NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY 19; HUNGARY; GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

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• Collection: NIS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP01-00707R000200110039-1
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3. The Kadar regime: "Goulash commu-
1. Communist party
17
nism" at work
5
a. Organization and structure
17
Reorganization of Communist party, initiation
Democratic centralism with power t
of low -key reformism, restoration of inter-
re d
derived from lower organs and
national image; New Economic Mechanism;
o
people but in practice localized in top
Kadar s success in maintaining domestic sta-
leadership; layers from central apparatus
bility while loyally supporting U.S.S.R. foreign
in Budapest to cells at local level parallel
policy directives.
to political territorial subdivisions; Party
B. Structure and functioning of the government
6
Congress, party conference, urban party
1. Constitution
6
organizations, general membership meeting
1949 Constitution on Soviet pattern, absence
for cell.
of limitations on state power; Kadar's efforts
(1) Parry Congress
17
to adopt a new constitution.
Highest organ of HSWP; chronology
2. Structure of government
7
of sessions; statutory functions.
All powerful character of extragovernmental
(2) Central Committee
18
Communist party, government as principal
Responsibility for party affairs be-
avenue of party control.
tween Party Congresses; representa-
a. Parliament
8
tive of party in relations with other
Unicameral rubberstamp of party policies;
parties, mass organizations, and state
theoretical powers; 4 -year term of mem-
administration; operations and com-
bers; gradual growth in interpellative
position; Politburo as controlling sub
action.
organ.
b. Presidential Council
9
(3) Politburo
18
Collective presidency elected from among
Locus of power in HSWP� dominant
members of Parliament; formal adminis-
political leaders as members; respon-
trative body to conduct day -to -day me-
sibility and control of all party and
chanics of government.
government affairs.
c. Council of Ministers
9
(4) Secretariat
20
Executive organ of government subject to
Second most important party execu-
members of party Secretariat and Political
tive agency; functions and composi-
Committee; echnocratic character.
lion.
3. Local government
12
Councils at three levels -19 counties and five
(5) Committees
20
cities with county status, 97 districts, 1,184
Central Control Committee, National
villages and 643 groups of villages; functions
Economy Committee, Agitation and
and composition.
Propaganda Committee; five "working
4. Legal system
collectives."
a. Legal codes
13
(6) County, district, and lower levels
20
Traditional law similar to common law;
b. Membership
p
1
Communist efforts to codify civil and crim-
Numbers and social makeup; membership
innl law on Soviet model, emphasis on
policies of party leadership; growth pat-
crimes against the state; powers of courts;
terns.
multitude of investigative agencies.
b. Courts
15
c. The decisionmaking process
21
Court system as tool by which Commu-
Unquestioned party primacy in deter
nists retain power; subordination to Min-
mining national policies; utilization of ex-
istry of justice; Supreme Court, county
pert advice if Soviet interests or internal
and district courts, juvenile courts, special
party interests do not predominate.
courts; composition and jurisdiction.
(1) Procedure
21
c. Central People's Control Co.m.nittee
16
Role of Politburo, Secretariat, Central
Watchdog over economic activity; invest
Committee departments, nonvoting
gative authority complemented by puni-
experts; binding character of Polit-
tive power since 1964; People's Super-
buro actions.
visors.
(2) Important external influences
22
C. Political dynamics
16
"Socialist internationalism" �the ne-
Hungarian Socialist Workers Party (HSWP) as
cessity for Hungary to gauge its
controlling force in national political life; Kadar's
actions to what other Warsaw Part
balancing dependence on Soviet Union against
nati-)ns will accept; political limita-
careful attention to rapport with people.
tions imposed by the U.S.S.R.
ii
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(3) Important domestic factors 23
Popular attitudes; industrial and agri-
cultural workers, youth, technocracy,
intellectuals; respected pre- Commu-
nist leaders.
2. Mass organizations 23
Buffers between party and population; char-
acter, missions, P .rty control.
a. Patriotie People's Front 24
Extension of party; vehicle to mobilize
support for party's program ane,, to dis-
seminate propaganda.
b. Communist Youth League 24
Purpose of extending party influence
among youth; general ineffectiveness.
c. National Trade Unions Council 25
Politburo supervised organ to control all
trade unions; mandatory membership of all
industrial, government, and some service
employees; function of assuring increased
labor output and productivity; Labor Code
of 19 and increased trade union au-
thority in representing workers' interests
as well as in overseeing management.
d. Other major mass organizations 26
National Council of Hungarian Women,
National Peace Council, National Federa-
tion of Sports Associations, Hungarian Red
Cross.
3. Electoral procedures
Communist faihire in 1945 election �the only
free and democratic election in Hungarian
history; suppressiou of opposition candidates
and parties and Communist domination of
candidate selection and election process
through Independent People's Front and the
succeeding Patriotic People's Front; liberaliza-
tion of nominating and voting procedures in
1967 and 1970.
D. National policies
Basic goals: maintaining Communist rule, sustain-
ing regime in power, preserving domestic sta-
bility, maintaining good relations with the
U.S.S.R.; reed for cautious, piecemeal innova-
tions toward more popuh:r form of communism;
necessity to contain international initiatives with-
in framework of Soviet policy.
26
Page
b. The worker peasant alliance 30
Rakosi's pre -1950 bias favoring industrial
worker over peasant; Kadar's successful
collectivization of agriculture and efforts
to equalize peasant status with that of in-
dustrial proletariat.
c. Safeguarding improvements in the
standard of living 31
Past neglect of consumer interest, Kadar's
recognition of need for consumer satisfac-
tion; New Economic Mechanism in 1968,
problems.
d. Expanding socialist democracy 32
Consistent direction despite caution, lack
of clarity, and slow pace; credibility as
greatest danger.
2. Foreign 33
Ties with U.S.S.R., benefits and restrictions;
sycophant repetition of Soviet pronouncements
from 1947 to 1956, efforts to reestablish
international credentials from 1956 to 1963,
endorsement of Soviet position in Communist
world since 1965, efforts to expand non -Com-
munist relations; support for Soviet stand on
European security; unsettling impact of 1968
Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia; good rela-
tions with Austria and Yugoslavia, problems
with Romania; support for world Communist
goals, involvement in CEMA and conse-
quences of New Economic Mechanism; gen-
erally good relations with Western Europe;
provocative and strained relations with the
United Mates from 1945 to 1963, modera-
tion and improvement since 1963; membership
in United Nations and other international
organizations.
3. National defense 38
Orientation toward Soviet and East European
defense needs, Politburo control, coordination
with Soviet advisers; budget and strength
trends; dependence on the U.S.S.R. for mili-
tary protection; Soviet troops in Hungary;
28 morale problems in armed forces.
1. Domestic 28
Kadar's successful program of gradual domes-
tic reform.
a. National reconciliation 29
Official tolerance of private non- Commu-
nist views if holders are not openly hostile;
failure to accommodate Magyar na-
tionalism.
4. Civil defense 39
Task of protecting population from weapons
of mass destruction or during civil emer-
gencies or natural disasters; training emphasis
on evacuation, medical support, subsistence,
and comu,unications.
E. Threats to government stability 40
1. Discontent and dissidence 40
Minor proportions, safety valves; weaknesses
containing potential for instability: necessity
to continue to improve standard of living,
Kadar's uncertain health, concentration of
wealth and privilege in hands of party elite,
nationalism and irredentism; general lessening
of hostility toward party.
iii
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2. Subversion 41
No known subversive groups; general recog-
nition of Soviet determination to crush all
challenges to its authority in East Europe.
F. Maintenance of internal security 42
Firm party control over complex organization;
primary mission of enforcing conformity to dic-
tates of party; significant role of secret police
in political maneuvering; structural organization
of intelligence and police system.
1. Ministry of Interior 43
Control by Kadar supporter; development and
functions of:
a. III Main Group Directorate (AVH).
b. II Main Gi�oup Directorate.
c. Frontier Guard.
d. Internal Security Troops.
Page
2. Other security elements
48
a. Workers Militia
48
b. Industrial Guard Force
48
c. Penal system
48
3. Intelligence
48
a. Nonmilitary intelligence
48
Responsibility of AVH.
3
b. Military intelligence
49
Second Group Command of the General
Fig. 2
Staff of the Ministry of Defense (VKF -H).
4. Countersubversive and counterinsur-
Politburo members (chart)
gency measures and capabilities
50
Failure of security apparatus in 1956 revolt;
4
unknown reliability of regular security organs.
Results of Hungarian elections table)
G. Selected bibliography
50
Chronology
52
Glossary
56
FIGURES
iv
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Fig. 1
Changes in Hungary's international
Fig. 6
Political controls chart)
10
boundary map)
3
Fig. 7
Administrative subdivisions map)
12
Fig. 2
Matyas Rakosi and Imre Nagy
Fig. 8
Politburo members (chart)
19
photos)
4
Fig. 9
Results of Hungarian elections table)
27
Fig. 3
Soviet tanks patrolling Budapest
Fig. 10
Schedule of domestic reforms table)
29
photo)
5
Fig. 11
Modern apartment buildings photo)
32
Fig. 4
Interrelationship of top party and
Fig. 12
Andras Benkei photo)
43
government posts (chart)
8
Fig. 13
Police and security services organi
Fig. 5
Parliament in session photo)
8
zation chart)
44
iv
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government and Politics
A. Introduction (S)
Under Communist domination since 1947,
Hungarv's political development has mirrored, and in
some ways helped to shape, the development of
relations between dominant Soviet political and
economic power in Eastern Europe and the indigenous
regimes of the area. 'rhe trauma of the 1956
Hungarian revolt, an explosion of long repressed
popular fury against Stalinist practices, served as the
point of departure for the gradual, pragmatic
reformism of Hungarian party leader Janos Kadar.
Kadar's approach, which is closely studied by other
Eastern European reformers, has gained Soviet
confidence, improved living standards, and main-
tained domestic tranquility, but it has not fully
tamped down the potentially dang(_;ous nationalism
of the Hungarian people.
Small, landlocked, and astride one of the main
European invasion routes, Hungary since the 16th
century has been almost continuously subjugated by
major foreign powers. Patterns of domestic rule have
been largely shaped by this factor and, indeed, the
major traditional task for Budapest leaders has been to
arrange acceptable accommodations with dominant
foreign powers. The severe limitations of Hungary's
endemically inferior power position have precluded
the achievement of lasting national autonomy, and
the best compromise that the Hungarians historically
have been able to attain is dom stic self -rule under the
strong political and economic influence of one or
another major ally. Such close foreign ties have also
been the Hungarians' undoing; in World War 1, as a
nominally equal partner in the Austro- Hungarian
Empire, Hungary shared the defeat and disintegration
of the Habsburg monarchy. When the resulting
political chaos impelled the Magyars into World War
H on the side of the Axis, a second defeat led directly
to subjugation by Moscow.
Hungary's subordinate relationship to dominant
foreign powers historically has combined with deep
social breaches within the Magyar nation to frustrate
the growth of democratic political institutions. Ruling
elites, whether sanctified by royal charter or Marxist
dialectics, have maintained their power and privileges
mainly on the strength of their relationship to the
dominant foreign power. They have not, however,
been able to rule with complete impunity. Populist
nationalists, professing to interpret the national will,
have always been willing to conspire against those
rulers who proved to be tyrannical, ineffective, or too
responsive to foreign dictates.
Hungary's very modest economic resources also
have posed limitations on its independence. Almost
bereft of the raw materials needed by its industry, the
nation now draws heavily on the massive resource base
of the Soviet Union and, as under the Habsburgs,
depends on exports of agricultural products to provide
the economic basis for its future industrial
development. Moreover, Hungary's economic ties t';
Moscow are so comprehensive that even minor shifts
in Soviet trade policy could cause serious shocks to the
Hungarian economy.
The Hungarian experience with military conflicts
has been nothing short of disastrous. Hungary's defeat
in every major war it has engaged in as an
independent or semi- independent state in the last two
centuries has imbued the nation with suspicion and
cynicism toward such adventures. The peasant
aphorism "when elephants fight, only the grass gets
hurt" accurately reflects the popular Hungarian
attitude toward military solutions. The pre -1956
Communist regime ignored this basic attitude in its
zeal to fulfill defense tasks assigned by Moscow.
Under Kadar, such ambitious and economically
exhausting military spending has been discontinued
and the leadership has publicly professed its
conviction that the nation can hope to thrive only
under it long period of peace in Europe.
Budapest is thus vitally interested in the movement
toward European detente and disarmament, but its
close adherence to Soviet guidelines restricts it from
playing any significant independent role. The
Hungarians have settled on a less daring course, using
the prospects of East -West detente as a reason for
�i)ancling political and, more important, economic
relations with Western Europe. There remain,
however, Soviet restrictions on these initiatives, and
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Hungarian relations with the major capitalist
powers �tht: United States, the United Kingdom, and
West Germany�arc hindered by Moscow's stance in
foreign poliev and economic priorities.
Although the international arena is generally closed
to unilateral Hungarian initiative, the Hungarians
have been allowed freer rein internally. The Kadar
regirnc has tapped some of the best ininds available in
an effort to devise means of working out i t more
effective and humane style of communism within the
limit: imposed by Moscow. Budapest's goal is the
modernization and perfection of standard Communist
methodology into it workable system satisfying real
national needs. Economic reforms have alrcadv been
successfully introduced, and the line in the sensitive
area of political reform �where Soviet interests must
be carefully weighed �has been breached. Kadar
proceeds gradually and pragmatically, and progress is
often retarded by overriding political factors. The
viability of this kind of controlled, paternalistic reform
is nevertheless still improved, since it has never before
succeeded in the Sovici orbit. Over tilt: next decade,
the nerve, political acumen, and inventiveness of the
I Iungarian leadership and people will be sorely tested
as they attempt to match their desires to the real
Possibilities of their geopolitical position.
1. The beginnings of modern Hungary
Hungary's defeat in World War I produced a
precipitous collapse of the nation's essentially feudal
structure, and initiated it quarter of it century of
political chaos. The collapse of the monarchv in 1917
was followed by the so- called Aster Revolution, which
brought it reformist Social Democrat regime under
Count Mihaly Karoly into power. The new
government was plagued by economic and social
disruptions caused by the war and by discord over
needed reforms. Meddling by foreign powers and by
royalist plotters further �.vcakened Karoly's govern-
ment, but its ultimate collapse was due to its failure to
create it workable land reform that would have unified
the peasantry behind it. With the collapse of Karoly's
government, the Hungarian Communist Partv -4
months old at the time but buoyed up by the successes
Of the Soviet revolution in Russia seized power,
under the leadership of Bela Kun, in a coup on 21
March 1919.
Kurt. who had only shortly before returned from
Leningrad, initiated an unwise imitation of Lenin's
policies without regard for local problems. Kin's
fill tionalization of large landholdings angered the
peasantry who instead wanted the estates parceled out
to them. Similarly, the rising urban bourgeoisie was
2
outraged by the nationalization of private businesses.
Economic chaos ensued. and by the end of July 1919
the Republic of Councils was overthrown by Drench
and Romanian troops while Hungary's regular army,
angered by Kim's policies, stood aside.
Bela Kin's Republic of Councils was followed by a
succession of weak governments. 'Their effectiveness
was further eroded by extragovernmental conservative
forces which directed nationwide roundups of
Communist and liberal sympathizers, and generally
suppressed even the milder aspects of Karoly's reforms.
Land was returned to the wealthy landowners and
determined steps were taken to restore privileges to the
upper classes.
During this period Hungary suffered the most
significant and lasting of its post -World War I
humiliations. As it result of the Trianon settlement
1920) Hungary was forced to accept the loss of 70% of
its prewar territory and 60% of its population. Figure 1
shows changes in Hungary's boundaries from 1914 to
1972. The loss changed Hungary from a multinational
state ruled by Magyars to an island of Magyars
surrounded by newly independent countries in which
significant Hungarian ethnic minorities were isolated
and, in some cases, treated with hostility. 'rhe'rrianon
settlement was to become the major political issue for
the next 20 years in Hungary. Revision of the treaty
became it national mania which both fueled and
cloaked the policies of successive conservative regimes
under the regency of Fascist- leaning Adm. Miklos
I-lorthy (1920 -44). Impelled by it rise of indigenous
fascism that predated even Hitler's rise to power, a
campaign for the revision of the Trianon settlement by
military force drove the Hungarians directly into the
Axis camp at the beginning of World War 11.
'rhe wartime government in Hungary, sponsored by
Germany and gambling on an Axis victory, annexed
portions of Hungary's pre -World War territory from
its neighbors. The price for this miscalcwation was
high. When World War 11 ended, the interwar
boundaries were restored, and even Hungary's
legitimate grievances were, perhaps permanently,
swept aside. Hungary, once again on the losing side of
a major European conflict, had also sullied its
international reputation by participating freely during
the last months of the Nazi "final solution' to the
Jewish question and in other racist nationalist
aberrations under it Fascist government which had
replaced Fforthy's independent and lass- tainted
government. Moreover, Hungary had the misfortune
to be "liberated" by the Soviet lied Armv, and, for the
first time in its history, fell under the domination of its
traditional enernv, Russia.
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iq
29 50- m,
F
Rijeka
m
-50 15 w Krak6w.'
50 15 N-Y Krak6w
Krakow.'
25
CZECHOSLOVAKIA POLAND
L vov
POUND
CZECHOSLOVAKIA POLAND
V 0 2'
L'vow
L' V
Brno
U.S.S.R
A
U.S.S.R. U.
Vienna
vo
Vienna
MukachiVo vo
AUSTRIA
AUSTRIA
Cluj
'Arad
r.b
Rije ka Zagreb
ROMANIA
0
45
ROMANIA f
YUGOSLAVIA
Belgrade
20
FIRST VIENNA AWARD-1938
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CZECHOSLOVAKIA POLAND L'voy
'Brno U.S.S.R.
Vienna
AUSTRIA A
Zagreb
Rijeka
YUGOSLAVIA
Belgrade 0
Arad
ROMANIA
SECOND VIENNA AWARD-1940;
50 is Krakow. 25
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45
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'Arad ROMANIA
-Zagreb 7
Rijeka
YUGOSLAVIA 45
Belgrade
20
FIRST VIENNA AWARD-1938
Krak6w.'
CZECHOSLOVAKIA POLAND L'voy
'Brno U.S.S.R.
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AUSTRIA A
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2. The Communist era: the early years
The establishment of Communist rill(- in Hungary
was characterized by an array of political mistakes
pe�petratcd by they part leaders. Larger� the products
01 the Soviet- c�outrolled Comintern, these leaders
attained power by treacherous methods to which they
later pointed xyith pride. Relying largely on the Soviet
Red Army and on the Soviet secret police, the party
under X1atyas Rakosi (Figure 2) immediately began it
forced restructuring of Hungarian political, economic,
and social institutions along Soviet lines. Religion,
private landownersidl), and traditional cultural ties
with the West were sohjected 'o unrelenting pressure
by the secret police. Sycophantic praise of the Soviets
became the order of the clay, aggravating further the
party's mindless disregard of traditional Magyar
national pride. Other serious mistakes included
Budapest's acceptance of detailed Soviet interference
in, and in some cases outright control of, the
Hungarian economy. Paralleling these heavyhanded
public policies was it series o f vicious intraparty purges
which ended in demoralizing and disuniting the
leadership as well as the rank and file.
Despite the mounting morale problems, there was
very little effort by Rakosi either to understand or to
ameliorate popular grievances. The first steps toward
correcting the situation were taken in response to an
alarming lag in th(- national economy i 1955. lunre
Nagy Figure 2), it Communist who was obsessed by
the failure of Rakosi to work out solutions to legitimate
national problems, became Premier in July 1953 and
immediate) introduced the so- called New Course, un
economic policy designed to improve consumer
supplies and encourage workers to produce by relying
ci
FIGURE 2. Former party leader Matyas Rakosi, "Stalin's
best pupil," and former Premier Imre Nagy, nationalist
Communist head of government during the 1956
revolt (U /OU)
cm incentives rather than force. As it corollary, Nagy
took advantage of the confusion after the death of
Stalin in March 19:53 to order an casing of police
terror. Nagy's program, hoxvvver, was effectively
undermined by Rakosi and his henchmen, and in early
1955 Nagy was ousted as Premier.
Rakosi's success in choking Nagy's mild reformism
proved to be the catalyst for it final buildup of popular
pressures that ultimately exploded in the 1956 revolt.
Although Rakosi's grip on the Hungarian political
situation was finally wrenched loose by Khrushchev's
denunciation of Stalin at the Soviet Communist
Party's 20th Party Congress in February 1956, it
too late. In the early summer of 1956 the new Soviet
lead.�rship pressured Rakosi to resign its party leader,
but he passed on his authority to his protege and
figurehead Erno Gero, who was it :capable of
containing the anti- Stalinist fervor that had by th^n
gripped the nation, including the party. Smell groups
of students and writers held frequent meetings
publicly denouncing the old regime and dernanding
full exoneration for victims of the terror. Emboldened
by the rise to power in Poland of a more nationalistic
regirne in October 1956, and enflamed by emotional
appals to Magyar nationalism at horne, Hungarian
students and intellectuals took to the streets in
spontaneotns demonstrations. 'Ch(- secret police
overreacted by firing on the demonstrators, and in late
October 1956 the Hungarian revolt was on.
1'h(! Rakosi -Gero regime resigned in the early days
of the revolt but it still maintained control over much
of the central part' apparatus and secret police.
Indeed, Imre Nagy, who was reappointed Premier,
was kept virtual prisoner by Rakosi mitil
November. In this leadership vacuum, the Hungarian
party disintegrated and popular demands for
withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact and for
"neutralism" became it key factor in raising Soviet
alarm. Soviet troops, who temporarily withdre% from
Budapest under the guise of accepting demands that
they leave the country, actually were deployed around
the city waiting for reinforcements to arrive. There is
strong evidence indicating that Soviet troops never
intended to withdraw from the country.
Under overwhelming pressure from the insurgents
and from the workers councils which had seized
control of factories, Nagy was forced to make
concessions he normally would have considered
excessive. During his few clays of independent
authority, Nagy was forced to recognize the validity of
workers councils as basic political organizations, to
revive o_d non Communist political parties, to
announce plans for free elections, and to set it neutral
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course for Hungary based on withdrawal from the
Warsaw Pact. Soviet troops, by this time heavily
reinforced, returned to Budapest (Figure 3) and other
insurgent strongholds and crushed the rebel forces by 4
Novernh 1956. Janos Kadar, a former victim of
Rakosi's purges who was appointed party leader when
Cero resigned, denounced Nagy as a tool of the
counterrevolutionaries, and set up a new Hungarian
government ender the protection of Soviet troops. The
concessions made by Nagy were renounced, and harsh
reprisals were ordered against those who had
participated in the Nagy government. With the failure
of the revolt, Nagy and his cabinet took refuge in the
Yugoslav Embassy in Budapest, but were later arrested
and sent to exile in Romania. Nagy and three other
rebel leaders were returned to Hungary and executed
on 17 June 1958.
3. The Kadar regime: "Goulash communism" at
work
Confronted by the extraordinary impact of the
revolt our all aspects of Hungarian society, and
particularly on the party, the Kadar regime set about
the task of reorganizing the Communist party,
winning the cooperation of an alienated people, and
reestablishing the international respectability of the
country. Kadar successfully initiated a low -key policy
of gradualism and relaxation that fitted the mood of
the people and satisfied the desires of the Soviets. He
demonstrated a remarkable willingness to use a
pragmatic approach in resolving domestic problems
and an ability to preserve a degree of maneuverability
in dealing with the U.S.S.R. Despite popular
resentment and obstructionism from former Stalinist
elements within the party, Kadar accomplished the
ex;:eedingly difficult task of reorganizing the
Communist party and effecting a limited improve-
ment in its popular image.
Kadarsoon l gall to flex the political muscle he had
gained during his party's rebuilding efforts after the
revolt. In 1960 the first amnesty for some of the
participants of the revolt was a benchmark of Kadar's
growing power. By 1962 he had completely
outmaneuvered his Stalinist opposition, expelled
Rakosi and his cohorts from the party, and initiated a
de- Stalinization campaign that ousted others
identified with Rakosi's ru!c� from the party and
government. Almost simultaneously, Kadar an-
nounced a general amnesty, resulting in the release
from prison of most of the remaining rebels of 1956.
He also changed the party's relationship with the
nation at !arge by reversing Rakosi's aphorism "Those
who are not with us are against as" to read "Those
who are not against us are with us."
As Kadar opened the door for Hungarians to
participate more in national affairs, and as he
reestablished the international respectability of his
regime, he gradually added new advisers mostly of a
relatively liberal cast �to his retinue. These more
highly educated Hungarian Communists helped in
the difficult task of forming a program of political
relaxation that would both ease internal divisions and
vet stay within the limits acceptable to the Soviets.
Building his position gradually on demonstrated
successes, Kadar gently pushed the Soviets toward
granting him a greater degree of domestic autonomy.
Kadar's major structural change to date has been
the New Economic Mechanism (NEM), a program of
economic reform initiated in 1968. While its general
thrust can be traced to Imre Nagy's New Course in
1953, the NEM essentially embodies those theories on
decentralizing the economic structure that were
suppressed in 1958 by the then still influential Stalinist
elements. By 1962, however, a group of talented
economic theorists within the party leadership
convinced Kadar that the tightly centralized Soviet
style economy could not satisfy Hungary's long -range
economic goals. Recommendations were studied and
tailored to satisfy cautious political criteria before the
reform's introduction 6 years later. The reform's
initially destabilizing impact on the Hungarian
economy was carefully minimized, and the general
success of the NEM has been reflected in a significant
improvement in the standard of living with a
concomitant improvement in the party's relations with
the people.
Paradoxically, as Kadar's reformist course began to
yield fruit, popular anxieties over potential Soviet
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FIGURE 3. Soviet tanks patrolling Budapest
during the 1956 revolt (U /OU)

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dissatisfaction increased. Part of the reason was
Kadar's decision to enter the highly sensitive area of
political reforms, in spite of the lessons of the ill -fated
Czechoslovak experiment of 1 1968. Arguing that the
economic reform called for parallel adaptations in the
political arena, regirne liberals began to carnpaign for
a more representative parliamentary system, a curling
of the extralegal powers of the secret police, and a
constitutional reform, that would ratify changes since
the Rakosi era. Although Kadar repeatedly has assured
both Moscow and domestic conservatives that he
intends to shun the ill -fated Czechoslovak heresy of
1 M8, footdragging at horne and Kadar's own inherent
�_Mtion vis -a -vis Moscow has made the movement
toward political reforms glacially slow.
Despite a gradual accumulation of reforms, the
Ilungarian Communists are still dedicated to
maintaining their power and retaining the means to
protect it. The regime ultimately defends its
prerogatives through the subtle manipulation of all
the weapons available to a modern totalitarian state;
the police, propaganda organs, and the judiciary are
fully responsive to political direction by the party.
Kadar, however, prefers to work in it sophisticated
way, using indirect controls in order to avoid creating
popular resentment and hostility. Where possible,
persuasion and incentive are used rather than pure
coercion. '['here is a growing degree of sincere
observance of the principle "socialism with a human
face," but the regime has not permitted any illusions
us to the nature of its response should its monopoly of
power come into question. Although the strict laws
from the Rakosi cra have fallen into disuse, they
remain oil the books, and few Hungarians doubt that
the regime's reaction to any serious antistate activity
would be severe.
Kadar's success in effectively controlling Magyar
nationalism is probably his strongest asset in dealing
with Rlcacow. Kadar makes no concessions to
vindently anti Soviet Magyar ,nationalists and tries
drastically to limit even the more innocuous
expressions of Magyar pride. 'this policy is the single
greatest obstacle to wider popular identification with
his regime, and Kadar has not vet found a formula
that would allow him to channel suppressed
nationalism in it politically henign direction.
The core of Kadar's working relationship with
Moscow is his maintenance of domestic stability and
his loyal support of the Soviet Union's foreign policy
directives. This all but total orthodoxy in Hungary's
relations with the non- Communist world is unpopular
with the great majority of Hungarians. Nevertheless,
the isolation of the people from the West has been
6
eased, and most Hungarians welcome the U.S.S.R.'s
interest in East -West detente. As it result, tensions
within Hungary over the pro Seviet alignment of
Kadar's foreign policy are at a relatively low ebb.
Hungary's relations with the Communist world,
however, are another matter. There is considerable
evidence of active regime pursuit of its national
interests within Communist bloc councils, particularly
in economic matters having an important impact on
domestic developments. Hungary has thus been vocal
in calling for reforms of the Council for Economic
Mutual Assistance (CEMA), and has also led the way
in the development of Eastern European cooperative
agreements with individual Western firms. Neverthe-
less, cooperation is the keyword; Hungary does not
and, for the foreseeable future, will not indulge in the
kind of flamboyant international foreign ,licy that
Romania pursues to the irritation of the l S.S.R.
Kadar and most of his immediate advisers appear
committed to consumer welfare and political stability
as the bases of their rule. These goals allow little room
for daydreams about full national independence, but
they do seem to have diverted the fervently
nationalistic Magyars from backsliding into the sort of
fanatic�m that has deeply scarred their recent history.
The continued success of this compromise, however,
depends in large measure on a wide range of potential
developments in international affairs that are outside
the regime's control. The Hungarians, however. have
learned several lessons from their tragic past and have
clone a relatively responsible job in preparing for the
future. Kadar himself has said, "Let our reputation be
'the Hungarians know what they want and what they
want they are able to achieve.' We want socialism,
communism, progress, and peace in the world. This is
what we are fighting for and, according to our powers,
we contribute to it."
B. Structure and functioning of the
government (U /OU)
1. Constitution
Oil 20 August 1919 the Hungarian Communist
regime, replacing the quasi democratic Constitution
of 1946, adopted a constitution based on that of the
U.S.S.R. which provided the framework for the
Sovietization of the country. Since then, the
Constitution has been amended on numerous
occasions �the most recent in April 1972 �but its
basic character has remained unaltered. As arneuded,
the Constitution declares the IIungarian People's
Republic to he a socialist state in which "all power is
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exercised by the working people.' Hungarian citizens
are guaranteed the right to work, rest and recreation.
protection of health, and universal education. 'I'll(!
Constitution states that citizens are equal before the
law and that women enjoy equal rights; that liberty of
conscience ar.d freedom of worship are safeguarded;
that the stale guarantees (although other provisions
qualify these guarantees) freedom of speech, press,
and assembly, the right to organize, and the freedom
and inviolability of the person, home, and
correspondence; and that discrimination on the
grounds of sex, religion, or nationality is forbidden.
Minorities are guaranteed the carne rights as those
extended to Hungarians, and provision is made also
for the instruction of minorities in their own language
in separate educational facilities.
The nations political leaders �and indeed the
citizens th-niselves �do riot view the Constitution as
the suprerne law of the land or as an effective
limitation on the power of the government. Moreover,
although the government structure appears to he
patterned in part after that of if Western political
democracy, there is neither a constitutionally
established system of checks and balances nor a
separation of governmental powers. Provisions that
appear to support the principle of popularsovereignty,
democratic government, and civil 1; have little
significance because of the absence of parallel
provisions for their effective implementation and
because of vague forrn. which in effect permit
whatever police actions the government deerns
necessary to preserve its monopoly of power. Similarly,
provisions regarding the inheritance and acquisition of
property are circumscribed by other provisions which
hold that private property and private enterprise must
not run "counter to the public interest.' [n the period
immediately following the 1956 revolt the regime paid
little attention to constitutionally entimercated civil
rights, and, although in recent years it has avoided
blatant contravention of these provisions and has
attempted to control the population by means more in
keeping with the wide latitude provided in the
Constitution, numerous restrictions on the activities of
all Iungarian citizens still exist.
Contrary to the expectations of many observers, the
April 1972 revisions of the Constitution failed to
introduce any far reaching changes into the fabric of
political life. Earlier suggestions that the revised
Constitution strengthen Parliament's legislative
competence and underwrite legal guarantees for
citizens' rights never reached fruition. Perhaps the
most notable addition is the acknowledgement for the
first time that the Communist party is "the leading
force in societv."
Ili practice, constittitional distinctions of structure
and function fade at the apex of the Hungarian
administrative hierarchy. Supreme authority since
1956 has been held by Janos Kadar, First Secretary of
the Party Central Committee. Kadar also held the
governmental post of Premier from 1956 to 1958 and
from 1961 to 1965. In June 1965 he relinquished the
premiership bt,' remained within the government as a
member of the Presidential Council. Immediately
subordinate to Kadar is a group of handpicked
assistants who hold the rnain command posts of both
party and government. The frequent practice of
announcing national policy in joint decrees of the
part\ and government illustrates the integration of
these lines'of command.
2. Structure of government
The most characteristic feature of the Hungarian
Government is the existence of an all- powerful
extragoverrimental organization, the ruling Com-
munist party. Acting as "the leadership of the working
class," the party has a commanding role in the
economic, political, and social life of the country.
Basing its pervasive role on a vague constitutional
provision, the party dictates the functions of
government, formulates national policy, and
supervises the implementation of that policy without
any system of direct popular checks. The government
structure, therefore, must be examined in terms of its
constitutionally undefined relationship to the
dominant Communist party, which operates without
any binding legal restraints. Despite the primacy of
the party's position, however, the government is the
principa! avenue through which the party's control
over the nation is manifested.
The national government is highly centralized and,
as depicted in Figure 4, some key party leaders hold
simultaneous positions in the government hierarchy.
This form of dual responsibility was much more
prevalent in the past, but Kadar has acted gradually to
reduce the most visible aspects of high -level part
influence in government. This reduction, however, has
been more apparent than real since 27 of the top 45
government officials are members of the party's
Central Committee and actively pursue party goals in
their state functions. In any case, few Hungarians are
fooled into believing that state authority is
independent or distinct from party authority.
6
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PARTY GOVERNMENT
(600,000 members)
CENTRAL COMMITTEE PARLIAMENT
(101 members) (349 members)
SECRETARIAT
POLITICAL
COUNCIL
PRESIDENTIAL
COMMITTEE
OF MINISTERS
COUNCIL
Q members)
(13 members)
(24 members)
(21 members)
Losanczl
President
Kadar,
Kadar
Kadar
First Secretory
Aczel
Aczel
Biszku
Blszku
Kamocsln
Komocsin
Fock
Fock, Premier
Nyers
Nyers
Nemeth
Nemeth
Faber
Faber,
Deputy Premier
Gaspar
spar,
Vice President
Kellar
Kallal
Benke
Apra
Names
Ovary
Pullal
FIGURE 4. Interrelationship of top positions,
HSWP and government, March 1972 (U /OU)
a. Parliament
According to the Constitution, the highest organ of
state authority is the Parliament, which theoretically
exercises "all the rights deriving from the sovereignty
of the people," and to which all governmental
agencies arc responsible. The unicameral Parliament is
elected every -1 years, and in 1972 was composed of
.352 members. The last pialiamentary election was
held in 1971. In extraordinary circumstances
Parliament may extend its mandate. :inch an
extension took place in 1971, when, after the 1956
revolt, the Kadar regime did not feel sufficiently
confident to face even Communist -style elections.
Parliament (Figure 5) is empowered by the
Constitution to make laws, determine the national
budget and econonai;! plans, create or abolish
ministries and define the scope of their activities,
declare war, conclude peace, and grant amnesties. In
practice, however, it has little actual power, and it
functions as a rubberstamp legislature, endorsing laws
4
and decrees aiready formulated by the party. Such
legislation may then he introduced by any member of
the Parliament, by the Presidential Council, or by the
Council of Ministers; most legislation is initiated by
the latter two bodies. 'There have been indications
since 1957 that committees of the Parliament, which
generally meet in closed session, have played a
growing role in the formulation of legislation, but the
work of the committees is still far front decisive. Also,
during each plenary session of Parliament there have
been a few more interpellations of government leaders
by the deputies. These interpellations are caaefully
staged, however, with questions submitted in advance,
and generally concern minor issues rather than overall
government policies. In rare instances deputies have
questioned members of the Council of Ministers about
their stewardship and have rejected their answers.
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FIGURE 5. Parliament in session in the assembly
hall (U /OU)

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Only one of these interpellations, however, has
resulted in a change in ministerial policy.
Since 1965, there has been a small but gradually
more vocal body of opinion dissatisfied with the
impotence of Parliament and wanting its role
expanded. Results have been sow in coming, but some
basic improvemerts have been made. For example,
parliamentary commissions are now given time for a
critical review of the governments budget requests,
and the annual budgetary session has come to be a
sounding board `or some legitimate complaints about
the porforrnance of individual ministries on the
domestic scene. The most fundamental measure
affecting Parliament to date was the change in the
electoral law providing for representation by
constituencies. This contrasted sharply with the
previous pro forma election of all parliamentary
delegates on the basis of a single national slate, on
w hich all names appeared in all parts of the country.
Other changes are being discussed, but, until the party
is ready to let Parliament use its legislative authority,
no Hungarian is prepa-,ed to view it as a serious
political force. In the meantime, proponents of
parliamentary reform are likely to concentrate on
minor changes calculated to highlight the minimal
degree of responsibility and integrity which the
orga nization has attained so far.
b. Presidential Council
The Parliament elects it Presidential Council from
among its members. This nominally collective
presidency consists of a president, two vice presidents,
a secretary, and 17 members. The president acts as
titular head of state, the spokesman for the
government at public ceremonies and in greeting
other heads of state. In the intervals between sessions
of the Parliament, the Presidential Council as a whole
is empowered to carry out all the functions of the
larger body except changing the Constitution. Decrees
of the council are later ratified by Parliament. In
addition, according to the Constitution, the
Presidential Council is empowered to call general
elections, convene the Parliament, hold plebiscites on
matters of national importance conclude and ratify
international treaties, appoint diplomatic representa-
tives and receive letters of credence of foreign
diplomats, appoint high -level civil servants and
ranking officers of the armed services (in accordance
with prevailing statutes), grant awards and titles
instituted by Parliament and authorize the acceptance
of foreign titles and orders, grant pardons, modify or
annul any central or local law or ordinance which
infringes on the Constitution or is detrimental to the
"interests of th- working people," and dissolve anv
local organ of government. The Constitution states
that the Presidential Council is responsible to
Parliament and must render aj account of its activities
to Parliament, which has the theoretical right of
recalling the entire council or any member of it.
Despite the impressive array of powers entrusted to
the Presidential Council, it exercises little real
authority' or initiative in formulating policy. Its
primary function in practice appears to be the conduct
of the day -to -day mechanics of government, under
provisions and procedures established by the party and
enacted by the rubberstamp Parliament. Several top
p arty leaders including party chief Kadar �arc
members of the council, thus insuring party control.
Most of the other members of the council elected by
the Parliament in April 1971 are politically
insignificant and exert no personal influence over
government policies.
The Presidential Council is assisted by a secretariat
which acts as liaison with the party on the working
level and employs a small staff of experts who prepare
the documents coming before the council. The council
meets about once a week to formalize decisions
forwarded by the party or other government organs
and to conduct the administrahve business of the
government. Some of its decrees are promulgated in
the official Hungarian Gazette (Magyar Kozlony);
others, which are not published, usually deal with
cases involving individuals and such matters as loss of
citizenship or clemency actions. Some of the
unpublished decrees are classified secret and these
include such matters as appointments of high -level
civilian or military authorities. Since about 1949 the
Presidential Council has reportedly formalized the
appointment of only the highest level persons,
previously chosen and approved by the party; the
official designation of new deputy ministers, field
grade officers, judges, and attorneys of courts martial
is said to have been transferred to the competence of
the Council of Ministers.
c. Council of Ministers
The executive functions of government rest with the
Council of Ministers, which in practice is the
dominant government body. Members of the council
are elected and recalled by Parliament and, according
to the Constitution, may not simultaneously be
members of the Presidential Council. In July 1972 the
council was composed of the Premier, four deputy
9
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premiers, 16 ministers, and four state office chairmen
with ministerial rank, I the ministries were:
Agriculture and Food
Construction and Urban Development
Culture
Defense
Finance
Foreign Affairs
Foreign Trade
Health
Heavy Industry
Interior
Internal Trade
Justice
Labor
Light Industry
Metallurgy and Machine Industry
Transportation and Postal Affairs
'For a current listing of key government officials consult Chiefs of
State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments, pukiishecl
monthly by the Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence
Agency.
Figure 6 illustrates the general relationship of party
and government units. Although in 1971 only two
members of the Council of Ministers held simultane-
ous positions in the Party Secretariat or the Politica!
Committee, the influence of the latter two bodies over
the Council of Ministers is pervasive and decisive. This
influence is achieved through the subordination of the
council's activities to the initiative and supervision of
the individual members of the Secretariat and Political
Committee. 'These individuals usually specialize in
one or more areas of government activity and have the
active support of Central Committee functional
departments in developing policies. The Secretariat
and the Political Committee issue binding and
detailed guidance to the Council of Ministers on
important and on many seemingly trivial topics. For
the most part, this "shadow government" remains in
the background and only occasionally issues public
statements on important questions.
HUNGARIAN. SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY
GOVERNMENT OF HUNGARY
NATIONAL
PARTY
CONGRESS
COUNCIL OF
PARLIA
PARLIAMENT SUPREME
YfllL
MINISTERS
COURT
Political
Presidential Council
Committee
Premier
Supreme
Prosecutor's I
Office
Secretariat
Ministries and
First
Central
Secretary
Agencies
Committees
Military
Colleglurn
Central
Control.
Committee
Military
COUNTY
Courts
40
DISTRICT
PARTY
COUNCIL
County
8
CONFERENCE
Prosecutor
COMMUNAL
Executive
County
Executive
Administrative
Comminee
Court --p
Committee
Agencies
Chairman
District
Prosecutor
Secretariat
District
Juvenile
Firs
Court"
Court
Secretary
BASIC
I
Party Members Party
Meeting Directorate
ELECTORATE
Broad Party Control
over ull Agencies
Appeal
NOTE: The County level includes Budapest and other cifies; the
District level imkdes large towns and B udopesf didriNr,
Nominal Election
includes
and the Communal keel irtdudes town didricls.
Control
or Appointment
Parlial Control
Nominal Responsibility
"Judges alerted by County and District Council.
FIGURE 6. Structure of political controls (U /OU)
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Despite this complicated system of duplicate
bureaucracies, the Council of Ministers is the actual
focal point of government and is the clearing house for
the collection of information, implementation of
policy, and solutior of problems which filter up
from the inlividn