NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY 32B; SOUTHERN YEMEN (ADEN); GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: NIS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP01-00707R000200100019-5
• Release Decision: RIP
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: October 25, 2016
• Sequence Number: 19
• Content Type: REPORTS

SECRET
?2B /GS
Yemen (Aden)
July 1973
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY
SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100019 -5

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY PUBLICATIONS
The basic unit of the NIS is the General Survey, which is now
published in a bound -by- chapter format so that topics of greater per-
ishability car: be updated on an individual basis. These chapters� Country
Profile, The Society, Government and Politics, The Economy, Military Geog-
raphy, Transportation and Telecommunications, Armed Forces, Science, and
Intelligence and Security, provide the primary NIS coverage. Some chapters,
particularly Science and Intelligence and Security, that are not pertinent to
all countries, are produced selectively. For small countries requiring only
minimal NIS treatment, the General Survey coverage may be bound into
one volume.
Supplementing the General Survey is the NIS Basic Intelligence Fact
book, a ready reference publication that semiannually updates key sta-
tistical data found in the Survey. An unclassified edition of the factbook
omits some details on the economy, the defense forces, and the intelligence
and security organizations.
Although detailed sections on many topics were part of the NIS
Program, production of these sections has been phased out. Those pre-
viously produced will continue to be available as long as the major
portion of the study is considered valid.
A quarterly listing of all active NIS units is published in the Inventory
of Available NIS Publications, which is also bound into the concurrent
classified Factbook. The Inventory lists all NIS units by area name and
number and includes classification and date of issue; it thus facilitates the
ordering of NIS units as well as their filing, cataloging, and utilization.
Initial dissemination, additional copies of NIS units, or separate
chapters of the General Surveys can be obtained directly or through
liaison channels from the Central Intelligence Agency.
The General Survey is prepared for the NIS by the Central Intelligence
Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency under t' eneral direction
of the NIS Committee. It is coordinated, edited, pu. ed, and dissemi-
nated by the Central Intelligence Agency.
WAR \I \G
This document contains information affecting the notional aefense of the United States, within the
meaning of title 18, sections 793 and 794 of the US code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation
of its contents to or receipt by c i unauthorized person is prohibited by low.
Cl ASS IFIED Bl 019541. EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFI-
CATION SCHEDULE OF E. O. 11652 EXEMPTION CATEGORIES
511 0), (2), (3). DECLASSIFIED ONLY ON APPROVAL OF THE
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100019 -5

WARNING
The NIS is National intelligence and may not be re-
leased or shown to representatives of any foreign govern-
ment or international body except by specific authorization
of the Director of Central Intelligence in accordance with
the provisions of National Security Council Intelligence Di-
rective No. 1.
For JIS containing unclassified material, however, the
pc tions so marked may be made available for official pur-
poses to foreign nationals and nongovernment per' ,inel
provided no attribution is made to National Intelligence or
the National Intelligence Survey.
Subsections and graphics are individually classified
according to content. Classification /control designa-
tions are:
(U /OU) Unclassified /For Official Use Only
(C) Confidential
(S) Secret
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100019 -5

This chapter was prepared for the NIS by the
Central Intelligence Agency. Research was sub-
stantially completed by April 1973.
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100019 -5

YEMEN (ADEN)
CONTENTS
This chapter supersedes the political coccrai' it
t he Southern Yemen portion of the Gent ral Survey
on Southern Yemen /bfrmeat and Oman rte..� Sep-
tember 1969.
A. Introduction 1
B. Structure and functioning of the government 2
1. Central government 2
a. Constitution 2
b. Executive bodies 4
c. Legislative branch 4
d. Judicial system 5
2. Regional and local government 5
3. Civil service 6
SECtu r
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100019 -5

Page
C. Political dynamics 6
1. National Front 6
a. History and internal politics 6
b. Membership and organization 12
2. Gather political groups 12
3. Elections 12
A National policies 12
1. Domestic policy 12
2. Foreign policy 13
Page
E. Threats to government stability 15
1. Discontent and dissidence 15
2. Subversion and insurgency 16
F. Maintenance of internal security 18
1. Police 18
2. Intelligence 19
3. Countersubversive and counterinsurgency
measures and capabilities 19
G. Suggestions for further reading 20
Chronology 20
Glossary 21
FIGURES
ii
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100019 -5
Page
Page
Fig. 1
Structure of government chart)
3
Fig. 5
`Ali Nasir Muhammad Hasani photo)
10
Fig. 2
`Abd al- Fattah Ismail photo)
8
Fig. 6
Husayn Uthman Ashal photo)
16
Fig. 3
Salim Rubay`i `Ali photo)
8
Fig. 7
Adeni dissidents (photo')
17
Fig. 4
`Ali `Antar photo)
9
Fig. 8
`Abd al -Qawi Makkawi photo)
18
ii
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100019 -5

Government and Politics
A. Introduction (S)
The People's Democratic Republic of Yemen
u is ruled by a single -party government of
,Marxist orientation. That government, the National
F ront (NF has been in power since tht N.D.I.I'. won
independence in November 1967 after it hitter terrorist
campaign against the British, who had governed the
cite of Aden for over a century and tht� remainder of
what is now P.D.R.I'. territory since the 1930's.
Aden was first captured by the British in 1539, and
tutil 1937 it was ruled as a part of British India.
Thereafter it becanu� a Crown Colony administered
directly by the Colonial Office. 'Ito protect this
foothold in Aden, the British found it necessary to
establish their authority in the hinterland and
gradually concluded treaties of protection with the
local rulers. "these treaties gave the United Kingdom
full responsibility for the� conduct of the local stales'
foreign relations and defense in reture for protectiol
against other powers. Between the I930's and t he early
1950's, British influence \%ith the local rulers increased
with the signing of supplementary treaties by which
the riders agwed to accept British advice in matters of
internal administration; those rulers who did not
accept the advice were deposed. In a treaty of
February 1959 with six states of the Protec�totate of
South Arabia, the British pledged that Aden Colony
and the Protectorate would be made ready for full
independence. Under this same treaty, the six states
joined to form the Federation of South Arabia, which
was formally inaugurated in January 1963. In the end,
Ili states and Aden Colony joined tit( federation.
'Until 1970 the Peop!e's Dernocralic Republic of Yemen
IP.D.R.YJ teas knotcn as the Pceplc'% Democratic Republic of
Southern Yenten. In this General Surce\ chapter the counts sill be
referred to as Yrmen (Aden the government. the P.D. R.Y.: and the
capital cite, Adrn.
British efforts to prepare the� federation for
independence by the target date of 1968 were
ccntfoundcd by the enormous differences in levels o
development between the people in the modern port
of Aden and those in the traditionally oriented
sheikhdoms and sultanates of the Protectorate. An
additional complicating factor was the rising tide of
Arab natinmalisnt. whose advocates canc into open
conflict with both the British rulers and the traditional
chieftains. In the face of rising violence in the cite of
Aden, the British began withdrawing their troops in
the fall of 1967. Federal rule collapsed. and the
British. having announced their int ntiom of dealing
with any indigenous group capable of forming a new
government, subscyucntly negotiated a transfer of
power to the National Liberation Front (NI.F). it
political party which had succeeded in eslablishi.a, its
authority at the expense of the other nationalist
groups.
'I he N I.h. which later charuged its manic to the
National Front (N F), formally took over the
government ()n 30 November 196 It inherited a
country in economic� and political chaos. and it has
done little to improve the situation in its 5 years in
office. Aden's once thriving economy was damaged
severely by the closure of the Suez Canal in Jume 1967,
atul the forced departure of the British later in the
same year compounded the fledgling nations
ec�omoniic� problettts. The cot ntr% has never recovered.
Large numbers of busines and the wealthy fled
the c�ountr% after the NF lakemer for political as well
as economic reasons. and the ecoll has stagnated
Mid rcycrtctl to dependence on suh,istence fanning
despite government pledges to industrialize.
The NF has had sonte(yhat more success in ruling
the political chaos of the prcindependertcr and
iminvdiate poslindependcnce periods �at least as far
as yuieling domestic discontent and active internal
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100019 -5

dissidence is concerned. %lost dissidents h left till.
country. Some have formed arnu-d groups which, with
Saudi Arabian backing, conduct forays into
territorv, their disunity� poor dic�ipline," and Pool
planning, however, have weakened their ability to
threaten seriously the NF government. Internal
discontent also exists, but the NF has successfully
neutralized the most powerful of the discontented,
and the� remainder are too diverse and too weak to
threaten the government.
Within the NF's own ranks, and thus within til
gover the last :5 years have witnessed a
remarkable degree of internal riya'.ry %%hieh has often
virtually paralyzed the� governing apparatus. The
Party has been divided into bitterly opposing factions
since its creation 10 years ago� and centers of power
and party loyalties are in a continual state of flux. One
faction overthrew another in a bloodless coup in 1969.
and the victorious faction itself has since Ix c.olll
irrevocably split into groups of differing regional
backgrounds and ideological outlooks. Although the
southern Yemeni. pro- Peking group Ied It% the
President is currently the more p(merful, its
position is by no meats assured. Indeed. if an% threat
exists to the c�outitmed ride of the present \F'
government. this threat is lxsed wit In diwolitellte�el
nonpart% elements. but b% eletu.nts withitl the part
itself who alone are capable of overturning the faction
in power.
Th(� 1 signed an agreement in 0clober 1972
pledging to work for unit% �to be impletnente d %%itbi11
a year �with the n.iglalxring Yemen oral Hepullic�
(1'.A.R.). The tyo countries ha%. talked above unit%
since each was founded and hay. Ilia cntaine d c olltacts
of one sort or another for %ears: the 11rd.r% are usuali%
open to tr,a%der�, Iran either side�. there is re�gularl%
scheduled air tr,affi� ln�twe�e�n the t%%o capil.11s. ,and
officials of eadl g(nernttt.nl, up to the t%o Pre�siclettts,
nt.e�t laerioalicall%. :%I the s;,nu ti bow.%e�r. ;all
appar�ntl% unbridg.abi. gap .%i %ts IN-1ue�.n the�
MaINist regime of the P. I). R.1 mid II1. mom
nuxl.rate 1. :1.11. gerenoment..its] 1114' Itll�Itf%N tit s of
.%deni dissidents olx� rating from 1ases in the� 1 it
hayv often led to loortler fighting It- 1,%e e n the� regid.ar
forces of till- tuo cmintrie�s 011ollell 111 Ither (c011111n
cants tell) -scab� war �;cad 11111� IxIII we11c11x� the
re --pite from lighting which Ilia. unit ,ten 1 nx n1\
pryides� neither has all% i111ewim, of acccmull4lL/t-
ing to the ide�4let% of I1,. o4he�r '1'1x� P 1) B 1 is j11sf ,Is
holx�ful of in1101%ine its t%lx� of tme"Ill".11t 4111 Ifw
1..%.R ;as the� Latter is olmertlltlwirtt Ilia. \F radic,ds
Trlx� unit% 1% I1111s 1lulike1% to 1( acc.4mltlish111 under
prese�11t .in�11mo anew
B. Structure and functioning of the
government (S)
The governmental structure of the 1'.I).R.l'. (Figure
I) 11w, changed radically in the years since
independence in 1967. T1ie most significant
development occurred in 1970 when, in an effort to
ease domestic discontent and lessen foreign criticism,
the National Front regime adopted a rte%% constitu-
tion. While it creates tilt- impression of a more broadly.
based and repre�setitatiye government, this doc�unu�nt
%:as clearly designed to alloy the National Front to
retain control of the� governmew.
Although the new c�onstituti:ni provides for an
elected. unicameral legislative body �the Neople's
Supremo� Council (PSC) �the members of. the ne%y
co11ncil have been appointed by till- F. and
x�heduled elections have to be held. Tlie other
major org;anizatiorts. the 1 Comic�il and the
Conned of Ministers, also re�ma;n under the-
donlination of till' \F: the chairman of the
Presidential Counc�if is S:din Ruba%'i ':111.= %clue heads
the dominant pro- Peking faction of the� front.
1. (ventral govemment
a. (;onxtitution
'1'11. British prepared ;a pro%isiomal cowtitution prior
to indelx ndencc halt this was ignored I% the \F.
which declared that it Mould go%.rl until a u.%%
ecmtitution Has drawn alp 011 :141 \o%.mher 19;11.
the third :uni%e.s.n of the e.labiklill�e�nt of the
ec11utln. the \F General (;ermmatld promuls;.ate(i its
own etow-tiltltiow %t the .attic time. the ".lathc of the
crunln was chattgeci Ifom the P1411. s R.lnblic of
%clout lenn�n to lit. Ne4pl. s IN -mo'r. +tie R.pu1,lic of
)rtiiru In .all effort I4 iucn�aw 1lttpodaf accept im 111
the 'if-ill eYNNtitllltoft, %%loch Ilael 11a�e�tl w1c.im-d I11 t1,.
pr�lecli11r .ielrwt. 1111' \1' pfoftloll ti pliblic dlse'11%
111 111,1�� Ille�1�lit es throlleh4t11t the e'41nitn ,Ind hl.anke t
viner,aa;e in the pros
The e.n1,61u6on of 14:11 slr.sa�s 1.111( ui lout%
111111\ 01 I1,4' P 1) R 1 .111(1 its nofthenl nelghlNt. I1,.
1 1 It 'i1,. first .irlitIc stales th..t the gt.11 of the
st,lt. is to hone alaell a "hailed e11�11Nlcra11c ltv114�11
11,. 1,,11 .41.41 .alnr nt.16 .I n�%olatwei.lr%
e.11tn1116o11 ttterlanl 1\lw %ral n %oluti40n.e.% rll�%.-
nl1.111 cal It- 4�.1./1,11.11 .1 d.nte41 ra11c. tuaite�d
11 .IS a 1 n�hllllta.U% 11.� 141 ele11N04'f.41ll' ltfal?
1.-1 a ..4 id 1..1 ..1 L. p,�" n1r1M 1rl �Ilutal� e+.14�.111 f aN l�
*-tett and (aheowt Ut,1JMr� I .,t,t%, (,,#.m m� 1.41,1 .1,.
111.11011. L. 4114 11111�. t��r,.0. ..1 Ir.l. the. �n, 1 r.t...l IM. II c� n.
lit, 1.
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100019 -5

LEGISLATIVE EXECUTIVE
JUDICIAL
People's
Supreme
I
Chairman
Supreme
People's
Sharia Ti ibal
Appellate
Council
Court
Law
Court
Presidential
Standing
Council
A
A
Committee
I
0
J
Appellate
Sharia
Council
Courts
Courts
J
of Ministers
I
A
Prime
1
Minister
1
r
People's
I
Ministers
Courts
1
Minister
I
I
I
of Justice
I
1
Peo les
p
Governorates
Appoints
I Council
I A
I
to Governors
-t Elects
I
I
Districts
Supervises
I 1
Commissioners
Approves
I I
I
Centers
P Nominates
I I
Deputy
-a- Appeals
Commissioners
Electorate
Administers and controls
FIGURE 1. Structure of government (UIOU)
unil\. 'I'lie 'ic�inc�ni lx oltle are des(�rihed as united in
it cccnunon sincggle fir- final rc�lic�I' from the causes of
partition and for ll(e restoration of nccrinLll eouditions
for uniting the territorn."
The leftist politi(al orienlalion of the constitutions
drafters is readily exident in its re\olulionar\ \larxist
stile rhetoric. Accwding to the c�omslitnlion, the
politic-al acithorih of the state is to he ezeruiscd h\ the
%%(Aiiie people, and the Basis of the national
detno(�ratie rc%olution is described as the alliance
hehceen the anrki,i Blass, farmers, intellitenlsia,
snstll husinessanen. soldiers, \\omen. and stu(lencs.
111e histori( %d role of the \\orkillt class is descrihecl in
IrcdiIion ;tl \I.1r \ist teens �i.e.. ;cs nliI In lelc
(�otnposing the leaclershil) Class of the countr\. 'I�he
organization and adminktration of the aulhorit\ of
the state are said to hc� goxenu�d h\ the� principle of
den()c ratic c(�ntralkin. What this nceans essentiails is
that the NV dnlllinates and controls all political life.
and the front, in fact. is clec�lared to be the nu:uis hx
%chic�h the den(ccc�ratic forces of the people express
theins(I\ es.
The c�onstit lit ion eta% he amended at the i Ili tiali\e
I f the Presidential (:()until, the :ounciI of \Iinisters,
or one� -third of the mcnil>ers ref the national legislature
(the People s tinprenu� (:ounc�ill. Ratification of it it
I roposed changes in the Basic laic of the land requires
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100019 -5

tit( approval of two- thirds of the representatives in tits
national Icgislatum.
b. Exccutirc bodies
The most important bod% in the I'.I).R.1'. S plural
executive is the� Presidential (Council, which consists of
it chairman and from two to six members. The
Presidential Conned has had as nuury us four members
in addition to the chairman, but as of November 19 2
it had only three. Salim fiubav'i 'Ali has oven
chairman of the council si'tce its inception, and *Abd
11- Fattah isnna'd has been a utcnnber for the same
period. 'Ali Nasir \luhtunnnad Ilasani bccunu� hints
Minister and a member of thccounc�il in August 197 1.
The chairman and members of tit( Presidential
Council are elected by the Peoples Supreme Cottnc�il
tl'SC) front among its ntcrnbcrs: a nevy Presidential
Council is also selected whenever the I'SC holds new
elections. The chairman of the Presidential Council
acts as the official representative of the state it its
foreign relations. The Presidential (Council hears
reports from the Prime Minister on the conduct of the
country affairs and advises the I'SC on domestic and
foreign polic�\. The constitution provides that if the
chairman and members of the Presidential Council
desire to resign, the�\ uncut submit their resignations to
the PSC: two- thirds of the members of the PSC must
rote inn favor of accepting the resignations before they
can be declared valid. Once the resignation of the
chairman of the Presidential Council has been
tc�cepted, the other members of tit( cotnc�il ttnst also
resign.
The chief administrative body of the state is the
Council of Ministers, consisting of the Prime Minister
and his ministers. As defined by the� 19 0 constitution.
the chief task of the council is to implement the
general polic'ie's laid clown by the legislative arm, the
Peoples Supreme Council. The Collnc�if of Ministers is
empowered to propose the� broad lines of domestic and
foreign police and to submit draft legislation to the
PSC. The council approves international treaties and
agreements before they are presented to the PSC or lbc
Presidential Council.
licsolutim, of the Council of Vlinistcrs are binding
on leading government officials, including governors.
commissioners, and depute commissioners. It the
event the Prim Minister resigns, he tnttst Submit his
resignation to the Presidential Council, which inn turn
forwards the resignation along with the its views to the
PSC. 'I'll(- 1'M, may accept the resignation or withdraw
its confidence from the ['rime `Minister by a two thirds
vote. A member of the Council of Ministers moist
submit his resignation to the� Prime Ministeratnd to the
I'S(: which nnty accept it with it majority vole. Should
the Prints Minister resign, tiv Council of Ministers is
also required to resign. The terns of the ['rime Minister
aunt the Council of Niiuiste;s expires upon the clectio n
Of a new IN
c. l.cgistatirc branch
TlW unicameral Peopic's Supreme Council (PSC),
created by the November 190 constitution, is the
legislative branch of the 1'.I).li.Y. Governmeol. 'I'll(-
c�ot,stitulion describes the council as the "supra rate
instnnm�nt of tit( a(tthorily of the slate. 'I'll(. I'SC
elects the chairman and numbers of the ['residential
Councd and a1proves the Prints Minister and Council
of Ministers selected by the Presidential Council.
The I'SC decides the foreign and domestic polio' of
the state and "dcfineS the principles of the work" of
the ['residential Council and the (Council of Ministers.
It atpproves the Mutual budget Submitted by the
Council of Ministers and approvos international
political and economic treaties. A state of defense
(Similar to martial law) can be declared only with the
approval of the 1'SC, which also has the responsibility
of defining the extraordinary powers to be exercised by
the I'rosidential Council and the (Council of Ministers
during it stale of defense.
According to the constitution. the 101 members of
the PSC are directly elected fora tout of no more than
i years. TIT( PS(C may pass a no- confidence motion
against the� Prime Minister, wbo trust then resign.
According to the constitution, '.he I'SC shall be
dissolved and ne\% elections held. if the no- confidence
motion is passed on more than two occasions during
the terns of the I'S(:.
The vyork of the I'S(C, as specified in the
c�onslitttion. will be directed by a Standing
Committee vyhich the PSC will elect from it', o,vyn
members. A Constitution and Legal Cotnn;ittee'
examines proposed legislation and submits recopy
nnendations to the I'SC. Laws tray be enacted by the
Presidential Council but must be submitted to the PSC
for approval. If the PSC fails to approve stich laws by a
majority, they are considered revoked. Draft
legislation tray be presented by both the Presidential
otncil and the Council of Ministers to lit( PSC
vvhic�h refers it to an appropriate committee for
recommendations. Members of the PSC may propose
legislation with the� approval of one -third of that body.
Puilic� organizations may subunit proposals regarding
legislation to tit(- Standing Committee of the PSC.
It March 1971, the General Command of the
National Front chose 86 of the 101 members of the
council, while the right to choose the remaining 15
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100019 -5

members was reserved for the trade unions. I'eas,.!it
orgai izalions w(.rc assigned 12 represcntalkes from
the 86 chost'n by the NF, the security organizations
and the armed forces 10, women's organizations 5,
and professional organizations ti rclucsenlaliyes.
Dvspite the fact that it nunber of muvmbers of the
council are not inenbers of the National Front, the
diffuse membership of dic I'SC hats noele it easy for
the front to maintain control. T first PSC, which
was selected by the NF ostensibly as .ill interim
measure, was to be a provisional legislature with tit(.
primary responsibility for drafting the laws and
regulations governing general elections which Wert' to
be held in October 1971. 'I'll(- elections were never
held, however, and the original I'SC was still in office
as of April 197-3. 'I'll(- elections apparently were
postponed bveause of disagreements in the NF over
the number of seats to be allocated to ill(. Ba'th and
the Communist parties. An elected I'SC could product'
an organized political opposition within the
governmental structure.
d. Judicial system
Prior to indt'pendence, the judicial systein was
divided h(.tween secular courts set up b the British
and th(. Nluslint religious Sharia courts. which
handled matters of personal status such as marriage.
divorce, and inheritance. I the fortner uufederated
prote-ctorate states, local customary law and tribal law
were also applied. In January 1968, a Suprem(. State
Security Court was established to try high -level
political offenders. and a number of former rulers and
government officials were scntencvd.
The constitution of 1970 provides for the creation of
it high court. and press reports in early 1972 revealed
that a Supreme I)eople *s Court in Aden was
reviewing cases. It is not clear whether th(. Supreme
Peoples Court has original jurisdiction in any cases. A
number of Pcople*s Courts have b een established by
the Prime Minister, and an official resolution issued by
the chairman of the Presidential Council ill early I i72
makes reference to appellate courts. It is not clear
what types of cases are reviewed by the appellate
courts or whether these courts have original
jurisdiction over any cast-s. Press reports do reveal that
sentences passed by Peoples Courts are at least in
some instances forwarded directly to the chairman of
the Presidential Council for review. The constitution
also provides for the establishment of special courts,
such as military courts and arbitration tribunals, hilt it
is not known if any were in existence as of November
1972.
a
9n addition to a civil court system, a Sharia courl
systen coutiuut'd to (.\isl in 1972 despite �the absence
Of any provision for it in the constitution. 1'r(-s::; reports
in early 1972 also revcaled the existence of a Sharia
Appellate Court. lit addition, tribal and local
customary law are almost certainly still applied ill
sectors outside heavily populated areas.
The 1970 constitetio ll states that the slat(. shall
gradnall\ issue democratic civil, labor, family, and
criminal laws, and that in cases where no laws have
been enacted judges shall b.- grided b the spirit of the
constitution. Laws and prcccclures enacted before
independence remain in effect unless they conflict
with the principles of the c �1stitution. 'Trials are to be
public except where speci ii circumtstances rey dre
otherwise or where state security or public morals are
threatened.
2. Regional and local government
lit the structure of the British Protcetorate of South
Arabia, mgional divisions conformed more or less to
the trio -i divisions of the country, thus reinforcing the
hegenun\ of local sheikhs and sultans. hollowing
indepcndence, the new government, in an effort to
weaken these divisions, divided the state into the
following six governorates:
I. 'rhe area of the former Crown Colony of Aden
and the islands of Perim, Kamaran, and Socotra. The
Khuryan Muryan islands,' which were ceded by the
United Kingdom to Muscat and Oman in November
1967, but whose cession is not recognized by Yemen
(Aden), are nominally included in this governorate.
Kamaran Island was occupied by Y.A.R. forces in
October 1972.)
II. Lahij, Subayhi, Ilaushabi, 'Alawi, Radfan, Shti ayb
Ilalhnayn, and Maflahi.
III. Upper and Lower Yaf t'i, Fadhli, 'Audhali,
Dathina, and Lower 'Aulagi.
W. Bayhanal Qisab, Upper 'Aulagi, Al Wahidi, and
the northwest IIadhrunaut.
V. Iladhrunaut, excluding the northwestern areas.
VI. Al Mahrah.
In early 1972, certain small areas of the 'Third
Governorate were m adc parts of the Second and
Fourtl Governorate, and a small area of the Fifth was
nade part of die Sixth Governorate. Each governorate
is headed by a governor and is subdivided into districts
headed by commissioners. Districts are further
subdivided into centers or posts headed by deputy
commissioners. Theoretically these officials admini- ter
their governorates and districts directly, under the
`For diacritics on place names see the list of names on th(� apron
of the Sununarc Map and the map itself.
7
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100019 -5

..thorn\ the\ derive front thl� central gine�rmne�nt. io
actual fact, the regional alid hwal XF t -rl matins.
wIsich parallel the more formal govermlivitt
organizations, exercise more real authorit-r thrn their
governmental counterparts.
The constitution of 1970 pro%ides for the
estallishnu�nt of I0ca1 P4-0ple s Councils as 10VA
legislative bodies to "administer and control" local
administration. These councils are tit Ili- elected in
free, general. ellual, and direct election%. Xccirding to
the constitution, the cent rai go%crnn4-nt shall
endea\or graduall% to transfer the authorit\ of the
state for local administration to the Peoples Councils.
As of April 1973. it \vas nuclear \thether am loc
Peoples Councils had vet been established.
:3. Civil sen'ice
{'hs, shortage of trained and competent p :�rsonucl
constitutes a serious problem for the 1'.1).li.l Prior to
1967, ninny of the important adnsinistrlti ov posts \\ere
held b\ British nationals. With their departure- tic
lost all personnel \vho had an\thing inure
than the most m(lirnentary kno\vledge of ku\ernnt�nt
operations. In late 1972. the t (nernment still did not
exhibit a clean police \\itlo regard to the civil service
and remained dvsperatv1% short of top inatiagenivni
and technical personnel. \v�% civil servicv retijkitious
to replace those existing prior to independence had not
vet been dr.tfled.
The Establish^� nts I)epartnu�rlt. \\iich is (liret�tl\
responsible to tore Pritne Minister, is the nain
instrument by \which the govenns,nt exercises control
over the civil service. This department promulgates
the rules and regulations of the ck it service and carries
out routine personnel di lies such as rm-mitnteut.
promotion� diwipline. retirement, and maintenance of
records. A Public Service Commission, conpo'wd of
five members who belong to either the Council of
Ministers or the NF General Command. det�ides on
appointments to public office, promotion". firings.
and other niatters affecting; the ck it wrvicv.
C. Political dynamics (S)
The recent history of politics in Ow I'.1).R.l. is one
of extreme leftist, out -part domination highlighted
b\ continual intenecine strife and a u verel\ strained
financial and economic situation. The \atimial Front.
a Marxist oriented part \which has ruled the cotititr\
since independc ,c4- in \ovein1wr 19117, is virtually the
only political past% in the counts; although other
parties exist, they are small, few in nulnher, and able
to operate only al the sufferance of the \F. Like that
6
of luting parties in Aomntntsist tvootstrics_ M trokitlro
parallt�1% that of tlle>;t\t -Ink tit.: vol it Itmvr t +1
the .14ttiinistrttiots. ahervlvoit4itutiorsal ir11\isit +trloot
the est :dlishna nt t1 loc:d >;o\cnlnk ut tnk'1n7t� ha\c
Clot \t�t IN�t�11 carried tolt. It N'al Not
o l'h.11ll�r trt� tilt�
go%t�fllillg INNlies
'1 iv \F's rule has Clot lov"It ,111 t�.1s\ 10104� TIN- p.Irt\
has IN -�11 Plagiled silt it� (oursaling its I4A:i b\ st�rious
irstern.d di\ isions t split orit;in.IH\ do :chgN -f
IN�t v'11 a radical mod a tiooth factimi ri- oilt tit
the o\erthroa o.f oho� ritlftlt ttaNleratt h\ the p.trt\
radical %%itit its 1%4. ThiI Uas 111114 w4 v1 ,dnN +st
inuree- Iiatt�1\ In :e further split .itiootiv floc codic.ds th.it
hies de%elop -1 t't \t�r Ilic past lo'\\ \ears into a Iittef
apparo�ntl\ irretvmcil.lblc break :dolt. imotl1 rctio11.d
old idcolot,ical lins,s %midst this illtcrisal bickcriut
the part\ has had loo t- tilviod \\Ilil a st' \t�rt� ccotttnat
crisis. a degrm of lotpular divvtttetlt not stiffit-wilt tit
threaten t +\cnunctlt st.slti!it\ but etv,it cttootith tot
lallsl� tlagtlog 1ntl11'tlls tit 0 fe1`!ttN' IN-a-t b' I.Ittt't
\\orries. atul a tvontinuius; loordc� \\af \\ith dissidetlts
\1111 fid the P 1) It 1 after tilt. \F t.lktvo\er.estd It.t\e
silt-� launched frt�llucut incursions irsto 1' I) It 1
tcrritor\ from fa.4-� in S ttxli 1f.I1ii.t .tnd tfle 1% B
De all thew problem,_ tic chief tlir4-.Al too Ilst�
regime-%. st�eiint\ cmiw frottll amotit tic *atks of lilt�
\I' ilscll. \1� fartC 1111111th' lilt' part\ -ills slttolnt
4-11touth to mt-s the Lo\crntnt -W. hilt list- part\ is
so di\idtil int4-nc111\ th.�t a coup 11r still] lar lNt\\ct
n110\4- b\ 11114 faction aValllsl the facli11n currcull\ in
homer Is a distillct lNssillilit\.
1. National front
a. !/ixhtry and internal juditiex
'I'll(- \F \\as Bounded its 196: under (i4- rl.mic
National Front for the hloo- ration of the )tviipietl
14-11ecni Stuth AL b\ 4).1111.(11 al Sia'bi. th(-
I'.1).11 .l.'s first t'resi(leW until Ills o%crthrim b\ a ri\al
factiot of the \I.F in jmic 1464 Droll 1114- mid -14111 s
Instil lots IY- Alorvarl\ 1461. Ski'bi :raffili.stl�tl ills
the South %rabiall Ivagis4- (511.. all arltivolonial.
tsationalist ort,aniialion \\host� principal ails \\as to
acliiv%v ind4-pe ndrncc for South %rabic After
yuarr4-ling \\itIt the 511. leadership. Sha'bi brok4-
a\ \a\ Auld formed his 11\\11 group. the \1.1=. hick he
described as the .lirab sooith hrun�h of the Is rab
Nationalist Minvillcnt 11. The \I. \\hich had
regional organizations in a nun11N�r of Arab countries.
\\as an outgrt\\th of a student org :ani /ation foulltled
at the American Uiii\ersit\ of Wirut in the late 1916%
This group preache -I Arab unit\ and rv%viiCc against
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP0l- 00707R000200100019 -5

I
Israel- Ile NIT -ANM tie nit, broke ti in I(XiS), and the
\\I itself is lion \irt uall\ defunct.
After the (stahlishnlrnt of the l vinen Arab Republic
in ti"- Ptemlc�r IS) 2 and th, arrival of Egyptian forces
in that ctiuntn to aid the regime of l'..%.R. I' resident
3J11al, Shit bi .end his folloners \v(-lit to lbe Y.A.R. to
wek triini!:g and other assistance in ousting the British
front Solid. Arabi:(. The LF Fecarne the chosen
inslnurle :t of Eg\ptian intelligence against the
British, and until late 1 Egyptian intelligence
officers in the I A.R. undertook full re%pi msiIlility for
the pl anning, dire�ctimi, training, laid arming of the
MY. With this aid, the \I,h' developer] into an
orgarniration capable of striking Iota at Soutb :Arabian
%rill\ Posts in the outlying states of the Federation of
Somth Arabia .end at individual securit\ 1wr�onnel in
Aden.
Achem the rival Front for the Liberation of
Okrulied S(mth Admen (FLOSY) \cats formed in
Januan 1%ti throll0l the aumalganlatiorn of it number
of nationalist grimps, including part of the I.F,
Epptiati stiplitirt for Sha'bi*s \1,1' ended. Cairo's
s111IMrt for HAM' al 4 4Nrl e nde& ho\veyer. after the
June IS)ti, Arab- 11%ral -Ii mar and the Egyptian
.%ithdrrn:d from the 1. %.R. As it result, the \!,1
4�iz(�cl the initnati\e in the terrorist \%ar against the
British. It nits :resisted in its campaign by the fact that
it fill,] more \rnpathizers in the arm\ and among the
tril(�s of the I'mtectorete than did FLOSY and \vas
regarded b\ the British, because of the severance of its
ties pith Eg\ pl. as the lesser (if the tvm evils. When the
British forces IN�gan t: nithdra\\ from the Protectorate
states in August 1 the \I .F look Dyer %%itbout am
olpesiti(n from the trill\. "I'be aria\ tried to mediate
IN -t"ven the \IY and FIA)SY. It( riyaln had
degenerated into virt ual %%itr it re. font ben t ese�
efforts failed. Ib.� arm\ declared itself for the \IJF.
:After establishing an \LF dominated �mcmi n�nt
folioning indele�ndence in \member 196 the \I,F
cluickl\ 4tuared off into rival moderate and radical
laet ion s The former \%i, led b\ Qahttu al- Sha'bi,
nh, had been appointed President of the ne\v I'eople's
Repubbe of South tern n.:uu] he his cousin F'aysal al
Sha'bi, the Prince Minister and number hvo man ion
1 h \I,F. This faction Was more cemcerned about the
immediate problems of establishing it viable
government and salvaging the ece,nonly than about
carr\ing out the part% s longer term socialist, anti
im1wrialist objectives, a, ,IwIled out in the I
charter. The more leftist, doctrinaire faction, con the
other hand. a({\ocated it more rapid advance toward
the establishment of it Marxist, socialist state. B\'
\ariou, tactics, ,ucb its using the press to propagate its
idea, and arousing public opinion over the 1968 trials
of persons \\ho had pla\e(I prominent roles in the
government during the period of British control, lb(�
leftist faction Was able to insinuate itself increasingly
into the governing apparattens.
The conflict bet\vecu the two factions earn� to a
bead at the Nil' congress ill A�z. "Lanjabar in March
1965. NI(derattes \von most of tht� scats on it -11-
member N LF General Command elected at the
congress, but the c�oni nuuiclue issued at its
termination indicated it police shift to the left and it
victor% for the radicals. Among other things, tile
c�om mi niy ie recommended at purge of the armed
forces, virtiutlly the only force for conservatism ill the
c�ountr\, and the aMminlincnt of political instructors
in all militim units. The annv reacted, ill what
appeared initially to be it coup attempt, b arresting a
number of the N I.F leftists. A compromise \yats
vventwilly \%orked out by which the grim anti the
NI,F agreed not to med(Ile in each others internal
affairs, but basic disagreetnee.t remained over the
policies adopted al the Az 'Laujatbar congress.
.1 numlbcrof the� radical NLF leaders participated in
abortive tribal uprisings in Jule and :August 11)68, and,
as it result of this and of their increasing dissatisfac,mll
\%ith the leadership of the Sha'bis and the influellc�e c;f
the arm\, mtactty went into exile, particularly to the
1.A.R. Their cooperation was regarded by the
nnoderate Shat' bi faction as essential to N f JF cohesion,
howv\er. and in October 1968 the government
declared it general amnest\ for all exiled N LF leaders
to which it large number responded. Further shills
occurred in the respective yiewpoitits and policies of
both the moderate and the radical factions in
succeeding months; h\ nnid -1969 the moderates had
taken on it more leftist coloration, while the� rand'. s
had come to recognize the practical problems
confronting any attempt to innplenu�mt socialist
doctrines at the P.I.Ii.l'. s stage of de\'ciopntcmt.
'these (�hinges in attitude were not enough to permit it
reconciliation. how ever. and the strain was further
aggravated by the increasing tendency of the Sha'bi
cousins to make police decisions without prior
consultation \yitilin the N LF. With the return of tit(-
radical exiles after the governinenCs amnesh, the
leftist faction by June 1969 constituted a majority of
Ill(- NI,F General Command members actually in
:Aden. Tbvy were thus able to overtbrov the Slidbis in
it coup on 22 J
The� coup \vas it bloodless one. and the Sha�bis and
many other members of their faction, although taken
into custody, \\etc able to maintain contact with
elements, particularly in the� army, who were
H
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100019 -5

sNnIput let ic to therm. ':1hd II1 alt;th Istna'iI (Figure
2). it le iderc,f the radical fact it II and the nut%iIIg force
behind the coup. moved eluicki\ lc, consolid.itc hi
position. Ile sealed off N I.I headcltmrlers to all but
those members of the NLF Cenend C nnmand w1w
were persouall\ lo\al to hint� appn,xinmtek 20(4 the
original II tnen, hers �and %%ithin a few da\s of the
coup, he had been appointed to the n( post of NI,I
secretary general. ;Although Salina I{ubak'i' :11i (Figure
3), as :hairnwn of the it(-\% fixe In:ut (later mcluccd to
three men) Presidential (:ouncil, hel(I the highest
government Imsilion. Isntui'il seas the cminln's most
poccerful Figure b\ virtue of his position as part\
sec�retar\ general: Isnlu'il a:ts a nn�mber of the
Presidential Council but held no other Formal
government position.
Isnt;t'ii reluins the Dust ,,f part\ secret:try general,
and *Ali remains the Presidential Council chairimin�
indeed, trust Irtrl\ and goveriunent posts remain
unchanged �hut a series of hitter internal Imrt\
disputes Mid conslantlY shifting hwidt:es have resulted
in It marked r(wersal of the poker positions of the t\%o
men. 'Ali is at present the dominant figure, Athoiigll
his Position is b uo means sec�urc� his altellipls in tfnc
List year to tindertnine IsIlliCiFs pc,wer hake left the
secret;u general in it %%eakened but not tolull\
po%%'erlcss position.
FIGURE 2. NF Secretary General
'Abd al -Fattah Ismail (C)
8
The ':11i Isnia'il pu\cer slnigglc (Ic'clopecl only
slocl. :11i. it former terrorist leader during
preindcpendenc�e elms. W'Is, it virtual ttonentit\ at the
time of :tad inunediatel\ after the c�o(tp: he cnjokc(l
liinited influence in the go%erunenl and the party and
apparently had little interest in ac�cluiring more pincer.
:1!thougfi his outlook \%Its generally more n -odenite
than Isnuc'il's, for the most pitrt he remained neiand
in the se end internal disputes ahic�h plagued Ismut'il
almost front the start.
Despite Ismu'il's rapid nu,\es to c�ousolid ite his
position and eliminate the influence of the Sha'his. the
part} soon broke (1()\% it into l\co fuc�tions: it pre,- Ismail
radical group and i t group of "pragnuttisls" led b\
Prime Minister Midmi maul ':11i Ilit\lhattt. \clto look
It generally more moderate approach to "(Ming the
c�ountr\'s problems aid \cere inure cmwilialor\ to\card
the Sha'bi faction. The urnn\, still a c�onscrvatke force
and tuduippy ower the soup .1gilinst the Sha'bis. %cas
mmneuvering ;ig;tinst the nesc p;irt\ and goweninu�nt
leader. In addition. the c(mtitry 's continuing finunciul
difficulties farther threatened the ne\c estahlishinemt.
In an attempt to c�omibat these problems. the part
begun negotiations in August 1969 scith Fassal al
Sha'bi in an effort to bring the misted moderate group
back into the governnent and part\. The negoli,itions
broke doyen. however, over Sha'bi's denui nd that
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100019 -5
FIGURE 3. President Salim Rubay'i 'Ali (U /OU)

Isn la il appwotnit-nl a \LF tr'n1.In VtI"T,11 IN
auuull(A. slla'bi. \.ho \\a undt-r ..t flit. 11111+. Iwo t
ahl4� to 111A4. (YIfitact it 11 IN /11fic.11 .11111 talilt.,fn
c�roiTric,- aI)par -tit I% Iit Ili %,,I I alt 111,' .Irrn\ 'A 4
prepared to Ino\c akairl�t I i1 vlli441 frro!afrl\
(�4 III I r11)11ttA t1. III :JII11l'fl't Il'1' tit ,1 ti.Pf(1 141fQ.1111HIL'
p41 111E 0111:! tl, IIIt 1'f- (;/lrjit %01141 of 1104'
coup nunor, arid, u flit- public wvii it\ to v,
\\hi('ll \\crt- 1, \:d 141 lulu ,Irrt_*t�11 .Ilnl4 IIitt *4t l., fit
.uplwlrtvr% ill late .lolIC11,t 0111111;11 111.141\ of tl� v
\rcre relt-a,cd \\ilhin a ft-\\ (L/\ 11\ 1'rt�.id4 %I,�
\\hl. apparcntl la\41rcd a nou' con(�iliator\ ,Ippro.l(41
tv%%ard tiha�hi Illt tlw)k 1141 I_1rt in am :Plitt I
plotting� I,nla'il prompt act it t- litilin :fto -(I 1
in,rncdiate threat to hi, Iwl
A :4'invt re avid d .IItwtlilt lnt �ilf if 111
'Antar (I- i4rlrc I a l)rincr aitti- Rriti,ll (r,nun :14ldo
leader and apro- I radical, a, artn\ (rtrllnc14141t-r
in M -ceinb �r I!)f)4 1lrtlier 1rc114t111vil"d
po\ition- undercutlilig fill inHucncc 411 flit "IraL
nlati.t\" and 0l the arnl\ (vitim r\ ati\t�, %u
n41r, onizalicln in tilt- aint- month (duritic \hich lilt
cam
FIGURE 4. Army Commander 'Ali 'Antar (U /OU)
1 .trf\ IL, rJ0- 'A t te./11 rt too 01041ft.tl I Poll# It/fnl./Il\
\fl1 ill. *41./ too 'l1 I .,I 110ty �40111 ".04 r. Ir.+r /f
fill ;1.11t\ ..10-1 F�I'L ���l tI'l 1 4 10t I /4rU41itr t4
1It/ p.lrt\ (a I N 1. :I I .,fliffs., old ,016111t< to., 111 rill. f-
lit 1104' ..dr'ill's) .t it 1111- rgtfflialt, I,.1� 1 f14�
Itlrlr\o' f11111tr 1.+11\ dl it/, P Ili It 1
I lit., d /l.a\ Id 40114 1,111, /tr/11 110140 f 11.1x. r
1At-r4, rl(If11l.1.r1 In \I.14441 1 ,lit r (till. >N
flit "1) h 1 %ftrl\ 41141 11111414 41 111111, 14.nr- 'Al t
arr 0' for 41.111 +11411\ ill .111 .1111 -r,rl *4.4,9414
1411.1 141 11101r'.114� trll /al IIIK1 .It'll r, ./f.
di .1 .1 Ir�t�11ldc 140 .111 .11111% 41911p N I'l it" 1 1114
/r too[ l 1 4 f a.I roit fir 1111.IS:it 'lrl it pfo\141,r1 1.144.1 4!
pro 11.1 (1(4rQ111L II14' :11111\ ,a ill tr ilrll\
/tt 11 1NT'f 4111114 'lit II ,it". It, 1N,i, I t,'\4�.el4ri, 11'l
4-14,nt 141 1114. 11. 1 11 .1- r11nn\ oI fb-,-
afrl� 1 1p1wtrtrn,tt Pr111N \111.1 II..\111,1111
hi 411\ lion \..r liltl'1i .1 it t. 1.111 too t. /1�t- .to
reci4t14.d. id .14141114,011 to 14111018prit .11 .1\4-f14.r0- I 11
.1 114 14 141111141 IIN III 111 flf1M 1 K14-f
.11114,411'. 11'1111" IN �1x .1 114. L nil rlt
a 141111 41 11w Pro .11141 111"tl. Iwm,'1 .11 ,v .11�! 1 404 th
11, \.�11 4.1 tin [%.off\ 1,14 f..rl 11\ It" Z.qv I.1 I a., v I
.Ind llai, t1,(tn allot till-it rl �Iwrfn4 144Irtla 111 moll
�vllf114,fil �411l wtrl4,r \\141t-ut .4l MitillL 4tltt-dlA p.111\
clt-cll41tl 111 \Iltil 1470 fl it 1,.'.41 Itt./rli 11
(vrlllllllfl t- t11.It1\ Itl \\1141,1 tIN till" n \(.'f4' 4.1t/r1
lAcr tit ,t pit 4111 Ili/' I',v11lt %,,,or. PIN'
:oun4,1) 111t- c41tl 4 1.1141.111.4 1 t4-tl
Plod\ t-\l.nln.11l\ uri:.1111i4�41 Ill 1111d 14-1 hoed
nunllw'n of 11,4\111.1441 ii1gwtrtcr .141d 1t111'r p.ltt\
rncnllw r of lone! 0.111(hili, lo 014.11 ..0 1.1 pro- I 11
iwrfhcrticr of I41 IIIIktN4N11 194'114' \4- /t Iu Iwo. t4rtl 401
I 11.
'I'11c it11.11ion d4,tt-rior.Pll.d filrilluf \\Iwo I 14-11
flit- comitr\ on ,4 nl4,dical \i 1,1X14�(,1\4 14,f iii4sti'11
in mid- 14711. 1'01 to it oa it 414 v, \\11141111 L11141.1nct
Irt)m kvia fill. \1 Ilil.f.lrcIl% 41ttll 14 141 1111l. /tlal
N1 1I :II1111111;, caull Illi�111Iw'1 (111r hi 41\\ II IM't
111tcrt-,f,, :inn It-4,.1411t- ,o f :P4,tl41t1 r11141t 111.11 I fft-4-11\4-
llecki(millak111e I)r41 \4,d .i iwar 1111Iwt \lit 4#Ill\
(lid flit- 11a\tli.14ll lacti4ln ,ittrillpt 14+ ad\.v14v 11
Iw) Init Pilot- \\1,n� m(licahon if .P (1,'\t-1,1011C
pu\\t-r ,tru14+;lc \\ithin Ivna'il, 0\\11 Lit I 11
failed to rca�t-rt lik atidwril\ \\11cn 111, r0(1tm-d tit
.11111t- 1970. and for tilt- nc\t c\t-r.il 1714 lit It 111
If miti4111 reiiiiiiln'd chaofic,
until late 19 1. I'r4,,idt-nf 1Ii (vtntin :1411 f l
nlainlain all --litiall\ nt-t 'r :11 tan(v. ,ippar4 iak
inakiim no ell(lrl either to vidimict Ili o\\ rl Iwt or
1() kalicc flit- intcrc,t, of mimic ckt. In k�tol"�r.
1o\\t-\cr. writ of land rch)rm rnca,nrc iti0itided II\
knia'il rc,ullt-d in Hic cizurl if hii(1 iron ,1 Lrtlup of
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100019 -5
t

VIN �tlM 4 *+RAtl T MO -A� Rq tln�I rn9 nntm 9nn 1 1114 4 44
I of alai ail ..rna.f 11.,4 ford-Lo- alit 111 tl14 1 1#4rd
/w \rrw+rnit
lot ta.,r 1 tin ta4t ZnN11/ t tot 4111
.i\tha:r ad re 11114-41 If, 1104 41.,�h fw fd.f. lfa' .,rill\
rlltt nt�f3Q-4I 1.+. fell 1 1111 ifa "L fit al,(ert1#tl\ 11#.18,"1
16 Iwxrtlulfir 44 "Ihat rlflrrlat. 1\ 4 1#" rtfIf .4 fottit f
f. %il offal 1�ru., 11 .,tat t {a t.lrt ,d %h
cr+.dt t Ikaill11441aq, ell %dt'u IW41114 A affair
%if (t.,af \t n, rw114l- I 11 td. hLwtL .aod flit.
\L.�N Irf+ alwl, la At- woriw.f 14,11#81` 1{14' till
A[fd 11 -4f 111 frl.,taNr �till Il14' bill., d 1.61'1144:.
.1111 h F /.al fw 1# 14 n ..,ntl\ Ir11 "t+\ a t 111 4/11t I N +k
%%10461 I d Mill.-� 1111 tilt Mtn for .41#4111#4
r\1tt1414 -4f \4,11 6, \14rvoa ar41lovid %lnl 14, %h towif,,
flo thh 4lKtUNIt; 141 IN C oll IfIllft'r1i1't11111t+ 1#i 1M';il\
.44111l'-d \,1414 4194 fniN' 11, IMH' .1111114N11tlntl 114111.
+ol(a or \F lo-at IA r that .t1# incd\ ha Iota Kln,tltm of
,�r.,n,,n "44 wrnr alai .06-f ta�.4 �4111141 ,nl% tr4
f 1#(\ %h Iwta,l all!, .611 .Irdor I "mlunill: 4111
fJ'1a1141'nl It, diicarf/,' (!'1�.I 11ltrt Llntllt�
I.,Iwor.�r v-ort if 1.ttaf fwl.11 4 r:�a 1-461-41 f1 lNl.lt
a1,41 6 1111� aura ,o4illow.Ittd It\ lww /f 1w'.1 %alit
1R cro lot 4'r, 1, 1f of wt Ill who
11.4 Ita1.+ atal :;41\4,1#,1#04 1#t 4 41 4 4` %h A.-I
1 "A1# fia .tdna111 1t.1t1\. Ill.., 111114'n L +\.,1 Coo Prir
\11/11 Ila\111a111 .61041 lilt' 114�.41 \F 4Y01111111taY' to \.Il
to I.1#., it .61141 4, f.d41 a 1111n11w�r ,:I 'lw a%.lnt
4Y aho fl Aura' 1. \t to hill ,i otlr
list 4-ne -of rt'\nlilt!,-wa1\ IIH'.1�Itr ,e1#tuwd bltttr
+1"(1 0 1114011. ataf 1104' 1 4141.01oll 1 4 14 111 dt�L4 eft -4I 14141114�
4-4 .irivNYl 4r011fhtt `(NH.,4114 th4w full l,Yi Iw�t\\4,t11
Gil tltgr.trltr alai 41jr(wqrt1 \\1#iti1 ,111116 4'+(-.114-4 .t
d�r1,1, for 1 "114 1114' vo%4 Boll tilt 1.Irl\ I)4-,lil4-
4'04�11 lw. +I to %1i 1'1141 allloll>; \1
F \4,4 Iltr\t� 1 41t1t11 11f,Y' fIN'1111w'1 flit IY 11111111t1,'4' prin,-41
(N4Mt rl4-� 140 0 1#1111 .11041 1!1 lrlott 11\4-�f It 111.1choll_
1 \11111 If.l \111.1111 .iltf I\ ('.111111,'1 1111111
1111t1iltt:r! their rt i.itl4ln 1#1 Lac %lril I1.1\th.,fn.
vt C,- tolltlllt14 14 0 4 01114� Ill1N off .I ill: if IV
II14441trAc1 Ill flit .,fill\ .1pp.trtlltl\ i, 11#' \vIf 111.11 under
;11 InII,N�1141. 1104 ,rill\ t.ofIlii lot( I1)1\ Il.11t %h
hold \oil %u4- %rill\
1 ultllll.ltttft'f %fl %Ilf.lt �flit brew rl\ llri, imi it
7.04114 .61 .ijol" 1#1 114�4-4 1111 "�r Iloilo (o 411!��1 tilt
4+01 r%,,11 0l flit .,rill\ .1 at11 is flit \1imAcr of
Ititurwr .,fill flit 11rtiacopal It.edtr, 411 tilt ,4-4 11rit\ lore u
.e r1. 1111 IF.,\Ih.lnl ltot4 l�41\, -4l to Iw in \aitl.
1#1#4 114' .11141 flit 411114-r olgN. fninl n nlain(-d iu
tilt go\4,n felt �IIt
1 (14011 ht rttuni Irvin \1,: ill slid -)ul\ 1471.
1- rim'll .oploart-tak ho(wrl to rt,4o1\t Ihe' %li iLt\th.u11
4 allll 11.1 ill it ,ililhorit\ b\ tiro flirm% kit
1#1 \\tight 1"�1111141 !1.4\1han1 .ifld \\h4-n %h hold IN�(-n
u
;wAl 1144�16. I.d14 r th44ltl itiv ll:a\thatn, tllel :,,,uriiig Ili,
Hall .4 1 4 Y10:ua�\ {I(- f1miul ',%Ii t4mo strong. hcl\\(-\tr.
.1141 1Y011 ieoineYl f ,prcY, \\itIt hint 1rohal,l\
kopoist c%vntmill\ it, filth tilt lablt, oil Ali it r(-,ull
of 1!I.� it -fill Nlrtr\ '.%Ii i, lit il aII itnc�e�. tIt(- f*(
tg wit a-if 141 1Li\thaits \\tit at la,t ,trfmg enough to
di of the� Prism- \1itli,ttr: IIa\Ibaill bad loug
la -4�1# .It ,idd \\itIt ni11th of tilt \I` hicr:trc�h\, but Until
Ilit% Iii fill hi influ,�ncr had a Ili r.tr(-ntI\ Iwcii to great
to iN�rrnit filo\t ag:tin hint. 111 (-arl\ \ugu,t it
4-.IFlnn�t n� and a inlultativm r(-alignnit^111 (If'
/:onunittev resulted in Ila\thanl",
4rlt froth i>,,tit tNNht,. \11I11 lf 1)11('111 \II \a,lr
Mlilvaiiiilad Va%ani II 6zijrt 5 replaced i1 I\ lh:un a,
Prime Mmi,trr and tool, hi, (-at oil the' >r�;\tc�uli\r
lla .i111N �,r- 1 11:4\1 b(-(-1# a cirri ronike� thoict.
Ill Ilad IN�tti .i tio,t friend of Ih\thaln', and i t
im tidw�r of Ili(- iw f1crat,� (action. ih�,lit(- flit ,lrctitth
�I ilia tim bi11t -4l %li- I,nw'il f irc�t,. thtr(- \\4,n�
iitlrn, (66.111 iudic:tion, that tilt arnn and tilt air Iorc�t.
hart Ila%tham (-njo\(-d ,,pill(- rt irlflu(-uct.
rilitit! i \lift in lltott -A 41 \4-r III i)u %tcr. Qtdck illel\Y�, b\
%rill\ t:olnlnaitdcr '.\Ii \ntar lre%ented thi,. but tilt
rtlliuC NF lacti,o11 lrobabl\ \i(-\\(-cl tilt aliitoiutintnt
FIGURE S. Prime Minister 'Ali Nasir
Muhammad Hasani (U /OU)
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100019 -5

of Muhammad as m�cessary to hold off further lrouh1v
from the military. Ilasani, a moderate, wits not
identified with any particular faction in the NF. and
the NF iierarehy nmy have regarded hits as a more
malleable figure and less a liability than his
predecessor. In fact, Ilasani has proved to he uol
particularly troublesome to any of the contending
factions in the continuing NF power struggle.
The 'Ali Istna'iI alliance �never tnore than an
expedient arrangenent by which Isma'd hoped to
gain the tipper hand and which 'Ali probably fell
could only benefit his own position �\as not long
lived and, contrary to Isma'il's expectations, slid not
materially enhance his standing. Withio a few
months, relwi,� 1 ),-tween the tw icaders had become
strained bec�attsv of 'Ali's pio- Peking Was and Ism,61's
warm feelings toward NIosc�ow. The strains were
aggrawatcd by idcologic�al- regional factors �the pro
N -king faction was composed largely of southern
Yvnienis, while the northern 1'etne�nis tended to be
pro Soviet in outlook. It was becoming increasingly
clear that 'Ali, as it southerner, was solely interested in
domestic affairs and that he firmly opposed northerner
Isna'il's policy of seeking to subvert the Y.A.B.
Government.
'Ali gradually strengthened his position throughout
197 I. but the going waS not easy. I Ie lost the� support
of some cabinet ministers to Ism -dil over the question
of whether the center of N P power should be Aden or
the rural areas. As a southerner 'Ali favored the rural
areas, while Ismail believed the center of N F stmngth
should be Aden where most of his support was
concentrated. Ismail also won s.:pport from the leader
of Aden's security forces and from the commander of
the army's elite 72d Brigade, whose numbers were
handpicked for their political rclia:ility. 'Ali's pro
Chinese police also incurred the displeasure of the
Soviet Union which, nevertheless, has continued to
provide aid to the P.D.11.1'. In all probability, the
presence of Soviet advisers and the infleenc�e exerted
ty Moscow may have been the decisive factors
deterring 'Ali from instituting certain Maoist- inspired
policies atnl moving to eliminate Istna'd as it political
rival.
Despite opposition, 'Ali was able to strengthen and
consolidate his position with the� rural masses
throughout m6ch of 1971. This was reflected in the
elections to the fifth NF congress held in March 1972,
tit which time the 'Ali faction won a large majority of
the delegate scats. bast held i March 1968, the
congress had been postponed repeatedly since its
originally scheduled convening in late 1969. Although
Ismail wits reelected at the congress to his position as
NF secretary general and a number of the more
influential Isma'd supporters were reconfirmed in their
positions in the NF hierarchy. 'AIi's supporters
succeeded in \winning a majority on the NI' General
Command (renamed the Cenlral Committee and
expanded to include tit frill and 1.1 candidate or
alternate members) and on the seven- mendwr
Executive Conuuitlee (renamed the hditical I;ureau
and reduced in size from nine t embers). The congress
comtmtunieluc also affirmed NF support for 'Ali *s
Maoist policies, specifically with respect to agrarian
reform and the establishment of peasant cooperatives.
'Ali has been able to consolidate his position still
further since the congress, to the point where he now
enjoys probably as first a hold on the reins of power as
is possible given the vicissitudes of P.D.R Y. politics.
Soon after the conclusion of the NF congress, Isma'd
again trade the mistake of departing the� country, this
time for a month -long trip to China, North Korea� and
the Soviet Union, and 'Ali again seized the�
opportunity to stove against his rivals. Several of
Isnta'il's supporters, including the c�ommawler of the
secerit forces. were arrested; the properly holdings of
many other Isma'd hackers were nationalized; and. in
it Clear attack on pro Ismail trade unionists, several
workers control committees were estabhslivd,
purportedly for the� purpose of "purging reactionary
elements" among the laboring forces.
Since ntid -1972� the P.D.R.1'. political scene
appears to have stabilized somewhat, probably in part
becallse the border war with the 1'.A. R. in September
and Octoimr and the suhseeluent negotiations toward
unifying the two countries have necessit ;tted a mo ru
united P.11.R.l'. front. 'I'll( P.D.Iti.I'. s hc:vy and
increasing dependen on the Soviet Union for
economic and particularly military assistance has
probitbly also been it significant factor contributing to
nodcraled his Maoist views, probable to ac�conuno-
datc his country's Soviet benefactors�and no doubt to
ale his country Soviet benefactors �and no doubt to
preserve his own position �and, although the 'Ali
Isnta'd rivalry still exists. Soviet influence may have
been a factor in forcing it modus vivendi between the
two ntcn.
Whatever the forces behind the present calm, the
P. 1).11.' .*s past record militates against a firm
prediction of lasting stability. I'residem 'Ali currently
retains predominance in the party and thus also in the
government, fut Isnut'd is midouhtedly only hiding
his time, waiting for an opportune moment to
challenge 'Ali's control. NF politics seem likely to
remain in disarray for the fcre�secable future.
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100019 -5

b. Membership and organization
Must of the present NF leaders arc former terrorists
with no e�xpericnce in goveniment. (Many Low
important tribal leaders in their own right or have
personal connections that enhance their standing. The
bulk of the rank- and -file membership comes from the
lower classes in Aden and the hinterland, and manv
support the party simply because their tribal leaders
support it and arc in a position to hand out patronage.
The NF has retained essentially the structure it had
in preindependence days. The basic unit, the cell, is
subordinate to the branch, which in tunt is subject to
the authority of the local district cominawl. Th
various district commands report to the governorate
curnrnand, which is responsible to the party's Gen(-ral
Command, now called the Cenlr.,! Committee. Before
the establishment of thy. Supreme People's Coutcil in
1971, the Central Committee .,erved as the� country's
legislative body, and it probable retains this function,
in fact if not legally, since large members of its
members sit on the Counci't. 'Pile Central Committee s
Political Bureau, formc -,diod the 1 ?xccrttive
Committee, is composed of .,even Central (:urnmitteV
members who form the party's, caul in effect the
govern ent's, governing body.
2. Other political groups
Both the Communist Party and the Bath Party
have been allowed to operate openly since
independence, but neither organization has played it
particularly significant role in the country's political
life. After the june 1969 coup against the Shabis, NF
Secretary General Ismail brought both parties into un
alliance with the NF; it Cortmunist was named
Minister of Education and it 13a'thist became Minister
of Economy and f udrtstry. Neither party has exercised
more than !invited influence, howe�ier, in the file(- of
NF dominance and, although they maintain Z.
separate existence and arc represented in the
government and the People's Supreme Council, even
their curly influence has been diminished. "Pile�
Communists, for instance, were formerly closely allied
with Isrna`il's pro Moscow NF faction, but when
I'r,sidew 'Ali's Maoists, who had never favored the
NF- '.ommunist alliance, became predominant in
1971, the Communists stopped prat least limited their
cooperation with the NF.
3. Elections
Although the constitution grants the vole to all
citizens at age 18, popular elections have vet to be
held in Aden. Elections for the People's Supreme
12
Couuc�il are called for ill the constitution. but the
evuncil's initial membership was appointed b% ti
NF� largely front aneutg the nn�ntbers of its o%yn
Central Committee �and there is no evidetwe that
this council has been or is likely_ to he replaced I\ an
elected body.
D. National polick-s (S)
The policies of the P.D.11-Y. Govenunent, as spelled
out both in the \ationul Front charter and in the
resolutions adopted at the lourth party congress i
March 1968, arc vaguely 1) It rased in Marxist
terminology and include sac) objectives as building
socialism, furthering a fit i- imix- rialism. and nraiutain-
ing close relati s with Communist countries. More
specific policies were enunciated at the fifth party
congress in Nlarch 1972. Reflecting the inclinations of
the pro Peking faction of the \F, led by President 'Ali.
these policies are focused prir�tarily on domestic
problems, although they also include statenu�rtts
whi_�h confirm the I'. D.R.I'. s narrow vie%% of the
world and reaffirm its allian with the socialist e�antp.
1. Domestic policy
At its fifth party congress, the \F affirmed its
c�ommitnu�nt to support "the leadership role of the
working class and its allies the peasants." In
furtherance of this "leadership role,' the congress
called for the urgent promulgation of it labor law and
an agrarian reform law, urged the formation of
peasants' federations and wrric�ultural c�otntc�ils.::nd
reaffirmed the policy of developing state .,no
cooperative fares.
During the� period when President 'Ali*s Maoist
policies were fashionable. the \F governtne�nt ryas
primarily concerted about est.iblishing its base of
support among the peasants. In 1971. following it visit
to Peking, 'Ali instigated it series of "peasant
uprisings" throughout the country which resulted in
widespread sei�r.ures of property from lanchwners.
homeowners, and small businessmen. The seizures
continued at least though mid -1972, although at it
somewhat slower pace. In August 1972 the
government ex1) roprialed, apparently \yithutit
compensation, all privately owned commercial
buildings and residences; property owners have been
allowed to retain one house for their own personal use,
while the rentals from the expropriated properties are
now collected by the government.
'AIi's policies arc� actually it continuation of
somewhat less radical domestic policies carried out by
the� NF government since independence. Some of the
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100019 -5

11afro' Hiiflt /1,/41419!41 /..IN -o1 114" A41r,- Im'.0 1. 1f
161 11111 0 (tKra1141 11 1911 4 -a M04 0 4 IIN' (w .M11
tnttf. o rlhm th. \I .41141 a h.tred% nN�Afr oral In
Ott" 141(11 141 WIA Iw.flwrtt frown "iIIJ1019tfT" 04 I:r.-
ttlw r 19N 1 10,41" IM04 +l dow'd .4.160191� hA.I lw,�n
C.Arrail -vie In Ait,- nf.4160r a111e lip trnrvionvul
%lard�* Ifn1,1tt� a1Nl 111 1�trtiN'fAf�,- -4 of- A6m ,fl
4- I1�"Ifft .1 �.191.411.1 4ilr In Iwo.- 14:11 Ill.
*�.1 1 -��1441 .4 61141 n -1. 19m ,�n16nAf SOWN
Ir�nN14d low 4614' .'061191 ..f i I..M1 ..arwld In
dfl� _111111. .44141 11dt .4911 ah� ILMI (1otf�441/f11d thl�
tr .4411tifN1.1 Ifw'.OI nollitt Aft" it! fn410111w 1141".4,� I L%-
nlatf% 411 till, mall* i6.t/f III-vi t N' 41.1or"" Alt1.1 the \I
faLAlnt�r floc OM 0! 114,� Iflatlfil n +In�1N19r� 1 190 IwftAt4�
+.UtN f�htil $1 1.41141 Ifni Itrtn1&1i low �4
1.1fiff lot Iww iw.4�.4114� 1 nrmja�r 44 WO -4 .4MA Iw a.AM
(Y iw�faf 4 .4'�
h .4%# 1w1Y1 4.1 .4I4t -IpA Ire rlerAl An'A-
Jowl .e I (Y.11,41 farm fawle 14 11 0191 ,t ifo1n 141
4 tOf%I IArm O A14.. e0 11 lr A�l ."w 4n'.4 in Ae1lhiN
.i Illlrllfwr 4 I .Y114'llM- fn lll.t 1 1114.!
.4411- .'f11ltlt .144'11411'' .41141 �rf 4.411 r Ntlf rIwv- 1. tr1.�1� ...f141
1114 'a1