NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY 18; CZECHOSLOVAKIA; GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

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CONTENTS
This chapter supersedes the political coverage
in the Central Sauey dated December I97I.
A. Introduction
1
U. Structure and functioning of the govertunent 5
1. Constitutional developments
5
2 Legislative an executive functions
8
3. Central government
8
(1) Legislature
9
(2) Presidency
11
(3) Cabinet
12
b. r:zech and Slovak national governmen*
12
c. Local government
13
I judicial system
13
,T� I
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Page
C. Political dynamics
15
1. Assessment of the reform era
15
2. The Communist regime
17
a. Background
17
b. The Dubcek era
18
c. Husak and the return to normalcy
21
3. Communist Party organization and
federalization law photo)
membership
24
a. Central organs
24
b. Regional and local levels
26
c. Membership
26
4. Mass organizations and other parties
27
5. Exile groups
28
6. Electoral procedures
29
D. National policies
30
1. Domestic
31
2. Foreign
34
a. Relations with the Communist world
35
b. Relations with developed non-
Communist states
36
c. Relations with developing count ries
38
Page
E. Threats to government stability 38
1. Discontent and dissidence 39
2. Subversion 40
F. Maintenance of internal security 41
1. Police 41
2. Countersubversive and counterinsurgency
measures and capabilities 43
G. Selected bibliography 43
1. General works 44
2. The pre -1948 period 44
3. The Stalinist era and after 44
4. The Dubcek era and the 1968 crisis 44
Chronology 46
Glossary 51
FIGURES
Page
Fig. 1
Territorial changes map)
2
Fig. 2
National Assembly voting on
federalization law photo)
7
Fig. 3
President Svoboda signing
federalization law photo)
7
Fig. 4
Organization of government (chart).
10
Fig. 5
President Ludvik Svoboda photo)
11
Fig. 6
Premier Lubomir Strougai (photo).
12
Fig. 7
General Secretary Gustav Husak
26
Fig. 12
(Photo)
16
ii
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Fig. 8
Former First Secretary Alexander
Dubcek photo)
19
Fig. 9
Invasion by the Warsaw Pact
countries photo)
20
Fig. 10
Organization of the Czechoslovak
Communist Party chart)
2.5
Fig. 11
Leadership of Communist Party
(chart)
26
Fig. 12
Minister of Foreign Affairs Bohuslav
Chnoupek photo)
35
Fig. 13
River patrol photo)
43
ii
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Government and Politics
A. Introduction (C)
When on the night of 20 August i9b S the Soviet -led
militar invasion of Czechoslovakia terminated
Prague's R -month experiment with "socialism with u
human face." it did more than forcibly reinstate
Soviet dominance in the formulation of Cmeheslovak
national policies. It also once again turned the
Czechoslovak people away from their sporadic
flirtation with r oliticad idealism, and forced them to
retreat into that putrid of political apathy, passive
resistance, awd pragmatic materialism which
historically has been the more common national
characteristic As a result, the forced return to
orthodo%% that hits been dubbed "nornialization" by
the C.errnmunist regime of Gustav Husak has brought
about a degree of political stability and renewed
Soviet trust in the lovalty of its Czxchoslovak ally.
Nevertheless. the lcgacv of the 1%. 8 experiment and its
strangulation by Moscom continues to Plague the
countn whose current rulers have had to concentrate
attvittion on the material well -being of the people to
elicit a degree of acceptance from them.
Since 1968. therefore, the political, social, cultural,
and economic development of the country has
reverted to it mold that has been historically more
common than the brief periods of true self
determination. Indeed, the central theme of the
histories of the Czech and Slovak peoples has been the
stniggle to maintain their cultural and national
identities in the face of Successive periods of
domination by their neighbors. Victimized by
geography and their relatively small numbers, the
t mchs and Slovaks have repeatedly found themseive s
the pawns of European expansionist powers ---in
modern times the Austro- Hungarian Empire, Nan
Germany. arid, most recently, the U.S.S.R.
The geographic proximity that led to their political
domination by other Europeans kept the Czechs, and
to a lesser degree the Slovaks, within the sphere of an
essentially Western cultural and social development.
an evolution consistent with the Greco -Roman rots of
Ixth societies. Prior to 1918, however, the (:zechs and
the Slovaks pursued their respective national identities
largely ind.:pcndently of each other. This historic
individuality inevitably troubled the unity of
Czechoslovakia. While the C:zech% were developing
their cultural and social traditions during 3W years of
Germanic rule, the neighboring Slovaks were being
molded by feudal Hungarian overlordship and
customs. By the 20th century the Czechs and Slovaks
had developr:d disparate cultural attributes and
political modalities that were to prove as influential as
the shared ethnic and linguistic characteristics in
shaping the Czechoslovak polity.
The independent First Republic of Czechoslovukia
lasted onl) from 19113 to 1938, its existence being
assured only as long as British and t Bench support
appeared certain. The country's fate was sealed,
hOWCVCr, when the Western powers, unprepared to risk
war, chose a polic) of appeasement at the Munich
Conference in September 1938 and agreed to the
cession of the Czechoslovak Sudetenland to Nazi
Germany. In March 1939 German troops occupied the
remaining areas of Bohemia and Moravia, which
became a protectorate of the Reich; Slovakia was
established as a Gennan- sponsored autonomous state.
Extensive border areas in southern Slovakia were
seized by Hungary, which also acquired the
easternmost province of Czechoslovakia, Sub-
Carpathian Ruthenia (Carpatho- Ukraine). Poland
annexed the city and surrounding area of Tesin
(Cieszyn).
The restoration of an independent Czechoslovakia
was an avowed objective of the World War 11 allied
victors. The country, however, emerged from the war
with four- fifths of its territory occupied by forces of the
Soviet Union, the dominant military power in a
Furope that was still without a security system.
Despite the 1943 Soviet- Czechoslovak treaty of
mutuul assistance which recognized the pre- Munich
frontiers of Czechoslovakia. the U.S.S.R. annexed
Ruthenia in 1945. The territorial changes that have
occurred in Czechoslovakia since 1938 arc shown in
Figure 1.
The lack of opposition to the ceding of Ruthenia. a
section inhabited almost entirely b ethnic
Ukrainians, perhaps reflects the failure of C:zecho-
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-Annexed M Germany Under German ion Annexed by Hungary �Annexed by U.S.S.R administration
Miles
0 100 200 300
0 100 200 300
Kilometers
NOTEf This chart does net show minor le"Nonal changes such as the numerous smoll odiostments
that have occid along the northern limits of the 1937 Czechoslovak boundary.
FIGURE 1. Territorial changes in Czechoslovakia, 1937 -1973 (U/OU)
slovakia, a model of Western democracy during the
interwar years, to repair a strong sense of national
purpose after World War II. It is perhaps
representative, too, of the atmosphere in which the
country succumbed in 1948 to a bloodless Communist
coup and, over the following decade, developed into a
model Soviet satellite, docile and unquestioning in its
loyalty to Moscow.
The country's high degree of economic develop-
ment, its proximity and strategic importance to the
U.S.S.R., and its vulnerable liberal political system
were am the factors which made Czechoslovakia
an attractive target for postwar Soviet expansionism.
From 1945 to the coup in 1948, the leaders of major
non Communist political factions pursued con-
ciliatory tactics toward the Communists, with whom
they formed a coalition government. This first postwar
government, its confidence in the Western powers
impaired by the memory of Munich, committed itself
to internal policies favored by the Communists and to
a fo!eign policy line sympathetic to Soviet interests.
The Soviet Union at this time was still greatly admired
by most Czechoslovaks because of its role in the war
and the fact that in 1938 it had been the only power to
declare its support of Czechoslovakia. In addition,
many Czechoslovak leaders had a utopian vision of
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Czechoslovakia's serving as a "bridge between East
and West." They lulled the nation into a false sense of
security and tolerated the activities of domestic
Communists and Soviet agents who were already
preparing for an eventual takeover.
The Czechoslovak experiment with the popular
front government formed in 1946 was viewed with
considerable optimism by some Western leaders, who
were prepared to believe that the Communists were
sincere in their professed desire to cooperate with the
democratic parties in a multiparty government. The
subsequent Communist coup came as a harsh
awakening to the West and dashed hopes for
constructive cooperation with Communists in the
international political arena.
The Czechoslovak Communists had carefully
prepared the groundwork for their seizure of power. In
particular, they were able legaiiy to place party
members in key government positions. Other postwar
developments also had contributed to setting the stage
for this event. The Soviet occupation authorities not
only actively supported the Communists in efforts to
extend their political influence a.d organization but
also sought to obstruct in numerous ways the
rebuilding of the nwi- Communist political organiza-
tions shattered by the war. Thus, Soviet influence,
the pliant attitudes of Czechoslovakia's first post
uar government, the party's legal status during
the interwar pe od, and its role in the anti -Nazi
underground all contributed to Communist strength.
In the last free national elections held in May 1946,
the Communists gained 38% of the vote. By 1948 the
party's popularity had diminished considerably, but
by then it was well entrenched in the government, the
trade unions, and other public organizations.
Moreover, many non Communist political leaders
naively supposed they could combat the Communist
threat by democratic means. In February 1948, 12
non Communist cabinet ministers attempted to
hasten new national elections by resigning from the
cabinet in protest against Communist manipulation of
the police. The Communists, however, seized the
initiative by activating "action committees" which
effectively took over every governmental office,
nationalized enterprise, and public organization.
President Benes, who vacillated in the governmental
crisis, accepted the government's resignation and a
new, virtually all- Communist cabinet was formed.
After 1948, organized opposition to the Czecho-
slovak Communist Party �from either the non
Communist political parties or underground
�letivity �was eliminated. The party quickly
consolidated its position as the "leading force" in
shaping national life, and concentrated all pinver in
the hands of a few top party leaders. The
Czechoslovak regimes of Gottwald, Zapotocky, and
Novotny remained in power by employing all the
techniques at the disposal of a modern totalitarian
state intimidation and terror, propaganda, and
regulation of the political, economic, and cultural life
of the people. In contrast to most of the Communist
ruled countries of Eastern Europe, the death of Stalin
in 19x`3 did not lead to a relaxation of the tight grip
the Czechoslovak regime held on almost every aspect
of national life. The defeatism of the people, the
relatively high standard of living, and the economic
concessions granted by the regime all contributed to
delaying pressures for liberalization.
In July 1960 the Communist regime proclaimed
Czechoslovakia a "socialist state," the second in the
world after the U.S.S.R., and renamed the country the
Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. At the same time the
Communists wrote a new "socialist" constitution and
made far reaching administrative changes. These
changes called, inter alia, for the country to complete
the "construction of a mature socialist society" by
1965, at which time it was supposed to begin the
transition into a "Communist societv." To the
sophisticated, urban Czechs, memories of democracy,
and even of the relatively benign Austrian hegemony,
made the Communist dictatorship increasingly
difficult to endure. The ill feeling which the Slovaks
had towar,] the Czechs and toward Czech domination
of the central government created further problems on
the domestic scene.
By late 1962, economic failure exacerbated by
political discord encouraged liberal forces inside and
outside the Communist Party to demand the
liberalization or de- Stalinization which had begun
many years earlier in the U.S.S.R. and some other
Eastern European Communist countries. After
considerable pressure, the regime of Antonin Novotny
was forced to modify its policies and permit a gradual
"thaw.
But even limited liberalization had adverse effects
on the party. It permitted, for example, the feud
between party liberals and conservatives to be brouy,ht
into the open. Meanwhile, deep- seated differences
within the Communist leadership, long just below the
surface, were being aired publicly, often impeding the
formulation or implementation of effective policies
needed to deal with a number of urgent economic and
social problems. Inertia seemed to grip the leadership,
and this it; turn led to crippling confusion and the
interparty crisis of the final months of 1967.
3
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Aware of Novotny's vulnerabilit, Slovak officials
led by Alexander Dubcek criticized iii the Central
Committee the park boss and his ineffective, Czech
dominated administration. Other party leaders,
including Czechs who sought a change in leadership,
soon joined in these personal attacks on the previocv.l�
sacrosanct Novotny. He was replaced as First
Secretary by Dubcek in January 1968.
Dubcek and his colleagues won popular approval
after they announced a comprehensive reform
program �the so- called Action Program published in
April 1968. Dubeek's proposed "clemocratization"
called for ending the Communist Party's fight control
of society. The program guaranteed personal righis
and liberties, including freedom of speech, assembly,
and the right to travel, work, and �in some cases
reside abroad permanently. Lifting the part's heavy
hand from the process of government, the program
directed the National Assembly to assume its rightful
rule as the "supreme organ of state power." In sum,
the Czechoslovak Communist Part was given the task
of "humanizing" socialism by making it responsive to
basic democratic processes.
From the beginning, however, the new leaders in
Prague and their "political experiment" were
confronted with significant opposition, both foreign
and domestic. The Soviet Union and other Warsaw
Pact countries saw in the reform program the seeds of a
disintegration of the Czechoslovak Communist system
which could have (lire effects on the political,
economic, and even military integrity of the bloc. At
the same time, conservative Czechoslovak Com-
munists were concerned over both the ideological
"deviation" of Dubeek's programs and their own
political positions should he succeed. As foreign
pressures on Dubce!. to modify his program mounted,
most of the competing interest groups within
Czechoslovak society closed ranks to foige a strong
bond of anti- Soviet nationalism between. the liberal
party leaders and the ordinary people.
Domestic solidarity, however, could not deter the
fateful Soviet decision. On the night of 20 -21 August
1968, approximately 3(N).O(X) troops, predominantly
;nom the Soviet Union but including forces from Fast
Germany, Poland, Bulgaria, and Hungary, occupied
Prague and the other major urban areas. 'There was no
organized military resistance, and casualties were
extremely light, despite sporadic gunfire and &tt,,mpts
by some Czechoslovak citizens to sabotage the
movements of the invading troops. Key Czechoslovak
leaders, including Dubcek, were taken to Moscow,
where they were held captive during "negotiations"
between 23 and 26 August.
4
During and immediately following the invasion.
Czechoslovak national unit and loyalty to the
Dubcek leadership reached unparalleled heights. The
Soviets had mistakenly assumed that they could install
a collaborationist regime within hours after the
intervention, but these plans had to be changed when
the Soviets realized that an abrupt ouster of the
Dubcek leadership could result in an uprising similar
to that in Hungary in 1936. Dubcek and the other top
officials returned to Prague, and the Czechoslovak
leadership remained intact.
Nevertheless, the Soviets launched a campaign to
deprive Dubcek of support within Czechoslovakia.
Their primary tactic was to undermine the Dubcek
leadership by forcing it to comply with Soviet
demands. Meanwhile, a "shadow' leadership
dominated by "realists," including Slovak Party boss
Gustav Husak, gradually emerged. The newly
ascendant group called for accommodation with
Moscow as the only possible course, while attempting
to curry popular favor by implementing those
remnants of Dubcek's reform program that did not
conflict with Soviet objectives. As the leading
spokesman for "realism" and "normalization" of
relations with Soviet Union, Husak won the party's
nomination as Dubeek's successor and in April 1969
was named First Secretary (now called General
Secretary).
When Husak assumed power, he faced a faltering
economy and a thoroughly disordered society.
Although most Czechoslovaks looked with distaste on
what they viewed as Husak's opportunistic willingness
to do Moscow's bidding, they reluctantly agreed that
he was the least odious of the available alternatives.
Although Husak managed to inject a degree of
restraint into the "normalization" process, as time
went on the bulk of Dubeek's reforms were
dismantled: censorship was reinstituted, the party's
control over all segments of the government and
society was restored, freedom of travel to the West was
sharply curtailed, and the various special interest
groups that had sprung up under Dubcek were either
disbanded or reoriented to serve the purposes of the
party. Moreover, the party was subjected to a massive
purge. Of the 1.7 million party members when Husak
came in, some 300,000 were stricken from the rolls and
another 200,000 resigned in disgust. In the end, the
individuals who were in the forefront of the Dubcek
reform movement were removed from positions of
power and ostracized. Dubcek, for example, was
assigned to run a motor pool for the Slovak Forestry
Administration.
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Nevertheless, Husak's "normalization" program has
not included the administrative and police practices
prevalent during the early days of the Novotny
regime. Husak, himself a victim of a purge of so- called
Slovak "bourgeois nationalists" in the early 1950's,
successfully opposed putting the reformers on trial, at
least not for their activities prior to the invasion. His
success in deflecting the more severe reprisals
advocated by the party's ultraconservatives. however,
has led to squabbling among the leadership. The
question of how to deal with the leading figures of the
reform era remains it major point of contention S years
after the events of 1968. While one faction apparently
feels that the time has come to use selectively the
talents of the Dubcek reformers in economic affairs
and cultural efforts, the ultraconservatives voice
paranoid concern over the continued danger posed by
these "rightist opportimists."
Husak seems to favor it policy of "differentiation.."
He would separate the ex- reformers into an
irredeemable "hard t� responsible f o r t he events of
1968, and "honest Communists" who were merely
duped and who can return to the mainstream of
Czechoslovak life by recanting. Although most of the
country's technical experts appear to have reached a
nuidus oiuendi with true regime, most creative artists
and other intellectuals have resisted all the regime's
blandishments and have boycotted the party
controlled cultural organizations. As a result, the
country has become it cultural wasteland. Within the
part. Itusak has repeatedly counseled patience in
dealing with the intellectuals, and in 1973 there were
some signs that a less oppressive cultural policy might
eventually be instituted.
Husak has taken a wmll- publicized interest in
popular welfare. More and better consumer goods are
ayailablc, and for the most part, the populace has
responded by grudgingly grcutting qualified accept-
ance to t.I Itusak regime. Even more important,
Husak has been accepted b% the So%iets. So iet party
chief Brezhney made it clear during his visit to Prague
in February !97:3 that Husak had passed the
performance test, ending speculation that his
stewardship over the party would be temporary and
that he would be replaced by it more reliable
conservative.
In spite of all this, the Czechoslovak regime's claims
to domestic "normalization" �i.e., that the "Prague
Spring" has been obliterated �are it sharn. Internal
repression, though hidden behind an aura of material
prosperity, is harsher than it was in 1967, and leaders
of the reform are in exile, in jail, or at least out of the
way. Neither their erstwhile supporters nor their
opponents who are now in power can forget the
impact of the reformers. Indeed, current policies are
what they are in large part because the reformers once
held sway and because they continue to influence,
eve if negatively, the thinking of the leadership.
Although Prague has become more active in the
field of foreign relations since late 1972, its activities in
the field clearly remain circumscribed by the necessity
to conform to the wishes of the Soviet Union. Indeed,
Czechoslovakia is the loudest proponent of the
"coordinated socialist foreign policy" that Moses%%'
has called for from its allies. The Husak regime,
however, will do what it can to utilize the openings
created by the Soviet policy of detente to seek further
recognition of its legitimacy.
On the other hand, the potentially corrosive impact
of detente will perhaps be f -it more in Prague than
elsewhere in Eastern Europe. it should be noted that
Moscow's rationale for the 1968 invasion was in large
part to counter the danger stemming from Dubeek's
inability to resist the alleged subversive influence of
Western ideas. Husak inherited this rationale, but it
now appears as if he may have to contend with much
the same Western influence as a matter of policy,
treading a tightrope between the impact the West will
haiye on popular expectations and the demands of
Soviet- imposed discipline. His success in this, as in all
his other goals, is by no means a foregone conclusion.
B. Structure and functioning of the
government (C)
1. Constitutional developments
The present "socialist" constitution of Czecho-
slovakia was promulgated on I1 July 1960, replacing
the one adopted in 1918. A new constitution, which
w�ouid have codified the reforms of the Dubcek
regime's "democratization program, was in the
process of formulation in 1968. It became it casualty of
the August invasion, however, and is now a dead
letter. By early 1974 the Communist leadership had
given no indication that it new constitution was being
considered.
The 1960 constitution changed the natne of the
country fn,nr Czechoslovak Republic to Czechoslovak
Socialist Republic and accorded the nation the
distinction of being the second to achieve the status of
a 'socialist st att after the U.S.S.R. The constitution
is important not only as it legal document but also as a
reflection of political and social changes imposed since
the Communist accession to power in 1948. Like
constitutions of all countries ruled by Communist
5
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regimes, it is primarily an outline guide for the
transition of the nation to "mature socialism." Only
secondarily is it a charter setting forth the structure
and operations of the government apparatus and the
rights and duties of citizens. The programmatic
character of the docurent suggests that the
Communist Party, then under First Secretary Antonin
Xovotny, planned to issue a new constitution when
the leadership decided that the nation was prepared
for the final transition to a Communist socie This
temporary aspect of the MWO constitution further
distinguishes it �in common with other Soviet bloc
cunslit tit ions �frout most Western democratic hasic
la%%s with their seeming assurances of perpetuity.
F.tnphasis on the "socialist" character of the state is
the salient characteristic of the 1960 constitution. It
proclaims the affiliation of the nation to the bloc of
socialist and Communist nations, a first for it Soviet
bloc constitution. Hie Communist Party's monopoly
of power is explicitly confirmed, as is the doctrine of
"democratic centralisn." The Czechoslovak Com-
munist Part, which had shaped the lives of the
population and tFrc development of the countrx
without arty for ad constitutional sanction since 1948,
received cousti' utional status as the "vanguard if the
%corking class" and the "leading force in the
community and the state. The 1960constitution, like
that of 1948, makes no mention of the fear existing
puppet political parties, bu! it clearly spells out the
influential role of the Communist controlled mass
organizations, particularly the trade unions.
Although the constitution of 1960 is patterned after
the constitution of the U.S.S.R., especially with reg ard
to the socioeconomic rights of citizens, the regime
retained almost all aspects of the governmental
structure of the 1948 constitution, xhich in turn had
emhodied certain features 4 the democratic
('Z echoslovak constitution of 1920. Both postwar
constitutions retained a seemingly powerful office of
President of the Republic, creating an impression of
I uridical confornity %it,', the� form of the popular First
Republic. TIiv rete,rtion of a nominally powerful
president as the chief executive officer of tiie
government as well as head of state distinguishes the
C -ch rslovak constitution from those of most other
?astern European Communist countries where the
chairman of a multimember state council has the
generally ceremonial role of head of state but virtually
no executive functions. The Czechoslovak Com-
munists thus sought to benefit from tLe strung
attachment of the population to the democratic forms
of the former republic by observing them in name, if
not in substance.
6
The reincorporation of certain administrative
mechanisms outlined in the earlier constitutions
notvithstatAing, the present document gives legality
to an unabashedly totalitarian system. There are,
indeed, clauses reaffirming the principles of popular
sovereignty, democratic government, and civil
liberties, b,it they have littli significance because of
the absence of meaningful implementing laws or
decrees, and, most significantly, of adequate
provisions for checks and balances. Unlike Western
democratic constitutions, the Czechoslovak document
places no limits on the arbitrary powers of the
government. The classical concept of individual
liberty was replaced by a nesy rubric of "collective
freedom." Greater emphasis throughout is placed on
he "equality" rather than on the "freedoms' of the
individual. Furthermore, economic rights and duties
arc stressed more than those of a political nature.
Under the 1960 constitution, the concept of private
property was eliminated and replaced by a more
restrictive concept of "personal property, essentially
limited to articles of private and domestic
consumption, family houses, and savings acquired by
"honest work." (It should be noted, however, that this
provision has not inhibited the material acquisitive-
ness of the Czechoslovak people; the present Husak
regime has in fact encouraged this tendency as a
means of diverting popular energies from political to
mat!ria! goals.) The earlier constitutio r had allowed
for small business enterprises mid _agricultural holdings
but, because such prerogatives conflicted with part
aims, they were progressively ignarod. The extension
of state contol over virtually all businesses and the
collectivization of farms were among the main
features of the development toward "socialism" after
1948.
Like its predecessor, the 19('0 charter proclaimed a
"unitary stale of two fraternal (Slavic) nations
possessing equal rights, the Czechs and the Slovaks."
Both documents provided for local administration to
he under the authority of national committees
"accountable to the people," although the 1960
constitution alone specifically provided for popular
elections.
'Pouching on the basic relationship of the Czech and
Slovak people, one important reform envisaged in the
stillborn 1968 constitutional draft, the federalization
of the country into two separate Czech and Slovak
republics, did survive the invasion and was enacted
into law on 28 October 1968, the 50th anniversary of
the founding of the Czechoslovak Republic. This law
of federalization went into effect on 1 January 1969
(Figures-2 and 3).
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FIGURE 2. Czechoslovak National
Assembly voting on the federal;za-
tion low, 27 October 1968 (U /OU)
La
FIGURE 3. President Ludvik
Svoboda signing the wastRu Tonal
low declaring Czechoslovakia a
federal republic, 30 October
1963 (U /OU)
Federalization was the culmination of a Slovak
drive, begun in 1968, to attain constitutional equality
with the numerically superior Czechs. Slovak
dissatisfaction over traditional Czech domination of
the national administration dates from the founding
of the republic in 1918. Various letislative concessions
were made by both democratic and Communist
regimes to grant the Slovaks a semiautonomous status,
but none provided the Slovaks with meaningful
control of their domestic affairs. During the belated
de- Stalinization movement of the early 1960'x, the
Slovaks focused their energies on gaining a greater
share in the central government, but remained
discontented with the concessions wrung from Prague.
By 1967 Slovak officials were able to take advantage
of Novotny's rapidly deteriorating political position
and launched a renewed campaign for national
autonorvy. Slovak nationalism played a key role in the
collapse of the Novotny regime and was an important
platforn of the successor Dubcek government, which
committed itself to a new Czech Slovak federation.
As Slot ak party boss under the Dubcek regime,
Gustav Husak in 1968 was named deputy premier in
chz ge of the "great Slovak dream federalization of
a
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the country. He .njoyed a measure of popular support
in Slovakia, and worked diligently against Czech
opposition to engineer a meaningful federal program.
The effort seemed doomed to defeat, but, ironically,
was revived by the invasion, which gave Husak
considerable leverage in asserting Slovak claims
because it was widely believed the Soviets were
opposed to them. Even after the federalization law
was passed and partly implemented, howover, the
uncertain vacillation between strong central authority
and federalism continued. When Husak became First
Secretary, in April 1969, he felt obliged to dismantle
some of the federal alterations in the government
structure already put into effect. A multitude of
problems had been encountered in transferring
legislative and executive powers from the central
government to the separate republics. The diminished
authority of Prague threatened to disrupt the social
and political administration of the (country; Husak's
efforts to assert absolute control were commensurately
compromised. As a result, federalization became a
serious liability to a government whose first obligation
was to reesh political stability throughout the
country. The regime, gradually transferred much of the
regional authority back to national government
institutions, and in December 1970 the Federal
Assembly amended the federalization law to once
again permit essential direction from Prague.
This trend toward recentralization in ;practice while
retaining the outward institutional forms of
federalization has continued through 1973, and
includes the effective reimposition of central controls
over mass organizations, such as the trade unions, by
means of newly created coordinating executive organs
on the federal level.
The public's assessment of the constitution is
realistic; given the fact of the Communist Party's
monopoly of p)wer, the Czechoslovak Government is
one of peen, not laws. In this context, no written
document, even if it contained legal constraints on
governmental power �which the Czechoslovak
constitution does not �can be viewed as providing a
genuine recourse to the citizenry against an abuse of
powr r by their rulers.
2. Legislative and executive functions
a. Central government
Although separate legislative, executive, and
judicial branches of government are delineated in the
constitution, no act ial separation of powers has
existed under the Communists. Until for the period of
Dubcek's incumbency, there were constant efforts to
13
concentrate as much power as possible in the hands of
,a few Communist leaden. The legislative body, the
National Assembly, was in practice a tool of the
executive branch. In turn, many leaders of the
executive branch often simultaneously held leadership
positiors in the Communist Party. This interrelation-
ship between party and government leadership was
personified by Antonin Novotny, who functioned as
both First Secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist
Pariy and as President of the Republic between 1957
and January 1968. The numerous interlocking party
and government positions enabled the party hierarchy
easily to dominate the state apparatus.
In 1968 the Dubcek leadership initiated an
extensive reorganization of the government, which
eventually would have been spelled out in a new
constitution. The new plan separated and defined
executive, legislative, and judicial responsibilities, and
provided for the effective delegation of powers by the
party, which would then withdraw from its ubiquitous
tole in the governmental process. In particular, no
longer would leadiii party officials have been
permitted to assume top positions in the governmental
hierarchy.
The only major constitutional reform to survive the
downfall of the Dubcek regime was the federalization
of the country. Approved by the U.S.S.R., the federal
law invested in the Czech and Slovak republics much
of the executive power previously held by the central
government, and provided for equal representation
between the two nations in all remaining central
government bodies. The premiers of the Czech and
Slovak national governments automatically became
deputy premiers of the federal government.
Enforcement powers for laws enacted by individual
republics as well as many federal laws were given to
the separate republics. Areas limited solely to federal
jurisdiction were foreign policy, national defense, and
"materiel reserves" (strategic resources). Executive
functions under joint jurisdiction of the federa! and
two national governments included finance, prices,
agriculture, transportation, communications, labor,
internal security, and the mass media. In addition to
the federal budget, each of the national governments
was empowered to draw tip its own budget.
Legislative powers, on the other hand, were left
largely in the hands of the federal government, but
both national administrations were given veto power
in the federal legislature in such important matters as
the federal budget, the distribution of revenues
between the federation and national states, taxation,
police affairs, and informati :)n media. Regional
legislation was envisaged concerning civil and penal
law, education, and conservation.
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The federalization law was a hastily drafted
document and when promulgated was fur from
complete, causing considerable administrative
confusion and leading to disputes between Czechs and
Slovaks, each fearful that the other was getting undo
advantage. The composition and responsibilities of the
bicameral Federal Assembly featuring a coequal
Chamber of Nations, alongside the traditional
Chamber of the People �.vas an early issue, as was the
yet untested division of powers between federal and
national governments. The abolition of 16 federal
ministries and their replacement by federal
"committees" posed serious staffing problems,
particularly among the Slovaks who had fewer
qualified officials. There .were inadequate national
organizations in both the Czech lands and Slovakia.
Moreover, the Czechs and Slovaks were to implement
federalization at different speeds, when tandem
cooperation was vital to the program's success.
When Gustav Husak took over as party First
Secretary in April 1969, it was his purpose quickly to
reinstate strict centralized control of the country as the
only possible course in the face of military occupation
and the threat of a serious confrontation between the
populace and Soviet troops. Federalization �in terms
of the political and administrative separateness
initially envisaged proved incompatible with
Ilusak's new policy of "realism," and he has
subsequently .whittled away most regional authority,
placing the federal government and both national
administrations under tight party control. In June
1970 a special party commission was set tip to review
and propose changes in the federalization law. The
commission's recommendations resulted in the
enactment of Mditional legislation in December 1970
.which further reduced the regional autonomy of
Czech and Slovak authorities in economic and
administrative matters. Figure 4 depicts the federal
arrangement, as amended.
i Legislature- -The bicameral legislature, known
as the Federal Assembly, consists of a Chamber of the
People (the former National Assembly), and a
Chamber of Nations. The Chamber of the People
consists of 200 deputies elected on a proportional
basis. The Chamber of Nations consists of 73 Czech
and 73 Slovak representatives elected by the respective
national legislatures, the popularly elected Czech and
Slovak National Councils. Legislation must be
approved by both chambers to become laws of the
land.
The Federal Assembly is governed by a Chairman, a
First Vice Chairman, and a 40- member Presidium
which consists of 20 deputies from the Chamber of the
People. and 10 Czechs and 10 Slovaks from the
Chamber of Nations. The Chairman and First ,'ice
Chairman are elected in joint session of the assembly,
and must alternate between Czech and Slovak.
Dalibor Hanes, a Slovak and pro -Husak moderate,
replaced Alexander Dubcek as Chairman of the
Federal Assembly on 1.3 October 1969- -the latter's
last significant post. In December 1971, Hanes himself
was replaced Gy Alois Indra, a Czech and one of the
most conservative, pro- Soviet members of the
Communist Party's policymaking Presidium. Hanes
remained a member of the Federal Assembly's
Presidium, however, receiving the additional post of
Chairman of the Chamber of Nations. Vaclav David,
who served as Foreign Minister from 1933 to :8 and
is a sycophant of the Soviets, was named Chairman of
the Chamber of the People.
The Federal Assembly Presidium carries out the
duties of the Federal Assembly when the latter is not in
session. It cannot, however, elect a President of the
Republic, make a decision on peace for war, adopt the
federal budget, or pass on a vote of confidence asked
by the government. The Presidium issues decrees
which become invalid unless approved by the next
session of the Federal Assembly.
This reshuffling of the legislative leadership
followed the first national elections since the 1968
invasion, held on 26 -27 November 1971. The elections
scheduled for November 1968 clearly had to be
scrubbed in vi;w of the unsettled political and
constitutionai conditions. The 1971 elections were
held in a traditional, closely controlled manner in an
atmosphere of intimidation and some antiregime
pamphlefeering by dissident intellectuals.
During the Novotny era, regular sessions of the
National Assembly were largely devoted to approving
legislative measures submitted by the President's
cabinet. Parliamentary committees met outside the
regular sessions to discuss legislation, to hear reports,
and to draft recommendations. To expedite the
implementation of measures, it parliamentary
presidium consisting of 30 deputies selected by the
party and elected by the assembly �sat year round
and approved measures on a "temporary" basis. In
this manner, the government could proceed in its
course without waiting for the formal approval of the
whole assembly in regular session.
Beginning in 1963, the Novotny regime responded
to demands for more rational, democratic government
by granting the National Assembly greater respon-
sibilities in policy and legislative matters as well as
greater control over governmental ministries. The
9
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regime largely offset these reforms, however, by
increasing the role of the party in initiating and
guiding legislation. The Party Central Committee
established commissions to direct policy implement_
tion in the realms of ideology, the economy, standard
of living, law, and agriculture. These commissions,
chaired by members of the party hierarchy, were
responsible only to the Party Central Committee and
the Party Presidium; they had the power to dictate to
the governmental minist.ies concerned as well as to
the National Assen Iv and its committees. In
addition, there was a patty organization parallel to, if
not actually in, almost every government component
to insure continuous party control.
Dubcek's Action Program directed the National
Assembly to assume its constitutional role as the
"supreme organ of Mate power" and to" really decide
on laws and important political questions." Party
organs were no longer to do the work of state bodies,
thus removing the party's omnipresence in govern-
mental affairs. These reforms were abandoned in the
wake of the invasion.
Under the Husak regime, the Federal Assembly has
again been subjugated to the pre- Dubcek system of
party controls. Senior members of the Communist
Party, including Husak himself, now sit on the Federal
Assembly Presidium. Legislative initiative again rests
with Party Central Committee commissions and
departments.
(2) Presidency �In contrast to the constitutions of
most .)ther Communist countries, the Czechoslovak
document provides for the position of a President of
the Republic exercising real executive functions. This
holdover from the 1920 constitution is in large part
explained by the prestige originally attached to the
office by the popularity of the first "President
Liberator," Tomas G. Masaryk. Under the 1960
constitution, which was tailored to fit pasty boss
Novotm the President is asysgned executive functions
as Chief of State, Commander in Chief of the Armed
Forces, and representative of the state in all
international dealings. He also exercises powers such
as the appointment and recall of the Premier, cabinet
members, all ranking government officials, and
diplomatic representatives. While Novotny exercised
these theoretical constitutional powers, his real
authority as President flowed from his paramount role
as Communist Party First Secretary. The President is
elected by a three fifths majority of the Federal
Assembly sitting in joint session. His term of office is 5
yea rs.
It was the intention of the Dubeek government to
divest the Presidency of the nearly limitless powers
formerly associated with the offi -e, while retaining its
ceremonial eminence. Ludvik Svoboda, who replaced
Novotny as Chief of State in May 1968, was elected
with the tacit understanding that he would be an
interim, rubberstamp President (Figure 5). His
widespread popularity based on his wartime exploits,
along with his courage in standing up to the Soviets
before and after the invasion, also served the interests
of the Husak regime, which had no other figure with
which the public could identify. Svoboda's image has
subsequently been tarnished, however, because of his
close association with the Husak egime and almost
total acquiescence to So�.,et demands. Some
dissidents, in fact, have blamed the aged (78 in 1973)
general for having begun the postinvasion "dialog"
with the Soviets, and thus allegedly compromising if
not negating the possibility of active resistance to the
occupation.
As the expiration of Svoboda's 5 -year term (on 30
March 1973) came closer, a great deal of speculation
emerged concerning his successor, and the impact this
would have on the political configuration of the party
leadership itself. Though in failing health mainly
senility �and anxinw, to step aside, Svoboda was
reelected to the Presidency. Indeed, as a consistent
supporter of party chief Husak's political line,
Svoboda reportedly was persuaded by Husak himself
to accept the post to prevent a reshuffling of the
hierarchy in favor of the hardline elements over
Husak's moderate /conservative supporters.
Given Svoboda's ill- health and advanced age, the
regime realizes the problem of presidential succession
and its impact has been only postponed. One
consideration bearing on the selection of the next
President will be his nationality; no Slovak has ever
held that post and many may think that after Svoboda
11
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FIGURE b. President of the Republic
Ludvik Svoboda (C)

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the time will be right. Unless the regime decides in due
course to combine the top party position and the
Presidency �a proposition that is widely considered as
unlikely in view of Novotny's adverse record under
his arrangement prior to 1968 �the next President is
likely to be a Czech assuming that Husak retains the
top party slot. Some Czechoslovaks, however, foresee a
time when Husak will be dispensable enough to be
"kicked upstairs" into the Presidency.
Although filling the office of a chief of state in a
Communist country is normally a matter of small
significance, both the unusual prerogatives of the
Czechoslovak Presidency and Svoboda's ill- health will
give this question continuing political and constitu-
tional significance. With this in mind, some reports
have suggested that the regime will seek a
constitutional amendment abolishing the Presidency
and establishing a collective executive on the model of
the U.S.S.R. and some other East European regimes. It
is unlikely, however, that the Czechoslovaks would
lightly aba,.don the traditional office of President of
the Republic unless a major political impasse
developed in the selection of Svoboda's successor.
(3) Cabinet �Under the federal system the powers
of the cabinet (Council of Ministers) were to be
sharply curtailed. Sole federal jurisdiction was to be
limited to the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and
National Defense. All others were supposed to be
reorganized to serve as coordinating agencies between
federal and national governments. Each such changed
ministry would then be assigned a state secretary as a
Czech or Slovak counterpart to the minister. The
existing 21 ministries were to be reduced to seven, with
the abolished ministries being replaced by seven
federal committees, each with equal Czech and Slovak
representatiou. Like the five reorganized ministries,
the committees were to be responsive to their
rc7,pective cot� terparts in the Czech and Slovak
governments. These changes were short lived,
however. As part of Husak's program to recentralize
economic planning, the cabinet system was again
overhauled in December 1970. All federal committees
were restructured into federal ministries, which now
total 12. The old Ministry of Planning was replaced by
a State Planning Commission, which is responsible for
overall national planning. The office of state secretary,
designed to give the Slovaks equal representation in
the federal ministries, was also abolished. The names
and the role of the federal ministries in early 1974 are
given in Figure 4.
All cabinet members, including the Premier are
appointed by the President of the Republic; their
tenure is subject to resignation or presidential recall.
12
I
FIGURE 6. Czechoslovak Premier
Lubomir Strougal (C)
The present Premier, Lubomir Strougal (Figure 6),
succeeded Oldrich Cernik in January 1970. The
appointment of Strougal, then head of the powerful
Czech Party Bureau and a potential rival to Husak,
was engineered by Husak to strengthen his own
position.
The federal cabinet at the beginning of 1974
consisted of a tota! of 24 members. In addition to the
Premier, there were 8 deputy premiers, 12 heads of
ministries, and 3 ministers heading cabinet -level
central agencies (the People's Control Committee, the
State Planning Commission, and the State Price
Bureau).' All 24 members belonged to the Communist
Party.
b. Czech and Slovak national government
Under federalization, the governments of the
individual Czech and Slovak Socialist Republics were
organized parallel to the federal structure. Each of the
two republics thus has its own Premier heading a
cabinet which, in turn, directs the activities of local
government organs, i.e., the national committees
existing at the regional, district, and community levels
within the respective republics.
The Czech and Slovak National Councils are the
legislative organs representing the "national
sovereignty and individuality" of the respective
republics. While their legislative powers are limited to
regional mat`.ers, the National Councils provide the
individual republics with considerably more
autonomy than they previously had. The councils are
empowered to implement, at the national republic
level, laws passed by the Federal Assembly and to
'F'or a current listing of cabinet posts and key governmental
officials, consult Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign
Governments, published monthly by the Directorate of Intelligence,
Central Intelligence Agency.
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"approve" international treaties whose implementa-
tion requires regional legislation. The councils are also
invested with the nominal power of appointment over
regional judiciaries. Subordinate to the councils are a
number of commissions which coordinate legislative
activity in such fields as health, education, and
transportation.
Although the Czech National Council was an
innovation of the fed( rulization plan, the Slovak
National Council had been established as early as
1960, in deference to Slovak pressure for "autonomy."
Before 1969, its legislative powers were limited to
minor administrative matters, and all initiatives were
subject to veto by the National Assembly.
As implemented by the 1969 federalization scheme,
the National Councils are bodies whose members are
popularly elected for 4 -year terms. The Czech
National Council has 200 representatives, the Slovak,
150. Deputies may not be prosecuted for criminal or
political activity without the consent of their council.
Each council elects its own presidium, which performs
the functions of the main holy when it is not in
session. fhe presidiums are empowered to appoint and
remove national republic government officials,
including the national premiers.
c. Local government
local administration in Czechoslovakia is
conducted by a system of national committees which
exist on the regional (kraj), district (okres) and
community levels. The r mmittees are constitution-
ally responsible, under the jurisdiction of the
respective national governments, for the regulation of
economic, cultural, educational, security, and civic
services. Corresponding to the country's adnuaistra-
tive breakdown, there are I I national committees with
regional status, 118 with district status, and about
1 1,001) local committees.
Members of the national committees, are popularly
elected for 4 -year terms in the same manner and at the
carne tirne as members of both of the National
Councils and of the Federal Assembly. Each
committee is run by an executive council, which varies
in size depending on the area of jurisdiction. The
function of the committee system is to closely
supervise the activities of the individual citizen and to
act as an administrative transmission belt from the
national ministerial level to the local level. The
committees are ci.arged with implementing govern-
mental directives in virtually all social and economic
spheres, including local transportation, sanitation,
public order, community services, cultural activities,
and the administration of local judicial organizations.
Autonomous administration of economic enterprises of
local importance is an important function of the
committees. The national committees to a degree serve
as ombudsmen for citizens' complaints, although this
role varies widely among the localities and depends on
the character of the officials invrlved. The
Communists have claimed that the committees have
contributed to Czechoslovakia's "democratic" system
by directly involving the population in executive
functions on the local level. dtl,ough the committees
are constitutionally "accountable to the people," their
elections and programs are closely managed and
supervised by the central government. Moreover, it is
the party organization at each level of local
government that is the real locus of power.
Prior to federalization, the national committees
were directly subordinate to the central government.
Whey are now ;csponsible to the respective national
governments As part of its economic decentralization
program, the Dubeek regime declared the regional
nation� 1 committees "superfluous" and in June 1968
abolished the Slovak regional committees. Abolition of
the Czech regional committees was preluded by the
invasion. Reversing this process, the Husak regime in
December 1970 reverted to the "three- tier" (kraj,
okres, communal) national committee system
throughout the country by reinstituting the three
Slovak regional committees.
I judicial system
The constitution of 1960 amply demonstrates the.
Communists' basic philosophy with respect to the role
of the judiciary by charging it first with the protection
of the "socialist state' �its social order �and then
with the rights and "true interests" of the citizen.
Lovalty to the political system is thus given priority
over the protection of basic human rights. In addition,
the constitution restricts the independence of the lower
courts which had existed in the prewardernocracy and
were theoretically preserved in the 1948 constitution.
The traditional three systems of courts criminal,
civil, and military �were through the early 1950's
integrated into a single system. The Supreme Court,
itself ur der firm central party control, came to
supervise closely the work of the four lower courts:
regional, district, local people's courts, and military.
The local people's courts, which in 196. succeeded the
once ubiquitous "comrade" courts, and whose
function was to relieve higher courts of cases involving
work discipline and minor breaches of "socialist
order," were abolished in 1970. The structure and
subordination of the court system is shown in Figure 4.
13
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The reform mowinent of 1968 set in motion a full
scale review of the judicial system with the intent of
once more separating the judiciary from political
control. Uccause of a combination of influences�the
continuing pressures for reforms from the judiciary
itself, the need of the Husak regime to align the
judicial system along federa; lines, and the need to
conic to grips %%ith the numerous It-gal problems
following the invasion� suhstantial changes were
enacted in December 1969. The powers and duties of
the courts were specified in much greater detail,
emphasizing the administrative separation of the
judiciary from the government. The new laws
explicitly confirmed the independence of judges,
binding them only to the "legal order of the state.
Many of the reforms were administrative, designed to
increase the effic'ency of the court system.
Under federalization, the Supreme Cot! t of the
Czechoslovak Socialist Republic is the Highest judicial
organ in the country. It has the lxwer of judicial
review over the Supreme Courts (established in 1970)
of the� Czech and Slovak Republics. %%hick in turn
exercise review authority over the kraj and okre. courts.
Judges of the Supreme Court of Czechoslovakia are
elected to 10 -ar terms by the Federal Assembl on
the nomination of the National Front (an "umbrella"
political mass organization encompassing all political
parties but firmly controlled by the Communists).
Members of the national supreme courts are elected,
also for 10 -year terms, by their respective National
Councils.
The regional court systems employ both professional
and lay judges who theoretically have equal status.
The constant turnover of the lay judges and their
ignorance of legal procedures have decreased the
courts' effectiveness, and the use of laymen is
declining. Professional judges are now elected by
National Councils of the Czech and Slovak Republics
oil the nomination of the National Front for 10 yrar
terms, a regime compromise with jurists who
demanded permanent appointments. Lay judges are
elected for 4 years I -y kraj or okres national
committees. Judges can he recalled or prosecuted only
by the action, or with the consent, of the organ
electing them. The Czech and Slovak ministers of
justice supervise the administrative aspects of the
regional judicial systems, Including financing and
assig Trent of clerical personnel. They also supervise
the legal training and professional examinations of
judges and determine their saki es.
The military judicial system is under federal
jurisdiction, with no direct participation by regional
Czech and Slovak judicial authorities. The
14
administration of military justice corws under the
jurisdiction of the federal Minister of National
Defense, who acts through the ministry_ 's Militar\
Courts Administration. The authorih of the regional
Czech and Slovak ministers of justice in criminal law
affecting military personnel is limited to initiating
judicial complaints. Judicial review of the military
courts is exercised by the federal Supreme Court.
"There are two levels of military courts military
district courts and "higher" military courts which
exercise jurisdiction in all criminal matters involving
members of the armed forces. "These courts consist of
both professional and lay judges who serve only while
they themselves are members of the military. The
military district and higher' courts are constituted
and dissoled by the President of the Republic.
Commanding officers exercise judicial authority in
criminal cases involving 500 korunas or less, in
accordance with the military Manual of Discipline.
The federal Prosecutor General, and under him the
two national prosecutors general, are responsible for
the "observance of the la\%, and other legal regulations
by ministries and other organs of state administration
national committees, courts, economic and other
organizations, and individual citizens." The federal
Prosecutor General is appointed and recalled by the
Federal Assembly, while the national prosecutors
general are appointed and recalled by the presidiums
of their respective National Councils. The prosecutors
general operate through subordinate regional and
district public prosecutors.
From 19417 to 19178 the application of public, civil,
and criminal law generally failed to respect the legal
rights enumerated in the 11948 and 1960 constitutions.
Criminal administrative law, in man\ cases, was
enforced directly by the secret police %%ithout even it
facade of court proceedings. Criminal cases requiring
court action also were largely determined by state
prosecutors, who gave judges orders on the basis of
police evidence. De- Stalinization� parti, ularl with
its emphasis on rectification of past "miscarriages of
justice brought some liberalization to the court
system after 1962. Party chief Novotny ordered
periodic token amnesties of political prisoners but the
judiciary remained tightly controlled by the
Communist Party until his fall in January 1968.
The liberal judiciary that briefly emerged under
Dubcck soon came under severe attack by the Husak
regime for its "inadequate protection' of the socialist
state. Because of the difficult\ of finding "qualified"
judges, the conservative retransforrnation of the
judiciary began slowly, but by mid -1970 it had
commenced in earnest. Most of the judges on the
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federal Supreme Court were removed mud politically
conservative judges were appointed to succeed them.
Under a hardline minister of justice, numerous judges
within thi Czech judiciary were replaced. Efforts have
since been made to fill hundreds of vacant judgeships,
and to speed up prosecutions, which fell behind in
1968 -69.
Husak had long publicly pledged that there would
be no return to the harsh repressive judicial practices
of the Stalinist era, and that punitive political trials
would not be held. His determination on this score,
however, was slowly whittled away by pressure from
party extremists as well as by the sometimes audacious
Political dissent by some of the ousted reformers of
1968. In 1972 a number of trials were held with many
former reformers in the clock, although they were
technically charged only with antistate political
activity since the 19(78 invasion.
The pressim-s that led to the trials also contributed
to significant and harsh amendments to the legal
codes enacted by the Federal Assembly in April 1973.
The changes affected the codes of 1961, as amended in
196-5, and put on the books some provisions which
%%ere even harsher than those of the Novotny era. For
example, military courts were given jurisdiction over
civilians in a wide range of generally ill- defined crimes
involving "state secrets." The amended codes also
virtually eliminated the hard -won rights of the defense
with respect to its participation in the investigative
pro ass and access to evidence. Moreover, the search
and- seizure powers of the police (though long
exercised in practice) were expanded and written into
law. Finally, mast criminal sentences were increased,
and provisions were made for export facto increase in
sentences already being served if the inmate refused to
cooperate. Refusal to undertake overtime work (which
may total as much as 280 hours a year) or refusal to
eat, i.e., engaging in a hunger strike, is now
punishable by as much as I year added to the inmate's
original sentence.
C. Political dynamics
Political fife in Czechoslovakia is, by virtue of
popular alienation from the regime, even more
insulated from domestic issues than is the case in
neighboring East European countries; it consists
essentially of factional party infighting, with virtually
all serious candidates for positions of authority angling
for support from the ultimate arbiter, the Soviet
Union. A leadership capable of instilling a sense of
national purpose has been conspicuously lacking since
the Soviet -led invasion in 1968 and the ouster of the
Dubcek government. Governmental instabili :v has
been aggravated by the economic problems facing the
nation. The events of the past several years have
demoralized the Czechoslovaks who, for the most part,
appear to have "given up." The popular esteem
enjoyed by the political leaders is in inverse proportion
to the degree of their commitment to Moscow, the sine
qua non for an assured future for an aspiring
politician. (U /OU)
Knowing that little can change without the
approval of Moscow, the Czechoslovak people ignore
the maneuverings of the party except inasmuch as this
results in policies that could affect the national welfare
of the population. By 1973, the Husak regime
appeared fairly secure and stable in having obtained
Soviet endorsement of its "normalization" policies,
and having gained a modicum of popular acceptance
if not support. (U /OU)
The regime, however, continues to be faced with a
paradox. While the leaders wish to engage popular
energies in support of the party's program
particularly in the economic area �thev realize that
government stability depends on the continued
political apathy of the masses. Ins'ill;ng the lost sense
of nationa! purpose thus conflicts with the regime's
sense of self preservation, a conflict that is unlikely to
be soon resolved. Meanwhile, most Czechoslovaks
now pursue material well -being as a substitute for
their repressed political impulses. (U /OU)
1. Assessment of the reform era (C)
The reform movement which brought Alexander
Dubcek to power in 1968 convulsed the Czechoslovak
Communist P� rty by reevaluating the theory and the
practice of unitary party control of the state.
Beginning in 1967 as a reaction to the inadequacies ,i
the Novotny leadership, the movement rapidly
evolved into a revolt against the traditional Soviet
model of party government citizen relations. It was
essentially a palace revolution led by senior, dedicated
Communists, and supported in differing degrees by a
wide range of party members. The thrust toward
reform then, not unexpectedly, elicited the
enthusiastic support of the citizenry as a whAe. As the
first effort by any ruling European Communist party
to question its monopoly on power, the initiative set a
precedent that, from the Soviet point of view,
threatened to trigger the dissolution of Communist
hegemony in Eastern Europe. Furthermore, the reform
era was accompanied by a maximum of fanfare and
publicity, which, with its anti-Sovi -t thrust, further
aroused the hostility of Moscow and other
conservative Communist regimes.
15
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After the experiment was abruptly checked in
August 1566 by the Soviet Union and other Warsaw
Pact nations, it became Gustav Husak's task to
reestablish the party's control over the entire
government and social structure and thus to reassure
the U.S.S.R. that r zechoslovakia no longer
constituted a threat to its domain. This Husak has
done. The Husak "counterreformation" has not,
however, been a reversion to the authoritarian style of
Novotny which held scant regard for popular needs or
desires. Husak has emerged as a "moderate" with a
new and distinct understanding of the structure and
the governing authority of the Communist Party of
Czechoslovakia. He has committed himself, insofar as
possible, to base party rule ultimately on popular
cooperation, despite the odds against this inherent in
the popular mood. By 1973, there were increasing
indications that the regime was ready, as political
conditions allow, to look anew at some of the reforms
of the 1968 era particularly in the economic
sphere �with a view to implementing them in
modified form. Yet each such hopeful sign appears
balanced by countervailing repressive moves.
Moreover, the advent of detente in Europe has
intensified this conflict between the need for economic
reinvigoration, if not reform, and the need for political
ce ;ntrol in order to counter the potentially corrosive
effect of Western influence.
To a large extent the course of the Husak regime
since 1969 has been influenced by the interplay of pro
Soviet party extremists on one end of the spectrum and
the disruptive though relatively benign political
activity of liberal dissidents on the other. Husak's
desire for political peace as a precondition for some
degree of relaxation, cautious reform arid, ultimately,
popular support has thus been inh;hited by the need to
counter both liberal dissidence mid ultraconservative
pressure for even more draconic measures. By
alternately moving against both extremes, he may
have wished to strengthen his fundamental position as
a moderate /conservative. Yet to many Czechoslovaks
he has only succeeded in appearing to yield to
conflicting pressures arid, on balance, to be
compromising his principles to Soviet desires.
It is difficut to determine how many of Husak's
"counterreforms" have been the result of Soviet
pressures and how many have resu.ted from his own
initiative. Once his "normalization" campaign had
succeeded basically the n!establishmerit of party
control domestically and reaffirmation of Czecho-
slovak allegiance to the Soviet Union �Husak u
to have been free to chart his own course so Ions as it
was consistent with Moscow's foreign ,)olio%
16
objectives. Close Soviet supervision continues, and all
important issues, such as economic planning, have
stayed closely in step wit'. ;,oviet purposes. By early
1973, however, Moscow was clearly content to let
Husak deal with his own domestic problems and
endorsed his assertion that the p ocess of "normal-
ization" had omen completed.
Gustav Husak (Figure 7) has unquestionably put his
personal stamp on Czechoslovakia. He is highly
intelligent and dynamic, and effectively holds the
reins of power. He is the first intellectual since Lenin
to head a ruling European Communist party. His
reputation as a competent political tactician stems
larger from his role in establishing the Slovak state.
An ardent Slovak nationalist, he was prominent in the
anti -Nazi Slovak uprising in 1944, and emerged from
the war a major Slovak political figure. Husak became
embroiled in the power struggle following the
Communist coup in 1948 that ushered in Czecho-
slovakia's Stalinist era. Accused of "bourgeois
nationalism," he was expelled from the party; in 1954
he was tried on trumped -up charges of treason,
sabotage, and espionage, and was sentenced to life
imprisonment. He was released in 1960, but avoided
becoming politically active in the Novotny regime, for
which he held no sympathy. Although he apparently
played a minor role in the 1967 drive to unseat
Novotny, he was picked up by Dubcek in early 1968 to
mastermind the Slovak drive for federalization.
During the first two decades of Communist rule,
Husak refined a sense of political "realism" which, by
his own evaluation, governs his formulation of current
policies. His dealings with both the Germans and the
Soviets during the war years, his political caution
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FIGURE 7. General Secretary of
the Czechoslovak Communist Party
Gustav Husak (C)

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during the waning years of th^ Novotny regime and
during the reform era, his reversal on the issue of
federalization, and his cooperative attitude toward the
Soviet Union all indicate an ability to weigh carefully
the pros and cons of a given course of action.
Influenced no doubt by his own long incarceration,
Husak also seems to have little stomach for oppression
and terror despite a willingness to use harsh measures
in order to avoid being exposed to political pressure by
the ultraconservative elements in the party. His
interest in fedcrali7ation also indicated a willingness to
treat with moderation traditionally trouFlesome
problems such as Czech Slovak rivalries and the
church, as long as neither threatened to undermine
Comp..unist control.
Husak's success in his attempt !o pursue course
somewhat akin to the reformist but politically correct
program of Hungarian party leader Kadar is by no
means assured. Husak is caught in the crossfhe
between those who still fear and wish to suppress
everything reminiscent of the 1968 reform era, and
those advocates of reform who will accept )nh� a
wholesale reviv; of the Dubeek program. In between
are those elements which, like Husak himself, see that
nothing can come of such continual snipinj, proclaim
1968 to be "history." and ardently wish that moderate
forward movement would replace the stagnant
hostility which has to a large extent sapped the energy
of the regime and maintained the wide gulf between it
and the people. There were signs in 19 that this
might, be accomplished, but these signs were still
inconclusive.
2. The Communist regime (C)
a. Background
The introduction of Communist rule in Czecho-
slovakia in February 1948 effectively terminated the
popular democratic parliamentary form of govern-
ment which had first been introduced in 1918. Non
Communist political parties were either disbanded, or
merged with or reduced to mere puppets of the ruling
Czechoslovak Communist Party (KSC).
The Communist Party, four puppet parties, and
various mass organizations were molded into a unified
mass organiza! ion, the National Front, dominated by
the Communists, which presented a single list -,f
approved candidates at election time. While givia.,g
some attention to the maintenance of a democratic
facade, the Communist Party influenced all facets of
national and social life, much on the pattern of its
prototype in the U.S.S.R. Gradually the party became
the dominant force through coercion and terror, which
reached its zenith during the bloody anti- Titoist trials
in the late 1940's and early 1950's. The regime at the
same time moved quietly to tighten its grip on the
educational institutions, the church, and the
information media.
Virtually all outlets of cultural and political
expression eventually came under Communist control.
Trade unions became a mere transmission belt for the
imposition of labor discipline and the party's
economic directives. In order to facilitate indoctrina-
tion and control of the population, the Communists
created such mass organizations as the Communist
Youth Union and various athletic, and friendship
societies. Although choice was permitted theoretically,
membership in these organizations was, for the most
part, compulsory.
From 1953, when Antonin Novotny become Party
First Secretary, until 1960, the Czechoslovak regime
was one of the most stable in Eastern Europe. After
Stalin's death in 1953, the regime successfully
suppressed pressures toward liberalization. Unlike its
Polish and Hungarian counterparts, the Novotny
regime maintained a tight grip on the country and was
able to prevent the serious unrest which broke out in
neighboring Communist states. Although there were
forces in Czechoslovak society that retained some
vitality during the years of repression, they were
devoid of the massive popular support which
elsewhere in the Soviet orbit was successfully pressing
indigenous regimes toward varying degrees of de-
Stalinb: ation.
It was not until the 12th Partv Congress in
December 1962 that reform ele,nent,. in the Party
Central Committee, possibly with veiled Soviet
support, gained enough influence to push through a
resolution favoring, at least some tents ive steps toward
liberalization. The iegime began this campaign by
calling for a review of the purge trials and executions
of Communists between 1949 and 1954.
At about the same time that the party began to
loosen its grip somewhat, the once prosperous
Czechoslovak economy, damaged by misdirected
Communist management in the 1950's, began to
decline precipitously. In !963 shortages and industrial
stagnation triggered widespread popular discontent.
Criticism of the economy led to a wider call for reform.
Debates on virtually --very aspect of the party's
political and social policy became commonplace, avd
an overall deterioration in party discipline ensued.
Growing dissatisfaction among other sectors of the
society contributed to the malaise. The intellectuals
emulating their counterparts in Poland apd Hungary
in the mid- 1950's �were particularly active in pushing
17
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for an easing of restrictions on creativity in many
aspects of the intellectual and cu!tural life of the
Ration. The Slovaks commenced a hold drive to regain
some degree of autonomy and to rectify past injustices
perpetrated b% the central government. Stimulated to
greater efforts. the liberal faction among the
Communist began to exercise genuine influence in
part% affairs.
In manv instances, the demands of the Czech and
Slovak party liberals initial!% coincided. In time,
however. traditional Czech- S!ovak animosities
reemerged as a crucial problem, and combined with a
growing popular awareness and involvement to add to
the instability. By late 196:3, Novotnv himself
appeared in danger of being toppled.
By carp� 1964, however, Novotny seemed to have
decided on tactics that would enable him to restore
oiler and reconsolidate his power. One significant
comp. was his decision in 1966 to bring into the
part% it aurnber of younger, more liberal members to
offset the influence of the dogmatists who were
hindering economic reforms. The newcomers, who
comprised half of the Central Committee, quickly
became discouraged with Novotny's dilatory
approach toward reform and consid-vred him an
impediment to meaningful liberalization. The
intensification of differences between the liberals and
conservatives in the p- ity became so acute that by
mid- 1967 a stalemate in Icaders!1j) resulted. A number
of serious problems, notably the continuing decline in
the economic growth rate, could no longer he
conceded or rationalized.
The regime's problems were significantly height-
ened by its inability to cmmtrol or to achieve rapport
with the intellectual community. Czechoslovak youth
also contributed to the pressures for change and
became it force which the regime could not ignore.
During demonstrations in October and November
1967 protesting poor living coi ditions in their Prague
dormitories, students were badly mishandled by the
police. "Phis, and a number of other political
misadventures in which the regime was culpable,
served to magnify intraparty confusion.
When the Central Committee met in it plenary
session in October 1967, Novotny 's position was in
serious jeopardy. Encouraged by his apparent
vulnerability, Slovak leaders launched it Iwid and
personal attack against him, suggesting that it was
time for collective leadership and that the next
President ought to be it Slovak. Novotnv w ;s able to
postpone discussion of the leadership question until
December, but throughout the period he continued to
lose support at all levels of the party.
IK
Soviet apprehensions a6ont events in Czecho-
slovakia became apparent in the final weeks of 1967.
Sw.eral delegations from the U.S.S.R. visited Prague in
late November and earl% December to sign bilateral
agreements and to assess the state of the economy and
the extent of unrest among intellectuals and youth
Soviet park chief Brezhncv, at the urging of Novotny
and the Soviet Ambassador to Czechoslovakia, made a
sudden visit to Prague on 8-9 December it, discuss the
situation in the party leadership, but reportedly
refused to he drawn into the quarrel on the ground
that it was an internal matter. Although the Soviets
had preyiousl sought in various ways to holster
Novotny's position, it was obvious that Brezhncv, at
this point, was more interested in stability than in
Novotny "s personal fortunes. Regardless of the
circumspect role played by Brezhncv, many
Czechoslovaks resented his presence and regarded it as
unwarranted interference in Czechoslovak affairs.
The Central Committee met in it healed but
inconclusive session between 19 and 21 December,
during which Novotny attempted to intimidate his
adversaries by threatening to use the army against
them. Some of Novotny's close associates attempted a
military coup %%hich was foiled by an alert general.
When the Central Committee sessions were resumed
in January, Novotny was ousted as the Party First
Secretary and was replaced by Dubcek. Novotny still
retained the Presidency, however, as well as his seat on
the Party Central Committee and its Presidium.
After it succession of political setbacks, the fate of
the Novotny regime was scaled in February 1968,
when Czechoslovak Army General Jan Sejna defected
to the United States. Because of Sejna's close relations
with Novotny, the defection caused a sensation and
led to allegations of Scjna's corruption and
participation in military coup plotting on Novotn%'s
behalf. 'There were widespread demands from wit: ;in
the party for Novotny retirement from political life.
Novotny refused to step down despite Dubeck's
urging, but in March was forced from the Presidency
and the Part% Presidium.
h. The Duheek era
Alexander Dubcek (Figure S) and his colleagues
rapidly attained popularity once they had launched
their comprehensive reform program in April 1968.
"r'his Action Program clearly designed to
synthesize communism with basic democratic
principles and promised profound changes in virtually
every sector of Czechoslovak society. To many
Czechoslovak Communists whose naive idealism was
dashed by the gars of Stalinist oppression, Dubcek
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symbolized that synthesis of socialism and humanism
which many of them erroneously believed would
ensue after the 1948 coup. In one sense, therefore,
1968 seemed to wipe clean the Stalinist slate and begin
anew. This factor contributed to the tremendous
release of political energy that characterized the
Dubcek era.
Despite inadequate time for thorough preparation
and a bitter hchind- the scenes struggle waged by the
conservatives, the Action Program was well underway
by early summer of 1968. In quickly freeing the mass
media and making substantial personnel changes in
government and party organs, the program
strengthened Dubeek's popular and party position.
His appointments were designed to appeal to the
I.ro: idest possible range of the party membership and
impeilalion. He concentrated on replacing the old
guard conservative ideologists with younger technical
experts anxious to implement sweeping economic and
political reforms. Dubcek also sought to strengthen the
representation of particular interest groups such as
farmers, intellectuals, and national minorities.
Inevitably, frictiow, between interest groups
emerged. Conservatives, both inside and outside the
party, opposed Dubeek's changes for ideological
reasons and for fear of losing their positions.
Progressives began to urge immediate and more
sweeping reform measures. Czechs and Slovaks
engaged in a debate over the steps required to
federalize the government structure and the varying
interpretations of the idea of "equality."
But once the Soviet Union in the summer of 1968
intensified its pressure on Dubcek to modify his reform
program. competing interest groups began to unify
around the leadership on the basis of patriotism. As
the pressures increased, popular attitudes became
inereasingh hostile toward the Soviet Union and
forged a strung lxwnd between the liberal party leaders
and the people. Dubcek, President Svoboda, and other
leaders became national heroes after standing up to
the Soviets during the confrontation between the
Czechoslovak Part Presidium and the Soviet Party
Politburo in July 1968 at Cierna nad Tisou" near the
Soviet border. A subsequent meeting between
Czechoslovak and Soviet leaders in Bratislava seemed
publicly amiable, but in fact may have represented
Dubeck's last chance to moderate his course.
Dubcek either failed to recognize or ignored the
warnings. In response, the Soviet leadership, already
distrustful of Dubxek's reforms and fearful that they
would eventually lead to Czechoslovakia's withdrawal
from the socialist camp, disrupt the political and
economic unity of the Warsaw Pact nations. and
infect the other Fast European countries and the
U.S.S.R. itself, ordered Soviet troops and Warsay. Pact
forces from Hungary, Poland, East Cennany, and
Bulgaria into Czechoslovakia on the night 20 -21
August 1968 (Figure 9).
The ability of the Dubcek leadership to remain in
power for some 8 months after the entry of Soviet
troops can be attributed to the unprecedented wave of
national unity that the invasion precipitated. It even
prupell-d a number of prominent conservatives, who
opposed the reform program, into the Dubcek camp.
The immediate aim of the Soviet Union was political
stability and, after failing to install a pupp ^t regime,
the Soviets realized that if the Czechoslovak
leadership were deposed by force, the csult might be
open rebellion. The Soviet leaders decided to let the
Dubcek regime remain in power but at the expense of
the reform programs which were to be drastically
curtailed. Moscow reasoned that Dubcek could
eventually be reduced to a puppet or his popular
support could be eroded to the point where he could
be removed without creating a stir.
The ground swell of public support for the
government eng0ed the Dubcek leadership initially to
weather enormous Soviet pressures, including the
infamous "inquisition" of Dubcek, Premier Cernik,
and others in Moscow from 23 to 26 August, which
included physical maltreatmert, as well as threats of
'For the diacritics on place names, see the list of names on the
apron of the Summary Map and the map itself in the Countr%
Profile chapter.
19
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FIGURE 8. Alexander Dubcek --the happy
face of socialism, 1968 May Day
parade IU /0111

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FtiURE 9. Soviet -led invasion of Czechoslovakia, August 1968 (C)
dismemberment of the republic and the establishmer:t
of an occupation government. The Soviets in the
ensuing months, not totally insensitive to world
criticism and reluctant to engage in full -scale
repression, were vulnerable to political blackmail on
the part of the Czechoslovak population itself. Anti
Soviet demonstrations in October and November
0ireatened to bur.:t into full -scale rictiny, and in late
December over i million workers threatened
nationwide demonstrations and strikes if any of the
tots reformist leaders were ousted from their posts.
With such critical political issues at stake, however,
the Czechoslovak leadership inevitably divided again
over what courses of action to t -ke. Dubeek came
under fire from many of his liberal supporters who
claimed he was going too far in satisfying Soviet
den ands, which were spelled out in the "Moscow
protocol" of October 1968. Moderates joined the
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liberals who attacked him for bowing to Soviet desires.
Both telt that he was permitting the conservatives to
enhance their politics positions. Thy.� conservatives,
for their part, pressed Dubcek to move faster to satisfy
Soviet demands. Rivalry between Czech and Slovak
leaders sharpened over the it uninent implementation
of the federalization program, with the Czechs fearful
of losing their traditional prerogatives and the Slovaks
complaining that they would still be dominat( d by the
more numerous Czechs on the basis of "majority
rule."
Czechoslovak leaders also disagreed over the status
of- forc-,s agreement which they felt constrained to sign
with the Soviets in October in Prague. Although the
pact called for the removal of the busk of the Soviet
occupation troops by mid- December 1968 �an actual
reduction to about 60,000 �it also gav� a semblance
of legality to the "tempori ry" stationing of Soviet
troops in the country. In sum, the Soviet hope to erode
Dubeek's popular support seemed to be working.
By late December, the Dubcek leadership had
begun to lose some of its drive as a result of indecision
and the competing demands of the various factions.
The liberals were attempting to save the remnants of
the reform program while the "realists" or the centrists
were trying to reconcile the demands of the population
With those of the Soviet Union. The pro Soviet
conservatives, meanwhile, were seeking to develop an
opposition bloc in the Central Committee as a
springboard to power. At the same time, Soviet
officials were making a concerted effort to expand
their contacts with Czechoslovaks at all levels of the
party and government, hoping to persuade middle
and lower level officials to support the conservative
cause. Dubeek's political position had rapidly
deteriorated by early 1%9, enabling the Soviets to seek
out a more amenable successor. In April of that year
Dubcek was forced to step aside in favor of Gustav
Husak.
c. Husak and the return to normalcy
Gustav Husak's rise to power began with his
assignment, in April 1968, to lead the Slovak fight for
federalization. Th, campaign led to heated (Imputes
with the Czech leaders and, although the Slovaks
seemed headed for defeat on the issue, Husak
reemerged as an influential national political figure.
Husak made his mark with the Soviets immediately
following the invasion. Fir was a member of President
Svoboda's delegation to Nloscow to negotiate the
release of Dubcek and the other leaders who had been
taken prisoner. During the talks, Husak argued
cogently and forcefully; he apparently impressed his
Soviet counterparts who began a dialog with him that
has continued to the present.
Husak had also established a record acceptable to
the Soviets and most of his party colleagues on the
reform programs. While he championed federalization
and many of the "democratic" reforms that went with
it, he had been critical of several "incorrect views"
incorporated in the Action Program.
Husak's increasing influence at home won him
election to the Presidium and Central Committee of
the Czechoslovak Communist Party during the
"illegal" 14th Party Congress conducted secretly in
the shadow of Soviet guns on 22 August. Following his
return to Czechoslovakia from Moscow, Husak
dominated the "extraordinary" Slovak Party Congress
26 -29 August and was elected First Secretary_ of the
Slovak Communist Party.
Shortly thereafter Husak delineated his policy of
"realism" and became the foremost spokesman for
"normalization" �broad compliance with Moscow's
demands �as the only possible course in the face of
military occupation and the threat of violent
repression. Husak's apparent transformation from a
nationalist to an uncompromising supporter of
"normalization" appears to have been entirely
pragmatic. His stress on the bilateral character of the
Moscow Agreement suggests that he believed the
Soviets would make no significant concessions to
Prague until their demands had been met.
The strong leadership exercised by Husak in the
aftermath of the invasion Dubcek appears to have
relied heavily on him �and his dialog with numerous
Russian visitors led to widespread speculation as early
As September 1968 that he was being groomed as
Dubeek's successor. Gradually, Husak achieved
greater prominence while Dubcek fad into the
background. The anti- Soviet rioting triggered by
Czechoslovakia's ice hockey victory over the Soviet
Union in March 1969 embroiled the Czechoslovak
leadership in its most serious crisis !after the invasion.
The Russians apparently demanded Dubcek's ouster
and the installation of new leaders who could exercise
effective control over the population. Husak was
instrumental in organizing a new regime whose
members were more acceptable to the Soviets. Husak
was subsequently nominated for the post of party chief
by Dubcek, and he received the overwhelming
support �often for conflicting reasons �of the
members of the Central Committee on 17 April 1969.
Moscow's role in Husak's ascendancy is not entirelv
clear, but the Soviet leaders appear to have accepted
him on the basis of his strength in Prague and their
21
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belief that his Slovak "nationalism" and his
authoritarianism would work to their advantage. The
Russians may also have believed that, if necessary, it
would he it relatively simple matter to replace the
cautious and pragmatic Ilusak who did not command
the intense loyalty and support of most Czechoslovaks.
Husak wits immediately prPoecupiedi with
establishing his own authority in the party, it delicate
task in view of the hitter conflict between the liberal,
centrist, and conservative factions. A struggle soon
began between Husak and part conservatives for
control. There were substantial numbers of
conservatives in the part hierarch v, including
Luhomir Strougal, Vasil Bilak, and Alois Indra who,
although opposed to the course the M'S reform
program had taken and to a large degree victimized by
it, were able to retain a precarious hold on their
positions until the invasion. Subsequently supported
by the Soviets, who were anxiously seeking it nd�w
Czechoslovak leadership, the conservatives gained a
new lease on life. Immediately following Husak's
ascendancy, conservative leaders began voicing
opposition to Husak's relatively restrained policies.
It was clear from Ilusak's speeches that he held little
sympathy for many of the conservatives' demands,
such as it wholesale purge of the party and political
trials. Ilis tenuous domestic position, however, and his
need to convince the Soviets that he was the proper
nian to head the country's "normalization" program
depended on it ntodicurn of conservative support. To
hold conservative criticism to it minimum he was
forced to grant them numerous concessions. Many of
Dubcek's reforms were slowed or reversed. Increasing
numbers of conservative and dogmatic hardliners
began finding their way into important part and
government positions. The press emerged as it
battleground between Husak supporters and the
dogmatists over key issues, such as how energetically
to purge the Duhcek reformers.
As the first anniversary of the Soviet invasion
approached, however, it became clear that a major
lest of Husak's ability to maintain domestic stability
was approaching. Antiregime and anti- Soviet
incidents increased, generating a volatile atmosphere
in the country. Moscow manifested considerable
uneasiness over the situation, and made thinly veiled
threats of military intervention if Czechoslovak
security forces were unable to maintain order. 'rhe
Soviets' failure openly to support Husak heightened
popular fears that they were seeking a more repressi%v
regime. Continuing economic difficulties, highlighted
by worsening morale in the factories, contributed to
the general nalaise.
.1 a
Large -scale demonstrations occurred following the
first atumve.sary of the invasion. The regime prevented
extensity, violence, however, b- tight security measures
.which included emergency security legislation,
massive preventive arrests, and, occasionally, brutal
police tactics. H usak's willingness to use force earned
him much needed Soviet approval, conveyed through
an appreciative Soviet press and a belated Order of
Lenin award for his wartime efforts in Slovakia.
Nevertheless, the demonstrations were embarrassing
to the regime and it left Husak little choice but to
launch it nationwide purge of liberals, which he had
previously eschewed. During it Central Committee
plenum in September, Husak announced that the
purge would affect the party, government, and social
organizations with emphasis on local party
organizations. He stopped short of justifying the
invasion despite the urgings of the conservatives, but
his remarks pleased Moscow, because they were it
quantum leap from his previous ambivalence. It was
at tl,e September plenum that Dubeek lost his
remaining official positions in the Party Presidium and
his chairmanship of the Federal Assembly.
The Czechoslovak Central Committee plenum
scheduled for January 190 was expected to he a major
test for Husak in the leadership struggle. After it was
over, however, in terms of personnel appointments
and party policies, it was clear that neither Husak nor
the cons rvatives could achieve more than it standoff.
Within the top party organs, Husak clearly held his
own. The three remaining liberals in the Presidium,
Oldrich Cernik, Karel Polacek, and Stefan Sadiovsky,
were removed. as was expected. Whatever ground
Husak may have been compelled to yield as a result of
these appointments was more than regained by the
transfer of Luhomir Strougal from Czech party boss to
federal Premier, thus removing Strougal from his
political base in the part. In addition, Husak named
moderates to head the Czech and Slovak party
organizations, respectively.
Perhaps the most threatening development at the
January plenum was the appointment of a
predominantly hardline commission to implement the
part membership card exchange program. This
progran was designed to purge the party membership
of liberals hut, if carried to the extremes the hardliners
were demanding, threatened to erode Htsak's
support.
The dogmatists, motivated in part by the Soviets,
sought a drastically reduced membership, leaving it
small, highly centralized and disciplined elite to rule
without the encumbrances of an unwieldy party
structure and membership. Some of 'hem demanded
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the ouster of all who had any com.,,etion with the
Dubcek regime or who had objected to the Soviet
invasion. Willingness to approve of the invasion
became the touchstone of a member's "reliability."
As the purge progressed, it became clear that the
dogmatists would be unable to prevail. Most of the
local party commissions conducting the reliability
interviews refused to utilize the heavily slant.d criteria
presented by the hardline commissioners in Prague. In
some instances, the interviews turned into fiascos, with
more aggressive party members either refusing to
cooperate or launching counterattacks on the
commission member.. Many members simply resigned
in disgust, while othea., cajoled their interviewers into
renewing party cards.
The result of the purge was a decided victory for
Husak. Some 300.000 party members were ousted
which, in addition to the 200,000 believed to have
resigned prior to the purge, left a membership of about
1,200,000. The bulk of those removed were liberals
who had supported the Dubcek reform program and
who had refused to recant their sins and follow the
new party line. The intellectual group was the hardest
hit by the purge, followed by officials of the central
government, especially those in positions that called
for dealing with foreigners, because such posts were
now judged to be "sensitive."
By the summer of 1970 Husak evidenced a growing
confidence in his ability to head off conservative
pressures and to guide the part% as he saw fit. The
party simultaneously published !t preliminary
interpretation of Dubcek's role in the reform
movement, describing him not as the principal villain
behind the liberalization process but ay the dupe of
"antisocialist forces." Dubcek's tenure was depicted as
an aberration, brought on by Lzq overemphasis in late
1967 on party unity when the ;:e exercise of Leninist
criteria would have resulted in the selection of a more
qualified and foreciul man. Party spokesmen,
nevertheless, have consistently defended Novotnv's
removal as a legitimate move toward correcting the
numerous problems that faced the country.
This theme was developed further in December
1970 when the Central Committee approved the
regime's official definition of the "lessons to be
learned from the Dubcek and late Novotny periods.
The document, published in early 1971, is intended to
serve as a model and warning to other Communist
regimes faced with potential reformist pressures.
"Full title Lessons Drawn from the Crisis Development in the
Party and Society after the 13th Congress of the Communist Party
of Czechoslovakia.
The u:.ev.mtful second anniversary of the invasion
in August 1970 was touted by the regime as proof that
"normalization" had been a success, and Husak
seemed to be confident enough of his own position to
call for convocation in May 1971 of the long delayed
Party C-ngress.
The 14th Congress of the Czechoslovak Communist
Party, held in Prague on 25-29 May, formally marked
the end of one phase of Czechoslovak history and the
beginning of another. The congress outwardly held
out little hope for early relaxation, moderation, and
national reconciliation. There was in fact little solace
to be gleaned from congress proceedings for purged
Communist reformers and the non Communist
popt�' :lion. Several changes i the amended party
statutes (such as the abolition of the Czech Party
Bureau) had the effect of eroding still further what
little remained of federalization and of tying the
Czechoslovak party closer to its Soviet model. The
overall effect of the amendments, moreover,
strengthened central party control and discipiine over
the membership.
The Soviet rationale for the invasion �an act of
"selfless international assistance" intended to save
socialism in Czechoslovakia and carried out in
response to the "appeals" of leading Czechoslovak
party -state officials �was enshrined as party dogma.
Husak, who is on record as initially opposing the
invasion, expressed his gratitude and thanked
Brezhnev for his role in it. Husak's reversal, dictated
apparently by politicvl expediency, merely contrib-
uted to the atmosphere at the congress, which glorified
all thiags Soviet. The few personnel changes that took
place in the party hierarchy seemingly strengthened
the pro Soviet, hardline cast of the Presidium �at the
expense of the more moderate position generally
associated with Husak.
On balance, the congress stressed the collective
character of party authority and underscored the fact
that Husak would continue to pay for his preeminence
with fundamental compromises wish his conservative
colleagues. Although a show of cohesiveness and unity
was apparent factionalism was in fact formally
proscribed by fiat �Husak was not permitted by the
Soviets to have a leadership constellation of his own
choosing even if he were otherwise able to do so.
Since the congress Husak has secured his position
both with the Soviets and his internal critics. He
obtained wholesale endorsement of his course �and
the Order of Lenin- -from Brezhnev when the latter
visited Prague in February 1973, the 25th anniversary
of the :.ommunist coup. internally, his position as first
among equals is unchallenged, although it apparently
23
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serves Soviet purposes to maintain a potential for
criticism by prexy. In short, while Husak seems secure
from attack by the hardliners, he has not been allowed
to remove them from the leadership.
Vasil Bilak, who was accused of collaboration in
August 1968, has long been regarded as a Soviet
favorite and a man posing the most easily discernible
threat to Husak. Bila!, is a member of the Presidium
and is the Party Secretary in charge of international
-lations, although there have been reports that he
has, perhaps coincident to the transfer of India to the
largely ceremonial position of head of parliament,
assumed a greater role in the formulation of domestic
policies In late February 1972 rumors circulated in
Prague that Husak had mrde a secret trip to Moscow
to complain about Bilak's domestic activities and that
Bilak, in turn, was summoned by Brezhnev for
disciplining. On 19 April Bilak publicly disclaimed
any differences between himself and Husak and gave
high praise to the party leader, lending credibility to
the rumors. In view of Husak's reputation as a master
tactician and of the acrimony which has existed
between the two men for years, Husak can be expected
to keep a particularly close watch over Bilak's
activities.
It is generally conceded, even by Husak's bitter
critics, that in intellect and ability Lc f_-. exceeds other
members of the Czechoslovak leadership. He appears
thus far to have prevented anv single Czechoslovak
leader from seriously challenging his position. While
there have been rumors of ultraconservative plots to
unseat him, the Soviets �who retain the final say on
who Should rule in Czechoslovakia �would hardly
permit his ouster at this time, if only because they
would not want a leadership struggle in Prague which
could affect Soviet policies of detente. Husak has
given Brezhnev a stable, if sullen, Czechoslovakia,
which has in many respects resumed its role of "model
satellite." Should Husak falter or become a liabilitv,
however, Moscow would undoubtedly replace him.
3. Communist Party organization and member-
ship (S)
As part of its goal of democratization, the Dubeek
regime in 1968 launched a comprehensive review of
the organization, structure, and delegation of
responsibilities among the organs of the Czechoslovak
Communist Party (KSC). The most important of the
pending changes was the division of the party into two
separate but equal components: the Czech Com-
munist Partv and the Slovak Communist Party. This
division was to have paralleled the federalization of
the government. Few of the proposed party reforms
24
survived the invasion, however, and today federaliza-
tion of the party is a dead letter.
The basic rules governing the organization of the
party in 1913, together with its functions and
membership requirements, are contained in the party
statutes adopted at the 14th Party Congress in May
1971. Among the statutory changes introduced at the
14th Congress was the change in name for the top
party position from First Secretary to Secretary
General, and the lengthened interval between
congresses from 4 to i years. In both instances the KSC
clearly followed the Soviet model.
Like other Communist parties, the KSC is
theoretically guided by the principle of democratic
centralism. The main theoretical elements of
democratic centralism include election of all party
leaders, strict party discipline, the accountability of
higher party bodies to lower bodies, the indisputable
and compulsory nature of decisions once made, and
the subjer�tion of the minority to the majority.
Husak has clearly concentrated political power in
the KSC top leadership. Nevertheless, the repeated
turnover of personnel and changes in policy since 1968
have left unclear important aspects of its day -to -day
management and working relationships among the
top leaders and party organs. Husak clearly dominates
policymaking, but it is difficult to assess the degree of
support he enjoys among the hierarchy or the extent to
which he has delegated administrative responsibilities
to his colleagues in the Secretariat and Presidium. The
public image of party unity that KSC leaders evinced
during the 14th Party Congress does not hide the fact
that now dormant ideological and personal differences
could have a significant effect on party administra-
tion
Subordinate to the national party is the Communist
Party of Slovakia (KSS) which serves as a transmission
belt for promulgating directives of the KSC
throughout the respective regional, district, and' local
party organs in Slovakia. The Central Committee
Bureau for the conduct of party work in the Czech
Lands (Czech party bureau), established in November
1968 as a stopgap measure pending the outcome of
party federalization plans, was dropped at the 14th
Party Congress. The organizationa; hierarchy of the
Communist party system in Czechoslovakia is shown
in Figure 10.
a. Central organs
The KSC Party Congress, which now convenes
every .5 years, is in theory the supreme organ of the
party. In practice, however, t!ie congress has merely
served to ratify the policies fixed by the top leadership.
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hold plenary sessions at least once every 4 months and
to report on its work to the lower party organs. In
exercising party supervision of government programs
the Central Committee operates through It
departments:
Agriculture
Economy
Education, Science, and Culture
Elected State Organizations
Ideology
Industry, Transportation, and Communir--ions
Internal Affairs
Organization and Politics
Pan, Radio, and Television
Social Organizations
State Administration
As a collective body, the congress elects the Central
Committee, hears the reports from the various party
committees, and reaffirms general party policy. An
extraordinary congress may be called by a vote of one
third of the members of 'he Central Committee.
The Central Committee has the assigned task of
directing the work of the party between congresses and
of organizing aid supervisi:ig the executive agencies of
the KSC, including its own 11 administrative
departments. It promulgates directives on the
implementation of party policies. It also appoints
chief editors of the party's central press and maintains
central funds. The Central Committee is comprised
primarily of technicians and "apparatchiki" (plant
managers, party functionaries, and bureaucrats). The
size of the Central Committee varies, often reflecting
the needs and policies of the party leadership. The
14th Party Congress elected 115 members and 45
candidate members. Candidate members normally
attend plenary sessions but do not have the right to
vote. Party statutes require the Central Committee to
The ruling body of the KSC is the Presidium, a
group of 11 members and 2 nonvoting candidate
members who determine the policies and tactics of the
party. The Presidium exercises authority over the
Central Committee, which formally eiects" it. In
actuality, the composition of the Presidium is
determined by the Party General Secretary, or, as in
more recent years, by the Presidium itself. The
Presidium is not enjoined to report its activities to any
other party or slate body, including the Cenral
Committee. Moreover, there is no direct electoral
relationship, even t'ieoretically, between the rank
and -file and the Presidium.
The Secretariat is the administrative arm of the
Presidium and the only other party body with
considerable authority. Its activity, however, is
restricted to the implementation of policies and is
subject to review by the Presidium. Nevertheless, its
powers, which embrace the direction of day -to -day
party work in all spheres, are very extensive. The
leadership of the KSC as of IM is shown in Figure 11.
The Secretariat is headed by the Party Genc(LI
Secretary, who presides over and directs th, woik of
the six additional secretaries and two other members of
the Secretariat. Collectively, they supervise the work
of the secretaries on the lower party levels. Separately,
they keep a careful check on the activities and
attitudes of government and public agencies operating
in their assigned fields of interest.
Under Novotny, the predominant force in the party
leadership was a handful of doctrinaire party
politicians, who were primarily specialists interested in
gaining and wielding power rather than in developing
expertise it functiewil areas such as government,
international relations, or economics. This model was
abruptly abolished by Dubcek who installed leaders
with technical qualifications to cope with the
country's major economic and social problems. The
25
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FIGURE 10. Organization of the Czedaslovak Corn
munist Party apparatus (C)

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leadership thit has developed under Husak is basically
a combination of politically influential conservatives
and more moderate men that agree with most of
Ilusak's policies. A majority of the members of the
Secretariat and Presidium may still be considered
technical experts and administrators, however,
suggesting that Husak continues to stress technical
competence and part expertise over pure power
Politics.
b. Regional and local levels
In 1968 the party organization in the Czech lands
secs divided into five Bohemian regions, two
Moravian regions, and a Prague city region. To the
existing three Slovak regions wits added tnc Bratislava
city region.
26
The evolution of party administration on the
intermediate level has paralleled that of the national
level. Thus, just as the Party Congress is the
representative body of the national party, conferences
of the regional, district, and basic party organs serve
their respective levels. Similarly, regional and local
committees and secretariats serve as counterparts to
the national Central Committee and Secretariat. All
organizations are responsible to the party's central
apparatus, in consonance with the princip !c of
democratic centralism. The lowest level of tF.e party is
referred to as the basic party organization, ,which has a
minimum of five inembers but otherwise varies widely
in size. In 1973 there were over 30,000 such basic p:,rt
organizations.
The basic part. organization, which is found in
schools, industry, agriculture, the armed forces, and
the government apparatus, has a number of functions.
It disseminates propaganda and promotes organiza-
tional work with the people and the local press for
fulfillment of part resolutions, and mobilizes workers
and employees in factories and offices to prevent
waste, fulfill economic plans, and strengthen state and
local discipline.
c. Membership
The Czechoslovak Communist Part, unlike most
other Eastern European parties, has traditionally been
it "mass" party, designed to incorporate repre-
sentatives of all age groups and major segments of
Czechoslovak society. Having been legal prior to
World War 11, the part had it core of several hundred
thousand upon which to build following the end of
Nazi rule in the country. Because of the KSC's
traditional legitimacy and its anti -Nazi record, the
membership rose sharply following the war. When the
Communists came to power in 1948, the membership
soared to 2.3 million, 19%% of the total population of
the country. Party membership has since fluctuated
clue to periodic purges ant; membership drives, but it
has remained the largest in proportion to the
population of all ruling Communist parties, including
that of the U.S.S.R. In 1962 the leadership decided to
hold party rolls to about 1.3 million, or approximately
one out of every six adults. By 1968, when
liberalization of the party was well along, the
membership had swelled to nearly 1.7 million, where
it remained until the fall of Dubeek.
Following the 1968 invasion, some 200,000
members mostly disaffected intellectuals and
youth resigned from the part; added to this loss are
some 300,000 who were dropped in the 1970 purge.
The membership in 1971 was approximately 1.2
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FIGURE 11. leadership of the Comnwnist Party (C)

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tnillian, the lowest figure since 1918. In %lay 1973 this
figure grew to only 1.2:5 million, despite the fact that
more than 920X) new candidates were admitted. ['his
indicates that the net gain in part nu
(hiring the 1971 -',3 period was almost matched b% the
nunnber of purged, resigned, or otherwise dropped
members.
Metnberhip is technically open to all citizens over
IS years of age. Under Novotny, membership was
dependent upon numernus qualitative rcyuirements
regarding each applicants social background and
political vie%ys. As it result, the rank and file have
normally been conservative in outlook and, until the
late 1960'x, disinclined to regard the party as it vehicle
for social or political innovation. The average age is
high, clue to the large numbers who join(-([
inunediate1% after 11'orld War 11. Many members have
joined (it(- party for oppo,rhmistic reasons personal or
professional ambition, desire for political protection,
travel abroad, or even professional survival. In 1971
candidate membership, in effect it 2 -year probationary
period, was established to enable the regime to screen
its members more carefully.
Belo%% the top levels, the hSC membership has
never displayed marked ideological fervor. Except for
the period of Nazi occupation, the party has been a
legal political movement; it enjoyed a measure of
success in free electoral competition with other parties,
having at time during the interwar period polled as
much as Wr of the. total �.ote.
Most of the party members who survived the purge
hay(- not proved to be the militant "vanguard' of
soci(-t that the regine sought. %%hatever loyalt to
the nesv regine the hulk of the rank and file has
developed has been diluted by the post -1968
organizational disnnptions that seriously affected the
party local effectiyene-,.
In view of these disruptions, data on the social
composition of the part are sparse. In 1971 workers
constituted only ?:iii of the rembership, and another
20'1 consisted of retired people. The average age of
the membership in 1971 was -19 years, it slight increase
over the previous year. In mi(I-197 the regime
claimed that Wi of party netnbers "wee working in
factories ;uul on farms." it figure undoubtedly inflated
to include administraliye staffs. Other (IC fires to give
the illusion of it rising percentage of %corkers in the
party include the use of statistical categories stuck as
workers and former workers,.. who tot,cther were said
to constitute 68 r of the part in 1973.
The parts efforts to reestablish its "proletarian"
basis b% increasing the proportion of industrial workers
Oil the party rolls h the had limited.srtccess. 'I'll(- Ilusak
reginu�, both for ideological and practical reasons,
largely spared the workers during its purge of the
membership rolls, in spite of the large number that
had rallied to the Dubcek banner. Many workers.
however, disgruntled over the reversal of liberalization
policies, resigned from the party.
The regime is also paying particular attention to
recruiting young people and the technical intel-
ligentsia. The skills and assistance of this latter group.
consisting mostly of professionals such as scientists and
economists, are ind;spensahle if the regime is to decd
effectively with the counts_ 's numerous economic
troubles. The regime has acknovIedged haying
considerable difficult in recruitment, however, and
this is not likely to change unless the part relax,�: its
restraints on initiative and constructive criticism.
Nor Goes the regime appear to be improving the
balance between Slovak and Czech membership. Prior
to 1968, Slovaks comprised only about 12Si of the
total membership of the part', although they iarmed
2854 of the population of the cotuttry. No reliable data
on the ratio of Czechs and Sitwaks within the party as
it whole have been avail :cble since the invasion.
Within the party leadership, however, the Slovaks
enjoy representation more than consistent with their
proportion of the total population, with four of 1I
members in the Pro siditun and three of seven in the
Secretariat, including General Secretary Husak.
Little is known about party finances. According to
part statutes, income is derived from membership
dues, revenues of part enterprises, and "other"
sources. The party purports to he financed by monthly
membership dues %%hich are roughly I ci to 4c' of each
members net nnonthly wages, depending on the
income bracket.
4. Mass organizations and other parties (C)
As in other Eastern European countries, the
Czechoslovak Communist Party has from the
beginning of its rule employed it number of political
and sociopolitical mass organizations to extend its
control and influence over the population. The
purpose of the mass organizations has he(-n to reach all
segments of sotci(-ly and .,.tivitics and organizations.
particularly those which were carr,overs from the
democratic era and cotuld not be disbanded or
neutralized in any other way. "cider the total
domination of the Conttnunist Part, these mass
organizations are designed to channel the political and
social energies of the population into pursuits which
either further park goals or which at least are
politically harmless. Virtually every Czechoslovak
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citizen is involved in some wav in the elaborate
network of political, economic, and cultural mass
organizations.
The most important of these organizations have
been the Czechoslovak National Front (NF), the
Revolutionary Trade Union Movement (ROH), and
the Czechoslovak Youth Union (succeeded in 1970 by
the Socialist Youth Union �SSM The National Front
is political) the most influential organization in
Czechoslovakia aside from the Communist Party, on
whose behalf the Front is charged with mobilizing the
er: of both the Communist and the non
Communist members of society through control of all
other political and social organizations. In short, it is
an umbrella organization, encompassing all political
parties and most major specialized mass organizations,
dominated by the Communist Party, and designed to
assure the Communist monopoly of power. The
National Front supervises national and local elections
and serves as the party's vehicle for appointing or
nominating candidates to the Federal Assembly and
other government organs. In 1969 the Front took on a
liaison role with the military for coordinating civil
defense and paramilitary training. Dubcek sought to
reorganize the National Front, enabling it to supervise
the activities of its constituent organs free of
interference by the Communist Party. Husak has
reaffinaed the tr�iditional role of the National Front
and, by having himself elected chairman, has restored
part supervision of its activities.
There are four theoretic.-lly non Communist
political parties in Czechoslovakia �the Czechoslovak
Socialist Part, the Czechoslovak People's Party, the
Slovak Revival Party, and the Slovak Freedom Party.
The regime has permitted these parties to survive 22
years of Communist rule primarily to enhance the
facade of a multiparty democracy, as well as to
provide Czechoslovaks who in conscience cannot
become Communist Party members with a vehicle for
permissible political activity. These parties are totally
subservient to the Communist Party, however, and
offer no challenge to its authority.
It is testimony to the democratic political impulses
of the Czechoslovaks that the minor parties
energetically sought to increase their influence in 1968
prior to the invasion. Encouraged by the concessions
granted by the Dubcek regime, such as lifting
restrictions on recruiting and publishing, the smaller
parties openly stressed the importance of non
Communist political organizations and even
challenged the "leading role" of the Communist
Party. Membership in the parties swelled, with the
Czechoslovak People's Party and the Czechoslovak
Socialist Party reporting an increase of more than i0%
28
to 40,000 and 16,000, respectively. Since the advent of
the Husak regime, however, the non- Communist
parties have taken their cue from the purge conducted
by the Communist Party, expelling the liberals from
their own ranks and proclaiming loyalty to the
program of th^ National Front, that is, to the
Communists' program. As a result, these parties have
resumed their marginal existence on the periphery of
national political life.
5. Exile groups (C)
Prior to 1968 Czech and Slo-ak exile groups
domiciled in the West consisted almost entirely of
anti Communist intellectuals or former politicians
who either chose a life of intellectual freedom or were
forced by threat of reprisals to remain outside the
country. Loosely organized, such groups have limited
their activities to antiregime propaganda and have
posed no significant challenge to the Communist
regime in Prague, although their condemnations
occasi y have been troublesome for the leadership.
The Dubcek regime had sought to woo some of the
emigrees back to Czechoslovakia by promising full
rehabilitation and remuneration for losses suffered
when they left the country. This process was abruptly
halted by the Soviet -led invasion of 1968, however.
The invasion resulted in a new exodus of refugees,
many of whom were fearful of retribution for having
supported the reform movement. The large majority
have remained in Western Europe and for the most
part have avoided involvement in political activity.
Some of the leading intellectuals behind, the
liberalization movement, such as former TV director
Jiri Pelikan, economist Ota Sik, and literary critic
Antonin Lie.'.m, have expressed interest in trying to
bring together the exiles for the purpose of continuing
the struggle for reform in Czechoslovakia. Pelikan,
from his residence in Rome, has spearheaded an exile
periodical, Listy (Papers). Unlike earlier emigree
groups, the post -1968 refugees consider themselves
dedicated Communists who wish to reform the party's
leadership rather than to end Communist rule. As a
result, the regime has been much more sensitive to
their activities, especially inasmuch as they have
contributed to keeping alive the resentment within
many major Western European Communist parties
toward the Soviet crushing of the Dubcek experiment.
Gustav Husak has made a considerable ef:ort to
persuade the postinvasion emigrees to return by
reducing their fear of punitive measures. Immediately
after coming to power, the Husak regime declared an
amnesty which expired in October 1969. Few of those
who returned appear to have been arrested or
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otherwise penalized. llowever, those who chose to
remain in the Nest �over 5009), by the government's
count �had their apartments and private property
confiscated.
In late 1970 the authorities in Prague sought to
blackmail the exiles living abroad by advising them
that tile% woidd be prosecuted in absentia for illegally
leavinx the country and that the "defense costs"
incurred as a result of these proceedings %vonld be
collected from relatives living in Czechoslovakia if
payment was not forthcoming from abroad. Following
worldwide� criticism, Husak personally terminated the
practice as "impractical." 'I'll(- regime's "differenti-
ating" attitude toward Czechoslo%ak citizens living
abroad was underlined in Decemi,er 1970 by President
Svoboda's cordial New Years greeting to emigrees
who maintained their "warm attitude" toward
socialist Czechoslovakia.
Another amnesty, commemorating the 25th
unnive�car% of Communist rule, was proclaimed by
S".)boda in Fehruar% 1973. Under this edict, emigrees
"'ho have not engaged in "sedition, ?eopardzirg state
were�ts. or causing darnege to Czerhoslo ak interests
abroad" could return home forgiven for their "illegal
emigration" pro%iding they (lid so by the end of 197
That the amnesty excluded the regime's most
prominent gadflies abroad was made clear by an
official press comment stating that "it ma% he inferred
that the amnesty does not apple to several score
inte'leetuals and former officials of the Czechoslovak
Cormminist Party because of whom the Czechoslovak
leadership has encountered fresh difficulties in its
relations with some Western Communist parties."
6. Electoral procedures (C)
Czechoslovakia has had extensive experience with
free elections dating hack to the relativel% liberal
s%stenn under the Austrian Empire and the scrupulous
practice of democratic governments during the
interwar period. Despite a generation of Communist
rule, these democratic traditions are still cherished by
the large majorit of Czechoslovaks.
In line with t1w practice in other Eastern European
countries where the Communists had gained power.
the Czechoslovak party rmised the electoral
procedures to assure vic�twn at the polls. There may
have been non Communist leaders in Czechoslovakia
who hoped that the part' �which had won it .3Vi
plurality in the last free national election in 1946
nlight have been influenced by Czechoslovakia's
dernoc�ratic� traditions and that it would be restrained
in its exercise of power, but the restrictions the party
i unposed in 1948 were as rigid as any in the
Communist world. The new procedures severely
restricted political activity and made it virtually
impossible for an individual to stand freely for office,
nominate opposition candidates, or campaign on his
ow-1 initiative.
According to the electoral laws implementing
constitutional provisions, the nomination of all
political officials was the province onl of the political
parties and organizations represented in the
Communist dominated National Front. In practice,
tile National Front put forward only one name for
each pent to be filled. Thus, the periodic election
campaigns were meaningless, reflecting on:y the
extent of Communist Party control over the electoral
process. Devices such as semicomptihory "manifest
voting" (voting without the secrecy of the booth) and
the appointment of part' members as election officers
gave the Communists control of both the balloting
and the counting of votes. These practices, coupled
with propaganda and various methods of coercion,
insured the success of the specially selected candidates.
"Negative" votes generally consist of blank ballots
heing cast as a symbol of disapproval.
Under the Dubeek regim far- reaching changes
were proposed in the electoral law, mainly in the
direction of liberalizing anti restricting the role of the
Communist Parh� in the nominating process, in
ensuring the secrecy of the ballot, and guaranteeing an
honest count. These proposals, as well as the national
election. that were scheduled by Dubcek for
November 1968 were scuttled by the invasion.
"Three years !titer, the incumbent Ilusak regime felt
sufficiently secure to hold general elections, the first
such balloting in Czechoslovakia since June 1964.
Husak and other regime spokesmen viewed the
elections of 26 -27 November 1971 as the culmination
of the political consolidation process: the elections, in
fact, served to legitimize the Husak regime's hold over
the legislature and government executive organs in the
same manner that the 14th Party Congress held the
preceding May had clone for Husak's hold over the
Comnnunist hierarchy.
The elections were carried out in match the same
manner as those of 964. 'I'll(- "c�ampaign' was broken
clown into four phases. First, candidates were
nominated by the communist Part', sovial
organizations, or individual citizens who presented the
names to the National Front. 'I'll(- National Front then
selected the candidates according to their political and
social yualific�ations as determined by the part, and
registered the names on official election lists. Election
"programs politic�al platforms that the candidates
were required to follow �were then drawn up at the
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respective electoral levels under party supervision.
This phase also included public hearing:: at which
each candidate committed himself to the program au.d
answered c,tizens' questions. Finally, the voter
"approved" the official slate at the poll'.
Although the elections were patently rigged, the
regime went all out to cloak them with an aura of
democratic respectability. According to the tortured
official philosophy, it is the voters participation in the
preelection process and his willingness to convince
himself of the candidate's proper political caliber that
gi�.�es the elections their "democratic" character.
Indeed, it is the duty of the citirea. not merely his
right, to countersign the slate, thus transforming what
otherwise would he an official appointment into an
"election."
The regime hailed the results of the 1971 elections as
it measure of popular support for its policies. It
claimed that 99.h