NORTH KOREA: GROWTH OF THE HELICOPTER FORCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP04T00447R000200810001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 9, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Intelligence
o~r~/,mss
North Korea: Growth
of the Helicopter Force
Secret
EA 85-1011 /C
June 1985
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Intelligence
North Korea: Growth
of the Helicopter Force
This paper was prepared byL
Office of East Asian Analysis.
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Northeast Asia Division, OEA,
welcome and may be directed to the Chief,
assisted in its preparation. Comments and queries are
EA 85-1011 IC
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North Korea: Growth
of the Helicopter Force
Summary North Korea's illegal purchase of 86 US-produced Hughes 500 helicopters
Information available in 1984 and 1985 is but one of a series of steps taken since 1974 to build a
as of 25 April 1985 larger and more flexible helicopter force. Imports from Poland and China
was used in this report.
as well have helped raise the size of the force to over 250 from a mere 25
aircraft, with North Korean interest in acquiring helicopters paralleling
broad international trends. Following the successful use of helicopters by
the United States in Vietnam, a large number of developing countries
began acquiring them for both attack and troop-carrying roles.
Once able to perform only transport and support functions, the North 25X1
Korean helicopter fleet is expanding into a force that should be capable of
more complex operations. The large number of newly acquired MI-2 and 25X1
Hughes helicopters are being integrated into the operational force, but
combat training has been limited thus far.
orth Korea because it maintains a large
number of highly trained troops in its Special Operations Force. The
predominance of light helicopters seriously limits the number of troops that
can be carried, but helicopters could be used to infiltrate small teams into
the South. In this regard, North Korea's Hughes helicopters pose a special
threat because they are indistinguishable from the 195 Hughes 500s in the
South Korean inventory.
Domestic production will play a prominent role in further growth of the
force. North Korea recently initiated serial production of a version of the
Polish MI-2 utility helicopter, which can be fitted with guns, rockets, and
antitank guided missiles. Significant problems are impeding production at
this stage, but
P'yongyang has signed an assistance agreement
with Bucharest to produce the French-designed Alouette III helicopter
between 1986 and 1990 at the same plant.
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EA 85-10111 C
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Although North Korea is committed to expanding its helicopter force, we
believe that future growth will be constrained by the need to consolidate
and train new units and by growing pains in mastering series production.
Even so, we anticipate that North Korea will fit more of its helicopters with
antitank guided missiles to improve its edge over South Korea in armor-
antiarmor capabilities and train more aggressively to use helicopters in a
troop insertion role.
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Expanding Missions
The Production of Helicopters 5
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North Korea: Growth
of the Helicopter Force
Introduction
The acquisition of sizable numbers of Polish MI-2
helicopters and US Hughes 500s since 1980 has
significantly altered the North Korean helicopter
force. The 25-helicopter force of 1973 expanded in
1974 with the acquisition of MI-4 helicopters from
China. In 1976, North Korea used the MI-4s to form
We believe that North Korea has a sufficient number
of helicopters-Hughes 500s not yet in service and
MI-2 to form at least two addition-
al regiments.
Building the Inventory
North Korea's interest in attack helicopters in the
early 1970s reflected broader international trends.
Following the United States' extensive use of attack
helicopters in Vietnam, a large number of developing
countries decided to acquire them.
We believe the growth of the North Korean helicopter
force from 25 aircraft in 1973 to over 250 today
reflects a progression involving three major turning
points (see table 1).
In 1974 the acquisition of 42 Chinese MI-4s and the
formation of a tactical regiment marked an earlier
decision to move beyond the use of helicopters for
Table 1
The North Korean Helicopter Force a
1973 13 12 0 0
1974 13 54 0 0
1980 13 53 26 0
1981 13 53 43 0
1983 13 53 61 1
1984 13 53 104 45
1985 13 53 104 86
(MI-2) of which no more than 11 are in service
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92
109
128
215
256
simple transport and support functions. North Korea
had broken ground on a helicopter production facility
at Panghyon in 1973, but construction ceased shortly
thereafter. We do not know whether the effort at
Panghyon was abandoned because North Korea was
suddenly able to acquire helicopters from China or
because it decided to seek an outside source of supply
in anticipation of difficulties in initiating domestic
production. Possibly both considerations came into
play, for in 1974 the French backed out of a commit-
ment to allow the North Koreans to coproduce the
Alouette III helicopter.
In 1976, North Korea moved to acquire light, utility
helicopters, specifically the Soviet-designed and
Polish-built MI-2. Light helicopters have become
popular because they are less expensive and more
agile than medium- or heavy-lift helicopters. In Po-
land, MI-2s have been armed with guns, rockets, and
antitank guided missiles. North Korea arms its heli-
copters with similar weapons.
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By the early 1980s, North Korea began to diversify
and improve its light helicopter inventory through
additional purchases, as well as reinitiation of a
domestic production program:
? Construction of the production facility at Panghyon
resumed in 1981. Production of MI-2s began in
1984.
the transaction shipped 86 Hughes model 500 helicop-
ters from the United States.
(further ship-
ments were halted by US Government action in early
1985.
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? P'yongyang had by 1984 apparently resumed its
quest to coproduce the Alouette III.F_
The first MI-2 was imaged at Panghyon Airfield in
1977. Two more were photographed in 1979, but
North Korea did not begin to receive sizable numbers
until 1980, at which point final assembly in Korea
began. Between March and October 1980, 23 helicop-
ters were shipped in crates from Poland and assem-
bled at Panghyon. North Korea began to use Sondok
Airfield as a second assembly site in early 1982, and
P'yongyang's campaign to acquire Hughes model 300
and model 500 helicopters moved forward in 1983
when representatives of the West German firm Delta
Avia Fluggeraete, presumably responding to inquiries
from P'yongyang, visited and concluded a contract.
The first two helicopters, one of each model, were
shipped from Los Angeles and diverted to North
Korea through Yokohama, Japan, and arrived in late
April (see figure 3, Hughes 500 at Sunan).
US investigations into the illegal diversion of Hughes
helicopters to North Korea show that between March
1983 and November 1984 intermediaries involved in
In late March 1985, Delta Avia
Fluggeraete shipped spare parts that it had initially
stopped en route as a result of publicity surrounding
its illegal diversion of Hughes helicopters to North
illegally acquired Hughes helicopters
North Korea is already receiving spare parts for its
Expanding Missions
Paralleling the growth and diversification of the
North Korean helicopter force has been a progressive
use of these aircraft for more complex missions.
Before the mid-1970s, when it acquired MI-4s from
China, North Korea employed helicopters primarily
for transport and support functions. When undertaken
in a nonhostile environment, this is a relatively simple
task.
The insertion of troops behind enemy lines is more
complex, requiring specialized training and the use of
weapons. This mission is particularly important to the
North Koreans, whose doctrine calls for sowing confu-
sion in the enemy's rear and disrupting supply of
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Table 2
Helicopter Characteristics
Range Operating Troop Maximum Weapons
(nm) a Radius Capacity Speed
(nm) (knots)
MI-2 320 160 7 113 Guns,
rockets,
ATGMs
MI-4 240 120 12-16 110 Guns,
rockets,
ATGMs
MI-8 200 110 24 140 Guns,
rockets,
ATGMs
Hughes 260 130 4-6 145 Guns,
500 rockets,
ATGMs
Alouette 270 150 6 110 Guns,
III rockets,
ATGMs
frontline units. North Korea maintains a force of up
to 70,000 specially trained troops in its Special Opera-
tions Force (SOF) to accomplish this task:'
? With its 50-plus MI-4s, the 22nd Helicopter Regi-
ment, which trains in troop insertion, could trans-
port up to 800 troops in a one-time lift, either in
attacks against airfields or in occupying positions
immediately behind South Korean defenses. The
much smaller Hughes 500 and MI-2 helicopters
combined have a capacity to provide a single lift for
an additional 1,200 troops, if all were used in this
role.
? With its speed, maneuverability, and small size, the
Hughes 500 is especially well suited for use in
insertion/infiltration. Because they are visually in-
distinguishable from South Korea's own 195
Hughes 500s, they are ideal for inserting teams of
SOF troops, or small numbers of agents and terror-
The North Koreans are apparently interested in night
vision equipment and possibly infrared equipment,
which could provide greatly improved nighttime of-
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Placed on Hughes helicopters, such equipment would
enhance North Korea's ability to surreptitiously pene-
trate South Korean airspace and attack targets at
night. the North 25X1
Koreans have not yet succeeded in obtaining such
equipment, but we believe attempts to obtain equip-
ment that will improve the combat capability of their
helicopters will continue. 25X1
vances marking Army Day in 1982, a small number
of MI-2s demonstrated the insertion and extraction of
troops, but we have not observed any training in that
role since.
The only helicopters in North Korea that have partici-
pated in coordinated air-assault exercises with ground
and naval forces are MI-4s. The 22nd (MI-4) Regi-
ment appears to be the best trained and best manned.
Although training associated with the Hughes 500s
has been limited largely to pilot familiarization thus
ists into the Southl
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North Korea is experienced in arming helicopters. At
least since 1976, it has been fitting helicopters with
small wings, probably for mounting guns, rockets, and
ATGMs. North Korea produces the Soviet-designed
AT-3 ATGM and may have recently begun serial
production of the US-designed TOW antitank missile.
North Korea
obtained the TOW from Iran in 1981 and has proba-
bly been attempting to reverse engineer the missile.
We believe North Korea has mounted AT-3s on
helicopters, but successfully firing the TOW from a
helicopter would require a stabilized sight mecha-
nism, which we do not believe North Korea capable of
producing at this time. There is no evidence of North
Korean employment of helicopters to launch air-to-air
missiles, a capability thus far maintained only by the
Soviet Union and the United States.
Prospects
Although North Korea is committed to continued
expansion of the helicopter force, as shown by its
investment in a production facility, we believe the rate
of growth will be moderated by the need to consoli-
date and train its newest units. Moreover, we expect
North Korea will continue to experience growing
pains in mastering series production of helicopters,
We anticipate that the North Koreans will continue to
fit more helicopters with ground attack weapons,
probably including ATGMs, and to expand training
in an antiarmor role. Over time, all types of helicop-
ters in North Korea could be equipped with antiarmor
weapons. The lighter Hughes 500 and the MI-2 can
mount weapons only at the expense of transporting
troops, but the Hughes is particularly well suited to
use as a light antitank platform and serves in this role
in Israel and Kenya in addition to South Korea.
Fitting large numbers of helicopters with ATGMs
would increase the North's edge over the South in
overall armor-antiarmor capability.
As pilots become more skilled, North Korea may start
training its Hughes 500 and MI-2 units in coordinat-
ed exercises involving ground forces. Troop insertion
training would marginally improve the North's advan-
tage in mobility.
Hughes 500 and MI-2 helicopters
may also begin deploying to forward bases, increasing
the potential to airlift SOF troops to airbases and
other targets deep inside South Korea
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Appendix
The Production of Helicopters
Facilities
North Korea's aircraft production facilities at Pangh-
yon in North P'yongan Province include helicopter
and fixed-wing plants that are located in adjacent
valleys and are, we believe, collectively known as the 6
January Factory. The two valleys housing the 6
January Factory are just north of Panghyon Airfield,
where an aircraft repair facility known as the 4 April
Factory is located. The 6 January Factory is under
the control of the Second Economic Committee, a
civilian government organ established in the late
1970s to administer most of North Korea's weapon
production programs
North Korea started
construction of what was to become the helicopter
production facility in 1973, a year before it negotiated
with France to produce the Alouette III. When this
deal-as well as later approaches to France and
Italy-fell through, construction halted.
Construction resumed in 1981 and has proceeded
rapidly in tandem with work on the nearby fixed-wing
facility. Apparently completed in late 1984, the heli-
copter facility includes a flight control building, a
short takeoff and landing runway, a rotor test cage,
and a helicopter landing pad located at what appears
to be a weapons calibration range
Production of MI-2s
Production activities at the plant were noted in No-
vember 1984
P'yongyang may have initiated helicopter pro-
duction based primarily on imported parts and mate-
rials. Work on helicopter number five may represent
an effort to copy or reverse engineer those parts or
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Table 3
North Korean Factories Engaged in Hyoksin-2 (MI-2) Production
6 January Factory a
Panghyon, N. P'yongan Province
Fuselages
4 April Factory b
Panghyon Airfield
Generator design
18 January Factory
Kaech'on, S. P'yongan Province
Generators
Hamhung Electrical Equipment Factory
(1 June Factory)
Hamhung, S. Hamgyong Province
Gears, shafts
Huich'on Electronics Factory (Factory
No. 38)
Huich'on, Chagang Province
Kumgang Electric Factory (Factory
No. 33)
Wonsan, Kangwon Province
Pukchung Machine Works (8 August
Factory)
Yongch'on, N. P'yongan Province
Rotor blades
a The 6 January Factory is responsible for overall production.
b The 4 April Factory appears to have significant responsibility
regarding technical aspects of Hyoksin-2 production, possibly in-
cluding final approval.
Both helicopters were under production in February
We believe that, of the first 12 Hyoksin-2s produced,
Production of Alouettes
An agreement reached with Bucharest in January
1985 provides for North Korean production of both
the IAR-316B, the French-designed Alouette III heli-
copter, and the Romanian IAR-93 ground attack jet
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The timespan of the agreement, combined with the
scheduled training of North Korean technicians in
France, possibly in connection with the Romanian
agreement, suggests the effort involving the Alouette
III helicopters is geared toward production rather
than assembly.
Equipment useful to both projects associated with
Romania is being imported from Western Europe.
Along with this effort at acquisition of foreign equip-
ment, P'yongyang is giving a high priority to alloca-
tion of domestic resources to the plant.
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