THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN: ABERRATION OR SYMPTOM?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP05S00620R000300770003-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 5, 2009
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: April 15, 1980
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2009/06/05: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000300770003-2
SECRET
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington. D. C.20505
15 April 1980
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Zbigniew Brzezinski
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
SUBJECT: . The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan:
Aberration or Symptom?
1. A short time ago we were discussing the implications of the
Soviet move into Afghanistan. We asked whether this was an aberration
which, when behind us, will see the Soviet Union revert to its previous
pattern of behavior; or whether it is a symptom of a new phase of
adventuresome policy to which the Kremlin is already committed. Sub-
sequently, I asked our Soviet experts to look at these two possible
explanations for Soviet behavior in Afghanistan. They have written
the attached paper which I believe is very helpful in putting these
two explanations into perspective.
2. It concludes that Soviet behavior in the future will be quite
contingent on the conclusions which the Soviet leadership draws from
the results of their experience in Afghanistan and US reactions to it.
In short, the Soviets are neither committed to returning to detente nor
to pursuing an aggressive policy on a global basis.
3. I would only add a personal comment that I would he a. bit more
categoric than the paper in stating that the Soviet behavior in Afghanistan
was riot an aberration. I agree that we do not have evidence that the
Soviets are firmly committed to continuing as aggressive a policy in the
third world as was this Afghan example. Yet, I do believe that the Soviet
track: record over the past five or six years indicates a definitely greater
willingness to probe the limits of our tolerance. "Detente" was not a bar
to their greater assertiveness in Angola, Ethiopia, Kampuchea, and Yemen.
It need not be so again, even if we return to detente. As the paper
concludes, how assertive the Soviets will be in the future will very
likely depend upon how "successful" the Soviet leadership views their
intervention in Afghanistan to have been.
Attachment
, SECRET
Approved For Release 2009/06/05: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000300770003-2