NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY 18; CZECHOSLOVAKIA; COUNTRY PROFILE

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GENERAL SURVEY CHAPTERS
COUNTRY PROFIIX Integrated perspective of the
subject country Chronology Area Brief Sum-
mary Map
THE SOCIETY Social structure a Popu }ation a
Labor a Health a Living conditions a Social
problems a Religion a Education a Public infor-
mation Artistic expression
GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS Political evolu-
tion of the state a Governmental strength and sta-
bility a Structure and function a Political dynamics
a National policies a Threats to stability a The
police a Countersubversion and counterinsurgency
capabilities
THE ECONOMY Appraisal of the economy a Its
structure agriculture, fisheries, forestry, Fuels and
Power. metals and minerals, manufacturing and
construction a Domestic trade a Economic policy
and development a International economic rela-
tions
TRANSPORTATION AND
TELECOMMUNICATIONS Appraisal of systems
a Strategic mobility Railroads *Highways e
Inland waterways a Pipelines a Ports a Merchant
marine a Civil air a Airfields a The telecom system
MILITAR; GEOGRAPHY Topography and climate
a Military geographic regions a Strategic areas a
Internal routes a Approaches: land, air
ARMED FORCES The defense establishment a
join: activities a Ground forces a Naval forces a
Air forces a Paramilitary
SCIENCE Level of scientific advancement a Or-
ganization, planning, and financing of research a
Scientific education, manpower, and facilities
a Major research fields
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I.1 �:tl 17 7::_F9II:1bI:fti[: 311< a: 1] IZQIf Lf /:iIIYIZfibIII:1�
WW r f
W K A i
The Past- Duhcek Era: Buck to P- udence
and Pragmatism I
Land of Forests and Factories
A Star Crossed People
The Stalinist Interlude and the Dubeek Revival
Husak's Headaches
"We Have Bern, and We Will Be Again"
Chrawl ogy Zb
Area Brief I 25
Swnmary Map follows 25
This Country Profile u.as prepared for the NIS by
the Central Intelligence Agency. Research was sub-
stantially completed by January 1974.
Confidential
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The Post-Duhcek Era:
Back to Prudence and Pragmatism
In sharp contrast to the turbulence and tensions
which marked the period immediately following the
Warsaw Pact invasion of August 1968, the domestic
scene in Czechoslovakia in early 1974 was quiet and
outwardly stable. The idealism of the fleeting
preintervention Prague Spring had given way to a
strongly :materialistic pragmatism. In many ways, the
population was enjoying a mea! ire of prosperity un-
known since just prior to World' Jar II. Consumer lux-
uries, botf: of foreign and local manufacture, were
available in unprecedented variety and quantity. Both
real wages and savings were at alltime highs. After
years of privation, the Czechoslovak people were
hastening to reap the benefits of what one Western
observer has aptly termed "dumpling communism."
Preoccupied with their quest for material
pleasures� including TV sets, cars, and, most recently,
summer cottages �they seemed to have lost ill interest
in politics. (U/ 0U)
True enough, a few intellectuals still held high the
banner of dissent. But they were becoming increasing-
ly isolated. Most of their countrymen appeared to be
resigned, however reluctantly, both to the loss of many
of their individual rights and liberties and to the con-
tinued presence of about 60,000 Soviet occupation
troops on Czechoslovak soil. A consensus had gradual-
ly emerged that further overt resistance to clearly
overwhelming power could only delay any loosening
of internal controls and might even imperil coveted
improvements in living standards. Not only did the
average man on the street seem almost anxious to
forget what the Czechoslovaks now refer to
euphemistically as the "August events," but there also
appeared to be growing feelings of resentment toward
the fallen heroes of the Prague Spring �and toward
erudite roman. Gists in general �for having gotten
Czechoslovakia into such a mess in the first
place. (U /OU)
Indeed, the agonizing process of "nor-
malization"� psychological, political, and
economic seemed near completion. Czechoslovakia
was once again a trusted memLer of the Soviet bloc.
From the Kremlin's point of view, Prague's conserv-
ative domestic policies were ideologically sound, and
none of Moscow's other Warsaw Pact allies could
boast of a better record of loyal cooperation in the
foreign policy field. (U /Oi_J)
For better or for worse, a large part of the credit for
bringing all this about belongs to Gustav Husak, the
shrewd and authoritarian Slovak intellectual who
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replaced Alexander Dubcek at the helm of the
Czechoslovak Communist Party in April 1969.
Operating under the twin banners of realism and
moderation, Husak played upon fears of much more
unpleasant alternatives to win grudging acceptance of
a policy of broad compliance with Moscow's demands.
His task was made easier by his reputation for stub-
born independence and personal integrity born of long
years sp -nt as a political prisoner of the Novotny
regime on the charge of "bourgeois Slovak
nationalism." Moreover, despite his insistence on dis-
cipline, he demonstrated a genuine determination to
avoid returning to the harsh administrative and police
methods of the 1950's. Like his well publicized efforts
to improve the economic well -being of his coun-
trymen, this aspect of Husak's style of rule did much to
case the pain of capitulation. (U /OU
Not that the "normalization" process didn't take its
human toll. The party was subjected to a purge which
cost it� through resignation or involuntary
separation nearly one -third of the 1.7 million
members carried on its rolls when Husak came to
power. In addition, those individuals who stood in the
forefront of the 1968 reform movement have been os-
tracized and denied responsible or well paying
employment. But, thanks to Husak's continuing
resistance to the demands of party ultraconservatives
for more severe reprisals, only a handful� primarily
people who could be charged with inflammatory or
subversive behavior in the postinvasion period �have
been brought to trial. Even Dubcek has been spared.
And although the question of how to deal with the
leading figures of the reform era remains a major point
of contention within the Czechoslovak Communist
Party, Husak has made it clear that he personally
favors a policy of selective rehabilitation. (U/ 0U)
All told, however, Husak has asked his countrymen
to swallow a great deal, not the least of which has
been his own gradual conversion from an open critic of
the '968 invasion into one of its dutiful apologists.
Although he initially promised to preserve the
"positive features" of the Prague Spring, he has
methodically dismantled or vitiated virtually all of the
reforms, including those with which he himself was
once closely identified. Censorship has been
reinstituted. The party's control over all segments of
the government and society has been restored �a
process involving, among other things, both recen-
tralization of the economy and abandonment of many
of the established or projected features of the country's
new binational federal system. Sharp curtailment of
freedom of travel to the West has provided yet another
cause for popular dismay. But perhaps the cruelest
blow of all was the signing in May 1970 of a nety
bilateral Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and
Mutual Assistance with the U.S.S.R., which not only
vindicated the Warsaw Pact invasion but established a
legal basis for possible Soviet intervention in the
future. (U/ 0U)
Thus, Husak's bargain was at best a hard one, and it
might seem a bit surprising that a people who had
made such a show of defiant unity during the initial
stages of their confrontation with their Warsaw Pact
allies did not hold out for somewhat better terms. After
all, the Kremlin's willingness to countenance some
rather innovative reforms elsewhere in Eastern Europe
and its apparent reluctance to risk taking any action
%%hich might adversely affect the new trend toward
East -West detente must have suggested to the
Czechoslovaks that such a goal was not beyond reach.
But a capacity for prolonged heroics is not a
characteristic Czechoslovak national trait. (U; OU)
Czechoslovakia was carved from the
Austro- Hungarian Empire in 1918. It is not an
ethnically homogeneous state like Poland or Sweden
and thus has lacked their cultural unity to help it
withstand the unusual pressures occasioned by its
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Brezhnev and Husak shake hands following the
signing of the 1970 bilateral treaty

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strategic location. Although the Czec4,s and Slovaks
share a Slavic background and were -mired `n their
desire for independence from the Peal Monarchy,
they differ markedly in cultural ano institutional
heritage. Indeed, their mutual antagonisms have been
exploited successfully by Czechoslovakia's enemies at
several critical points in the country's history.
Moreover, a legacy of centuries of foreign domination
has left a lasting imprint on Czechoslovak society and
has played an important role in the political life of the
country. (U/ 0U)
Thei: long experience with powerful foreign
overlords lias endowed both the Czechs and albeit,
to a lesser extent �the Slovaks with a down -to -earth
realism, a -leep- seated respect for the worth of the in-
dividual, nd a strong dose of caution. With little hope
of freein themselves by force of arms, they learned to
preserve their intellectual and national integrity
through a mixture of resignation and passive
resistance, or simply put �to bend with the wind.
Even among the Slovaks, who tend to be somewhat
more hot blooded than the Czechs, rebellious impulses
were generally kept in check by considerations of
numerical weakness. Today, when confronted with
what he judges to be a superior power, the average
Czechoslovak citizen is still inclined to fall back on
devious maneuvering under a pretense of submission
rather than mount outright frontal opposition.
Although he is as ready as anyone to rise and fight for
his convictions, he is unlikely to do so unless he sees a
realistic chance of success. He would rather y'eld and
preserve his strength than risk breaking it in a mere
gesture of bold defiance. (U /OU)
These enduring national traits have been immor-
talized in the figure of "Good Soldier Schweik," the
Czech folk hero �now more popular than
ever� created by novelist jaroslav Hasek in 1923. A
reluctant conscript in the Austro- Hungarian army dur-
ing World War I, Schweik managed to frustrate the
will of his superiors by feigning obedience, indolence,
and stupidity. He did not, for example, risk expressing
his pacifist views; he simply got lost repeatedly �on
his way to the front. (U /OU)
The persistence and significance of Czechoslovakia's
earthy Schweikist tradition is well illustrated by the
parallels between the population's response to the
Warsaw Pact invasion and its behavior when the coun-
try fell to Hitlerite Germany 30 years earlier. In both
instances, the majority of the Czechoslovak people
rallied to the defense of their government and their
country's sovereignty in the face of a clear external
threat �only to break ranks and gradually lapse into
seemingly subservient apathy when that threat
developed into actual military intervention. Although
there were scattered acts of heroism, in neither case
were the entering occupation forces met with organ-
ized armed resistance. And both times the sacrifice of
popular beliefs and ideals on the altar of cautious
realism generated a compensatory �in fact, virtually
escapist interest in material comforts. (U /OU)
But even though Husak has been able to exploit his
countrymen's traditional instincts and attitudes to
achieve his initial domestic objectives, the long -term
viability of his conservative program is by no means
assured. The doctrinaire formulas of orthodox Marx-
ism- Leninism simply have little appeal for most
Czechoslovak citizens. After all, Husaic is dealing with
a people who, alone in Eastern Europe, experienced a
working and fairly liberal democracy throughout the
interwar period. Hence, while successful in winning a
degree of popular acceptance based on purely
pragmatic considerations, he has been unable to
develop the broadly based domestic support he needs
to revitalize the country politically and economically
and to reduce his dependence on Moscow. This
absence of rapport and meaningful communication
between the regime and the people has been reflected
in alarmingly poor job discipline and widespread eva-
sion of minor regulations. Husak is understandably
troubled by this situation, and is making a determined
effort to correct it. Given the atmosphere of rising ex-
pectations generated by the current trend toward
East -West detente, however, it seems like'y that he will
find this task quite difficult. (C)
11E RUM OF SOIOER SHEIK
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Land of Forests and Factories Wou)
Comprising the historic provinces of Bohemia,
Moravia, and Slovakia, modern Czechoslovakia is a
long and narrow landlocked nation about equal in
area to New York State. By almost any measure �loca-
tion, climate, drainage, or vegetation �it can be
characterized as constituting the very heart of Europe.
It is hardly surprising, therefore, that geography has
played a key role in shaping the political and
economic evolution of the country'; inhabitants, both
before and after they achieved independence. The
strategic location of their homeland athwart some of
the oldest and most significant trade routes in Europe
has traditionally invited intervention by powerful
neighbors. And together with the area's long division
between Austrian and Maryar overlords, marked
variations in weather and terrain have contributed to
the growth of the economic disparities and cultural
differences which still cause friction between the
Czechs and Slovaks today.
For its size, Czechoslovakia exhibits an unusual
variety of physical and climatic features. In the west,
the Bohemian basin �the core of the so- called Czech
Lands consists primarily of a rolling fertile plateau
with broad river valleys and intervening forested
divides. Its hilly to mountahious rimlands are exten-
sions of mountain systems further to the west, and the
natural transportation routes through them have
traditionally oriented the region and its inhabitants
toward the western part of Europe. Bohemia's climate,
influenced by the maritime weather systems that
predominate over western Europe, tends to be
somewhat milder than that of most of the rest of the
country. Another distinctive feature of Bohemia is
the radial convergence of its streams toward Prague in
the center. All are tributaries of the Elbe, which drains
the region northward and provides a water route to
the North Sea. As a whole, the Bohemian region is
extensively cultivated, and its northern and western
reaches �where there are long exploited coal and iron
deposits and more recently discovered uranium
fields �are heavily industrialized.
The Moravian lowlands, also traditional Czech do-
main, form a distinct transitional zone between the
Bohemian basin and Slovakia. A considerable portion
of Moravia is hilly, but its valleys �most of which
trend toward the Moravian Gate (a strategic gap
between the Sudeten Mountains and the Carpathian
Alps) provide the best avenues for north -south com-
munication in central Europe. North of the low divide
which separates the headwaters of the Baltic -bound
Oder and the southward flowing Morava, the region
exhibits some of the physical and climatic
characteristics of the Bohemian rimlands. Four- fifths
of Moravia lies south of that divide, however, and the
weather conditions and terrain features there resemble
those of the neighboring lowland areas of southern
Slovakia. Moreover, the soils in central and southern
Moravia are generally very fertile, and, unlike the
forested and marginally productive northern uplands,
the area is extensively cultivated. Despite these
physical variations, however, most of Moravia is
densely populated. In part this reflects the area's
historic importance as a hub of commercial activity,
but its coal deposits and favorable location favored its
early industrialization as well. The first major facilities
for manufacturing and metallurgy in what is now
Czechoslovakia were built in northernr st Moravia.
And while, with active Austrian encoui- ement, fac-
tories and furnaces soon spread westward, Moravia's
impressive array of urban industrial centers still nearly
matches that of Bohemia.
Slovakia, which makes up the eastern two- fifths of
the country, has a few rather sizable pockets of fertile
lowland in the south, but unlike Bohemia and
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P3.
Overlooking the forested Moravian Beskydies are the
Slovak Carpathians. The wealth of forest land in Slovakia
has given rise to large wood processing works.
Moravia, it is predominantly mountainous. Its rugged
highlands extend in a thick are from the Danube in the
southwest to the Soviet frontier in the east, attaining
their highest elevations and greatest beauty in the
craggy High Tatras mountain chain which forms part
of Czechoslovakia's border with Poland. Much of this
rough terrain is also heavily forested, and although it
poses no insurmountable obstacle to communication,
it has reinforced the effects of a thousand years of un-
enlightened Magyar rule in isolating the Slovaks from
western European influence and in retarding their
economic development Drainage is to the Black Sea
via the Danube, and since S!ovakia's principal com-
munication routes follow the river valleys that
penetrate deeply into its mountainous backbone from
the Danubian Plain in the south, its natural orienta-
tion is toward Hungary and the Balkans. This, in turn,
together with the difficulties involved in tapping the
re gions timber and mineral resources, has contributed
to the area's slow rate of industrialization and thus to
the economic and cultural differences which set the
relatively provincial and tradition -bound Slovaks
apart from their more urbanized and sophisticated
Czech cousins.
Even in today's age of modern technology, the stub-
born facts of geography have hampered Prague's ef-
forts to hasten Slovakia's economic and social develop-
ment. True, Bratislava and the Vah valley have
become the core of a small but highly diversified in-
dustrial belt which, with its new petrochemical,
machine tool, and steel plants, now complements the
traditionally important agricultural economy of the in-
tensively cultivated lowland regions. But despite the
local impact of large forestry and mining operations,
Slovakia's mountainous hinterland is still a
predominantly backward and sparsely populated area,
and the people there still live in comparative isolation.
Viewed as a whole, however, Czechoslovakia has at-
tained a rather advanced level of economic develop-
ment and over the years, the process of growth has
placed increasingly heavy demands on the nation's
natural and human reso While a variety of other
important industrial minerals including tungsten,
lead, copper, gold, silver, zinc, and low grade iron
ore� continue to be mined, only magnesite and
uranium ore (the latter almost totally earmarked for
export to the Soviet Union) are being produced in suf-
ficient quantities at present to meet the country's re-
quirements. In some respects, at least, the energy pic-
ture is considerably brighter. Both hard and soft coal
are still in relatively abundant supply, and hydroelec-
tric power sources are being developed. On the other
hand, there is little oil or natural gas anywhere in
Czechoslovakia. In fact, locally produced petroleum
products account for less than 5% of domest; con-
sumption.
With a population estimated in 1973 at only a little
over 14 5 million �less than half that of Poland and
well under that of the German Democratic Republic,
East ,rn Europe's geographically compact industrial
giant Czechoslovakia has also felt a manpower
pinch. This problem is not attributable to the modest
number of its inhabitants alone, however.
Government sponsored urban migration has seriously
depleted the country's agricultural work force, a
development which has contributed in no small way to
the continuing inability of the modern and extensive
agricultural sector to produce enough food to meet
domestic needs. At the same time, Czechoslovakia's
low rate of population growth �also at least partly a
byproduct of the modernization process �has helped
to depress the nation's overall manpower pool by
bringing about a rise in the median age of the popula-
tion.
5
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A Star Crossed People (ulou)
Czechoslovakia's population may be aging, but at
least is is less ethr' complex than it was only a
generation ago. In an effort to provide the country
with some natural protection against potentially
hostile neighbors, the elder statesmen of Versailles gave
their creation borders �for the most part historic �that
generally follow mountain ridges and major rivers. By
so doing, however, they also endowed the
Czechoslovak state with large groups of people who
were neither Czech nor Slovak and whose existence
was subsequently used to justify irredentist territorial
claims. Individuals of German extraction, for example,
accounted for slightly more than 22% of the popula-
tion, far outnumbering the Slovaks. Another 11 was
composed of Hungarians, Ruthenians, and various
lesser minority groups. But as a result of the territorial
and population adjustments which followed World
War II �the most significant of which were the mass
expulsion of Germans, the resettlement of large
numbers of Hungariaas, and the loss of the country's
easternmost province (Ruthenia) to the
IJ.S.S.R.�Czechoslovakia is now almost solidly
Slavic. The dominant Czechs now make up about 65%
of the population, and the Slovaks about 30 A half
million or so Hungariar for the most part concen-
trated in Slovakia near the border of their ethnic
homeland, constitute the largest remaining minority
group.
he Czechs and the Slovaks are descendants of a
western Slav group that migrated into the general area
of their present Homeland from beyond the Car-
pathian mountains before the sixth century A.D.
Mach of the region had been occupied earlier by
Celtic tribes, from one of which, the Boii, Bohemia
and the adjacent German state of Bavaria derive their
names. The Celts were gradually supplanted by Ger-
manic groups, and in the seventh century, the Slavic
tribes banded together for the first time under a single
leader �a merchant named Samo �in order to fend off
both the Franks and raiding Avar tribesmen from Asia.
For a while, they were successful. But Samo's
kingdom, which embraced Bohemia, Moravia, and
part of present -day Austria, died with him in 685 A.D.
For the next 100 years, the history of the Czech and
Slovak peoples was scarred by Avar domination and
periodic Frankish incursions.
In the early ninth century, however, following the
defeat of the Avars by the Franks under Charlemagne,
the Czechs and the Slovaks once again emerged from
the shadows. Czech princes established what soon
became known as the Great Moravian Empire and, in
863, invited Byzantine missionaries Cyril and
Methodius to visit their domain and convert their sub-
jects to Christianity. By then, the empire was one of
the largest states in Europe. Centered on Moravia and
Slo, akia and covering a very respectable share of the
central and eastern portions of the continent, it showed
promise of becoming a permanent fixture of the
political scene. Internal discord over succession
gradually weakened it, however, and over time, the
locus of political power began shifting westward to
Bohemia, where the Prague -based Premyslid princely
house was gaining strength. Finally, in 906, defeat by
Magyar forces that had invaded Slovakia brought the
Moravian Empire down altogether.
The Czech Lands survived this catastrophe relative-
ly unscathed. The Premyslid princes succeeded in es-
tablishing the independent duchy �later kingdom �of
Bohemia and quickly incorporated Moravia into their
domain. The Slovaks, on the ether hand, had no such
luck. Their homeland was annexed by Hungary in
973, an event that ushered them into nearly 10 cen-
turies of uninterrupted isolrtion and repression.
The Bohemian state is generally regarded as the
direct nredecessor of modern Czechoslovakia. Indeed,
the s!atue and name of -)ne of its earliest rulers, Prince
Vaclav (later sainted and still widely celebrated as ttie
"Good King Wenceslas" whose exploits are recorded in
a traditional English Christmas carol) eomewhat in-
congruously continue to grace the main square in
Communis! Prague today. Although few of Vaclav's
successors won greater fame, their influence in shaping
the distinctive character and outlook of the Czech peo-
ple was no less profound.
Under the Premyslids, who ruled until 1306, the
Kingdom of Bohemia entered into a loose relationship
with the Holy Roman Empire, thus beginning an
association with Germanic lands to the west that has
affected Czech political and cultural life ever since.
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Karlstein, perched in the mountains
near Prague
Although frequently torn by dynastic rivalries, the em-
bryonic to not only survived but eventually expand-
ed its t;�-: .'oriel into parts of Austria and Poland. A
brief interregnum followed the death of the last
Premyslid king, during which several European royal
houses contested for the vacant throne. The victor,
John of Luxembourg, rarely visited his new domain.,
preferring to leave the business of government to his
nobles while he sought his fame on the battlefield and
his amusement at the French court. But the reign of his
son, Charles 1 (1346 -78), is generally considered to be
the most brilliant in the history of the Kingdom of
Bohemia. Charles was elected Holy Roman Emperor
(as Charles IV) in 1355, and Prague for a time became
the chief city of the empire.
Charles quickly elevated Bohemia to a position that
rivaled those of the greatest states of Europe. Among
other things, he established the Prague Archbishopric
and founded the first university in central Europe. In
13.56, acting in his capacity as Holy Roman Emperor,
be issued the Golden Bull, which gave the King of
Bohemia first rank among the electors of the empire.
In addition, he promoted the use of the Czech
language, promulgated a code of laws, and en-
couraged the growth of cities and commerce. He also
imported foreign architects and artisans and initiated a
program of public construction that contributed to
Prague's later renown as one of Europe's most
beautiful cities.
After Charles' death, however, Bohemia entered a
prolonged and ultimately fatal period of decline. The
line of succession became uncertain, and, together
with flagrant church corruption, frequent struggles
between successive kings and the entrenched nobility
generated considerable popular unrest. Finally, emly
in the 15th century, the bold rhetoric and martyr's
death of Jan Hus �the Prague pastor and university
rector who became central Europe's first champion of
religious reform� brought matters to a head. His
followers, the Hussites, established fortified towns in
southern Bohemia and, in 1419, rose in open rebellion
against their country's establishment which was con-
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trolled by German Catholics. Interestingly, the inci-
dent that touched off the fighting was the defenestra-
tion of a number of Prague town counselors by their
angry Hussite compatriots, a unique form of violence
(the victim is literally thrown through a window)
which has twice since played a prominent role in
Czech history.
The Hussite Wars, which lasted about 20 years,
ravaged Bohemia and left a legacy of bitterness and
distrust. Basic issues were left unresolved, and the
Hussite movement remained. active. With the land
thus divided, powerful nobles extended their estates at
the exp rise of both the church and the crown. In time,
the succession to the Bohemian throne again became
confused, passing briefly into Hungarian and Polish
hands before being successfully c!aimed for the House
of H,;psburg by Ferdinand I of Austria in 1526.
Although a precursor of later traumatic
developments, the advent of Hapsburg rule had little
immediate impact on the political, social, and
ec:)nomic structure of the Czech Lands. As legal
masters of a complex domain embracing Austria and
Hungary as well, Ferdinand and his successors were
content to share their royal power with the local
chinch and lay nobility. Thus it was that in an era
when tiie Hapsburgs were becoming more and rnore
involved with the Counter- Reformation, Czech
Protestantism drew fresh strength from Luther's
teachings and placed Prague on a collision course with
Vienna.
Frictions between the House of Hapsburg and
native Bohemian nobles finally erupted into open war-
fare in 1618, setting off a series of conflicts that raged
over much of central Europe for 30 years. Once again,
hostilities were precipitated by the defenestration of
Catholic officials �in this instance, the appointed
representatives of Ferdinand 11�by assembled Protes-
tant dignitaries in Prague. This time, however, retribu-
tion was swift in coming. After jcining forces with
Maximilian of Bavaria (the head of the Catholic
League) and the Elector of Saxony, Ferdinand dealt a
decisive defeat to the Czech armies at the Battle of
White Mountain, near Prague, on 8 November 1620.
From that day forward �and for the next 300
years traditional Czech independence and civil liber-
ties were forfeit to the Austrian crown.
The leaders of the rebellion were promptly behead-
ed. Catholicism was proclaimed the area's only
religion. The German language was elevated to a
higher status than Czech. Religious and political
persecution forced most :)f the surviving nobility to
flee, and their estates were handed over to a new gen-
try composed primarily of Catholics fron southern
8
Germany who had supported the Hapsburg cause. All
high administrative offices were taken over by crown
appointees, and the powers of town and village of-
ficials were sharply curtailed. Deprived of both
political and intellectual leaders, the Czech nation was
reduced to a mass o f serfs.
Although the Czech Lands became mere provinces
of the Hapsburg monarchy, their resilient inhabitants
die: not lose their sense of national identity. Regional
patriotism surfaced once again in the more relaxed at-
mosphere of 18th century "enlightened despotism"
and subsequently gathered strength under the con-
ditions of comparative prosperity and intellectual
freedom that prevailed during much of the 19th and
early 20th centuries. Moreover, despite the
Hungarians' continuing treatment of the local pop
ulace as subhuman, Slovakia experienced a parallel
national revival. Thus, when World War I offered an
opportunity to win independence from the
Austro Hungarian monarchy, there was no dearth of
capable Czech and Slovak leaders �men like Thomas
G. Masaryk, Eduard Benes, and Milan Stefanik �will-
ing and able to join forces to launch what turned out
to be a finely orchestrated and highly successful cam-
paign to attract widespread international support for
their cause.
The establishment of Czechoslovakia as an indepen-
dent democratic republic was proclaimed on 28 Oc-
tober 1918, and its self- appointed National Assembly
elected Thomas Masaryk to be the country's first Presi-
dent a few days later. Masaryk was returned to office
in the general election which followed final determina-
tion of the new state's boundaries and remained there
until old age and ill health forced him to retire in 1935.
Under his leadership, Czechoslovakia developed into a
relatively liberal, prosperous, and democratic nation
dependent for its security on treaties linking it with
Romania, Yugoslavia, France, and, ultimately, the
U.S.S.R. Nevertheless, Eduard Benes, Masaryk's friend
and foreign minister who succeeded him as President,
was confronted with some formidable problems.
Economic difficulties born of the worldwide depres-
sion were aggravating old minority -based internal ten-
sions. Moreover, Hitler had already exploited this
situation to foster the organization of a large �and
growing� Nazi- oriented Sudeten German Party which
was calling for autonomy for all Germans in the
republic and being generally disruptive politically.
Then, in 1938, when Hitler openly espoused the
cause of self- deterrnination for the Sudeten Germans
and began levying political and territorial demands on
Prague, Czechoslovakia's allies deserted her. The
Soviets made a point of announcing their readiness to
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join in a rescue effort if, as required under their mutual
assistance treaty with Czechoslovakia, France would in-
tervene first. But Paris, like London, was determined to
avoid war at all costs. Conclusion of ti.e four -power
Munich Agreement of 30 September 1938, which
directed unrepresented Czechoslovakia to cede all dis-
puted Sudeten territory to Germany within i I days,
prompter! Benes tc resign and leave the country.
Although his successor, Emil Hacha, was more accept-
able to the Axis powers, he was in no position to halt
the breakup of his homeland. Poland and Hungary
joined Germany in seeking additional bits and pieces
of the hapless Czechoslovak state. Finally, in March
1939, Hacha bowed to a new ultimatum from Berlin
and surrendered control of all remaining Czech
territory to Germany. What was left of Bohemia and
Moravia was promptly incorporated en bloc into the
Third Reich as a protectorate. To the east, Slovakia
was established as an autonomous republic under an
almost equally onerous degree of German control.
After existing for only 21 years, Czechoslovakia dis-
appeared from the map.
The outbreak of World War lI enabled Benes to
form an exile government in London and, in time, to
secure full recognition for his group from all the major
Allied powers both as the leg successor to
Czechoslovakia's pre- Munich regime and as a
cobelligerent in the war against the Axis. As the war
progressed, Benes became convinced of the wisdom of
a policy of close cooperation with the Soviet Union as
well as with the West. In December 1943, he flew to
Moscow to conclude a new 20 -year treaty of friendship
and mutual assistance with the Kremlin. While there,
he also agreed to several political compromises that
favored his country's Communists in order to secure
their cooperation in a postwar government. In early
1945, when it became evident that responsibility for
liberating Prague would fall to the Soviets, Benes
returned to Moscow in order to work out the details of
establishing a provisional government on
Czechoslovak soil as soon as circumstances would per-
mit. In April, Benes and his newly reorganized cabinet
arrived in Kosice, a town in eastern Slovakia that had
been designated as "he temporary national capital a
few weeks earlier. Their first official act was to publish
a detailed governmental plan, the so- called Kosice
Program, which revealed the extent of the concessions
Benes had made to insure Soviet support.
Indeed, the chanties made in Czechoslovakia's
traditional political and economic systems under the
Kosice Pr:.4ram were nearly as dramatic as the popula-
tion and territorial adjustments cited earlier. A
National Front coalition government was established
in which the Communists initially held more than
one -third of the portfolios, including the important
ministries of defense, interior, agriculture, and infor-
mation. The conservative Agrarian Party �the largest
political party in prewar Czechoslovakia �was barred
from participation in the coalition on the grounds that
its representatives had collaborated with the Germans
during the occupation. Under these circumstances, the
Communists were soon able to push through a number
if measures that further strengthened their position.
Land redistribution, under a thinly disguised system of
party patronage, was begun by 'fie Communist
minister of agriculture. Nationalization of industry,
banking, and commerce was introduced. A reorgan za-
tion of the military and police establishments aimed at
bringing them more fully under Communist control
was initiated.
These moves, together with the general popularity
enjoyed by the Communists as a result :heir prewar
and wartime activities, contributed to the party's
strong showing in the parliamentary elections of 1946.
Receiving 38% of the votes cast, Communists won 14
of the 300 seats at stake �far more than any of the
other five coalition parties. Their chief, Klement
Gottwald, became prime minister. With little in-
terference from his relatively complacent intended vic-
tims, he promptly began laying the groundwork for a
total Communist takeover. His opportunity came in
February 1948 when, noting that Communist pop-
ularity was declining and hoping to hasten new elec-
tions, all the non Communist cabinet ministers re-
signed in protest of Communist manipulation of the
police.
The Communists quickly brought massive pressures
to bear on President Benes to force him to form a new
government which would exclude their opponents.
Communist controlled action committees in almost
every town, factory, school, and government office
were armed and sent out to join the police in an
overwhelming display of strength in Prague and other
key points throughout the country. The radio and press
were commandeered and used to saturate the popula-
tion with pro Communist propaganda. Tired, sick,
and above all anxious to avoid civil war, President
Benes capitulated. On February 25, he accepted a
new National Front cabinet headed by Gottwald and
composed largely of Communists and Communist
sympathizers. And, while otherwise relatively
bloodless, the coup took a final tragic twist in what
may have been yet another defenestration incident.
Whether he jumped or fell, as the Communists main-
tain, or whether he was pushed, as most Czechoslovaks
still believe, the body of Jan Masaryk Benes' postwar
foreign minister and son of Czechoslovakia's first
President �was found beneath the window of his
quarters in Prague Castle on 10 March 1948.
9
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The Stalinist Interlude and the Dubeek Revival (c)
The advent of Communist rule brought a whole new
series of traumatic experiences for the Czechoslovak
people. Early hopes that local Communist leaders
would prove to be less exacting overseers than their
Soviet counterparts and that Moscow would allow
them to chart their own domestic course were quickly
dashed. Gottwald's forces embarked on a determined
campaign to secure their victory and force the nation
into an ideologica!ly orthodox authoritarian mold. Ef-
forts to liquidate non Communist elements were
stepped up, and in May 1948 the National Assembly,
by then Communist- dominated, approved a new con-
stitution redesignating Czechoslovakia a "people's
republic" in consonance with the pattern the Soviets
had established elsewhere in Eastern Europe. A
problem developed when President Benes resigned
rather than sign the new charter int-, law, but
Gottwald, Benes' successor as President, made haste to
remedy this s-tuation. By mid -June, Czechoslovakia's
initial postwar political system had been officially dis-
carded.
With this event, the country entered a grim and
lengthy Stalinist phase in its development. Fearful of
lingering democratic values, the Gottwald regime
employed all the techniques at the disposal of a
modern totalitarian state� including intimidation,
propaganda, and strict regulation of the political,
economic, and cultural life of the people �to con-
solidate its position. Intensive programs of nation-
alization of remaining small private firms and of
agricultural collectivization were launched. A highly
centralized command economy was established in
which, just as in its Soviet prototype, investment
priority was accorded to h -avy industry. Those non
Communist parties which were not disbanded out-
right were either merged with or made puppets of the
Communist Party. Much to the dismay of the
10
nominally autonomous regional Communist Party
organization in Slovakia, effective political power was
concentrated in the hands of a few top national party
leaders in Prague. Ever tighter controls were imposed
on educational institutions, the church, and the infor-
mation media. The population was herded into a web
of interlocking Communist- dominated mass organiza-
tions embracing almost every aspect of social activity
and was subjected to a broad campaign of coercion
and terror which reached its zenith during the ruthless
Stalinist trials of the late 1940's and early 1950's.
In contra: to what happened in most of the other
Communist countries of Eastern Europe, neither
Stalin's death in 1953 nor Khrushchev's famous
denttnciatioA of his former master 3 years later resulted
in any internal liberalization in Czechoslovakia.
Gottwald quickly followed Stalin to the grave, but the
heirs to his power� Antonin Zapotocky, who stepped
up to the Presidency from his former post as prime
minister, and Antonin Novotny, who took over leader-
ship of the party �were risen of the Stalinist mold.
Despite their general unpopularity, however, they
were spared the sort of internal unrest that erupted in
neighboring Communist suates by the tight grip that
they maintr fined on all aspects of Czechoslovak life,
the traditional caution of the population, and the
steady increase in living standards generated by
forced -draft industrial grnwth.
Zapotocky's death in 1957 brought no change in
the ultraconservative orautation of the regime, for
Novotny simply donned the hat of President in addi-
tion to that of party chief. Three years later, a new
constitution was promulgated proclaiming
Czechoslovakia to be a mature socialist state,
one� indeed, the only one aside from the
U.S.S.R.� nearly ready to begin the vaguely defined
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J x i
,4r
if
Klement Gottwald
process of transition to communism. The charter
changed the name of the country to Czechoslovak
Socialist Republic and provided for far reaching ad-
ministrative changes designed to support the principle
of strong centralized rule. In addition to its more mun-
dane objectives, the document was clearly intended to
serve as an eloquent testimonial to the success and
wisdom of Novotny's domestic policies. But such self
congratulation was a bit premature. In fact, Novotny's
outmoded Stalinist system was already beginning to
break down.
Over the years, Novotny's policies had alienated
most of his countrymen and had even created
divisions albeit for the most part well con-
cealed� within the party itself. The Slovaks, chafing
under their total subordination to a Czech dominated
regime in Prague, were particularly unhappy.
Moreover, popular discontent, while rarely openly ex-
pressed, had quickly found reflection in various forms
of passive resistance which not only exacerbated the
shortcomings inherent in Czechoslovakia's strait-
jacketed economy, but undermined the effectiveness
of Novotny's political programs as well.
In late 1962, mounting economic troubles and
Khrushchev's renewed assault on Stalinism brought
matters to a head. Reformist forces inside and outside
the party began to agitate openly for the sort of
liberalization that had been undertaken throughout
most of the rest of Communist Eastern Europe many
years earlier. raced with new economic reverses in
1963, Novotny was forced to modify his policies and
sanction a gradual relaxation of controls. Once begun,
however, liberalization developed a momentum of its
own. Longstanding differences between party liberals
and conservatives broke out into the open, frequently
impeding the formulation or implementation of
policies needed to deal with pressing economic and
social problems. Novotny's efforts to establish and
maintain a delicate balance between these factions
only increased the levels of party discord and official
inertia. By late 1967, Novotny was clearly losing con-
trol of the situation, and a full -blown party crisis en-
sued.
Sensing Novotny's vulnerability, a group of Slovak
leaders headed by Alexarder Dubcek precipitated the
crisis during an October meeting of the Party Central
Committee by boldly criticizing him and his inef-
ficient Czech dominated administration and by
suggesting that the time had come for collective
leadership. Although a number of Czech leaders who
also favored a change at the helm soon joined in these
personal attacks on the previously sacrosanct Novotny,
he managed to postpone discussion of the leadership
question for a number of weeks in hopes of improving
11
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Antonin Novotny

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his position. It was a bad gamble; Novotny continued
to lose support at all levels of the party. The final blow
came in early Decernt er when Soviet party chief
Leonid Brezhnev arrived in Prague for an on- the -spot
assessment of the situation and decided not to in-
tervene in Novot, 's behalf. Desperate, Novotny and
his principal supporters ther, toyed with the idea of
mounting a military coup, but they proved unable to
bring one off. In early January 1968 the Central Com-
mittee ousted Novotny as Party First Secretary and
elected Alexander Dubcek to take his place. Novotny
was, however, allowed to retain both the Presidency
and his seats on the Party Presidium and Central Com-
mittee until March when, partly because of the
damaging revelations of a close associate who had
defected to the West, his political career came to an
abrupt end.
The news of Novotny's fall was received with ap-
proval at home and abroad. A brighter era seemed to
be in store for the Czechoslovak people, but no one,
least of all the Soviets, really expected momentous
changes. Dubcek, a compromise choice for the top par-
ty post, had been trained in Moscow and had seemed
to occupy a middle -of -the -road position on political
and economic reform during his rise to leadership of
me Slovak Party organization under Novotny. Once in
national office, however, he surrounded himself with
an impressive team o% liberal intellectuals and
youthful technocrats whose unorthodox views and im-
patient energy soon won popular approbation.
Czechoslovakia's brief and exhilarating Prague
Spring blossomed in April when the Dubcek regime
adopted, and swiftly moved to implement, a com-
prehensive program for reform �the so- called Action
Program. The sweeping changes embodied therein
were intended both to rationalize the country's un-
wieldy socialist system and to humanize it by making
it responsive to democratic processes. Thus, personal
rights and liberties were guaranteed, including the
freedoms of speech anJ assembly and the right to
travel, work, and, in some cases, reside permanently
abroad. Censorship was lifted. The role of the party in
the process of government was reduced, and the
National Assembiv was directed to assume its con-
stitutional role as the "supreme organ of state power."
Plans were made to establish a decentralized and
market- oriented economy, akin in spirit if not in detail
to the Yugoslav model. Gustav Husak was called out of
political obscurity to lead a drive to federalize the
state. And while the Dubcek regime repeatedly reaf-
firmed its basic loyalty to Moscow, it delighted its
prideful domestic constituency by simultaneously
serving notice that Czechoslovakia would thence
forth maintain a less subservient stance.
12
The tasks Dubcek set for himself in the Action
Program were not easy. From the outset, the reform
process was impeded by quarrels over tactics and
priorities and by the maneuvers of formidable op-
ponents both at home and abroad. For their part,
Czechoslovak conservatives, both inside and outside
the party, opposed Dubcek's programs for ideological
reasons and out of fear that they would lose their jots.
Beyond the country's borders, the Soviet Union and its
more conservative Warsaw Pact allies, most notably
East Germany and Poland, became concerned that
Dubeek's reforms not only might lead Czechoslovakia
to withdraw from the socialist camp but also might
prove to be disastrously contagious. In consequence,
the pressures brought to bear on Dubcek from the east
to get him to alter his course mounted steadily
throughout the spring and summer of 1968,
culminating in a summit -level confrontation between
the Soviet Politburo and the Czechoslovak Presidium
at the Slovak border town of Cierna nad Tisou in late
July.
The Soviet- orchestrated campaign of intimidation
was, however, a dismal failure. Far from cowing the
Czechoslovak people and their leaders, it forged a
strong bond of anti Soviet nationalism between them.
Increasing domestic popularity, in turn, encouraged
Dubcek, and his lieutenants to deal with their Warsaw
Pact critics in the best and most devious Schweikist
tradition. Finally, when it appeared that the pledges
the Soviets thought they had extracted from Dubcek
at Cierna nad Tisou would not be fulfilled, the
Kremlin's patience ran out. On the night of 20 -21
August, Moscow moved to crush the Dubcek experi-
ment by force. About 300,000 troops, predominantly
from the Soviet Union but including contingents from
East Germany, Poland, Bulgaria, and Hungary,
poured into Czechoslovakia. The invasion was swift
and well coordinated. There was no organized milif.a-y
resistance and, despite sporadic gunfire and atterripts
by some Czechoslovak citizens to sabotage the
movements of the invading forces, casualties were ex-
tremely light. Prague and other major urban enters
were quickly occupied. Key Czechoslovak leaders, in-
cluding Dubcek, were arrested and spirited away to
prison cells in the U.S.S.P1.
At this point, however, the Soviet Union's carefully
laid plans went awry. Failing to foresee the surge of
national unity and lok. Ity to Dubcek that its
heavyhanded actions would provoke, the Kremlin had
assumed that it could install a collaborationist regime
within hours after the intervention. The Soviets quick-
ly learned how wrong they were. Ge... Ludvik
Svoboda, the normally mild mannered old national
hero who had succeeded Novotny as President 5
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A
ti
`i
Angry crowd confronts a Soviet tank in Prague
months earlier, refused to name a new government.
Leading Czechoslovak conservatives tripped over each
other in denying complicity in or sympathy with the
invasion. The National Assembly issued a ringing
resolution of protest. Angry throngs, defiant radio and
television broadcasts, and an irrepressible flood of
hastily lettered slogans and posters ridiculed Moscow's
lame justification for intervention. An extraordinary
congress of the Czechoslovak Party -by name and
composition an expditiov.s substitute for the party
conclave previously scheduled for September �was
convened in secret under the very noses of the occLpa-
tion troops in Prague on 22 August. By nightfall, the
assembled delegates had elected a new and
overwhelmingly liberal Central Committee, recon-
firmed Dubcek in his post as First Secretary, con-
demned the invasion, and adopted a resolution threat-
ening unspecified "measures" it the Czechoslovak
leL.ders being held in the Soviet Union were not freed.
The following day, President Svoboda, accom-
panied by Husak and an ideologically mixed group of
other Czechoslovak leaders, flew to Moscow to de-
mand the release of his colleagues and to negotiate a
mutually acceptable solution to the situation created
by the invasion. Fearing the outbreak of an uprising
similar to the one in Hungary in 1956 and under sharp
attack from both Communist and non- Communist
critics abroad, the Soviets backed down. Dubcek and
his associates were freed and brought to the
negotiating table in Moscow. A compromise agree-
ment, one which fell far short of meeting the Kremlin's
original objectives, was hammered out, and on the
morning of 27 August Czechoslovakia's preinvasion
leadership team returned home �tired and discour-
aged, but intact.
Undaunted, the Soviets launched a determined
campaign to undermine the Dubcek group's domestic
position by forcing it to implement a number of un-
popular measures. In this, the Kremlin was successful.
Prague's actions in nullifying the work of the extraor-
dinary party congress, signing a status -of- forces agree-
ment authorizing the "temporary" stationing of Soviet
troops on Czechoslovak soil, and creating a new and
appropriately "balanced" eight- member body at the
apex of the party hierarchy reopened old divisions
within the leadership and disappointed the popula-
tion. Althou as Dubcek had promised, a law
federalizing the country into separate Czech and
Slovak republics was duly enacted and implemented,
bitter factional infighting made it increasingly dif-
ficult for him to preserve any other feature of his
preinvasion reform program. Finally, in April 1969, he
bowed to the inevitable and agreed to step aside in
favor of Husak, Slovakia's postintervention party boss
and by then the leading advocate of "realism" and
"normalization" of relations with the Soviet Union.
Subsequently stripped of his remaining party posts and
recalled from honorable exile as Ambassador to
Turkey, Dubcek was eventually expelled from the par-
ty altogether and relegated to a modest and obscure
existence as a motor pool supervisor in the Slovak
forestry administration, a job he still held in late 1973.
13
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Hu:ak': Headache: (c)
14
The situation that Husak faced when he took over as
Party First Secretary was far from reassuring. The
country was suffering from inflation, shortages, and
generai economic chaos resulting from the beleaguered
Dubcek's inability to develop a workable new
economic system to replace the discarded centralized
controls of the Novotny era. Moreo%er, the leadership
was still bitterly divided, the Czechoslovak people
were still indulging in occasional anti Soviet demon-
strations, and the Kremlin had recently renewed
threats of direct intervention. It was evident that,
at the very minimum, political normalization would re-
quire reunification of the party and restoration of its
"leading role establishment and maintenance of an
effective system of control over the country's popula-
tion and mass social organizations; removal of the dis-
ruptive influence of surviving liberal and, in some
cases, fundamentally antisocialist elements; and
restoration of the confidence of the Soviet Union and
other Warsaw Pact members in the policies of the
Czechoslovak Government.
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Dubcek with his successor, lusak, the night he resigned as party leader

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Despite the apparent urgency of the need to correct
the "distortions" of the Dubeek era, Husak sought to
establish a relatively moderate regime, one which
would gradually win both popular acceptance and
support by turning back the clock as gently and selec-
tively as possible. In this, he was hampered to some
degree by his own authoritarian bent, a trait which
was reflected in his willingness to employ firm and oc-
casionally brutal methods in suppressing the open
manifestations of dissent which marred his early
months in office. More important, however, his room
for maneuver �never very great� shrank markedly as
the forced exodus of liberals from public life gradually
denied him the traditional centrist option of playing
both ends of the political spectrum against each othe:.
Husak's problems o_� this score were compounded by
the Soviets who, suspicious about his reformist past
and t. ue intentions with respect to the future, not only
withheld the support he needed to consolidate his
domestic position but also actively sought to prevent
him from becoming too powerful by giving measured
encouragement to his hardline critics. In keeping with
this strategy, flattering attention was paid to promi-
nent ^onservatives, especially to those like Alois Indra
and Vasil Bilak who were potential contenders for par-
ty leadership, and their willing cooperation was
enlis.ed bosh in keeping a close watch on Husak and in
prodding him to further rapid compliance with Soviet
wishes.
Because of these pressures, Husak was forced into a
series of damaging political retreats. He yielded to his
opponents on some key cadre appointments. Bit by bit,
he backed away from his early positions on a number
of vital issues, including his initial and highly popular
contention that the 1968 intervention had been both
uninvited and unneeded, his promise that there would
be no massive purge of the party membership, and his
advocacy of a policy of "reconciliation" with the
deposed liberal community. indeed, as he shifted
toward a more orthodox and conservative posture, his
policies at times became indistinguishable from those
of his hardline rivals.
But liusak's retreat never became a rout. A tough
anti brittle- scarred master of the art of political sur-
viva. he yielded just enough to steal his conservative
opponents' thunder and to bolster his standing with
Moscow. By so doing, he w, is able to prevent his rivals
from converting the part:/ purge of 1970 into a
witchhunt that would have Deprived the organization
of its mass character and reduced it to an elite core of
hardliners. He also managed to stave off demands for
Stalinist -style political vials and for a wholesale purge
of technicians, managers, and other members of the
"technical intelligentsia." In late 1970, he even
succeeded in getting Moscow to agree to the removal
of two of his more troublesome domestic enemies:
Czech lnturios Minister Groesser and General Rytir,
Prague's representative in the Czechoslovak Soviet
Military Liaison Office. Shortly thereafter, following
new concessions designed to satisfy Moscow's remain-
ing minimum requirements foi political normalization
(most notably, the publication of two major party
documents sanctifying a Soviet- approved explanation
of the origins and nature of the country's recent inter-
nal crisis), political infighting in Prague began to taper
off.
By late May 1971, when the long postponed official
14th Congress of the Czechoslovak Party was convened
to proclaim the defeat of "izvisionism" and the ad-
ve it of a hopeful new era of solid "socialist construc-
tion," the continuation of Husak's tenure as party
chief was no longer in doubt. The thoroughness with
which he had dismantled the liberal movement and
his firmness in quieting public dissent had left his con-
servative opponents no lever with which to challenge
his position. Moreover, the dedication with which he
had aligned Czechoslovak policy with Soviet interests
and his personal allegiance to Brezhnev had earned
him the all- important backing of Moscow. The issue
on which he had appeared most vulnerable �his failure
to sanction the Warsaw Pact's military intervention in
1968 �had been largely diluted by his public accession
at the Soviet Party Congress a month before to the
thesis that th� invasion had been mounted in response
to "appeals" by true Czechoslovak Communists.
For the most part, the 14th Congress was a pro for-
ma affair, nota5le primarily for its display of unity
within the top leadership. Husak was duly reconfirmed
in office and subjected to some warm words of praise
from Brezhnev. The changes made in the party
leadership and organization were minor, designed
either to tie up loose ends remaining from the reform
era or, like according Husak the Soviet -style title of
general ecretary, to underscore Prague's loyalty to the
U.S.S.R. Perhaps the most significant of these moves
was the decision to recentralize the power structure by
abolisYng the Czech Bureau �a stopgap body created
after the invasion by reformists attempting to
federalize the party around equal Czech and Slovak
organizations �and by returning the Slovak Party to
its traditional subordinate, albeit separate, status.
Despite his emergence as undisputed primus inter
pares, however, the congress was not an unqualified
personal success for Husak. For all th. pomp and cir-
cumstance, the proceedings had done nothing to im-
prove his domestic popularity or to decrease his
dependence on Moscow. Quite the contrary. Not only
15
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Husok dWivarkv closip sWemwit at 11th Porte Conprem
had he heen forced to repeat his endorsement of the in-
vited invasion thesis but, by strming the collective
nature of party authority, the congress had un-
derscored the fact that he had paid for his preeminence
by making fundamental concessions to his conserv-
ative colleagues. Moreover, the one change made in
the membership of the Party Presidium �the replace
ment of Dubeek -era holdover Evzen Erban by
hardliner Karel Hoffman served notice to all con-
cerned that the c tinservative wing of the party would
continue to exercise a strnag voice in the policymaking
process.
Flusak was subsequently able to redress the
leadership balance to his advantage by easing Alois 1n-
dra out of his post as Party Secretary and into the less
powerhrl lob of Chainnan of the National Assembly.
Hilt although Husuk's position in late 1973 appeared
stronger, with regard to both the Soviets and his inter
nal opposition, than at any time since he assumed
power, his room for maneuver was still very limited.
The short- and long -term problems that Husak has
encountered in the economic field have been inex-
tricably intertwined with his political woes. He was
painfully aware that the inherent weaknesses of a coin
mand economy had played a major role in Novotny's
downfall, yet in moving to overcome the chaos
generated by Dubeek's embryonic reforms, he had no
choice other than to reimpose a highly centralized
system patterned on the Soviet model. From the out-
set, however, he wisely avoided one major error of the
Novotny era by preserving the J)ubcek regime's
emphasis on building new housing, producing more
consumer goods, end upgsadirg the Czechoslovak
diet.
Hawk's first order of business was to strengthen his
regime's control over the planning and direction of the
economy, As in the political field, he moved slowly at
first in artier to avoid unduly alarming the populace.
In mid -IIQ09, however, continued inflationary pressure
ft+iced his hand, and Czechoslovakia entered a
prolonged period of economic retrenchment and
reorganization. Retail prices were increased and then
frozen. New investment projects were curtailed. Plan-
ned walte increases were halted. A wide range of con-
trols, including obligatory goals for output and trade,
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were imposed on the business community. The trade
unions were gradually deprived of the meaningful
voice in both local and top -level economic decisions
that they had acquired during the I>bcek era and
eventually were relegated to their traditional role as an
instrument of control under the unenlightened
leadership of hardliner Karel Hoffman.
Husak succeeded in containing inflation by the end
of 1970. He then unveiled a new Five Year Plan
(1971 -1975) which turned out to be the most cautious of
any in Eastern Europe �and the most closely attuned
to Moscow's desires. The plan's growth goals were, in
fact, clearly understated in order to insure that the
economy would enjoy the appearance of healthy
progress. In broad terms, the document called for a
renewed stress on heavy industry, closer cooperation
with the U.S.S.R. and other Communist countries, and
increased attention to the immediate needs of the
Czechoslovak consumer.
One thing which was eon:.pieuousty missing front
the plan was any hint of new economic reforms.
Indeed, while possible changes affecting prices, wages,
and managerial techniques have subsequently become
the subject of lively debate within the closed confines
of top b lvernmental and party organs, little movement
toward -)verhauling the country's resurrected com-
mand economy had been recorded by late 1973. In
Husak's defense, it must be said that neither the
political balance in Czechoslovakia nor Moscow's
renewed emphasis or,, conformity have favored innova-
tion. Furthermore, there is no denying that Husak's ef-
forts to improve consumer welfare have met with con-
siderable suc.. ass. At the same time, however, his
dutifully orthodox approach to ec -nomic and political
affairs and his marked reluctance to remove loyal par-
ty hacks from important jobs have aggravated old
economic problems and created some new difficulties
of their own.
In fact, while the economy continues to plod along
(both national income and industrial production have
been growing at about 6% a year), it is creaking
audibly. The manpower squeeze has grown worse. Ex-
hortation and threats have failed to yield planned
gains in productivity. Thanks largely to poor worker
discipline and unsound management, construction
and production costs have increased much faster than
anticipated. In part due to the same factors, major in-
vestment projects have been taking an average of 8
years from planning to completion� nearly twice the
comparable period in other developed nations. Many
industrial facilities are antiquated and lag !ar behind
their Nestern counterparts. Alarmingly, in view of
Husak's efforts to bind his country more closely to the
Soviet bloc, even the comparative advantage which
Czechoslovak products have traditionally enjoyed
within the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance
(CEMA) has evaporated.
Husak's principal problems in the field of foreign af-
fairs� Soviet tutelage and troubling isolation �were a
logical outgrowth of his normalization campaign. Dur-
ing his first 3 years in office, when he was largely
preoccupied with internal matters, his foreign policy
was characterized by total subservience to Moscow.
Predictably, his regime's overall responsiveness to
Soviet desires and, in particular, its action in officially
endorsing Brezhnev's views on both the practical and
ideological justification for the 1968 invasion, le-1 to a
marked deterioration of its relations with free spirited
Yugoslavia and Romania. Similarly, Prague's relations
with the leading nations of the non Communist world
became strained as Husak moved to cut off the free
travel of Czechoslovak citizens to the West and as his
rigid domestic policies came under growing Western
criticism.
Toward the end of 1972, increasing self- confidence
and the opportunities created by Moscow's unfolding
policy of detente prompted Husak to turn his hand to
repai-ing some of this damage. With the Kremlin's
blessing, he launched a broad diplomatic offensive
designed to restore Czechoslovakia to its preinvasion
standing in the international community. There were
some setbacks, both of his own making and because of
problems in the Middle East, but by early 1974 he
could claim an impressive list of accomplishments.
Among other things, he had buried the hatchet with
Romania and Yugoslavia. At the cost of retreating
from its original demand that Bonn declare the 1938
Munich Agreement invalid ab initio, Czechoslovakia
had concluded a pair of bilateral treaties with West
Germany which had paved the way for restoration of
normal diplomatic relations between the two coun-
tries. Soma progress had been made toward resolving
longstanding differences with Austria and the Vatican.
The U.S. Secretary of State had paid a much publi-
cized visit to Prague, and workin -level talks aimed at
reaching a satisfactory settlement of opposing U.S. and
Czechoslovak financial claims had been initiated.
Despite its more assertive posture, however, Prague's
freedom of action in the foreign policy field in early
1974 was still clearly circumscribed by its loyalty to the
Soviet Union. Indeed, Czechoslovakia remained the
loudest proponent of a "coordinated socialist foreign
policy" in Eastern Europe. And under those cir-
cumstances, Husak was still finding it hard t,1 develop
either domestic support or international respect.
17
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This old Czech motto reflects the combination of
resignation and basic optimism that still characterizes
the outlook of Husak's countrymen. Despite past dis-
appointments, hopes persist that Husak will someday
reveal himself to be the ultimate practitioner of
Schweik ism �that, having lulled L )th the Kremlin
and his hardline domestic opponents into dropping
18
their guard, he will shrewdly exploit the logic and im-
peratives of detente to launch a new round of liberaliz-
ing political and economic reforms. But although such
a happy eventuality is iot beyond the realm of
possibility, the prospects for any significant improve-
ment in Czechoslovakia's internal climate in the near
future are not bright.
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"We Have Been, and We Will Be Again" (c)

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Whatever his ultimate intentions. Husak is in a dif-
ficult position. He cannot chart an e-en modestly in-
dependent course unless he can develop a firm base of
popular support similar to that enjoyed by Poland's
Gierek or Hungary's Kadar. ironically, the trend
toward East -West detente has made it more difficult
for Husak to court this support. For one thing, Moscow
has been pressing for increased discipline and conform.
it) in Eastern Europe in order to counter the poten-
tially corrosive impact of detente. As might be ex-
pected, the Kremlin's call for an intensification of the
struggle against all forms of ideological heresy has
been enthusiastically echoed by Czechoslovakia's
hardliners. Moreover, although Husak still favors a
policy of moderation, even he recognizes that
Czechoslovakia is particularly vulnerable to destabiliz-
ing Western influences. Not only do most of the pop-
ular grievances that combined to topple the Novotny
regime still lie close to the surface, but the 1968 inva-
sion created a str )ng �and for the Czechoslovaks, un-
precedented� undercurrent of anti Sovietism as well.
All told, Husak must find the arguments against casing
internal controls to be very strong.
In any event, the general trend of developments in
Czechoslovakia suggests that Husak's course will con-
tinue to swing between suppressing the vestiges of
resistance with a stick and luring the masses out of
their apathy with a carrot. Unfortunately for the
Czechoslovak populace, the stick seerred most in
evidence as 1973 drew to a close. For example, about
a0 former students and faculty merrtbc-rs of the Com-
ruunist Party's higher school were suddenly and
belatedly stripped of their academic titles and degrees.
The 'ply of )an Palach, a young student who im-
molated himself in January 1969 to protest the War-
saw Pact in -asion and its consequences, was
mysteriously removed from a cemetery in Prague, and
his grave was replaced with that of a virtually un-
known woman. In addition, there were reports that a
new trial of prominent dissidents was being prepared.
In sum. it would appear that no general thaw is in
the immediate offing. Without one, however, it seems
almost certain that the economy �and Husak per
sonuliy- --will have to continue to bear the twin
burdens of popular apathy and passive resistance.
Indeed, even if Husak should introduce some modest
economic reforms in the near future, he could find it
increasingly difficult just to satisfy the newly whetted
economic expectations of his countrymen-
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Mom than 50,000 mourners offend funeroi serriees of
!on Moch, whose self- immolotion was in protest of the Soviet -led invasion.

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Chronology (u/ou)
863
Greek missionaries Cyril and Methodius arrive in Moravia,
establishing early Christian unity among Czech peoples; draw
up first Slavic alphabet.
906
Moravian Empire is dissolved after defeat by Magyars.
921 -29
Bohemia and Moravia are united under crown of Wenceslas,
Bohemiz's patron saint.
973
Slovakia is annexed by Hungary.
13th century
Germans begin mass migration into Bohemia, setting stage
for rapid social and ronomic development.
1346 -78
Bohemia enjoys "Golden Age" under aarleg I of Bohemia
(Charles IV of Holy Roman Empire).
1348
University of Prague (Charles University), first university in
central Furope, is founded.
1415
Martyrdom of Jan Hus precipitates Hussite revolt against
domination by Germans and Catholic Church; Czech national
consciousness gestates.
1526
Ferdinand assumes Bohemian throne, beginning Hapsburg
domination and renewing Catholic domination.
1592 -1670
Jan Comcnius reforms education and leads latter phase of
Czech reformation.
1618
Bohemian Protestants revolt against Catholic Church,
initiating Thirty Years War; two Catholic governors are
victims of "defenestration of Prague."
1620
Czechs are defeated at Battle of White Mountain, reestab-
lishing Hapsburg rule; daring "Time of the Night" Bohemia
endures severe political, religious, and cultural persecution;
war losses and heavy migration lead to renewed Germaniza-
b n of Bohemia.
19th century
Czech "renaissance" emphasizes literary works of national
history and folklore; Czech language revives.
1867
Austro- Hungarian Empire incorporates Slovakia, Bohemia,
and Moravia; economic and cultural growth are facilitated
by relatively mild Austrian hegemony.
1918
First Czechoslovak Republic is founded under President
Tomas G. Masaryk.
1921
Czechoslovak Commun:st Party is founded.
1935
Eduard Benes succeeds Masaryk as President of the Republic.
1938
September
Munich Conference cedes Sudetenland to Germany.
1939
March
German troops occupy Czechoslovakia; Bohemia and Mo-
ravia become German protectorate and Slovakia becomes
"independent" state.
1940
J aly
United Kingdom recognizes Czechoslovak Government in
London under Eduard Benes.
1943
December
Benes signs 20 -year friendship and mutual assistance pact
with U.S.S.R.
1944
August
Slovak national uprising takes place against Nazis.
1945
April
Kosice program of close relations with U.S.S.R. and nationali-
zation of industry is announced.
May
Last German resistance ends with liberation of Prague.
June
Expulsion of most ^thnic Germans is ordered. Ruthenia ceded
to U.S.S.R.
December
By mutual agreement, U.S. and Soviet troops withdraw from
Czechoslovakia.
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1946
May
Communists receive 38 National Socialists 18 Social
Democrats 13 and Slovak Democrats 14% of votes in first
postwar general election. Three other parties share remaining
17% of votes.
June
Eduard Benes is unanimously elected President.
July
Klement Gottwald (Communist) forms government.
1947
July
Under Soviet pressure Czechoslovak cabinet reverses its de-
cision to participate in Marshal: Plan.
1948
February
Communists seize power in bloodless coup and formally
establish "people's democracy."
June
Benes resigns presidency.
Gottwald becomes President and Antonin Zapotocky Prime
Minister.
1949
January
First Five Year (Economic) Plan (1949 -53) begins.
1951
March
Roman Catholic Archbishop Beran is banished from Prague.
November
Rudolph Slansky is arrested and charged with conspiracy
against state.
1952
November
Slansky and 10 other former officials are sentenced to death
for treason.
1953
March
Gottwald dies; Zapotocky becomes President and Viliam
Siroky Prime Minister.
September
Antonia Novotny becomes party First Secretary.
1955
May
Warsaw Pact is established.
1956
January
Second Five Year Plan (1956 -60) begins.
1957
November
President Zapotocky dies; Novotny becomes President,
retaining post of party First Secretary.
1960
July
Newly elected National Assembly proclaims achievement of
socialism in Czechoslovakia, ratifies new "socialist" con-
stitution, and changes country's name to "Czechoslovak
Socialist Republic."
1961
January
Third Five Year Plan (1961 -65) begins.
June
Judicial law tightens party control over simplified court
system.
1962
August
Third Five Year Plan is scrapped as economic situation
deteriorates.
December
12th Party Congress agrees to review 1949 -54 purges and to
begin de- Stalinization in earnest.
1963
May
Intellectual :crment reaches point of public criticism of party
and state leaders.
June
Regime announces liberalization of cultural policies at
writers and journalists unions' congress.
Novotny moves to reassert his control as de- Stalinization
gains momentum.
Verdicts of 1949 -54 purge trial are revised and victims
partially rehabilitated.
Septembe:
Premier Siroky is fired and cabinet shuffled; Jozef Lenart
becomes Premier; party commissions for ideology, economy,
standard of living, and agriculture are established.
Americans still in Czechoslovak prisons are released and
returned to United States in gesture to improve relations.
1964
March
Experiments in economic decentralization and "market
socialism" begin.
October
Youth demonstrations occur in Prague.
November
Novotny is reelected President for 5 -year term.
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1965
February
Radical reform of economy is adopted.
Archbishop Beran it named Cardinal; leaves permanently
for Rome.
1966
January
Economic Reform Program (ERP) is introduced.
May �June
13th Czechoslovak Communist Party Congress elects more
liberal Central Committee.
1967
Jane
Liberal intellectuals attack conservative Novotny regime at
fourth congress of Czechoslovak Writers Union.
July
Novotny visits Moscow to reaffirm his policy position and to
gain Soviet support.
October
Slovak leaders, including Dubcek, launch strong person -1
attack at Central Committee meeting against Novotny for
his poor handling of Czech Slovak problems.
Prague students demonstrate in streets in protest over poor
living conditions, but are intercepted and brutally man-
handled by police.
December
Brezhnev arrives in Prague to assess political situatior and
to encourage Czechoslovak party leaders to maintain stable
regime.
Novotny is attacked by bosh Czech and Slovak leaders at
Central Committee plenum, and continues to lose support on
all levels of Communist Party.
1968
January
Central Committee plenum ousts Novotny as Party First
Secretary bnd replaces him with Slovak leader Alexander
Dubcek. Four additional Dubcek supporters also elected to
Presidium, thus providing moderate Dubcek group with a
majority.
Dubcek visits Moscow alone for first time as party chief.
1968
February
Dubcek meets separately with Hungary's Kadar and Poland's
Gomulka.
Czechoslovak army Maj, r General Sejna, who is implicated
in attempted military coup in support of Novotny, defects
to United States.
First issue of Lilerarni Lisly, new journal of Liberal intel-
lectuals, appears in Prague.
22
March
Novotny resigns from presidency, e.11egedly for reasons of
health; wave of resignations among high- ranking regime
conservatives follows.
Dubcek attends meeting with Soviet, Polish, East German,
Bulgarian, and Hungarian leaders in Dresden in abortive
attempt by Prague's bloc allies to influence internal Czecho-
slovak developments.
Novotny resigns from Party Presidium.
April
New Party Presidium and government caLinet are an-
nounced; Oldrich Cernik replaces Lenart as Premier; party
announces its Action Program designed to fuse socialism with
basic elements of democracy.
May
Dubcek and other leaders visit Soviet Union to discuss
Czechoslovak situation.
Soviets and Poles conduct military maneuvers along Czecho-
slovak border.
Soviet, Polish, East German, Bulgarian, and Hungarian
leaders meet in Moscow to present united front against
Czechoslovak "democratization."
Soviet Premier Kosygin and Defense Minister Grechko visit
Czechoslovakia to confer with Prague leaders.
Novotny is ousted from Central Committee and suspended
fro.n party membership.
June �July
Warsaw Pact "command staff exercises" in Czechoslovakia
and Poland result in protracted presence of Soviet troops in
Czechoslovakia after maneuvers are over.
June
National Assembly passes law abolishing prior censorship.
Three Prague newspapers publish "2,000 Words" manifesto
written by liberal writer Ludvik Vaculik and signed by other
liberals demanding acceleration of "democratization" and
callh.g for dismissal of party leaders who have abused their
power. Party Presidium denounces manifesto on same day.
July
Czech National Council established as provisional counter-
part to Slovak National Council, as first step in proposed
federative arrangement.
Soviet, Polish, East German, Hungarian, and Bulgarian
leaders meet in Warsaw and draft letter censuring Dubcek
regime and Action Program.
Czechoslovak Minister of National Defense recommends re-
form of Warsaw Pact command.
Czechoslovak Party Presidium issues reply to "Warsaw
Letter" refuting allegations.
Soviet Pravda claims that Czechoslovak security forces found
secret cache of U.S. arms near West German border.
Soviet Warsaw Pact military exercises along Czecho-
slovakia's borders greatly expand.
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1968
July- August
Czechoslovak Presidium and Soviet Politburo meet at Cierna
nad Tisou, on Czechoslovak- U.S.S.R. border.
August
Soviet bloc leaders ratify Cierna nad Tisou agreement at
special summit sessior in Bratislava.
Yugoslav President Tito given rousing welcome during 3 -day
visit to Prague.
East German party boss L'Ibright receives chilly reception
during brief trip to consult with Dubcek at Karlovy Vary.
manian party chief Ceausescu arrives in Prague to confer
with liberal Czechoslovak leadership and to sign 20 -year
mutual friendship treaty with Czechoslovakia.
Soviet pres-., after 3 -week silence, resumes heavy propaganda
barrage oplosing Czechoslovak reforms.
Soviet troop accompanied by East German, Polish, Hun-
garian, and Bulgarian forces, invade Czechoslovakia on
night of 20-21 August; by morning of 21 August, Soviet
military in complete control of Prague and other major
population centers. Dubcek and other leaders arrested.
Extraordinary "14th" Party Congress convenes clandestinely
in Prague factory.
President Svoboda journeys to Moscow to negotiate releases
of all arrested leaders and agreement on future of Czecho-
slovakia under occupation. Dubcek is allowed to resume post
as Party First Secretary.
Party plenum hears Dubcek report on Moscow talks; Pre-
sidium enlarged to 22 members; Central Committee also
expanded.
October
Czechoslovak leaders Dubcek, Premier Cernik, and Siovak
party chief Husak� negotiate with Soviet Po)'!buro in
Mosco.+; communique outlines Soviet demands for "nor-
malization."
Czechoslovaks and Soviets sign status -of- forces agreement in
Prague; pact gives semblance of legality to occupation and
calls for removal from Czechoslovak soil of bulk of Soviet
bloc invasion forces by mid- December.
Czechoslovaks demonstrate in restrained manner on 50th
anniversary of founding of Czechoslovak Republic; federali-
zation law transforms Czechoslovakia into two nations
Czech and Slovak �with equal rights.
November
Anti Soviet demonstrations mark 51st anniversary of Russian
October Revolution.
Party plenum announces new middle -of- the -road policies.
Czech and Slovak students stage sit -in strikes to protest
further compromise of liberal reform program and to support
Dubcek leadership.
December
Czechoswvak and Soviet leaders hold summit conference in
Kiyev; Soviets review Czechoslovak progress in fulfilling
commitments and im ,)ose new demands on Czechoslovak
regime.
1968
December
Over one million workers threaten nationwide demonstrations
and strikes if any leading political figures especially
National Assembly President Smrkovsky �are ousted.
1969
January
Czechoslovakia is declared a Federal Republic.
Czech student Jan Palach protests occupation by setting
himself on fire in Wenceslas Square; widespread demonstra-
tions occur in Czech Lands; Prague police disrupt crowds
with tear gas.
March
Victory of Czechoslovak ice hockey team over Soviets sparks
popular riots in Prague; mob sacks Aeroflot office rendering
position of Dubcek regime virtually untenable.
April
Leading Communists accused by Dubcek regime of collab-
orating witF Soviets in 1968 are rehabilitated.
Central Committee plenum replaces Dubcek with Husak as
First Secretary.
Dubcek replaces Petr Colotka as Chairman of Federal
Assembly.
May
Central Committee plenum promulgates "Implementation
Directive," spelling out Husak's basic policies of establishing
tight party discipline and reconciliation with ex- liberals
willing to accept party authority. Ota Sik and Frantisek
Kriegel, two of Dubeek's closest supporters, are expelled
from party.
August
Large -scale pro- Dubcek demonstrations in Prague on inva-
sion anniversary are brutally dispersed by security forces;
regime promulgates Emergency Law temporarily suspending
and rule of law.
September
Party Presidium rescinds its August 1968 condemnation of
Soviet invasion.
Central Committee plenum removes Dubcek from Presidium;
Dubcek refuses to recant; leading Dubcek supporters ousted
from Central Committee; Husak eschews punitive measures
against liberals.
December
Dubcek named ambassador to Turkey.
1970
January
Central Committee plenum revises Presidium; Strougal
named federal Premier; Dubcek "resigns" from Central
Committee.
February
Central Committee implements party card exchange
program.
23
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March
Dubcek suspended from Communist Pa! ty.
May
Czechoslovak- U.S.S.R. Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation,
and Mutual Assistance, signed in Prague, includes principle
of "socialist internationalism" justifying Warsaw Pact in-
vasion, provides for close economic cooperation, implicitly
commits Czechoslovakia to side with Soviet Union in case
of military confrontation between latter and Communist
China.
Dubcek returns to Prague and semi- isolation.
1970
June
Dubcek and ex- Premier Oldrich Cernik are stripped of
remaining government positions.
Party conservatives heighten criticism of Husak's moderaO
domestic policies and call for more thorough party purge.
July
Regime publishes counterattacks on conservative critics,
highlighting intraparty feud.
Regime publishes official interpretation of Dubc '-.'s role in
1968 reform movement, describing his r ;..se tc power as
aberration in otherwise necessary reform effort.
August
Quiet passing of second anniversary of invasion strengthens
Ht yak's political position.
September
Party organ Rude Fravo declares party purge over and be-
ginning of effort to restore party discipline� second stage of
post Dubcek "consolidation" campaign.
October
Husak fires Czech Minister of Interior and Army liaison
officer with Soviet forces to reduce influence of hardliners.
Czechoslovak and West German officials make preliminary
plans to open political talks.
November
Regime stresses "reconciliation" with intelligentsia by an-
nouncing plans to foster cultural activity, including amnesty
for signatories of 1968 political manifestoes.
December
Central Committee plenum issues Party's definitive "Les-
sons" of Czechoslovak history since 13th Party Congress of
1967; Husak announces postpurge Party membership to be
1,200,000; proceedings indicate stand -off between pro -Husak
moderates and conservative faction.
Federal Assembly amends federalization law reducing Slovak
economic and administrative autonomy.
1971
May
14th Party Congress convenes; pronounces "end of the crisis
period." Minor leadership changer reflect regime's emphasis
24
on party u:.ity. Central Committee undergoes large turnover
in party's search for reliable and motivated members. Fifth
Five Year Plan (1971 -75) approved.
November
Elections held to federal, republic, and local governmer.t
bodies, first such balloting since 1964 (scheduled 1968 elec-
tions indefimi;ly postponed after invasion). Regime claims
99.8% of 10.3 million eligib!c voters supported official single
slate.
December
As result of election "mandate," Ifusak revamps leadership
of Federal Assembly, Czech and Slovak National Councils,
and reshuffles respective cabinets. Shifts symbolize final
phase of Husak's consolidation of power over government
apparatus.
1972
July- August
Some 50 former second- string party officials and intellectuals
associated with Dubcek tried for subversive and other illegal
acts committed during 1970 -71 period.
December
Foreign Minister Chnoupek visits Romania in effort to heal
rift caused by Bucharest's vehement denunciation of the
invasion in 1968.
1973
February
Soviet party leader Brezhnev visits Prague on 25th anni-
versary of Communist takeover. Brezhnev warmly endorses
Husak, presents him with Order of Lenin, and declares
Czechoslovakia's "normalization" completed.
March
Aging General Ludvik Svoboda reelected President by
Federal Assembly.
June
Czechoslovak -West German treaty initialed in Bonn after
Prague dropped persistent demand that Bonn declare 1938
Munich Agreement "void from the beginning."
U.S. Secretary of State Rogers visits Prague in first such visit
since World War II. Eve: t_ paves way for improving bilateral
relations within framework of detente, and symbolizes
Czechoslovakia's success in gradually breaking out of post
invasion diplomatic isolation.
October
Husak's visit to Yugoslavia ends cool relations that followed
Belgrade's 1968 denunciation of Warsaw Pact invasion.
December
Husak pays official visit to India, in first trip to non -Com-
munist country since assuming power.
West German Chancellor Brandt visits Prague for formal
signing of bilateral good will treaty, opening way to
establishment of riplomatic relations.
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110008 -5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110008 -5
Area Brief Neu)
LAND:
Size: 49,400 s mi.
Use: 42% arable, 14% other agricultural, 35% forested, 9%
other
Land boundaries: 2,200 mi.
Other political group: Puppet parties Czechoslovak
Socialist Pasty, Czechoslovak People's Party, Slovak
Freedom Party, Slovak Revivrl Party
Member of: CEMA, GATT, IAEA, ICAO, Seabeds Com-
mittee, U.N. Warsaw Pact
PEOPLE:
Population: 14,608,000, average annual growth rate 0.6%
(current)
Ethnic divisions: 65.0% Czechs, 29.2% Slovaks, 4.0%
Magyars, 0.6% Germans, 0.5% Poles, 0.4% Ukrainians,
0.3% others (Jews, Gypsies)
Religion: 77% Roman Catholic, 20% Protestant, 2%
Orthodox, 1 other
Language: Czech, Slovak, Hungarian
Literacy: Almost complete
Labor force: 7.1 million; 18% agriculture, 37% industry,
11 services, 34% construction, communications and others
GOVERNMENT:
Legal same: Czechoslovak Socialist Republic
Type: Communist state
Capital: Prague
Political subdivisions: 2 separate autonomous republics
(Czech Socialist Republic and Slovak Socialist Republic);
7 regions (kraj) in Czech lands, three regions in Slovakia;
national capitals of Prague and Bratislava have regional
status
Legal system: Civil law system based on German codes,
modified by Communist legal theory; revised constitution
adopted 1960, amended in 1968 and 1970; no judicial review
of legislative acts. legal education at Universita Komenskeho
School of Law; has not accepted compulsory ICJ jurisdiction
Branehep: Executive President (elected by Federal As-
sembly), cabinet (appointed by President); legislative
Federal Assembly (elected directly), Czech and Slovak Na-
tional Councils (also elected directly) legislate on limited area
of Czech ari Slovak affairs; judiciary Supreme Court
(elected by I� rderal Assembly); entire governmental structure
dominated by Communist Party
Government leaders: President Ludvik Svoboda (reelected
March 1973), Premier Lubomir Strougal
Suffrage: Universal over age 18
Elections: Governmental bodies every 5 years; President
every 5 years (last election, November 1971)
Dominant political party and leader: Communist Party of
Czechoslovakia (KSC), Gustav Husak, General Secretary;
Communist Party of Slovakia (KSS) has status of "provincial
KSC organization"
Voting strength (1971 election): 99.81% Communist
sponsored single slate
Communists: 1.2 million party members
NOTE �This Area Brief is compiled from data appearing in
the January 1974 issue of the NIS Basic Intelligence Factbook.
ECONOMY:
GNP: $36.8 billion in 1972 (at 1971 prices), $2,540 per
capita; 1972 real growth rate 3.6%
Agriculture: Diversified agriculture; maie craps� wheat,
rye, potatoes, sugar beets; net food importer �moat, wheat,
vegetable oils, fresh fruits and vegetables; caloric intake,
3,100 calories per day per capita (1967)
Major industries: Machinery, food processing, metallurgy,
textiles, chemicals
81sortages: Ores, crude oil, grain
Crude steel: 12.7 million metric tons produced (1972), 880 kg.
per capita
Exports: $5,123 million (f.o.b., 1972); 50% machinery,
equipment; 28% fuels, raw materials; 4% foods, foou prod-
ucts, and live animals; 18% cr,,.sumer goods, excluding
foods (1971)
Imports: $4,662 million (f.o.b., 1972); 33% machinery,
equipment; 44% fuels, raw materials: 15% foods, food prod-
ucts, and live animals; 8% consumer gc ^ds, excluding
foods (1971)
Major trade partners: $9,785 million (1972); 70 �h Com-
munist countries, 30% with West
Monetary conversion rate: Commercial 5.2 crowns =US$1;
noncommercial 10.7 crowns =US$1, tourist rate 13.3
crowns US$1; old commercial rates: 6.63 crowns L'S$1
in 1972; prior to 1972, 7.2 crowns= L'SSI
Fiscal year: Calendar year
Note: Foreign trade figures were converted at the 1972 rate
COMMUNICATIONS:
Railroads: 8,260 mi.; 8,080 mi. standard gage, 70 mi. broad
gage, 110 mi. narripw gage; 1,014 mi. double track; 1,560 mi.
electrified; government owned (1972)
Highways: 45,5W mi.; 800 mi. concrete; 28,651 mi. bitumi-
nous; 2,400 mi. cobblestone, brick sc.,t, stc ne block; 13,650
mi. crushed stone, gravel, improved earth (1972)
Inland waterways: 517 mi. (1973)
Pipelines: Crude oil, 900 mi.; refined products, 535 mi.;
natural gas, 2,800 mi.
Freight carried: Rail -248.9 million short tons, 41.2 billion
short ton/mi. (1972); highway -901.4 million short tons, 8A
billion short ton/mi. (1972); waterway -9.5 million short
tons, 2.5 billion short ton/mi. (incl. int'l. transit traffic)
(1972)
Porli: No maritime ports; outlets are Gdynia, Gdansk,
Stet in in Poland; Rijeka, Yugoslavia; Hamburg, West
Germany; Rostock, East Germany; principal river ports
are Prague, Melnik, Usti nad Labem, Decin, Kom� rno,
Bratislava (1973)
25
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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110008 -5
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110008 -5

i
e!
PLACES AND FEATURES REFERRED TO IN TEXT (U /OU)
COORDINATCB
COORDINATES
COORDINATES
Banskti Byetrica
'N 'E.
'N o 'E
'N. 'E.
Banskh tiavnica
48 44 19 09
Kra13v 7 Dv,6r
49 58 14 03
Senec.. 48 12 17 24
Beroun
48 27 18 54
PLACES AND FEATURES REFERRED TO IN TEXT (U /OU)
Land Utilizal
Fors.+ Mgor. i.q,.
GENERAL AGRICULTURAL REGIONS
Corn, wheat, barley
Wheat. barley, sugar bests
Oats. Potatoes, rye
Mountain farming
Pi
Font
/ai1,,:1 =1 1 11;1 6 1 :a N =1 I =Fait ='4 Iwo] Fai IIZ Qillyflyl:ZIIIIIN `bIII11 -s
COORDINATCB
COORDINATES
COORDINATES
Banskti Byetrica
'N 'E.
'N o 'E
'N. 'E.
Banskh tiavnica
48 44 19 09
Kra13v 7 Dv,6r
49 58 14 03
Senec.. 48 12 17 24
Beroun
48 27 18 54
Krnov
50 08 17 43
Sered 48 17 17 44
49 57 14 05
KromD
Land Utilizal
Fors.+ Mgor. i.q,.
GENERAL AGRICULTURAL REGIONS
Corn, wheat, barley
Wheat. barley, sugar bests
Oats. Potatoes, rye
Mountain farming
Pi
Font
/ai1,,:1 =1 1 11;1 6 1 :a N =1 I =Fait ='4 Iwo] Fai IIZ Qillyflyl:ZIIIIIN `bIII11 -s

Land Utiliza.l
Forest Malor
GENERAL AGRICULTURAL F
Corn, wheat barle
Wheat, barley, su1
oats, potatoes, ry
Mountain farming
Populal
Persons Per spore
00 71 111 21111 20
0 x 10 ltl
Persons per peers kl
14
E a s t on,aR
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Limit or Polish
AdmlMseration
18
W roctow
Ottl nod oksnr
r Ckfwtnowmost
M Karkry Gary
Sokdn Klel
1
Pkei
Stro coke�
18
Basic Resourci
and Processin
RESOURCES
Hard coal
Brown coal
Iron ore
M Magnetite
U Uranium
PROCESSING
Iron and .feel
p oil refining
PIPELINES
Crude oil (CEMA)
Refined produefa
Natural gas
Ikjr
HrMlke
WON 7
Joke�
TfakA
ealiprka

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA �RDP09 00707R0002009 9 0008 -5
URB" OFUUrION
00..1.
Basic Resources
and Processing
RESOURCE!
Hrd c.O
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NFELINES
C.A.odICEMA)
R.6,W pdl
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Industries
i "H. qv. ..M,._ .moo.
kld�W p� ph
Food p�,.."
Sw W crcrs sne sspn.�o
MQq ,.wn.wp.rnnee
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78e11f. ct:'::S
48 28
`QilevFe
49 46
Bn.d)a bad Labem (4ee aJ Brand0 wd L.6cw-
Slari Bakal .a)
50 II
BRAWL .va
48 09
Bhelav
48 46
or...
49 12
B udapest, Hungary
47 30
Budto v
49 04
Budkovice
48 38
Budubv....
48 35
nad Per
BOON= oitejoere
49 31
Cad
49 26
Cw..
49 SS
Cehjovee
48 35
C-14 v P. lumavi.
48 44
C.luk Up.
50 41
Ceaki Thb. va
49 54
Ceaki Bud4jo"M'�
48 59
Ceahi Veleniee
48 40
C. Krumlav
411 49
Corky Tflln
49 45
Cheb
50 04
Chomuw I
50 27
Chop, U.H.S.R
48 26
Ch^. de Hce
50 34
Clerna nod Tiwu
48 26
Cleasyn, Pel and
49 40
Citer
48 19
Coltovo
48 30
C...Mrta, Remaeta
44 It
Danube(arm)
45 20
D561n.............
50 47
D. 1.[ 2k6
50 5o
Dreaden, Ewt Germ anY 4.......,
51 03
13 ukta Paw (Pawl
49 25
Dukovany.. I.......... I
49 05
Elbe arm)
53 50
Frabtodt, .I- tri,
48 30
Frydek -Newt (coma...)
49 40
Kurth Im Wald, Wear Germany
48 IS
Cdynfa, Pa l a9d
54 30
(I6ny9, Ilungwy
47 44
G.tte,ald.e
49 13
Habty...
49 4S
Hamburg, Weat Germany
53 33
Hanbta
49 37
11- Illk0v Brad
49 37
Illohovec
48 4:
Hnivlm
SO 27
Horns 31.65.
48 49
flnrn5 Srale
48 49
Hndco Krifove
50 13
Hradiltaki M.Yv
49 36
Wank. ...1-1
49 33
Hurbenavo
47 52
11"" Wrm)
47 49
latebnf
C', 13
Ja6leniea
48 36
Jfchymov
50 22
J ar.mdf
50 22
is 38
Z liay.........
iovee.
48 24
JIM. van
49 24
Karlovy Vary
50 13
Karvinf.......
49 52
Kawwi.. Po (and
30 l0
K) adn o
4 SO 00
Klawvy
49 24
Klobaukr
18 39
Kl.dako, Poland
50 26
Kalin._.
5002
K.m6rao
47 49
Kopffv.ix...
49 36
Kullce
48 42
Kral.py nad Vlnvou
50 14
17 39
Kdty
48 40
13 22
Lamrilol K�il (m.al)
50 19
SI y.
1�fire.
48 13
14 40
Llblicc
50 05
17 07
I.Ipnik na4 Bd..
49 32
1853
L.mnlckg Stit( a.) r"I'll
4012
16 38
Leuny
50 2t
t9 05
Lovinoha6.
48 26
14 00
Luben(k
48 40
21 56
Lutenec
48 20
21 00
5lalacky
49 28
16 18
Mall.
..49 68
18 47
hhly Duna! (arm)
47 45
IS 24
MarktredniLt, West Germany.
50 00
21 04
Martin
49 04
14 07
SSedved'ov
47 48
14 33
hl5lnik
SO 21
16 27
Mich. lout
48 45
H 28
Mirkolr, Hungary
48 OB
14 .58
htladf Meet v
50 2S
it 19
Wilek pod Rimy
49 52
I8 37
Moldova cad H.dvou
48 37
12 22
Morava (arm)
10
13 26
Manvla (ogin.)
49 30
22 12
Manvln Gate (Pura)
49 33
13 47
Motoemagyatdvir, IluntarY
47 52
22 06
Wit
.50 32
18 36
Matdtlet
50 O9
17 30
N.Wlf tar,
48 l6
20 23
New9ee
49 03
28 39
Nlln
48 10
29 40
Nev6 Metro nad Vih.m
45
14 13
N �v Zi mky
47 59
14 13
N.vy J161.
49 36
13 45
Nymburk
50 11
21 42
Odcr( rlrm
53 32
16 12
Ohfe 41
50 32
0 00
Olomouc
49 35
14 30
Ondfejuv
49 54
18 20
Op. 6f.e k
50 02
12 51
Oanva
49 50
i8 33
Oalravako-Karvinski Pi� (119ml)
49 50
17 50
Pamki Yea
50 32
17 40
Par dubice
50 02
15 29
Pet6(n (iilD
$0 OS
30 DO
Plest'any
48 36
21 15
Plavwky SLvrtok
48 22
15 25
PIw6
49 45
16 46
Podbrtwvi
48 49
N 22
Podibody
SO 09
18 53
Podu.ajsk6 Blakuplre
48 08
IS 05
Pepr ad
49 03
IS 50
PavaLki Byetrica
49 07
21 4o
Povrly
L- 50 40
17 44
Pndad (m[1
50 05
IS 12
Prague
50 05
IS 51
Pfeov
49 27
19 13
Prelov
4o 00
17 25
Pllb.r
49 39
125.5
PHhnm...,
4942
15:.5
PdcM.�....
4946
20 t4
Prmtfjov
49 28
IB 04
Pr6h.wc
50 00
IS 35
Nlhav
49 09
12 34
flea
50 l0
1833
Rijeka, YUgwlavia.....
4521
10 fit
R)may.kf Sebota...._
48 23
14 (16
Roatock, Et Germa.y
54 OS
13 18
Roudnln nad Labem....
So 25
16 52
RudhanY
48 53
16 39
Rwki.
48 32
IS 12
Safic(kevo
48 25
18 08
Sahy
48 04
18 09
'Salsa
48 O9
21 15
sttallee.._
50 07
14 19
Satan fal)
49 10
17 01
14 22
18 36
14 53
17 36
20 13
13 48
19 30
20 12
10 40
17 01
1.5 18
I8 09
12 05
I8 50
17 40
34 20
21 56
20 17
14 54
14 16
21 00
Ig 39
17 00
17 5o
17 17
13 39
14 42
18 28
14 12
Is 05
17 50
)8 10
18 01
13 03
14 38
14 OH
17 IS
14 48
I5 30
18 17
is 30
14 33
13 47
14 24
17 50
17 00
13 22
to 32
IS 08
i7 13
20 18
IN 27
14 10
17 15
14 28
17 27
21 15
IS 0o
14 01
18 38
17 07
14 34
Is 20
14 21
14 24
20 02
12 08
14 IS
20 41
22 Drs
20 20
18 58
I7 53
14 35
20 D3
Sku hwv...................................
49 41
SHdkovl6uvo
48 12
Stan
49 38
SI y.
50 14
SI.py.
49 49
81 6.._
48 37
81a 1, Rudehone (muc)
48 45
Sokol�"..
50 11
Starojkki Lhota
49 34
Staty' B.humf
49 55
Swain, Poland
53 25
Strbak5 Mean.
49 07
StOcovo
47 48
Sumperk
40 56
Tibor
40 25
Tarry.............
48 45
Teh.v
49 58
Tepliea
50 38
Tifywhant, Went Germany
49 35
Thant, AIL..).
41 20
Tfia (arm)
45 15
Tlma6e
48 17
TomiinvA....
48 22
TOpo1'6.ny
48 34
TIe 615
49 13
Tre b%
48 38
Tren61 n
54
T'lnec
49 44
Tr.ava
48 22
Tupf
48 07
Tgn nad Vft..
49 14
Oelf mad Labe.
50 40
Usbgowd. U .S.S.R
46 47
Vih (arw)....... I
47 55
Vajek.vi
48 49
Wkl Bitei
49 16
VOW K. Pe aany
48 33
Vel'ki Zllevm
48 12
Vienna, A.at,i
48 12
Vitkovlee (sec of oarosa)
49 49
Vltava (al�).. 4
50 20
Vochov
49 46
Vrchlabi
50 3a
Vrdtky.......
49 07
Vyaokf prl Mcra�
48 20
VywkS Tatty (,aw
49 t0
Vyaok6 Tntry 41
4D 08
Waldkous, West Oermany
41 39
Z6141f
50 34
Moo (arc I Pmgasi
50 01
Zbraalty
50 02
21. mad It�
48 35
2ldluchoviee
49 02
211i.a
49 13
ZI.tk M.ntvice
48 23
Znojmo
X18 51
Z.h.r
48 I9
Zvolen
48 35
SELECTED AIRFIELDS
17 39
21 29
14 08
14 24
19 11
20 20
12 38
17 SS
18 20
14 35
2D 03
I8 44
19 58
14 40
14 12
14 42
13 50
12 35
19 50
20 17
18 32
20 01
I8 11
IS 53
21 43
18 02
18 39
17 36
IS 54
14 25
14 02
22 is
18 O1
19 31
16 13
22 05
19 27
16 22
18 16
14 ^9
13 17
15 38
18 35
16 55
20 00
20 13
12 30
13 36
14 26
13 09
Is 52
16 37
18 44
18 24
)6 03
10 50
19 OB
Bmhy.e._ __..........__._.....,..4916
1430
Bntialay.ilvanke..._._, I
4810
1713
Cwt- lChetosfce
49 56
15 23
Ceske Budejovice
48 57
14 26
Dobrany
49 40
13 16
Hndee Kralme.,.._.....
50 15
15 51
KleueylV.dochody
5013
14 24
Milovlce
50 14
14 55
Ml�nco
50 37
14 55
Mormov.
49 42
18 07
Nameat nad Oaavou
49 10
16 07
Pardubice.
50 01
IS 44
Png.011 -yne
50 06
14 16
Prm:v
40 26
17 24
84be.
4838
1908
Zater
50 22
13 35
M me,
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110008 -5

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110008 -5
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110008 -5