lawyer, Mark H. Lynch, urged that no
payment be required for at least 60 days.
Violated Secrecy Oath .,
In addition, Mr. Lynch complainedthat
the department was seeking recovery of
the total amount of money that Mr. Snepp
received from his publishers without re-
gard for the. fact that some of this money
had already been paid.to the Government
in taxes -and-without considering that
some of it was used to cover the expenses
needed to produce the book..
To demand recovery of this total sum,
Mr. Lynch said, in a memorandum ,to
Judge Oren R. Lewis,, "would bankrup
Mr. Snepp
Judge Lewis, . in. a_decision on. July- 7
after two days of hearings in the Govern-.
men's breach of contract suit against,
Mr. Snepp, said that the -former intelli';
gence officer had violated his secrecy
oath with the agency and that all the "ill.
gotten gains' should be turned over to the
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ARTICLE AFY'FA
ON PAGE
N Turn
y.~
NEWSWEEK
31 July 1978
The CIA vs. Me
Last November, when my highly critical convinced of this because the CIA had Asia Division, now
account of the American evacuation betrayed its obligations to me under my is a well-paid lobby-
of Vietnam appeared on the stands, I original secrecy agreement In exchange ist for Japan, and
never dreamed I would be dragged into for my signing that document, the CIA . Henry- Kissinger in-
court by the government, denied my had promised to address any complaints tjersperses work on
profits and stripped of my right ever to I might have about its operations. But-A his own multimil-n-do write again about my experiences in when I returned from Vietnam in-1975 Iwo with nnllarcrlectnrrs
--
proval. Yet all of this has happened and I - tae evacuation wl- ulc Yavyca a...+-..?. _.__ ._ _-_--
now find myself in the center of a crucial ties, no one wanted to listen. year. These men have not been sued for I
test case of the First Amendment As a way of getting the truth out, I exploiting a public trust for money.
During my recent trial in a Virginia sought CIA support for a book about the I believe the justice Department and
Federal district court, the lawyers for the evacuation, but my superiors told me the Carter Administration are. treating
Justice Department claimed I had violat- they would never sanction any book by a me differently in order to intimidate
ed a "public trust" and a "contract," a present employee that was critical of the those in the CIA who would speak out
1968 secrecy agreement with the CIA, by agency. Meanwhile, I discovered that against official wrongdoing. They are
publishing my book without authoriza- senior CIA officers were leaking their using my case to establish a precedent
tion. But not once did they accuse me of own self-flattering accounts of Saigon's for punishing those who will not toe the
leaking secrets or even less sensitive final agonies to the press, sometimes company line.
information that had not already been using classified information whose very
DISCIPLINARY PRECEDENT
revealed by the CIA. disclosure potentially endangered Viet-
Nor has the government seen fit to namese we had left behind. That did it Turner claims he needs this precedent
acknowledge that a second secrecy for me. I resigned in protest to enforce discipline in the CIA and to
agreement I signed when I left the CIA In the course of my trial, most of these ensure that secrets are kept But if the
in 1976 significantly modified the first. facts were somehow lost Moreover, higher courts agree with him, the chill
The later agreement did not obligate me when CIA director Adm. Stansfield will be felt far beyond CIA ranks. The
to submit everything I might write for Turner took the stand to spell out the justice Department will be free to muz-
review. It merely put me on notice to "damage" I had done to the agency with zle and to break financially any Federal
protect the nations secrets by exercising my unclassified disclosures, my lawyers employee in a "position of trust" who
my own common sense and judgment from the American Civil Liberties Union dares to call the Administration on its
were unable to pin him down. He would mistakes, even if he exposes no secrets
AGREEMENT AND APPROVAL say only that books such as mine less- and has signed no secrecy agreement.
The Justice Department's lawyers, erred the, public's confidence in the No doubt, the CIA must find some way
however, have pretended that my sec- agency's ability to keep secrets. Former to protect legitimate secrets. Perhaps the
and agreement is meaningless and have director William Colby, in testimony of most sensible solution would be for Con-
based their case solely on the earlier one. his own, went further, claiming that even gress to enact a law that would prescribe
That agreement did forbid me to write or "cleared" books and Congressional in- stiff criminal penalties for any employee
say anything about "intelligence activi- vestigations can have this effect Are we of a security agency who leaks secrets
ties generally" without CIA approval. to stifle responsibile criticism to save the harmful to an intelligence source or
But because of the sweeping character of CIA from embarrassment? Are we to gag method. Under this rule a would-be au-e this prohibition, it was never enforced. I Congress to protect the CIA's image? thor a Pen gon would State able a mete be e to
did write uncensored letters to my family -'ILL-GOTTEN' GAINS
from Saigon; I did provide countless what he wanted without having to sub-
briefings to the press in Vietnam without In the end the judge declared that I mit his manuscript for clearance-but
having to clear my remarks beforehand. deserved to lose all my "ill-gotten" gains always with the understanding that if he
Furthermore, agency veterans such as because I had violated an implicit "pub- disclosed classified information he
Miles Copeland and Tom Braden fre- lic trust" (not merely a secrecy agree- would face a terrible reckoning. This
quently wrote about their professional ment, mind you) to earn them. He did not would not, of course, prevent someone
experiences without CIA clearance and find it necessary to reconcile that judg- bent on treason from revealing national
they were never sued. (Admittedly, for- ment with the fact that many others have secrets (nor, for that matter, would the
mer CIA employee Victor Marchetti was done virtually the same thing. Hundreds court's ruling against me). But it would
hauled into court in 1972 and prohibited of prominent Americans, from Thomas serve to reconcile, in the only consciona-
from writing without CIA approval, but Jefferson to George Kennan, have writ- ble way, the demands of national securi-
only after the agency had convinced the ten critically of official policies after ty and the imperatives of the First
court that he had violated the ban against serving the government in positions of Amendment.
disclosure of classified information.) trust and have been paid for their efforts. in Sai-
CIA wonder, then, that when I left the Other public servants have mined the Snepp, a former CIA official CIA in 19761 felt the agency had no right knowledge they gained at the public's gon, wrote "Decent Interval," a book
to demand clearance of everything I expense to great personal profit Colby, that details the CIA's alleged, mistakes
might write or say. I was all the more who was once head of the CIA's East during the last days of the Vietnam war.
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ARTICLE APP T WASHINGTON WEEKLY
ON PAGE_ 27 JULY 1978
BA
VICTORIES
A.~~,
FOR JUSTICE
PATRICK[ BUC!ANAIf Y' . ' -
WASHINGTON - -Last-week, Attorney General signed a CIA. oath to allow agency scrutiny of sub-
Griffin M- picked up a contempt citation, rather sequent writings- a contract Snepp willfully and
than divulge the names ofFBI`informants in: the knowlingly violated
Socialist, Workers Party. And his Department-of If the Snepp decision has a :"chilling effect',' upon
Justice swept both ends of a doubleheader in federal,:. potential. turncoats inside the. agency who are .now
court here: ,t' gathering dirt in anticipation of fame and fortune on
David Traong son of etnamese'"'peace=can the-lecture-and-talk show circuit;: that is awelcome
didate"` in 1967 and" co-conspirator Ronald ancillary benefit_
behavior, they will be eligible for parole in 1982.) Snepp's initial requestfor a jury trial was gaveled
And Frank W: Snepp rn ;the cheeky ex-CIA agent down.,He was regularly referred to by the judge as
who blabbed in a highly` profitable book about the "Shep." "Objection sustained," i the. judge, would
each sentenced' to 15-years is the Graybar Hotel for:
espionage. for the :-Hanoi.=regime-. -(Given good
upon the=simple, unassailable fact that Snepp had
betrayed vital security secrets.-its-case was built
Department of Justice made' no- apologies for the.
use of-wiretapping; 'secret television surveillance
and double agents to apprehend the, pair:
As for Snepp - Justice did not' claim that he had
In the Truong-Humphreg case; for :example, the:
the United -States:- 7``;} s` }
but essential' tools to-protect the internal security of
over his ill-gotten gains .` % -
In each instance;: Judge Bell showed the courage
to be unpopular; the moxie to employ unappetizing
botched Saigon withdrawal 'was ordered- to fork -
It was the misfortune of Snepp and his lawyers to
have their: case upon the docket of federal Judge
Oren: R. Lewis, a minor, legent in the-locality...-
thunder to defense .arguments:.--.well before-the
prosecution had time to make the objection. Linger-
ing doubts about the judge's-thinking disappeared
half an hour-.into the trial., when he gave: the defense
-directions to the federal: appellate court., in
Richmond:: "You just take-1-96 and go-'s=tt4 h40
But: if the judge's handling of the Snepp cue was
not-& model. of jurisprudence to be-studied In laves
schools,; his decision cannot be faulted.;.
Snepp,is not some backwoods bumpkin.. He signed
a "clear and_unambiguous,contract" with, the CIA.
He took their pay for 10 years.; He then broke that
contract and reaped, at last report, $60,090 in profits
for his breach of faith.
At least two former and one present CIA director
concurred'with the judge's, opinion that Snepp's con-
duct "caused the-; United States_irreparable.barnt.
and loss....(and l inpaired the CIA's ability to gathers
and protect'_ ?..,. ; .. t
"It's an~ extremely'sensitive'ithat-
ter, " the source added 'One of ,the-j
problems is~'thaE; to ~p'ri secure we;
;.might have torelease classified infor*';.
?mation; and'we just can't do that?'
fz.It :xvas~learned'that