NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY 21; YUGOSLAVIA; THE SOCIETY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: NIS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP01-00707R000200100032-0
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 71
• Document Creation Date: October 25, 2016
• Sequence Number: 32
• Content Type: REPORTS

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009106/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100032 -0
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100032 -0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100032 -0
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY PUBLICATIONS
The basic unit of the NIS is the General Survey, which is now
published in a bound -iiy- chapter format so that topics of greater per-
ishability can be updated on an individual basis. These chapters� Country
Profile, The Society, Government and Politics, The Economy, Military Geog-
raphy, Transportation and Telecommunications, Armed Forces, Science, and
Intelligence and Security, provide the primary NIS coverage. Some chapters,
particularly Science and Inteiligence and Security, that are not pertinent to
all countries, are produced selectively. For small countries requiring only
minimal NIS treatment, ine General Survey coverage may be bound into
one volume.
Supplementing the Genera! Survey is the NIS Basic Intelligence Fact
book, a ready reference publication that semiannually updates key sta-
tistical data found in the Survey. An unclassified edition of the factbook
omits some details on the economy, the defense forces, and the intelligence
and security organizations.
Although detailed sections on many topics were part of the NIS
Program, pruduction of these sections has been phased out. Those pre-
viously produced will continue to be available as long as the major
portion of the study is considered valid.
A quarterly listing of all active NIS units is published in the Inventory
of Available NIS Publications, which is also bound into the concurrent
classified FactLook. The Inventory lists all NIS units by area name and
number and includes classification and date of issue; it thus facilitates the
ordering of NIS units as well as their filing, cataloging, and utilization.
Initial dissemination, additional copies of NIS units, or separate
chapters of the General Surveys can be obtained directly or through
liaison channels from the Central intelligence Agency.
The General Survey is prepared for the NIS by the Central Intelligence
Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency under the general direction
of the NIS Committee. It is coordinated, edited, published, and dissemi-
nated by the Central Intelligence Agency.
WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States, within the
meaning of title 18, sections 793 and 794 of the US code, as amender. Its transmission or revelation
of its contents to or receipt by an unauthorized person is ohibited by law.
CLASSIFIED BY 019641. EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFI-
CATION SCHEDULE OF E. O. 11652 EXEMPTION CATEGORIES
5B (1). (2), (3). DECLASSIFIED ONLY ON APPROVAL OF THE
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100032 -0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100032 -0
WARNING
The NIS is National Intelligence and may not be re-
leased or shown to representatives of any foreign govern-
ment or international body except by specific authorization
of the Director of Central Intelligence in accordance with
the provisions of National Security Council Intelligence Di-
rective No. 1.
For NIS containing unclassified material, however, the
portions so marked may be made available for official pur-
poses to foreign nationals and nongovernment personnel
prc vided no attribution is made to National Intelligence or
the National Intelligence Survey.
Subsections and graphics are individually classified
according to content. Classification /control d- signa-
tions are:
(U /OU) Unclassified /For Official Use Only
(C) Confidential
(S) Secret
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100032 -0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100032 -0
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100032 -0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100032 -0
Page
1. Ethnic and linguistic divisions 4
Roman Catholic Slovenes and Croats in north
and west, Orthodox Serbs in south; interwar
dominance of Serbian monarchy; minority
Albanians, Montenegrins and Macedonians;
five official languages Serbo- Croatian, Slo-
venian, Macedonian, Albanian, Hungarian;
somewhat parallel religious grouping �Roman
Catholic, Orthodox, Islamic.
2. Physical characteristics 4
Predominance of tall, long legged, large -boned
Dinaric, distinctions on basis of nationality,
decline of distinguishing characteristics.
3. Social classes
Traditional peasant societies, interwar ascend-
ancy of upper middle class, Communist so-
ciety of broad occupation groups� peasants
and workers, independent craftsmen, white
collar workers including party elite at top of
social pyramid; corelation of social mobility
and education together with connections.
4. The family and the individual
Decline of extended patriarchal system under
pressures of urbanization, industrialization,
and Communist ideology; Communist em-
phasis on legal and social equality of sexes;
weakening effect of social insurance and wider
education on traditional family interdepen-
dence; marriage and divorce.
5. Social values and attitudes
Gradual supplanting of traditional peasant
value ,.ystem by single industrial culture; per-
sistence of localism, nationalism, ethnic and
religious separatism as opposed to identity as
Yugoslav; economic rivalries as they affect
centralism; national attitudes of Croats, Serbs,
Slovenes, Montenegrins, :.facedonians; respect
for Tito; attitudes toward the West, the
U.S.S.R., Germany, the United States, im-
mediate neighbors; support for nonalignment
and peaceful coexistence, acceptance of com-
pulsory military sex,/ice and civil defense.
C. Populetior
1971 census total of 20,504,516; rank in size and
density among selected countries; distribution by
republic, nationality, urban -rural area, age and
sex; comparatively low median age and corre-
spondingly high dependency ratio; birth rate,
death rate, life expectancy; emigration; growth,
fertility rate; agricultural overpopulation, em-
ployment in the West; absence of government
population program.
5
7
9
D. Manpower and labor 15
1. Manpower resources 15
Economically active population, labor force
participation rate; distribution by sex, age;
labor reserve.
ii
Page
2. Characteristics of the labor force
16
Proportions in agriculture and industry; cate-
gories of agricultural workers; categories in
industry, crafts, services; efforts to upgrade
qualifications; increasing registered unemploy-
ment, problem of joblessness among educated
youth and young professionals; underemploy-
ment.
3. Labor productivity and working
conditions
20
Comparatively low rate by European stand-
ards, both in agriculture and industry; eco-
nomic reform measures for industry, chronic
absenteeism, work stoppages; shift from 48-
to 42 -hour workweek, working hours, leave
and holidays, standards of health and safety;
occupational mobility; employment abroad,
especially West Germany.
4. Income
22
Disparity between living levels in countryside
and cities despite overall improvement since
1950; variety, quality, and cost of goods com-
pared with selected countries; per capita in-
come; sources of income, rising money wages,
average income by economic sector, narrow
differentials for skill; fringe benefits.
5. Labor problems
23
Low productivity; unemployment; 1965 eco-
nomic reform plan; wage level.
6. Labor legislation
24
Comparative lack of central controls for
Communist country; Basic Law on Labor
Relations; major role of workers councils
and other self management organs.
7. Labor relations
24
The workers council, its central role in self
management, its composition and operation,
its varying success as an institution; the
Confederation of Trade Unions of Yugoslavia,
its changing role, its relationship to the Com-
munist party, its espousal of workers' interests;
general organization of trade unions and
their use as an instrument of foreign policy.
E. Living conditions and social problems 26
1. Levels of living 26
Marked variations, regional, urban and rural;
housing; considerable overall improveme.t
since World War II; persisting discontent.
2. Social welfare 27
All- encompassing insurance system health,
old age, survivors, disability, children's allow-
ances, unemployment; coverage in relation to
socioeconomic groups; organization and fi-
nancing on principle of self- management;
benefits, inadequacies, abuses; communal
services for juvenile delinquents, orphans,
and children of the employed; federal re-
spcnsibility for disabled veterans.
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100032 -0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100032 -0
Page
3. Social problems 30
Disruption of traditional values by indus-
trialization, socialization, urban migration;
incidence of crime, increasing economic crime,
growth of juvenile delinquency; alcoholism.
4. Drugs and narcotics 31
Yugoslavia a leading European producer of
raw opium, smuggling of d..:gs considered
the major problem, increasing drug use.
F Health 32
1. Medical care 32
Local administration of public health services,
wide range in quality and availability; pro-
liferation of small institutions with limited
resources; national health policy, health in-
surance; death rate, infant mortality; numbers
of hospitals, beds, physicians; medical train-
ing, effects of socialization of medicine; dis-
ease control, major diseases, animal diseases;
harmful insects and plants.
2. Sanitation 34
Inadequacy of food handling, waste disposal,
and water procurement methods, ineffectual
enforcement of legislation; pollution; avail-
ability of personnel and facilities in event of
national disaster.
3. Nutrition 35
Adequate caloric but deficient protein intake,
general monotony of diet; dependence on food
imports, food crops and meat production.
G. Religion 35
1. Religious influence and the state 35
Strong religious roots, geographic distribu-
tion of dominant religions; greater religious
freedom than under other Communist regimes,
corelation with permissiveness toward national
particularism, early postwar drive against
religious influence Communist- dominated re-
ligious associations, continuing restrictions on
religious expression; data on religious affilia-
tion, numbers of churches, mosques, schools,
publications.
2. The Orthodox churches 38
Serbian Orthodox Church, Macedonian Ortho-
dox Church.
3. Roman Catholicism 39
Most influential and organizationally cohesive
religious force, link with Croatian national
identity, improved church -state relations, in-
creasing religious and social activities, goals
and problems.
Page
4. Islam 40
Strongest in tradition, exemplary modus
vivendi with regime, organization, dependence
on state subsidy.
H. Education 41
1. General 41
Extension of schooling to masses, mediocre
academic accomplishments, education an im-
portant determinant in social stratification;
ideology's permeation of curriculum, general
acceptance of socialism; corelation of eco-
nomic and educational opportunity; decen-
tralized administration and financing.
2. The educational system 42
Decentralization and self- management, uneven
achievement of prescribed standards, flexi-
bility; major components and their purposes
voluntary preschool, 8 -year primary, sec-
ondary, skilled- worker and vocational, higher
education; emphasis on vocational training;
types of higher education and generally open
admissions; adult education.
3. Problems in education 45
Shortages of space, equipment, and trained
personnel; poor teaching methods, restlessness
of teachers, teacher training, low pay for
teachers; inequality of educational oppor-
tunity.
4. Students and their attitudes 46
Orgr;nized extracurricular activities designed
to indoctrinate youth in socialist self- manage-
ment Pioneers, Federation of Youth of
Yugoslavia, Federation of Students of Yugo-
slavia; three degrees of political involvement
of youth �small number of disillusioned and
impatient radicals, larger number of politically
active moderates, the most numerous apa-
thetic; inflation, lack of job opportunities,
and party control as causes of frustration;
drug use.
I. Artistic and cultural expression 47
1. The regime and culture 47
Open, diverse cultural life; postwar Com-
munist efforts to regiment culture toward so-
cialist realism and relaxation of the policy
after 1948, continued regime control usually
through indirect pressure, instances of im-
prisonment for antiregime expressions; prob-
lems of allowing but controlling culturr.l
nationalism.
2. Cultural heritage and traditions 49
Foreign influences superimposed on separate
native forms: Latin- oriented Croats, Byzan-
tine- oriented Serbs and Macedonians.
iii
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100032 -0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP0l- 00707R000200100032 -0
Page
3. Literature 50
Two groups of writers: radicals opposed to
one -party system, those seeking change within
the system; novelists, poets.
4. Music and the theater 51
Foreign influence on music, preference for
folk music; nationalist expression in drama.
5. Art and architecture 52
World giant sculptor Mestrovic; prominence
of primitive art; functionalism of Belgrade's
postwar construction, baroque architecture in
Zagreb and Ljubljana.
J. Public information 53
1. The media, the regime, and the public 53
Relatively high standard of objectivity and
depth of coverage; general self censorship
but ultimate control by regime; direct rela-
tionship of impact of media and education
and economic level.
Page
2. Press and publishing 55
Principal daily newspapers and their circula-
tion; weeklies; orientation of periodicals to-
ward specialized leadership; minority and for-
eign publications; official agency TANJUG,
Pres Servis; book publishing; small library
network; museums.
3. Motion pictures, radio, and television 57
Modestly successful motion picture industry;
growth of radiobroadcasting, emergence of
illegal stations; TV expansion program.
4. Propaganda 58
Regime device for furthering objectives
indoctrination, discipline; party monopoly;
attenticn to foreign audiences; importance of
radio, the press, and television, other chan-
nels; propaganda from abroad.
K. Selected bibliography 61
Glossary 62
iv
Page
FIGURES
37
Major religious publications (table)
Page
Urban and rural schools (photos)
Fig. 1
Yugoslav ethnic types photos)
5
Fig. 19
Fig. 2
Comparative population density
Fig. ID
45
(chart)
9
Fig. 21
Fig. 3
Population density map)
10
Fi,. 22
Fig. 4
Population by administrative division
51
Mestrovic sculptures (photos)
52
(table)
11
Fig. 23
Fig. 5
Distribution of ethnic population
(Photo)
53
(chart)
12
Fig. 24
Fig. 6
Population pyramid by age and sex
56
Fig. 25
(chart)
12
Fig. 26
Fig. 7
Births and deaths chart)
13
Fig. 27
Fig. 8
Vital rates (chart)
13
Fig. 9
Population increase since 1921 (table)
14
Fig. 28
Fig. 10
Age -sex distribution, population and
Fig. 29
labor force chart)
16
Fig. 11
Labor force by economic sector and
Fig. 30
sex (chart)
1.6
Fig. 12
Employment by level of training
Fig. 31
(table)
18
Fig. 32
Fig. 13
Registered unemployment (table)
19
Fig. 14
Comparative levels of living (chart)
26
Fig. 33
Fig. 15
Modern stores and peasant market
(Photos)
29
Fig. 34
Fig. 16
Urban and village housing (photos)..
29
Fig. 17
Principal causes of deaths table)
34
Fig. 35
Fig. 18
Distribution of major religions (snap)
36
iv
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP0l- 00707R000200100032 -0
Page
Religious architecture photos)
37
Major religious publications (table)
38
Urban and rural schools (photos)
43
Structure of educational system
(chart)
44
Schools, enrollment, and teachers,
1969/70 (table)
45
Zagreb University photo)
46
Village cultural center photo)
48
Venetian cultural influence photo)
50
Avant garde theater, Belgrade
(photo)
51
Mestrovic sculptures (photos)
52
Contemporary painter Martin Jonas
(Photos)
52
Museum of modern art, Belgrade
(Photo)
53
Principal :laily newspapers (table)
55
Publication of books by language,
1967 (table)
56
Library reading room at workers'
university photo)
57
Radiobroadcasts to and from
Yugoslavia (chart)
59
Soviet House of Culture, Belgrade
(Photo)
60
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP0l- 00707R000200100032 -0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100032 -0
The Society
A. Introduction (U /OU)
The Yugoslav tcderat on� ethnically, culturally,
and socially the most heterogenous European country
west of the U.S.S.R. �is a microcosm of the
complexity derived from the varied cultural influences
and (livers(- political heritage of the whole Balkan
Peninsula. The Yugoslav (South Slav) state, created
only after the disintegration of the Austro Hungarian
Empire and the realignment of great power influence
in the Balkans following World War 1, is a compact of
convenience for five South Slav nationalities who form
the majority of the population and several non- Slavic
peoples who make up it minority. As it result,
differences of religion, language, and culture divide its
peoples, each of whom is jealous of its separate
identity while seeking to play an important role in the
difficult process of forging it United, Yugoslav national
consciousness. Yugoslavia's unit\� is thus fragile, and
dependent largely on the realization by each of its
constitoent nationalities that, in striving to insure the
viability of the Yugoslav state, each must forego some
of its traditional, nationa,' separateness in order to
retain the greater measure of it.
Of the five major nationalities in Yugoslavia, the
Serbs, Groats, and Slovenes are numerically the largest
three. None, however, constitutes it majority of the
more than 20 million iit habitatits. The peoples of
Yugoslavia are for the most part the descendants of
Slavic tribes who migrated into the Balkans sometime
in the sixth and seventh centuries A.D. In the course of
the subseque -it 200 years they were converted to
Christianity. but at no time prior to 1918 was the
territory of present -clay Yugoslavia politically united.
Even fit(- introduction of Christianity to the Balkans
divided the South Slays: the Croats and Slovenes were
converted by ernisaries from Rome, while the Serbs,
Macedonians, and Montenegrins fell under the
influence of missionaries from Byzantium. The schism
that divided the Chrk world in 105.1 formalized
This division, swing seeds of hatred, controversy, and
conflict which still plague the Yugoslav state.
Since the church was the main vehicle for cultural
advaoecment in the Middle Ages, the S)uth Slays
developed along the respective lines of the two
Christian worlds. To the north and west, the Slovenes
and Croats identified with and participated in the
cultural development of Western Europe. To the south
and east, the Montenegrin, Serb, and Macedonian
cultural expression followed the Byzantine model
before falli-tg prey to five centuries of oppressive.
Turkish domination and tale introduction of [slam into
an already div isive religious context.
"There were brief moments of glory for some of the
South Slays. From 92.3 to 1102 an independent
Croatia flowered before being acquired by the king of
Hungary. The Serbs' national consciousness was
fostered when in 1219 the�, were granted an
independent archbishopric. A short -lived Serbian state
blossomed in the 11th century before falling under
Turkish rule after the Battle of Kosovo in 1359. The
only people to avoid foreign domination at any time
were those Serbs who migrated to the barren Black
Mountains Montenegro. The region's isolated,
nearly inaccessible mountain valleys helped the
Montenegrins to resist Turkish assaults, and to
maintain their independence.
The struggle for Ldependence which led to the
emergence of modern Yugoslavia began with the
spread of nationalism in intellect aal circles in the late
15th century, and was given impetus by Napoleon's
creation of the Illyrian provinces in the early 1800's.
Two uprisings in Belgrade, in 180.1 and 1515,
dra watically awakened Seri) nationalism. It was not
until 1867, however, that Turkish garrisons were
withdrawn and the Serbian princedom became truly
independent. From then until the first World War,
nationalism was the driving force in the region. The
peasants of Bosnia and Hercegovina (Boma i
Hercegovina) rose in revolt against the Turks in 1875.
The result, however, was only the exchange of one
foreign master for another, as Turkish rule in Bosnia
and Hercegovina gave way to domination by the
Austro Hungarian Empire. Nationalism in both
Montenegro (Crna Gora) and Serbia (Serbija)
burgeoned in the early 20th century as both states
Joined forces on several occasions to push the Turks
farther south and to annex large chunks of Balkan
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100032 -0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100032 -0
territory. Secret patriotic organizations fanned
national passions and fostered cultural separatism,
while working cLuulestincly to amuse the Slav
minorities in Austria- Hungan. The fateful result of
this activity was the assassination of Austrian
Archduke Francis Ferdinand in Sarajevo on 28 June
1914 sparking the first World War. Serbia paid
dearly in material and human losses during the
ensuing conflict. but by the end of 1918 the� Serb
heroic resistance had won for them the admiration of
other South Slav peoples. On 1 December 1918, after
more than it thousand years of separate cultural,
social, all(] Politil�al development, the Kingdom of tilt�
Serbs, Croats. and Slovenes was officially proclaimed
under the Serbian royal house. The task of governing
these diverse and discordant South Slays proved
difficult.
"Throughout the interwar period, internal frictions
arising from differences of political experience and
tradition were aggravated by the system of centralized
control from Belgrade. 'I'll( Croats in particular came
to loathe the interbcllum period as a time of
subjugation to the Serbs. Less numerous than the Serbs
bolt highly Westernized, they felt culturally superior to
the rest of the South Slays (save the Slovenes) and
strenuously resisted subordination to the Serbian royal
house. The resulting pent -up hostility and frustration
burst forth "ith it vengeance during the Nazi
occupation. Front 1941 to the close of World War 11,
hundreds of thonsands of Croats and Serbs lost their
lives its a bloody civil war fought under the banners of
fascism and corn lit unism that often as not merely
masked traditional ethnic hatreds.
In the inurediate postwar period the Communist
regime's federalist solution to the thorny nationality
problem met with considerable success. Since the early
1960�x, however, national antagonisms have increased.
Fuelcd b economic rivalries, the nationality issue has
spurted to the fore in the midst of the nations political
and economic decentralization. In 1971, excessive
:roatian nationalism presented the regime with one of
its most serious challenges, which was hro:ight under
control only after 'Tito's personal intervention.
Postwar attempts to force Yugoslav social an(1
c�ultnral life into it unified doctrinaire C:onummist
pattern failed. The main reason for this wits the
regimes concessions to nationalism and traditional
cultiirai values in order to garner popular support after
Yugoslavia's ouster from tile Communist Information
Bureau (Continfornt) in raid- 19 -18. From 19.18 on,
Belgrade began to develop its own particular brand of
socialism, known as self- managetnent. Self- nnuaage-
ment as it social and political system is based on a wide
a
range of \%orkers councils, Noosing committees, and a
Lost of other local organizations which manage such
rmaiters as economic and cultural development.
e(leicatiora, public health, social insurance, and public
entertainment. Because it is based on it philosophy of
decentralized, local control and development, self
management fosters rather than dinninishes existing
regionalism and social and cultural individualism.
Despite the regime's successes in industrialization
and modernization since 1945, there are still too many
Yugoslays for the economy to support at levels of
living as high as those in Western Europe. Ac'c'ording
to preliminary 1971 census figures, the population
surpassed 20.5 trillion and it is growing at a rate
exceeding that of most European countries. Surplus
labor is it problem of the regime, and temporary
economic emigration is encouraged. Some 900,000
Yugoslays were working abroad in 1971, most in
Western Europe.
Living conditions in Yugoslavia vary sharply from
one region to the next, according to degree of
urbanization and industrialization, and the educa-
tional an(1 cultural background of the area's
population. The northern republics of Slovenia
(Sloyenija) and Croatia I I ry it t s kit and the
metropolitan region of Belgrade in Serbia enjoy higher
standards of living than the southern regions or rural
areas. One main goal of the regimes current 5 -year
plan is to develop the nation's backward areas
sufficiently to reduce the gap between the nation's
"have." and "have -not" regions.
Rapid urbanization has accompanied industrializa-
tion, and labor has left the land at a rapid pace since
1945, creating, increasing social problems in the
expanding cities. 'Traditional family relationships and
Peasant values have been undermined, with no firm
new value system to take their place. As it result of the
regime's abandonment of farm collectivization in
1953, agriculture Kati remained the stronghold of
private enterprise; about 855( of the arable land is
privately held.
Economic development has helped create it new
socialist middle class, composed of party functionaries,
technicians, and business officials. "Tile upper echelons
of this new white collar group have more and more
become it social elite running the country. Entrance
into tile circle is based on political and business
connections and, inc�rcasingly, on education. The
deal :iml for better educated personnel to run an ever
more complex economy and society has created
tension between the new young technocrats, who
believe their talent is undertitilized. and older party
and partisan veterans, who believe that tbey canned
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100032 -0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100032 -0
their present economic and social status by their
sacrifices during World War If. Added to this has been
it student ootery against arbitrary exercise of
bureaucratic authority, and calls for snore educational
opportunity for working -class students as a means of
!oosenueg the grip of the new class' on society.
Advances in education have been achieved by
making free schooling available to all, encouraging
higher education, and granting government stipends
and scholarships. The educational system, however,
has tended to become divided between the children of
the workers and peasants, who receive vocational
education, and the children of the white- collar group,
who have greater opportunity for lih4her education.
Overcrowded classrooms and lack of qualified
teachers, moreover, limit educational achievement. As
it result, the educational system has done little to break
down social elitism and distinctions both between
developed and uuderdevelcolicd parts of the country
and between rural and urban areas.
Although the regime attempts to limit the influence
of religion and, where possible, to use it for its own
purposes, there is religious freedom in the sense that
public worship is permitted .without undue
interference. Religious crganizations are officially
discouraged from taking stands on important public
issues at variance with the state, and the regime has
consisten!IN opposed the Ronan Catholic Church*s
attempts to expand religious education or to move into
the areas of social welfare and health. Relations with
the Vatican. hove %er. have improved dramatically
since 1970, when the I loly So-(- and Belgrade upgraded
their relations to the ambassadorial level. In early 1971
President Tito became the first head of state of a
Communist nation to pay an official visit to the
Vatican.
After 27 years in power, the Communists i,re still
trying to forge it viable nation out of a crazy -quilt
patching together of peoples, traditions, and interests,
and to persuade the country's constituent ethnic
groups to set aside their regional prejudices in the
interests of the Yugoslav federation. 'Though the
obstacles are great and success is by no means assured,
there has been progress toward this goal. i\-loreover,
Yugoslavia's postwar history has taught its friends and
adversaries alike that the Yugoslav social and political
systene, albeit lacking order, has it resiliency that has
repeatedly enabled it to resolve both domestic strains
and foreign crises. The flexibility of the Yugoslav
system in absorbing open criticism and adjusting to
domestic complaints has led to the development of it
relatively open society, and constitutes it major step
forward in giving Yugoslavia that element of
democracy which makes it at once a maverick and an
attraction within the Communist world.
B. Structure and characteristics of the
society (U /OU)
Deep rooted nationality rivalries have hindered the
development of a unified Yugoslav society since the
creation of the country at the end of World s't'ar 1.
Despite the total control of the state achieved after
World War 11 by the Communist regime, it too has
been handicapped in creating a unified Yugoslav
national consciousness by the country's diverse
political, ethnic, cultural, and religious heritage. In
the late 1960's and early 1970's the interplay of
government reforms, continuing econoric problems,
and it freer political climate has led to a resurgence of
bitter regional and nationality animosities. These
antagonisms threaten President Tito's efforts to build a
system that will promote the survival of an
independent, nonaligned Yugoslavia once he leaves
the scene.
In its simplest forts, the Yugoslav nationality
problem has been a struggle by non- Serbians against
Serbian hegemony. During the period between the
two World Wars, the ruling Serbian monarchy viewed
and treated ngoslavia as an extension of greater
Serbia. The resentment, suspicion, and distrust
resulting fie,n; that experience still color the outlook of
many other Yugoslav nationalities �nost particularly
the Croats. Following their victory at the close of
World War 11, the Communists erroneously believed
that the establishment of six republics and two
provinces� roughly corresponding to the boundaries
of Yugoslavia's major nationality groupings �would
solve the nationalitic problem. The problem did in
fact fade (hiring the first two decades of Communist
rule, but this was more the result of Tito's personal
leadership than of the system of Communist rule.
Yugoslavia thus remains it crazy quilt of ethnic,
linguistic, religious, and cultural differences. No other
country in Europe is as ethnically heterogeneous. The
sharp differences in the regional topography of
Yugoslavia have accentuated and abetted the
divisions of the people. A precipitous mountain range
extending the entire length of the country aggravated
the linguistic and religious differences by inhibiting
cultural interchange. The sanee geographic factors also
resulted in large disparities in the standard of living
between the inhabitants of the mountainous regions of
.3
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100032 -0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100032 -0
the center and south and the more prosperous
population of the fertile valleys and plains of the north
arid northwest.
1. Ethnic and linguistic divisions
To the north and west are the Roman Catholic
Slovenes and Croats, whose historical ties to the West
and to economically more advanced societies nurture
feelings of superiority. To th-. south and east are the
generally Orthodox Serbs around whom modern
Yugoslavia was formed. The Serbian monarchy
dominated the interwar Yugoslav Government, and
the Serbs �mane of whom feel they have been chosen
to play a leading role in the nation �still predominate
in the federal administration. T!ere are the Albanians
in Kosovo, who demand national recognition and
equality; Montenegrins, with a proud and independ-
ent past all their own; and Macedonians, whose
national consciousness has been encouraged in Tito's
Yugoslavia.
The Orthodox Serbs and Macedonians, as well as
the Muslim Albanians, share a Byzantine heritage that
helped them endure 500 gars of Turkish rule. Muslim
culture and religion took firm root in Bosnia, where a
large Muslim Slav minority remains. Divisions of
culture and religion are reinforced by those of
language. Yugoslavia has five official languages, of
which three are Slavic� Serbo- Croatian, Slovenian,
and Macedonian �and two non Slavic� Alhanian
and Hungarian.
Language, along with religion, is one of the main
determinants of nationality among the South Slays.
Serbo Croatian, which serves as the lingua franca of
the country, is spoken in Serbia, Croatia, Montenegro,
arid Bosnia and Hercegovina. Slovenian is used
mainly in Slovenia and Macedonian in Macedonia.
Albanian is spoken in the autonomous province of
Kosovo, while Hungarian is widely used in the
autonomous province of Vojvodina.
All the major Slavic languages are related closely
enough to enable people from different parts of the
country to understand each other. Although Serbian
aril Croatian are not identical aril are written in
different alphabets Cyrillic for Serbian and Latin for
Croatian� Serbo- Croatian is considered one language
by terms of an agreement signed in the city of Novi
Sad in 195 -1. It has many dialects which are mutually
understandable aril which shade into one another.
The Yugoslav Constitution makes Serbo- Croatian the
language of military command, drill, arid administra-
tion, although all the languages of Yugoslavia are
recognized as equal and training manuals are printed
in all five languages. Non Serbo Croatian soldiers may
use their native languages when off duty, but they are
required to learn enough Serbo- Croatian to cyan out
their military duties.
Slovenian, which is more akin to Russian than is
Serbo- Croatian, is written in the Latin alphabet.
Macedonian, close to Bulgaria- arid written in
Cyrillic, was before World War II considered a
Bulgarian dialect even in Yugoslavia. Bulgaria and
Greece, with their ;Macedonian minorities, still do not
recognize Macedonian as a separate language. Since
the establishment of the Macedonian republic bj� the
Yugoslav Communist regime in 1944, the Yugoslays
have pushed for international recognition of the
language as part of their campaign to legitimatize the
e- +stence of a separate Macedoni, n nationality and
culture.
The use of minority languages is guaranteed by the
Constitution, but only in the late 1960's was this
principle gradually put into practice. In 1966 the
faculty of law and economics in Pristina, the capital of
heavily Albanian Kosovo province, began lecturing in
Albanian. In addition, the Communist party in
Kosovo has been urging major Yugoslav universities to
offer entrance examinations in the Albanian language.
Simultaneous translation of Yugoslav Federal
Assembly debates into Serbo Croatian, Slovenian, and
Macedonian started only in M67; previously only
Serbo- Croatian Fad been used.
Religion is an equally divisive factor in Yugoslavia's
complex nationality problem. The distribution of the
religious groups throughout the country is based upon
the historical development of the various peoples and
is a factor that divides the population. The majority of
the population professes to belong to one of the several
religious groups: Serbian Orthodox, Roman Catholic,
and Islamic. Traditionally, being a Serb meant being
of the lr`rthodox faith and being a Croat meant being
a Roman Catholic.
2. Fhysical characteristics
Most Yugoslays belong to the Dinaric racial
classification. They are the most numerous and
characteristic inhabitants of the Dinaric zone, which
stretches from southern Germany to the Greece horder
and which centers in Bosnia and Hercegovina and
Montenegro. The typical Dinaric is tall, long legged,
and large boned but spare. His head is small to
moderate in size, wide in relation to length and flat in
the portion behind the ears; the nose is prominent and
the jaw line, wide. Pigmentation and hair color vary
from light to dark, and eyes are usually blue or brown.
Each South Slav nationality possesses its own
distinct physical characteristics presumably acquired
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100032 -0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100032 -0
through long isolation and inbreeding. Slovenes are
almost indistinguishable from their Austrian
neighbors. They are of medium height (5'6 have
moderately round heads with rather small facial
dimensions, and are predominantly blond. Croats
have similar pigmentation, but are taller (5'7') on the
average. Serbs are about the same as Croats in their
bodv measurements, but differ by having a
preponderance of high broad heads with faces smaller
but longer than those of the Slovenes. The Serbs
usually have a high rooted nose with a downward
turning tip, and are darker than the Croats.
Macedonians usually are shorter and more darkly
pigmented than other Yugoslays, although some are
tall and blond. The range of physical types is shown in
Figure 1.
The Montenegrins are probably the tallest and
heaviest people in Europe, with a mean stature of
5'10" and an average weight of 160 pounds for a -40-
year -old man. They are thickset, with large frames,
wide shoulders and deep chests. beads are
correspondingly large. 'Their faces have it rugged bony
structure, heavy jaws, and it large hawklike, beaked
nose. They are lighter in color than Serbs and darker
than Slovenes.
Intermarriage and large -scale migration within the
country have made many of Yugoslavia's national
minorities almost indistinguishable from the
surrounding population. Peculiarities of dress have
declined as a method of identifying various
nationalities as relatively uniform dress has spread
front the cities to the countryside.
3. Social classes
FIGURE 1. Yugoslav ethnic types (C)
Se: bion
Macedonian
Before World War 11, the various national divisions
that make up Yugoslavia were predominantly peasant
societies. The 'Turkish conquest in the 14th century
wiped out the old Serbian nobility. The petty landed
gentry who survived this slaughter eventually became
the nucleus around which a new nobility emerged in
the early 18(x) s� eventually to form the Serbian
monarchy and aristocracy in the interwar period. The
native aristocracy in Slovenia and Croatia virtually Croatian
disappeared under A List ro- Hungarian rule. Only in
Bosnia and I Icreegovina, where the heretical medieval
nobility embraced Islam to preserve their lands, dill an
influential local aristocracy survive into the 20th
century.
Between the wars, society was dominated by the
tipper echelons of a small middle class. At the top of
the social structure stood persons in governmental
services, including the army. Since education was
needed to perform higher government jo4)s, classical
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100032 -0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100032 -0
European education became a status svrnbol. At the
bottom of society were the millions of mostly illiterate
peasants and workers.
The Communist takeover during 19.11 -45 deprived
the old social elite of ?ts political power, and
nationalization stripped it of economic power. The
society that emerged is composed of broad occupation
groups, the major ones being peasants, blue- collar
(industrial) workers, independent craftsmen, and
white collar workers. Within these broad categories
there are marked differences in social prestige, income,
privileges, and opportunities to participate in major
decisionmaking.
At the !road base of the Yugoslav social pyramid
remain the peasants and the workers. iUthough they
constitute the largest social group in the country, both
are underrepresented in the seats of power. The
peasantry, in particular, has undergone significant
diminution in size, prestige, and importance since
World War IL Partially as it consequence of this
situation, a new group of peasant workers has
emerged, consisting of those who work in factories and
return to their farms daily or on weekends. In 18f,
there were about 1,300,000 such peasant work. -n
performing unskilled jobs to industry.
Independent craftsmen, caterers, and truckers form
it second major category. Their number is growing to
meet the increasing dernand for craftsmen such as
plumbers, carpenters, and electric appliance
repairmen. Most such craftsmen however, have
remained at the mercy of the taxing power of local
officials and have little or no political influence as a
group.
The upper levels of Yug oslav society are occupied
mainly by white collar workers, whose ranks extend
from lowly clerks to influential professors and party
functionaries. This broad group comprises 8% to 10%
of the total active population. Among them, social
distinctions generally derive from occupation,
educational level, and the relative importance of their
jobs. The white collar group is mainly drawn from
wartirne partisan leaders �many of whorn are of
peasant background tile postwar generation of
students, and remnants of the prewar middle class.
The leadership of the League of Communists of
Yugoslavia (LCY) �from the political elite down
through the members of the central committees of the
republics and provinces--stands at the top of the
social pyramid. This group makes up the white- collar
elite. They enjoy certain social privileges and a living
standard considerably higher than that of the lower,
white- collar workers. Moreover, educational oppor-
tunity depends to a large extent on money and
6
influence, both of which lower class families often
lack. Children of blue collar workers are most
numerous in the apprentice schools. Children of
white collar workers predominate in the general
secondary schools which prepare students for
advanced education. One of the demands voiced by
the rioting Belgrade University students in June 1968
was for increased opportunities for the children of
pcasant and worker families to acquire higher
education; they also demanded more worker
representation in the party.
The conditions for high social mobility exist in
theory and law in Yugoslavia. In reality, connections
(veze) remain important. Social mobility is greater for
those who know the right people, join the party, and
contrive to acquire an education. Although party
membership is no longer the overwhelming criterion
for success, it still is a passport to the top of Yugoslav
society.
4. The family and the individual
The pressures of urbanization, industrialization,
and Communist ideology have accele ated the
transformation of Yugoslav family life from the
traditional extended patriarchal system (zadruga),
which was rooted in rural life, to the modern family
concept. 'rhe continued influence of some zadruga
traditions, however, can be seen in the ability of most
Yugoslays to recite intricate lists of family and clan
relations Family life has continued to be more
cohesive in rural than in urban areas, and even though
migration to the cities is slowly changing their
attitudes, many peasant- workers maintain ties with
rural relatives.
The emphasis on male dominance in the pre -World
War II family left women in a subordinate legal and
social position. Since then, the Communists have
emphasized legal and social equality between the
sexes. The regime encourages women to work outside
the home and to be active in sociopolitical affairs. In
1967 Croatia became the first republic to name a
woman premier. The drive has been most successful in
Croatia and Slovenia and in the cities. In the
underdeveloped rural republics, particularly those.
influenced by Muslims, unwritten social restrictions
on women are fading only slowly.
The regime also attempts to use the family to
provide it basis for social stability. The long -term trend
is to smaller families. The endemic housing shortage,
however, often forces young couples to live with their
parents. Elaborate social insuranu schemes weaken
interdependence within the family, while more
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100032 -0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100032 -0
widespread education undermines the deference paid
by the young to the opinions of their often poorly
educated elders.
Marriage and divorce are under civil jurisdiction,
although religious rites often follow the obligatory
civil ceremony. 'There are liberal grounds for divorce
and the number of divorces has risen from 1 -1,807 in
the 1952 -5.1 period to 20,984 in 1968. Most divorces
occur among urban blue- and while- collar workers.
The relatively low divorce rates in Kosovo,
Macedonia, and Montenegro probably reflect the
influence of traditional no-es in rural regions.
5. Social values and attitudes
Urbanization, industrialization, and socialist
practice under Communist rule has severely strained
the traditional peasant- derived value systern. Not all
Yugoslays have accepted the accompanying demands
for it change in outlook, and some have resisted. Many
Yugoslays ascribe to Marxism most of the ills
attendent upon rapid secularization and urbanization.
Ideologically the regime is antagonistic to the
traditional peasant culture but understands its deep
roots and attempts to use its values to gain regime
ends. Despite conservative peasant resistance to rapid
social change and continuing wide urban -rural and
also regional difference,, Yugoslav society is moving in
the direction of it single dominant industrial culture
and valve system. The major unifying factors in this
evolving culture arc the expansion of primary
education teased on an increasingly standardized
currictdum; the development of mass media
conveying similar ideas, norms, and goals, and
improved communications and transportation, which
foster increased interaction between urban and rural
areas and between the various republics.
Traditional peasant culture involved it strong
attachment to the land and association Nvith an
extended kinship group. Even thongh these ties
usually involved identification with it broader
religious or ethnic group, the Yugoslav j;casant's
outlook remains very localistic. 'I'll(- social systern
stressed the values of *rlf- reliance, independence,
work, cooperation, and submission to the will of God.
The Marxist ideology stressing mans ability to
master nature and shape society and his own fate
clashes with the peasants tendency to attribute
change to the will of God. After an initial period of
rigorous persecution of religion, the regime
acconunodated itself to the peasants basic religions
beliefs, hoping to exploit religiously derived values
such as humbleness, loyalty, justice, and self- sacrifice
in building a socialist society.
Despite thc exhortations of the Communist
leadership that party members should be models of
social re,ponsibility and that they should respect the
rights and opinions of othc �s, self- interest still
dominates most prrsonal conduct. In the economy,
self management can he vitiated by to %al park
cliques, and business corruption often occ. S.
The failure of the party to live np to its proclaimed
standards has reinforced the traditional Balkan
cynicism of much of the population. Apathy and
frustration are particularly apparent among the youth.
Despite their basic acceptance of the regime, many
e�oung people are skeptical about the validity of
Marxist ideology and are concerned primarily with
their uwn material well being.
Although the Communist- inaugurated federal
system has helped case some interregional conflicts,
the nationality problen remains dangerous. Most
people still think of themselves primarily as Croats,
Serbs, or members of one of the other national groups
rather than as Yugoslays. The onset of economic and
political decentralization in the early 1950's allowed a
slow surfacing of regional particularism. This process
was acceleraied in late 1970 when President Tito
encouraged public debate of major moves toward
governmental decentralization. One result was an
alarming rise of regional chauvinism in Croatia, which
ultimately impelled Tito to purge sonic 400 local
officials.
The old national antagonisms were based on ethnic
and religious grounds. The new rivalries are primarily
economic. In the case of Croatia, retention of a larger
share of foreign currency earnings was the major
demand articulated by the reptblic's nationalists in
1971. As the national republics competed for
investment funds and the means for faster economic
growth, the old ill feelings reasserted themselves in
sports, cultural activities, commerce, historiography,
and politics. In addition, the outbursts of regionalism
since 1970 were based on interrepublic rivalry for the
powers hitherto exercised by the central government
and �aw� developing in the individual republics.
In the case of the Serbs, however, there appears to
be an undercurrent of opposition to the decentraliza-
tion by unspecified officials who prefer it more
orthodox, centrally controlled, Communist state. The
Serbs, in addition to emphasizing the sacrifices they
have made for the Yugoslav idea in both world wars,
apparently are also fearful of losing at least some of
the economic benefits accruing to them from it
centralized system run from Belgrade, the capital of
both Serbia and Yugoslavia.
The Croats and Sloven-s, by contrast, are suspicious
of it centralized systern, relieving that it siphons off
H
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100032 -0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100032 -0
resources from their relatively developed economies to
subsidize the nation's underdeveloped regions. Croat
officials in particular loathe the interwar period as a
time of subjugation to the Serbs. Less numerous than
the Serbs, the more Western- orient(d Croats feel
culturally superior to the rest of the country (Slovenia
excluded) and are determined to push for nearly full
autonomy through decentralization. Because Slovenia
as an entity is relatively new �there was no Slovene
state until the 20th century �the Slovenes are
particularly sensitive to such things as the treatment of
their Paguage and the preservation of their
considerable, essentially central European, intellectual
heritage.
The Montenegrins, situated in a small quarter of
Yugoslavia along the Adriatic coast bordering
Albania, are ethnic Serbs who settled in the Black
Mountains in the Middle Ages. They successfully
fought off the Turks and remained independent
throughout the 500 years of Turkish dominance in the
Balkans. These tough mountaineers thus view
themselves rs superior to the rest of the Yugoslays.
Montenegro harbors strong pro Russian sympathies
dating to the days of Tsar Peter the Great when sailors
of the first Russian navy trained in Montenegro.
Subsequently, Montenegro and Russia periodically
joined in waging war against the Ottoman Empire.
Even under Communist rule there are similarities
between the Soviet and Montenegrin viewpoints. The
Montenegrin Communist Party, for example, remains
one of the most conservative in Yugoslavia and favors
many elements of a more orthodox Communist
political and economic system.
'me rise of Ivlacedor.ian national consciousness is
closely linked with the existence of a Yugoslav state.
Situated at the southeastern end of the country next to
Bulgaria, the republic of Macedonia was established
as a component of the Yugoslav federation after World
War H. Only through membership in the federation
has the distinct character of the Macedonians been
recognized and allowed expression. Bulgaria refuses to
recognize the existence of a Macedonian nation,
culture, or language �a refusal most Yugoslav
Macedonians read as an expression of age -old
Bulgarian claims to the region. Bulgarian needling
over the "Maceuonian question" has only heightened
the republic's sense of national identity and solidified
its ties to Yugoslavia. Although Macedonia may have
partially sympathized with the Croatian nationalist
position in the late months of 1971, the republic's
nationalism has never run counter to the basic interests
of the federation.
Many Yugoslays are proud of the Communist
regime's achievements in industrialization, mass
education, and social w- lfare, and of the high esteem
Tito has won for Yugoslavia in much of the world.
Tito's defiance of Stalin in 194`: earned him immense
popularity, much of which he has retained. Tito's
person is a major unifying force which is buttressed by
the popular desire to maintain independence from
outside control.
Yugoslavia's foreign policy of nonalignment and
balancing between East and West has helped sa',isfy
the public's craving for prestige. Since the Soviet -led
occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1968, Bel- rade's
nonalignment has tipped in favor of the West.
Culturally, most Yugoslays already lean toward the
West, and the nation's intelligentsia and the youth
avidly pick up Western styles and trends in literature,
clothing, and music. Infatuation with Italian (and
French) fashions, in fact, has helped mitigate the
traditional Yugoslav contempt for Italians.
Hostility of the ;population toward Germany is
strong in some areas, but it is mixed with admiration
for German technical and economic achievements.
Thousands of Yugoslays find temporary employment
in West Germany. Past economic, technical, and
humanitarian aid has fostered a favorable attitude
toward the United States, and the study of English is
increasingly popular in many parts of the country.
Pro- Soviet feeling is strong among the older
Communists, who sometimes feel a nostalgic pull
toward the U.S.S.R. The Soviet Union, however, by
the behavior of its troops in 1945, its treatment of
Yugoslavia after the break with Stalin, and its brutal
intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968 has
squandered the good will it earned in World War II.
The Yugoslav public's attitudes toward their
immediate neighbors are affected by historical
antipathies and cultural differences. There is still some
residual distrust of Italians and Hungarians.
Romanians are tolerated as allies. Greeks usually are
regarded as friends. Bulgarians are distrusted as
traditional rivals in the competition for Macedonia.
The attitude toward Albanians, usually one of
hostility, has improved in the wake of the mutual
decision in February 1971 to raise diplomatic relations
to the ambassadorial level and to improve general
relations.
The regime's policy of nonalignment and peaceful
coexistence accurately reflects the public attitude
toward international conflict. Influenced by national
suffering in two world wars, most Yugoslays condemn
ar,ything that threatens to generate another conflict.
The regime fully supports the United Nations as an
instrument :,f peace. There is little opposition to
compulsory military service, which has been reduced
from 2 years to 18 months. The mem -)ry of foreign
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100032 -0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100032 -0
invasion is still strong, and Yugoslavia maintain:, an
army which is large in relation to the countrv's size.
Additionally, the army is vitally important for
indoctrinating recruits with the concepts of Yugoslav
national unity.
The general attitude toward civil defense has
improved dramatically since the Warsaw Pact
invasion of Czechoslovakia. Yugoslavia has adopted a
program of nationwide mobilization called all
people's defense. Should Yugoslavia be invaded, every
person between 1S and 60 would assume a specific
defense assignment. The first large -scale joint
maneuvers of the army and local defense Units
Freedoin 71 �was held in September 1971. Eyewitness
observers report widespread enthus;asm on the part of
the participants.
C. Population (U /OU)
Yugoslavia recorded a population of 20,504,516 in
the 31 March 1971 census. This fivure represents an
increase of 1,955,225 over the 1961 census, and the
Foreign Demographic Analysis Division (FDA D), U.S.
Department of Commerce, estimates that by I
January 1973 the population had increased another
:336,500, to 20,841,000. The 1971 census employed a
complicated questionnaire designed to provide long
unavailable data on educational ,attainments,
migration, characteristics of the labor force, and
nationality. Both before and after the census a great
deal of controversy arose over these forms, particularly
concerning the question on nationality. The term
"Yugoslav" was criticized by many because it seemed
to encourage individuals to give tip their specific
national identity. in Croatia, charges arose that
inclusion of terms such as "Dalmatian" in the
nationality category was implicitly anti Croatian. The
end result of the bickering was the delay of the full
publication of the census results until 1973.
Of the seven countries which border Yugoslavia
Albania, Austria, Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary, Italy,
and Romania �both Italy and Rona'anla have larger
populations. Yugoslavia ranks fourth in size, after the
Soviet Union, Poland, and Romania, of the
Cornmlinist -niled countries in Eastern Europe. In
land area, Yugoslavia's more than 98,700 square miles
rank third in Eastern European Communist countries
behind the Soviet Union and Poland. Yugoslavia's
'In this chapter. 1971 census returns are used where available
otherwise, the latest estimates are used.
POPULATION
In thousands
32A92
20.596
20.505
17.03+
14.426
10.376
8.765
8.601
2.212
POPULATION DENSITY
Persons per square mile
Federal
Republic
Of Germany
Italy
Poland' 273
650
4"
Romania 225
YUGOSLAVIA 208
East Germany 408
Czechoslovakia 292
Hungary 290
Greece 172
Bulgaria 200
Albania 1 191
FIGURE 2. Population and population density, Yugo-
slavia and selected European countries, 1971 (U /OU)
population density of 208 persons per square mile is
roughly similar to that of neighboring Bulgaria and
Romania, but there are many more people per square
mile in Czechoslovakia and Hungary, and more than
twice as many in East Germany (Figure 2).
Population density, according to the 1971 census, is
relatively high in the northern and eastern interior and
along the borders of Austria, Hungary, Romania, and
Bulgaria. It is low in districts along the Adriatic coast
and in the mountains which parallel this coast,
although densities along the narrow coastal plain are
often high. Except for sparsely populated Monte-
negro, the range of densities among the larger
administrative divisions is not great; those with the
largest populations are also the largest in area
(Figure 3).
Serbia, the largest and most populous of the six
federal republics v,hich make up Yugoslavia,
9
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100032 -0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100032 -0
Republic capital
0 Autonomous area capital 501625 3-73
FIGURE 3. Population distribution according to the 1971 census (U /GU)
contained 8.4 million persons in 197 1, or slightly more
than 415 of the total population (I'igure4). Croatia,
with 4.4 million, and Bosnia and Hercegovina, with
3.7 million, were the second Ind third most populous
republics respectively, but theircornbined populations
totaled less than that of Serbia. Macedonia registered
1.6 million inhabitants and Slovenia 1.7 million.
Montenegro, the smallest and least populous of the
republics, contained only 530,000 people and
accounted for less than 3 1 /'r of the total population.
Yugoslavia was formed in 1918 when the national
aspirations of several different Slavic peoples in the
area coalesced, and its administrative divisions still
reflect its ethnic diversity. Each of the six republics has
its own history, traditions, and cultural peculiarities,
as do the two autonomous regions of Serbia
Vojvodina and Kosovo, the latter often called the
Kosmet. There are five "Yugoslav nationalities," to
which abotit 90% of the people belong.
The 1971 census figures on the nationality makeup
of Yugoslavia have yet to be published. Nevertheless,
the basic pattern of ethnic population distribution in
1961, as shown in Figure 5, remains valid. It is clear,
however, that the highest rate of population increase
among Yugoslav nationalities during the cleeade
ending in 1971 occurred among the Albanians in the
province of Kosovo. The province registered an
increase of 295c between 1961 and 1971, far
outstripping its closest rival, Macedonia, which
registered a 17% increase. In general, each of the five
basic nationality groups �Serb, Croat, Slovene,
Macedonian, and Montenegrin �is concentrated in the
republic which bears its name. The peoples of the sixth
republic, Bosnia and Hercegovina, are not identified
as a separate nationality group. The republic is it
three -way mix of Serbs, Groats, and Muslims of
unspecified nationality. Bosnia and Hercegovina was
created in part to terminate rival Groat and Serb
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100032 -0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100032 -0
FIGURE 4. Population by administrative division, 1971 (U/OU)
'Figures may not add to totals because of rounding.
claims to the area and also to give recognition to its
unique historical development.
The last official statistics to be released on the
national ininority groups are those of the 1961 census.
At that tittle these national minorities comprised ahont
1051 of the population. 'I'll(- two largest groups were
the Albanians (915,000 or about iii of life total
population) and the I I ungarians (500,000 or about
2.7i of the total population). There were 15 other
smaller minorities, the largest of which were Turks
(183,000), Slovaks (86,000), Bulgarians (63,000),
Romanians (61,000), Czechs (30,000), and Italians
(26,000). Nlost of the people belonging to these
minorities live in border regions in the northern and
southern portions of Yngoslavia. With the exception of
the Albanians, and despite the overall growth of the
Yugoslav population since the 19-11 census, the
conntry's nationality structure has remained
proportionately about the same since 1941.
Yugoslavia is if land of small rnral settlements, lint
the number of large towns and cities is on the increase
as it result of contintiud rnral to nrban migration. In
1961, approximately 2851 of the Yugoslav population
lived in urban areas. Since then, this figure
undoubtedly has become nuch li}jier. Preliminary
returns front the 1971 census show that 2fi i of the
population lives in cities of nore than 20,000
compared with 18.71 in 1961. Maurdotia has the
highest 1ercentage 37 -of persons living in towns
of 20,000 or more. The province of Vojvodina is
second with 31.3 "r, and Croatia is third with 30.211.
The lowest percentage of urban population 15 -is
found in both Bosnia and Hercegovina ant)
Montenegro. Althwigh figures for the cities proper are
not available, statistics for the 10 largest metropolitan
areas -a city and surrounding county or counti ^s
(apstina) -show their growth from 1961 to 1971 was
as follows:
1961 1971
Belgrade
942,190
1,204,271
AVERAGE
459,464
602,058
Skopje
PERCENT
DENSITY
Sarajevo
213,101
292,241
OF TOTAL
PER
AREA IN
Novi Sad
162,075
POPULA-
SQUARE
SQUARE
ADMINI$rRATIVE DIVISION
POPULATION
TION
MILE
MILES
Slovenia
1,725,088
8.4
223.5
7,719
Croatia
4,422,564
22.0
203.6
21,723
Bosnia and Hercegovina
3,742,852
18.3
189.6
19,745
Serbia
8,436,547
41.1
247.3
34,116
Serbia Proper
5,241,524
25.6
242.9
21,582
Vojvodina
1,950,268
9.5
232.0
8,407
Kosovo
1,244,755
6.1
301.8
4,125
Montenegro
530,361
2.6
99.4
5,333
Macedonia
1,647,104
8.0
165.9
9,928
Total
20,504,516
0 100.0
208.0
98,564
'Figures may not add to totals because of rounding.
claims to the area and also to give recognition to its
unique historical development.
The last official statistics to be released on the
national ininority groups are those of the 1961 census.
At that tittle these national minorities comprised ahont
1051 of the population. 'I'll(- two largest groups were
the Albanians (915,000 or about iii of life total
population) and the I I ungarians (500,000 or about
2.7i of the total population). There were 15 other
smaller minorities, the largest of which were Turks
(183,000), Slovaks (86,000), Bulgarians (63,000),
Romanians (61,000), Czechs (30,000), and Italians
(26,000). Nlost of the people belonging to these
minorities live in border regions in the northern and
southern portions of Yngoslavia. With the exception of
the Albanians, and despite the overall growth of the
Yugoslav population since the 19-11 census, the
conntry's nationality structure has remained
proportionately about the same since 1941.
Yugoslavia is if land of small rnral settlements, lint
the number of large towns and cities is on the increase
as it result of contintiud rnral to nrban migration. In
1961, approximately 2851 of the Yugoslav population
lived in urban areas. Since then, this figure
undoubtedly has become nuch li}jier. Preliminary
returns front the 1971 census show that 2fi i of the
population lives in cities of nore than 20,000
compared with 18.71 in 1961. Maurdotia has the
highest 1ercentage 37 -of persons living in towns
of 20,000 or more. The province of Vojvodina is
second with 31.3 "r, and Croatia is third with 30.211.
The lowest percentage of urban population 15 -is
found in both Bosnia and Hercegovina ant)
Montenegro. Althwigh figures for the cities proper are
not available, statistics for the 10 largest metropolitan
areas -a city and surrounding county or counti ^s
(apstina) -show their growth from 1961 to 1971 was
as follows:
1961 1971
Belgrade
942,190
1,204,271
Zagreb
459,464
602,058
Skopje
270,299
387,889
Sarajevo
213,101
292,241
Ljubljana
206,305
257,640
Novi Sad
162,075
214,048
Nis
146,524
193,320
Split
132,873
183,912
Maribor
152,939
172,155
Rijeka
127,029
160,G30
The irregular shape of Yugoslavia's population
pyramid (Figure 6), clearly reveals the impact of wars
all(] changing levels of fertility and mortality rates
upon the country's age and sex composition. "There is
sonic lingering effect of deaths in the Balkan Wars of
1912 13 and in World War I in the narrow shape of
the pyramid above age 60, especially on the nude side.
The losses during World War II are represented by the
deep indentation between ages 45 and 59 years. The
deficit of births during World Wars 1 and 11 is sharply
delineai; d by the small nunlhers at ages 50 -5.1 and 20-
29. A long -term decline in fertility, which appears to
have begun in the 1920's (though it was heavily
influenced by the sharp drop in hirtbs during World
War II and it postwar hoom in births immediately
after it), bas given the pyramid if fairly slender
contour; it has it much narrowe hale than is
characteristic of populations with high and relatively
stable levels of fertility.
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100032 -0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100032 -0
in hmw* 47
15 13.4
2&0 54 V
Goar.
vas
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION
OF ETIIPRC GROUPS
2.
5.e
South Slav
swim M AI I."i�m
0 0001. w MW" "WW
MVAM sow, of
unspacKed noliandiy
National Illaerttles
Albursr Twks
Hwwwisa ONM
2.1
NOTEa Ef nk groups accounting for /w Ikon 5% of fho
popublion of an odminidrafive eli.ision
an kKJQ1& d in Olow."
FIGURE 5. Distribution of the population in admin-
istrative divisions by ethnic groups, 1961 (U /OU)
Yugoslavia's population is young by European
standards; the median age was estimated at 28.3 years
in 1968. Because of this relatively low median age, the
dependency ratio is correspondingly higher. In 1968,
there were 690 persons in the dependent ages (0 -14
and 65 and over) per 1,000 population; Bulgaria had
270 and IIungary 394.
Females outnumbered males in Yugoslavia in 1961,
when there were 95 males per 100 females. While
statistics on the male female ratio from the 1971
census have not been relea FDAD estimates the
1973 ratio at 97 miles per 100 females. It is a universal
phenomenon that more boys are horn than girls so that
the ;lumber of males per 100 females is typically
12
higher in the 0 -14 age group. Because the mortality
rate is higher for males than for females, the number of
males relative to the number of females usually drops
in each successively older age group.
Toward the end of the 19th century both birth and
death rates were still high and relatively stable, but at
about the beginning of the 20th century the death rate
began to decline rapidly, followed, after a lag of about
two decades, by a decline in the birth rate. The course
of the trend in hoth vital rates has been affected by
World W. II and its aftermath, so that neither has
been consistently downward. The death rate has
declined from about 29 per 1,000 population at the
beginning of this century to 9.0 in 1969, while the
irth rate has dropped from about 42 per 1,000
Population at the turn of the century to 17.8 in 1969,
as shown in Figure 7.
Although Yugoslavia's birth rate is half that of
neighboring Albania, it is st higher than the average
for European countries and the United States. Because
the birth rate has been considerably higher than the
death rate throughout the 20th century, Yugoslavia
has experienced a relatively high rate of natural
increase (Figure 8). Life expectancy was 62.4 years for
males and 65.6 for females in 1961 -62, according to
official Yugoslav figures. Improvements in medical
care since then allow an estimate of 67.3 for males and
74.2 for females as of 1968.
Birth rates vary significantly within Yugoslavia. In
1970, for example, the birth rate ranged from a high of
36.4 per 1,000 population in Kosovo to a low of 13.0 in
Vojvodina. In general, populations living in the
poorest and most backward areas have birth rates
Aw
7s and
over
Yugoslavia Uklbd$toIto, 70-74
65-69
60-84
SS-S9
50-54
45.42
40-44
33-39
30-34
25-29
20-24
Male Female 15-19
10- 14
5-9
0-4
5 4 3 2 1 0 1 2 3 4'. 5
Percent
FIGURE 6. Popuintion by age and sex, Yugoslavia and
the United States, 1972 (IJ /OU)
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100032 -0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA -RDP01 -00707 R000200100032 -0
thousands left what is now Yugoslavia in search of
work. Most went to the United States and Canada.
During the 1930'x, emigration declined as a result of
the worldwide depression and the imposition of
restrictions oil immigration by the United States and
other countries which made emigration on the pre
World War I scale impossible. European countries,
particularly Turkey and Germany, became the
principal destination of Yugoslav emigrants.
Emigration from Yugoslavia was extremely large
during and after World War 1I, amounticg to a net
loss estimated at between 600,000 and 700,000. "These
people were primarily Yugoslav citizens of German
FIGU''E 7. Births acid deaths per 1,000 population,
1921 -70 (U /OU)
which rank among the highest in Europe, whereas
those living in the more ecorunnically and culturally
advanced areas have birth rates typic_il of those in
Western Europe. Although death rates also varied
within the country, the range was not nearly as wide as
that for birth rites. Death ra..-s ranged from 10.5 per
I,(N)0 p( )ulation in Slovenia to a low of 6.5 in
Montenegro, with most of the administrative divisions
reporting rates close to 9.0 per 1,000.
There are extremely wide variations in rates of
natural increase within Yugoslavia. In 1970, the high
fertility areas had rates of increase double those in the
low fertility areas. Whereas in Slovenia, Croatia,
Voivodina, and Serbia proper, natural increase
amounted to between only 3 and 6 per 1,000
population, in Bosnia and 1lercogovina, Macedonia,
and Montenegro, natural increase ranged between 13
and 16 per 1,000 population, and in Kosovo, where
the birth rate was very high, it was nearly 28 per 1,000
population.
Since at least the latter part of the 19th century,
Yugoslavia has consistently lost population through
emigration. Although the size of the movement cannot
he accurately determined before the 1920'x, it is
known that emigration was relatively heavy during
the first decads-s of the 20th century when hundreds of
13
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100032 -0
FIGURE 8. Vital rates, Yugoslavia and selected countries,
1969 (U /OU)

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100032 -0
descent, Italians from territory acquired by Yugoslavia
after the .war, and Yugoslays displaced during the ar
w1w, did not retr,rn after the cessation of hostilities.
Although no official data exist for the period 1948-
.53, an analysis of intercensal population change by
the U.S. Bureau of the Census indicates a difference of
14( between the population that could be
expected according to vital records and the
enumerated popul ation. Some of this difference may
be attributed to varying degrees of accuracy in the
1953 and the 1948 censuses, but the major part must
be attributed to net emigration. Some of the
components of this migration can be identified anti
are estimated as follows:
Immigrants:
Returning Yugoslays
6,000
Refugees from East European Communist
56,000
countries
9,000
Total
15,000
Emigrant:
960
Jews to Israel
7,000
Russians expelled to the U.S.S.R. or escaping
932
West...............................
15,000
Yugoslays escaping West
5,000
Italialis to Italy
48,000
Germans resettling in the Federal Republic
1,200
of Germany
7,000
Total 82,000
Net emigration 67,000
Yugoslav demographers have made estimates of
international migration by republic for the intercensal
period 1933 -61, apparently based upon official
migration data. They show population losses as
follows:
Slovenia
14,000
Croatia
56,000
Bosnia and Hercegovina
2,000
Serbia
41,600
Montenegro
960
Macedonia
160,000
Macedw. a experienced the greatest loss, principally
due to the exodus of 'I'-arks.
The volume of emigration has decline(] marked!v
since the 1953 -61 intercensal period, as follows:
Between 1962 and 1966, net emigration amounted to
38,928 persons. or an average loss of less than 8,000
14
persons per year. In 1970 only 3,808 persons
emigrated, and the figure for net emigration was even
smaller because 793 persons immigrated during the
yea r.
Yugoslavia has had one of the most rapidly growing
populations in Europe. In December 1918, when the
Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes was created,
there were an elimated 11.6 million persons in the
area that was to become Yugoslavia. The first census,
taken in 1921 after the Yugoslav borders had been
established, recorded a population of 11,98 ,000. The
history of population change is primarily one of high
natural increase, but a Honor part of the growth was
clue to territorial acquisitions. On 10 February 1947,
Yugoslavia acquired the major portion of the lstrian
Peninsula (the Julian March) and several islands, with
a combined territory of 2,971 square miles and a 194E
population of about 446,000. After the partition of the
Free Territory of 'Trieste between Italy and Yugoslavia
in 19-34, Yugoslavia acquired 202 square miles with an
estimated popul:tion of 61,0(10.
I'hc data from various censuses since 1921 have
been adjusted to the 1961 area so that rates of growth
during this period can be indicated for a comparable
area, and They are shown in Figure 9. Between 1921
and 1931, the population grew at an average annual
rate of 1.511,, a high rate for a European country
during this period. Although the population grew
somewhat more slowly after 1931, estimates indicate
that it grew more rapidly between 1931 and 1939 than
in any other country west of the U.S.S.R. except
Albania and possibly Greece. Moreover, all of its
growth was due to natural increase.
Yugoslavia suffered one of the greatest population
losses sustained by any country during World War 11;
only the U.S.S.R. and Poland lost greater proportions
of their population. About 1.'i million persons were
killed, expelled, fled, or refused repatriation �a loss of
more than 10% of the population. 1n addition, there
FIGURE 9. Population increase, 1921 -71 (U /OU)
(Adjusted to territory of 1961
AVERAGE
ANNUAL
RATE OF
CENSUS DATE POPULATION GROWTH
NET
YEAR
INIMIGRATION
ETIIGRATION
EMIGRATION
1962.......
618
7,891
7,273
1963
932
8,661
7,729
1964
728
7,107
6,379
1965.......
1,200
9,071
7,871
1968.......
907
10,583
9,676
Between 1962 and 1966, net emigration amounted to
38,928 persons. or an average loss of less than 8,000
14
persons per year. In 1970 only 3,808 persons
emigrated, and the figure for net emigration was even
smaller because 793 persons immigrated during the
yea r.
Yugoslavia has had one of the most rapidly growing
populations in Europe. In December 1918, when the
Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes was created,
there were an elimated 11.6 million persons in the
area that was to become Yugoslavia. The first census,
taken in 1921 after the Yugoslav borders had been
established, recorded a population of 11,98 ,000. The
history of population change is primarily one of high
natural increase, but a Honor part of the growth was
clue to territorial acquisitions. On 10 February 1947,
Yugoslavia acquired the major portion of the lstrian
Peninsula (the Julian March) and several islands, with
a combined territory of 2,971 square miles and a 194E
population of about 446,000. After the partition of the
Free Territory of 'Trieste between Italy and Yugoslavia
in 19-34, Yugoslavia acquired 202 square miles with an
estimated popul:tion of 61,0(10.
I'hc data from various censuses since 1921 have
been adjusted to the 1961 area so that rates of growth
during this period can be indicated for a comparable
area, and They are shown in Figure 9. Between 1921
and 1931, the population grew at an average annual
rate of 1.511,, a high rate for a European country
during this period. Although the population grew
somewhat more slowly after 1931, estimates indicate
that it grew more rapidly between 1931 and 1939 than
in any other country west of the U.S.S.R. except
Albania and possibly Greece. Moreover, all of its
growth was due to natural increase.
Yugoslavia suffered one of the greatest population
losses sustained by any country during World War 11;
only the U.S.S.R. and Poland lost greater proportions
of their population. About 1.'i million persons were
killed, expelled, fled, or refused repatriation �a loss of
more than 10% of the population. 1n addition, there
FIGURE 9. Population increase, 1921 -71 (U /OU)
(Adjusted to territory of 1961
AVERAGE
ANNUAL
RATE OF
CENSUS DATE POPULATION GROWTH
Not pertinent.
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100032 -0
Percent
31
January 1921
12,545,000
31
March
1931
14,534,000
1.5
15
March
1948
15,841,566
0.5
31
March
1953
16, 991, 449
1.4
31
March
1961
18,549,291
!.1
31
March
1971
20,504,516
1.0
Not pertinent.
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100032 -0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100032 -0
was an estimated loss of 600,000 due to increased
mortality under conditions of severe hardship and to a
deficit of births. Thus, It the war's end the population
was about 2.3 million persons less than might have
been expected had there been no hostilities. Because of
these losses, the rate of population increase between
the censuses of 1931 and 1948 averaged only 0.5% per
yea r.
Between 1948 and 1953 the increase in the birth rate
raised the level of population growth to an annual rate
of 1.4 c. As the birth rate declined during the 1950's,
the annual rate of increase fell to 1.1 for the period
1953 -61. Data since 1961 are incomplete, but suggest
a further slight decline.
Fertility in Yugoslavia is still high by European
standards, however, and as the country becomes
increasingly urbanized and industrialized a decline in
fertility, .which generally accompanies these
phenomena, may be expected. Furthermore, the wide
differences in fertility within Yugoslavia suggest that
many people are already limiting the size of C eir
families and that others may be expected to do so in
the future. Family plant however, has met with
only modest success. Basic problems in achieving an
adequate bird:- control r �gram stem from continued
reliance on abortion as the principal means of family
planning, aril the lingering attitude of a male
dominated society especially in the underdeveloped
republics �that women should be kept barefoot and
pregnant. If social forces in Yugoslavia operate to
bring about a 15% decline in fertility by 1978 and
then maintain this level through 1987, while net
migration remains .icgligible and mortality declines as
it has in other European countries since World War II,
Yugoslavia's population would total about 24,112,000
in 1987.
Yugoslavia em( ge(i from World War I! as an
economically and socially backward country with a
rapidly growing population and a large surplus
agrarian populAion. Subsequent rural to urban
migration has diminished the problem of agricultural
overpopulation but has led to increased unemploy-
ment in the nation's cities. Between 1953 and 1971 the
agricultural population declined from 60.7% to 36.4%
of the total population. For many enterprising young
Yugoslays leaving the farm the answer was not to go to
Belgrade or Zagreb but to seek employment in the
West as a temporary worker. It is estimated thol in
1971 about 900,000 Yugoslays were gainfully
employed in the West, most of them in West
Germany.
The Yugoslav Government has not formulated any
precisely defined programs aimed at regulating
population growth: Various economic, educational,
and especially health and social pc.ic :es, initiated
essentially for nondemographic reasons, have been
demographic in nature; some encourage, while others
discourage, population growth. Social insurance
measures which provide free maternity care,
compensation for worktime lost because of pregnancy,
and free medical care for infants under 1 year of age,
coupled with a system of family allowances in which
the rate of compensation increases with the birth of
each additional child, indirectly encourage population
growth. Liberal abortion laws and the widespread
dissemination of contraceptives and birth control
information and advice are, in contradistinction,
measures which would tend to limit population
growth.
D. Manpower and labor
1. Manpower resources (U /OU)
Yugoslavia's economically active population` was
estimated at 9,702,000 persons in 1971. Of that total,
4,706,000 (48.5 were employed in agriculture: and
4,996,000 (51.5 iu nonagricultural endeavors. The
1971 labor force was estimated at 47.2% of the total
population and 72.5% of the working age (15 -64)
group.
Yugoslavia's labor force participation rate (i.e.,
labor force as a percent of the total population) is
among the lowest of all the countries in Eastern
Europe, in large part because of the lower
participation rate of women. This relatively low rate
results primarily from deeply rooted cultural attitudes
which confine women to home and household
activities. Resistance to female employment is greatest
in the Muslim areas of the south, especially in Kosovo.
Post -World War II industrialization and improve-
ments in education have resulted in the gradual entry
of women into nonagricultural occupations and in a
growing tendency on the part of urban women to
remain in the labor force while raising a family.
The last official breakdown of the total labor force
(the 1961 census) indicated that 2% of the nation's
working population was under 15 y ars of age. and 4%
was 65 or older, as shown in Figure 10. Labor force
participation by children aged 10 -14 has declined
sharply (from 20% in 1953 to 10% in 1961) because of
2 'rhis term is used synonymously with "labor force." The
Yugoslav definition of the economically active population includes
all persons, regardless of age, who are engaged in "socially useful"
work, including those temporarily not exercising their occupation
(the unemployed, prisoners, and members of the armed forces).
15
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100032 -0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100032 -0
employment stood at a new high of 51.5 (Figure 11
The actual number of agricultural workers is difficult
to determine since this is overwhelmingly a private
sector of the economy. The problem is complicated by
the existence of numerous small truck farms, which are
family enterprises and whose male workers may also
hold jobs in nearby industrial enterprises. According to
the 1961 census, there were more agricultural workers
in Serbia than in any other republic, but the
autonomous province of Kosovo had the greatest
percent (70.8%) of its labor force in agriculture while
Slovenia had the lowest (37.9%) of all the republics.
'there is considerable geographic variation in the
pattern of agricultural activity. For example, peasant
the considerable increase in educational facilities,
especially in isolated and underdeveloped areas.
Improvements in the pensions system resulted in a
modest decline in labor force participation by persons
aged 65 and over during 1953 -61. In 1961 about 601
of the males, but )niv about 31 of tl females, were
economically active.
In 1971 there were an estimated 3,673,000 eco-
nomically inactive persons of working age. Many
are of military age, with an educational and skill level
that is, on the whole, superior to that of their elders.
Nearly all of the economically inactive males aged 15-
A, and about a third of the females, are still in school
acid could readily he transferred to the armed forces or
to industrial or agricultural occupations. Only a small
proportion of the economically inactive males 25 vears
of age or above would be physically capable of
entering the labor force on a full -time basis, since this
group is made up largely of war invalids, disabled
workers, and old -age pensioners.
Inactive females aged 25 -64 comprise the remainder
of the labor reserve. Most are housewives with only a
modest education and no industrial skill or experience.
Younger women, however, could replace men on the
farms or perform other manual work requiring little
training or skill and some would take up arms in the
event of war. Yugoslavia has a more readily accessible
:c:erve in its unemployed labor force, which in 1970
totaled about :320,0(X).
2. Characteristi., .-s of the labor force (U /OU)
There has been a significant decline in agricultural
employment since World War It as a result of the
governments industri..lization e ffort. Agriculture's
share of the total labor force has fallen from 66.8% in
1953 to -18.5% in 1971, while nonagricultural
16
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100032 -0
FIGURE 10. Age -sex distribution of the population and the
labor force (U /OU)
FIGURE 11. Labor force by branch of economic activity
and sex, 1971 (U /OU)

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100032 -0
owners operate small farms at.(] orchards throughout
Serbia proper and Croatia, \%hercas in Vojvodina, the
c�ountr%'s richest crop area, most of the paid
agric�ultimil labor force are workers on large, highly
nrcc�hanized state and collec�tivv farms. In the
inhospitable mountains of Kosovo, livestock raisers,
ban�I% able to eke out it liyittg, predominate. Forestry
is concentrated ill the nwuntainous regions of Bosnia
and llerc�egoyina and fishing along the Dalmatian
coast.
Private ownership predominates in agriculture, and
small and scattered holdings farncd by owncr-
operators with the assistance of family members are
characteristic of most of the area. By la\% the size of
private farms is limited to 10 hectares (approximately
2 -1 acres). In 1969, approximately 96"5 of the
agricultural labor force of 5,305,000 was employed in
the private sector. I ?nrplovnent in the socialized sector
of a griculture droppe prvcipitousl when the
collectivization drive initiated in 1945 was abandoned
in 1953. h:nrplo%nu�nt on stale farms and collective
farms (peasant work cooperatives) rose, however, from
the mid- 1950's until 1965, \%lien it reached a peak of
251,000, but declined to 208,000 in 1969.
The 1970 \%ork force in manufacturing and mining
\%as estimated at 1,454,000 persons, about 26"( above�
the 1961 figure. Nearly all manufacturing and mining
\%nrkers are in paid employment. 'n 1970, the leading
industries in this brunch of economic activity,
according to numbers of emplo %ces, were nu�talwork-
ing 185,800), primarily metal processing and
machinery and eelnilmie nt nanufacturing; textiles
and apparel (229,200): woockorking 1330,001)): food
and beverages 121,000); elec�tric�al cot iii pnent
(91,200); and c�licnuicals (8 1,000). F.nrplo\tnent in
the petroleum, nn�tallurgical, electrical procluc�ts, and
rubber industries is concentrated ill large enterprises
situated in the north. The building materials, textiles
and apparel, and food processing industries, however,
are dispersal in numerous smaller cnlerprises
throughout the country.
Approximately 25.1,000 persons wen� engaged in
crafts in 1970, compared with 251,000 in 1961. Craft
activities �such as metalworking, leatherworking, and
\%ood\%orking �in Yugoslavia are distinguished frown
una nufac�turing not only by the predominance n
handwork Ihul also by the performance of the enth:-
prodmc�tion process b\ one worker, or a f ^\y at most,
and b% prodnc�tion to fill individual orders. Although
private artisans are permitted by lay% to hire as many
as five orders, onl% about it fourth of the craftsmen in
the private sector are paid ernplo\ves. Since 1911 the
government has sought to encourage the expansion o
private craft activities. and paid cmPlo\ nu�nt in
private workshops has risen from 313,000 in 1963 to
41,000 in 1970. Nevertheless, the total number of
artisans (ennplo\ers, self- cmplo\ed, wage and salary
earners, and unpaid family v%orkcrsl in the private
se ctor �mane of \%hone are near retirem:nt age �is
c�ontiuuing to decline.
The labor force in services has gnr\%n substantially
since 1961, \%lien it totaled 725,000 persons. Paid
cmplo\nn�nt increased (luring 1961 -70 in virtually all
service activities, \\ith the notable exception of
government administration. Roughly 95`1 of the labor
force engaged in services is in the socialized sector.
Domestic servants, restaurant owners and their
employees, and self employed professionals (ph%si-
c�ians, lawyers, artists, and journalists) account for
most of those in the private sector. Members of the
armed forces numbered over 2334,000 ill 1972, or over
2i of the total labor force.
The distribution of the labor force b\ class of worker
has probably changed little since 1961. At that time
employers were few in number, wage and salary
earners comprised about 42i of the total, and males
outnumbered females in all categories except turpaid
fannil% workers, as shown in the following tabulation:
PERCENT OF
NIALE FEMALE TOTAL LABOR FORCE
thousands
Wage and salary
earners
2,596
934
3,530
42.3
Unpaid family
workers
915
1,527
2,442
29.3
Self employed
1,739
451
2,190
26.2
Employers
25
5
30
0.4
Other
112
36
148
1.8
Total
5,387
2,953
8,340
100.0
Wage and salary earners, nearly all of whom work
in the socialized sector, are employed primarily in
nonagricultural occupations. Unpaid family workers
and self employed persons work almost exclusively in
private agriculture, while the majority of private
employers are artisans and craftsmen. Mining,
manufacturing, and crafts accounted for 38 of all
wage and salary earners in 19151. While the number of
wage and salan earners in the private sector (83,000
1970) has m than doubled simc�e 1952, their share of
total wage and salary earning employment has
remained about the same 2. V, in 1970 compared
\%ith 2.5(' in 1952. Craft workers and domestic
servants together accounted for about 765i of the 1970
total in pri ate paid employment.
The latest available st, t'stic�al information
concerning apprentices was released in 1967. 'I'll(-
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100032 -0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100032 -0
number of registered apprentices had then reached
145.000. a 39S1 increase over 1961, when they
constituted only 1.35i of the labor force. The
educational qualifications of apprentices have
improved considerably; in 1967 abort 99% had
completed primary school as compared with 819c ip
1961 and 49r in 1954. Of those in training, 32% were
in manufacturing and mining, :30% in crafts, 14% in
trade, 7% in construction, and 7% in agriculture and
forestry. The announcement in 1963 of government
measures aimed at encour aging private craft activities
halted a steady decline in the number of young people
apprenticed to private employers, and their number
nearly doubled between 1963 and 1967, when almost
25,300 were in the private sector.
Craftsmen, production process workers, and general
laborers comprise the largest occupational group
outside agriculture, and in 1961 they formed 205c of
the total and 45% of the nonagricultural labor force.
Yugoslavia has a relatively small percentage of its
labor force in the professional and technical and in the
administrative, executive, and managerial groups. In
1961 approximately 469,000 persons (or 5.65C of the
labor force) were placed in the professional technical
group, and about 94,000 (1.1 of the labor force) were
considered administrators, executives, or managers.
Comparable percentages for Hungary, for example,
were 8?SC and 1.Y-i of its labor force in 1963.
1'he governments considerable effort to upgrade
the qualifications of the labor force has begun to pay
dividends. As of December 1968 only 9% of the total
labor force had never attended school or at most had
completed 3 years of primary classes. Although 92i of
the l abor force has finished secondary schools, lack of
education still characteristic of workers 40 years of
age and older. This situation is a result of the limited
educational opportunities before World VVar II and
the chaotic conditions which prevailed during the war.
The qualifications of younger workers improved
markedly in the postwar period as a result of the
expansion of educational and vocational training
facilities. After -hours classes and on- the -job training
have enabled a substantial number of workers to
upgrade their qualifications. Workers are required to
pass special examinations in order to he certified as
skilled or highly skilled; such certificates were awarded
between 1965 and 1967 to approximately 183,000
skilled and 39 ,000 highly skilled .workers.
Training has riot kept pace with the needs of the
economy, however, and one out of every five paid
emplovees is reportedly .working in a job for which he
is no, adequately qualified. A survey conducted in
March 1967, which divided paid employees into wage
earners and .alary earners, placed the majority of the
former in the skilled and semiskilled category and
indicated that the majority of the latter had received
secondary education (Figure 12). On the basis or this
survey, however, it was estimated that 34 of the
jobholders in %hite- collar positions requiring
university training and 39% of those working in highly
skilled trades lacked formal qualifications. Of the
251,000 salary earners who had actually completed
higher education on the survey date, approximately
64So were employed in services. Some 4151 of the
199,000 wage earners who qualified as highly skilled
workers were in manufacturing and mining.
Registered unemployment has been on the increase
since the late 1950's but has trended sharply upward
since economic reforms began 'o take effect in 1965.
The number of registered unemployed rose from a
monthly average of 67,000 in 1955 to 319,000 in the
first half of 1968, and the unemployment rate
FIGURE 12. Employment by branch of economic activity and level of skill or training, March 1967 (U /OU)
(Thousands)
WAGE EARNERS
SALARY EARNERS
Skilled
lIighly
and semi-
higher
Secondary
Primary
skilled
skilled
Unskilled
education
education
education
TOTAL.
Agriculture, forestry, and fishing........
10.3
123.7
137.1
::.1
26.2
27.7
339.1
Mining and manufacturing
81.7
588.1
472.5
42.2
93.8
80.8
1,359.1
Crafts
18.5
91.9
47.8
2.1
10.2
10.9
181.4
Construction
16.4
105.2
125.5
9.7
20.6
13.5
290.9
Trade
22.3
111.4
51.4
12.2
29.5
32.5
250.3
Transportation and communications.
27.5
132.3
56.7
10.7
29.9
31.2
288.3
Services
22.2
117.0
158.9
160.3
223.6
128.9
810.8
All brunches
198.9
1,269.6
1,049.9
251.2
433.8
325.5
3,528.9
NOTE Figures exclude apprentices.
K
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100032 -0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100032 -0
FIGURE 13. Average monthly registered unemployment, 1961 -70 (U/OU)
(Thousands)
*Figures may not add to totals because of rounding.
(registered unemployment as a proportion of paid
employment excluding apprentices) reached about
9 Since then, average monthly unemployment has
remained within the range of 320,000 to 330,000, as
shown in Figure 13. There is a pronounced seasonal
swing in unemployment, due in large measure to the
curtailment during the winter months of construction,
forestry, and other activities. Unemployment
registrations normally rise sharply in January and
reach it peak during February and March; the low
occurs in July and August. There are remarkable
regional variations as well. The unemployment rate in
Slovenia is the lowest in Yugoslavia, while in
Macedonia and Kosovo it is the highest. Unemploy-
ment in the south results principally from village -to-
city migration. Population pressure is considerable in
the predominantly Muslim areas and drives many of
the men to abandon subsistence agriculture. Wage
earning employment opportunities are severely
limited, however, for the region remains largely
unindustrialized.
Persons with no marketable skills accounted for 80%
or more of the registered unemployed until 1965, but
this percentage had declined to 75% by June 1969.
This downward trend results in part from an absolute
decrease, since 1965, in the number of unskilled
females registering at government employment offices.
At it time when employment prospects are especially
poor, many housewives appear to have withdrawn
from the labor market.
The number of secondary school and university
graduates unable to find jobs has soared upward since
1965, as shown in Figure 13. The problem is severe in
Belgrade (where: the last accurate data showed that in
1967 graduates comprised about 21% of the city's
registered unemployed), and in other cities with large
student populations. School graduates with specialities
in commerce, administration, the humanities, law,
and economics encounter the greatest difficulty in
finding jobs. Joblessness has risen steadily but less
rapidly among skilled and highly skilled workers. Of
the skilled workers, the highest incidence of
unemployment occurs among officeworkers, followed
by drivers, masons, carpenters, farmers, foresters,
fishermen, tobacco processors, and metalworkers. This
reflects the streamlining of government administration
and cutbacks in industries where business activity is
lagging.
The government clearly regards the employment of
young professional and skilled workers as a matter of
urgency. The outbreak of student unrest in June 1968
hastened the adoption in midyear of measures aimed
at guaranteeing jobs for skilled and qualified young
people and at stimulating an overall increase in
employment. A hitherto ineffective law was amended,
in effect to compel enterprises to establish training
programs and to accept qualified youths as trainees. A
related measure requires craftsmen in both the private
and socialist sectors to hire apprentices. Another 1968
measure requires enterprises to draw up job
classification systems which clearly specify the
qualifications required for the job. This requirement,
and it companion measure which guarantees priority
of employment to individuals with the highest
qualifications, is intended to curtail the widespread
practN-ce of filling vacancies on the basis of
"connections" and in sonic cases even bribery.
Underemployment is prevalent in both agriculture
and industry. Yugoslavia's high rate of population
increase and retarded economic development prior to
World War 11 resulted in a considerably larger
population in agriculture than could be efficiently
19
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100032 -0
HIGHER OR
RICHLY
SEMISKILLED
LOW
SECONDARY
SKILLED AND
AND
PROFESSIONAL
YEAR
TRAINING
SKILLED
UNSKILLED
EDUCATION
TOTAL*
PERCENT
1961.........
5
21
160
5
191
5.9
1962.........
5
31
190
10
237
7.1
1963.........
8
30
179
13
230
6.8
1964.........
9
23
168
13
212
5.9
1965.........
11
28
185
13
237
6.5
1966.........
17
35
192
1-,
258
7.2
1967.........
26
40
189
14
269
7.6
1968.........
43
49
206
13
311
8.5
1969.........
43
46
231
11
331
8.7
1970.........
42
41
228
8
320
8.1
*Figures may not add to totals because of rounding.
(registered unemployment as a proportion of paid
employment excluding apprentices) reached about
9 Since then, average monthly unemployment has
remained within the range of 320,000 to 330,000, as
shown in Figure 13. There is a pronounced seasonal
swing in unemployment, due in large measure to the
curtailment during the winter months of construction,
forestry, and other activities. Unemployment
registrations normally rise sharply in January and
reach it peak during February and March; the low
occurs in July and August. There are remarkable
regional variations as well. The unemployment rate in
Slovenia is the lowest in Yugoslavia, while in
Macedonia and Kosovo it is the highest. Unemploy-
ment in the south results principally from village -to-
city migration. Population pressure is considerable in
the predominantly Muslim areas and drives many of
the men to abandon subsistence agriculture. Wage
earning employment opportunities are severely
limited, however, for the region remains largely
unindustrialized.
Persons with no marketable skills accounted for 80%
or more of the registered unemployed until 1965, but
this percentage had declined to 75% by June 1969.
This downward trend results in part from an absolute
decrease, since 1965, in the number of unskilled
females registering at government employment offices.
At it time when employment prospects are especially
poor, many housewives appear to have withdrawn
from the labor market.
The number of secondary school and university
graduates unable to find jobs has soared upward since
1965, as shown in Figure 13. The problem is severe in
Belgrade (where: the last accurate data showed that in
1967 graduates comprised about 21% of the city's
registered unemployed), and in other cities with large
student populations. School graduates with specialities
in commerce, administration, the humanities, law,
and economics encounter the greatest difficulty in
finding jobs. Joblessness has risen steadily but less
rapidly among skilled and highly skilled workers. Of
the skilled workers, the highest incidence of
unemployment occurs among officeworkers, followed
by drivers, masons, carpenters, farmers, foresters,
fishermen, tobacco processors, and metalworkers. This
reflects the streamlining of government administration
and cutbacks in industries where business activity is
lagging.
The government clearly regards the employment of
young professional and skilled workers as a matter of
urgency. The outbreak of student unrest in June 1968
hastened the adoption in midyear of measures aimed
at guaranteeing jobs for skilled and qualified young
people and at stimulating an overall increase in
employment. A hitherto ineffective law was amended,
in effect to compel enterprises to establish training
programs and to accept qualified youths as trainees. A
related measure requires craftsmen in both the private
and socialist sectors to hire apprentices. Another 1968
measure requires enterprises to draw up job
classification systems which clearly specify the
qualifications required for the job. This requirement,
and it companion measure which guarantees priority
of employment to individuals with the highest
qualifications, is intended to curtail the widespread
practN-ce of filling vacancies on the basis of
"connections" and in sonic cases even bribery.
Underemployment is prevalent in both agriculture
and industry. Yugoslavia's high rate of population
increase and retarded economic development prior to
World War 11 resulted in a considerably larger
population in agriculture than could be efficiently
19
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100032 -0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100032 -0
utilized in farm work. While the large -scale movement
away from the land since the war has diminished
agricultural overpopulation to some extent, roughly
12% of the 1961 population in agriculture was
estimated to he surplus. A substantial reduction of
underemployment in industry (about 10(/,, of the
industrial work force in early 1966 .vas considered
redundant) is one of the cardinal aims of the economic
reforms, and is being achieved to some extent through
dismissals aril reassignments.
3. Labor productivity and working conditions
U /OU)
Productivity levels in agriculture and industry have
been low throughout the postwar period. Although
some improvement has taken place in industry in
response to government efforts, the level of labor
productivity in Yugoslavia remains well below that in
many other European countries.
The low productivity of agricultural labor in the
private sector is linked with village -to -city migration,
low farm income, inaelequate utilization of
technological advances, sociological attitudes, and
skill shortages. The movement away from the land is
gradually depriving the agricultural labor force of its
most productive members, for migrants to the cities
consist almost entirely of the young and able bodied.
The manpower shortage in some villages has forced
older peasants to cut hack production or sell their
land. Few private farmers have the cash for substantial
investment in improved seeds, fertilizers, or
equipment, and the small size of their holdings
frequently preludes potentially productive mech-
anization. Among the older peasants there is
considerable resistance to change in farming
techniques which have been handed down from
generation to generation. Distrust of the government
because of frequent changes in its agricultural policy
also contributes to low productivity. While
productivity is much higher on the large mechanized
farms in the socialized sector than it is in private
agriculture, the shortage of skilled personnel and
carelessness in the use of farm machinery lessen the
effectiveness of agricultural investment.
I'he� productivity of industrial labor lagged seriously
until the early 1960's wlwn the government launched
a series of economic reform measures %%hick
culminated in the reform of July 1965. (laving
identified high production costs as it leading cause of
Yugoslavia's economic difficulties, the government
moved forcefully to establish profitability as the
criterion for successful business performance. Tax
measures introduced in 1961 provided management
20
with a strong financial hicentive for economizing on
manpower, investing in more modern equipment, and
otherwise increasing labor productivity. The federal
government's labor productivity agency was
reorganized extensively in the same year, and its
research, publishing, and consultative activities were
stepped tip
Wasteful utilization of manpower is a leading cause
of low labor productivity in industry. A substantial
degree of overstaffing resulted from the irrational and
uneconomic hiring practices which prevailed. The
harmful effects of redundancy were largely ignored
because of the government's desire to maintain full
employment. Beginning in 1962, however, enterprises
were encouraged to dismiss surplus workers and to
keep new employment to a minimum. The workers
councils, which must approve dismissals, proved
fiercely protective and tended to ignore financial and
other inducements to dismiss surplus workers until
stronger measures were introduced in 1965. Mass
dismissals since 1965 have become a source of blue
collar discontent and have evoked criticism from the
usually acquiescent trade unions, but the government
appears determined to continue its attack on
redundancy.
'Che irrational utilization of skilled personnel which
results from favoritism in hiring and placement has
.also conk under attack from the government. In 1968
the regime moved to assure priority in employment to
the most suitably qualified job applicants. Many
enterprises, however, continue to reject job applicants
with impressive technical or manaticrial credentials
and to accept less qualified candidates with
connections or "pull."
Chronic absenteeism and excessive labor turnover
contribute to the low productivity of industrial
workers. The problem is greatest in the recently
industrialized areas, but also exists in Slovenia and
Croatia, where the tradition of industrial labor dates
back to the lust century. Throughout the country the
large -scale movement of peasants into nonagricultural
occupations creates problems of industrial discipline.
The newcomers' lack of industrial experience is
manifested in lack of punctuality and reliability and
in generally poor working habits. The widespread
practice of holding two jobs �one in the socialized
sector, which provides social insurance benefits, and
another, often more lucrative, in the private sector
results in fatigue, carelessness, and lack of diligence.
Strikes are not legally sanctioned in Yugoslavia, but
"work stoppages" are tolerated its an acceptable
expression of worker discontent and usually result in at
least partial concessions to the workers' demands. The
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100032 -0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100032 -0
duration of the stoppages, however (roost last only a
few hours, or a few clays at most), do not have
significant economic impact. The second Self
Managers Congress of May 1971 was originally slated
to propose some form of legalization of %%ork stoppages
but at the last moment shied away front making such
a proposal.
Yugoslav industry is in the midst of it changeover
from it 48- to a 42 -hour workweek which began in late
1963. Full implementation of the shorter workweek
has been delayed, however, by the failure of many
enterprises to register commensurit^ productivity
increases as required by the government. The switch to
shorter weekly working hours is being supervised by
the government to insure that overtime does riot rise as
working hours are reduced.
Usual working hours in firms which are still on the
48 -hour week are from 6 a.m. to 2 p.m. (including a
30- minute paid luncheon period), 6 clays a week.
Afternoon and evening hours are frequently used for
moonlighting or attending classes. Most enterprises on
it shorter workweek have reduced the number of hours
worked on Saturday; some have eliminated Saturday
work altogether. Workers in government offices and
public institutions, who have been on a standard 42-
hour, 6 -clay week since 1957, no longer enjoy the
leisure of long afternoons. "Their daily schedule was
changed in 1967 to 9 a.m. -4:30 p.m.
Output per man -year is not reduced by excessive
leave and holiday arrangements. Annual leave of 14-
30 working days per year, depending on length of
service, is grunted to all wage and salary earners who
have completed at least 11 months of continuous
employment. Leave is also granted for special
purposes (military service, appearance at legal
proceedings, important family occasions) and on
public holidays, which are celebrated on 1 and 2
January, I and 2 May, 4 July, and 29 and 30
November.
Standards of industrial health and safety arc
generally low. In 1967, which was proclaimed Labor
Safety )'ear in connection with an international labor
safety congress hosted by the Yugoslays, official
attention was directed to the high accident rate and
deplorable safety conditions which prevail in many
bran:�hes of industry. Losses arising out of industrial
accidents averaged about the equivalent of USS400
million annually during the 1960's.
A 1965 law on labor safety prescribes standards for
safe and healthful working conditions, requires the use
of protective clothing and equipment in hazardous
occupations, and redefines tk; responsibilities of the
labor inspectorate, which ha.s functioned since 1959.
Safety regulations tend to be ignored by labor and
management alike; the government inspectors'
warnings are frequently disregarded, and many
workers are careless with machinery, ignorant of its
hazards, and fatalistic about the "inevitability" of
accidents. Although the number of work injuries and
fatalities is considered excessive by Yugoslav safety
officials, there has been it decline in the 1960's. The
industrial accident rate %%as 6.3 per 1000 workers in
1965, compared with 87 per 1,000 in 1961. According
to the latest available social insurance data, the
annual number of work accidents declined from
307,000 in 1961 to 231,000 in 1967, with fatalities
declining from 681 to 438.
Yugoslays move readily from one occupation to
another and tend to advance rapidly within the
industrial hierarchy if they possess marketable skills.
The shortage of skilled workers and of competent
professional, technical, and managerial personnel
provides opportunities for rapid upward mobility. The
government has led the way in advancing workers,
technicians, and administrators who display initiative
and promise. While good performance is a primary
criterion for advancement, personal connections are
often essential, and demonstrated political reliability
is required as well for appointment to responsible posts
in government and industry.
'rhe unwillingness of most Yugoslays to settle
outside their native region limits the movement of
qualified workers to areas which stiffer acute skill
shortages, and contributes to an oversupply of certain
skills in some of the large cities. Government attempts
to promote geographic mobility have been largely
ineffective. Slovenes and Croats in particular are
reluctant to leave their native republics for work in
other parts of the country, including the capital. I'm
students and workers from elsewhere in Serbia and the
south, however, the lure of Belgrade often overcomes'
regional attachment.
Rising unemployment in the latter half of the 1960's
led the government to encourage temporary migration
abroad. The number of Yugoslays employed abroad
reached over 800,000 in late 1970 (nearly all in
Western Europe, including some 425,000 in West
Germany). Since then, partly in response to
complaints, notably from Croatia, that skilled workers
were being lost, there has been an effort to encourage
some workers to return, particularly those who have
developed skills that are needed at home. Relatively
few of these workers take up permanent residence
outside Yugoslavia, but many do remain abroad for
several years.
21
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100032 -0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100032 -0
Government employment offices %%ork closely with
foreign firms in need of labor and assist Yugoslav
jobseekers in obtaining passports, visas, work permits,
and other documents. The regime attaches great
importance to formal intergovernmental agreements,
which are designed to regularize the status of
Yugoslays who have entered other countries illegally,
to provide a regular procedure for entry and
employment, to assure foreign countries of a steady
flow of Yugoslav labor, and to protect Yugoslays
abroad with respect to wages and social insurance.
Such an agreement was signed with France in 1965
and with West Germanv in October 1968.
Representatives of the Confederation of Trade Unions
of Yugoslavia frequently meet with Italian and West
German trade union officials in order to guarantee the
rights of Yugoslav workers in those countries.
4. Income (U /OU)
Living levels in both the rural and urban areas have
improved markedly since 1950 and are considerably
higher than in pre -World War II Yugoslavia. Peasants
in even the poorest parts of the country have been
drawn into the money economy and have cash at their
disposal for the purchase of clothing, furniture, and
cmmsumer durables w'tich traditionally had bee,, a
rarity in most peasant households. The disparity
between living levels in the countryside aad in the
cities, however, is still great. Urban workers' incomes
are far higher than peasant incomes, and citydwellers
are more consumption oriented, buying heavily and
often on credit.
The variety and quality of goods available to the
Yugoslav consumer compares favorably with other
Eastern European countries, and prices are generally
lower relative to wages than elsewhere in Eastern
Europe. Compared with Western Europe, however,
Yugoslavia is a high -cost country. The prices of
refrigerators, TV sets, automobiles, and other
consumer goods coveted by the Yugoslav worker are at
least as high as in Western Europe, while Yugoslav
wages are far lower. In many instances, however, an
apartment is included with the workers' job at a
nominal rent. With his income free of onerous housing
expenses, the average Yugoslav is thus able to buy
more of the consumer goods available. Real income in
Yugoslavia deteriorated sharply in 1965, 1966, and
again in 1972 as a result of currency devaluations. As a
result, widespread dissatisfaction with spiraling living
costs continues to be expressed through work stoppages
aril criticism of prevailing wage levels.:'
"Since 1967 there has heen a lack of continuity in reliable
statistical information on income levels and distribution. General
data for later years are used when available, but trends and
comparisons based on this data are tenuous.
22
The per capita income of peasant households, is
only half to three fourths as much, on the average, as
that of nonagricultural households. According to a
1966 survey of peasant households, avenige annual
income in the countryside totaled 11,693 dinars
(US$93.5.44)' for a family of 4.7 members. Money
income from working the family landholding
amounted to only 35% of peasant household income
in 1966, while paid employment in industry provided
21 as shown in the ollowing tabulation, in dinars:
Sale of agricultural produce
Other sources of money income:
Paid employment in industry
Paid employment in agriculture
Family allowances
Pensions
Other
4,088
2,473
226
75
520
868
Total 4,162
Value of income in kind 3,443
Total 11,693
Money wages have moved r, .)idly upward since the
early 1960's, and virtually skyrc, -keted from 1964 until
early 1967, when inflationary curbs imposed by the
government began to take effect. Money earnings in
the nation as a whole rose by 38% both in 1965 and
1966, but by only 14% in 1967. The sharply rising cost
of living has, however, largely counteracted the pc5t-
1965 gain in money earnings, and the gap between
money and real earnings has widened. The guaranteed
monthly minimum wage was raised in 1968 to 300
dinars (US$24), but actual wage rates generally exceed
Lie guaranteed minimum by a substantial amount.
Average monthly earnings (base pay plus overtime
pay, premiums, awards, bonuses, and residual income
shares) increased from 204 dinars in 1961 to 787 dinars
in 1967. This average rose to 1,173 dinars in 1970.
Slovenia outranks the other Yugoslav republics, with a
monthly per capita income of 1,376 dinars, whit
Kosovo has the lowest income rate, 967 dinars.
Average monthly income by economic sector in 1970 is
Shown in the following tabulation, in dinars:
Agriculture and fi ^hcries
962
Forestry
1,089
Construction
1,127
Industry
1,120
Transportation and communications
1,277
Arts and crafts
1,077
Housing and public utilities
1,142
Covernment and social services
4,473
'Income figures are given at the dinar rate far January 1966 (12.0
dinars US$1.00).
'Income figures are given at the 1970 rate of 15 dinars= US$1.00.
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100032 -0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA� RDP01- 00707R000200100032 -0
Thcre is considrahle variation within each industrial
branch, resulting primarily from differences in the
structure of the work force. Coal and coke mining and
the printing and publishing business rank among the
most highly paid branches in manufacturing and
mining, with average monthly salaries in 1970 ranging
from 1,434 to 1,681 dinars. Earnings are lowest in the
textile and leather industries and in tobacco
processing, ranging from 857 to 988 dinars.
Wage differentials rewarding level of sk'sll are fairly
narrow in Yugoslavia. In 1966 highly skilled workers
employed in the socialized sector earned less than
twice as much as the unskilled. The earnings ratio
between persons with university -level training and the
unskilled was 2 7:1. The charge of inequitable income
distribution is aired frequently in the press, and
underpaid workers complain bitterly of the
"exorbitant' salaries commanded by top- ranking
personnel. Wage data indicate, however, that such
salaries are relatively uncommon and that skill
differentials do not provide sufficient incentive for the
acquisition of additional qualifications. The problem
is more properly one of rapidly rising living costs and
increasing hardship for workers in the lowest income
brackets. The highly paid group included many
enterprise directors, top party officials, and other
members of Yugoslavia's" new class," whose influence
entitles them to vacations, housing, and trips abroad
on a scale which is far beyond the reach of the
population at large.
The cost of tringe benefits was estimated ii: 1967 at
approximately half the total wage bill. The social
insurance systeci, which is financed by employers at a
maximum rate of 20.5% of gross payroll, is the largest
single expense. 'These social insurance benefits,
however, are playing a decreasing part in family
income. They accounted for 5.4% of the 1967 income
of a four member worker's family, compared with
9.3% in 1965. Other fringe benefits provided by large
enterprises include low -rent housing, medical services,
vocational training, subsidized restaurants, trinsporta-
tion, and vacation and recreational facilities.
5. Labor problems (C)
The low level of labor productivity is a serious and
persistent problem. Even more urgent, however, are
increases in unemployment and living costs which
have emerged as dominant issues since the mid- 1960's,
with political as well as economic implications.
Productivity levels seriously '.fait Yugoslavia's
ability to compete on the world market and generally
impede economic growth. They are linked with the
inadequate education and training and poorly
developed skills of much of the work force, ehe careless
working habits of the relatively large number of
industrial workers who have but recently left
traditional agriculture, and glaring deficiencies in
business organization and management.
The government is under growing pressure from the
trade unions, students, and the populace at large to
alleviate the unemploymen situation, and demonsira-
tions in June 1968 by students in Belgrade and
elsewhere focused attention on the bleak employment
prospects for Yugoslav youth. The unemployn
problem results basically from the inability of the
nonagricultural sector to absorb the steadily growing
number of labor force entrants. A large proportion of
these are rural youths, with no industrial skills or
experience, who seek employment doing menial tasks
in the cities and towns. Those who find jobs in
industry tend to be among the first laid off or
dismissed, but they usually maintain their ties with the
village and can, if necessary, retreat to the family
farm. Most worrisome, however, is the increasing
scarcity of jobs for skilled workers and for
professionally qualified secondary school and
university graduates. Their plight points up a serious
deficiency in Yugoslav manpower planning:
thousands of young people are being trained in
occupations with which the economy is adequately
supplied, while shortages persist in ot,_ ^r fields.
Mea ,ures designed to open up job opportunities for
skilled workers and qualified professional personnel
were adopt..d in 1968, but job prospects ':`or the
unskilled remain poor. The government is committed
to the implementation of the 1965 economic
reforms �an ambitious attempt to lower production
costs, rationalize the price structure, and achieve
economic stability. If the program continues to be
implemented, the primary stress will be on
modernization rather than sheer econor :'ic expansion,
and the government will try to resist demands for
assistance on the part of ailing industries and
enterprises. This would mean slower growth and a
continued high level of unemployment by past
Yugoslav standards. The government has warned that
full employment may riot be achieved for a decade or
more.
The wage level has also become a source of serious
discontent, Lind brief wildcat strikes protesting wage
policy have occurred with increasing frequency. The
trade unions do riot condone strike action and the
government is embarrassed by it, but strikers are rarely
punished, for the regime moves cautiously, as a rule, in
dealing with expressions of popular discontent.
23
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100032 -0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100032 -0
6. Labor legislation (U /OU)
Governmental control over labor is far less stringent
in Yugoslavia than in other Communist countries. The
government eschews compulsory allocation of
manpower and relies on the operation of a free labor
market to direct workers to occupations and industries
where they are most needed. Federal legislation
guarantees all wage and salary earners minimum
standards of protection with respect to wages, working
conditions, occupational safety, and social insurance,
but the detailed regulation of all employment matters
is left to the discretion of the individual enterprise or
private employer. Enforcement of labor legislation
however, is barely adequate. Violations of the safety
regulations are especially numerous, and evasion and
manipulation of the regulations on wages and
dismissals also occur.
The single most important labor law is the Basic
Law on Labor Relations, which has been substantially
amended since its adoption in 1965; nearly all of the
major labor legislation was redrafted in 1965 -66. The
Basic Law on Labor Relations applies to all wage and
salary carnets; it governs hiring and dismissal
procedures, hours of work, periods of rest and leave,
special protection for women and young workers, the
method of wage determination, labor discipline, and
grievance procedures. This law is couched in general
terms, however, and is supplemented by implement-
ing directives and decrees, by republic and local' laws,
and by enterpri >e regulations on labor relations.
wages, and other matters. Responsibility for
formulating and giving final approval to these
regulations rests with the workers council, elected by
the entire work force in each enterprise.
Active participation by the work force (through the
workers council aril its executive organ, the
management board) in many of the decisions
customarily reserved to management was introduced
on a limited basis by a law of 1960. The system of
workers' self management has undergone almost
continuous modification since then, mostly in the
direction of ever greater independence and
responsibility for the workers councils aril other self
management organs, and it now embraces the entire
socialized sector. Workers' self- management is
undoubtedly the most distinctive feature of the
Yugoslav industrial scene and plays a prominent role
in the regime's ideological explanation of its "separate
road to socialism."
Yugoslav legislation contains only brief and
scattered references to grievance procedures and labor
disputes. There is no law governing collective
bargaining or strikes. The 1963 Constitution names
24
the Confederation of Trade Unions of Yugoslavia
(C'TUY) as the organization through which workers
may seek to improve their living and working
conditions, but trade union rights and responsibilities
are not defined in any of the legislation currently in
effect. This legislative neglect reflects a conviction
that smooth functioning of the system of workers' self
management eliminates all areas of disagreement and
dispute.
7. Labor relations (C)
The Yugoslav system of economic self- management
centers on the workers councils. The councils were
established by law in 1950, -md their legal basis was
embodied in the Constitution of 1963, which states
that:
The basis of the social economic system of
Yugoslavia is free, associated work with socially
owned means of labor, and self management of the
working people in production and in distribution
of the social product in the working organization
and social community.
Self- management in the working organization
shall include in particular the right and duty of
the working people to manage the working organi-
zation directly or through organs of management
elected by themselves.
Each business enterprise, and public institution
elects a workers council once a year. No more than
one -third of the members of the council may be
retained for consecutive terms. In large enterprises
component work units elect their own councils, which
send delegates to compose the overall enterprise
council. Nominations can be made by the enterprise
trade union branch, the existing workers council, or a
group of at least 5% of the total number of workers in
the enterprise. A majority of votes is needed to win a
place on the council. Voting is by secret ballot.
The council elects a managing board as;ts executive
arm to oversee the implementation of its decisions.
"Three- fourths of the managing board's membership
must be composed of workers engaged in production,
but the chairman of the workers council may not be a
member. The managing board chooses its own
chairman, who may not be the enterprise director.
The workers council makes basic decisions on the
enterprise economic activity, organization, internal
relations, and personnel policy. It also selects the
director of the enterprise. The enterprise must publicly
advertise openings for the position of director, who is
then selected from among the applicants by the
workers council.
As an institution, the council has had varying
success in actual operation. Some have worked well;
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100032 -0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100032 -0
others have not been equal to economically wise
decisions when facing such choices as higher salaries
versus the purchase of modern equipment. Where self
management has been applied to institutions such as
hospitais, a frequent complaint is heard that workers
are making decisions in areas where they are totally
unqualified. Although it is unconstitutional to impair
the function of self- management, the Yugoslav press
has been frill of denunciations of party or technocratic
interference with the decisions of workers councils.
With the evolution of the workers' management
system, the role of the trade unions has undergone
substantial change. Originally, the unions, under the
ieadership of the Confederation of Trade Unions of
Yugoslavia were a strong arm of the regime, entrusted
by the Communist Party with controlling the workers
to stimulate productivity, to assist party control of
production, and to carry out state social welfare
policies. The introduction of the workers council
marked the beginning of a general decline in the
importance of the trade unions that lasted into the
mid- 1960'x. Since that time there has been
considerable ferment in the CTUY as it has sought an
ever expanding role as protector of worker interest.
The result has been that the CTUY, with 3,448,072
members in 1970, has become the third largest, and
one of the most important, mass organizi.tions in
Yugoslavia.
Trade union objectives are still determined in
general terms by the party, and the CTUY recognized
in its revised statute of 1964 the leading role of the
party. The regime itself has sought to use the unions as
a check against the workers councils in order to
prevent these organs from exceeding the limitations
which the party feels appropriate. But the advent of
the economic reforms of 1965 and the fall of Tito's
conservative heir apparent Aleksandar Rankovic in
1966 has led the CTUY to insist on more
independence for itself than the regime envisaged.
The union's leadership has more and more taken the
side of the workers in the grievances against the
government. Union leaders were particularly
concerned over the fact that the 1965 reforms initially
resulted in higher prices, a temporary decline in the
standard of living, and widespread layoffs. Salaries of
managerial personnel tended to remain steady or even
to increase with the cost of living, while workers'
salaries in unprofitable enterprises often dropped or
delays occurred in payment of wages.
In late 1966 and early 1967 the CTUY leadership
was already beginning to take an independent stance.
At that time the CTUY took issue with government
slx)kesmen who blamed wage increases in excess of
gains in productivity for causing inflation. They also
fought government attempts to economize by
trimming soeial security benefits.
Despite this support, worker dissatisfaction with the
trade union leadership burst forth publicly at the sixth
congress of the CTUY in June 1968. For the first time
the congress was relatively open and the voting for the
new leadership was conducted by secret ballot. Union
reformers and activists worked for a militant union
more independent of the LCY and protective of
worker interests. Delegates demanded more equitable
income distribution and an end to the privileges of the
government, party, and economic bureaucracy.
The sixth congress also adopted a new CTUY
statute in an effort to inject more flexibility into the
organization. A new trade union conference was
instituted, to meet at least once a year to consider
problems of working conditions. The old central
council was reduced in membership from 183 to 107
members and renamed the Council of the Trade
Union Federation. The presidium, however, which is
elected by the central council, was retained. The
position of CTUY deputy secretary general was
abolished, being replaced by a new vice presidency.
The year 1971 was particularly noteworthy for
increased trade union activity on behalf of Yugoslav
workers. The CTUY openly opposed price increases,
criticized the government for overlooking worker
interests, defended the interests of Yugoslays employed
abroad, and came out strongly in favor of improving
the social and material position of the workers in
Yugoslavia. In the past the CTUY has been, in part,
the victim of the Yugoslav self- managing system,
which implicitly questions the rationale for a trade
union's existence since enterprises are managed by,
and labor relations vested in, the workers themselves.
With new problems involving Yugoslays employed in
the West and inflation eroding workers' earnings at
home, the CTUY is beginning to emerge as a strong
power factor in a dramatically changing Yugoslavia.
The CTUY's new role on national social and economic
issues, however, must adjust to the position of the
Communist party as it emerges from the current
political reforms. With the ongoing debate over
whether decentralization should be extended to
include the party, the potential importance of the
CTUY in playing a unifying role in Yugoslavia on a
class basis cutting across regional boundaries and
differences �could be enhanced.
The CTUY continues to press for a greater role on
behalf of the workers. At the trade union conference in
March 1972, bread and butter issues and the union's
role as defender of worker interests were dominant
25
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100032 -0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100032 -0
themes. The conference proposed that the union have
a constitutionally sanctioned political role. A demand
was also voiced for a change in housing policies as well
as for increased educational opportunities for workers
children.
Basicallv, workers are organized into six large
functional unions, which have republic affiliates;
these in turn form federations. Underlining the growth
in importance of the republican trade union bodies,
the Croatian trade union organization decided in
October 1968 to change its name from the Federation
of Yugoslav Trade Unions for Croatia to the Croatian
Federation of Trade Unions.
The Communist regime uses the trade unions as an
instrument of foreign policy, annually sending
numerous delegations to the less developed countries
of Africa, the Middle East, Asia, and Latin America.
Efforts are also made to maintain labor's relations
with the socialist countrie- and the West. The
Yugoslays studiously avoid close identification with
either East or West, and are riot members of either the
Soviet- dominated World Federation of Trade Unions
26
(WF although they send observers to WFTU
meetings �or the International Confederation of Fr---e
Trade Unions (ICFTU).
E. Living conditions and social problems
1. Levels of living (U /OU)
The standard of living in Yugoslavia differs
markedly from one region to another. Conditic in
industrialized, culturally Western, and prosperous
Slovenia, .where education is high and unemployment
low, approach a favorable comparison with thou: of
Weste n Europe. On the other end of the scale is the
economically depressed, rural, and heavily Muslim
autonomous province of Kosovo .which suffers from
chronic unemployment. Firm statistical data relating
to living standards are often not available or are not
very useful because they contain fragmentary
information or averages. Certain indexes of levels of
living in Yugoslavia may be compared with those of
selected other countries, however, as is shown in
Figure 14.
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100032 -0
FIGURE 14. Compnrative levels of living, Yugoslavia and selected other countries (U /OU)

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100032 -0
Despite the wide regional diffes2nees, the standard
of living in ail areas of Yugoslavia has improved
considerably since World s't'ar IL Under the 0 -year
plan the regime is channeling funds into less
developed regions to narrow the gap between the
developed and underdeveloped fzarts of the
federation.
In urban areas consumer goods are readily
available. Stores in Belgrade as well as in republic and
provincial capitals are relatively well stocked,
although the variety is at times limited, and open -air
peasant markets coexist with modern supermarkets
(Figure 10). Good housing is still at a premium, and
overcrowding is common even in Belgrade where
much new construction has taken place. Despite the
completion of some 248,999 housing units throughout
the country in 1968 and 1969, the construction
industry h:,s failed to keep pace with the demand for
housing. At the root of this problem has been the large
and continuing migration of peasants to the cities with
the resulting heavy demand for urban living quarters.
Major differences in urban and rural housing relate
not only to availability of dwelling space but also to
quality of dwellings, the urban type being
considerably superior to the rural (Figure 16). Housing
conditions in the countryside, however, are gradually
approaching urban standards. New rural housing is
increasingly electrified, although indoor plumbing is
still rare. Wells and outhouses, when they exist, are
usually found in surrounding gardens. In contrast to
most urban dwellings, rural dwellings tend to be
privately owned.
Urban housing since the war mainly takes the form
of multistoried apartment buildings. Dwelling units
are relatively small, usually with one or two rooms. In
1960, the latest figures available, of the 1,638,000
dwellings in cities, most (1,030,0(X)) had electricity,
less than half (7090X)) uad toilets, some 809,000 had
running water, and more than half (834,(X)0) had
access to a sewerage system. Electricity, running
water, and it sewerage system are usually absent in
prewar urban housing, which in 1961 accounted for
64% of all urban dwellings. The standard of urban
housing is significantly higher in the north than in the
south. Most urban dwellings throughout the country
have electricity. More than 00% of the urban
dwellings in Slovenia have water and sewerage
systems, but elsewhere the figure is far less than 00
Nearly all Yugoslays, from all walks of life and from
all the diverse regions of Yugoslavia recognize that the
regime has improved their levels of living. "There are,
however, serious problems .which remain sources of Ixrp-
idar discontent. 'rhe per capita income in 1971 stood
at about US$I,000, but the regime's inability to curb
spiraling inflation, which wipes out gains in income
faster than they accrue, is one sore spot. Moreover, it is
estimated that sonic 00% of a workers' earnings are
spent just on food. At the root of the problem is the
wide range of economic conditions between different
parts of the country, as well as the general urban -rural
cultural dichotomy. These factors, under the impact of
peasant migration into the cities and increasingly
modern cornmunicatic.:s, generate dis,-ti4action with
living conditions among the "have rots" as they
become aware of the level of living of the "haves."
Despite the regime's efforts toward economic
equalization, regional and urban -rural jealousies,
based also on cultural factors, persist and hinder
improvements in living standards.
2. Social Welfare (U /OU)
Since World War 11, Yugoslavia's social insurance
system has been vastly improved and extended into an
all encompassing insurance system that includes
health insurance, old -age and survivor's insurance
(known in Yugoslavia as pensi.m insurance), disability
insurance, children's allowances, and unemployment
compensation. 'Total expenditures for health insurance
alone -,were the equivalent of US$402 million in 1968.
Before World War II, about 17% of the population
was covered by benefits; by 1963 the regime had
extended some form of social security to ti arly all the
people and about half were covered by full social
insurance.
Social insurance coverage is not uniform, differing
as applied to wage and salary earners, independent
professional persons, and private farmers. The
differences in coverage reflect regime attitudes toward
the various socioeconomic groups. Wage and salary
earners �the "working class received full coverage
early and, in line with Communist ideology, are the
most favored group. They are automatically covered
by social security upon employment.
Independent professional persons are covered by
contracts between their professional associations and
an institute for social insurance. Such contractural
insurance has been secondarily useful in pressuring
professional people to join the Communist controlled
professional associations. Artists, including writers,
musicians, and actors, are insured by special
legislation. Compulsory health insurance for private
craftsmen was introduced only in 1962, and
compulsory pension and disability insurance in 1967.
Compulsory health insurance for private farmers
was established in 1909. Private farmers are not
covered by comr alsory pension and disability
27
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100032 -0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100032 -0
insurance, and they must arrange for coverage by
contract. Health insurance has become 'he most
widespread type of social insurance in Yugoslavia,
embracing in sortie form about 98% of the country's
populati.m. Pension and disability insurance are less
widely distributed, but they cover more than 50% of
tine population.
Under the pending government reorganization,
which will give more authoritN and power to the
r ,-publics, the organization and financing of
Yugoslavia's social insurance, which is already based
on the principles of self management and self
financing, will be decentralized even further. The
1962 law on Organization and Financing of Social
Insurance, giving the government policyrnaking
and supervisory control, will be drastically revised to
give a greater voice in social insurance policy to local
officials.
The principal self management bodies for the
insurance system :ire so- called communities of social
insurance, established at the federal, r: .public, and
communal levels. Separate communities of social
insurance exist for w: (including independent
professional persons and private craftsmen), and for
farmers. Each community of social insurance has an
elected assembly through which insured persons are
supposed to exercise their self- management rights. 'ri
assembly of a communal community is elected by
workers councils in enterprises, trade unions,
organizations of private employees, professional
associations, pensioners' ..associations, and similar
organizations. The assembly of a republic community
of social insurance is elected by the communal
communities. The assembly of the Yugoslav
coil] in of social insurance is chosen by the
assemblies of the republic communities. As the basic
organs, co,nmwnal communities collect and provide
fluids for health insurance and are responsible for
vocational rehabilitation and reemployment of
disabled workers. Republic communities are
responsible for pension and disability insurance policy.
The Yugoslav (federal) community of social insurance
coordinates matters of common interest for all
communities.
The operational side of social insurance is
conducted by institutes for social insurance at the
communal, republic, and federal levels. 'These
institutes implement the policies determined by the
social insurance communities.
The social insurance system is supposed to be self
financing. Increased costs for medical insurance and
pensions and inflation, however, have resulted in
deficits. 'I'll( deficits usually have been covered by
28
loans. Farads for social insurance expenditures are
formed separately for each branch of insurance. The
funds accrue principally from contributions for wages
and enterprise funds. For workers and ^mployees in
the socialized sector, economic enterprises and
government agencies pay the contributions out of
personnel cost funds. Private employers tray for their
insured employees. Self- employed persons and those
with contractual insurance pay their own contribu-
tions.
Ilealth insurance benefits comprise health
protection, compensation for loss of earned personal
income due to illness or pregnancy, compensation for
travel expenses connected with health protection, and
grants for the birth of a child or the death of an
insured person. Coverage extends to members of the
insured's immediate famih and dependent relatives.
Although most medical services are free, the insured
pays part of the cost of drugs, voluntary immuniza-
tions, and dental and orthopedic supplies. Health
insurance is carried out on the basis of contracts
between communal social i.,arance institutes and
health institutions. This arrangement does not deny
those insured the right to select their own physicians,
but failure to obtain treatment on the basis of the
contract may require the insured to pay an additional
share of the expense.
The increasing expense of the health insurance
system, which more than doubled between 1964 and
1970, has led to suggestions that the insurants pay
more of the cost of medical care. Although contracts
between health insurance institutes and medical
facilities sometimes work well, thev usually lead to
inefficiency and do not stimulate better care. Some
enterprises are considering contracting directly for
medical services for their employees, bypassing the
social insurance institutions.
Eligibility for old -age pensions is determined by age
and length of covered status. Pensions normally are
payable to men at age 60 after 20 years of coverage
and to women at age 55. The amount of pension is
based on average monthly earnings and the duration
of coverage. Periodic adjustments are made to account
for inflation. Dependents have the right to a family
pension upon the death of an insured person.
Pensions are used by the regime as a method of
rewarding its followers. Armed forces and internal
security personnel, veterans of the partisan movement,
and prewar party activists receive increased pensions.
The expense of the country's pension system
skyrocketed between 1963 and 1968, from the
equivalent of about USM5 million to nearly $620
million. Despite this increase, the pension systern fails
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100032 -0

y�
w
4
1
ELf 7-
I I
r,
Tt It
tip
JPO
S
K
,1 r
1
1
s 1
4 t
.rte f T a
A
i f

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100032 -0
to provide a living income for mail% of its
beneficiaries. In addition, abuse of the system is
%%idvspread, and businesses often its( pensions to rid
themselves of surplus manpower. "There is little
uniformity in the dispensation of pensions, and no
reliable data are available. In 1967, however, about
half of all pensioners received no more than the
equivalent of $20 per month.
Full disability protection is offered to the usual
categories of insured. Major benefits include disability
pensions, disabilit% payments for serious physical
injuries, occupational rehabilitation with cash krauts
during training, and suitable employment with
supplementary compensation.
Children's allowances were introduced in the early
1950'x, but this form of insurance has lost much of its
importance as a source of income. Not only have
increases in the amount of the allowances failed to
keep pace with the rising cost of living, but new
restrictions have cut the number of beneficiaries from
it 1966 high of 1,50 ,635 to 873,719 in 1968. Benefits
and coverage for peasants awning private plots
generally lag behind, even though the rural
community makes up about half of the population.
The unemployment compensation system was
revised in March 1965, in time to meet the
considerable additional unemployment which
accompanied the economic reforms. Unemployment,
which stood at 266,900 in 1963, had climbed to
315,6(x) by 1969, and would have been far greater if it
were not for the more than ..+:0010 Yugoslays
employed in the West. The unemployment compensa-
tion system is supervised by communal and republic
employment bureaus. The republics determine the
contribution rates and level of monetary c mpensa-
tion. Eligibility requirements are stringei.t, and
probably less than half of the unemployed recieve
benefits.
Social protection involves assistance to the aged and
indigent, minors, handicapped children and adults,
disabled veterans and families of fighters killed in the
war. and victims of natural catastrophes. Since no
comprehensive program exists and communal
authorities supply the funds and administration, social
protection is uneven and usually inadequate. Facilities
.and personnel for social work are in short supply,
mainly because of IaLk of funds.
Protection of the aged and indigent is based on
communal statutes and ordinances. Financial aid in
the form of permanent assistance or lump -stun
payments is the most important hype of social
protection. Because of restrictive eligibility require-
ments and insufficient local budget appropriations,
30
mane needy persons are excluded from social
assistance. Placement of aged and infirm persons in
institutions usually is limited to the most pressing
cases. Institutic,-is for the aged are limited in number
and expanding only slowly.
Communal welfare services undertake the
rehabilitation of juvenile delinquents and care for
orphans. Maintaining institutions for young people
and supplying school lunches are other important
forms of social assistance. The most important
establishments for children are the day care centers for
children of the employed. In the past, families in the
upper income brackets have peen the main
benefactors becausa parents must share the cost of
these centers. In February 1972, however, the
Assembly of Self- Managers in Zagreb, in the republic
of Croatia, went on record in favor of reforming the
child care center system. Under their proposal, parents
with low incomes would not be charged for placing
their children in nurseries and kindergartens.
Legislation involving protection of disabled war
veterans and their families comes exclusively within
the jurisdiction of the Federal Assembly. The program
of benefits, which started in the early postwar years,
has constantly expanded, the whole cost being borne
by the federal budget. Among other benefits, disabled
veterans have a lifetime right to free medical care. The
Federation of Disabled War Veterans offers its
members reduced rates at convalescent homes.
3. Social Problems (C)
The impact of rapid postwar industrialization and
socialization on an economically backward nation has
resulted in it disruption of traditional cultural values
and aggravation of major, chronic, social problems:
alcoholism, illiteracy, inadequate housing, and
unemployment. As the Yugoslays have attempted
rapidly to pull themselves into the 20th century, they
have also encountered typical modern social
problems: an increase in certain types of crimes,
juvenile delinquency, drug abuse, alcoholism, and
disturbed family relations. Only in the latter part of
the 1960's was the regime seriously beginning to look
for ways to combat these problems. In February 1972
Yugoslavia became the first Eastern European country
to introduce legislation prohibiting the advertising of
tobacco and alcohol in the public media.
The chief factor compounding the social problems
of the post -World War 11 period has been the
migration of thousands of literate and semiliterate
peasants from rural to urban areas. The increased
employment of women outside the home and the
decline of the extended patriarchal family have added
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100032 -0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100032 -0
to the migrants' problem of adjusting to urban life.
The regimes discouragement of religion and attempts
to keep religious influence at a minimum has
weakened traditional values of society. In most
instances, however, the regime has not totally
succeeded in replacing such traditional values with
new ones.
Laws on criminal offenses in Yugoslavia are a
curious mixture of the traditional and the modern. In
1%8, for example, only 186 Yugoslays were convicted
of various crimes against the state, while 37,802
persons were convicted of crimes against "honor and
reputation." Adult crime in general has tended to
decline in recent years. For example, the total number
of persons convicted for all crimes fell from 133,714 in
1%0 to 118,824 in 1968. During that period the
number of adult women convicted of crimes declined
from 26,774 to 20,692. Only two major catagories of
crime showed increases, crimes against civil liberties
and rights and crimes against the economy.
Lengthy prison sentences are unusual and most
frequently are meted oil, for crimes against life and
limh or property. Short sentences of 15 to 30 days or of
3 to 6 months are the rule. Many sentences are in the
form of monetary fines, and suspended sentences are
common.
In contrast to the traditional criminal acts,
economic crime generally has increased. Such shady
practices as bribery in commercial transactions,
embezzlement, tax evasion, and unjustified price
increases are relatively common. In early 1972, a
major investigation of tax evasion appeared headed
for it large -scale scandal in Skopje. In 1968, 6,265
individuals were found guilty of economic offenses.
Moreover, most illegal practices go undetected and
politically influential persons usually escape
Punishment, unless the regime determines to make
examples of them. Public awareness of the situation
helps breed cynicism toward the regime's administra-
tion of justice.
'I'll(- steady increase in violations labeled
"hooliganism" and in traffic violations has evoked it
public outcry. As it result, the criminal code was
amended in April 1967 to provide stiffer penalties and
more flexibility in meeting both types of transgres-
sions.
The growth of juvenile delinquency, although still
low b; Westeni standards, Lr s aroused the regime's
concern. In 1959, 3,0(X) juveniles were sentenced for
various crimes. By 1968 the number hall jumped to
6,468. Most convictions were for crimes against
property, including an increasing number of auto
thef.;. Belgrade is plagued by young thieves who prey
on the diplomatic community by stealing cars,
appliances, and clothing. The incidence of juvenile
delinquency is highest in the more urbanized areas
Croatia, Slovenia, and parts of Serbia proper �than in
the more rural areas of Bosnia and Hercegovina,
Montenegro, Macedonia, Kosovo, and Vojvodina.
Students comprise the largest group of convicted
juvenile offenders, and most of the delinquents come
from reputable farni.ies of middle income, as well as
from the families of high party officials. Yugoslav
authorities emphasize that strained family relations
are a major factor in juvenile delinquency.
Alcoholism is a growing problem in Yugoslavia to
which the regime is giving greater attention. It has
been a major social problem ever since World War II,
but only in the latter 1960's did the regime begin to
examine the roots of the problem. Excessive drinking
underlies many of the country's social and economic
problems and undermines labor productivity.
Although accurate statistics on alcoholism are
unavailable, it apparently is the main social problem
in Bosnia. In the Kakanj mining center there are
individual workers who spend up to 60 of their
personal income on alcohol. Regime efforts to stem
alcoholism through associations to combat it and
treatment centers have been inadequate.
4. Drugs and narcotics (C)
Yugoslavia is a leading European producer of raw
opium as well as a major transit point for drugs
smuggled out of Turkey and the Middle East to
Western Europe. In 1947, Belgrade, Ankara, New
Delhi, and Teheran signed an international
convention limiting their poppy and opium
production to amounts needed for medicine. Since
then, opium production has been sharply reduced in
Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, officials in Belgrade
estimate that between 1965 and 1970 some 33,000
kilograms of opium were illegally produced in the
country.
Drug addiction is on the rise in Yugoslavia. A
leading "Zagreb daily in August 1971 estimated the
number of drug users in the city to be near 5,000.
Nevertheless, smuggling of drugs rather than domestic
addiction is considered the major problem confronting
the government. Drugs transiting Yugoslavia find their
way into the United States either by direct smuggling
O, distribution to U.S. servicemen in Western Europe.
The Yugoslav Government is concentrating its
antismuggling effort in Macedonia, which horders on
Bulgaria and Greece. llerc, republic inspectors and
officials of the Public Security Service have compiled
dossiers on known or suspected sm In addition,
31
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100032 -0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100032 -0
federal officials are cooperating in the campaign. The�
use of trained clogs to unco%er concealed drug, has
been eslx�c�iall% suc�c�essful. In ja imar% 1972. 16 drug
smugglers %sere arrested and 250 kilograms of drugs
were confisc at the Yugoslav- Bulgarian border
to%%n of Dimitrovgrad. This amounted to one -half the
total confiscated for all 1970.
O[,I% since about 1970 ha%e Yugoslav officials
puhlic�I% ac�kn(mledged that the% have a drug abuse
problem at home. although the total number of
addicts has never been revealed. The most recent and
significant inme b% Belgrade aimed at combating the
problem came oil 12 \1a% 1971, with the
announcement of the formation of it Federal Narcotics
Commission. Creation of the ne%v commission, corning
in the midst of it major go%ernment reform,
underscores Yugoslavia's serious concern over the
problem. The new federal body is designed to develop
and coordinate intensified research on narcotics
addiction, and to organize it massive editc�ational
effort among social and professional institutions for
e,eedical treatment of addicts. In addition, the� new%
commission is slated to redefine health care
n�gulations to all(,%% treatment for addiction its one of
the citizen's rights under the c�oiuitr% *s bealth
program. and tc, encourage dc�%�elopment of
specialized institutions for the treatment of addicts.
Due to it shortage of funds and lack of trained
personnel, it is milikel%r that the new narc�otic%
cmrnmissimn %will have an earl% and effective impact on
Yugoslavia's drug related problems.
F. Ilealth (U /OU)
1. Medical care
The post%rar de%elopment of public health services
has been predicated on Iwo basic princ�iples�
dec�entrolization of operations and health insurance.
Vncler this decentralized sstem, hom each local
commune plans and administers its own public health
program, n�I%ing nwinl% on its o%vn financial
resources. As a result, there is it %%ide disparity in the
elualih, availabilil%, and administration of medical
care. 1n Slmvenia and Croatia. as %%ell as in large urban
centers throughout the counlr%, medical care is
adeolua e, although belm%c the standards of NYestern
Mro pe. Els�%vhere, health care is uneven at hest and
lacking at %worst. In most southern and rural
cmtrtmicmes of the c�otintr%, for example. there is an
almost total lack of medical facilities and trained
personnel.
Because of the Yugoslav regimes connlitnx�nt to
local autonom%, i.e., decentralization, the public
'3.2
health s%stem is characterized b% it prolife ation of
small, separate, regional health institutions, each %%ith
limited resources, facilities, and personnel. Efforts
have been undemaa since the earl% 1960's to, integrate
these small units into larger ones. but progress has
been slo%%. For example. not e% (-it the� blood
transfusion service has been coordinated on a national
basis. Each republic has its oven regulations and
s%stems of operation, and the (Itiality of the eyuiprnent
and service curies c�onsiderablx. Periodic shortages of
blood occur, and Yugoslav authorities believe it .would
be necessary to double the amount of blood no%c
obtained in order to fill national reyuire�rments. The
Yugoslav Bed Gross is the primary agent for soliciting
donors, but apparenthi it has no nationall%
coordinating role. The In:,titute for Blood Transfusion
of Serbia is the principal procurement and production
fac�ilit% for blood and blood products
National health policy is formall% determined by
the Social Welfare and Ilealth Chamber of the
Federal Assembly. Most federal health legislation,
bo%%�ever, is prepared by the Council for Ilcalth and
Social Policy, %%hick replaced the former Federal
Secretariat for Health and Social Policy in April 1967.
"I'll� Council for Ilcalth and Social Police functions
more as a coordinating body than did the old
secretariat. Most activity ill public health matters has
been relegated to the republics, each of which has a
secretariat dealing %cith health matters. Republic
assemblies (parliaments) also have i t social- Ilcalth
c�handwr as one house of their legislature's.
The health insuranc�c program covers nearly Wi of
the population. Oil an average, Sir of it %%orkcr's
%%;ages go for insurance premiums. I fealth institutions,
although lomuinalIN independent, self- nuuuuging
entities, are obliged to honor the rights of tIl- insured.
As a result, curative services have been emphasized in
practice at the expense of prc�centi%�e uneclic�ine. 'I'hc
health insurance program also influenced the
concentration of most health facilities in industrial
and urban centers. %%here� until the introduction of
health insurance foragricoltural %corkers in 1959, most
of the insured lived.
I)espite the qualitative and organizational
shortcomings of the Yugosla% health s%steun, health
care since World War 11 has impro%ed draunatic�all%.
The dealh rate for the c��untr% as it %%bole fell from
12.7 per 1.000 inhabitants in 1947, to 8.7 in 1968.
Infant mortality (Iropped from 116 per 1,000live births
in 1953 to 59.8 per 1,000 for males and 5 -1.3 per 1.000
females in 1968. "these rates, ho%%r%er. flmc�tuate
%videl% from region to region relative to the repmhlic's
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100032 -0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100032 -0
developneat. [n economically advanced Slovenia, the
infant mortality rate in 1968 was 26.8 per 1,(x10; in
underdeveloped Bosnia and Hercegovina the rate was
62.6 per 1.(x1(1 (down sharply, however, front 80.0 per
I,(X)0 in 1966). In Kosovo, the nation's poorest region,
the infant mortality rate in 1968 was 118.5, it figure
that in fact represents au increase from the 1966 level
of 111.2 per L(xx) live births.
1 11 1970 Yugoslavia had 259 hospitals with .06,726
beds of which 1:38 were general hospitals %with 73,941
beds. "There were also 245 medical centers with 8,287
beds. L 1970 the bed to population ratio was 1:180.
To ease the load on the civilian hospitals, military
hospitals (24 in 1966) often provide their facilities for
treatment of the civilian population. In 1965 (tire
latest available data), more Than 32,700 civilians were
treated in military hospitals throughout Yugoslavia.
"Tire military health system which, unlike the civilian
service, has the advantages of nationwide organization
and a greater uniformity of standards, may be thus
attempting to correct the %vide disparity in the
availability of civilian medical care. To what degree
this is a regime- inspired policy and the precise
magnitude of the military's role in providing health
care for the civilian population are not known.
There were 20,369 physicians in 1970, or about 1 for
every 1,010 inhabitants. Most of the physicians
remain in the urban centers or medium -sized cities,
resulting in a lack of medical personnel in rural areas,
particularly in the south. The shortage of dentists and
oral physicians is not so severe; the country had 3,001
dentists in 1970. The latest available data indicate
that there were 2,242 stomatologists and 2,687 dental
technicians in 1968. In 1970 there were also 3,616
pharmacists, 4,077 veterinarians, 2,950 nudwive.,,
26,731 nurses, 1,941 assistant midwives, Nand 18,409
assistant nurses.
Medical training in Yugoslavia lags behind that
available in Western Europe. There are eight medical
fac�ttltics in the country, although two, in Novi Sad
and Nis,` graduated their first class only in 1965. The
whole system graduates about 1,300 to 1,500
physicians per wear. Medical courses last 5 years,
followed by I year of compulsory internship. At most
medical institutions, however, a detailed internship
program does not exist.
Many of the regimes general policies with regard to
the medical profession and the health system as a
.whole have tended to discourage entrants into the
field and to exacerbate existing deficiencies. The
socialization of the medical services virtually all
'For diacritics on place names see the list of natnes at the end of
the chapter.
physicians (9WC' .work in socialized institutions �arid
the abolition of private practice since 1958 are the
most important factors. The proscription of private
practice, including the strict prohibition against
collecting fees on an individual basis from patients, is
it particular issue of contention between the regime
and the medical profession. In March 1971 a group of
physicians in Belgrade demanded a restoration of the
right of private practice, but received no encourage-
ment from the government. This situation has only
added to the shortage of doctors throughout the
country, since many professionally trained men and
women prefer to emigrate to the West %where
opportunities for advancement are better. The
governments curtailment i: the hiring of new
physicians, a result of an economy drive associated
with the economic reforms of the mid 1960'x, has
intensified the outflow of trained doctors. Unsatisfac-
tory salaries are also a major cause of discontent
among the Yugoslav medical profession; delays in
salary payments generated a short strike by all medical
personnel in Ljubljana in April 1968.
Diseases susceptible to relatively simple preventive
measures have been effectively combated. Compul-
sory vaccination has greatly reduced the incidences of
diptheria, tetanus, poliomyelitis, and whooping
cough. Malaria was virtually eliminated by 1962. The
first smallpox epidemic in 40 years broke out in the
province: of Kosovo in March 1972. Fourteen cases and
one death were reported i the first 3 weeks of that
month. The disease was apparently introduced by
Muslim pilgrims returning from Mecca. A nationwide
vaccination campaign was initiated and travelers
leaving and entering Yugoslavia as of mid -1972 were
required to have a valid vaccination certificate. There
were a total of 173 cases with 34 deaths.
The remaining major diseases are closely linked
with congested living quarters and unsanitary
handling and storage of food and drinking water.
Heart disease is the major threat to national health,
with an unusually high death rate (Figure l7).
Gastrointestinal disorders strike even more of the
population, but account for few deaths. Hepatitis is
common, often occurring in localized epidemics. In
1968, gonorrhea was the fourth most widely reported
infectious disease.
Other major disease threats are amebiasis and
shigellosis, infectious jaundice, and scarlet fever. An
estimated 25% of the country's rural population
suffers from a mysterious kidney disease, endemic
nephropathy, apparently unknown outside the
Balkans. Nephritis also occasionally becomes
widespread, as in Bosnia in December 1965. In 1967,
33
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100032 -0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100032 -0
FIGURE 17. Principal causes of deaths, 1969 (U /OU)
CAUSE NUMBER PERCENT
Enteritis and other diarrhoeal diseases..
1,882
1.0
Tuberculosis and respiratory system...
3,563
1.9
Other tuberculosis, including late
eff ects
424
0.2
Malignant neoplasms (cancer)
19,308
10.2
Benign neoplasms and neoplasms of
unspecified nature
949
0.5
Diabetes mellitus
1,387
0.7
Chronic rheumatic heart disease
1,281
0.7
Hypertensive disease.....'............
1,800
1.0
Ischaemic heart disease
11,420
6.1
Other forms of heart disease..........
?6,860
14.2
Cerebrovascular disease
16,155
8.5
Influenza
4,372
2.3
Pneumonia
8,161
4.3
Bron.:titius, emphysema, and asthma..
2,943
1.6
Peptic ulcer
1,061
0.6
Cirrhosis of the liver
2,384
1.3
Nephritis and nephrosis
1,979
1.0
C0119enitul anomalies
1.0:36
0.5
Birth injury, difficult labor, and other
anoxic and hypoxic conditions......
1,589
0.8
Other causes of perinatal mortality....
4,699
2.5
Symptoms and other ill- defined condi-
tions
49,787
26.3
Deaths by violence
12,052
6:4
VOTE� Sequence listed is according to the International
Classification of Diseases (8th revision, 1965).
rodent -borne hemorrhagic fever reached epidemic
proportions in Bosnia and Hercegovina, which
reported 156 ill and two deaths.
Animal diseases of importance in Yugoslavia are
essentially the same as those of other countries of
southeastern Europe. Yugoslavia has generally made
more headway toward control of infectious diseases
than other Balkan countries and about the same
progress as those of northern Europe. The country is
still confronted with some animal disease conditions
which are also public health problems. A majorsource
of concern is infected milk from tubercular cows.
Among the most prevalent anima( diseases are
anthrax, Q fever, and rabies. Occasional outbreaks of
foot -and -mouth disease usually are quickly localized
and brought under control.
The principal diseases in Yugoslavia which may be
transmitted front animals to man are rabies, anthrax,
and brucellosis. Control measures, such as vaccination
and elimination of stray dogs and other animals, are
applied with varying degrees of success.
Harmful insects and plants abound. Of tl various
species of mosquitoes, 35 have been identified and are
particularly prevalent in the marshlands and
lowlands. Extensive use of insecticides has greatly
34
reduced the mosquite population and the incidence of
diseases spread by them. Other harmful insects and
animals include flies, fleas, lice, ticks, mites, reptiles,
and rats. Possibly as many as 3,000 species of
medicinal and toxic botanical drugs and plants are
found in the country.
2. Sanitation
Yugos' -tvia has made some progress in improving
sanitatit,.a and food handling methods, at least on the
level of legislation; enforcement has been vested in the
Federal Council for Health and Social Policy since
1967. In practice, however, neither personnel nor
equipment is adequate to insure sanitary food
distribution. In large urban centers U.S. -style
supermarkets have adequate refrigeration, but in rural
areas hygienically poor conditions are the rule.
Laundry facilities and even water are sometimes
lacking, as well as adequate storage space for food.
Some cattle or hogs are slaughtered by the peasants
and the meat is placed on the market with little or no
veterinary supervision or control. Milk is often
delivered to households in bulk and is frequently
unsafe for drinking uniess boiled.
A central sewerage system is available in-only about
a dozen urban centers, and even in cities where a
system is operational not all buildings are tied in.
Principal cities depend largely or entirely upon surface
drainage for the disposal of liquid wastes. In coastal
towns sewage is sometimes discharged into the sea.
Throughout most of the country, garbage is dumped
into pits or piled up at distances sometimes less than
one -third of a mile from human habitation. Most of
the dumped garbage remains uncovered. Local and
national programs for improving waste disposal have
progressed slowly because of the cost and public
apathy.
Lack of sewerage facilities remains a nationwide
problem. In Belgrade, as many as half the city's
buildings are not hooked in to the sewerage system. In
the south, particularly in rural areas, the general lack
of proper sanitation facilities, especially waste
disposal, increases the likelihood of serious disease in
exactly those areas least able to bear the cost of
prevention and cure.
Water supplies generally are adequate, but sources
vary from rr nt to region. Most of the population
satisi its water requirements from wells, springs, and
centr,J mater systems, although some use ponds,
sl nvams, and cisterns. Piped water is available to about
One- fourth of the country's population, but only about
one -fifth is served by piped distribution systems. The
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100032 -0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100032 -0
potability of water varies greatly, as do the standards
and efficiency of water treatment plants in the major
cities.
In many areas methods of storage and distribution
of water are primitive and highly unhygienic,
although water control regulations comr*� to
those in the United States have been on the statute
books for years. More often than not the water comes
from contaminated sources. In rural areas night soil is
employed as fertilizer and pollution is common.
Limestone springs and wells are often contaminated
by polluted surface water.
Legislation on the control and curbing of various
forms of air pollution is on the books, but appears to
be largely ineffective. The failure of the authorities to
monitor flagrant industrial violators, the vague
provisions of the law itself, lack of funds and staffing
to assure prosecution, and public apathy are all factors
vitiating pollution control. All industrial centers have
major air pollution problems; as of mid -1972,
foreigners suffering from respiratory conditions were
being advised not to reside in Belgrade.
In the event of a national disaster, Yugoslav civil
defense authorities have at their disposal all personnel
and pertinent installations of the federal and republic
health services. In addition, the services of the nation's
veterinary facilities, the army, the security police, the
Yugoslav Red Cross, and the nation's mass
organizations are immediately available.
3. Nutrition
The diet of the population, although slowly
improving, is� outside the urban areas� modest and
for the most part monotonous. The average diet is
adequate in terms of total caloric intake (3,190 calories
per day in 1968), but remains deficient in meat and
dairy products. The unsatisfactory protein content of
the average diet reflects excess dependence on cereals
and high carbohydrate foods. A major problem in
limiting protein intake is the soaring cost of meat.
Large areas of Yugoslavia �the western karst areas
and the barren mountains of southern Serbia �arc
food deficit areas. The populations of these regions
depend largely upon Vojvodina and eastern Croatia to
augment their food supply. While the Yugoslays are
attempting to become self- sufficient in grain
production, periodic droughts and flooding force
purchases of foreign grain. Annual purchases from the
United States under Public Law 480 supplied much of
the deficit until 1966, when Yugoslavia ceased to be
eligible for the program.
Vegetables, such as potatoes, kidney beans, peas,
cabbage, kale, tomatoes, carrots, onions, green
peppers, garlic, and lentils, and cantaloupes and
watermelons are grown, but not always in sufficient
quantity to satisfy the domestic market. Mediter-
ranean crops� olives, grapes, and citrus fruits �arr�
grown along the Adriatic coast.
Pork is the most popular meat among the non
Muslim population, with beef the second most widely
consumed meat. Sheep also constitute an important
source of food among the peasants. Despite
Yugoslavia's long Adriatic coastline, fish occupy only
a minor place in the Yugoslav diet. Poultry is generally
available, and game is abundant in forests and
marshes.
G. Religion (U /OU)
1. Religious influence and the state
Religion has strong roots throughout Yugoslavia.
The Serbian Orthodox Church was for centuries a
rallying point against Turkish rule. The Roman
Catholic Church, particularly under the influence of
Archbishop Strossmayer of Zagreb, was a learling force
in the renaissance of Croatian culture and nationalism
in the 19th century. The Muslim religion became
entrenched in Bosnia and Hercegovina and among the
Albanian minority. In addition to the three main
affiliations Catholic, Orthodox, and Muslim �there
are 30 other religious communities in Yugoslavia. The
geographic distribution of the three dominant
religions is show in Figure 18.
Although the Communist regime openly attempts
to diminish the influence of religion in Yugoslavia, it
nevertheless allows greater religious freedom than
exists in any other Communist country. Some indirect
controls, such as various degrees of dependence on
state subsidies, continue to restrict church activities,
but virulent antireligious propaganda has disappeared
and obstruction of purely religious observances has
ceased.
The atmosphere of relative freedom in which
religious services are conducted and their large
attendance is startling� particularly in Catholic
Croatia and Slovenia. In these two republics, as in
Poland, religion is closely tied to nationalism and
religious rites assume strong nationalistic overtones.
The regime's emphasis on permitting Yugoslavia's
various nationalities a wide latitude of cultural
expression has directly buttressed religious freedom in
Yugoslavia. Because the diverse historical and cultural
traditions that characterize Yugoslavia's many
nationalities are inextricably intertwined with specific
religious influences, it follows that the more permissive
the regime has become toward expressions of national
35
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100032 -0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100032 -0
14� R U S T R"t A. RWalon p
IT. H :U.. N A i
NarsyNaNrisa
aed
46
a Timisoars
p R O M A N I A
kuCsni a d Morwits
0
Pul o nja
poQ N v, Vreoci
o o, valievoe 0
^mo
41- o I 44
aj Patatin anu
Titovo
C�
1 O ulice o
L
I SyVa
i
``I r MONTE GRO
O V
YUGOSLAVIA Dubrov bin tin SOFIA
International boundary BULGARIA.
R -pubic boundary Sh d al A �J�
Autonnmouaarm boundary '9
42
e
C8th011C rvar Tit vVeles
Gradsko v Strumics
Orthodox ebar Prilev.
Durre E MACEDONIA
AIMNIA tA