NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY 60A; ZAIRE; COUNTRY PROFILE

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• Collection: NIS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP01-00707R000200110007-6
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
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• Content Type: REPORTS

SECRET
6DA /GS /CP
Zaire
April 1973
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
SECRET
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The Blessings and Perils of One-Man
Rule.............................. I
The National Heritage Paternalism and
Prem,,ture Birth *Decline and "all of the
First Republic Pax Mobutu *Growing
Pains Nonalignment� Pragmatism With a
Flair
Chronology 17
Area brief 20
Summary map follows 20
This Country Profile was prepared for the NIS by the
Central Intelligence Agency. Research was substan-
tially completed by January 1973.
I
is
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f
r
During this Administration,
the� entire w'utttnry has de-
voted itself' singlembidedl v
to building the Republic a d
industrializing it. Our future
is ever brighter. Our goal:
t(s -make sivift r progress
than- any� ether developing
country. Zaire's endrtnous
material resources; plus the
energies oj' a proud, dedi-
rated people, guaranmee that
We shall achieve shut goal.
June 1971
Lt. GW J. 1). MORUTCl
Pre� .ude w
A
w
R
a Y

s
The Blessings
and Perils of One -Man Rule
In mid -1965, the Democratic Republic of the Congo
(as 'Zaire was then known) was an example of prac.
tically everything that could go wrong for a newly
independent country. Five years of postindependence
rebellion and violence had left the political, economic,
and social life of the country in ruins. The appoint-
ment in 1964 of the controversial Moise Tshombe as
Prime Minister and his subsequent use of white
mercenary troops to help quell widespread insurgency
had alienated most of the so- called Third World.
Economic activity (except for copper mining) had
come to a virtual standstill. Many of the foreign
experts whose skills were vital to the modern commer-
cial, economic, and administrative sectors had fled.
The treasury was bankrupt, the currency debased, and
the population terrorized, divided, and demoralized.
(U /OU)
Moreover, the country's existing political structure
virtually precluded firm corrective action. Under the
provisions of the 1964 constitution, political authority
was none too clear! divided rimong u "strong"
President, the Prime Minister, an unruly bicameral
national legislature, and the governments of 21 largely
autonomous provinces. Behind the scenes, a kitchen
cabinet (the "Binza Group and the military es-
tablishment wielded considerable power. All depended
on close teamwork �and of that there was precious
little. When President Kasavubu dismissed Tshombe
in October 1965, he was unable to persuade parlia-
ment to confirm his choice for the new Prime Minister.
For nearly 6 weeks, the central government all but
ceased to function. (U /OU)
As he had done under similar circumstances some 5
years earlier, the Commander in Chief of the
Congolese arnied forces, Lt. Gen. Joseph Mobutu,
stepped in to break the impasse. Backed by the army
and by fellow members of the Binza Group, he
summarily dismissed Kasavubu on 25 Noveml�,er 1965,
proclaimed himself President, and installed a military
colleague as Prime Minister at the head of a broadly
representative civilian cabinet. And his initial lipser-
vice to the 1964 constitution notwithstanding, he
proml tly set about replacing the Congo's federal
structure and disorganized parliamentary system with
centralized ac.tocratic rule. (U /OU
Mobutu began by canceling the presidential elec-
tions scheduled for 1966 and by claiming a 5 -year
mandate to rule by decree. Once parliament had
dutifully endorsed these moves, he adjourned that
body "until its next regular session" (an event which
never materialized). In the months that followed,
Mobutu reduced the number of provinves to
eight �plus the national capital dirtrict of Kinshasa.
fie made the provincial assemblies purely consultative
bodies, then abolished them altogether. He gave the
provinces essentially the same status as before in-
dependence: apolitical administrative units run by
appointed officials, He merged the provincial police
forces into a new r.itional police organization under
the Interior Ministry. He then suspended the activity
of all political parties and subsumed the office of
Prime Minist.rr into the Presidency. In June of 1967, he
incorporated most of his structural revisions Into a new
constitution. declared the suspended parliament of-
ficially ended, and postponed the election of the
envisaged new unicameral National Assembly until
1970. (U/ OU)
Reversion to what amounted to a slightly modified
version of the former Belgian colonial administration
left the Congo without a political system even
theoretically responsive to the electorate. Mobutu
moved to fill !his void and at the same time to forge a
tool for mobilizing the masses and for further con-
solidating his personal position. He set up the Popular
Movement of the Revolution (MPR) in May 1 "d67 as
his country's only sanctioned political party. (Official
encouragement for the formation of a second party as
originally authorized under the 1967 constitution
quickly evaporated.) The MPR was designated the
nation's supreme political institution technically
superior to the Presidency, army, parliament, and civil
administration --in a constitutional amendment
adopted in December 1970 A creature of its founder
and president, the highly centralized MPR parallels
the governmental hierarchy and is interchangeable
with it. (C)
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Mobutu's political organization has been slow to
develop grassr("s suppc)rt. Nevertheless he has been
able to use it effectively to stage -mans� the referen-
dum -ityle presidential and ;parliamentary elections in
1970, to centralize control of political patronage, and
to manipulate the National Assembly. In addition,
Mobutu has used his "movement" to bring the
country's religious and labor organizations in line, to
counterbalance the power of the military, and to
.supplant with its youth wing (tile) M PR) all the former
vouth and student organizations. (C)
Thus, despite the trappings of democracy which
'Laird has displayed since late 1970 �when the
citizenry was galvanized into giving an overwhelming
vote of confidence to Mobutu as sole candidate for the
7 -year post of esident and to the MPR's hand- picked
National Assembly slate �the government (now
termed the Second Republic) remains very touch a
one -than show. In fact, with a presidential slush funs]
which amounted to about $100 million In 1971 (i,e.,
around 15% of the entire government budget),
Mobutu ru!es more as a paramount tribal chief than as
a head of state in the Western sense, Secretive, ruthles,,
and politically astute, he has a talent for catching
rivals off balance and for exploiting tribal jealousies.
And while gene�ully car -ful to avoid offending key
military leaders, he dispenses largesse and punishment,
funds pet projects, and indulges in such luxuries as a
yacht and a second presidential palace without being
directly accountable to any authority. (S)
With an eye to broadening suplxrt for his regime
both at home and throughout Africa. Mobutu recently
proclaimed national "authenticity" as a primary
political goal. Similar in spirit to his earlier moves in
rehabilitating Patrice l_umumba as a national hero
and in posing as a champion of African liberation
movements, Mobutu's call to his countrymen to reject
foreign models and to draw on their own heritage in
shaping their nation's future was designed to appeal to
local xenophobia and to generate a unifying Congolese
nationalism. In terms of developments elsewhere in
Africa, Mobutu was at least a decade behind the times
In attempting to develop and harness nationalistic
fervor. But he approached the idea with characteristic
zest. Backed by the full resources of the MPR, he
began a controversial campaign to Africanize the
symbols of national identity starting with the name
of the country and of its principal river �in the fall of
1971. Thus Zaire was born. The national flag and
anthem were changed. Preindependence monuments
were removed to museums. Street and placenames
with colonial connotations were scrapped, and a law
was passed requiring all 'Zairians to take African
names. Mobutu himself adopted the names of Sese
N
Seko, which can be �ughly translated�depending
upcm one's persc- -al feeling% atmut the 'Zairian
tresident�as either "Great (thief of the Earth and
Unconquerable Warrior or "Rcxster Who Leaves No
Hen Intact." (C:)
Behind all the ruffles and flourishes, Mobutu's
highly personalized style of rule has brought Zaire
same very tangible benefits With the assistance he has
been able to secure from friendly powers� chiefly the
United States and Belgium �he has moved his country
well down the road toward economic recovery, lie has
reduced factional links between segments of the
military establishment and ambitious politicians and
has restored a measure of discipline and cohension to
the army. He has reestablished centralized political
and administrative authori(y, placed competent men
in key positions, and given his countrymen some peace
and political order for the first time since in-
dependence. And he has vastly improved 'Zaire's
stature in Africa. W)
Nevertheless, 'Zaire remains a fragile state,
vulnerable to abrupt political change. There are
serious flaws in the system which Mobutu has es-
tablished. Some of these are inherent in one -man rule,
but others are attributable to Mobutu's persona)
weaknesses and idiosyncrasies. In general, the political
institutions It(- has created still have shallow roots and
often appear to operate as little more than palace
appendages. Mobutu's advisers, including the cabinet,
are politicalIv unimportant technocrats who owe their
position to the President and who are not inclined to
snake waves. While all this accords with Mobutu's
style and insures a sole source of authority, the risk is
high that the president will become inc, easingly
isolated and ill informed. And there is no question but
that his sur]&n departure from the national scene
would leave a serious political void. (S)
These problems are compounded by Mobutu's
temperament. f)espite his many talents, he seems to be
able to focus on only one problem at a time. He tends
to immerge himself in minutiae, to avoid following
through on complicated decisions, and to wear himself
out periodically. Further, his vanity and suspicion
prevent him from delegating authority or grooming a
successor. Potential rivals are reassigned, demoted,
imprisoned, or sent into diplomatic exile.. In the past
few years, Mobutu has purged practically all persons
with whom he once shared a measure of power,
Including such able and powerful figures as Justin
Bomboko (long -time Foreign Minister) and Victor
Nendaka (former Minister of Finvnce and of Interior).
The atmosphere created by this !cort of behavior has
tended to stifle initiative, impede interdepartmental
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coml>.�raliom, and reinforce flit- President s relative
isolation. (S)
Moreover, Mobutu'-- sssl: m of rub� delt -nds (o a
degme� fill his ability to dislrense soilsidies and n�wards,
itu�luding untffieiad payme fits to key arm%. loolice,
party, and Kovemment officials. Yet not only dot�,
spending on the scale which Mobutu semis (o (et -I
necessary contribute to infla!ionaty pressures, boil the
,%stern could backfire if for uuv reasmi the mmney were
to rum low. (n an% event, the practice of buyint; it
measun� of unity and loyalty through v ash gifts
cfinflicts with cvrncurmnl attempts Ili inform govem-
metit olierations and to root out corniption, (S)
Finally, Mohutoi's efforts to prom otv the Milli as
Zaire's milm- ie institution have not le -en well received
by the arms. 'Ihw situation is particularly delicate
bec�alise it comes at a tithe w beoi M obutu fins beery
force- to curtail rnihtary v%pertcfitures and when the
Imng illness of the bumbling but loyal former army
The Hational Heritage knjnnl
"Zaire is a country of great promise --and great
problems. Its outstanding characteristics are its im-
mense size and diversity. Hut, despste the fabled
wealth of 'Zairian natural resources, the historic,
geographic, and sociological heritage which Mobuht
now so elocpimitly evokes has done more to impede
than to facilitate the nation building process.
The third largest nation in Africa, Zaire covers
approximatel two- thirds of central Africa alz:f Is
uhout equal in area to the United States east of the
Mississippi River. The country is roughly rectangular
in shape; maxiumin dimensions �both north -south
and east west --are about 1,200 miles. Lying astride
the equator, it is essentially an inland state with access
to the sea being limited to a 23 -mile strip of land along
the Atlantic Ocean on the north hank of the Congo
Zaire) River estuary between Angola and the Angolan
exclave of Cabinda, In addition to Angolan territory,
eight independeat states border on 'Zaire's more than
6,(Xx) -mile perimeter. Unlike many. of these other
former colonies, however, Zaire aloes constitute
something of a natural geographic entity. Not only do
most of its houndaries follow clearly defined
topographic features, but they generally conform to
the outline of the watershed of the Congo River,
which, !ogether with its most distant major tributary,
the Imalaba, winds for 2,8W miles through the
chiel. (:ertt -rill Hobozo. has Illcf.%miatt -d ntakiug
ss ceeling chaisKes iii flit- militar% commati f %Iruulun�
I)c- %trite Mnloitu's efforts Ill Lcep tit(' affm 41111 o)
lnlilie- and too devef.p idWrnatc mmirevs of suplurrt. 1be
110)(J-111an ntihlars e 0.11)I shnlelt u�npains 1,011 his
principal loouvr bass and flit mt,,t .rnfiu% pfit�nth11
thn�at Io his n.16111c� The %ettsilise )runic� oil iofra-
arrm factiomal rivalries which hr has w, I.cr manaevd io
tnaiut:lio eoltld be easili, upset
In sump. the strength of Lure tmtin% pk Avl its
weakness. The countr% is virlu.dls deprndrnl fin one
neaert' Iresidrnf Mofmtn Facelt for isolaled and so
far vivdy containecf---- pockeh (if old Simba rebels in
southeastern Kivu Regifili. fir faces no over) :pposi
limn. Hut lbe prolr)rtns with which hr toast rope an
cc mplr. indeed. c�oridilimwd as the, ;iry bs %aim� s
histor% and geography. by the,-ontinuing and unc-rn
impact 4 mmleniii.11ion and bs his fiwn 0%Ic of ride
Ills prospects, and those of tilt' Second livpltltlic.
remain mwertain. (S)
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eastern, central, and northwestern sections of the
country.
Because of Zaire's location on the Equator, seasons
are reversed in the northern and southern sections of
the country, Temperature, rainfall, and humidity vary
markedly with the topography, and the country's
boundaries include widely differing geographic areas.
The Congo Basin, a relatively low -lying plain in
central 'Zaire, is covered by a dense equatorial rain
forest and makes up about one -third of the country.
This area Is characterized by Hgh temperatures,
excessive humidity, torrential rains. and the prevalence
of disrase- hearing insects. The Congo Basin Is rimmed
by plateaus and hills, with extensive areas above 5,000
feet in elevation, The upland country beyond the
humid central core of the basin gradually becomes
cooler as elevation increases and has definite wet and
dry seasons, in the northeast there are savanna lands,
covered with long grasses and stunted tree,; in the
northwest, swamps and marshes; and in the south,
scattered woodlands along the plateaus. The rest of the
country Is characterized by grassy hills, plains, and
scrub forests. In the east, the border passes through
several larger lakes in the Creat Rift Valley of east
Africa, including lake. Tanganyika, and through a
mountain chain with some of the higheft peaks in
Africa.
Because of its diversity of climate, terrain, and
resources, Zaire perhaps has the greatest potential for
economic development In sub Saharan Africa. The ruil
exteci of the country's natural wealth has yet to be
chartered, much less tapped. The Congo River has one
of the greatest hydroelectric Potentials in the world.
Major mineral resources include copper, cobalt, in-
dustrial diamonds, zinc, tin, iron, bauxite, manganese,
uranium, and gold. Offshore oilfields have recently
been discovered. Despite generally poor soils, the
country's differing climatic zones make possible the
raising of a broad range of tropical, subtropical, and
tempe. -atz crops. Its rivers and lakes abound with
many species of fish. And extensive tropical forests
provide an almost Inexhaustible� though difficult to
exploit source of valuable timber.
But Zaire's physical size and diverse topography
have severely complicated efforts to unify the nation
and to promote its economic development. Despite the
country's extensive river systems, great distances and
natural obstacles (e.g., swamps, forest barriers, rapids,
and falls) have always made travel and communica-
tion difficult. The roads and railroads built by the
Belgians to complement the uatural waterways were
primarily oriented toward improving lateral com-
munication. And now even these inadequate transpor-
tation facilities have deteriorated as the result of
Zaire's postindependenre strife.
N
Thus while Loire has a limited capacity to s!irlift
ergo and lr. to most parts of the country, it still
has no complete nrrth -south or east -west transport
system. Considerable effort has been made to repair
and maintain existing railroad trackage, but rood and
river transportation have been barfly neglected. It
takes goods offloaded at the Congo River port of
Matadi nearly a month to reach the capital of
copper -rich Shaba Region because of costly and
time consuming tramfers from rail to water transporta-
tion and back again. In the heavily populated eastern
region of Kivu, travelers need 2 months to negotiate
the sporadically maintained road between the capital
city of Bukavu and the town of Mwen,ga some 100
miles to the south. And there is no usable road
connection at all between Bukavu and the two faiTly
large Kivu cities of Kindu and Kasongo on the
Lualaba river. In fact, the road system which
provides the only means of access its some parts of the
country--has deteriorated so much that the un-
reliability and high cost of truck transport have
become thou principal limiting factors in the develop-
ment of 'Zaire's rich interior. FAlually important,
continued difficulty of movement and communication
has hinderM efforts to overcome traditional regional
and tribal loyalties and to unite Zaire's diverse peoples
under an effective national government.
As a whole, Zaire Is thinly populated in comparison
with most other African countries. But even before
contact with the West hastened the process of ur-
banization, adverse climatic and soil conditions
throughout much of the area had resulted in marked
variations in density of population, with the, bulb of
the people living In the fertile northeastern plain and
along the lower reaches of the Congo River. And
although about 80% of Zaire's 24 million inhabitants
are of Bantu stock, history and geography have
combined to create wide differences among them.
There are more than 200 tribes in Zaire, and many
of these are made up of significant subtribal groupings.
Bantu tribes Inan drifting Into the area at least 1600
years ago, pushing the pygmies they found there back
deep lnta the forests and +ettling in the vicinity of their
present homelands by the beginning of the I5tij
century. There was little: Intertribal contact and no
common Iangilage. Sharply differing forest and savan-
na cultures developed. And while several kingdoms
emerged between the 14th and 17th centuries which
united one or another of the larger tribal groupings for
a century or more, none included more than a small
sector of present -day Zaire,
Over the past 500 years, the impact of successive
tureign interventions �most importantly, Portuguese,
l
J
r
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I
Arab, and Belgian �has widened tribal and regional
differences. The Portuguese arrived on the scene in
1482. They built forts along the lower reaches of the
Congo River, made contact with and Christianized the
then flourishing Kingdom of the Kongo, established a
profitable trade in ivory and slaves, and dominated the
extreme western sector of the Congo until well into the
19th century. While the span of effective Portuguese
control began to decline toward the end of the 17th
century, the activities of Lisbon's slave merchants (as
well as of their rivals from other European countries)
continued to expand. In contrast to the limited
influence of early missionary efforts, the impact of the
slave trade �which reached its peak during the first
half of the 19th century�was felt throughout the
land. Some tribes were enriched, others decimated.
The constant warfare which the growing demand for
slaves promoted caused great suffering and generated
tribal hatreds and a distrust of foreigners that still
affect the Zairian scene.
Tier Arabs contributed their share to this unfor-
tunate aspect of Zaire's heritage. Long entrenched in
settlements along the east African coast, they extended
their operations inland in the mid -19th century. After
establishing a caravan route from "Zanzibar to Ujiji on
Lake Tanganyika, they penetrated the Congo in
search of ivory and slaves. Like the Portuguese, their
policy was to get both by winning the cooperation
of �and arming� selected tribes rather than by the
direct use of force. They were so successful that by
1885 the controlled a large part of eastern Congo
through an elaborate administrative system based on
local chiefs. And although the Arabs made no effort to
force their culture on their new African collaborators,
their influence affected dress and manners, brought
about conversions to Islam, and altered agricultural
practices throughout their area of control. Even today,
the so- cai'.,-J Arabises of Kisangani and other eastern
i! 'a'"t- '''k.'aS'x.ti �:,a. 4 :.r ',r. ;:t.' rut+ ;urrvsr< wawa..: s :...o.�.,_........,.....
towns remain more Arab than African in their way of
life, and hundreds of thousands of their fellow
easterners speak Swahili �the lingua franca in-
troduced by their former Arab masters.
It was also in 1888 thai Belgium's King Leopold II
capped a decade of devious maneuvz;;ng by founding
the Corgo Free State aad getting tNe Berlin Congress
to recognize it as his personal possession. Thus, the
general outline of present -day Zaire was established.
Within 9 years, Belgian -led contingents had ousted
most of the Arab slavers, adding a new facet to 'Zaire's
complex tribal rivalries in the process. Tribes like the
Batetela which fought on the Arab side generally
remained extremely hostile to Belgium rule and toward
Belgium's tribal allies. Like the suspicions and
animosities born of the slave trade, these old
resentments still have so ne relevance. They account in
part for separatist tendencies throughout ea::e-n Zaire
and particularly it; Kisangani. And they were reriected
in the inability of such postindependence leaders as
Lumumba (a Batetela) and Kalonji (a Luba) to work
together.
Today, as in the past, no single tribe holds sway over
all of Zaire. Indeed, the largest group, the Hamitic
Mangbetu- Azande cluster in the northeast, accounts
for less than 15% of the total population. But Zaire's
eight largest tribes dominate home areas which
together cover something more than half of the
country. Some of these groups �e.g., the Kongo, Luba,
and Lunda �are still moved by memories of past
empires. The process of modernization has further
exacerbated old tribal tensions and created new ores.
Despite continuing government efforts to broaden
their horizons, most Zairians remain loyal to their
tribal communities. In fact, many rural inhabitants are
either totally unaware o.' existing provincial and
national institutions or see them as so i emote that they
seem almost unreal.
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Patergaiism and Premature Birth
(u /0u)
The difficulties which Zaire's postindependence
leaders have faced in trying to establish a cokes; e and
viable nation are hardly unique on the African scene.
But in Zaire's case, many of these problems were
deeper because of Brussels' approach to colonial rule.
The beginnings were particularly inauspicious. King
Leopold's interest in the Congo Basin was purely
commercial. A man of expensive hab.itr, he was
perpetually short of funds. Tile ruthless manner in
which he exploited Congolese labor in order to increase
his profits from rubber and ivory in time resulted in
international opprobrium. After vacillating for a
n;amber of years, the Belgian Government finally
annexed what had become Leopold's 900,000- square-
mile private African estate and in October 1908
created a Ministry of the Colones to oversee it. On the
map, the Congo .Free State was replaced by the
Bcigian Congo.
Brussels moved swiftly to mitigate the harsher
features of Leopold's former practices, to establish
tighter accountability for revenues produced, and to
provide greater opportunity for foi eign participation in
the development and exploitation of the Congolese
economy. Beyond this, however, the shift in the
Congo's international status brought little change.
Leopold's system of highly centralized rule was maiaa-
tained. So were the alliances he had forged with the
Catholic Church and with influential business circles.
And the Belgians cont=inued to regard their African
subjects as children, incapable of managing their own
affairs in an environment marked by modernization
and rapid change.
Under these circumstances, Belgian colonial policy
gradually evolved toward paternalism. The primary
duty of the metropole, as the Belgians saw it, was to
provide for the economic, social, and moral well -being
of the native population. And, in fact, Belgium's
record in this regard was impressive. With Brussels'
encouragement and support" the Catholic Church
established an extenAve primary schoo; system. Ad-
ditional schools were provided by various Protestant
denominations. Over time, iperea. by substantial
sums of money were poured into the construction of
housing projects, hospitals, village wells, and other
facilities of direct benefit to the population. Social
services were expanded, snd following World War II
the Belgians provided the Corgo with tropical Africa's
first comprehensive t ocial se,:arity program.
On the other hard, Belgium's approach to the
problem of training Congolese for responsible positions
6
0
and to expansion of self government was one of
gradualism bordering on immobilism. While they paid
lipservi to the role of chiefdoms as basic units of
administration, in rural areas, Belgian officials did not
hesitate to intervene vigorously in.local affairs. Until
about 1950, educational opportunities for the
Congolese beyond the primary level� indeed, beyond
the second grade �were extremely limited. The native
population was kept in check and protected against
temptation by a host of discriminatory regulations,
including a curfew and restrictions go,erning
weapons, al ^oholic beverages, and land ownership.
And prior to 1958, when the first municipal elections
were held, the Congolese were not able to form
political parties or to exercise a meaningful voice in
governmental affairs above the chiefdom level.
By 1958, there were at least some leaders in Brussels
who were seriously considering the possibility of
granting the Congo independence in perhaps another
25 or 30 years. But the times were no longer suited to a
leisurely approach to decolonizati.an. In August 1958,
President de Gaulle visited Brazzaville and offered
independence to the French Longo. Scarcely 4 months
later, Patrice Lumumba, head of the newly formed
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National Congolese Movement (MNC), returned from
talks he had held with various African nationalist
leaders at the first Pan African Congress in Accra and
issued a public call for indepene.. -rice for the Belgian
Congo. And the efforts of the colonial administration
to block what it feared might be a similar speech by
Joseph Kasavubu, eader of the Alliance of the
Bakongo People (ABAKO), in Leoy 1ville (renamed
Kinshasa), in January 1959 touched off rioting which
lasted for several days.
Shaken by this development, Brussels changed its
course and for the first time offered the Congolese a
program for political change explicitly directed at
achievement of independence within a few years. But
Belgium's retreat only fanned the nationalist fervor of
the Congo's fledgling politicians. In the chaotic
months that followed, political parties proliferated and
vied with one another in calling for early in-
dependence. Tribal and regional tensions mounted
over the issue of whether the future Congolese state
should be federal or unitary in structure. Vague
secessionist threats were voiced by prominent regional
leaders, and bloody tribal conflicts broke out in
Albertville (Kalemie), Bakwanga (Mbuji- Mayi),
Elisabethville (Lubumbashi) and Tshikapa.
Faded with a rapidly eteriorating situation,
Brussels capitulated in January 1960 and set 30 June of
that year as the date for Congolese independence.
Brussels drafted an interim constitution based on the
Belgian model which, among other things,
transformed the Congo's six provinces from d
ministrative jurisdictions into political entities �PAch
with an assembly elected by universal suffrage, a
president elected by the assembly, and a full comple-
ment of ministers. Nationai and vincial elections,
contested by over 100 parties, w Ad in May. No
single party emerged in a com._ ,.ping position. A
reasonable factional balance seemed to have been
struck at the !ast minute, however, by the election of
ABAKO's federally oriented leader, Kasavubu, as
President and the installation of the centralist
Lumumba as Prime MiniAer at the head of a cwalition
government.
But ti. Congolese were grossly iil prepared to take
over tL administration of their new state. The
Belgians had bequeathed them the most advanced
evonomy �and the highest literacy rate �in sub
Saharan Africa. Nevertheless, when independence
day arrived, the country's three recently established
universities 1,ad yet to produce a single graduate.
There were, in fact, less than 25,000 citizens in the
whole country who had received any kind of secondary
education. While some individuals had pursued higher
education abroad, there were few doctors, fewer
engineers, and no lawyers at all. No Congolese had
attained officer status in either the security forces or
the civil service. Although there was no dearth of
aspiring and vocal politicians, none had practical
governmental experience above the local level And
there were no political parties of sufficient breadti, to
support a strong national government.
Moreover, the Republic of the Congo inherited a
public debt of about $900 million, the sen-icing cf
which promised to drain away nearly one quarter of its
annual budget. It also inherited a number of generous
social welfare programs which the new regime could
neither afford nor easily reduce. Finally, Belgian
policies, the uneven impact of modernization, and the
charged atmosphere of the immediate
preindependence period had all served to strengthen
regional and tribal particularism.
All told, the new Leopoldville regime's position was
clearly precarious. Its prospects depended heavily on
external economic and technical assistance, including
the continued service of large numbers of
foreign primarily Belgian specialists.
7
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Decline and Fall
of the
First Republic
Unfortunately for the Republic of the Congo, there
were a number of additional factors which com-
pounded its troubles during the first few years of its
existence. For example, the interim 1960 con-
stitution� failing, as it did, to define clearly either the
powers of the President and Prime Minister or the
division of authority between the provincial and
central echelons of government�.was poorly attuned
to local political realities. In addition, irresponsible
electioneering rhetoric had raised false hopes about
rich and immediate benefits which would more or less
automatically flow from independence. Throughout
the period of Kasavubu's Presidency the impact of
successive foreign interventions� including some of
the well- intentioned actions of the United Nations
Peacekeeping Force� tended to exacerbate factional
and tribal sirife.
0
The new Congolese state was only 5 days old when
its soldiers, disappointed in their belief that in-
dependence would bring immediate Africanization of
the military leadership, mutinied against their Belgian
officers and thereby set in motion the chain of events
that eventually led to the downfall of the First
Republic. Despite the relative calm which prevails in
the country today, the lessons and legacies of those
crisis years still bear heavily on Mobutu's attitudes,
options, and problems.
Lumumba's initial efforts to cope with the mu-
tiny proved futile, and on 10 July, Belgian
paratroopers acting without Congolese au-
thorization� landed at Lul-labourg (Kananga) and
Elisabethville to restore order. The following day,
Moise Tshombe led Katanga Province (now Shaba
Region) into secession. Lumumba and Kasavubu then
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Patrice Lumumba Antoine Gizenga

i
g
1
s
z
appealed to the United Nations for protection against
foreign (i.e., Belgian) aggression. But while the first
hastily assembled United Nations units arrived in the
country on 15 July the situation continued to
deteriorate. In early August, Albert Kalonji proclaimed
the independence of the Mining State of South Kasai
(now part of Kasai Oriental Region). Unable to per-
suade the United Nations to help him reintegrate his
country's two secessionist provinces by force of arms,
Lumumba called on Moscow for direct support. By
then, however, his increasingly freewheeling behavior
had placed him on a collision course with President
Kasavubu. In September 1960, the world watched as
Kasavubu and Lumumba attempted to dismiss each
other.
The Congolese parliament refused to confirm the
dismissal of either man s.nd sought to effect a recon-
ciliation between them. A deadlock ensued, and in
mid September, the commander of the army (or of
what was left of it), Joseph Mobutu, announced that
he was temporarily assuming power. A clerk in the
security forces from 1950 to 1956 and subsequently a
journalist, Mobutu had been appointed Chief of Staff
of the army following the July mutiny and had served
in that capacity until his promotion to the top military
post in early September. He had joined the MNC in
1958 and, while not a Batetela but a non -Bantu
Ngbandi tribesman fron. the north, was a close friend
of Lumumba. Thus it was ironic �but indicative of
the intricate twists and turns of Congolese
politics �that he turned out to be the man most
responsible for Lumumba's political, if not physical,
demise.
Mobutu'S objectives were apparently limited, at
that time, to ending the factional strife which had
paralyzed the central government. He undercut
Lumumba's position by ousting the Communist mis-
sions which had been giving the MNC moral and
material support. He replaced the cabinet with a
t College of Commissioners composed of
recent university graduates, students, and a f %w
carefully selected former ministers. In addition, he
.1 neutraii;.ed" parliament, thereby initiating a practice
of imposing the primacy of the executive over the
legislative branches of the government which, with
brief lapses, has endured.
But the brief period of Mobutu's caretaker rule was
also highlighted by the establishment of a rival regime
in Stanleyville (Kisangani) under Lumumba's lieuten-
ant and former Deputy Prime Minister, Antoine
Gizenga. There was also the arrest and imprisonment
of Lumumba after his escape from United Nations
protective custody in an effort to join Gizenga. Thus
when Mobutu stepped down on 9 February 1961 to
resuine his military duties, the Congo had four
governments �h: -)wn at Leopoldville, and the rival
establishments I led by Gizenga, Tshombe, and
Kalonji. The world standing of the Leopoldville
regime was at a low ebb and would soon sink further
with the announcement that Lumumba and two of his
associates had perished during their mysterious transfer
to Katariga. Only two provinces plus a portion of a
third remained under the effective control of the new
Kasavubu -ileo provisional government.
Nevertheless, the secessionist phase of the Congo's
postindepen&nce cris?s soon came to an end.
Pressured by the United Nations, Kasavubu and No
opened a series of bilateral and multilateral discussions
with Tshombe, Kalonji, and Gizenga during which it
was finally established that the Congo would become
a federal, rather than a confederal or unitary, state.
Parliament was reopened on 25 July 1961 (under
i iited Nations protection) with all areas except
'i shombe's Katanga represented. After several days of
spirited debate, the legislators gave nearly unanimous
approval to a broad coalition government headed by
Cyrille Adoula as Prime Minister. Gizenga, offertd the
post of First Deputy Prime Minister, chose to remain in
Stanlewii1e. But his camp was divided, and he was
deposed and arrested by some of his own
colleagues� acting on Adoula's instructions and
backed by United Nations units �in January i962.
In response to the continued growth of tribal and
regional particularism and to agitation for the
overhaul of ineffective or inequitable institutional
arrangements, the Adoula government tentatively
reorganized the country into 21 provinces. Together
with United Nations experts, it accelerated efforts to
prepare a new constitution. The internal situation
further improved in September 1962 when Kalonji's
arrest fatally weakened the still recalcitrant govern-
ment in South Kasai. And while Tshombe continued
to hold out for a confederal solution, both inter-
national and internal support for his position was
dwindling. After a third round or fighting with United
Nations forces, he capitulated in Jaruary 1963 and
departed for self imposed exile in Spain a few months
later. The Congo was whole once again �but not for
long.
With less than a year of relative peace in which to
catch its breath, the Congo moved from a period of
regional secessions to one of near general rebellion.
Nearly 3 years of strife, complicated and prolonged by
foreign intervention, had resulted in much suffering
and in a marked decl;ne in the material well -being of
the populace in mr'.st areas of the country. Moreover,
such rewards as had actually flowed from in-
dependence had been unevenly distributed. Economic
9
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deprivation tended to be most severe in the areas
farthest removed from two poles of relative prosperity,
southern Katanga and the Leopoldville -Lower Congo
area. Tribal jealousies had deepened arid, equally
important, the expectations of virtually all segments of
the general population particularly of the widely but
inadequately educated postwar generation �had been
bitterly disappointed. Although Leopoldville con-
tinued to benefit from generous :.reign assistance, its
efforts to overcome warborn social and economic ills
were hampered by administrative breakdowns, clashes
between radical nationalists and the military-
bureaucratic oligarchy, and labor unrest. The inability
of the Kasavubu Adoula regime to cope with rising
popular discontent was reflected in its decision to
suspend parliament in September 1963. Thereafter,
Kasavubu backed by his powerful Binza Group
advisers �ruled by presidential decree.
Deprived of their parliamentary immunity, a
number of radical Congolese political leaders fled to
Brazzaville, where, under the friendly protection of the
newly installed Massamba -Debat government, they
formed a group called the National Liberation Com-
mittee (CNL), established guerrilla training camps,
and launched a number of terrorist operations against
the Leopoldville establishment. The activities of the
CNL were backed by a number of African countries
and received some covert support and encouragement
from both Moscow and Peking. The CNL sought to
wrap itself in Lumumba's fallen mantle, but it was
never a cohesive, disciplined group. Tensions rapidly
developed over tactics, leadership, goals, and sources
of external support. In fact, until January 1964, when
Pierre Mulele apparently acting on his
own� successfully raised the flag of rebellion in Kwilu
Province (now part of Bandundu Region) and thereby
attracted the attention of other members of the CNL
to the fertile target of rural discontent, the Brazzaville
conspirators constituted little more than a nuisance
factor for the Kasavubu Adoula regime. The insurgen-
cy which spread through much of eastern and
northeastern Congo in the ensuing months came to be
known as the Simba rebellion, after the name given
troops of the Batetela- Bakusu officered eeople's
Liberation Army (APL) raised by "General" Nicholas
Olenga in the spring of 1964. But it was in fact a series
of revolts, strongly influenced by local contingencies
and bound together only by a shifting coalition of
leaders, certain common grievances, and common
external support.
Stanieyville fell to the APL on 4 August, and the
rebellion reached its high -water mark during the 6
10
weeks that followed, By early September, Leopoldville
had lost control over almost all that part of the
Congo �about two- thirds of the country�which had
once been under Arab rule. A rival govr:�rnment,
Christophe Gbenye's so- called People's Rerniblic of the
Congo, had been established in Stanleyville and was
courting the rr,dical African states, the Soviet bloc, and
Peking. But the summer months had witnessed major
and more encouraging developments in Leopoldville
as well: Adoula's inability to stem the tide of revolt
bA cost him the confidence of the Binza Group, In
late June, faced with the imminent departure of the
last United Nations peacekeeping units and the ad-
ditional problem of introducing a new constitution in
the midst of civil strife, Kasavubu and his ad -isers had
invited Tshombe to return home from Spain. The
following month, Tshombe had been installed as
Prime Minister at cne head of a transitional govern-
ment and had begun to organize an auxiliary inilitary
force composed of veterans of his former Katangan
gendarmerie and mercenary personnel. Thus
strengthened, the Congolese Army began to administer
telling defeats to the rebels in mid September. In late
November, a joint Belgian -U.S. paratroop operation to
rescue civilian hostages in Stanleyville facilitated the
recapture of that city. By the end of 1964, the rebels
had been reduced to small pockets of guerrillas who,
while still receiving liwited quantitie- of arms from
Corimunist sources via Sudan, Uganda, and Tan
zartia, no longer constituted a serious threat to
Leopoldville.
The suppression of the rebels did not, however, spell
the end of the Congo's internal crisis. Tshombe
entertained political ambitions extending far beyond
the temporary fireman's role for which he had been
recalled from Spain. Following the promulgation of
the new constitution in August 1964, he established a
power base by forming an alliance of political parties,
the National Confederation of Congolese Associations
CONACO). And when CONACO won a majority in
the parliamentary elections of March 1965, he
emerged as the leading potential challenger to
Kasavubu in the presirential race scheduled for the
following year. In the fall of 1965, howevt Kasavubu
moved to cut Tshombe back to size. Exercising his new
constitutional prerogatives, he dismissed Tshombe
from office and named Evariste Kimba of the bitterly
anti Tshombe Katangan Balubakat party to take his
place. But the CONACO- controlled parliament
refused to confirm the Kimba government, and the
impasse which triggered Mobutu's second seizure of
power ensued.
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mobutu's distrust of freewheeling democratic prac-
tices, his sensitivity to the risks involved i'l letting anN
local or national leader develop too :uhtitantial it
territorial or organizational po.ver base, and his reluc-
tance to delegate authority are firmly grounded in his
appreciation of the disnlptive role that divided
loyalties and opportunism have played in his countrN s
brief post indepe n d e n c �t. histor%. Considering the
potentially destabilizing imPac�t of the radical charges
I, has effected in 'Zaire's political and administrative
systc�Tns, he has been remai ably .ticcessful in restoring
and maintaining a reasonable degree of domestic
peace and order. ;Vey �rtheless, his efforts to establish
highly :e'ntralized one -man rule and to suppress all
signs of overt opposition have not gone unchallenged.
Mobutu has had to cope with thvo military mutinies
in eastern "Zaire. one involving Rat.otgan units in 19
the other Hoene serious-- imolving both '-bite
nwri :�nary and hatargan troops in 1967. Student
ioonstratio os eru deed in 1969 and again in
>>eginlling with ti,�� trial and execution of four
former cabinet ministers in mid -1966, a seemingl}
endless series of real or alleged plots against Mobutu
has been exposed to public view. 'kncl the opening
months of 192 were marked b confrontation
between Mobutu and the (i it illion-member Zairian
(:alt Church when Cardinal Malula, Archbishop
of himhasa and long -time Mobutu critic. took it
public stand against the Africanization of ChrisLan
uan}es and attacked certain impious ac�tiyitie� of the
\1111. "I'he Archbishop. fearing arrest for "treason,"
fled to ijoine in Fel..oarx 1972. He was permitted to
return, howewr, afv�r the remaining Zai,i!o; church
hierarchN capitulated and acceded to de-
.1
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mand that MPR youth organizations be established in
the seminaries.)
Although few citizens would welcome a re::::.. to
the chaos of piecoup Zairian politics, Pax Mubutt. is
still little� more than a truce enforced through presiden-
tial monopoly of the instruments of military and
political coercion. Beneath the surface, tribal and
regional tensions persist, and the social problems
generated by urbanization and modernization are
becoming more acute. Moreover, Mobutu is con-
fronted with a number of problems of his own making.
For example, his practice of assigning administrators to
areas where they have no Tribal ties and of frequently
rotating these officials has had its intended effect in
that it has kept these officials from developing a
regional base of power. But it has also contributed to
bureaucratic inefficiency and to widespread resent-
ment of being governed by "foreigners." Similarly,
Mobutu's efforts to suppress criticism of his ,regime
have partially alienated the student and intellectual
communities v support he badly needs. And white
Mobutu's drive to Zairianize the economy has im-
proved his stature at home and throughout the Third
World, it has resulted in less efficient operations,
periodic strains in Zaire's relations with Belgium, and
the flight (albeit, generally temporary) of some badly
needed foreign capital and technicians.
Zaire's domestic problems 'lave been compounded
by Mobutu's tendency to accord higher priority to
suppressing centrifugal currents and dissent and to
propagandizing the public than to attacking the root
causes of social discontent. Until recently, relatively
little money has been allocated for expanding urban
housing and services or for providing the technical
assistance and improved transport facilities needed to
restore farm output and living conditions to
preindependence levels. In a period marked by high
urban unemployment and spiraling living costs,
Mobutu has sought to tame the trade union movement
rather than allow it to develop into an independent
champion of workers' irterests. Student protests have
been met with punishment iaiher than dialog.
The twin problems of tribalism and ,-vionalism
provide another case in point. Viewed by i "obutu as
the source of many of Zaire's ills, overt tribalism is
outlawed and routinely condemned in political dis-
course. But the logic of Mobutu's one-man rule has
limited the scope and pace of bureaucratic reform, and
tribalism remains an important factor in competition
for government, party, military, and business positions
as well as in popular attitudes toward the central
government. Despite Mobutu's efforts to exhibit an
even hand, ethnic rivalries have been exacerbated I,
12
such widely held �and largely valid beliefs that the
Luba of Kasai Oriental dominate the educational
field, that soldiers from Mobutu's home region of
Equateur have increased their proportional strength
within the army, and that the Kongo and Luba
dominate commerce in the key Kinshasa and mining
belt areas.
Moreover, since the presence of the central govern-
ment is stilt virtually unfelt throughout vast sections of
Zaire �being manifested primariiv through scattered
and none too welcome army units doubts flourish
about the intentions of the remote elite in Kinshasa.
Shaba's residents, fo: example, feel strongly that the
central government is bleeding their copper -rich
province while returning almost nothing to it. In Kivu
and Haut Zaire regions, the populace fears that
Mobutu will never build up those areas that supported
the Simba rebellion. A similar fear exists in Bandundu
Region because of the Kwilu insurrection.
Nevertheless, the significance and depth of popular
dissatisfaction with Mobutu's regime are difficult to
gauge. Continued high levels of unemployment or a
renewal of student agitation could result in urban
disorders. But most of the rural population remains
apathetic. There is at present no political nucleus
around which active opposition to the regime could
crystallize. And despite the clash with Cardinal
Malula, there are signs that Mobutu's "authenticity"
program may be having a greater stabilizing effect
than most outside observers originally anticipated. All
told, while Mobutu's survival depends on successfully
handling a variety of interrelated problems, his most
pressing difficulties are in the economic field.
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Growing Palos f c
Zaire's current economic difficulties stem from
many sources, including the lingering effects of
postindependence chaos (particularly the deterioration
of the country's road, rail, and water transportation
facilities), a continued shortage of modern technical
and managerial skills, the persistence of c
and inconsistencies or flaws in Mobutu's own policies.
In fact, the Kinshasa regime's approach to economic
progress has been somewhat haphazard. It has com-
piled a list of projects which are to receive priority
attention during the next 5 years, but it has yet to
begin work on a formal development pla i. Moreover,
it has consistently tended to favor quick profit or
showcase ventures over badly needed but less
glamorous or rapidly maturing projects in the fields of
agriculture, transportation, and education.
As the result of 'these and other problems, economic
recovery has I �en markedly uneven. On the positive
side of the ledger, a combination of domestic calm,
economic reform, substantial infusions of foreign aid,
and rising copper prices yielded an average annual
increase in gross domestic product 1( ;DI of nearly 8'('
from 1968 through 1970�with the most dramatic
gains being registered in the industrial field. Put this
period of relatively_ rapid growth was not accompanied
by a comparable improvement in the distribution of
cash income. The percentage of the work force
receiving steady wages is still well belo%y its
prcindependencc level. There arc, in fact, nearly as
many unemployed workers in Zaire today as there are
regular wage earners. And even those workers who
hold steady jobs hove suffered a marked decline in real
wages over the past fey yea, as the result of inflation.
Moreoye structural changes in 'Zaire's econmv
have eroded the fairly high degree of diversification
which had been achieved under Belgian management.
For example, prior to independence, agriculture con-
stituted the backbone of the economy, and agri-
cultural commodities� primarily rubber, coffee,
palm oil, cotton, and timber� consistently accounted
for between one -third and one -half :f the country's
foreign exchange receipts. This is no longer the case.
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The production of most of Zaire's cash crops is still
below preindependence levels, and the prices which
the country's agricultural exports have commanded on
the world market have tended to decline in recent
years. Thus, while about 70% of the Zairian popula-
tion is still engaged in agricultural pursuits,
agriculture's share in both GDP and export earnings
has sharply declined. And whereas the country was
once comfortably self- sufficient in most food products,
postindependence agricultural output for domestic
consumption has not kept pace with population
growth.
At the same time, the modern sector of the economy
has become more and more dependent on minerals,
especially copper. While production of some minerals
has stagnated or declined, the mining industry as a
whole now accounts for almost one- fourth of GDP,
about one -half of government revenues, and well over
three fourths of export earnings. Zaire is currently the
non Communist world's largest producer of industrial
diamonds and cobalt and its fifth largest source of
copper. More important, however, is the fact that in
1969, when the world price of clipper was nearing its
peak, that metal alone accounted for nearly 80% of the
more than $575 million received through the sale of
Zairian minerals abroad.
Overdependence on a single expc,rt commodity is a
hazardous state of affairs for any developing country,
particularly for one plagued with economic and social
problems of the scale fac,vd by Zaire. Zaire's net foreign
trade accounts for abort 25% of GDP. Despite con-
tinuing inflows of foreign aid and investment,
Kinshasa needs to maintain a relatively high level of
export earnings in order to pay for the import of the
machinery, raw materials, equiiprnent, and consumer
goods essential to economic recovery and development
as well as to cover balance -of- payment deficits in
services and private transfers. Moreover, since a sub-
stantial portion of export earnings are regularly
reinvested in the Zairian economy or spent on locally
produced goods or services, any contraction or expan-
sion of these receipts is certain to have acorresponding
secondary effect on national income, governmental
revenues, and employment.
With a per capita GDP of about $90, Zaire ranks
among the poorest nations of the world, By late 1970,
however, when Mobutu was elected to a new 7-year
presidential term, 3 years of near economic boom had
generated high expectations for the future. Even
Mobutu did not foresee the consequences of the
downturn in world copper prices that had begun some
6 months earlier. During his inaugural address, he
sketched out ambitious developmental plans under the
14
ruUtir "Objective 80." He pledged that henceforth the
economy would be at th:! service of the citizenry and
that the coming decade would be a period of evenly
distributed social and economic progress. Within
months, however, the emphasis in Kinshasa had
shifted from growth to retrenchment. M GbUtu had
little choice. Since mid- 1970, government revenues
have barely risen, while foreign exchange reserves have
fallen. Imports have mounted. Inflation has
reappeared. And despite Mobutu's quiet postpone-
ment of a number of prestige projects, government
expenditures have increased.
A prolonged economic stagnation could seriously
weaken Mobutu's position, generating social unrest
and jeopardizing his ability to sustain the loyalty of his
subordinates through liberal material rewards. In fact,
the short -term economic outlook is not particularly
encouraging. Much depends on the price of copper
which, while it has recovered somewhat from 1971's
low, seems unlikely to regain the lucrative heights of
the late 1960's very soon. Major investments now
being made to expand Zaire's mining and refining
capacity will not bear much fruit before the
mid- 1970's and will not become important sources of
tax revenues until still later in the decade. Agricultural
exports cannot be expected to take up much of the
slack because they depend on major improvements in
internal transportation and port facilities which are
years away.
There is no doubt but that Mobutu is counting
heavily on foreign technical and financial assistance to
he'p him weather what promise to be 2 or 3 rather lean
years a;: Pad. To some degree, at least, his recent
increase in emphasis on cultural and economic
nationalism is likely to be an impediment in this
regard. But so far, Mobutu has appeared willing to
draw back from Zairianization, nationalization, or
other popular measures when vital economic activity
seemed to be threatened. Thus periodic campaigns to
expel alien residents have fallen more heavily on west
African and Asian traders than on Zaire's European
population. Thousands of highly qualified foreign
executives, educators, military officers, and
technicians still hold responsible positions throughout
the country. In fact, Mobutu has not only extended
the use of foreign experts in various government
components but has also engaged foreign firms to
operate a number of public utilities and nationalized
industrial plants. And while financial aid from foreign
governments and international agencies has dropped
off to about one -third its crisis years peak of over $200
million annually, Kinshasa has waged a rather
successful campaign over the past year or two to
attract ne v foreign private investment.
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Nonalignment
Pragmatism With a Flair (s)
As is the case with his domestic policies, Mobutu's
approach io foreign affairs has been colored by a
unique mix of pragmatism and egotism. He has sought
to stimulate Zairian nationalism, to loosen his
dependence on Belgium, and to improve his regime's
standing in African circles by portraying Zaire as a
nonaligned nation firmly committed to the elimina-
tion of the political and economic vestiges of
colonialism and dedicated to promoting inter African
cooperation. But his overriding concerns in the inter-
national field have been his need for financial and
technical assistance from industrial countries and his
fear of Communist- sponsored intervention in Zaire's
internal affairs. Thus, behind his militant rhetoric and
demonstrative acts, the thrust of his policy has been
essentially moderate and pro Western.
In fact, Mobutu privately calls the United States an
"ally" and expects key security and economic
backstopping from Washington. His hopes in this
regard are understandable, for not only has the United
States poured over $650 million into Zaire since 1960
in various forms of aid and support, but U.S. advice,
encouragement, and assistance proved to be of crucial
importance to Mobutu during his difficulties with
rebellious mercenaries and a faltering economy in
1967. And while the amount of U.S. bilateral aid has
been decl;ning, Mobutu's recent breakthrough in
attracting American investors has given Washington a
growing direct stake in the Zairian economy.
Periodic strains in Zaire's relations with Belgium
notwithstanding, Mobutu has furnished ample
evidence o the flexibility and pro Western orientation
of his foreign policy posture. He has openly entrusted
the training of elite military and police units to Israeli,
Italian, and U.S. advisers. Although he tolerates the
existence of modest Soviet bloc missions in
Kinshasa �bo ti as "proof' of his nonalignment and as
potential sources of economic aid �he monitors the
activities of Communist diplomats closely and does
not hesitate to expell them if his suspicions are aroused.
And while he gives lipservice and some modest
material support to liberation movements nithp
Africa, he has prudently sou&h to limit the practical
consequences of such action. For example, he
righteously broke relations with the colonialist govern-
ment in Lisbon in 1966. But, mindful that the shortest
exporc route for Shahan .opper passes through Angola,
he has restricted the activities of Holden Roberto 's
Kinshasa -based Revolutionary Government of Angola
in Exile (GRAS). Indeed. in March 1970 he allowed
two Portuguese representatives to establish an office in
the Spanish Embassy in Kinsham. Similarly, he has
condemned the Rhodesian regime and rejected
proposals for opening a diplomatic dialog with South
Africa but has kept open us- trade links with both
countries.
Despite his ambivalence toward nearby non African
governments and his ill concealed ties to the West,
Mobutu has managed to win a position of leadership
and respect in Africa. Seeking a measure of insurance
against repetition of the type of intervention which at
one time or another during Zaire's postindepimclence
troubles has been mounted across the borders of almost
all nine of his country's immediate neighbors, he has
consistently taken a more active role in the Organiza-
tion of African Unity (OAU) than any of his
predecessors. Whenever possible. he has tailored his
more dramatic moves �such as his posthumous
rehabilitation of Lumumba �to appeal to both OAU
and domestic audiences. His early success in easing
strained relations with such states as Algeria, Egypt,
Guinea, and Sudan made possible his triumphant
hosting of the 1967 OAU summit. Thereafter,
Mobutu's regional stature bolstered by his domestic
record as well as by skilful diplomacy �grew rapid:-.
Nevertheless, Mobutu's action in spending over $20
million on preparations for the OAU summit meeting
in Kinshasa was illustrative of the egocentric and less
15
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rational aspect of his foreign policy behavior. Mobutu
firmly believes that it is 'Zaire's destiny �and his
own �to play a leading role in African affairs, and his
ambitions in this regard sometimes distort his un-
derlying pragmatic appreciation of his country's basic
material interests. In 1968, for example, he drew Chad
and the Central African Republic into a mini common
market in an apparent challenge to France's economic
pr -dominance in central Africa. And despite his
pressing economic difficulties at home, he has pater-
nalistically provided aid to his poorer neighbors �e.g.,
military training for the Chadian Army and budgetary
supplements for Burundi.
Zaire's economic union with Chad and the Central
African Republic was stillborn. And Mobutu's quest
for glory suff ,-red other setbacks as well �such as in
June 1970 when Kinshasa's involvement in two abor-
tive efforts to overthrow the leftist Ngouabi regime in
neighboring Brazzaville was revealed. But by the end
of 1971, Mobutu apparently felt sure enough of his
international position to assume an even more assertive
foreign policy posture. In the course of the next 6
months alone he moved to improve relations with the
16
Soviet Union, effected an at least temporary rec.-
onciliation with Ngouabi, withdrew from the
French sponsored Afro Malagasy Common Market,
and stepped up agitation for dismantling
"neocolonial" barriers between French- and
Eliglish- speaking African states. He also took the
initiative is attempting to 'impose an end to the feud
between two rival Angolan liberation organizations,
launched a concerted drive to improve Zaire's rele #ions
with Guinea and Algeria still further, and dominated
the Rabat OAU summit conference of June 1972.
While Mobutu n.-) doubt derived a considerable
degree of personal satisfaction from this flurry of
activity, and while he may have at least temporarily
succeeded in diverting poprlar attention away from
Zaire's domestic problems, his is a risky course of
action. For example, his campaign to reduce French
influence in Africa could jeopardize the approximately
$5 million a year in bilateral assistance which Kinshasa
has beer receiving from Paris. Further steps to improve
relations with Moscow or Peking could generate
discontent in the military establishment. Mobutu's
penchant for summit diplomacy could result in his
absence from the country at some critical juncture. But
more important, his emphasis on foreign affairs cuts
down on the time and energy he is able to devote to
meeting his country's pressing internal problems. Arid
without his constant attention and encouragement,
progress could be slow indeed.
Mobutu has, of course, taken many calculated risks
in the past, and some of the more assertive interludes
in Zah an foreign policy have ;Melded very tangible
accomplishments. Not the least of these has been
Kinshasa's success in reducing Belgian domination of
the Zairian economy without sacrificing continued
financial and technical support from Brussels. But the
gains �apart from enhancing his domestic and
regional stature �which Mobutu now hopes to achieve
are not clear. Unless he is able to translate his new
activism on the international scene into concrete
economic benefits (e.g., modest new credits from the
Soviet bloc), he may find that its net effect has been to
worsen his internal problems. Despite the strength of
Mobutu's current position, there is always the danger
that at some point a combination of economic and
political malaise will lead Zairian military leaders to
decide that he is more useful as a scapegoat than e- a
strongman.
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KLrshaw's ostm&Wkw OA

I
I
Chronology (u/ou)
1885
Congo Free State is established as personal domain of
Belgian King Leopold II.
1908
Belgian Parliament assi:aies control of Congo Free State
after international scandal over conditions.
1959
January
First African riots in Leopoldville (now Kinshasa).
1960
June
Congo becomes independent under President Joseph
Kasavubu and Premier Patrice Lumumba.
July
Congolese National Army mutinies and Belgians flee.
Katanga Province (now Shaba) under Moise Tshombe
and eastern Kasai under Albert K_alonji both secede. U.N.
troops arrive at request of central government.
September
Kasavubu dismisses Lumumba. Col. Joseph Mobutu and
army take over and remain in control until February
1961.
1961
January
Lumumba is killed.
August
Cyrille Adoula approved as compromise Premier by near-
unanimous parliamentary vote.
1962
September
Secession in Kasai ended by Congolese armed forces.
1963
January
Secession in Katanga ended by U.N. forces.
September
Kasavubu adjourns parliament indefinitely and begins to
rule by decree with support of "Binza group," comprising
army commander Mobutu and four key civilian officials.
December
Peasant uprising led by Pierre Nlulele begins in central
sector of present Bandundu Province.
1964
April
Simba uprising in eastern Congo beginr to spread north-
ward.
July
Moise Tshombe named Premier by Kasavubu with con-
currence of "Bins group" and many members of still
adjourned parliament.
August
President Kasavubu promulgates new constitution ratified
by referendum in June -July.
Simba guerrillas capture Stanleyville (now Kisangari).
September
Refugee politicians join Simbas in Stanleyville, declare
"Popular Revolutionary Covemment" and gain support
from radical African and Communist states.
November
U.S. planes drop Belgian paratroopers at Stanleyville and
Paulis (now Isiro) to rescue white hostages held by rebels.
1965
Congolese army units with white mercenaries retake
rebel -hell territory as rebel leaders flee.
March -April
Parliamentary elections are hell. Moise Tshombe's
CONACO party gains majority.
October
Kasavubu dismisses Tshombe. New government appointed
by Kasavubu fails to get parliamentary approval.
November
Mobutu seizes control of central government, anncunces
plans to remain its president for a years.
December
Mobutu assumes power to rule by decree.
1966
May -June
Four former cabinet ministers are accused of plotting to
overthrow Mobutu, found guilty by military tribunal, and
publicly hanged.
July
Katangan units in northeastern Congo mutiny, subdued
several months later by white mercenaries loyal to the
government.
17
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i!
1966
October
Mobutu dismisses Premier Leonard Mulamba, popular
army colonel, and declares hims- =!f Pnnnier as well as
President.
1967
January
Congolese Government seizes UMHK Congo -based assets
and establishes its own company to run UMHK copper
mines. UMHK retalia`es by threatening prospective
copper buyers with court action.
February
Government reaches compromise agreement with UMHK
affiliate, ending for time being dispute over control of
UMHK operations.
April
Mobutu publishes a new constitution, legalizing strong
presidential system, gad forms new party, Popular Move-
ment of the Revolution (MPR).
June
New constitution promulgated following popular referen-
dum.
IMF sponsored monetary reform instituted.
July
White mercenaries and Katangan troops mutiny in eastern
Congo.
November
Mercenary mutiny ends with mercenaries withdrawing to
Rwanda.
1968
April
Mercenaries airlifted from Rwanda to Europe.
September- October
Mulele flees to Brazzaville, is returned to Kinshasa under
amnesty guarantee, and executed. Brazzaville government
wreaks diplomatic relations with Kinshasa.
1969
June
Lovanium University students demonstrating in Kinshasa
are shot by troops; sympathy demonstrations at other
universities and schools are greatest show of civilian dis-
content since Mobutu became President.
August
Mobutu bans independent student unions and requires
all students to loin MPR youth wing.
Mobutu dismisses large portion of cabinet ministers, in-
cluding Victor Nendaka and Justin Bomboko, most in-
fluential members of former &iza group.
18
September
Final settlement of dispute between Congolese Govern-
ment and UMHK.
1970
June
Mobutu and Congo (B) President Ngouabi sign Manifesto
of Reconciliation, agreeing to phased resumption of
normal commi cations, trade, and diplomatic relations;
their respective embassies are reopened in December.
King Baudouin attends 10th anniversary of Congolese
independence, climaxing gradual return to solidly con-
t;' ructive relations between the two countries.
1970
August
Mobutu makes his first state visits to the United States,
Romania, and Yugoslavia; he negotiates substantial in-
dustrial investments and military purchases in the U.S.
while reasserting nominal policy of nonalignment.
November
Presidential and National Assembly elections complete
constitutional basis for Mobutu's rule.
December
Mobutu declares amnesty for all refugee rebels, at home
or abroad, who turn themselves in to authorities; two
principal leaders of Stanleyville rebel regime of 1964
and some less notorious emigres accept amnesty by 31
January deadline.
1971
March -April
Mobutu makes state visits to France, Japan, and Taiwan,
gaining fairly substantial increases in long -term economic
aid.
June
Lovanium University students stage unauthor, -ed demon-
stration commemorating students shot by troops in June
1969; Mobutu declares entire student body must serve
in army for 2 years.
August
Mobutu announces that student draftees will return
to campus militia units after rugged basic training; Lov-
anium and two other universities at Lubumbashi and
Kisangani are amalgamated into the National University.
Highly ublicized subversion trials are conducted for
student demonstration leaders, a former rebel "general"
who accepted Mobutu's amnesty, and a mixed bag of
obscure dissidents.
October
Nendaka and Bomboko, who were ousted from cabinet
in August 1969, are publicly accused of plotting to
assassinate Mobutu and put under indefinite detention
without trial.
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r
a o�r
October
Mobutu changes official title of country from Democratic
Republic of the Congo to Republic of Zaire; his "return
to authenticity" campaign is soon extended to the Congo
River, several provinces, and other place names.
1972
January
"Authenticity" campaign is extended to personal names;
the President declares himself Mobutu Sese Seko and
orders subordinates to do likewise.
Cardinal Malula, leading Catholic prelate in Zaire, cri-
ticizes Mobutu's name changing campaign; Mob to
threatens Malula with prosecution for treason and sus-
pends a leading Catholic publication.
Glossary (u/ou)
Much
Belgium agrees to $23 million in additional technical
assistance and credits for Zaire, one of largest single aid
packages since independence.
April
Mobutu's public confrontation Catholic Church in
Zaire winds down, with Malula sojourning at Vatican
and church accepting MPR youth cadres in its seminaries.
August
Mobuto retires many senior generals and tightens the
command structure of the security forces.
1973
January
Mobutu visits Peking and prepares to exchange ambassa-
dors between China and Zaire.
AwwEv ATioN
F OREIG N
E NGLISH
CGTC
Confederation Generale des Travail-
General Confederation of Congolese
leurs Congolass
Workers
CND
Centre Nationale de Documentation
National Documentation Center
DGRSM
Direction Generale du Renseignement
Directorate of Information and Mili-
et de Surete Militaire
tary Security
DIA
Agence de Documentation et d'Infor-
African Documentation and Inferma-
mation Africaine
tion Agency
CECAMINES
La Generale des Carrieres et des Mines
General Quarries and Mines Com-
du Zaire
pany of Zaire
GRAE
Govern Revolucionario de Angola no
Revolutionary Government of Angola
F.xilio
in Exile
INREL
Institut Belge d'Information et de
Belgian Information and Documenta-
Documentation
tion Agency
JMPR
Jeunesse du Mouvement Populaire de
Youth of the Popular 'Movement of
la Revolution
the Revolution
MPR
Mouvement Populaire de la Revolution
Popular Movement of the Revolution
MNC
Mou�ement Nationale Congolaise
Congolese National Movement
SCM
Societe Generale de Minerais
General Ores Company
UGEC
Union Generate des Etudiants Congo
General Union of Congolese Students
lzis
UMHK
Union Minier.�e du Haut Katanga
Mining Union of Upper Katanga
UPA
Uniao das Populacoes de Angola
Union of Angolan Peoples
UNTZA
Union Nationale des Travailleurs de la
National Union of Zairian Workers
Republique du Zaire
i
19
v......... a. w.... o.,.-............�.. :xvw awe+. wraaaawrw. arcura: k: ti^. Y+. b: :xaraa.Yxu ::a47WSG7:,rtiafkt4
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t
SECRET
Area Brief (u/ou)
LAND
Size: 905,000 sq. mi.
Use: 22% agricultural land (2% cultivated), 45% forested,
33% other
Land boundaries: 6,153 mi.
WATER
Limits of territorial waters (claimed): 12 n. mi.
Coastline: 23 mi.
PEOPLE
Population: 23,918,000, average annual growth rate 4.2%
(FY71)
Ethnic divisions: Over 200 African ethnic groups, the
majority are Bantu; four largest tribes� Mongo, Luba,
Kongo (all Bantu), and the Mangbetu Azande make up
about 45% of the population
Religion: 51% Christian, 45% animist, 4% other
Language: French, English, Lingala, Swahili, Kikongo,
and Tshiluba are all classified as official languages
Literacy: 5% fluent in French, about 35% have an
acquaintance with French
Labor force: About 8 million, but only about 12% in
wage structure
GOVERNMENT
Legal name: Republic of Zaire (until October 1971 known
as Democratic Republic of the Congo)
Type: Republic; constitution establishes strong presidential
system
Capital: Kinshasa
Political subdivisions: 8 regions and federal district of
Kinshasa
Legai system: Based on Belgian civil law system and
tribal law; new constitution promulgated 1967; legal edu-
cation at National University of 'Zaire; has not accepted
compulsory ICJ jurisdiction
Branches: President elected 1970 for seven -year term;
National Legislative Council of 420 members elected for
five -year term; the official party is the supreme political
institution
Government leaders: Lt. Gen. Mobutu Sese Seko, Presi-
dent
Elections: Presidential and legislative elections in Octo-
ber and November 1970
Political parties and leaders: Popular Movement of the
Revolution (MPR), only legal party, organized from above
with actual grassroots popularity not clearly definable
Communists: No Communist Party
Member of: EAMA, FAO, IAEA, ICAO, IHB, ILO, ITU,
OAU, UDEAC, U.N., UNESCO, UPU, WHO, WMO
20
ECONOMY
GDP: $2.1 billion (1971 est.), under 3100 per capita; real
growth rate 7.9% p.a. 1968 -71
Agriculture: Main cash crops� coffee, palm oil, rubber;
main food cramps� cassava (manioc), bananas, root props,
corn; some regions self- sufficient
Major industries: Mining, mineral processing, light indus-
tries
Electric power: 751,380 kw. capacity (1971); 3.23 billion
kw. -hr. produced (1971), 148 kw. -hr. per capita
Exports: $669 million (f.o.b., 1971); copper, cobalt,
diamonds, other minerals, coffee, palm oil
Imports: $693 million (c.i.f., 1971); consumer goods, food-
stuffs, mining and other machinery, transport equipment,
fuels
Major trade partners: Belgium, U.S., West Germany, Italy,
and France
Aid: Economic �U.S. (FY61 -70) $449 million; (1970 esti-
mated disbursements) Belgium, $27.4 million; France, $6.9
million; other bilateral aid $3 million; U.N., $7.1 million;
EC, $14.1 million military�U.S., $39.2 million (FY62 -71)
Monetary conversion rate: 1 zaire US$2
Fiscal year: Calendar year
COMMUNICATIONS
Railroads: 3,218 miles, all single track; 2,419 miles 3'6
gage, 78 miles 3'3%" -gage, 85 miles 2' 3 /4" -gage, 636
miles 1'11%"-gage. 532 miles of 3'6" -gage electrified.
Highways: 86,930 miles; 1,095 bituminous, 10,427 laterite,
gravel, cr crushed stone, 75,408 improved or unimproved
earth
Inland waterways: 9,320 navigable; 8,390 in Congo River
system, 930 miles on lakes
Ports: 2 major (Matadi and Boma), 1 minor (Banana)
Merchant Marine: 4 ships of 1,000 g.r.t. and over, totaling
35,901 g.r.t. or 45,8P, d.w.t.
Civil Air: 26 major transports
Airfields: 320 usable; 1 has a runway over 12,000 feet,
2 have runways 8,000 to 11,999 feet, and 56 have run-
ways 4,000 to 7,999 feet; 19 have permanent- surfaced
runways. 166 airfield sites and 5 seaplane stations
Telecommunications: Average African system composed
of radio -relay links, open -wire lines, multiconductor
cables, and radio and TV stations; principal center, Kin-
shasa; 22,500 telephones; 800,000 radio receivers and
20,000 TV receivers; 7 AM, 1 FM, and 2 TV stations
DEFENSE FORCES
Military manpower: Males, 15 -49: 5,715,000, of whom it
is estimated that about 2,745,000 (or 48% are fit for
military service. About 240,000 will be coming of military
age (16) each year through the period 1972 -76
SECRET
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Places and features referred to in this General Survey (U/01J)
0;
COORDINATES
F
0 IS.
0 'E I
1
0 0
'E.
Aketi
2 44N.
23 46
Lake Albert, (lake)
I 40N.
31 00
Akula
2 22N.
20 11
Lake Edward
1 21
29 35
Ango Ango
5 51
13 26
Lake Mwci-u lake)
9 Gu
28 45
Bafwasende
I 05N.
27 16
Lake Tanganyika (take)
6 00
29 30
Banana
6 01
12 24
Libenge
3 39N.
18 38
Bandundu
3 19
17 22
Lienart
3 04N.
25 31
Bangui, Central African Republic
4 22N.
IS 35
Likasi
10 59
26 44
Beni
0 30N.
29 28
Lisala
2 09N.
21 31
Binsa
1 03
28 54
Lobito, Angola
12 20
13 34
BNck River (strm)
3 57
15 54
Lomami (sirm)
0 46N.
24 I
Bomide
0 13
20 52
Lualaba (sirm)
0 26 N.
25 20
Boma
5 51
13 03
Luapula (sirm)
9 26
28 33
Bomu (sirm)
4 08N.
22 27
Lubudi
9 57
25 58
Bondo
3 49N.
23 40
Lubudi sta)
9 57
25 57
Brazzaville, Congo
4 16
15 17
Lubumbashi
11 40
27 28
Budjala
2 39N.
19 42
Luena
9 27
25 47
Bujumbura, Burundi
3 23
29 22
Lukala
5 31
14 32
Bukama
9 12
25 51
Luilu (mine)
10 38
25 21
Bukavu
2 30
28 52
Lulimba
4 42
28 38
Bumba
2 IIN.
22 28
Madula
0 28N.
25 23
Bunia
I 34N.
30 15
Mambasa
1 21N.
29 03
Busanga
JO 12
25 23
Maniema
1 11
28 37
Businga
Buta
3 20N.
2 48N.
20 53
24 44
Manono
Masina
7 18
5 52
27 25
17 03
Chililabombwe, Zambia
12 22
27 50
Matadi
5 49
13 27
Congo River (strm)
6 04
12 24
Mayamba
4 46
16 46
Crique dr Banana (tidal creek)
6 01
12 25
Mayunbe (massif)
4 30
12 30
Dilolo
10 42
22 20 1
Mbandaka
0 04N.
18 16
Djelo-Binza
4 23
15 15
Mbanza-Ngungu
5 15
14 52
Douala, Cameroon
4 03N.
9 42
Mbengo-Mbengo (whirlpool)
5 50
13 26
Fimi (81rm)
3 01
16 58
Mbuji-Mayi
6 09
23 36
Fungurume
10 37
26 18
Mongala (siren.)
I 53N.
19 40
Gemena
3 15N.
19 46
M'Pala. .'.ngola
6 08
13 44
(Iolua
1 41
29 14
Muanda
5 56
12 21
Guba,
10 40
26 26
Mulungwishi
10 47
26 37
Idiofa
5 02
19 36
Mungbere
2 38N.
28 30
Ilebo
4 19
20 35
Mushengc
4 32
21 21
Inga
5 39
13 39
Musoshi
12 15
27 38
Isiro
2 46N.
27 37
Mutshatsha
10 39
24 27
Itimbiri (sirm)
2 02N.
22 44
Mwenga
3 02
28 26
Ituri (strm)
I 40N.
27 01
Ndjili
4 28
15 21
Kahalo
6 03
26 55
Ndolo
3 36
23 03
Kabongo
7 24
25 38
Ndolo (sec popl)
4 19
15 19
Kalemie
5 56
29 12
Pool Malebo (pool)
4 15
15 25
Kamina
8 44
25 00
Port de Kindu
2 57
25 57
Kananga
5 54
22 25
Punia
1 28
26 27
Kasai (strm)
3 02
16 57
Ruzizi (strin)
3 16
29 14
Kasese, Uganda
0 ION.
30 05
Sakania
12 45
28 34
Kasongo
4 27
26 40
Sake
1 34
29 03
Katanti (mission)
2 18
27 08
Sankuru (sirri)
4 17
20 25
Katonto (hill)
10 38
25 21
Shituru (mine)
It 01
26 46
Kenge
4 52
16 59
Sona-Bata
4 54
15 09
Kiambi
7 20
28 01
Songololo
5 42
14 02
Ki,;ali, Rwanda
1 57
30 04
I Tenke
10 35
26 07
Kigoma, Tanzania
4 52
29 38
Titule
3 17N.
25 32
Kikwit
5 02
18 49
Tshela
4 59
12 56
Kimpoko-Nsele
4 14
15 33
Tshikapa
6 25
20 48
Kinkuzu
4 58
14 28
Tshinsenda
12 18
27 58
Kinshasa
4 18
15 18
Ubangi (airm)
3 30
17 42
Kipushi
11 46
27 14
Ubundi
0 21
25 29
Kisangani
0 30N.
25 12
Uvira
3 24
29 08
Kisenge
10 41
23 10
Vila Teixeira de Sousa, Angola
10 42
22 12
Kitona
5 28
17 42
Yei, Sudan
4 05N.
30 40
Kolwezi
10 43
25 28
Zonzo
5 44
14 39
Komba
2 53N.
23 59
Kongolo
5 23
27 00
Selected Airfields
Kota Koli
It 40
27 28
Kwa (8irm)
3 10
16 11
Kamina Base
8 38
25 15
Kwango (siren)
3 14
17 22
Kitona Base
5 -M
12 27
Kwilu (strm)
5 40
12 52
Lubumbashi
11 35
27 32
Lac Kivu (lake)
2 00
20 10
Ndjili
4 23
15 27
NOTE-All latitudes are south unless otherwise indicated.
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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200110007-6

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200110007-6
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