NORTH KOREA: A NEW POSTURE BETWEEN MOSCOW AND BEIJING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP04T00447R000301990001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 8, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 25, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

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Central Intelligence Agency 25X1
WtshkVm a C. 20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
25 July 1985
Moscow and Beijing
Summary
We believe the recent changes in North Korea's
behavior toward the Soviet Union and China--and in
part, its new flexibility toward the South--reflect
a basic reassessment of its strategic options,
rather than simply tactical adjustments in foreign
policy. The North's acquisition of Soviet MIG 23s
in the last few months is obvious evidence of the
benefits from P'yongyang's shift toward Moscow,
In our view, P'yongyang's failure to extract
any real benefit from the 13-year relationship
between Washington and Beijing leads the list of its
motivations for downgrading the primacy previously
accorded China in this triangle. At the same time,
the development of a more assertive, militarily
powerful, and ideologically compatible Soviet
This memorandum was prepared byl ~ Office of East Asian
Analysis. Information available as of 23 July 1985 was used in its
preparation. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the
Duplicate of C0542271 0:
RIP
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posture in Asia in the 1980s has changed the North's
balance sheet in favor of closer collaboration with
Moscow. We believe North Korea will attempt to
remain actively involved with the Chinese,
particularly in seeking economic and technical
assistance. But we expect P'yongyang to continue to
invest more heavily in cooperation with Moscow,
rather than with Beijing.
If these judgments about North Korea are
correct, they connote:
-- A North Korea that will continue to appeal
to Moscow by modifying its longstanding
independence on ideological and East-West
issues because it recognizes that only the
Soviet Union can meet its most important
needs in the 1980s and 1990s.
-- A "two-tiered" North Korean relationship
with China, with P'yongyang trying to
foster correct ties with Beijing and
perhaps to experiment with a Chinese-style
opening to Western trade and investment,
but keeping China at arm's length on
strategic and other political issues.
-- And, a North Korea that is positioned to
engage the Soviets actively in its own
version of quadrilateral diplomacy on the
peninsula.
A closer North Korean-Soviet relationship
neither simplifies nor advances US and South Korean
interests. Rather, it further limits China's
influence on the North as a collaborator with US
policy and opens the door to a greater Soviet role
in the Korean question. Even so, P'yongyang's shift
toward Moscow is not immutable. A variety of
developments, including changes in US-Soviet
relations, China's foreign policy or Kim I1-song's
succession plans could again bring P'yongyang to
alter its course.
China: The North Korean Perspective
Since US-China rapprochement in 1971-1972, North Korean
concerns about China's ties with the United States have been a
central problem in its relationship with Beijing. The record
demonstrates that the Chinese have been solicitous of P'yongyang
at each major turn in US-China relations. China has regularly
dispatched high level leaders to provide Kim I1-song with
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authoritative readings and assurances regarding Chinese
intentions and expectations for their US relationship. We can
only surmise about the substance of these sessions, and of
intervening contacts. But the evidence in the North Korean media
over the years, and the obvious fact that the United States has
remained P'yongyang's principal adversary, together suggest that
the North has closely scrutinized, sharply questioned, and
skeptically viewed each shift in US-China relations.
In our view, North Korean anxieties about the US-China tie
are deepseated and a key factor in P'yongyang's behavior. We
believe concern about US-China rapprochement led P'yongyang'to
take the initiative in the North-South dialogue in 1971, in part
to protect its freedom of action on the peninsula from subversion
by the major powers. Moreover, despite P'yongyang's historically
cool relations with Moscow, the North's policies and statements
demonstrate that the anti-Soviet dimension of China's cooperation
with the US--especially its acceptance of a US posture in Asia
that included US military forces in South Korea--have
consistently troubled Kim I1-song.
We do not know how hard or how often Kim and others
expressed their concerns and complaints to Beijing. But we
believe the North Koreans may have pushed for, and perhaps the
Chinese promised, more than Beijing could ever deliver from its
US relationship. For the North, the late 1970s produced a
worrisome evolution in the US-China tie, including the
development of cooperation in strategy, diplomacy, trade,
investment, and a security relationship that entailed arms
transfers as well as technology for Beijing. But the growing US-
China relationship produced little real benefit for P'yongyang
and no aid whatsoever for its leading foreign policy goal--a
dialogue with the United States and the removal of US forces--on
the Korean peninsula.
In fact, P'yongyang could tally up further
disappointments. China's support for the North's standdown on
major military exercises and its lower key diplomacy toward Seoul
and Washington after the Carter Administration's 1977
announcement of planned US ground force withdrawals brought no
gains for P'yongyang. Instead, Washington not only reversed the
withdrawal decision, but subsequent US publicity of China's
"support" for the presence of US forces in the South (a position
that Chinese statements in private to US and Japanese officials
had implied for some time) undoubtedly deepened P'yongyang's
misgivings about the US-China relationship.
Pyongyang at first almost certainly looked pessimistically
at the policies of the Reagan Administration. Given the rapid
downturn in US-China relations in 1981, however, we believe the
North may have taken some comfort in the contention between
Washington and Beijing that began almost immediately over the
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Taiwan arms issue. Most obviously, the Taiwan problem put a
sharp brake on aspects of US-China relations that gave P'yongyang
trouble. We have no evidence on this score, nor do we know
whether the North believed the Taiwan arms problem would
seriously effect the long-term US-China relationship. But it is
logical to assume the North Koreans welcomed China's 1981
decision to impose a highly publicized freeze on Beijing's
"strategic relationship" with Washington and to shelve military-
related contacts. And, in our view, P'yongyang also almost
certainly was troubled in August 1982 when the United States and
China resumed a more broad gauge relationship following the
Taiwan arms communique.
Moreover, we consider it likely that the North saw a
parallel between the issue of China's reunification with Taiwan
and Korean reunification, and that it viewed China's 1982
compromise on Taiwan as a harbinger of potential Chinese
duplicity on the Korean question. Again, we have no information
that the North Korean leadership assessed the development in
these terms. But, P'yongyang had clearly, if intermittantly,
suggested a parallel between Taiwan and its own reunification
goal during the arms sale controversy. Against that backdrop,
Beijing's compromise with Washington--the common actor in both
situations--could well have carried a decidedly negative message
about China's potential willingness to sell out P'yongyang's
goals for the peninsula.
Suspicions about Chinese dealings behind P'yongyang's back,
in any event, were already evident in P'yongyang in the early
1980s as a result of China's evolving economic ties with South
Korea. In addition to reinforcing North Korean misgivings about
Chinese support, the growth in Sino-South Korean trade since the
late 1970s undoubtedly has led P'yongyang to question how far
Beijing would go toward a de facto public linkage with Seoul. In
fact, Chinese comments last year, implying that Beijing would
move farther after Washington took steps toward the North,
highlight China's interest in closer economic ties with South
Korea. Beijing could continue to work both sides of the street--
maintaining a tie to the North, while controlling the growth of
its economic link to Seoul. But a Chinese judgment that the
North has taken a permanent shift toward Moscow also could lead
Beijing to conclude that it has little to gain in Pyongyang, and
considerable economic benefit to lose, from curbing its
relationship with Seoul.
In short, we believe that the North Korean experience with
China in the 1970s and 1980s has impelled P'yongyang's policy
shift toward Moscow. We also believe, however, that P'yongyang
reassessed the Soviet role in Asia at that time. Its judgments
about Moscow's capabilities and potential in the region, in our
view, brought the North to reevaluate the need for some
accommodation with the Soviet Union.
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The View Toward Moscow
North Korea's relations with the Soviet Union have rarely
been close, and P'yongyang would be unlikely to expect that
merely warming the political atmosphere would bring rapid or
dramatic changes. In fact, impediments to significant new
departures have long existed for both sides. Moscow's distaste
for Kim II-song's independence and its concern that another
Korean war could bring a US-Soviet conflict continue to underpin
a basically conservative Soviet policy on the peninsula.
Nonetheless, unlike the 1970s, when Pyongyang saw China
embarked on its opening to the United States, and the Soviet
Union still pursuing the politics of detente, the last five years
have brought considerable--and from the North's vantage point,
welcome--change.
In the last decade, three developments have been
particularly important to P'yongyang.
-- First, P'yongyang has welcomed Moscow's policy of
assertiveness toward the United States and the West.
The parallel Soviet and North Korean characterizations
of the dangers posed by the US military presence in
Northeast Asia and by the budding "US-Japan-South Korea
alliance" exemplify their community of views. North
Korea's unhappiness with the Soviet role in Southeast
Asia and Afghanistan also has mellowed- And. in light
knew aircraft transfers, the Soviets offer P'yongyang
a reassuring source of support compared to Beijing with
its worrisome tie to the United State.s.
Second, Moscow has made clear that its large,
thoroughly modernized military force will be a fixture
in East Asia, with its mobile intermediate range
nuclear forces, its growing naval force in the Pacific,
its presence in Japan's Northern Territories, and its
military outpost in Southeast Asia. This Soviet
military strength obviously has its downside for
P'yongyang, since it works to reinforce the US
willingness to maintain its own commitment to the
region, including US forces in South Korea. But, on
balance, Moscow's readiness to aggressively assert
itself in the Asian strategic environment stands in
marked contrast to P'yongyang's perception of Sino-US
and Sino-South Korean accomodation.
And, in North Korea itself, the quicker pace of
Kim II-song's family succession, and the effort to
revive the ailing economy, have caused the value of
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25X1
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better relations with the Soviet Union to appreciate
significantly. Soviet acknowledgement of Kim's son as
his successor helps lower some of the future risks from
would-be challengers who could consider looking for
Moscow's backing. So does an established link to the
Soviets that more clearly ties Moscow to P'yongyang via
a flow of military, economic and technological support.
In sum, we believe that the movement by P'yongyang and
Moscow toward closer ties evident since 1984 will persist into
the late 1980s.
What Does It Mean?
The North's reevaluation of its Chinese and Soviet
relationships and the shift toward Moscow have significant
consequences for its foreign policy tactics as well as goals.
-- It points to a more active North Korean diplomacy.
Whether Beijing will ultimately judge that a full-scale
competition with the Soviets for the North's favor is
worth the effort is open to question. But events of
the last year clearly suggest that P'yongyang can still
enlist Chinese good offices with the United States at
the same time it is markedly warming the atmosphere
with Moscow. However belated the North's adoption of a
more flexible and an active triangular diplomacy,
P'yongyang's simultaneous engagement with its two
allies amounts to a major departure from its low cost,
"straddle-the-fence" policy behavior.
The North's acquisition of MIG-23s calls into serious
question Chinese professions about their role,
including any "restraint" of North Korea if tensions
escalate, on the peninsula. P'yongyang already is
receiving Soviet political support; its improved
military relationship with Moscow, as well as its
reciprocal backing for Soviet positions on Indochina,
East-West and other issues, should make the North more
confident about continued Soviet aid. We have no
evidence to suggest that P'yongyang expects--or that
Moscow is willing to give--backing for more bellicose
behavior. But it is prudent to assume that the
improvements in Soviet-North Korean relations make
Moscow, rather than Beijing, the most likely source of
that aid--as well as the source of any presumed
restraint via its denial.
P'yongyang's exploitation of both its Chinese and
Soviet relationships points to the possibility of other
innovations in North Korean policy. As a case in
point, the North has pursued and expanded the current
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dialogue with the South despite events such as Team
Spirit and the student demonstrations that would have
derailed the talks in years past. Their behavior
suggests that such tactical flexibility may be
increasingly evident in P'yongyang.
Finally, the North's improved ties with the Soviets
represent, in effect, a new "two-tiered" format for its
relations with Moscow and Beijing. Essentially,
P'yongyang is seeking a relationship with Beijing
cordial enough to maintain access to China in economic
and, particularly with an eye to the United States,
political terms. But it has also chosen to identify
more openly with Moscow to gain the military hardware,
technology, and economic support that neither Beijing
nor a go-it-alone approach can provide in the
competition with Seoul in the 1980s. In return, the
North is willing to pay the public price--by backing
Soviet goals--and the private tariff--in the form of
intelligence and other military cooperation--that
Moscow wants and P'yongyang heretofore has not
provided. The net result suggests that the MIG-23
transfer is only the first point on an upward trend
line of cooperation, rather than an overdue fulfillment
of a longstanding North Korean demand.
The Alternatives: What Could Cause Another Change?
Our lack of knowledge about P'yongyang's decisionmaking and
the extent of any contention surrounding its policy choices make
it hard to estimate specifically what could turn recent events
around. In our view, there are several factors that could have
that effect.
-- A shift in Soviet-US relations to a detente-like
format, including the kind of tacit cooperation on
Korea evident in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Even
today, the North probably does not expect Moscow to
accord it a high priority in Soviet foreign policy. As
with its concerns about the US-China relationship,.
P'yongyang's latent mistrust of its ally would probably
cause movement away from the Soviets if Korean issues
again appeared vulnerable to US-Soviet collusion.
-- A sharp escalation in the Sino-Soviet rivalry. The
amelioration in Sino-Soviet tensions itself has given
the North a signal and running room to maneuver. If
Moscow and Beijing again turned up the heat, the North
would come under greater pressure from both. In that
case, P'yongyang could stand away from the fight by
once more clearly advertising its independence.
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A leadership change in China that brought an end to
military relationship and cooled the atmosphere with
the United States. History, a shared culture and a
record of postwar cooperation all are still a natural
impetus behind a North Korean policy more aligned with
China than with the Soviet Union. If Beijing's
perspective accorded more with the North's view of the
United States, the Chinese would be positioned again to
give the Soviets a run for their money in P'yongyang.
Soviet meddling in Kim II-song's succession plans. Kim
Il-song conducted a far-reaching purge in the 1950s and
1960s to root out real and perceived pro-Soviet
sympathizers. Any inkling on his part that Moscow was
seeking inside influence would be likely to bring a
dramatic reaction.
A succession that went on the rocks. In our view, the
recent changes in P'yongyang's ties with Moscow, as
part of Kim's effort to smooth the way for his son, are
potentially vulnerable to attack from internal
challengers for power if Kim Chong-I1 stumbles. If the
succession comes thoroughly unstuck, the consequences
would unsettle an array of North Korean policies,
including the North's approach to talks with the South.
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FPP-P-P'-
SUBJECT: North Korea: A New Posture Between Moscow and Beijing
DISTRIBUTION:
1 - Mr. Michael Armacost, Under Secretary for Political Affairs
1 - Mr. Paul Wolfowitz, State/EAP
1 - Mr. Richard Armitage, DOD/ISA
1 - Mr. Donald Gregg, Assistant to the Vice President for National
Security Affairs
1 - Mr. William Sherman, State/EAP
1 - Mr. James Kelley, DOD/ISA
1 - Mr. James Lilley, State/EAP
1 - Mr. Peter Rodman, Chairman, Policy Planning Staff, State
1 - Dr. Gaston Sigur, NSC
1 - Mr. Richard Childress, NSC
1 - Ms. Harriet Isom, State/EAP/K
1 - Ms. Rozanne Ridgeway, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs
1 - Mr. Jay Taylor, State/INR/EAP
1 - Como James Cossey, DOD/ISA
1 - Cdr. James Auer, DOD/ISA/EAP
1 - Mr. Jay Sloan, DIA/DIO
1 - Lt. Col. oe Cher DOD/OJCS/J-5/Korea
1 - DIA/JS13
1 - DIA/DB
1 - NIO/EA (7E-62)
1 - C/PPS/DO (DO1)
1 - OGI/IIC/PI
1 - OEA/NEA/Korea Branch
1 - OEA/NEA/Japan Branch
1 - OEA/NEA/STI Branch
1 - OEA/NEA Division
1 - OEA/China Division
1 - OEA/SEA Division
1 - D/OEA (4F18)
1 - C/Research/ OEA
1 - FBIS Analysis Group
1 - DDI
1 - PDB Staff (7F-30)
5 - CPAS/IMC/CG (7G07)
1 - CPAS/ILS (7F50)
1 - C/PES (7F-24)
1 - NIC/AG (7E47)
1 - OCR/ISG (1H-19)
1 - DDO/EA Division (5D00)
1 - DDO/EA (5C-19)
1 - DDO/EA 5C-19)
1-
1-
1 - Author
DDI/OEA/NEAS
(25 July 1985)
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