NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY 87; ECUADOR; COUNTRY PROFILE

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• Collection: NIS
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CONFIDENTIAL
97 /GS /CP
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Ecuador
July 1973
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY
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CONFIDENTIAL
NO FOREIGN UISSEM
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WARNING
I
The NIS is National Intelligence and may not be re-
leased or shown to representatives of any foreign govern-
ment or international body except by specific authorization
of the Director of Central Intelligence in accordance with
-:he provisions of National Security Council Intelligence Di-
rective No. 1.
For NIS comuining unclassified material, however, the
portions so marked may be made available for official pur-
poses to foreign nationals and nongovernment personnel
provided no attribution is made to National Intelligence or
the National Intelligence Survey.
Subsections and graphics are individually classified
according to content. Classification /control designa-
tions are:
(U /OU) Unclassified /For Official Use Only
(C) Confidential
(S) Secret
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GENERAL SURVEY CHAPTERS
COUNTF,Y PROFILE Integrated perspective of the
subject country Chronology Area Brief a Sum-
mary Map
TI!E SOCIETY Social structure Population
Labor Health a Living conditions Social prob-
lems Religion Education Public information
e Artistic eapnesion
GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS Political evo-
lution of the state Governmental strength and
+stability Structure and function a Political dy-
nounics s National policies Threats to stability
The police Intelligence and security Counter
subversion and Qounterinsurgency capabilitles
THE ECONOMY Appraisal of the economy Its
structure agriculture, fisheries, forestry. fuels and
power, metals and minerals, manufacturing and cm-
struction Domestic trade Economic policy and
devebpment International roonomic relations
TRANSPORTATION AND
TELECOMMUNICATIONS Appraisal of systems
Strategic nubility Railnwds Highways in-
land waterways Pipolines Ports Merchant
marine a Civil air Airfields The telecom system
MILITARY GEOGRAI IIY Topography and climate
Military geographic regions Strategic ar.as
Internal routes Approaches: land, sea, air
ARMED FORCES The defense establishment
joint activities Ground forces Naval forces
Air forr.+es
INTELL;GENCE AND SECURITY Structure of
organizations corncerned with internal security and
foreign intelligence, their responsibilities, professional
starndanb, and intemiatiorsships Mission, organi-
zation. fundions, effectiveness and methods of opera-
tion of each service Biographies of hey officials
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CUADOR
Situate for National Definition 1
Eemmmic and Social Diversily
Elusive Search for El Dorado
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Struggle for National Definition (c)
Regional geographic diversity and the dissimilar
economic interests that result, together with racial
differences, are the root causes of problems Ecuador
has been trying to surmount in a long struggle to
define its territory and achieve nationhood. "together
with historical experiences that produced deep social
cleavages, these factors explain in part the instability
of government that also has characterized Ecuador's
development. The incumbent military administration
of Guillermo Rodriguez has been more responsive than
most Ecuadorean governments to the need for social
reform and expects to finance social programs with
revenues from newly developing oilfields. But it faces
fomidable barriers in its quest for the political stabili-
ty and economic viability conducive to the reforms
that could nurture a genuine national consciousness.
Fronting the Pacific Ocean for about 640 miles.
Ecuador consists of a triangular wedge of land 103,000
square miles in area that has been uplifted markedly in
the middle by the spectacular Andean mountains, The
two parallel north -south ranges, their intermontane
valleys, and the basin between the ranges together are
commonly known as the Sierra, Flanking the moun-
tainous backbone on the seaward side is the Costa, a
somewhat irregular, hilly to flat lowland. On the
landward side is the Oriente, a vast, jungled portion of
the Amazon Basin. Mainland Ecuador is
supplemented by an archipelago, the Galapagos
Islands, lying 600 miles due west in the Pacific Ocean.
This topography, ;n conjunction with a combination
of trade winds ane ocean currents, results in an ex-
tremely diversifici climate, and despite its location
astride the isquator �from which Ecuador got its
name �much of the country lies in the cool Sierra
highlands.
As with the Incas before them, the great majority of
Spanish colonists settled almost exclusively in the
temperate basins of the Sierra, which made Quito the
traditional center of the cultural and political life of
Ecuador. From the middle of the 19th century,
however, there began to develop a populous and
economically important regional society centered on
QWo. Ecwoder's calWal.
cltrrfis the nwwaaku surrmn4log
its *,200-feer -hl1h *repay.
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Co TAB
RIENTE
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WIM ors
Ecuador's three historical regions.
Unlike present regional boundaries, which
generally follow those of the provinces for
statistical reporting, these historical
regional boundaries approximately .race
the 1,600 foot contour line.
the port of Guayaquil, and the contest of sectional in-
terests resulting from the challenge by the progressive
Costa element to the political doininance of the Sierra
aristocracy has become a constant in national political
life. The Oriente, still thinly settled, remained for most
Ecuadoreans little more than a zone of contention
with neighbors, particularly Peru, until significant o
reserves were discovered in that isolated region in 1967.
Tht Galapagos Islands were largely a curiosity of
nature �and more so for outsiders than for
Ecuadoreans �until 1966, when Ecuador began to en-
force its claim to territorial waters for fishing purposes
not only for 200 mites off the mainland but extending
the same distance from these offshore islands as well.
Ecuador's struggle for territorial definition began
with the conquest of the aboriginal Kingdom of Quito
by the Inca Empire and the selection of Quito as capi-
tal of the northern half upon division of the territory
w sm r W,
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by the Inca Huayna Capac between Atahualpu (son
of his Quito wife) and Huascar (son of a Cuzco wife).
Quito became capital of the whole empire upon the
defeat of Huascar by Atahualpa, who in turn was
liquidated by the Spanish congv under Francisco
Pizarro, It then became a Spanish coiunial city (found-
ed in 1534 as San Francisco de Quito by Sebastian de
Benaleazar). Throughout the colonial period that
lasted nearly 300 'cars. Quito and its surrounding
territory fought to survive and to maintain its identity
as it was shifted back and forth as an audiencia (royal
court of justice, with some political and military func-
tions) under the Spanish viceroyalties whose seats were
at Bogota and Lima. The struggle continued into the
fight for independence. Its proclamation in 1809,
though abortive, led finally to liberation from Spain in
1822 and then to separation from the Confederation
of Gran Colombia in 1830. Even since independen(v.
however, Ecuador has had to maintain the struggle.
submitting to losses of claimed territories in the AnJes
to Colombia and in the Amazon region to Brazil,
Colombia, and Peru. Although Ecuador acceded to a
1904 treaty with Brazil and a 1916 treaty with Colom-
bia, it has declared null and void the 1912 Protocol of
Rio de Janeiro, which attempted to resolve the border
conflict with Peru by awarding the dLputed territory
in the Amazon Basin to that country. Ecuador is striv-
ing still for further definition of its nationhood by
claiming jurisdiction over 200 miles of tuna -rich waters
along its coastline.
2
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Z Y
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Economic and Social Diversity
Climatic conditions associated with Ecuador's
varied terrain range from the strictly tropical, con-
tinuously hot and humid conditions of the eastern
lowlands of the Oriente and the northwestern lowlands
of the Costa to the permanent snowscapes of the high
Andes in the Sierra. Within the Sierra, below the
timber line, lies the Quito basin, described by many as
a "laud of eternal spring," and numerous similarly
temperate intermantane valleys; at lower altitudes
there are subtropical pockets. The coastal region, too,
is divided into the burning hot and humid area of the
north and the hot, dry desert of the south. Except for
the recent petroleum bonanza, mineral resources have
been discovered only in small quantities in Ecuador as
compared with neighboring Andean countries. Claims
to and exploitation of abundant fisheries in the Pacific
have been initiated with determination and some
success. The tourist attraction of the Galapagos Islands
shows promise for continued development. Ecuador's
basic resources consist chiefly of its tropical forests,
which cover an estimated 55% of the land area and are
yet to be fully exploited, and a climate that combines
with the soil and an adequate labor supply to produce
virtually any temperate or tropical crop, the latter in
fair abundance. Agriculture, therefore, as has been the
case for four centuries, is the mainstay of the economy,
despite the fact that a scant I M of the land surface is
arable.
The output of the two principal agricultural
areas �the Sierra and the Costa �is directly related to
their geography and climate. Since colonial times, the
principal products of the Sierra have been grains,
livestock, and root crops for domestic consumption;
planters of the fertile Costa plains, whose contribution
to the economy became significant only after the
mid -19th century, have specialized in cocoa, coffee,
and more !ecently bananas� largely for export.
The location of economic resources and the manner
of their development, t,.t least until the late 19th cen-
tury, have contributed to the pattern of regional
divergence of interest and the rigid stratification that
are both characteristic of colonial society. Land tenure
and labor organization still reflect their feudal origin,
particularly in the Sierra. Small subsistence farms
(minffundim) predominate in terms of numbers of
units but hold only one -tenth oir the land, while large
estates (latlfundios) with over 250 acres account for
almost one -half. Indians including the true Indian
and such derivatives as the mestizo (Spanish- Indian)
and moutuolo (Indian -Negro- Caucasian), who alto-
gether constitute 80% of the population� perform
most of the manual labor They serve as agricultural
workers (whose numbers compose more than half of
the labor force), nonskilled urban laborers, and
domestics. The characterization of the perpetually
poor non Furor an masses dominated by a small,
wealthy, white minority closely reflects Ecuador s
socioeconomic reality �the majority of the people con-
tinue to live on a subsistence level and an estimated
one -third to one -half of the total population rema:ns
outside the money ^cunomy altogether.
Ecuador is a mosaic of racial and cultural elements.
The socially, economically, and politically dominant
whites nia'ce up 10% of the population-, Indians ac-
count far approximately 40%: a wide range of
Ecuadoreans of Indian- Caucasian as well as In-
dian- Negroid- Caucasian combinations mane up
another 40 'r; and a small number of Negroes, Orien-
tals, and others constitute the remainder. Rigidifying
this ethnic diversity is a class system that has been fair-
y well entrenched since colonial times but is less es-
tablished in the Costa than in the Sierra. The
masses consisting at the bottom of the Indian
peasants and above them the rural Sierra mestizos,
rural Costa monruvios, domestic servants, artisans,
small shopkeepers, and most factory workers �are
eparated from the wealthy elite by a wide gulf that is
slowly being bridged by an emerging middle class.
The white minority has preserved the Spanish
heritage kn its language, religion, and intellectual life:
in its great estates; and in its domination of political
and economic life since the founding of the
Eeuadojean republic. Concentrated in the Sierra, the
descendants of the Spaniards for three centuries have
sought successfully to preserve the essentials of their
own way of life: the Roman Catholic Church, despite
constitutional experiments with anticlericalism,
remains strong, and the principle of hereditary
privilege continues to enjoy tacit acceptance. The im-
print of the Hispanic cultural traditions imposed by
the oligarchic Sierra aristocracy completely
overshadows the strong Indian heritage. Its only real
challenge comes from the commercial Costa
aristocracy, which, albeit Hispanic, has been
profoundly influenced by values and changes wrought
by foreign trade and Industrialization.
3
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The Indian heritage is also evident, especially in the
Sierra. Somewhat more than half the people of
Ecuador speak an Indian language, principally
Quechua, and approximately 10% use no other
language. The Sierra Indian, who far outnumbers the
members of isolated tribes in the Oriente and has been
economically crucial since the days of the traditional
Hispanic aristocracy, in a real sense leads a double life.
He typically wears a mask of humble, uncom-
municative, hardworking resignation in his contacts
with employers and other outsiders, whereas his
behavior within his own group is much more frank,
talkative, generous, and convivial. He has remained
mostly separate from the stream of national social and
political life in his strugvlc for a livelihood that barely
maintains his family near a subsistence level. Though
impoverished, he maintains a deep attachment to the
land. during the colonial era, Sierra Indians
demonstrated talent for fine craftsmanship in church
construction, ornamentation, and art, and some of
their descendants remain competent artisans. Iri a few
places, such as Otavalo. Indians have managed
through handicrafts, especially weaving, to ac-
cumulate enough capital to buy small plots of land.
Almost totally dominated by a basically hostile social
environment, the Sierra Indians demonstrate neither
time for nor interest in politics.
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The wide range of 111CStiZo Ecuadorcans extends
from the Sierra into the Costa. Afontuvios also form a
significant portion of the coastal population. Mestizos
and montuvim in general share the poverty of tine In-
dians, although, unlike the Indians, they are ordinarily
an integral part of the social and economic life of the
country. Many Sierra mestizos are subsistence small
farmers; others are town dwelling craftsmen or
tradesmen. Costa rnemizos are mostly small farmers,
but some are wage earners on large plantations.
it4estizos retain some traditional Indian values, but
almost always use the Spanish language and European
dress, and often live in an urban environment. They
normally stress family and kinship loyalties but, unlike
the village Indians, show little sense of community.
Although both Sierra and Costa mestizos themselves
generally identify with the Spanish element in
national society, they are disparaged by the whites and
scorned by the Indians.
Even though the diverse groups making up the pop-
ulation of Ecuador have lived in the same territory un-
der common rule for more than four centuries, they
have not formed a single people with a single language
and a shared way of life. The dual cleavage, persistent
and intense, that on the one hand sets the whites apart
from the bulk of the population, and an the other
hand sets the Sierra and Costa whites apart from each
other, has forestalled in the past and continues to im-
pede the emergence of a national sotlety.
Overwhelmed by a poverty that requires virtually his
full energy merely for subsistence, (lie Indian,
traditionally illiterate and apathetic, has little sense of
nationhood. In their striving to rise within the social,
economic, and political environment, the mestizos and
nsontuotos, rejected by both cultures that spawned
them, have developed considerable dissatisfaction and
restlessness. These factors. too, are incornpatiWe with
the development of a national consciousness.
Sd
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The elitist political overlay net Ecuador's economic
and social reality has given rise to a series of con-
stitutions that barely serve the needs of the whole na-
tion. A charter of representative democracy with
balanced powers was drawn up at independence, but
frequent periods of political disorder and unstable
governments have led to new constitutions on the
average of once every 9 years. Formal governmental
structure, however, has changed little throughout the
nearly 130 years of independence. Political struggle
during they 19th century focused chiefly an the role of
the Roman Catholic Church in government, with
separation eventually winning out. The 20th century
witnessed the struggle for dominance between the
legislative and executive branches. The 1967 Constitu-
tion is the most accent, but the 1915 Constitution,
which contains some relatively strong checks on the ex-
ecutive, was put into effect by the 1972 Nationalist
Revolutionary Government insofar as that charter did
not conflict with the decrees of the military regime.
The presidential story of Ecuador is capsuled in the
record of more than 70 changes of government since
independence nn 13 May 1&30. In general, the
Presidency has been occupied by more or less
demagogic strongmen �some military, some
civilian --in the deeply embedded cultural trad ?tion
called cauddllarno. Although their tenure has been un-
certain, unpredictable, and often short, a succession
of caudillos has occupied the Presidency. This per-
sonalistic rule has precluded the formation of the solid
political base that is needed for economic aad social
development The chronic instability of government
may stem in part from the leaders' failure to deal with
widespread economic problems. Rut other major fac-
tors are the intense personal rivalries within the small
ruling class, strong regional animosities, ineffective
leadership in general, and a low level of civic respon-
sibility. The charismatic appeal of some leaders, such
as five -time President Jose Maria Velasco has propelled
the average voter into a kind of mystical confusion of
the man and the nation's destiny. Exceptional
charismatic personality can work electoral magic, but
unfortunately it does not imply an ability to govern.
Velasco was not able to impart qualities of effective
administration to his governments, and was allowed
by the ever present military to complete only one of his
terms of office.
In line with O cuador s history of a succession -it
carrdillos, most political parties have revolved r- tiound
the ambitions of such strong men rather thaan fun-
damental political programs, and some hove been
6
organized expressly for the purpose of furthering the
Political career of a single individual. historically, the
two oldest parties represent philosophies characterized
by their names, Conservative and Radical Liberal. In
fact, however. they defend the interests of the
oligarchies of the Sierra and Costa, respectively. The
Conservative arty is composed of wealthy land-
owners, middle class professionals in small and
medium -sized cities, and Roman Catholic priests and
intellectuals. The Radical- Liberal Party draws its sup-
port from businessmen, middle class professionals in
Guayaquil, and anticlerical intellectuals. The smaller
Socialist Christian Party is supported by conservatives
who are independent of the church, including some
landowners, along with middle class professionals and
upper class women. of considerable recent importance
is the moderately left Concentration of Popular Forces,
headed by Guayaquil businessman Assad Bucaram.
With a program promoting better living conditions for
the poor, Bucaram's strong bid for the Presidency in
the aborted 1972 election was a major factor in the
military takeover. Fur leftist parties are fragmented
and have little influence.
The military establishment, along with the police,
is constitutionally disenfranchised. Nevertheless, the
military leadership has been and still is a key element
in political life. Perhaps truly considering itself a reluc-
tant neutral, the military has stepped into the ex-
ecutive branch at times to become the final arbiter of
politics. Basically disenchanted with civilian politics in
general, the mility y has expressed disgust at rampant
administrative e,rruption, though military officers
have themselves at times been involved in graft. Prior
to the 1972 intervention, the armed forces ousted the
inept civilian government in 1963 and remained in
power until 1966. Although apparently not eager to
reassume the burdens of government, the armed forces
again felt compelled on 17 February 1972 to take over
the Velasco government. There was little popular reac-
tion for air against the coup.
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Elusive Search for El Dorado
The legend of El Dorado, the mythical country that
represented gold in abundance, was an attraction to
the Spanish adventurers who searched far and wide in
the mountains and jungles of the New World seeking
to fulfill their fantasies of instant riches. Althougn no
abundant mother lode was ever found, new
generations of dreamers and seekers carry on. Pros peri-
ty truly has been elusive for Ecuador as a nation,
though some individuals and families have achieved
wealth, A poor, small country which produces hardly
any capital goods and few of the devices that are re-
rluired for the dev: lopment of modern agriculture and
industry, Ecuador' ability to fi!I its material needs is
highly dependent upon its capacity to import. which
in turn depends upon its r ap Acity to produce exports
and its ability to attract foreign capital. Ecuador still is
basically rural, and agricultural output is nearly evenly
divided for export and domestic consumption. Large
imports are required, partienlarly of wheat.
Agricultural growth has been slow and is a powerful
drag in terms of overall growth of the economy.
Production for domestic consumption, although in-
creasing at the same rate as production for export, nas
not kept up with demand because of the rapid popula-
tion increase --the current arinual population growth
rate of 3.4% is second only to that of Venezuela in
South America. Ecuador's recent balance of payments
problems follow directly from the widening gap
between rapidly rising import demands and slowly in-
creasing exports.
The beginning of modem commercial life in
Ecuador came with the expansion of exports of cocoa
after 1870. Reaching a peak between 1910 and 1925,
cocoa declined commercially until 1948, but by 1971 it
was back near its highest export Ievei, accounting for
one -tenth of export earnings. Other tropical plantation
products came to the rescue of Ecuadorean exports
during the period of decline in cocoa, rice and coffee
being the mainstays until bananas took the lead after
1945. By 1950 Ecuador was the third largest banana
producer in the world, and its share of about 41 of
world banana exports rose to more than 251 during
the 1960's. Since 1964 it has maintained omth its export
volume and its position as number one exporter, partly
by switching to the s.tuw marketable Cavendish varie-
ty of "green gold." The nation's trade balance,
naturally, has been highly sensitive to erratic fluc-
tuations of world market prices for its chief export
products. Although not as vulnerable as some countries
that depend on the export of only one or two products.
Ecuador's reliantx on bananas. c- offev, cfwou, and
sugar for Wei or more of its total foreign exchange ear-
nings nevertheless has been precarious.
Despite the flashiness of major agricultural export
production at some times, economic development,
particularly of the agricultural sector producing for
domestic consumption. has been painfully slow. The
list (if factors impairing gr is long: A limited
amount of arable land combined with the traditional
land tenure system and the very poverty of tile Indian
laborers forestalls anything beyond subsisivrice
agriculture; a lack of technical exp rtise results in the
widespread application of primitive methods of sowing
and harvesting; a deficient marketing structure results
from a sparse and low quality transportation system.
rugged geography, and high construction costs; the
great expense of refrigeration and other forms of
preservation lead to ina&ILlate supply and storage
facilities; and n traditional reliance on private funds
for development snake for a general absence of effec-
tive agricultural credit. Solutions by the government to
the restraints on agricultural production have been
limited and sporadic. But there is a positive side. A
modest program of agrarian reform was carried out by
the 1963.66 military regime: 11trasiprrngaje. a feudal
system whereby Indians were allowed to live on
miniplots in return for labor on hu ge estates, Has
abolished. and some government lands were sub
divided and resettled. Public investment, com-
plemented by international financial assistance, has
improved the highway system as well as maritime
facilities at Guayaquil. A program of agricultural
diversification is receiving prime emphasis, African
palm oil growing on old banana plantations and in-
creased plantings of soybeans and peanuts being
specifically encouraged. And the answer to improving
economic development for the urban areas has focused
mainly on expanding manufacturing, particularly as
thousands of migrants to the cities have crowded the
scene to Increase the problems related to rapid ur-
banization.
Urban migration, indeed, is one manifestation of
Ecuador's socioeconomic problem. It sterns from the
rapid population increase �from 3.2 million at the
time of the 1930 census to 6.6 million at the beginning
of 1973 --and the greater employment opportunities in
7
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urban areas. Even before this, population pressure on
the agricultural land had established a migrational
trend not only io the cities but from the Sierra to the
Costa, so that, whereas less than 107: of the population
lived in the Costa at the end of the colonial 1k�riod, by
1972 the populations of the Sierra and the Costa were
abot., dual. In ;addition to the agricultural
developmental problem inherent in a race between
prMuction and constant population growth, urbaniza-
tion and the population growth in general have
accented demands for employment, housing, educa-
tion, and other social services.
'rhe elusive search for El Dorado continues, as an ex-
pe;ted improvemen! in Ecuador s economic situation
\sIM
poehme
has 1wec ushered in by a petro }cum Immin. Veposits of
this "black gold" had been exploited since the 1920's
in the Peninsula de Santa Elena in the Loma region,
and until the mid- 1950's &rrovided for the bulk of
domestic requirements. But the 1960's witnessed rapid
depletion of known reserves, as well as ineira:.ed de-
mand. Fortunately, in the Oriente a Texaco -Gulf con-
sortium came up with a significant discovery of oil in
1967. This led to investment in exploration and
de-elopment that included a more than 300 -mile, 2u-
to 26- inch- diameter crude oil pipeline fmm fields
around Lago Agrio across the high Andes to storage
and loading i- eilities adjacent to the port of
Esmeraldas. Foreign exchange earnings from
petroleum are expected to net approximutely USS130
million in 1973, which would amount to mo. e than
half the value of total 1971 export earn'ngs.
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1
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At the Crossroads
Prospects for paying for social reform with the
benefits expected from economic growth are
problematical, kIven Ecuador's history of political in-
stability. The turmoil deriving from regional disunity,
deep ethnic divisions, indian apathy, and the huge
challenge of food production remains a very great con
ctrn. Politicians all ton frequently praise the richness
and potential of their land but falter in pushing for its
balanced development. At the some time.
developments of the 20th century, particularly since
World War It, have mutco regional hostilities
somewhat. Population shifts, combined with improved
transportation and comrranications which have made
more people aware of existing inequities, have focused
the concern of the political and social elite more on
orob #ems relative to urbanization and the need for in-
tegrated economic advancement than on their
traditional dilfereaces.
It may be that an awakening of national dignity, ex-
pressly evoked by President Velasco in his 1960 in-
auguration when he rejected the 1942 Protocol of Rio
de Janeiro, will serve as a catalyst, as o larger propor-
tion of the populace becomes conscious of its distinc-
tive Ecuadorean character amid foreign buffetings in
the world arena. Stimulation of such an identity is
natural consequence of seeking to find economic sup-
port regionally in the Latin American Free Trade
Association, the Andean 5ubregional Pact, and the An-
dean Common Market. The stress on increased foreign
trade and the augmented flow of foreign capital,
characteristic of recent years, can have a similar effect.
Certainly, the determination with which Ecuador af-
firms its claim to 200 mile limits of territorial seas
against foreign powers such as the United States can be
expected to stimulate national sentiment. And fun-
damental differences between Ecuador s position on
jurisdict and exclusive fishing rights and the
traditional U.S. concept of freedom of the seas which
have come to a head in "tuna war" incidents �are nol
likely to disappear in the forsecable futu.
Even as the flowing "black gold" of the newly dis-
covered oil has set the stage for changing the nation's
internal complexion, the diverse members of
Ecuadorean society may be moved closer together by
external pressures as well. The promise of an increase
in government proceeds resulting from oil revenues
brings a gm-At opportunity for easing chronic national
budget problems, for relieving balance of payments
streins, and for financing public investment in roads.
communicatiofis, electric power, agrarian reform,
agricultural extension, health, education, and welfare.
But dangers also underlie the oil boom, with both the
government and the public tending to forget that in
contrast to the potentially renewable soil resources. that
support agriculture, petroleum resources are finite.
Nevertheless, current resources provide Ecuador with
an unprecedented opportunity for advancement.
At this juncture in its development, 6cuadoi s
military government has been trying to apply the ex-
perience and special abilities of the armed forces to the
complexities of government and economics, and it has
had limited success. Gen. Guillermo Rodriguez Lara
calls his government revolutionary and nationalist.
The failure of the military to set forth a clear reformist
strategy, however, indicates disagreement between
moderates and liberals within the govemmerf which
also parallels Interservice and regional rivalries, since
the more radical point of view comes from the coastal
naval faction. A moat question is whether a lack of
military consensus for an adequate reform program
will impair the execution of policies that can forestall
widespread public disenchantment with the regime as
it stands at the crossroads.
V
.I,, I
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Chronology Woe)
146"
Inca Tupae Yupanqui conquers southern pruvtnces of
F.cuadur.
1526
Tupac Yupanqul's non 1lualna Capac dies, dividing his
kingdom hetweco Iluasear, in the south, and Atahualpa in
the north. Civil wars reRult, weakening the Incas, with
Atahualli s the ultimate victor.
1534
Colonial Quito is founded by Sebastlan de llenalcater after
Inca settlement is burned by retreating Indians.
ISO
Quito is made it scat of the Royal Audiencia.
1715
Economic griovancen lead w pnpular revolt.
1776 -1 A"
Indian pdtaantx engage In four uprisings.
1822
Ifaltle of Pichinehn secures Ecuadorean independence from
Slain; Ecuador Joins Cola -ibis and Venezuela in the Cun-
federation of Gran Colombia.
1 us
Ecuador scccdc" from gran Colombia to form an independ-
ent republic.
18W75
Gxbriel Garcia Moreno dominates politics In attempt to
build a theocratic state.
Isis
Liberalism triumphs under Eloy Alraro.
1925
Milstary revolta agalnst politiral elite dominated by coastal
bankers.
1924
.sass+ Smarts Velasco lbarra in elected President.
Isis
Yetmeo is deposed.
1941
Jdl- August
Fcusdor zuffers humiliating military defeat by I'cru in
border war.
1942
Jaaaar=
Protocol is signed at Pro do Janeiro defining the -puted
borders with Peru wad providing for their definitive Jemnren.
Lion, under guArantee of Chile, Argentina, MAO. and the
United States.
1914
My-J rfe
Coup returns Velaaeo to power.
1947
Au ffesl
velasco is ousted by military coup.
September
Carlos Julio Aroseaena is declared lnte.-im President by
Congress.
1946
Joe
Galo Plana ]Amww is elected President in a fair national
election.
1652
MW
Velasco, candidate of the National Velwquiots Afovemeot,
in elected President In the firer transfer of power by an
elected President to an elected successor in over three
decades.
1956
JIMe
Camillo Ponce �nriquez is elected Predden the first elected
to the office by ti;,a Conservatives in 60 years.
IM
ime
Y is Mpla elected President.
1963
November
Velaseo, ousted by popular and military action, is replaced
by leftWt Vice President Carlos Julio Arosemens Monroy,
son of pravloua Ptwident.
10
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1963
My
Aroscmena� alcoholic, inept, and lenient toward Consmu-
niPtr-- is ousted by armed forces; military junto taken power.
1964
July
Junta announcers agrarian and other reforms aimed at
allaying criticism and discontent.
It"
Mares
May
New l.'nUstitulion in adopted; Aronnincnr_ term is extended to
1 September 1068; national elections are scheduled.
Ilia
Jattc
Volxco Is again sleeted in elope tbrEY way premdential rare.
Ilicamoral legislature is also e!ected.
&pie rarer
Velasco beconies President for fifth t in final phase of
full return to constitutional gvernment.
Junta relinquishes power to civilian interim President 1970
Clemente Yerovi lndaburu. Jape
0claWr President felasce assumes extraconstitutio m) power is the
A Constituent Assembly is elecies3 to prepare groundwork face of a continuittg financial crisis and student disorders.
Congress is closed and a modifictl version of 1440 Constitu�
for return lu cowl ltutiunality. lion is relmliewed.
Move tale
C Assembly name Otto Arosemrna Comes Pro-
visional President.
1"7
Aging
During meeting of American Chiefs of State at Punts del
Crte, Uruguay, President Arommena adopts stance critical
of U.S. hemispht,ric actions.
1972
Feiraary
President Velasco is again ousted by military coup; Army
Comm9ndcr Gen. Guillermo Rodriguez Lam becomes Presi-
dent.
Angaat
Fird cargo cf Fcuadorcan crude oil leaves port of Iialao
near Esmeraldas, making Ecuador Latin Amedra's wond-
InMest oil exporter, behind Venezuela.
It
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;ON F 14)EN 1.
Area Brief
LAND (ufOU}
Sim: 106,000 square miles
Use: 55'6 forests; 11 arable; &y6 pastures and meadows;
26% built -up arras, eraateland, and other
Casatlisx: 640 miles
FWF LK (uf0[f)
Popolellea: 4,817,000, "cluding nomadic Indians (eat. I
January 1973); density about 63.6 persons per square mile
RLtzde /saps: 487E Indian; 4W% mestizo; 10% white; IOPA
mulatto and Negro
Religion: fla4ornivantl) Roman Cathnllc
Layosigm Spanish is the national language, but over 10%
of the population speaks an Indian language, mainly Quechua
Litrraey: Appm-imatel) 70% of the rmpululiun age 10 and
IM-f
licalth, nutrition. and sanitation Icvcls: I,ua
Mules 13--s}!; 1,572,ODD; 64% fit for military service
GOV9111KMICNT (WOU)
Unitary republic of 19 provinces and the territory of
Galapapios lslande
Constitutional democracy; executive mad legislative powers
held by executive since f bruary 1972, when army com-
mander general became President following coup
PeWkel putties: National Velaaotubsla Federation. Concen-
tralion of Popular Forces, Social Christian Party, Con-
servative Petty. Radical Liberal Patty of Ecuador, Ecua-
dorean Socialist Party, Communist Party of Ecuador
Member of the United Nations and the Orgsniaation of
American States
1[xparta: 8241 million (f.o.b.. 1971); bananas, coffee, cocoa,
sugar, and fish products; Ecuador began to export crude
petroleum In August 1972 at n rate of 300,000 barrcis per day
lmposiu: 5388 million (c.1.1., 1970; wheal ebomicalti metals,
petroleum products, construction materials, transportation
equipment, and most capital goods
Ceoversiew role: 25.25 sucres US$i (Welling rate)
Fiscal tear: Calendar year
COMMUN[CAT[ONiS (C)
flliikOa411a: 680 route miles nrrrow -Sage, single -track non
electrified listens; 61 S milts 3WO -gage and 45 miles 2'5
[[iwways: 14,200 miles; 1,900 paved; 5.100 crushed stone,
gravel, cobblestone, or stone blocks; 3,800 improved earth;
3,400 unimproved earth
Island waterways: 960 miles navigable
Pipelines; 387 miles crude oil; 50 miles refined products
Pow 2 major (Guayaquil and Slants), I I mine.
Merertt,@r marine: 9 ships of 1.0013 g.r.t. nod over, totaling
49,773 g.r.t, or 57,585 d.w.t.
Civil air. 46 major transport&
AirfkYs: 169 umble, 23 sites, 3 seaplane stations; 5 airfields
have runways between 5,000 and 11,999 reel, and 19 have
runways between 4,000 and 7,989 feet; 15 have permanent
srrfaced runways
Tekeounnieasiens: Adequate only in larger cities; 105,600
telephones; 680,000 radio and 120,000 TV receivers; 220 AM,
20 FM, and 13 TV ntaUons; communications satellite
ground station
DIf5 NSK 70KC118 (C)
Felso"d: Army 17,000, navy 3,150 (including SW marine.),
KONOMY (UIOU) sir force 1,665 (117 pilots)
1 GDP: 81.7 billion (at official exchange rate 1971); $260 per Major posiod violis; a brigades (5 infantry and l cavalry),
capita 6 separate ba.tallons
Feat: Self sufficient in most staple fowls: except wheat, milk,
and vegetable oils; main crops are bananas, sugar rant,
coffee, cocoa, corn, ricft beans
Main indasiries: Food poceminlL beverages, textile% drugs,
rubber and leather products, petrokum, fiWng, fertilisers,
cement
Zkwtrk power: installed capacity 320,080 kw. (1971); esti-
mated production 1.1 bdlkm kw. -hr.; per capita eoasumption
158 kw.-hr. (1971)
i
I
12 NO FOREIGN D1SSF.M
1
tfbipo: 7 combat ships, including 2 pntrul esearta and 3
amphlbioun warfare ships; 3 ausilfarhss, 5 service craft
Alrerah: 91 (28 jet) in gir lone. 5 (pop) In navY, 10 (plop)
in army
SoWyt Dr-pendent primarily ion U.S., some major purchases
from Western Eumpe
1 lhlilary befto: For fiscal year ending 31 December 8972,
535.3 milUoe; about 10.44% of central piovernment budget
C A) S VI I)t?N77A t.
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