NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY 71; GUATEMALA; COUNTRY PROFILE

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• Collection: NIS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP01-00707R000200110046-3
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CONFIDENTIAL
71 /GS /CP
Guatemala
March 1973
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY
CONFIDENTIAL
NO FOREIGN DISSF,M
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1
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(:ENI' :Ii:l.I, ti'Ii'I;?, cil kri'I i"s
(:O t' ""'1 1'11(MA1,1,' Integrated perspective of
the subject country (;hro u ology Are brief
Sunurary map
1.IIF sm:11' Social structure Population
Labor Iiealtl Living conditions Social
prohlctns Rcfigior I Public infor-
mation Artistic expression
AND 1'(>),I'! I(',ti Political evo-
lution of the state Governmental strength and
stability Structure and function Political d%-
narnics National policies '1 to stabilit
Tile police Intelligence anti security :ounter-
Sillwersion and countcrinswgvncv cap bilitics
Appraisal of the econorrv Its
structure agriculture, fisheries, forestry, fuels and
power, metals and minerals, nuuufac't ring and
construction Domestic trade 1?c:;;ic pohcN.
and deycloprr cut International econottic relations
1� It:1\Sp()I, "I
I'h:l :E 11Oti Appraisal of sys-
tems Strategic nv)bility Railroads liighways
Inland watertiuys forts Merchant mri
ane
Civil air �Airfields �The telecom system
ii.11'111 Topo and cli-
rnatc Military geographic regions Stratetic
areas Internal routes Approaches: larul, sea, air
1BMF1 1) I'OI((:1�:S '1'I defense oAablishnent
Joint activi,ies Cr mid forces Naval forces
Air forces
This Genera! Su vev supersedes the one dated
January 1969' copiev cf 'rlrich should he destroved.
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Country Profile
a
A Land Divided i
Institutionalized Separatism 2
G Reform, Reaction, and Terrorism 3
Bridging the Chasm 5
Chronology 7
Area Brief 9
Summary Maly follows 10
This Country Profile was prepared for the NIS by
the Central Intelligence Agency. Research was sub-
stantially completed by January 1973.
C.ONFIDP:NT{AL
No FoliEIGN DISSE'NI
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c
5
i
A
O ur lords most esteemed most high
your journey has been hard and long
to reach this land
we who are humble
we who are ignorant
look at you
what is it that we should say?
what is it that your ears want to hear?
can there be meaning
in what we say to you?
we are common people
because of our god -of -the- near -and -far
because of him
we dare to speak
we exhale his breath and his :,cords
his air
for him and in his name
we dare to speak to you
despite the danger
perhaps we will be taker) to our ruin
we are ordinary people
we can be killed
we can be destroyed
what are we to do?
allow us to die
let us perish now
since our gods are already dead
wait be calm our lords
we will break open
a little
e will open
a little
the secret of our g od- who -is
you say
that we do not know
the right god
th,: god who owns the heavens
and the earth
you say
our god is not a true god
we are disturbed
we are t.r )ubled by these words
our people
who lived upon the earth before us
did not speak
in this way
they taught us their way of life
heal us o lords
do not harm our people
do not destroy them
be calm and friendly
consider these matters c lords
we cannot accept your words
we cannot accept your teachings as truth
even though this may offend you
we cannot agree
that our gods are wrong
is it not enough that we h eve already lost
that our way of life :as been taken away?
is that not enough?
this is all we can say
this is our answer
to your words o lords
do with us
as you please
Change has not come easily to Guatemala,
beginning with the clash centuries ago
between conquistadores and the native
culture there and elsewhere in Central
America. After the Spanish conquest,
twelve friers were sent to convert "New
Spain" to Christianity. Their dramatic
encounter wo'h Indian elders in 1524 was
recorded in a famous manuscript, El Libro
de los Colloquios. This is a portion of
the Indian delegation's opening statement.
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Mayan temple at Tikal, one of many in Guatemalo
.t� 1A
ro
N ye
4
O F
ii
The ancient Mayan ruins fotind throughout
Guatemala are all that remain of a once unified and
advanced Indian civilization. The descendants of
these people remain, but their place in society has been
altered downward by time and invents. Guatemala to-
day is grossly divided culturally, economically, and
politically, and the gap bo tween the divisions is so
great that the country really encompasses different
worlds. About 2% of the people own more than
two- thirds of the agricultural land, and the political
and economic influence of this group extends back
throughout the era of the conquistadores and :nost of
the 19th century, Guatemala entered the modern
world with virtually no democra":ic tradition, with a
population that was mostlysili'terate, with a social
structure that retains vestigal aspects of the feudal
stage, and with a rigidly observed cultural gap
between the major racial groups. The present -day
de-cendants of the Mayas are generally considered in-
ferior, not only by the elite but by the rest of the
society as well. (C)
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institutionalized Se (c)
At the top of the sock i.. -conontic scald in G(latetntdu
is th(- landed aristocracy, many members of which �in
addition to their blood tics with pre Columbian
Spain�can trace links with each other, in the manner
of the EAtropeat) nobility. Second- and third
cousinship has frequently bv, n the basis for
relationships in the worlds of polities or business. A
fanily link to the heads >f the� economic empires is not
to he taken lightly, for in Guatemala the wvalthv are
very wealthy indeed. Family landholdings are seldom
broken up upon the death of the patriarch but toe
retained in the family and operated as a joint venture.
The stone concept has applied in a general 'ay to
()tltrr economic activities banking and finance, for
exampic, and industrial entrepreneurship.
The primary basis for family forhtnes, however, still
is land. '1'o the 0:atetnttlan elite, land is not only
superior to cash or any other form of capital, it is the
necessary antecedent to any other form of wealth, or
for that matter, prestige and social acceptability. 'Thus,
the value of land dogs not re!ate to its productivity. In
the absence of birthright, the only other pathway to
social status is the acquisition of money. 'The small
nm- rchant class that existed through the centuries to
serve the elite and the professionals such as doctors and
lawyers have filled a small but important second place.
This middle class group is expanding and �since the
internationalization of commerce by the big U.S. corn
panics such as Unitcd Fruit �has become politically
influential as well as tit o(Ivratcl,v wealthy.
Nevertheless, wealth and power, cvcu in limited
amounts, have conic to only a small segment of
Giatemalan society. Many iu tit(- lower class live on
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the borderline hetween poverty and starvation. Some
have abandoned their rural hontel in favor of life in
the urban slutus, but most of them are still working
their small landholdings.

1'.stltliates of Guatetala racial composition are ex-
tremely difficult hecar.lse the official census figures are
categorized Ily cultural differences, The terms in-
digena and ludino are used in Guatemala to indicate
rnernbers of the Indian and non Indian cultures,
respectively, but the distinction has little to do with
racial backgrou-id in their housing, dress, and
language. The customs and habits of these Indians
clearly have been changed by four centuries of 1 ?uro-
pean occupation, but the Indians now living in
Guatemala remain one of the purest strains of
1)re- (Aiiinbian peoples in the Western
Ilemisphere �not only in their bloodlines but also in
their culture, living h Abits, all(] language. (,udinas, orl
the other hand, play be racially classifiable as Indians
hot have adopted n.)n- Indian clothing and customs.
Ladinos speak Spanish as either a first or second
language (second after their parents' Indian language)
and nsually purport to scorn their indigo nu
antecedents.
There is a slow evolution front the indigenu culture
to ludino status, lint only on un individual basis. A
sharp distinction exists in the social status of the In-
dians turd that of the ladinus, however poverty stricken
and uncultured. 'I'lle Indians occupy a position of litter
inferiority, They tend to accept this social position,
however, with stoic equanimity. The Indian's chief
characteristic is a tremendous apathy towards activity
he considers unnecessary, lie displays a defensive and
lethargically passive resistance to ludino culture, and
the Mayan tradition of long ago is today a stronger
govcr: influence on his life than any institutional
influence that was superimposed upon it. Only rarely
do the Indian and the ludino worlds touch, and then
onl in carefully stylized encounters such as those at
the marketplace; the indkiduals involved never lose
their sens) of separateness.
It is this separateness that is the strongest barrier to a
cohesive, integrated national society. The two groups
exist side -by -side, each culturally complete and totally
distinct from the other and for the most part in-
different to both the fact and the ramifications of it.
The indigene culture is far frorn cohesive in any
national sense. Mach community of Indians is unique,
cohesive only in the tribal sense through the perpetua-
tion of traditional customs, distinctive clothing styles,
and use of the local dialect �which is generally incom-
prehensible to most other Indians as well as ladinos
and tends to further seal off the users. Only the ludinos
have a sense of national consciouness.
Reform, Reaction,
and Terrorism W
Guatemala's modernization bean with the election
to tile presidency in 194.1 of Juan Jose Arevalo, a
scholar who had spent the duration of the Ubico die
tatorship (1931 -4.1) in exile as a professor in Argentina.
Arcvaio was (alaternala's first freely elected President.
He ran on a reform program and won a resounding
Wi' of the votes cast. Ile sncccssfully campaigiied for
a new constitution, which was adopted in 1945 and
provided for the cst alit ishrnettt of a social welfare
program and for the state orientation of the economy.
Arcvalo's government attempted to incorporate the In-
dians into national life, promoted education and
sanitation, and establish- -d labor courts and a social
security system, Restoration of civil liberties en-
couraged the formation and growth of political parties,
labor unions, and agricultural workers' organizations.
With the 1951 inauguration of Jacopo Arbenz Guz-
nan, Arevalo became the second President to com-
plete a full 6 -year term and then retire upon the elec-
tion of his successor. 'I'hc first was Jose Lisandro
Barrillas (1886 -92); the third and only other one was
Julio Cesar Mendez Montenegro (1966 -70).
During the Arbenz administration (1951 -5-1),
agricultural workers' associations grew In size and in-
fluence and an agrarian reform law was passed in
1953, Arbenz attempted to limit the powers and
privileges of three North American companies --the
United Fruit Company, Inte.,rnatior:al Railroads of'
Central America, and the Bond and Share Electric
Conlpany�which under Ubico had assumed a large
role in Guatemalan life. No restrictions were placed oil
the activities of the Cornmtrnist party, legally
registered in 1952 as the Guatemalan Labor Party
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(I'(;1'). Its numbers infiltrated the ranks of the govern-
ment to a point that by 1954 it was widely assumed :n
the U.S. Government that Guatemala snort would he
comPletcly under tile n
e control of Co'nurnists,
The single ',lost important act of the Arbenz ad-
ministration mtay have been the expropriation of some
414,M0 acres of idle land belonging to the United
F ruit Company. As could be expected in perhaps any
country, this was the core issue that brought about the
confrontation between the government and the land
owners. A rightist activist m oveinent was formed,
hacked in part by the Dominican dictator' Trujillo, and
in June 195.1 this counterrevolutionary force "in-
vaded" Guatemala frorn Ilonduras, led by Col. Carlos
Castillo Arrnas. In an excess of what many people
termed as being anti- :orninunist zeal, the new regime
arrested 2,000 people or more, The expropriated land
was returned, civil liberties were abrogated, and
almost three Fourths of the population disen-
franchised. With the secret ballot abolished, (:astillo
had himself el ected President in a One- candidate
plebiscite by Voice vote before armed soldiers.
The Castillo re gime nullified the agrarian reform
law and set 1 11 its own program. It disbanded the ex-
istin.g labor unions but eventually sponsored the es-
tablishment of new unions. All the existing political
parties were outlawed, and the National Denocratic
Movenvvnt (M1)N) was establislud as the official
governmental party. 'Three years later political turmoil
erupted following the assassination of Castillo.
The next presidential election, in January 1958, was
won by Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes, a general and a
governor under the old Ubico regime, During his ad-
ministration, increased chaos and corruption brought
all government programs to a virtual standstill. Both
leftists and rightists were plotting against the govern-
ment. Then, late in March 1963, the brief return to the
political scene of former President Arevalo touched off
demonstrations of support and provided the military
with all the justification, it needed to overthrow
Ydigoras and assume power. The military junta of Col.
Enrique Peralta Az;irdias that followed lasted ir.,r 3
years.
With guerrilla activity on the rise, Peralta declared
a state of siege in 1963. It was lifted the next year, but
was rcirnl;o:: ^d early i.t 1965 following terrorist attacks,
In the ensuing months, a return to constitutional
government was announce Shortly thereafter the
siege was again lifted. In 1966 Julio Cesar Mendez
Montenegro was chosen as President art(; Pccalta
4
stepp down. Mendez gave the army alnnost free rein
to combat counterinsurgency as guerrillas continued
to pose a serious throat to the government;
counterterrorism reached a new plateau during his ad-
rninistration.
The political uncertainty and instability that had
prevailed since 1954 had set the stage for extremisn
and provided a backdrop for the terrorist politics that
were to heco'ne standard. Armed rebels, le(i by dissi-
dent junior officers from the Guatemalan rnilltary,
prodded the (;ornmunists away fro;:i polemical
theorizing into active insurgency.
Although the guerrillas have been active under one
title or another since November 1960, the most familiar
name is Fuerzas Armadas Reheldes (Rebel Armed
Forces �FAR). This group evolved from others that
hacl been active since 1960 and began operations in
1963. The FAR's principal effort was directed toward
rural targets until the campaign, by the military during
M endez's administration began to be effective. From
1966 to 1968 the guerrillas, who had failed to receive
support from the peasants in the countryside and who
had failed to outgrow the organizational squabbling
that prevented attainment of any i:x,litical effec-
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tiveness, found themselves on the defensive and facing
an increasingly bitter counterinsurgency campaign. By
early 1968, FAR's rural capability had been practically
eliminated and the center of extremist activities had
shifted to Guatemala City, the capital. The FAR
guerrillas took time out to give themselves better train-
ing and preparation and to tighten up the security of
their organization. Even while they were doing this,
they maintained their capability for hit and -run
terrorist action, and in 1968 carried out two spec-
tacular acts, bath directed against the U.S. presence in
the country: the murder c: two members of the U.S.
Military Assistance Group and of the U.S. Am-
bassador.
Lesser terrorist incidents were almost incessant dur-
ing 1968 and 1969. Violence increased in frequency
and scope late in 1969 when the campaign for the
presidential election of March 1970 began in earnest.
Col. Carlos Arana Osorio, the candidate of a conser-
vative coalition, took up the challenge and ran
successfully on a somber law- and -order f' itform. He
was the champion of the far right and the leader of the
counterterror approach to subversion that was so
successful in Zacapa Province from 1966 to 1968. Acts
of terrorism in the closing days of the cam-
paign� including the dramatic kidnaping of Foreign
Minister Alberto Fuentes Mohr undoubtedly helped
elect him, although Arana garnered only 42% of the
popular vote.
Following Arana's inauguration, he appealed for a
ceasefire and offered amnesty, but soon thereafter the
tempo of terrorism and counterterrorism increased. A
state of siege was declared in November 1970, and
soon the leftists were weak, divided, disoriented, and
either unwilling or unable to continue the deadly com-
petition. Although terrorist incidents have decreased
sharply, the present impuissance of tie leftists may be
only temporary.
Vestiges of ideological warfare remain in the con-
flict �even the moderate among today's leftist
political eaders still identify with the revolution of
1944 and nurture a sense of denied legitimacy. The
rightist fo;::es continue to identify with the
counterrevolutionary Castillo, and indeed many of
today's government leaders served in his administra-
tion. They tend to lump all opposition in the Com-
munist bag. Each side fears the other as the mortal
enemy. And treating each other as enemies thus en-
courages other rounds of personal and political
violence.
Bridging the Chasm (c)
Remnants of the mr, '.ernization and reform
programs begun in earnest under Arevalo in 1944 have
become the bases for some of those put forward by the
present administration. President Arana, in his cam-
paign speeches, in his inaugural address, and in his
public utterances since inauguration, has never failed
to express his concern for the welfare of the people and
his determination to effect an improvement in their
living conditions.
Arana has pledged greater technical assistance and
bank credits to farmers, more job opportunities and
better educational and health facilities for the masses,
and administrative reform and improvement of the
civil service. His administration is trying to fulfill those
pledges. In addition, Arana began implementing the
comprehensive 5 -year development plan prepared by
the Mendez government.
Following the Mendez plan, Arana has taken steps
to increase domestic tax revenues and the investment
budget. He has stressed social services and agricultural
development. Administrative reform legislation has
been passed, and the government has embarked on an
ambitious rural electrification and rural public health
program. The government also is promoting
agricultural research and reforming the rural credit
system.
It is far too soon to pronounce the problems solved.
For one thing, there are years of inertia to overcome;
for another, Arana simply cannot afford to abandon
entirely the powerful vested interests that resist
change. But he will undoubtedly achieve sufficient
progress to prevent any significant increase in the pop-
ular appeal of the insurgei.ts. He may pursue an even
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more vigorous rei. program, but one stopping short
of accelerating social and economic change at a rate
that would alienate the tightly knit and highly con-
servative oligarchy. Even if such a course were
attempted, its implementation would be made ex-
ceedingly difficult because of the government's short-
age of managerial skills and money.
The present situation in Guatemala could continue
with little char -e for an indefinite but possibly lengthy
period, The war between left and right, interrupted
from time to time by a truce brought on by fatigue as
much as anv other cause, probably could drag on for
another generation. Killings by terrorists at the present
level inhibit but do not eliminate political activity,
and in spite of the personal grief brought to a few, the
body politic can become, and probably is becoming,
inured to the violence. Indeed, such inurement may
help end the terrorism; to the extent that its shock
value has decreased, its perpetrators may conclude the
terrorism has lost its real effectiveness.
The government could fall into the hands of the ex-
treme right or the extreme left. In either case the net
result probably would be to drive the center away from
the governing extreme �if the government reverts to
the rightists, most of the moderates will look to the left
for salvation, and vice versa. Such an extreme govern-
ment might have surface features that would appear to
be new, but the underlying problems in Guatemala
would remain. And because the opposition would tend
to be adverse to compromise or cooperation, an ex-
treme government probably would be short lived.
Guatemala could be taken over by a militar -led
revolt that would inhibit democratic government and
embark upon a centrally directed program of social
reform, such as happened in Peru. Junior and middle
level officers in Guatemala's army have been engaging
in a variety of welfare activities under the aegis of the
civic action program, and many of the officers,
perhaps a majority, have developed a new sensitivity
to the country's problems. However, the Guaternalan
officer corps appears to lack the background and the
[$I
commitment to reform that Peruvian officers have dis-
played, and the institution of a benign military regime
seems unlikely in the short term.
It is pr .sible, too, that a much more reform- minded
civilian government �left of center but non -Com-
munist �might be elected to office and not precipitate
an effort to overthrow it by force. Such a developrr-ent
seems unlikely at present but is by no means impossi-
ble and is a measure of the changes that, however
gradual, have occurred in Guatemala over the past two
decades. Indeed, it may be that Guatemala's revolu-
tion under Arevalo and Arbenz �at least its program,
apart from the Communist infiltration failed not so
much because it was too radical but because it was im-
plemented too soon. It might be tolerated today, and
probably would not be considered extreme by the ma-
jority of ?nformed members of Guatemala's body
Politic.
Perhaps all future governments will strive diligently
to overcome problems such as those posed by the
massive rural population that is undernourished, ill
housed, illiterate and generally unproductive. Even
so, it is a formidable and long drawn out task in
Guatemala as in all developing countries to bridge the
chasm between extreme poverty and backwardness on
the one hand and, on the other, the Western goals of a
modern, prosperous, and progressive society based on
free elections and full participation in the country's
political and economic life. The growing, educated
middle class shares these goals and would have the
country pursue a path between elements of the army,
radical right, and conservative economic elite on one
side and the leftist forces on the other. But the burden
of past events, the divisions of society, and the aura of
violence continue to cloud the uncertain course of this
fragV constitutional republic. The extensive list of
rulers who plundered Guatemala during the I9th and
early 20th centuries and the terrorism of recent vears
demonstrate the magnitude of the heritage the modern
and moderate Guatemalans are striving to overcome.
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Chronology wo o
1524
Pedro de Alvaradc conquers the territory of Guatemala.
1542
Audiencia of Guatemala is established and, during the
colonial period, becomes a captainery general, including
all of Central America.
1821
Guatemala declares independence from Spain and joins
the Mexican empire.
1823
Guatemala breaks from Mexico and becomes part of the
Central American Federation.
1939
Guatemala becomes an independent state, officially de-
claring itself a republic in 1847.
1839 -1944.
Guatemala is ruled by dictator,;hips. principally by Rafael
Carrera (1839 -65), Justo Rufino Barrios (1873 -85), Manuel
Estrada Cabrera (1898 19:0), and Gen. Jorge Ubico
(1931 -44).
1944
June
Dictator Ubico is overthrown.
1945
March
Juan Jose Arevalo is inaugurated as Guatemala's first
freely elected President. New constitution is promulgated.
1950
December
Col. Jacobo Arbenz Guzman is elected President.
1951
March
Col. Arbenz is inaugurated President.
October
Organization of Central American States (ODECA) is
formed with Guatemalan participation.
1959
r zcember
Communist Party of Guatemala changes name to Guate-
malan Labor Party (PG:C) and registers officially as a
party.
1954
June
Anti Communist group of about 200 men, led by Col.
Carlos Castillo Armas, invades Guatemala and ousts
Arbenz.
November
President Castillo Armas is inaugurated.
1957
July
President Castillo Armas is assassinated; Lai; Arturo
Gonzalez Lopez succeeds to presidency.
Getober
Mob action forces Gonzalez' resignation; military junta
takes over; mobs force junta out; Congress names second
presidential designate, Guillermo Flores Avendano, In-
terim President and annuls October elections.
1958
January
Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes is elected President.
1959
December
Guatemala accuses Cuba before OAS of helping the Com-
munists to prepare an invasion of Guatemala.
1960
April
Guatemala severs diplomatic relations with Cuba.
1963
March
Government declares state of Beige following a wave of
terrorism; return of Juan Jose Arevalo precipitates a
military coup; Ydigoras is ousted; Col. Enrique Peralta
heads provisional military government.
July
Peralta government breaks relations with the United
Kingdom over British Honduras issue.
7
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110046 -3

1964
February
Decree law provides for formation and functioning of
new political parties.
March
State of siege is lifted.
May
Constituent Assembly is elected and charged with writing
a new constitution and preparing complementary laws.
July
Constituent Assembly approves abrogation of the 1956
Constitution and legalizes military government.
1965
February
State of siege is reimposed following terrorist attacks.
May
Terrorists assassinate Deputy Minister of National De-
fense, a key Peralta aide.
June
Schedule for return to constitutional government is an-
nounced.
July
State of siege is ended.
October
PR presidential candidate, Mario Mendez Montenegro,
commits suicide; brother Julio Cesar Mendez Montenegro
takes his place as the Revolutionary Party (PR) candidate.
1966
March
PR wins large number of congressional seats in election;
no presidential candidate receives absolute majority.
May
Congress elected in March chooses Julio Cesar Mender.
Montenegro fir President.
New constitution (promulgated in September 1965) be-
comes effective.
July
Mendez is inaugurated President for 4 -year term
October
Guerrilla leader Luis Turcios Lima is killed in auto
accident.
W
1967
December
Two Maryknoll priests and one nun, all U.S citizens, are
expelled from Guatemala for aiding guerrillas.
1968
January
Two U.S, military officers are assassinated by the Rebel
Armed Forces (FAR) in Guatemala City.
March
Archbishop Casariego is kidnapped by rightwing ter-
rorists; Mendez resignation is unsuccessfully demanded
in return for his release. Vice President Marroquin is
censured by Congress for his alleged involvement.
Mendez dismisses three top ranking military officers and
sends them into diplomatic exile.
May
Congress passes law establishing civil service system.
August
U.S. Ambassador John Gordon Mien is assassinated by
FAR terrorists on 28 August.
1970
March
Col. Carlos Arana Osorio is elected President by a
plurality.
April
Nest German Ambassador von Spreti is assassinated by
FAR.
July
President Arana is inaugurated; only the second peaceful
transfer of power to a duly constitutionally elected oppo-
sition in Guatemalan history.
November
Government reimposes state of siege to counter increasing
terrorist activities.
1971
November
Government lifts state of siege.
1972
March
Government coalition wins landslide victory in municipal
elections.
September
Top leaders of PGT reportedly seized by government.
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110046 -3

Area Brief
LAND (UIOU)
Size: 42,040 sq. mi.
Use: 14% cultivated, 10% pasture, 57 forest, 19% other
Land boundaries: 1,010 mi.
WATER (UIOU)
Limits of territorial waters (claimed): 12 n. mi.
Coastline: 250 mi.
PEOPLE (UIOU)
Population: 5,651,000, average annual growth rate 2.8%
(curren t)
Ethnic divisions: 41.4% Indian, 58.6% Ladino (mestizo and
westernized Indian)
Religion: Predominantly Roman Catholic
Language: Spanish, but one -third of the population speaks an
Indian language as a primary tongue
Literacy: About 37 age 7 and over
Labor force: 1.5 million (1969); 63.2% agriculture, 12.4
manufacturing, 11.8% services, 12.6% other, 2% unem-
ployed; severe shortage of skilled labor; oversupply of un-
skilled labor; of this total an estimated 10% are unemployed
at any one time
Organized labor: 5% of labor force (1970)
GOVERNMENT (UIOU)
Legal name: Republic of Guatemala
Type: Republic
Capital: Guatemala
Political subdivisions: 22 departments
Legal system: Civil law system; constitution came into effect
1966; judicial review of legislative acts; legal education at
University of San Carlos of Guatemala; has not. accepted
cumpulsory ICJ jurisdiction
Branches: Traditionally dominant executive; elected uni-
cameral legislature; 7- member (minimum) Supreme Court
Government leader: President Carlos Arana
Suffrage: Universal over age 18, compulsory for literates,
optional for illiterates
Elections: Next elections (President and Congress) March
1974
Political parties and leaders: Democratic Institutional Party
(PID), Donaldo Alvarez Ruiz; Revolutionary Party (PR),
Carlos Sagastume Perez; National Liberation Movement
(MLN), Mario Sandoval Alarcon; Guatemalan Christian
Democracy (DCG), Danilo Barillas Rodriquez, Rene de
Leon Schlotter
Communists: Communist party outlawed; underground mem-
bership estimated at approximately 700
Other political or pressure groups: Outlawed (Communist)
Guatemalan Labor Party (PGT), I3ernurdo Alvarado; Demo-
cratic Revolutionary Unity (URD)
Member of: CACM, IADB, IAEA, ICAO, 11113, OAS,
ODECA, U.N.
ECONOMY (UIOU)
GDP: $1.8 billion (1971, in 1958 prices), $340 per capita;
79% private consumption, 8% go� ernment consumption,
14% domestic investment, 1% net foreign balance; real
growth rate 1971, 5.1%
Agriculture: Main products coffee, cotton, corn, beans,
sugarcane, bananas, livestock
Caloric intake: 2,200 calories per day per capita (1967?
Fishing: Catch 5,000 metric tons (1970): exports $1,700,000
(1970), imports $500,000 (1970)
Major industries: Food processing, textiles and clothing,
furniture, chemicals, nonmetallic minerals, metals
Electric power: 178,600 kw. capacity (1971); 1,050 million
kw. -hr, produced (1971), 180 kw. -hr. per capita
Exports: $296 million (f.o.b., 1971); coffee, cotton, meat,
bananas, sugar, textiles, tires
Imports: $281 million (f.o.b., 1971); manufactured products,
machinery, transportation equipment, chemicals, fuels
Major trade partners: Exports�U.S. 28 CACM 29
West Germany 10 Japan 11%; import: �U.S. 41%,
CACM 20 West Germany 10 U.K. 17% (1968)
Aid: Economies- -from U.S. (FY46 -71), $182.7 million loans,
$177.5 million grants; from international organizations
(FY46 -71), $127.4 million; from other western countries
(1960 -68), 87.6 million; military assistance from U.S.
(FY53 -71), $24.4 million
Monetary conversion rate: I quetzal US81 (official)
Fiscal year: Calendar year
COMMUNICATIONS (UIOU)
Railroads: 592 mi., 3 gage; single- tracked; 520 mi.
government owned, 72 mi. privately owned
Highways: 7,600 mi., 1,300 ini. bituminous, 4,200 mi. gravel,
2,100 mi. improved or unimproved earth
Inland waterways: 164 mi. navigable year round; additional
458 mi. navigable during high -water scason
Pipelines: Crude oil, 30 mi.
Freight carried: Rail (1969) 622,600 short tons
Ports: 2 major, 3 minor
Merchant marine: 2 cargo ships (1,000 GRT or over) totaling_
3,600 GRT, 5,500 DWT
9
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CONFIDENTIAL
Airfields: 496 total, 329 usable; 4 with permanent surface
runways; 1 with runway 8,000 11,999 ft., 18 with runways
4,000 -7,999 ft.; 1 seaplane station
Civil. air: I1 major transport aircraft
Telecommunications: Modern telecom facilities limited to
Guatemala City; 41,000 telephones; est. 360,000 radio and
90,000 TV receivers, 81 AM, 19 FM, and 3 TV stations;
connection to international Central American microwave net
DEFENSE FORCES (C)
Military manpower: Males 15 -49, 1,390,000; 700,000 fit for
military service; about 63,000 reach military age (18)
annually
1O
Personnel: 12,970
Major ground units: 4 tactical brigades, 4 separate infantry
battalions, 1 Parachute infantry Battalion (known as the
Rapid Reaction Force), 0c Presidential Guard (400 men),
1 Mobile Military Police (battalion equivalent), and 1 en-
gineer battalion; in addition 1 Tactical Group (400 men)
stationed at La Aurora Air Base for airport security
Ships: 11 craft
Aircraft: 54
Supply: Dependent primarily on U.S.; substantial quantities
of army materiel obtained frorp Poland and Spain
Military budget: Proposed for fiscal year ending 31 December
1972, $18.9 million; about 7.5% of central government budget
No FOREIGN DissEM
CONFIDENTIAL
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110046 -3

COOlt nt 1 ATt:s
,Y�.
W
ingu iatl i
14 21
S9 35
Antigua Gu: tentala
14 34
90 44
Bahia de Atnatiquc (buy)
15) 5:i
SS 15
Bahia de GAI% (bay)
15 42
SS 3S
Bananrra
15 28
88 :i0
Baril las
I:i 48
91 IS
Canal de C hiquunuhlla (eanol)...........
13 55
91 07
Cantel
1.1 44)
91 27
Champerico
I -1 1S
?1 55
Chic l licastenango
1.1 :)(i
91 07
Chic�kasa%k (locality)
15 20
SS :iii
hlnlaltena [Igo
1; 4O
90 49
Chi(I uirilula
Il 4S
89 33
Ciudad Tec�tin t nnin
11 4(i
92 09
Coatepeque
1.1 .12
91 :i2
C obtin
15 29
90 19
uilapa
1.1 17
90 IS
DOS Lag/ leas
17 -12
89 :36
El Estor
t:i :32
89 21
1 .1 Progreso
1.1 51
90 0.1
El Rancho
1.1 55
9t) 00
issc Ili it tla
1-1 1S
90 47
F.squiptllas
1.1 34
89 21
Flores
lfi :)(i
89 5?
(ilia la n
15 OS
89 22
Guatemala Citp (or Guatenmla)..........
1-1 :3S
90 :31
Gulf of Honduras (yaln
16 10
I/ 511
Huehuetenango
15 20
91 ?S
Ixe-All locality
15 19
91 04
Izabal
13 21
89 OS
Jalapa
11 :3S
89 :i9
J 11tiit pa
14 17
89 5.1
Lago de Atitldn (lake)
1.1 .1
91 12
Lago de Izabal (takel...................
15 30
89 10
Las Casas
15 12
90 06
Livingston
15 :i0
88 15
Los Cipresales
11 47
40 17
Mazatenango
14 :32
91 :30
Melchor de Mencos
17 04
S9 10
Iiralnit ndo
1�1 33
90 06
Modesto M(-ndez
15 5:1
89 1:3
M ornostenango
15 0 -1
91 21
Morales
15 29
88 119
Panz6s
15 2.1
89 40
Petk
14 37
90 1
COOlt nt 1 ATt:s
Selected airfields
Dos Lag) nut.
r 1
'11.
Popt tin
i8 21
89 2(i
Puerto Barrios
lei 13
88 3(i
Quezaltenangc
14 51)
91 3l
Quiriguti
15 16
89 05
Itetalhul ell
14 :32
91 11
Rio ChixoY (strt�,tnl)
It; of
90 21
Rio de la Pasiem (.stream)
16 2S
90 :33
Rio Dulce (4ream)
l:i 49
88 4:i
Rio Ilondo
15 10
91 25
Rio ,Motagtnt. (stream)
15 -14
SS I 1
Rio Polochic� (strearn)
1:i 28
fig 22
Rio Salinas (stream)
16 28
90 33
Rio San Pedro (stream)
17 40
91 26
Rio Sarst(in (stream)
15 :i4
88 .il
Rio Usumacinta (stream)
IS 2.1
92 :3S
"an Crist6hal Verapaz
15 2:3
90 2.1
"all .1os6
13 55
90 19
Sari Juan 1xco3
15 36
91 27
San Juan Sacatepequez
14 43
90 39
San M arcos
1.1 5S
91 is
Santa Cruz del Quic�h(
15 02
91 os
Santiago Atitlim
14 :38
91 1.1
Santo I'onuis de Castilla
15 42
SS :37
SaVaxch(
Ili :31
90 11)
Sebol (archeologienl 'ife
15 47
89 riff
Sipacate
1:3 :i(i
91 09
Soloht
I4 .16
91 11
Tapachula, Mexico
14 :)t
92 17
T ikal
17 20
89 341
I lglll.. a t e
14 17
91 22
Totonicap :in
1-1 :iri
91 22
Uspan( tin
l:i 23
90 50
Z ac� apa
14 5S
89 :32
Selected airfields
Dos Lag) nut.
17 11
S9 32
Flores
16 :i.i
S9 03
La Aurora
1.1 :3.5
90 32
Peter Itza
17 02
89 :39
Puerto Barrios
15 4.1
SS 35
Quez a:tetiango
1 -1 rig
91 :30
Retalhulcu
1 1 :31
91 12
San Jose \r 1
1:3 :i(i
90 50
hacapa
Il 5S
S9 :32
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110046 -3
Places and features referred to in this General Survey (UJOU)

a
C
7
O
x
Sar, I
30(
Ck
T, k I
Melchor
Lag, do Menco
Qi
La L,bertad
e
do
oo
Sayaxch
\0
I jPoplun
San Luis
Com,tan
Ip
CuA uhtemoc v
Put
Modesto 1 p
iC I'e. ii rl a rl C., Vela Mendez
1
0 j-0 'FZ01, SF
aneli
"'pe
r) San Juan-. pe
TA
fixcoy� SIERRA N
t
j 14
0
El Estn
C. II a I de
Lago de
YA NL 5 Z a b a i
Cobin
j 'mi6s
W
19 600 1 lioll
e fil
Pc)/0 h izdb I
-,,,D I H u e h u e n a P. q o pbnc gg 1)
77
I
Z
i m
A.5 Los Am
1. 10L ;A
7
40 r
p
(i E 0 0 antz Cruz nn G -ja A n
h U C
3 j
o,i Z aca
r, R ly
P
r
S-
tip
1 ;Y -Zo -1
m r c h
R
4
zaltenanyo Cl
Chiq!! la
a 91' 1
r I r
mn p i u I a
a t Z, a)
Z
j
iudadTec.Cjn
U
c
Gu atemala
Q>
'maz n8n f
Anfigup
rtAqton .4 ll`
Oc �A
0
Re LU 4
a LOW itepro u e L
u uaternalle
Ret I h y,' c-'q c h i P q Laguna (I
Q t
An gti".
Rio B wa f, r
Pa I
e y' 6/ ,y. I I
U
Champo u t, Asuncio
dT i
Mta
42i
u".
s�
unc
Mta
ntla
cul
r,c jT,
?!Ia)a ,L L
ago do
of
'Esclo"05
Escuintla
14
j Lal cojale I a U a ty, iaWta
Sipacate San Jose
o o 0
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200110046-3
O
i
`o 1'4!,
a
C
7
O
x
Sar, I
30(
Ck
T, k I
Melchor
Lag, do Menco
Qi
La L,bertad
e
do
oo
Sayaxch
\0
I jPoplun
San Luis
Com,tan
Ip
CuA uhtemoc v
Put
Modesto 1 p
iC I'e. ii rl a rl C., Vela Mendez
1
0 j-0 'FZ01, SF
aneli
"'pe
r) San Juan-. pe
TA
fixcoy� SIERRA N
t
j 14
0
El Estn
C. II a I de
Lago de
YA NL 5 Z a b a i
Cobin
j 'mi6s
W
19 600 1 lioll
e fil
Pc)/0 h izdb I
-,,,D I H u e h u e n a P. q o pbnc gg 1)
77
I
Z
i m
A.5 Los Am
1. 10L ;A
7
40 r
p
(i E 0 0 antz Cruz nn G -ja A n
h U C
3 j
o,i Z aca
r, R ly
P
r
S-
tip
1 ;Y -Zo -1
m r c h
R
4
zaltenanyo Cl
Chiq!! la
a 91' 1
r I r
mn p i u I a
a t Z, a)
Z
j
iudadTec.Cjn
U
c
Gu atemala
Q>
'maz n8n f
Anfigup
rtAqton .4 ll`
Oc �A
0
Re LU 4
a LOW itepro u e L
u uaternalle
Ret I h y,' c-'q c h i P q Laguna (I
Q t
An gti".
Rio B wa f, r
Pa I
e y' 6/ ,y. I I
U
Champo u t, Asuncio
dT i
Mta
42i
u".
s�
unc
Mta
ntla
cul
r,c jT,
?!Ia)a ,L L
ago do
of
'Esclo"05
Escuintla
14
j Lal cojale I a U a ty, iaWta
Sipacate San Jose
o o 0
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200110046-3

T.kal
Melchor
La go
Fieten
de Mer
r 9,57
o
1 21 .4
q
Popt6n
San Luis
i i
ud d
C oral slat
L)
C'
0
r
C a r i b b e a n a n
S,e a
Cit y
Bel ize
FURNEFFE
4 f ISLANDS
If Qj ,Seimopan
"San Ignacio
Middlesex columbas
Slann
pp Creek
r i t
'Gfov'r
H o d L; r a s
F
0 25 100 200 500
0 10 39 77 193
Persons per square !i;unneter
Data h'ised or? 1964
census by muniripio
Punta G
G u f 0 f Economic Activity
H o n d u r a s
Bahia de
Ca C
l 11 Arratique
Puerto
Mode to
Francisco Vela Co te
Livingston
s
Mendez
Q
E Goife!e
Felipe er Bar S
S
Santo Tom.is
!t S pNTk S IERRA de Castilla 'DE
El Eslaf,
Lago de Motagua
Izabal Banapf' Morales ,r
ch ic lzab I
0 0
C a n' e
Ch-ckasaw
ell i a
Amates
Los
J
;v
o n d a S
in
H
i. KO
Q
z
7 N,
Guatemala liif
t
R et I lu !e u
International boundary a
Decartarnento boundary C p a mpenc E ccuint I Cuilapal
National capital
ft Len LI i'J
a Departarnento capital
Railroad
Swfaced road
Ang ial' Airfield
Jiv nicel
n Food processing
77 X-1 6. Z.-, Footwear
guia.' Major port
Textiles
0 Tires
sunc16
Mita Flour milling Cement
Lago dJ1 Populated places Sugar Giiija 'A C;o Over 350,000 milling Petroleum refining
tD- 15,000 to 80,000 AGRICULTURAL
0 5,000 to 15,000 Mostly forested and agriculturally unde-
Under 5,000
I Le veloped; some shifting cultivation;
Ric bananas and abaci in southeast
portion
S
ta A-na pot efe"rIfnn. if! feet Basically subsistence agriculture: mostl
)L� --1-.-'-- corn, plus beans, grain, and vegetables; A
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200110046-3
Population

U lr_'
pulation
I
salami.
�Iiclpa
,is per square mile
ti 2 00 5
39 77 193
per square kilometer
based on 1964
is by mumcipio
Dmic Activity
Guatttt)ata
EiCYlA ld Cuupa�
San Jose-
Food processing L Footwear
Hydroelectric powerplant
Textiles 0 Tires
Nickel deposit
Flour milling Cement
Sulfur deposit
Sugar milling Petroleum refining
AGRICULTURAL
AREAS
y forested and agriculturally undr_�
Principal food- producing area: corn,
7ped; some shifting cultivation;
beans, vegetables. and tropical fruits.
arras and abaca in southeast
Also cattle ranches tobacco
lion
Ally_ subsistence apriculture: mostly
LJ Principal coffee area
Vegetation
eh;
RTF{
t R
i iefmdi� i
i
Dc�I
P I Sn 9h 1,
Ind napohsj
f J
'Ashla "d
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110046 -3
_.l Broadleaf evergreen and dec,dur,us L Thorn forest
forest. and scrub antl grassland
Lnw Lrnd savanna and
Necdlcleaf f�frgr �!n and broad -if upland pasture
L__.J
deciduous for est. and scrub
j Swarr,u nr marsh
YF-, F 7 Oak scruh. with gra-.s!and and Mer.gnyve
patches or forest

S LA c,
J j t 1 r j L 1 1 1 i
p
T;ka:
"San Ign
I d(1u do Mencoy
own
r
La L�bertad i
JCL
e
i
de
i o
Saya.cr?e
3 ch: ,,,N
i lPoptLn
r
Comrtan �f'
,a
o San Lws
Pur,!a
.J Modesto
n
PC an i/ I Franrsc�, Vela j' IdQndez
i t
d or
ad
Cu uhtemnc
C, San Juan r a a 9 rc J G{4. $s(1Fehpe
t IxcoY, y �r S FRI.r iJ: 5ft1TA r
6 3 r' Rio Jana ago de
a0 UAh'Ara.h' Bar
.,,4 O
Coban C lzabat
-1 c
r 1 W Patizos
?n 'Izabal
,Cwlc K f�-... rc /i',;
t `v,'.
'p! t '+Y}'7?r,rnr dy, `euo e rat t �uys
`1 Huehue�tenango "IC" Parc3jl t NR1! D ,o i
t.. J ,..f r \r 110H9
Los ,{mate.
E
JAt' S OF P4 c. a".' V f,_
I. .5E00 r_.,# CrlL 0
_Snlama 1'
Santa Cruz FN
i' b o
Qw he Rabinal ro nd
TAP 'I Cu. o
sa
del q
San drCO5 P'+r .a. w 1 1 1^ r T LaCUpa
%otonlcapan `,:y. s rt F r 8
'v R nl Rn
/J M r c S 1'YRanch
+..r 1 r .a Gk
zaltenan El ula rf
Coate
hi
P i. u I q
agO /�.C..
i.cun ,j'l�� t Ti' 1> yQ Ch 1b$acatepequ
udad T. attt
uman Pat z 'v y i p l'. 'N7/ ..1 ca'`../-r'. -i J JAI ..la b., rf' i t.
Guatern .i
nan
aze
An A n a F itR t1
.'".,r Jl n. Anton ti r. `'r tigua r<
ocds, i /'7Re ai leu itep6gao A *uatemal r
Ret "E' U chi peg w J CagunadA't J 4' Ang'Jat
A}TB IR(yr
S f P.ip B ave ll P" fj t i a nguta!'
scuI tla r �2 7t 77 ulra,a
Champ
c tJ n y :1
Sri o� o TT
gL atc l f. k, 1 .,a r 1i Mita
Cr n 3 Cu
a %,...r Y R c de
o., t "I t.os
E5CiAltiil
r R
1+ t Ai'i
colate zlapa Ca 7 yc�
a
Sin ar`:amr San Jn
alC9 C i
Piacific Ocean T
i
Supt J Leg
I Nzmas and boundary representation SaWador f!OO
are sot necessarily authoritative
500829 12 -72
Central Intelligence Agency For Official Use ly
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110046 -3

Walk.
C a r i b b e a n
"s e a
de lize
City
TURNUFL
ISLANDS
W
J- )B
elmopan
*San Ignacio
i r)
Melchor
t Jqc do Mencqs, C b!.-
Fe ren Itza Wddlas iO
Stann
Greek
r s
5
C)
H o n d u r
C
Poptun
San Luts.
Punta G prda
G u I t 0 f
H o n d u r a s
At
Bahia d&
Ga cu 1 A n) a I i q u e Puerto
10
Vela Francisco Vea M M od es t o
0 ndez
G olfele
Z derto Bar S
CFO S-1 Felipe
't) i Santo
SIERF(A /V-E
z
SAIJA do Castilla
'sled
El E
ti Ij a
Lago de
ii b al Bana
Morale!.
*.z abal
h,ckafiaw
1 mfr, ro
S
LAS! I
Los Amates
Q n d U- a s
G ua!,i n
X W
A ned
zacLi
t7o
Ranch Guatemala
International boundary
Departarnento boundary
15 National capital
JaldP8 Departarnento capital
r
Railroad
Surfaced road
A n g ta Airfield
Major pt
nguia 4
1,U t
gal a suns r
Mica T Populated places
fj Le g o de
0I,er 350.000
15,000 to 80.000
0 5,000 to 15.000
Uride, 5.000
0 L
Scale 1: 1.510,000
E A C-
10 )C1 A 41,
T
S an K
c-
Lago de
SaWador llopango
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA�RDP01-00707R000200110046-3
r
L N Food i�I,-5%.nq Z.. rootwe
T�W.I 0 T,ti-s
Flour C I:Mell
Sugar milling Pvtrole
AG
Mosley 10-sl'Id and ailt,culturalty u
v, );)(!d. some sh-fti 6(l cultivation;
bananas and ,baca in ,).lh,w%t
Po on
Basically subsistence aq,(.ulture r
corn. p us lovans. qra,n. and vecie
some coffee
Bas,rally subsistence a';,!cultule mot
coin. clus beans and squash; wheat
potatoes. and deciduous fruits in
po 4uarp m.'r
j j5 1011 210 513
0 10 39 i 1 193
pvtoils Per qvare idumelt
Dal: t 11t,4
ice s- Ny If)-
San Just.
W�

Fls
r
A 1
Salami*
I
ns per square mile
100 200 500
'7
39 77 193
per square kilometer
based on 1964
is by municipio
ic Activity
1
I
rs
n
Ye2a af14 u a
Easain l Cuilapa
San Jose
e Food processing L Footwear
Hydroelectric powerplant
Textiles Tires
Nickel deposit
Flour milling Cement
Sulfur deposit
Sugar milling 0&1 Petroleum refining
AGRICULTURAL
AREAS
lostly forested and agriculturally unde�
Pr+ncipal food-producing area: corn,
veloped; sornr shifting cultivation;
beans, vegetables, and tropical fruits.
bananas and abaca in southeast
Also cattle ranches.tobacco
portion
lasically subsistence agriculture: mostly
Principal coffee area
corn. plus plus beans, grain, and vegetables;
some coffee
Commercial agriculture: sugarcane,
r
plus corn, cotton, cocoa, bananas,
lasirally subsistence agriculture: lture: mostly
and coffee Also cattle ranches
corn, plus beans and squash; wheat,
potatoes, and deciduous frnuls in
1 Principal cotton aria, plus sugarcane,
higher areas, plus sheep grazing
rice, and beans. Also cattle ranches
b
Ch
A1C9E RICAA =l\
.1
Summary Map
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110046 -3
Broadleaf evergreen and deciduous)
'a'r Thorn forest
forest, and scrub and grassland
Lowland savanna and
Needleleaf evergreen and broadleaf upland pasture
deciduous forest, and scrub
Swamp ur marsh
Oak scrub, with grassland and 1 Mangrove
patcnes of forest
I
a
S
N
V: ash rylo 1
Aslia d
-n-
1
t
V
Summary Map
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110046 -3
Broadleaf evergreen and deciduous)
'a'r Thorn forest
forest, and scrub and grassland
Lowland savanna and
Needleleaf evergreen and broadleaf upland pasture
deciduous forest, and scrub
Swamp ur marsh
Oak scrub, with grassland and 1 Mangrove
patcnes of forest

I
3
CONFIDENTIAL
NO FOREIGN DISSF..M
CONFIDENTIAL
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110046 -3