NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY 26; SOVIET UNION; ARMED FORCES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: NIS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP01-00707R000200090036-7
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 56
• Document Creation Date: October 25, 2016
• Sequence Number: 36
• Content Type: REPORTS

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U*S*S*R.0
CQNTENTS
This chapter .mpersedes the armed forces cover-
age to the Genav Survey doted march 2971.
A. Defense establishment 1
1. Military history
1
2. Command structure
3
a. joint agencies
4
b. I:orca components
S
c. Operational commands
5
d. Militarized security forces
6
B. Joint activities
6
I. Military manpower
8
2. Strength trends
8
3. Training
8
4. Military budget
9
a. Economic support
9
b. MilitarZ budget
10
5. Logistics
11
S. Uniforms and insignia
it
a. Uniforms
12
b. Insignia
12
Szcr.r
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Page
C. Ground forces 17
1. Organization 18
2. Strength, composition, and disposition 21
3. Training 21
4. Logistics 22
D. Naval forces 23
1. Organization 30
2. Strength, composition, and disposition 31
3. Training 31
4. Logistics 32
5. Naval aviation 32
E. Air and air defense forces 34
1. Soviet Air Forces 34
a. Organization 37
Page
b. Strength, composition, and disposition 38
c. Training
39
(1) Preoperational
39
(2) Operational
39
d. Logistics
41
2. Soviet Strategic Defense Forces
42
a. Organization
42
b. Strength, composition, and disposition
42
c. Training
44
d. Logistics
44
F. Rocket troops 45
I. Organization 45
2. Strength, composition, and disposition 47
3. Training 47
4. Logistics 48
G. Militarized security forces 49
1. Frontier troops 49
2. Interior troops 50
FIGURES
ii
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Fig. 1
Armed forces high command chart)
3
Fig. 2
Personnel strength of the armed forces
photo)
26
(table)
8
Fig. 3
Estimated value of military
patrol gunboat photo)
26
expenditures (table)
11
Fig. 4.
Officers' uniforms and insignia
cruiser photo)
27
(chart)
13
Fig. 5
Enlisted men's uniforms and insignia
cruise missile submarine (photo).
28
(chart)
15
Fig. 6
Shoulderboards and insignia of
submarine photo)
28
warrant officers chart)
17
Fig. 7
MAZ -537 truck with trailer carrying
ballistic missile submarine photo)
28
T -62 tank (photo)
20
Fig. 8
GANEF (SA -4) surface -to -air missile
submarine photo)
29
system (photo)
20
Fig. 9
Light amphibious armored vehicle
Naval aviation BADGER G (photo).
33
(photo)
20
Fig. 10
122 -mm multiple rocket launcher
(photo)
33
(photo)
20
Fig. 11
ZSU -23 -4 antiaircraft weapon photo)
21
Fig. 12
KRESTA I class guided missile light
Naval aviation HORMONE A ASW
cruiser photo)
25
Fig. 13
KRESTA II class guided missile light
Long Range Aviation BEAR B
cruiser photo)
25
Fig. 14
Moskva guided missile helicopter ship
Long Range Aviation BISON B
(photo)
26
ii
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Fig. 15
KANIN class guided missile destroyer
photo)
26
Fig. 16
NANUCHKA class guided missile
patrol gunboat photo)
26
Fig. 17
KARA class guided missile light
cruiser photo)
27
Fig. 18
CHARLIE class nuclear- powered
cruise missile submarine (photo).
28
Fig. 19
VICTOR class nuclear powered
submarine photo)
28
Fig. 20
DELTA class nuclear powered
ballistic missile submarine photo)
28
Fig. 21
GOLF class ballistic missile
submarine photo)
29
Fig. 22
Disposition of navy units table)
32
Fig. 23
Naval aviation BADGER G (photo).
33
Fig. 24
Naval aviation MAIL ASW) aircraft
(photo)
33
Fig. 25
Naval aviation MAY ASW) aircraft
(photo)
33
Fig. 26
Naval aviation HORMONE A ASW
aircraft (photo)
33
Fig. 27
Long Range Aviation BEAR B
(photo)
34
Fig. 28
Long Range Aviation BISON B
(photo)
34
ii
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iii
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Fig. 29
BADGER A used in Long Range
Aviation and Soviet Naval Aviation
43
Fig. 41
(photo)
35
Fig. 30
FISHBED MiG -2. used in Soviet
43
Fig. 42
Tactical Aviation photo)
35
Fig. 31
FITTER (Su -7) used in Soviet
Tactical Aviation photo)
35
Fig. 32
BREWER (Yak -28) used in Soviet
Tactical Aviation photo)
35
Fig. 33
Military Transport Aviation CUB
43
Fig. 44
(An -12) (photo)
37
Fig. 34
Military Transport Aviation CAMP
43
Fig. 45
(An-8) (photo)
37
Fig. 35
Military Transport Aviation COCK
44
Fig, 46
(An -22) photo)
37
Fig. 36
Military Transport Aviation HOOK
44
Fig. 47
(Mi-6) photo)
37
Fig. 37
Military Transport Aviation HIP
(Mi-8) photo)
37
Fig. 38
Aviation of Air Defense FIREBAR
(Yak -28P) (photo)
42
Fig. 39
Aviation of Air Defense FLAGON
45
Fig. 49
A (Su -15) (photo)
42
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Fig. 40
Aviation of Air Defense FOXBAT
MiG -25) photo)
43
Fig. 41
Aviation of Air Defense MOSS
(Tu -124) (photo)
43
Fig. 42
FARMER (MiG -19) employed in
Aviation of Air Defense and in
Soviet Tactical Aviation (photo).
43
Fig. 43
FRESCO MiG -17) employed in
Aviation of Air Defense and in
Soviet Tactical Aviation (photo).
43
Fig. 44
GUIDELINE (SA -2) surface -to -air
missile photo)
43
Fig. 45
GALOSH ABM -1) antiballistic
missile photo)
44
Fig, 46
TALL KING early warning radar
!photo)
44
Fig. 47
BAR LOCK early warning radar
and SIDE NET height- finder radar
(photo)
45
Fig. 48
BAR LOCK early warning radar and
ODD PAIR height- finder radar
(photo)
45
Fig. 49
SAVAGE (SS -13) intercontinental
ballistic missile photo)
46
iii
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Armed Forces
A. Defense establishment (S)
The Soviet Armed Forces, as presently constituted,
consist of ground, naval, air, air defense, and rocket
forces. The main purpose of each of these is to develop
combat forces along functional lines for coordinated
operations; all five components are highly inter-
dependent.
The personnel strength of the armed forces is
estimated at about 3.8 million men. Personnel
assigned to the ground forces represent about two
thirds of the total military manpower approximately
2 million, including about 345,000 assigned to ground
elements of the strategic defense forces. Of this total,
about 1,600,000 constitute the general- purpose
ground forces. Approximately 400,000 personnel are
assigned to ground forces command and general
support. The remainder of the military personnel are
believed assigned as follows: navy, 470,000 (including
394,000 in general- purpose naval forces, 12,000 in
strategic attack forces, and 64,000 in navy command
and general support); air forces, 575,000 (including
287,000 in general purpose air forces, 130,000 in
strategic defense forces, 57,000 in strategic attack
forces, and 101,000 in air forces command and general
support); strategic rocket forces, 375,500 (including
300,500 in strategic attack forces and 75,000 in rocket
forces command and general support). In addition,
the border and internal troops of the security forces
have a personnel strength of about 250,000.
The main units of the general purpose ground forces
include 21 armies, 12 corps, 169 line divisions
(motorized rifle, tank, and airborne), and 17 artillery
divisions. Major naval surface combatants total over
210, and submarines number about 340. In addition,
there are over 2,000 other surface combatants and
auxiliaries. There are over 1,000 combat and
reconnaissance aircraft in naval aviation. The long
range air force has approximately 875 bombers and
tankers, and tactical aviation comprises some 4,600
fighters and light bombers. About 2,700 fighters are
assigned to the air defense forces. An estimated
operational inventory of approximately 1,500
intercontinental ballistic missile launchers (over 1,600
missiles) and more than 500 intermediate- and
medium -range missile launchers (over 1,000 missiles)
are in the hands of the strategic rocket forces.
In addition to the strength of its own armed forces,
the Soviet leadership regards the military capabilities
of other Warsaw Pact states as an important element
in the strategic position of the U. S. S. R. Other Warsaw
Pact forces help maintain Soviet hegemony in these
countries; increase Soviet war potential; and, with
groups of Soviet forces in the area, provide a forward
line of defense against NATO forces. Since the mid
1950's the Soviet Union has increased the other
Warsaw Pact countries' capabilities for independent
military action by providing them with modern
equipment and giving them greater control over their
own forces than they enjoyed in the past. The Warsaw
Pact organization, however, is the structure for
organizational and command control of these forces;
in wartime the Soviet high command would exercise
ultimate control.
1. Military history
The Soviet Armed Forces date officially from 1918.
Aft^r the civil war, in which the Soviet regime
defended itself against internal and foreign
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opposition, development of the armed forces was
influenced by two major factors. The first was it series
of reforms, including the establishment of military
schools and academies, reorganization of the military
establishment along territorial lines, and the
assignment of more responsibility to tactical
corn manders. These reforms, which laid the
groundwork for it moder military establishment, were
carried out by Mikhail V. Frunze. Trotsky's successor
as Peoples Commissar of Defense. The second factor
was rapid industrialization of the U.S.S.R., which
began in the early 1930's and enabled the Soviet
Union to reequip its forces with modern weapons and
materiel.
The modernized armed forces faced their first test in
Manchuria with the successful frontier engagements
against the Japanese. in 1938 and 1039. In the attack
on Finland in late 1939, poorly trained Soviet troops
suffered it series of humiliating defeats. Early in 1940,
however, Finnish resistance was crushed by Soviet
units well trained in winter warfare.
World War 11 represents to the U.S.S.R. its greatest
military triumph. Despite initial defeats which caused
severe losses in men and materiel, its forces held
against the German offensive in 1941 and launched it
counteroffensive in the winter of 1942. 'The Nazis were
gradually repulsed, and in January 1943 the U.S.S.R.
unleashed the final offensive which opened the way to
Berlin.
Since the end of World War 11, the U.S.S.R. has
made it sustained effort to modernize its alined forces.
The ground forces, though reduced in number,. have
been reequipped on a scale exceeding that of any other
land force in the world, with it wide variety of modern
weapons and equipment ranging from small arms to
tanks and guided missiles. Notable advances have
been made in mechanization, communications, and
the development of amphibious equipment. Reor-
ganization and development have ,resulted in it
narked increase in the mobility and firepower of the
ground forces.
In the 1945-54 period the U.S.S.R. also devoted
considerable effort to it quantitative rebuilding of its
naval forces, both surface ships and submarines.
[wring this period, units such as the SKORYY class
destroyer, RIGA class destroyer escort, and WIIISKEY
class submarine were built in largo m-nibers. The navy
that resulted, though second only t 1 1 the U.S. Navy in
size, was still largely equipped with World War II-
type ships which neither supported the U.S.S.R.'s
aspirations to status as it great seapower nor met their
defense needs. In the 1956 -65 period the Soviets began
to apply modern technology to ship and submarine
a
design to produce fewer, but qualitatively improved,
naval units. This emphasis on duality and modern
technology produced l): ellistic- missile equipped
submarines, cruise missile equipped surface ships and
submarines, surface -to- air missile configured surface
combatants, nuclear power for submarines, and an
advanced gas turbine propulsion plant for surface
ships. The late 1960's introduced to the operational
inventory even more advanced naval -weapon systems
and units for the qualitative upgrading of the force.
New technology in shipbuilding permitted the
U.S.S. R. to produce ships at a rapid pace while adding
new electronics and weaponry. In the 1966 -73 period
six new classes of major surface combatants, five new
classes of submarines, and three one -of -a -kind
submarine units were constructed. The Soviets have
continued to produce advanced- design submarines
and missile equipped oceangoing surface ships and
have begun construction of their first aircraft carrier
Which is expected to carry vertical or short take -off
and landing aircraft and helicopters.
Competent strategic bomber, tactical air, and
defensive air forces have been trained. Among the
most significant developments in the air forces since
1960 have been the introduction of new equipment,
including a lieu- medium bomber, it new light bomber,
air warning and control aircraft, and neuv fighters and
transports; more v use of air -to- surface
missiles; and additional in- flight refueling capabilities
for heavy bombers.
The Strategic Defense Forces (PVO Strany occupy
a position of equal status with the ground, naval, air,
and strategic rockei components. This organization is
made up of Radio 'Technical 'Troops (aircraft control
and warning radar), Surface -to -Air Missile "Troops
(SAM sites), Aviation of Air Defense (fighter aircraft),
and possibly the Antiballistic Missile Troops (ABM
sites). This overall organiz -1tion is continually
undergoing transition. Significantly improved
capability has resulted from rapid deployment of
surface -to -air missiles (SAPA) and the introduction of
improved electronic devices and armament in both
interceptors and ground equipment.
The Strategic Rocket 'Troops, established in 1960
and placed on an equal organizational level with the
other force components, constitute the main strategic
force of the U.S.S.R. The development of strategic
surface -to- surface missiles (SSM) and their introduc-
tion into operational inventories provide the Soviets
with un intercontinental strike capability which can
be employed with minimum warning. Within the next
few years strategic missiles probably will account for
an increasing portion of Soviet nuclear offensive
capability.
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Command structure
The Soviet Armed Forces are controlled I)v the
Ministry of Defense, headed by a minister %%ho is
normally a military officer on active duty. The
Minister of Defense is a member of the Council of
`linisters within the Soviet Government and is
responsible to the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The minister
advises the Council of Ministers and the Party Central
Committee on the requirements and capabilities of the
armed forces and is responsible for implementing
Chief of the CINC
General Staff Warsaw Pact Forces
(First Deputy Minister) (First Deputy Minister
Army General MSU* Yakuhovskiy
V. G. Kulikov
Deputy Minister
for Construction
and Billeting
Colonel General
Komarovskiy
CINC Ground Forces
(Deputy Minister)
Army General
Pavlovskiy
decisions of the political leaders. Operational
command and overall administrative control of the
armed forces are exercised by the Minister of Defense
through the high command (Figure 1).
The Supreme Military Council, formed by
Khrlshchev and interposed behyeen the Party Central
Committee and the Ministry of Defense, was
composed of key party and military personnel and it
probably still exists. This council, in the past, %vas
presided over by the civilian Supreme I -ligh
Commander of the Soviet Armed Forces, usually the
General Secretary of the Communist Party. It served as
Minister of
Defense
MSU* Grechko
1
Chief of the
Main Inspectorate
(Deputy Minister)
MSU* Moskalenko
Chief of the
Main Political
Directorate
Army General
Yepishev
Chief of the Rear
(Deputy Minister)
Army General
K u rkotk i n
I I
CINC Navy CINC Strategic
(Deputy Minister) Defense Forces
Admiral of the Fleet (Deputy Minister)
Gorshkov MSU* Batitskiy
MARSHAL OF THE SOVIET UNION
*The exact relationship between General Yepishev and the Minister of Defense;
and the Political Directorate and other elej, of the high command is not
completely clear. In some matters Yepishev Is probably subordinate to
Marshal Grechko. In many political matters he undoubtedly reports directly
to the Party Central Committee.
*ADMIRAL OF THE FLEET OF THE SOVIET UNION
Note: There is a third First uty Minister (Army General Sokolov) whose functions
are unknown. Since Army General Penkovskiy's death no Incumbent has been
identified with the position of Deputy Minister for Combat Training. Whether
the position still exists is uncertain.
FIGURE 1. Armed forces high command (S)
3
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CINC Air Forces
CINC Strategic
(Deputy Minister)
Rocket Troops
Marshal of Aviation
(Deputy Minister)
Kutakhov
Army General
I I
CINC Navy CINC Strategic
(Deputy Minister) Defense Forces
Admiral of the Fleet (Deputy Minister)
Gorshkov MSU* Batitskiy
MARSHAL OF THE SOVIET UNION
*The exact relationship between General Yepishev and the Minister of Defense;
and the Political Directorate and other elej, of the high command is not
completely clear. In some matters Yepishev Is probably subordinate to
Marshal Grechko. In many political matters he undoubtedly reports directly
to the Party Central Committee.
*ADMIRAL OF THE FLEET OF THE SOVIET UNION
Note: There is a third First uty Minister (Army General Sokolov) whose functions
are unknown. Since Army General Penkovskiy's death no Incumbent has been
identified with the position of Deputy Minister for Combat Training. Whether
the position still exists is uncertain.
FIGURE 1. Armed forces high command (S)
3
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the highest organ for national defense policy and
planning. Other military councils exist at major
echelons of the military establishment from army_ or
equivalent level up through the headquarters of the
force components. 'These councils serve as advisory
organs to the commander at each echelon.
"I'he� Soviet high command consists of the Minister
of Defense and his deputies. At the present time there
are three first deputy ministers, nine deputy ministers,
and it political directorate. The political chief is not
ranked as it deputy minister, possibly because he is also
an official in the part secretariat, where lie is
subordinate to the General Secretary of the
Communist Parh.
"there are several joint agencies of an administrative
or technical nature within the Ministry of Defense
which direct;: support the high command. Some of
these agencies, such as the Main Personnel
Directorate, arc directly subordinate to the Minister of
Defense, others, such as the Main Missile and Artillery
Directorate, the Main "Tank Directorate, the central
Motor Vehicle- Tractor Directorate, and the Central
Finance Directorate, are subordinate to the various
deputy ministers comprising the high command. The
major elements of the Soviet high command and the
major operational commands are shown in Figure I.
The Soviet Armed Forces are divided into five force
components� ground, navy, air, air defense, and
rocket forces. I'.ach is headed by it deputy minister of
defense who is also commander in chief and the
administrative head of his component. Operational
control is the prerogative of the Minister of Defense,
though he has apparently delegated varying degrees of
operational control to force commanders.
n. Joint agencies
The General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces,
headed I)v it \Marshal of the Soviet Union, plans the
coordinated development and employment of ground,
naval, air, air defense, and rocket forces and issues
directives to the major operational commands in the
name of the Minister of Defense. The general staff
formulates the� military progr in in peacetime and
directly supervises its implementation in time of war.
It is closely involved in the direction of combat
operations in all theaters. The general staff includes
directorates for operations, intelligence, signal
cornmtinications, organization and mobilization,
military transportation, mil iL.r� topography,
crptography, military history, and others.
I'he Warsaw Pact, promulgated in 1955, establishes
a combined command for Soviet arc certain Eastern
European Communist forces. The headquarters is in
Moscow, and the chief of the Warsim Pact Forces is it
Marshal of the Soviet Union.
The Chief of the Main Inspectorate, with a staff of
senior officers, is responsihle for evaluating the state of
preparedness and the comba' efficiency of the armed
forces. I'll(- inspectors make periodic visits to the major
operational commands and present critiques on the
state of combat readiness and other natters to the
commanders concerned and to the appropriate
agencies within the Ministry of Defense.
The Chief of the Rear is responsil,le for all logistic
functions common to the armed forces and
participates in the logistical aspects of high -level
planning. lie has control of service and supply
functions common to all the services, including
budget. pay, accounting, food, clothing, other
quartermaster equip rent, fuel and lubricants,
medical and veterinar; services, military transporta-
tion, and the direction of the activities of the Central
Motor Vehicle- Tractor Directorate. These functions
include research and development, procurement,
storage, issue, and maintenance of common -use items.
The Chief of the Rear also coordinates the various
specialized procurement agencies (such as those for
aviation, engineer, naval, ordnance, and signal
equipment) which are either directly under the
Minister of Defense or under the force components.
'I'll(- Deputy Minister of Defense for construction
and Billeting coordinates the activities of specialized
construction and quartering agencies at all chelons of
the military establishment. Through his subordinate
directorates he allocates materials, equipment, and
personnel for construction activities and exercises
policy control over the acquisition, provision,
assignment, till(] repair of military hotising as well as
service and cultural facilities. He also coordinates the
activities of military and nonmilitary construction
agencies and authorizes the use of military
construction troops for m miditar- projects when
necessary. The principal lirectorates within the
Ministry of Defense directly subordini&- to the
Deputy Minister for Construction and Billeting are the
Main Military Construction Directorate, the Billeting
and Maintenance Directorate, and the Technical
Directorate for Capital Construction.
The Chief of the Main Directorate of Military
Training Establishments supervises and coordinates
the overall military school systems, although specific
control of service schools and academies (other than
the higher Military Academy of the General Staff)
and their ciirriculunis rests with the various force
components and troop branches.
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The Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army
and Nave is the principal instrument used by the
Central Committee of the Conrrnunist Party to
maintain political control over the a, .,led forces,
including rigid adherence to party policies and
dircc�i;ves. The political apparatus is an integral part
of all Ieadquarters above company level throughout
the military forces. It trains, administers, and directs
the activities of the political officers responsible for
political indoctrination of all personnel_ morale
Imilding programs, surveillance of political reliabilit%-
and the disciplinary and administrative control of
inernbers of the Communist Part and the Communist
Youth Leagne Komsomol
Othci joint agencies within the Ministry of Defense
which support the high command include the Main
Personnel Directorate, the Ilcadquarters for Civil
Defense, the Office of the Main Military Procurator,
and the Milihan Publishing House. Another
organization closely allied with the armed forces cut
not actually a part of the Ministry of Defense is the
Voluntary Society for Cooperation with the Army,
Aviation, and the Fleet (DOSAAF). Ileadud by the�
chairman of the Central Committee for DOSAAF, this
nationwide organization provides specialist training of
a military nature to ycueng men of draft and predraft
age. DUSA ;IF also assists in the civil defense training
p rog ra rn.
There arc three principal ordnance -type agencies
which are not directly subordinate to the high
c These are the Main Missile and Artillery
Directorate subordinate to the Commander of Missile
and Artillery Troops of the Crounc: Forces, the Main
"Tank Directorate subordinate to the Chief of 'Tank
Troop,, and the Central Motor Vehicle- Tractor
Directorate subordinate to the Chief of the Rear of the
Soviet Armed Forces. "These three agencies supervise
research and development, determine design
spec�ificaiions of materiel, place orders with factories,
,crept items as they are produced, operate central
depots, allocate and issue material to major
operational commands, and control maintenance. For
example, the `lain Missile and Artillery Directorate
deals with all t pis of weapons, including such varied
itens as aircraft arnranient, naval guns, small arms,
and tactical missiles.
b. Force .-ornponents
I'll( commanders in chief of ground, naval, air, air
defense, and rocket forces ;,re generally concerned
with organization, doctrine, manning, training.
administration, and logistic requirements for their
respective arms. Fach conunander in chief has a main
staff, corresponding to the General Staff of the Soviet
Armed Forces, and counterparts of the various
directorates of the Ministry of Defense to formulate
policies and adapt instructions from above to their
respective arms. 'Their participation in the operational
command of troops is limited by varying degrees of
command authority retained by the Minister of
Defense. The minister has delegated operational
control to the Commander in Chief of Strategic
Defense Forces and probably, in large measure, to the
Commander in Chief of the Strategic Rocket 'Troops
beemise of the quick reaction time required of their
missions. I'll(! Commander in Chief of the Navy has a
degree of operational control over naval forces because
of the specialized nature of such operations. The
Commander in Chief of the Soviet Air Forces, as a
deputy minister, probably advises and assists the
Minister of Defense in the operational control of the
several air forces, and for air matters he possible is in
the line of control to commanders of the military
districts and groups of forces. The position of
commander in chief and the headquarters and main
staff of the ground forces, abolished in 1961, were
reestablished late in 1967. Whether the Commander
in :thief of the Ground Forces exercises operational
control in any degree is not known.
Accordin to Soviet military concepts, all five force
components would be employed in a coordinated
effort in wartime. Operationally, forces prepared for
cornbat by functional components of the Soviet
Armed Forces are organized into major commands
which are controlled directly by the Minister of
Defense. Administratively, the force components
depend heavily for funding, logistic, and personnel
support on high command agencies such as the Main
Personnel Directorate, the Chief of the Rear, the
various main directorates for armament, and the
numerous other administrative and technical agencies
directed by the Minister of Defense.
c. Operational commands
'1'h^ principal operational commands outside the
high command are military districts and groups of
forces, naval fleets and flotillas, long -range aviation,
military transport aviation, air defense districts, and
strategic rocket forces.
The majority of land -based forces are organized into
military districts and groups of forces, whose
command apparatus can have a. relatively flexible
span of control, including operations of major line
units, combat and service support units, and tactical
air elements. Similarly, in the major nasal commands
the fleet headquarters for command of forces afloat
5
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also controls a supporting shore establishment,
encompassing coastal defense forces and land -based
fleet air forces. The remaining operational commands
have more specialized missions as indicated by their
designations.
The Commander in Chief of Strategic Defense
Forces serves as a channel of operational control.
Similarly, the Comrander of Long Range Aviation in
Moscow. although administratively subordinate to the
Commander in Chief of the Soviet Air Forces, is
believed to serve as an operational channel between
the ministry and the long -range air armies. Essentially
this is also true for the Commander of Military
Transport Aviation. The same type of channel,
furnished by the Commander in Chief of the Strategic
Rocket Troops, may link the ministry with strategic
rocket units in the field. Airborne units are believed to
comprise a separate operational command only so
long as they are held as a reserve of the high
command. When assigned to military districts or
groups of forces, operational control of airborne units
passes to the commander of the force to which they are
assigned.
d. Militarized security forces
In addition to its regular land, sea, and air forces,
the Soviet Union has approximately 250,000
militarized security personnel (frontier troops and
interior troops) who are organized into military units
to guard the borders, maintain domestic security, and
guard important establishments, persons, and
shipments. Some 175,000 Soviet Frontier Troops of the
Committee for State Security (KGB) are responsible
for securing the land and sea frontiers of the U.S.S.R.
The Main Directorate of Frontier Troops of the KGB,
in Moscow, exercises general supervision and control
over the frontier districts. Also und. KCB control are
special signal troops who are r. �ponsible for the
installation, maintenance, and security of com-
munication facilities (telephone and telegraph)
between Moscow and high -level military headquar-
ters, such as military district and group of forces
headquarters.
The Soviet Interior Troops, consisting of internal
security forces and convoy troops, and numbering
75,000, are subordinate to the ministries for
maintenance of public order of the constituent
republics in .which they are located. Internal security
troops are combat -type units responsible for
suppressing dissident and subversive elements,
quelling revolts and strikes, and controlling the civil
populace in the event of disaster. Convoy troops are
responsible for guarding deportees and prisoners en
route between prisons and labor camps, and for the
security of shipments of strategic materials.
B. Joint activities
I. Military manpower (S)
There were approximately 63,088,000 males
between the ages of 15 and 49 as of i January 1973. Of
these, about 80% were considered fit for military
service; their distribution by age groups was as follows:
Total, 15 -49 63,088,000 50,180,000
The average number of males who will reach
military registration age (17) annually, 1973 through
1977, is about 2,323,000. The annual draft contingent
is about I million and is expected to remain constant
fc the near future. The manpower pool is sufficient to
meet the demands of the armed forces and is adequate
to support essential defense industries in an all -out war
effort. Particularly notable is the fact that even in time
of peace the economy relies heavily on work
performed by women in sections of the economy in
which female labor is not typically employed in most
other countries.
The quality of military manpower, particularly of
the Russian element, is generally good. The
educational levels have been substantially raised,
particularly in the technical fields. T!te high quality of
training in military service also tends to increase
technical proficiency. Typical of most military
personnel is their willingness and ability to endure
hardships. The armed forces are loyal to the regime,
and morale is considered to be high, especially in
certain elite groups such as paratroopers, pilots,
strategic rocket tr lers, and submariners.
Conditions of ice are generally good. Beginning
with World War II, the pay and privileges of officers
have placed them in the same category as engineers,
party dignitaries, and other favorites of the state. To a
lesser extent, the enlisted personnel on extended
service also enjoy a higher prestige and status in the
armed forces than they might attain in civili: life.
Individuals may improve their professional knowledge
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TOTAL
MAXIMUM
NUN16ER
NUMBER FIT FOR
ACE
OF MALES
MILITARY SERVICE
15 -19
12,086,000
1 l ,i +60,000
20 -24
10,702,000
9,460,000
25 -29
6,349,000
5,160,000
30 -34
9,285,000
7,365,000
35 -39
8,746,000
6,640,000
40 -44
8
5,910,000
4549
7,070,000
4,285,000
Total, 15 -49 63,088,000 50,180,000
The average number of males who will reach
military registration age (17) annually, 1973 through
1977, is about 2,323,000. The annual draft contingent
is about I million and is expected to remain constant
fc the near future. The manpower pool is sufficient to
meet the demands of the armed forces and is adequate
to support essential defense industries in an all -out war
effort. Particularly notable is the fact that even in time
of peace the economy relies heavily on work
performed by women in sections of the economy in
which female labor is not typically employed in most
other countries.
The quality of military manpower, particularly of
the Russian element, is generally good. The
educational levels have been substantially raised,
particularly in the technical fields. T!te high quality of
training in military service also tends to increase
technical proficiency. Typical of most military
personnel is their willingness and ability to endure
hardships. The armed forces are loyal to the regime,
and morale is considered to be high, especially in
certain elite groups such as paratroopers, pilots,
strategic rocket tr lers, and submariners.
Conditions of ice are generally good. Beginning
with World War II, the pay and privileges of officers
have placed them in the same category as engineers,
party dignitaries, and other favorites of the state. To a
lesser extent, the enlisted personnel on extended
service also enjoy a higher prestige and status in the
armed forces than they might attain in civili: life.
Individuals may improve their professional knowledge
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and skills, but advancement is largeiy contingent upon
au Live n_:-iicipation in party programs. It is estimated
that 825 of armed forces personnel are party or
Komsomol members.
The military personnel procurement system is based
on the Universal Military Service Law of 1967, which
provides for mandatory conscription of enlisted
personnel for the nilitary establishment. Under this
law it new conscript class (afte group) is called up for
service each year in equai semiannual increments
(during May and June and during November and
December) as an older class is r Teased. Enlisted
conscripts complete terms of 2 years in the ground and
air forces as do naval air and shore -based personnel.
Naval personnel aboard ships serve for 3 years.
Inductees with a higher education are required to
serve only I year regardless of branch of the armed
forces; this applies also to frontier and security troops.
Professional enlisted Wen are procured on a voluntary
basis. "The broad category of extended- service
personnel was replaced in 1972 by the institution of
michrrua/praporshchik. Ilowever. personnel pres-
ently serving on extended service tours are permitted
to serve out their terms if they elect not to apply for the
new ranks. The creation of the tea� ranks has not
satisfied the requirements for quality career personnel.
The initial term of scrvi-�e for michman1praporshchik
is 5 years. It cyan he extended for periods of 3 or 5 years
until the mandatory retirement age of 50.
Officers enter active commissioned service in several
wuys. Most are -htained through graduation from one
of the various officer candidate schools maintained by
each arm or service. Officers are also obtained for
active duty service by cailup from the reserve. Reserve
commissions can be acquired either directly from
civilian life, through participation in an ROTC -hype
program in institutions of high education, or, in the
c�:: e of enlisted personnel with a high education, by
passing the prescribed examination upon completion
of their mandatory tours of active duty. It is also
possible to be commissioned directly from civilian life
and placed immediately on active duty. 'Three distinct
groups enter OCS: graduates of Suvorov or Naklibnov
cadet schools, young Wren who apply directly front
civilian status, and noncommissioned officers on
active duty who seek careers its officers. Officers serve
at the convenience of the government rather than for
specified periods. Officers can he called up front the
reserves on it voluntary basis or by conscription for
to 3 -year periods in the case of officers tinder 30 wars
of age. Of approximately 3.8 million officers and
enlisted rues in the armed forces, approximately 75%
are enlisted conscripts, I05c arc extended service
personnel, and IWi are officers.
The standards of physical fitness for service in
peacetime are revised frequently depending on the
number of men required for a. given year as compared
with the number available and the physical conditions
of the mein in the recruitment age group. Potential
conscripts can receive permanent exemptions or
temporary deferments from military service. Between
5Sfi and 10% of it given class is usually determined to
he physically unfit for peacetime military service.
Exemptions are give to these having family hardship
cases, and deferments are granted to those attending
institutions of higher learning.
The Soviet Union, through the application of its
Universal Military Service L.a%%, has developed an
effective reserve system. The 1.tw provides for two
categories of reservists. Category I consists of all men
who have served at least I year of .:dive cluty in the
armed forces. Category 11 reservists are� those who have
served less than 1 year or who for various reasons were
not called up for active duty. Reservists (ages 18 to 50)
are estimated to number about 20 million -10 million
each in Category I and Category II. Postservice
training requirements are established by tite Universal
Milt any Service Law for both officer and enikled
Category I and Category 11 reservists. The frequency
of cal!up for training and the duration of training
periods vary according to age group within each
category.
The voyenl onzal or military commissariat system,
existing at r(-public, oblast, and ration administrative
levels throughout the U.S.S.R., is an effective
instrume�.` for mobilization of manpower. The district
military commissariat, at the base of the mobilization
apparatus, makes mobilization assignments in
accordance with specialist qualifications. The district
military commissariat would be informed of general
mobilization probably within 2 or 3 hours following
the decision to mobilize. Couri ^rs would he sent out
immediately to notify reserve personnel being called
up in the first stage of mobilization. Insofar as
possible, reservists are assigned to units located near
their homes. About 1.7�") million reservists would be
required to bring the existing ground forces up to
wartime strength. This could he accomplished within
a very short time using only Category I reservists who
have completed active duty tours within the past 5
years. By utilizing all remaining Category I as well as
Category II reservists, several hundred additional
divisions could he formed. I lowever, the time re(Inired
to equip these divisions would depend entirel- on
production capacity since there is no evidence of
ii
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mobilization equipment stocks currently available to
supply more than the existing units of the ground
forces. It is believed that in time of war the Soviet
merchant fleet would he subordinate to the navy.
Many merchant marine crewmen are believed to have
assignments as naval reservists, and most merchant
marine officers hold commissions in the naval reserve.
The manpower in the Soviet fishing and river fleets
also would provide the navy with a reservoir of
experienced seamen to draw upon in wartime.
2. Strength trends (S)
"Trends in the number of men under arms are shown
iu Figure 2. Included are estimated levels of
uniformed personnel during each of several significant
years since 1945 in the ground, naval, air, and rocket
forces, the regular military establishment as it whole,
and the militarized security forces represented by
frontier and interior troops of various state security
agencies.
Motivated by political, economic, and strategic
considerations, Khrushchev in early 1960 announced
his plan to reduce total military manpower. By early
1961 the Soviet forces had been reduced to
approximately 3.2 million. Here reductions stopped
temporarily; actually the impulse of the Berlin crisis,
followed the next year by the Cuban confrontation,
caused temporary increases. The downward trend was
resumed in late 19C. During the next 3 years the air
defense forces and strategic missile forces were
expanded, while decreases took place in the theater
field forces.
3. Training (S)
The generally high quality of the military forces
results in large measure from the coordinated training
Of all components. Ground, naval, and air elements
ore provided with good training facilities and are
almost continually engaged in individual training and
unit field exercises, culminating in frequent joint
activity. Most common are ground -air and sea -air
exercises, with cooperation among all three types of
forces limited generally to air defense and occasional
amphibious exercises.
Under the Universal Military Service Law all
youths must receive introductory military training
prior to callup for active service. Th training is to be
conducted at general- education sell. )Is beginning in
FIGURE 2. Personnel strengths of the armed forces (S)
(Thousands)
ue Data not available.
'For this year only, naval air persuanel included in air forces strength.
H
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STRATEGIC
GROUND
NAVAL
AIR
ROCKET
ESTIMATED
SECURITY
DATE
FORCES
FORCES
FORCES
TROOPS
TOTALS
FORCES
World War II peak (May
1945)
10,000
600
1,000
11,600
700
January 1946...........
5,000
695
705
6,400
600
January 1947...........
2,8(`0
695
555
4,050
500
Janu -y 1948...........
2,600
695
505
3,800
400
January 1950...........
2,650
695
555
3,900
400
Jrnuar, 1951...........
3,400
695
605
4,700
400
January 1953...........
3,400
745
655
4,800
400
January 1955...........
3,000
7P5
705
4,500
na
January 1958...........
2,700
660
640
4,000
300
January 1960...........
2,500
560
590
3,650
250
January 1961...........
2,200
480
535
3,215
250
January 1963...........
2,000
505
540
185
3,230
225
January 1965...........
1,700
450
510
200
2,860
225
January 1967...........
1,950
455
500
230
3,135
225
January 1968...........
2,035
465
500
325
3,325
225
January 1909...........
2,200
470
477
336
3,483
225
January 1970...........
1,149
470
5':0
339
3,468
225
July 1970
2,139
470
510
375
3,494
250
July 1971
2,245
470
510
375
3,600
250
July 1971
2,245
470
555
375
3,645
250
June 1973
2,330
470
573
:375
3,748
250
ue Data not available.
'For this year only, naval air persuanel included in air forces strength.
H
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the ninth grade, in specialized secondary educational
institutions, and in ,nnical vocational schools.
Instructors are to be military personnel. Young boys
not in schoo, arc to receive introductory military
training at training centers set up at factories,
iiistitutions, and organizations, and on collective
farms.
For training of specialists and reservists, the Soviet
Union relies heavily on the joint scmimilitary
organization DOSAAF. DOSAAF activities, strongly
supplemented by propaganda, promote popular
support for the armed forces, especially through the
various programs conducted for youth. The
curriculums ii,clude extensive studies in military
science as well as training in marksmanship, vehicle
driving and maintenance, communication techniques,
and many other areas, which help to produce it large
reservoir of trained and se�nitrained personnel
available to the armed forces. The clubs of DOSAAF
also provide annual proficiency tests for reservists.
The armed forces conduct well organized and
effective officer training programs through a .wide
network of branch and higher level schools, where
personnel are thoroughly educated in political and
military subjects. Although centrally coordinated, the
majority of military schools are organized and
administered by the individual branches, with
relatively few institutions devoted to the training of all
arms and services. A notable exception to this division
in military education is the Higher Military Academy
of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the
U.S.S.R, (formerly knowp as the Voroshilov Higher
Military Academy). 'this is the highest level military
institution, and it is attended by high ranking officers
of all branches of the armed forces. Interarm
cooperation is taught at the other military educational
establishments, but as it subsidiary aspect of branch
training.
Officers of some foreign military forces are trained
in Soviet military schools. The majority of such
personnel represent Communist states, particularly
those of Eastern Europe, with sonic Middle East Arab
and nonaligned states represented.
Inasmuch as "Tactical Aviation �a component cf
the Soviet Air Forces �is assigned to military districts
and groups of forces, field training for land warfare
includes extensive activity featuring joint ground -air
operations. Ground forces offensive and defensive
missions in all large -scale exercises and maneuvers are
supported by fighter aril bomber aircraft of tactical
air armies. Moreover, as evidenced by observation of
the Soviet forces in East Germany, the yearly training
cycles of both tactical air and ground forces closely
coincide. This correlation of training programs also
prevails within the U.S.S.R., and at times other
components of the air forces are employed to support
tactical components.
joint training is considered at least as important in
the navy as in the ground forces. The naval fleets each
have organic fleet air forces of land -haled bomber,
mine- torpedo, reconnaissance, and transport aircraft,
-is well as helicopters. Cooperation is regularly
practiced betwee this shore -based naval aviation and
the surface and submarine units afloat.
The operational training of airborne and air defense
forces always involves closely coordinated activity. In
both cases, surface and air elements are organized with
the aim of insuring and increasing the efficiency of
joint operations. Airborne elements conduct field
training with their assigned transport aviation,
including fixed and rotary-wing units. Air defense
forces, in concert with elements of the ground and
tactical air armies in tho field, regularly engage in
practice alerts in which surface -to -air missile units,
and fighter aircraft act together in defense against
simulated enemy attack. Naval surface units also
cooperate with vir defense forces, conducting early
warning and intercept operations over water, ports,
and naval shore installations.
Despite its limited and unsatisfactory war
experience in amphibious operations, the U.S.S.R. is
showing renewed interest in this form of offensive
action in tr :Aining programs, particularly since the
reactivation of the naval infantry in all four fleets.
Evidence suggests there are only small numbers of
exercises and maneuvers to train ground, naval, and
air components in joint amphibious assaults.
However, the amphibious training program ap-
parently is current and well developed, including, for
example, simulated atomic play.
4. Military 'budget (S)
u. Economic support
'Che strength of the economy is a key elemer', of
Soviet military power, with the defense establishment
enjoying it high priority in the allocation of resources.
The U.S.S.R., with the world's second largest
industrial base, is virtually self- sufficient in food,
industrial raw materials, and fuels. 'There is relatively
little dependence on foreign trade. Economic growth
of about 5% to 6% annually enables the U.S.S.R. to
increase its military programs at a similar rate.
The gro: forces materiel industry produces large
quantities of weapons and equipment for Soviet forces
as well as the hulk of materiel for other Warsaw Pact
9
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countries. Of the complexes producing ground forces
weapons, some 16 sizable plants are at least partially
engaged in producing armored personnel carriers,
armored tracked prince movers, artillery, infantry
weapons, and tanks. Of these plants, three are final
assembly plants for tanks, four for armored personnel
carriers, and nine for the manufacture of artillery and
infantry weapons. Ammunition production facilities
are extensive: 37 final assemblers are supported by
numerous plants making components, explosives, and
propellants. About 50 plants in the large electronic/
telecommunication industry produce the hulk of
milit wire, radio radar, aucl other electronic
equipment. Military output, ranging from simple
components to highly complex devices, accounts for
nearly 75i of total domestic electronics production.
The motor vehicle industry has nine major plants
proder -img vehicles used by the military. Other
segments of industry provide the chemical, engineer,
medical and quartermaster equipment and supplies
required by the awned forces. Most of these plants are
dual- purpose facilities, manufacturing both military
items and consumer goods, and constitute it large
industrial rnobilizration base. In case of %var, the
U. S. S. R. would he capable of meeting its own
requirements for ground forces weapons and
equiprent and, in addition, could supply substantial
quantities of materiel to other members of the W arsaw
Pact.
All ships added to the naval inventory in recent
years have been built in Soviet shipyards, except for it
few class_s of amphibious and auxiliary ships r;; East
European origin. Naval shipbuilding is performed
both in yards specializing in naval construction and in
yards building both na..0 and merchant ships.
Current construction programs include nuclear and
conventionally pow submarines, an aircraft
carrier, guided missile cruisers and destroyers, escorts,
submarine chasers, mine w ;.rfare craft, amphibious
craft, and auxiliaries. New constnucti �u programs are
being augmented by subnmritue and surface ship
conversion programs. A number of naval repair yards
arc� available, though hard pressed, to support the
expanding Soviet fleet. In the event of mobilization,
there is sufficient shipyard capability to satisfy
itch:, .-.sell demands on the ship construction and repair
industry.
The aircraft industry, second in size only to tl.at of
the United states, is capable of producing aircraft of
all hypes and complexities. It is a high- priority industry
which claims a large investment in production and
research facilities and employs a significant share of
the country's engineering and technical personnel.
The industry not only fulfills domestic military and
civilian requirements for aircraft but also provides
military and transport aircraft for sale abroad. Most
airframe and engine plants have some capacity for the
manufacture of consumer goods, production of which
helps provide: stable employment for labor in an
industry noted for wide fluctuations in output. 'rhe
facilities are believed to be sufficiently balanced so
that engines and components would be available to
support it maximum production effort in the airframe
plants. [n general, the industry makes use of it fairly
narrow range of off- the -shelf engine types to power its
military and civil aircraft. The industry is striving for
and attaining improved quality in the aircraft heing
produced. Soviet production of aircraft since World
War 11 has been characterized by a decline in numbers
and a substantial increase in airframe weight. The
newer aircraft have improved capabilities, greater
efficiency, and longer service life. As a matter of
policy, the U.S.S.R. satisfies many of its light aircraft
needs by imports from other Warsaw Pact countries.
Tile U.S.S.R. produces space launch vehicles and
surface -to- surface, air -to- surface, and air -to -air
missiles of great sophistication and in sufficient
quantity to satisfy both domestic and export
requirements.
h. MiYtary budget
The military budget is prepared annually by the
Minister of Defense in coordination Nvith the
Chairman of the State Planning Committee and the
Chairman of the Military Industrial Committee. As a
portion of the state budget, the military's planned
expenditure is reviewed by the Council of Ministers.
This organization then presents the state budget to the
Supreme Soviet for approval. After approval, a single
defense budget figure is published for public
consumption.
'I'hc announced military budgets for the years 1970
through 1973 were a constant 17.9 billion rubles, an
increase of only 0.2 billion rubles over 1969 and 1.2
l.illion rubles over 1968. The-budget for 1974 is
slightly less, at 17.6 billion rubles. These announced
figures do not include the entire cost of the military
establishment, and provide no indication of the
distribution of funds to various programs or missions.
Additional military funds, mainly research and
development, are carried in other budget categories.
Because no useful military budget data are
published by the Soviet Union, estimates are prepared
by U.S. officials using indirect methods of analysis.
These methods are not undergoing review because of
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concern in the U.S. intelligence community over the
reliability of the results they have provided. Figure 3
shows U.S. estimates of the equivalent dollar value of
Soviet military spending for the years 1968 -72. These
estimates excluae all RDT &E (research, development,
test, and evaluation), military assistance, and nuclea-
warhead costs. For all the above reasons, these figures
should be viewed only as it rough approximation of the
equivalent dollar value and trends of Soviet military
spending.
5. Logistics (S)
The Chief of the Rear, who is it Deputy Minister of
Defense, either directly controls or coordinates all
logistic functions in the armed forces. His staff is one
of the principal armed force policy staffs and is
directly subordinate to the Minister of Defense.
Subordinate rear service directorates and departments
are found in the headquarters of the five force
components aril in all lower headquarters clown to
and including regiments.
The counterpart of the Chief of the Rear at
subordinate echelons is called the deputy commander
for the rear and is, in effect, commander of the rear
area. At each level the deputy commander for the rear
coordinates and /or supervises all logistic activities. fie
is responsible for the locati,rn of all installations and
units v ithin the rear area, and he supervises
transportation and local security. Specific respon-
sibilities of the deputy commander for the rear include
procurement and supply of fuel, lubricants, food. and
clothing; supervision of medical services, veterinary
services, salvage, and military labor; transportation by
road and supervision of road and rail maintenance;
and finance and pay of all personnel. His functions
apply not only to his own supply and service units, but
to those of the various combat arms and services as
well. At front level (the largest field command in
FIGURE 3. Estimated dollar value of Soviet
military expenditures* (S)
(Billions of 7972 dollars)
MISSION PROGRAM 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972
Strategic attack...........
9.5
10.0
9.5
8.0
8.0
Strategic defense..........
8.0
8.5
9.0
9.5
9.5
General purpose...........
25.5
25.0
26.0
27.0
27.5
Command and support.....
23.5
24.0
24.0
24.5
24.0
Total 66.5 67.5 68.5 69.0 69.0
*These estimates exclude all RDT &E, military assistance,
and nuclear warhead costs. These figures should be iewed only
as a rough approximation of the equivalent dollar level and
trends of Soviet military spending (see text).
wartime) the deputy com.ander for the rear
supervises it number of services which perform
functions of common support for the ground, naval,
air, aril rocket forces and also supports and
coordinates their respective technical services.
Services and supplies other than the cornmon -use
items provided by the Chief of the Rear are normally
furnished by the troop headquarters of the vari-us
arms and services. For example, engineer equipment is
procured directly by the engineer troops, ships are
procured by the t,aval forces, and aircraft by the air
forces. Artillery and armored vehicle supply also are
accomplished by the appropriate troop headquarters.
Artillery supply, in the Soviet sense, includes all
weapons and ammunition ranging from small arms up
through the heaviest artillery, including tactical
missiles, naval ordnance, and aircraft armament.
P.esponsibility for the procurement of these items is
centered in the r gain Missile and Artillery Directorate
of the Ministry of DefenI e. The procurement of
armored vehicles is also handled within the Ministry
of Defense by a technical directorate, the Main Tank
Directorate. At lower echelons of command the supply
of armored vehicles is the responsibility of the Chief of
Tank "Troops.
The procurement programs, as planned by the
various arms and services and by the directorates
within the staff of the Chief of the Rear, are
consolidated by the Ministry of Defense and then
coordinated with the various civilian ministries which
are concerned with production. Military inspectors
check production at factories and take over materiel
upon completion. Equipment is stored in central
storage depots in the interior of the country under the
control of the Ministry o,' Defense or of military
districts.
6. Uniforms and insignia (U /OU)
A decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of
the U.S.S.R., effective 1 January 1972, established the
new military ranks of praporshchik (ensign) and
michman (warrant officer), to rephlce the category of
extended service personnel in the Soviet Armed
Forces. Personnel prese;ltly serving on extended
service tours are permitted to serve out their terms if
they elect not to apply for the ,new ranks of ensign or
warrant officer.
The rank of praporshchik is used in the Soviet Army,
in coastal and aviation units of the naval forces, and in
the border and internal security troops. The rank of
niichman is used aboard ships and vessels, in naval
support coastal units, and in naval units of the border
11
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troops. The decree also established the rank of glavnyy
korabelnyy starshina (chief ship's petty officer) to
replace the rink of michman in its former sense
(warrant officer) for petty officers aboard ships and
vessels, in naval support coastal units, and naval units
of the border troops.
The title praporshchik is properly translated as
"ensign." However, because "ensign" implies
commissioned officer status and is currently used as a
commissioned rank in the United States Navy, it is
more appropriately translated as "warrant officer."
The rank of glavnyy korabelnyy starshina can also be
more appropriately translated as "senior chief petty
officer" in order to conform to an accepted usage
within the petty officers' rank structu,c.
a. Uniforms
Soviet Armed Forces uniforms, other than the field
uniform, may be grouped in three categories on the
basis of general design: for marshals, generals, and
admirals; for officers, warrant officers, and extended
service non commissioned officers; and for other
(conscript) personnel. Many changes have taken place
since the first regulations for the wearing of military
uniforms were published in February 1926. In July
1969 the Ministry of Defense published new
regulations which introduced several new uniforms
Ind uniform changes. New and improved fabrics are
now being used in the manufacture of uniforms.
Officers, warrant officers, and extended service
noncommissioned officers in the Soviet Army were
authorized a new parade off -duty uniform which is
blue -green for grou-cl forces and blue for airborne
troops and air forces personnel. An additional off -duty
uniform for marshals and generals includes a light
gray, double- breasted, open collar coat; white shirt;
black tie; and blue trousers. Conscript personnel,
students at military schools of the ground forces, and
military construction troops wear a new olive -drab
parade off -duty uniform consisting of a single
breasted, open collar coat; matching trousers; and
olive -drab shirt and tie.
The basic change to the service and field uniforms
was the replacement of the pullover tunic with
standing collar by a single breasted, open- collar coat.
Shoulderboards aril collar tabs on the service uniform
are in the color of the branch of service; on the field
uniform they are olive drab.
The uniforms of naval forces personnel remain
unchanged on the whole, except for the summer
service uniform worn by office:, warrant officers, and
extended service noncommissioned officers, c, hose
white and blue, standing- collar coats were replaced by
12
a white, double breasted, open- collar coax and a blue,
open- collar tunic, respectively. White shin. and black
ties are worn with the coat and tunic.
The new parade off -duty uniforms for officers :.nd
enlisted men in the ground and air forces and the
service uniforms for officers and enlisted men in the
naval forces are illustrated in Figures 4 and 5.
b. Insignia
Soviet personnel wear a variety of insignia to
indicate grade and branch of service. The grade of
officers is shown by varying numbers of stars and
stripes on the shoulderboards, the stars differing in size
and number according to the grade. In addition, naval
officers wear sleeve insignia of grade on several of their
uniforms. The rank of warrant officer in the ground,
naval, and air forces is indicated by two sm. stars
displayed on the shoulderboards. The stars may be
either gold or field -green ;n color, depending on the
service affiliation or the type of uniform worn.
Warra_it officers also wear insignia (chevrons and
stars) of gold braid on the left sleeve of the uniform to
indicate the number of years in service, as follows: one
narrow chevron -1 year; two narrow chevrons -2
years; three narrow chevrons -3 years; one wide
chevron -4 years; one wide chevron and one star -5
to 9 years; and one wide chevron and two stars for 10
or more years. The ranks of other enlisted personnel
are indicated by transverse stripes on the shoulder-
boards. Insignia are illustrated in Figures 4, 5, and 6.
Branch -of- service insignia are usually worn on collar
tabs. When the uniform does not include collar tabs,
the insignia are worn on the shoulderboards. Branch of
service also is indicated by the use of various colors for
the shoulderboards, collar tabs, cap bands on service
and dress caps, and piping c:n shoulderboards, collar
tabs, cap crowns, overcoats, and trousers or breeches.
Branch -of- service colors include: red for motorized
rifle troops; black for artillery, engineer, and tank
troops; and light -blue for airborne troops and
personnel of the air forces. Marshals, generals, and
admirals wear distinctive ornamentation on coat
collar lapels in lieu of collar tabs. The shoulderboards
of warrant officers in the ground and air forces are
made of colored braid -ed, black, or light -blue)
depending on the service affiliation and component.
The shoulderboards of naval warrant officers aboard
ships and vessels are made of black braid with white
piping. When shore- based, including the naval
infantry, they are black with red piping; for naval
aviation they are light -blue without piping.
Enlisted personnel in the ground forces display the
metallic letters "CA" (Soviet Army) on the
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PARADE -OFF DUTY
UNIFORM
SERVICE UNIFORM
PARADE -OFF DUTY
UNIFORM
13
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GROUND FORCES
PARADE -OFF DUTY
UNIFORM
CONSCRIPT
i
MASTER SENIOR
SERGEANT SERGEANT
PRIVATE PRIVATE
IST CLASS
SERGEANT
JUNIOR
SERGEANT
L
NAVAL FORCES
SERVICE UNIFORM
SENIOF CHIEF
PETTY OFFICER
PARADE-OFF DUTY
UNIFORM
CAREER NCO
SENIOR CHIEF CHICF PETTY OFFICER PETTY OFFICER
PETTY OFFICER PETTY OFFICER 1ST CLASS 1D CLASS
I I
SENIOR SEAMAN CAP INSIGNIA
SEAMAN JUNIOR PETTY OFFICERS
AND SEAMEN
AIR FORCES
1
MASTER SENIOR SERGEANT
SERGEANT SERGEANT
PRIVATE
1ST CLASS
SERVICE UNIFORM
AIRBORNE TROOPS
SERVICE UNIFORM
JUNIOR PE7t OFFICERS
ANn SEAMEN
7 C 77
r
FIGURE 5. Enlisted men's uniforms and insignia (U /OU)
15
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GROUND FORCES NAVAL FORCES AIR FORCES,
(MOTORIZED (ABOARD SHIPS AIRBORNE TROOPS,
Wd TROOPS) AND VESSELS( NAVAL AVIATION
FIGURE 6. Shoulderboards and insignia
warrant officers (U/OU)
shoulderboards. Enlisted personnel in the ground and
air forces also wear a distinctive shoulderpatch, which
portrays the insignia of the combat arm or service, or
the upper left sleeve of the parade and parade off duty
uniforms. Students at military schools of the ground
forces wear service stripes on the upper left sleeve
below the shoulder patch; the number of stripes
corresponds to the number of years completed.
Students at naval schools wear inverted chevrons on
the upper left sleeve to indicate the number of years
completed.
C. Ground forces (S)
The ground forces have been designed primarily for
exploitation of nuclear strikes and conduct of swift
offensive operations to defeat enemy troops and seize
enemy territory. In the European theater of operations
the ground forces are to destroy NATO troops and
rapidly dominate Western Europe. Their capability to
fulfill their doctrinal missions relies heavily on the
achievement of surprise and success of the strategic
strikes.
The ground forces have been undergoing a
continuous program of modernization and reorganiza-
tion since World War 11. Changes have been based
primarily on the development of new weapons and
equipment, modifications in organizational concepts,
and the formulation of new operational and tactical
doctrine designed for the conduct of war in a nuclear
environment. The most significant aspect of the
modernization and reorganization program in recent
years has been the emphasis on tanks and armored
personnel carriers, which has made both the motorized
rifle division and the tank division formidable
armored organizations by Western standards.
In addition, the introduction of new weapons and
additional standard weapons has given the ground
forces substantial increases in firepower at division and
army levels. This has been especially evident in three
important areas of artillery: field, antitank, and
antiaircraft.
Soviet field artillery continues to be increased in
both quantity and quality. The D-30 122mm howitzer
found in the motorized rifle regiments and artillery
regiments of the motorized rifle and tank divisions
continues to replace the older M -30. It is now
considered the standard 122mm howitzer in those
units. Some motorized rifle regiments have one or two
ext-a 122mm howitzer batteries for a total of 12 to 18
guns. lb.(152mm D -1 howitzers are considered
standard only in the artillery regiment of the
motorized rifle division.
The rocket launcher strength iLL both motorized rifle
and tank divisions is presently assessed as a standard
18 launchers. The 122mm BM -21 (40 -tube launcher
on a URAL -375 truck) is replacing both the 16/17
tube 140mm and the 12 -tube 240mm systems formerly
standard in motorized rifle and tank divisions,
respectively. The older types are still observed in
service, sometimes in a mix with BM -21's. A number
of the old 132mm BM -13 launchers are also present in
some units but are believed to be training weapons.
Soviet ground forces continue to improve antitank
gun and guided missile capabilities. The standard
assessed antitank equipment holdings of the motorized
rifle division include: 318 RPG AT grenade launchers,
18 manpack antitank guided missiles SAGGER), 27
antitank guided missile launcher vehicles (either
SWATTER or SAGGER), 18x73mm recoilless guns
(SPG -9), and 18x100mm antitank guns (M -55 or T-
12). Antitank capabilities are further increased in
those units possessing a full complement of the BMP
armored personnel carrier which, in addition to its
main gun and coaxial machinegun, is ca -able of
mounting a SAGGER missile.
Air defenses of the Soviet ground forces are
continually being upgraded by t introduction of
new weaponry, some conventional and some
sophisticated. At motorized rifle and tank divisional
level, the 24x57mm (S -60) antiaircraft gun, with its
radar caatmiled FLAP WHEEL fire control system, is
consider. standard. Some of the T -55 and T -62 tanks
have been retrofitted which allows the mounting of a
12.7mm antiaircraft machinegun on the loader's
hatch position to increase air defense protection.
Similar modifications have been noted to some of the
ASU -85 airborne assault guns. The QUAD 23mm
radar controlled ZSU -23 -4, while not fully issued to all
Soviet divisions, is now accepted as standard in the
self propelled antiaircraft batteries of both the
motorized rifle and tank regiments. Some tank
regiments still retain their ZSU -57 -2 and some
motorized rifle regiments also retain their towed
antiaircraft machinegun batteries. However, the short-
17
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range, IR- seeking missile BRDM -2 SAM system is
replacing the ZSU -2 and the towed antiaircraft
rnachineguns, thus giving the combat regiments a
mixed gun missile -air defense capability. The ZSU -23-
4 and BRDM -2 SAM's may in fact be organized into
respective regimental air defense battalions.
The SA -7 man portable air defense missile system is
issued down to combat company and battery level in
most cf divisions.
The Soviets have deployed the highly mobile, low
altitude SA -6 tactical air defense system with their
ground forces. This system organized as a regimental
level consisting of five firing batteries is normally
subordinate to the field army. The SA -4 provides
medium to high altitude air defense for the ground
forces. The wain contribution of the SA -4 to the
defense of tF, ground forces lies in its mobility. Tire
SA -4 system is replacing the SA -2 system at the front
arid army level. By replacing the SA -2 with the SA -4,
the Soviets in effect triple a SAM battalion's firepow
without a comparable increase in manpower.
Organized in brigade size units, consisting of three
battalions :rf three firing butteries each, the SA -4 will
normally be deployed at both front and army level.
Another new mobile low altitude SAM system, the
SA -8, is estimated to have performance characteristics
similar to those of the SA -N -4 naval SAM systern.
Although the organization of the SA -8 unit is still
speculative, it probably will be deployed at the
combat divisional level.
As the modernization of the ground forces has
progressed, Soviet helicopter forces have developed
increased flexibility. The heavy -lift helicopters already
have a greater lift capacity than any other helicopter
in the world. The present Soviet concept for the
employment of helicopter borne forces apparently
utilizes motorized rifle troops in coordination with
helicopter regiments.
Approximately 1,250 helicopters -260 (Mi-
6), 8 HARKS (Mi -10), 430 HOUND (Mi -4), 140 HIP
(Mi -8), and 420 HARE (Mi I and HOPLITE (M i-2)
are allocated by Military Transport Aviation (VTA) to
the tactical air armies within the U.S.S.R. and to the
Soviet groups of forces in Eastern Europe. Most of
these aircraft are unequally distributed among 19
known helicopter regiments. HOOK, FIARKE,
HOUND, and IIIP provide the basic heavy -lift and
assault capabilities. The smaller lift characteristics of
HARE and HOPLITL make therm more suitable for
liaison, reconnaissance, artillery fire direction, and
antitank warfare. Helicopter -borne assaults, as
demonstrated in Warsaw Part exercises, probably
would he employed in time of war to seize key areas
18
ahead of advancing armor. Exercises indicate that the
Soviets consider a reinforced motorized rifle battalion
as most adaptable for such a mission.
With the increased conventional artillery and
helicopter -borne assault capabilities, the Soviets have
exhibited a flexibility in practice which lends
substance to the possibility that war with NATO may
be, initially at least, conventional.
Concurrently, there have been improvements in the
missile and rocket systems available to provide nuclear
and chemical, as well as conventional, fires. FROG
battalions, standard in both motorized rifle and tank
divisions, are mostly equipped with four launchers,
either the FROG 3 or 7. SCUD tactical missile
brigades in the Group of Soviet Forces, Germany
(GSFG), and probably those in the Soviet western
border areas and along the Sino- Soviet border have
acquired a third battalion, increase ig the number of
launch vehicles from six to nine. In addition, five of
the brigades in the GSFG, at least, appear to have 12
launch vehicles each.
To satisfy the need for a tactical missile system with
the range and mobility suited to the needs of the front,
the Soviets have developed a 300- nautical -mile mobile
missile, the SS -12 SCALEBOARD. Equipment for the
SCALEBOARD has been observed at gr rand forces
installations, and it is likely that it would be used in
support of theater of operations. The increasing
availability of these varied rocket and missile systems
provides the theater forces with import i delivery
capabilities 'nor nuclear, chemical, and high explosive
warheads.
The requirement for improved logistical support
increased sharply with modernization and increased
mechanization of the ground forces. Soviet efforts to
modernize th--ir support elements as well as their
maneuver units have led to the introduction of tactical
pipeline units; greater emphasis on helicopters; the
appearance of new and better vehicles, including tank
transporters (Figure 7); and the development of
improved bridging equipment. The operating range of
vehicles throughout the theater forces has been
improved through the extensive addition of auxiliary
fuel tanks for the vehicles.
1. Organization
The Commander in Chief of the Soviet Ground
Forces participates in operational planning but is not
in the operational chain of command. Within the
Ministry of Defense, the responsibilities of the
Commander in Chief of the Soviet Ground Forces
include administration of the ground combat and
certain technical arms, development of tactical
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doctrine and training programs, and supervision of
training.
In the event of a major war, it is considered likely
that un intermediate headquarters would be found
between the General Staff and the fronts in order to
alleviate some of the command and control
responsibilities at the Moscow level. The So% i -ts have
used the term "Theater of Military Operations
TVIY which appears to apply to this organizational
concept.
The largest field command in wartime is the front,
formed from certain military districts and groups of
forces. It is a tactical and administrative unit
consisting of several ground armies, an air army, and
supporting combat and service units. In peacetime,
forces stationed outside the country, except for two
divisions in Mongolia, are under groups of forces
headquarters �one each in Czechoslovakia, East
Germany, Hungary, and Poland. The two divisions in
Mongolia apparently report to the Transbaykal
Military District.
Directly subordinate to the Ministry of Defense in
both peace and war are the 16 military districts of the
U. S. S. R. These are tactical and administrative
commands, organizationally similar to the groups of
forces. Being territorial in nature, military districts are
charged with severed housekeeping responsibilities
such as logistic support for schools, depots, and
miscellaneous military activities, as well as the
administration of conscription, reserve training, and
mobilization activities.
Ground armies are of two basic types combined
arms and tank; a typical combined -arms army would
consist of three motorized rifle divisions and one tank
division; a typical tank army would consist of three
tank divisions and one nsrtorized rifle division.
Combat support units in both types include a surface
to- surface guided missile brigade SCUD (SS -1), one or
two SAM regiments and /or brigades, one artillery
division (Type B) or brigade, an engineer regiment/
brigade, it ponton bridge regiment, an assault crossing
battalion, a signal regirnent, two signal intercept
battalions, an early warning battalion, a long -range
reconnaissance company, a chemical battalion, a
motor transport regiment, and intelligence elements.
Service support, including medical and quartermaster,
is provided in both types of armies by numerous units
subordinate to the deputy commander for the rear.
Many of the support units listed above at army level
also may be found directly subordinate to groups of
forces, military districts, and to the Ministry of
Defense. These v.;nuld be expected to become front
level units in wartime. A typical front would have an
artillery division armed with 152-mm gun howitzers
and 130 -mm guns. Two SS -1 brigades (or it follow -on
system) would provide front surface -to- surface missile
support with two SAM regiments and /or brigades
providing air defense. The SA -4 air defense missile
system utilizing the GANEF missile is used with the
field forces (Figure 8). Comhat engineer support of a
front would include a general- purpose engineer
brigade, two ponton bridge regiments, and three
assault- crossing battalions. Signal support would be
provided b.y a signal brigade, two signal intercept
regiments, and two ECM battalions and an early
warning regiment. A chemical battalion and
intelligence elements complete: the combat support
elements of a front. Service support would be provided
by a multitude of directorates, agencies, and units
subordinate to the front deputy commander fbr the
rear.
'rhe majority of line divisions are of two basic
types �the motorized rifle division and the tank
division. The main fire and maneuver elements of the
motorized rifle division are three motorized rifle
regiments, each of which consists of three motorized
rifle battalions transported in armored carriers,
supported by regimental reconnaissance and artillery
units and a battalion of medium tanks; a tank
regiment with three tank battalions; and it
reconnaissance battalion equipped with seven light
amphibious tanks (Figure 9). Division combat support
elements include an artillery regiment, a FROG
battalion, an antitank battalion, an antiaircraft
artillery regiment, a multiple rocket launcher
battalion (Figure 10), an engineer battalion, a signal
battalion, and a chemical defense company. Division
service support elements consist of a medical
battalion, a motor transport battalion, a maintenance
battalion, and other rear service elements.
The principal combat elements of the tank division
are three medium tank regiments, a motorized rifle
regiment, and a reconnaissance battalion. All these
units are practically identical in organization to their
counterparts in the motorized rifle division. Divisional
combat support includes an artillery regiment, a
FROG battalion, an antiaircraft artillery regiment, it
multiple rocket launcher battalion, an engineer
battalion, a si -nal battalion, and a chemical defense
company. Division service support consists of a
medical battalion, a motor transport hattalion, a
maintenance battalion, and other rear service
elements.
The ground f;rrces also have an airborne division
organized around three parachute regiments.
Supporting elements include an artillery regiment
with howitzer, assault gun, antiaircraft, and rocket
19
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FIGURE 10. 1 22 -mm 40 -round rocket
launcher on URAL -375 M1964 truck (C)
i
/f
avow
FIGURE 8. GANEF (SA -4) surface -to -air missile system (C)
launcher battalions organic to it. Medical, signal,
engineer, chemical defense, reconnaissance, and
service elenwitts complete the organization structure.
Some of the most significant developments within
the tank and motorized rifle divisions are expected to
occur in motorized rifle regiments. Following a trend
initially noted in 1971, many motorized rifle regiments
20
now have tank hath_!ions with 4! rather than 31 tanks.
['his organizational change increases the total tank
count in it motorized rifle division to 218 tanks,
bringing it more on a par with it U.S. mechanized
division which has 216 medium tanks.
The Soviets have shown an increasing willingness in
recent years to tailor the rifle regiment. Examples of
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FIGURE 7. MAZ -537 truck with lowboy trailer carrying T -62 medium tank (C)
FIGURE 9. Amphibious armored infantry
cva .6at vehicle, M 1967 (C)

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this are evident in those units to which additional
artillery, antitank guns, or an additional maneuver
battalion has i: subordinated. Additionally, the
low altitude BRDM -2 SAM system has been
introduced to replace the toyed antiaircraft
machinegun battery. The ZSU -23 -4 and BRDM -2
SAN1 tornbination greatly increases the air defense
capability Figure 1 1
The Soviets can he expected to continue the
modernization of ground forces while increasing their
capa.bilit� to fight both a conventional and it nuclear
ar in response to doctrinal requirements. The trend
to develop this capability can hest he observed within
the tank and motorized rifle divisions, where an
inereasin.; emphasis is being placed upon improving
the combat and service support capabilities. This
trend is evidenced by the improvements in equipment
and a corresponding increase in the size of the
divisions' logistical tail. The quantity and duality of
general- purpose cargo and special- purpose trucks
continues to increase. Also, certain units, such as the
division chemical company, have been enlarged in
order to provide more suup.?rt to t;w division.
2. Strength, composition, and disposition'
Personnel strength of the general- purpose ground
forces is about 1,570,000 Principal ground forces
organizations are: 21 combined -arms armies in(] tank
armies, 10 army corps, 109 motorized rifle divisions, 31
tank divisions, and 7 airborne divisions. The euncnit
deployment of t forces places the najority of the
divisions either in the groups of forces in Eastern
Europe or in the more strategic horder areas of the
'For detailed identification and locations of unit~ of the So%
Ground Forces. sec the current issue of the military Intelligence
Summary and Order of Battle Sunnmary, Foreign Ground Forces,
both published be the Defense Ink- Iligence Agency'.
FIGURE 11. ZSU -23 -4 anti-
aircraft weapon (C)
U.S.S.R., the greatest concentration being in the
western border districts and along the Sine Soviet
border. All command and control headquarters are
also in peripheral areas.
:3. Training
Training procedures, in genera, emphasize the
fundamentals of soldiering. Prior to the enactment of
the military service law cf t967, the conscript
underwent three I -year training cycles before he was
released from active duty. Under the 1967 law,
conscripts serve only 2 years; the biannual induction
has required an adjustment in the training cycle.
Noncommissioned officers in the ground forces
receive their training primarily within schools of the
regiments and separate battalions of divisions. In
peacetime, all regiments operate these schools to
suj; Ly noncommissioned officers for line duty within
subordinate units of the division's main arm.
Technical service noncommissioned officers for all
units of the divisions are provided by noncommis-
sioned officer schools operated by the ancillary units of
the division, such as the engineer, motor transport,
and signal battalions. In addition to the unit school
system, each military district and group of forces has
its own training units or schools which graduate
noncommissioned officers for the special troops of the
military district or group.
Officers are trained through a progressive system of
military schools. This network begins with cadet and
officer candidate schools or academies to the highest
military academies in the U.S.S.R. Among the more
important schools are the M. V. Frunze Military
Academy, the Military Academy of Chemical
Defense, the V. I. Lenin Military Political Acadeim,
and the Military Academy of Armored Troops.
21
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Courses range from 3 to i years. All activities of
these schools and academies are supervised by a
special directorate for military educational institutions
in the Ministry of Defense. In general, the military
school system has proved successful in developing
highly qualified leadership.
The sernirnilitary organization DOSAAF serves the
ground forces in two chief ways. First, since all citizens
above the age of 15 are urged to join DOSAAF, it is
able to provide preinduction training of an elementary
nature for several years prior to most youths actual
induction into military service. Second, this civilian
society develops for members of all ages certain
s;,ecialist skills which are of potential value to the
ground forces, such as motorcycling, driving, skiing,
parachuting, glider training, small -arms marksman-
ship, horsemanship, vehicular maintenance and
repair, and the operation of signal equipment. Local
chapters or clubs of DOSAAF usually stress those skills
applicable to a particular branch of service.
Appropriate equipment, as needed, is made available
from nearby military units. DOSAAF pla, an
important part in the compulsory military training
dictated by the 196; military service law.
Field training in the ground forces is conducted
according to an annual training program. Because of
the biannual induction, the training program has been
adjusted somewhat to include two 1 -month training
periods for inductees on arrival at their new unit. This
training is conducted separately and does not
significantly interfere with the simultaneous execution
of the regular training schedule. Regular units of the
division which contain trained troops may leave the
garrison area for field exercises, leaving the recruits
behind under it cadre of instructors to continue basic
training. On completion of each of the I -month
training periods, the recruits are integrated into their
assigned units and thereafter participate in the annual
training program. Under this concept, tactical combat
training up to army level may be carried out at all
times of the year. High -level combined and joint
exercises and both command post and field training
exercises also are held at any time during the year.
This training insures year -round combat readiness and
utilizes training areas, particularly those in Eastern
Europe, to the maximum. The nature of the training
program is essentially the same each year, except that
exercises are scheduled at different times and at
different locations and may emphasize different
aspects of tactics and operations.
During the period 1953 -65 ground forces training
featured nuclear settings, and all offensive and
d fensive field exercises were based on nuclear
22
scenarios. In 1965 the Soviets introduced a form of
flexible response to supplement their nuclear concept.
This plan calls for the use of conventional weapons
during the initial stages of a war with NATO and has
been evidenced by recent increases in conventional
artillery with ground forces divisions. The shift toward
a flexible response has not reduced the importance of
nuclear firepower nor has it changed the mobile
dispersal posture of the battlefield for tactical
operations.
Warsaw Pact exercises also represent a major feature
of the training program. These exercises generally
involve ground forces of at least two or more Warsaw
Pact countries training together several times a year.
Normally these exercises will be capped by one major
Warsaw Pact exercise directed by the Warsaw Pact
command or the General Staff in Moscow. These types
of exercises familiarize East European personnel with
Soviet communications systems and procedures as well
as increase the competence of staff personnel in all
aspects of combat operations. The Warsaw Pacts
conduct of numerous exercises over widespread areas
indicates interest in the testing of contingency plans in
all areas opposite NATO.
Overall, a comprehensive program of training and
exercises insures the maintenance of the combat
readiness of the ground forces, particularly in units in
Eastern Europe opposite NATO.
4. Logistics
In the U.S.S.R., logistic support is planned in the
Ministry of Defr by the Chief of the Rear on the
basis of plans drawn up by the General Staff of the
Soviet Armed Forces. At each echelon from front down
through regiment, the deputy commander for the rear
coordin�tes and supervises all logistic activities,
whether performed by elements directly subordinate
to him or by other elements of the headquarters and
staff. He provides the logistic part of staff planning
and directs the use of all transportation facilities. He is
directly responsible for the supply of common -use
items such as rations, clothing, fuel, and medical
supplies. He coordinates and supports the supply and
service functions performed by combat arms (such as
supi:ly of weapons and ammunition by the artillery
arms).
Each military district commander has administra-
tive control over units located within his area. He
provides logistic support for them through a system of
military district depots under the deputy commander
for the rear of the district. These depots draw from the
central depots of the Ministry of Defense which are
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strategically disposed throughout the U.S.S.R. The
hulk of the strategic reserves of military mat, riel and
suppiies is maintained in the central depots, while unit
mobilization reserves are kept either with the units or
in the military district depots.
Wartime supply of troops in the field is
accomplished through depois assigned at front and
field army levels. Front level depots may deliver their
stores to army forward or rear depots or divisional
supply points. The impetus of supply is forward; rail
transportation is used as far forward as possible,
although increased motorization at all levels and
product pipelines have materially increased transpor-
tation capabilities.
Recent doctrinal, organizational, and logistic
developments indicate the increasing importance of
road transportation for unit movement. Roads are
considered to be less vulnerable to permanent
disruption than railroads, arm more easily repaired,
and provide alternate routes and bypasses in greater
number than rail. The increased emphasis on mobility
has led the Soviet Union to develop and produce a
new generation of vehicles with good cross country
performance and greater load capabilities. Trucks now
issued to troops range in size from light weight, air
droppable vehicles to large 8x8 vehicles capable of
transporting tactical missiles and their launchers, and
of towing heavy missile systems, artillery, and tank
transporters. The predominant load carrier now in the
Soviet Groups of Forces' motor transport units is the
6x6 UI[A1. 375 (4.5MT capacity) with a 5MT trailer;
however, the U11nr.,377 (7.5MT capacity), a 6x1
version of the URAL 375, is appearing in increasing
numbers in the GSFG. The 'Ln., GAZ, and KRAZ Variety
of trucks continues to be employed throughout the
Soviet Army.
The maintenance system has undergone consider-
able modernization since World War II. Not only are
repair facilities more numerous and extensive, but
their technology, versatility, and general efficiency
have increased. The system appears adequate For
pr- -sent needs of the ground forces. Modern repair and
recovery units are at all echelons, and continuing
emphasis has been placed on the training and
procurement ,f technicians. Maintenance Iactrinc
emphasizes the repair of equipment and vehicles as
close to the front lir� as possible, either by the users of
the equipment or by mobile repair crews sent out by
the parent unit or a higher echelon. Where on- the -spot
repair is riot feasible, speedy evacuation is
emphasized. Separate evacuation battalions are
organized at army level for removing damaged
vehicles to repair bases at division and higher
echelons. Heavily damaged tanks, truck,, and field
artillery pieces are evacuated to plants in the interior
for rebuilding or scrapping.
Military stockpiles of ground forces materiel are
believed to be sufficient to equip fully the lin
divisions at wartime strength, although ;n some
divisions, as well as nondivisional support units,
certain motor transport and engineer items would
have to be mobilized from civilian resources. Since
World War II the quality of ground forces materiel has
continually improved with the introduction of a wide
range of new types of equipment, including missile
and combat vehicles. Due to the uneven distribution
pattern of equipment, however, many of the older
models remain in service.
D. Naval forces (S)
Soviet naval policy has three broad objectives: to
contribute to the national deterrence capability, to
defend the Soviet Union from maritime attack, and to
support Soviet interests abroad and at sea. To meet
these objectives the missions of the navy are to:
counter the threat from hostile strategic forces and
hostile naval forces generally; interdict sea lines of
communication; defend the offshore zone; support
land operations; contribute to strategic deterrence
and, upon commencement of hostilities, attack
strategic land targets; and support Soviet policies
abroad.
The navy's main operational forces are divided into
four fleets Baltic, Black Sea, Northern, and Pacific.
The majority of the missile and long -range attack
submarines are based in the Northern and Pacify;:
fleets. While each of the fleets is capable of
accomplishing its assigned missions without recourse
to immediate support from another area, geographic
and climatic factors limit Soviet access to the open
ocean and prevent pid reinforcement and resupply
among the four widely dispersed fleet areas.
Despite the large naval forces available to them at
the outbreak of World War 11, the Soviets, generally
regarding their navy as the seaward extension of the
ground forces, failed to make effective use of their
seapower. After the war, the Soviet Union set about
reconstruction of its devastated naval and shipbuild-
ing facilities embarked upon an extensive naval
construction rogram designed to transform the
U.S.S.R. into a major naval power. This program
concentrated on producing large numbers of cruisers,
destroyers, mine warfare ships, and long -range
submarines. Current ship construction programs
encompass guided missile cruisers, frigates, destroyers,
23
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and patrol boats; armphibious and mine warfare ships;
logistic support ships; and nuclear powered ballistic
missile, cruise missile, and torpedo attack submarines.
Construction is also underway on an aircraft carrier
which is expected to c�arrw ve rtical or short -take -off
and landing /S't'Ol.) aircraft and helicopters. Its
specific role is its vet unknown. Present :vnstruction
reflects Soviet determination not only to meet their
needs for dete rrence and wartime defense of the
homeland, but also to have the capability to deploy
creditable naval forces wvorldvd(i, in support of foreign
policy.
During the period 1947 -57, the Soviets completed
19 cruisers, more than 100 destrovers, 72 destrover
escorts, nearly 1,000 patrol craft of various types,
about 330 tn�nesweepers, a number of auxiliary types,
and about 350 submarines (m ore than three- fourths of
which were of postwar design). This program had
actually begun to level off in about 1956, wht the
changes in Soviet naval thinking that probably
followed upon Stalin's dcath in 1953 began to take
practical 41'Cet. These changes took into account the
advance~ in naval technology, particularly nuclear
propulsion for submarines, nuclear- arined missiles,
and modern electronics, and aimed at the qualitative
rather than quantitative improvement of Soviet naval
capabilities. The naval building program declined
sharply after 1956, but by 1958 the first missile
equipped surface ships and submarines began to,
appear.
In the raid- 1950's two of the Sverdlov class light
cruisers ware converted to SAM guided missile cruisers.
One was subsequently scrapped; the other still serves
the Black Sea Fleet. By late 1959 two classes of guided
missile destro\ers and two classes of guided missile
patrol boats were in service. "I'bc KII,DIN, was
constructed oil a KOTIJN hull, served as the first
guided missile destroyer (D)GS). It was followed by
the KRUPNYY class DDGS (the first seriallw
c�onstrurted DDGS built as such from the keel up),
.which is armed with a single SSM launcher fore and
aft.
Since 1959 the development of missile arnainent in
the navy has proceeded at it rapid pact'. In 1962 the
first of four k)*NI: 1 class guided missile light cruisers
(CLUM) was completed. It incorporated both SSM
(eight missile launchers) and SAM (one twin SA -N -1
launcher) annanlent. The SSM is the SS -N -31), which
has o likely maximum operational range of 150
V;1'fo code na:n:�s assii,ned to ship topes, missiles, aircraft, and
electroni.� near are indicated hs the use of caps. Ship classes hued
nn knm%n name. of Sosiet ships are italicized (e.t;.. Scerdloc clues
li�ht croiu�r!.
24
nautical miles. Also in 1962, the first KOTLIN clan
destroyer was converted to carry a hvin SA -N -I
launcher aft. In 1963 a new gas turbine- propelled
guided missile frigate (DLG), the KASHIN class, was
completed. I'� armament includes two twin SS -N -1
SAM launchers. The KRESTA I class CLGM, which
has two twin SS -N -3 SSM launchers and two twin SA-
N -1 SAM launchers, was completed in 1967 (Figure
12).
Four KRESTA I class CLGM are now operational
and class construction has terminated. In 1967, the
first modified KRESTA I class CLGM, designated
KRESTA 11, was launched (Figure 13). The KRESTA
II is fitted with an improved SAM system, the SA -N -3
G0B1,ET.
In 1968 the Moskva, the first guided missile
helicopter ship (CHG) (Figure 14), became
operational; a second, Leningrad, became operational
in mid 1969. 'These units are armed with two twin SA-
N-3 GOBLET launchers and a twin SUW -N -I
antisubmarine launcher which fires the FRAS -1
weapon. The primary mission of the helicopter ship is
ASW, but it is capable also of significant antiair
.warfare (AAW) and task force command ship
functions. Als.1 in 1968, the first conversion of a
KRUPNYY class ;uided missile destroyer (DDGS) to a
SAM configur was con and given the class
name KANIN (Figure 15). All SSM armament was
removed and replaced by additions! t=uns, ASW
armament, and SA -N -I SAM launchers. 'Phis
conversion progr will be completed when two units
in the Pacific are finished about 1975. 'The next
oddition in missile -armed combatants was the
NANUCIIKA class guided missile patrol gunboat
(P(;G) (Figure 16). The first of these became
operational in the summer of 1969. NANUCHKA's
surface -to- surface missile, housed in two triple -tube
launchers, is believed to represent it modification of
the SS -N -3. "I'hc horizon range capability of this SSM
is probably about 30 nautical miles. Using a [SEAR
(Tu 95), another ship or submarine, or a HORMONE
(Ka -25) helicopter for target indication, this weapon
could he fired to .I range of about 100 nautical miles.
A new destroyer class of about 400 feet, designated
KRIVAK class, carries one probable SSM launcher
and a point defense Sn Vi launcher forward and aft.
In early 1972, the first unit of the KARA class
Figure 17) guide(] missile light cruiser became
operational. This class, .which is similar to the
KRESTA 11 class, is the world's first ship to he
cgttipped with three missile systems (SS -N -10, SA -N -3,
Si; -N -4).
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FIGURE 12. KRESTA I class guided missile
light cruiser (C)
z a:u ':r^'.,.. ',r ,�r ','a,w.r *',max-- y..+': .a.:.
:...J.o- ,rr�... Jlr "..tl -.r V t'wOt
As of April 1973 the submarine force consisted of 24
classes, of which 13 were equipped either With cruise
or ballistic missiles. Since 1968, six new classes have
been added to the operational inventory: YANKEE
cl ass, nuclear powered, ballistic missile (SSBN);
CHARLIE class, nuclear powered, cruise missile
(SSGN) (Figure 18); V1C "COR class, nuclear- powered
(SSN) (Figure 19); ALFA class, nuclear powered
(SSN); PAPA class, nuclear- powered (SSGN); and
BRAVO class (SS).
Three (the YANKEE, CHARLIE, and N'ICTOR) of
the sir new classes titre second- gene ration nuclear
por:ered submarines, and the ALFA and PAPA may
he third generation nuclear powered submarines. The
PAPA appears to he similar to but considerable larger
than the (AIARLIE.
Although it was once in series production at
Severildvinsk in the Northern Fleet area and at
Konisomolsk" in the Pacific area, the YANKEE: class
SSGN is now constructed only at the latter vard.
Production at Severodvinsk has been discontinued in
favor of the newest member in the Soviet submarine
"For diacritics on place nanu�s see the list of n ;ones un the atnon
of the surnmary %iap and the map itself in the Countr Profile
chapter.
inventory, the DELTA class SSBN (Figure 20). It is 25
feet longer than the YANKEE class and is also
expected to he built at Komsomolsk. The YANKEE
class carries 16 1,300- nautical -mile, submerged
launched SS -N -6 ballistic missiles; the DELTA class
probably carries 12 4,200- nautical -mile, submerged
launched SS -N -8 ballistic missiles.
Unique to the navy is the diesel- electric or nuclear
powered cruise missile submarine. The navy's latest
entries into the cruise missile force are the CHARLIE
and PAPA SSGN classes. The first evidence of the
CHARLIE class was early in 1968 in the Northern
Fleet. The PAPA class was first observed in the same
area early in 1971. The CHARLIE class carries eight
SS -N -7 missiles in its bulbous how. The PAPA class,
which has a similar but larger bow, is estimated to
carry antiship cruise missiles also, although they have
not been identified. Unlike ether nuclear- powered
cruise missile submarines, the CFIARLIE and PAPA
classes are believed to have submerged- launch
capabilities. The range of the SS -N -7 is estimated to be
tiv to 40 nautical miles, but the range of the PAPA
class missile is not known.
Follow-on to the NOVENIBER Class nuclear
powered submarine is the VICT011 class, first
observed under construction at the Admiraltv
25
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FIGURE 13. KRESTA II class guided missile light cruiser (S)

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FIGURE 15. KANIN class guided
missile destroyer (C)
At pierside, with missile launcher and 57 -mm
antiaircraft mount covered by canvas
At sea, with equipment unshrouded
26
FIGURE 14. Moskva guided missile
helicopter ship (C)
FIGURE 16. NANUCHKA class guided missile patrol gunboat (S)
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Ship;crd in Leningrad. Like the (:l1ARLID' class
SSG1. the VICT011 became oper;tlional in 15168, it is
estiEri:ited to be the h istest sethmarine ill Ilse %vurld.
�.ith it inasi n�ton subinvi ged speed of i ll Ivast knots
The 1'1(:T011 class is in seriv production, 12 units
lta itig been built as of April 197.1
'11114. 1311AVO c�]ass sul>natrine. a small submarine
ilipr.iximutt I 220 Fret long. is probahlt tinder
votisin �c�tion it Kornsomolsk S11iptani. The 13111wo
vlass propu[sion ,Sce for %uhuierted operations and
the mission of the I3RAVO-c�laaarc� inickermined. It is
1 that the 11IIAVO class utilize. diesel
prnlmisieen in a %orfaved Coodition
is eif 1pril M73, ool% one unit of the A�]'A class
had ln�en observed, It is pruhablt nuclear J)"mc -rt,d.
\tthousat its cruet mission is not knouri. (11(� ALFA
cla is prob:thk :r prolottpe te platform for flit
Hurd Mi-nerition of nuclear %tibmitrines-
N nest vkl Soriet subinarint, vas sighted IZtle� ire
1970 olit�raflug at sea in Northern Fleet waters The
siebn �arine ;is sivIlled on the surface o perating;
indepcndenih and could lint I)v co rrelated to ans
knnnn 5oviel mlimarinv%. The hull of (1�t, sitbrnarirte
was rep orted to reseinhle that of it l,1lli.lt: class
nuclear powered cruise missile submarine (5SGX).
The oh%vrvc d length of 350 feet. howet er, ;ts much
kn9vr than Hie CIIAIiLIE c�luss length of 3(1R fret.
The s;til of th is tinit wits sirriilur to 111;11 of an 1:(:110
class SS {a', all(] the bow %ii s extremd\ brciad and
btikbom. Neither the propulsion nor the weapon
system oil this unit is kni mn; however, litielear-
po-wered propulsion is estimated. Became cif its
resvitiWanrt, to (he CIIA111.11: Class SSG\, it is
possible that this class mat incorporate a cruise- missile�
systein in the area Forward of the sail. Orile ..:tv unit of
the class has been observvil to date. Although [lo data
available indicate that the chm, is ill series procitictioii,
this stibrnarine has bec�rt desil;Eaatc�(I !':11' 1 chess SSG
first- geoerltion ballistic titiss"Ie subnuerinos (SS13)
;t�id nuclear- I)overed ballistic missile- submarines
(SS(:\) remain active its naval operif]onal tinits. The
C]U'l'I:I: to I!()'I'l:i. !I SSHN c�onvemion prorirn
as c�one�lncled earls ill 1970. whily the (.0 [.1 I to
COL. SS13 program continues (Figury 21 13 April
197 :3. 12 units had been converted to tbc�
configuration. While the GOI.F -I carries three� 300
n:tittic�al- rnilc�. su rfaced- ]nanrhrd SS -'I ballistic
missiles. both the- COIF -I I and 1 iO 1'1:1: II e�iurr tlire�r
7(H)- Efall(ic4l eililc suhinerged- launched Two
G01.1 units are unclerg;oii an e% eiulvil modifica-
tion indicating that file will he corifitgurvilcither than
the normal conversion to it COLF 11. One 1 10 1 1�;1. -I
tiiiit i estirnutt,c! tit hove peen converted (.e cnrr .is
missile. lu�tnchvrs. 17e�sig;iratcil 1i() "1'1.1: iI[. this Class is
probahly a n�soarch aitcl deveiopmelit missile� test
platform and as prokn wwd for the net -1?00-
2;
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FIGURE 17. KARA class guided missile light cruiser W/0U)

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FIGURE 18. CHARLIE class nuclear
powered cruise missile sub-
marine (U /OU)
28
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FIGURE 20. DELTA class nuclear powered ballistic missile submarine (U /OU)

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FIGURE 21. GOLF class ballistic
missile submarine (C)
nautical -mile SS -N -8 SLBM believed now operational
in the 13ELTA class. Similar conversion of HOTEL -II
to HOTEL -III are not expected. The last active
ZULU Conversion class SSB was placed in it reserve
training status in December 1972. The "LULU
Conversion carries two SS -N -4 missiles.
The Jder cruise missile submarines are the ECHO -I
and ECHO -I1, JULIETT, and WHISKEY etas- ^s.
Two Pacific Fleet ECHO -I nuclear- powered cruse
missile submarines have had their missile pubes
removed in the course of conversion to nuclear attack
submarines. The remaining three Pacific Fleet ECHO
I's will probably be converted to the ECHO -I SSN
configuration. The ECH04 SSGN carries six SS -N -3
cruise missiles. The ECHO -I follow -on, the ECHO -11,
carries eight SS -N -Ts. The maximum operational
range of the SS -N -3 is 220 nautical iniics. The
JULIETT class cruise missile submarine (SSG)
program concluded in 1969 with a total of 16 units
constructed. The JULIETT class carries four SS -N -3a
missiles and is the only diesel- powered cruise missile
submarine (SSG) actively engaged in out -of -area
operations. The navy's oldest operational SSG, the
WHISKEY class LONG BIN (four launcher) and
TWIN CYLINDER configurations, have not been
deployed out -of -area in recent years. The W1IT.SKEY
class SSG's have been restricted to in -area waters �the
Sea of Japan and the Baltic, Barents, and Black Seas.
Qualitative improvements in capabilities have been
evident in areas other than missile armament and
nuclear propulsion. Research and development efforts
in ASW since 1960 are apparent in the employment of
improved sensors and weapons. New models have
been installed in some units. For example, low
frequency sonars of 3.0 and 4.5 K1 1z plus it ,ariable
depth sonar (VDS) are fitted on the Moskva and
KARA classes, and 8.0 K11z bo%v sonars probably have
been fitted on KANIN and KRESTA II and KRIVAK
class combatants. The Moskva class has also been
equipped with the SUW -N -1 long- range(16- nautical-
mile) antisubmarine warfare (ASW) rocket. Con-
version of KRUPNYY SSM (SS -N -1) configured
guided missile destrovers to KANIN class SAM (SA -N-
1) configured guided missile destroyers, with improved
ASW dualities, continw i. Additional units of the
KASHIN guided missile frigate are under construc-
tion. A program to retrofit the KASHIN class with a
variable depth sonar and a helicopter platform is
underway. The stew general- purpose destroyer
KRIVAK, carrying both surface -!o -air and surface -to-
surface missiles, along with improved ASW
equipment, may serve as the replacement for the aging
Soviet conventional destrover and destrover escort
force and substantially upgrade Soviet open -ocean
capabilities. More important, new equipment is seen
as standard on the classes of ships in current
production.
Mine warfare has had it significant share of research
effort, resulting in a new acoustic- rising mine with a
considerable capability of selecting its target, and
which presents mine countermeasure problems.
Developments of Soviet mine countermeasure forces
have centered on the wooden hulled VANYA class
coastal minehunter, which first appeared in 1961. A
new minesweeper, designated ZHENYA, was added to
the navaistrength in 1970. This 143 -foot vessel may be
constructed of wood- reinforced fiber glass; if so, it
would be the largest ship in the world to be so
constructed. Only two ZUIENYA were produced and it
is believed they were prototypes for a glass- reinforced,
plastic -hull minesweeper.
During the 1960's, the gas turbine and combined
diesel and gas turbine propulsion systems were
introduced, and great strides were made in the quality
of support ships and auxiliaries. Improvements have
taken place in electronic equipment, particularly in air
search radar, communications, and electronic
countermeasures.
After languishing for almost two decades following
World War 11, the naval infantry was reactivated in
29
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1963 to provide it specially trained and equipped force
to spearhead amphibious landing operations. In
addition to this offensive mission, this elite force is also
assigned the defensive role of repulsing enemy
amphibious assaults. Since 1963, the Soviets have
gradually expanded their amphibious strength and
capability. The current strength is about 9,000 men
organized into about five regiments of about 1,800
men each with one regiment assigned to each fleet,
except the Pacific Fleet, which has two. Even though
the naval infantry force is small, it is growing steadily,
and landing exercises since 1968 indicate that the
Soviets are systematically developing the effectiveness
of the force. The equipment used by the naval
infantry is modern and of the best in use by the
infante and motorized rifle forces of the Soviet
Union.
At this time the Soviet amphibious forces are
structured and located for operations on the periphery
of the U.S.S.R. They have only it limited, long -range
seaborne assault capability. In certain circumstances
they could carry out small- scale, unopposed landings.
However, against significant opposition such a force
would have little utility. Amphibious units do
frequently deploy to distant areas. Since the end of the
Arab- Israeli War in 1967, the Soviets have normally
maintained one tank landing ship and two medium
landing si'nps in the Mediterranean. This represents an
amphibious lift capability of one battalion landing
team (433 men and associated equipment), although
it is riot known if such a team is actually embarked in
the Mediterranean ships.
Soviet Navy coasted defense forces comprise the
primary combat forces and equipment activated for
the defense of important installations in coastal
sectors. "These forces include personnel at coastal gun
and missile sites and their supporting echelons.
Although missiles constitute the bulk of the forces,
some naval bases remain partially dependent on gums
for their protection. The initial missile in the coastal
defense forces was the SSC -21) (SAMLET) missile.
This highly accurate system still provides protection
for major naval installations and straits on it point-
defense principle out to a distance of 25 to =15 nautical
miles from the coast. Improved capabilities have been
realized xvith the SSC -lb (SHADDOCK), a
transporter erector launcher -type 250- nautical -mile
missile, which is deployed in the Baltic, Black Sea, and
Pacific fleet areas.
Against this buildup of naval strength are arrayed it
number of weaknesses. The navy is handicapped
mostly by lack of adequate construction and repair
facilities in each fleet area. The physical separation
30
and the dependence on two fleets to provide most
major construction is one of the major weaknesses. A
limited open -ocean ASW capability and a vulnerabil-
ity to carrier launched air attacks remain a problem.
Current construction and conversion programs,
however, have emphasized ship and weapon
production designed to lessen these: problem areas.
The Soviet Navy also lacks it high -speed underway
replenishment capability. Underway replenishment is
usually accomplished by the stern -to -bow or bow -to-
stern methods, which are time consuming. Although
the navy is able to provide adequate logistic support in
peacetime with a combination of naval and merchant
ships, its lack of proficiency in alongside underway
refueling reduces flexibility and, in it conventional
war, would make the ships vulnerable to attack during
it replenishment operation.
The quality of naval personnel is generally high.
The top echelons of command have been infused with
dynamic and apparently well qualified younger men.
Rapidly advancing technology has placed a high
premium on profession- ulism, and junior officers have
found incentives and room for advancement.
Continued emphasis on complex exercises and realistic
out -of -area training will improve personnel efficiency.
1. Organization
Since March 19-33, the navy, as well as all other
services, has been under overall operational control of
the Minister of Defense. The Commander in Chief of
the Navy concurrently holds the position of a deputy
minister of defense. In this capacity he participates in
the formulation of top -level military policy decisions.
Within the framework of the Ministry of Defense
policy, the Commander in Chief of the Navy is
responsible for the overall control, administration,
development, training, and general state of combat
readiness of the naval forces. He exercises this control
through it main naval staff, a number of main naval
directorates, and the commanders of the several fleets
and flotillas.
The Main Naval Staff is the operations and
planning organ of the Commander in Chief of the
Navy. It is composed of it dozen 'or more subordinate
directorates and departments, each of which is
designated by a number as well as it title. The
directorates of the Main Naval Staff which have been
identified are: Operations (Ist); Intelligence (2d);
Observation and Coin munications (3d); Organization
Nth); Electronics (5th); Military Transportation (7th);
Cryptography (8th); Combat Training; Personnel;
and Training and Replacements. The Main Naval
Staff maintains close liaison with the General Staff of
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the Soviet Armed Forces, as well as with the staffs of
the several fleets and the one independent flotilla
command. Detailed information on the functions of
the Main Naval Staff is not available.
There are four other principal groupings of naval
services and directorates: Political, Naval Training
Establishments, Shipbuilding and Armaments, and
the Rear Services. Each group is heade t y a Deputy
Commander i- `hief.
'I he major operational forces are divided into four
fleets, one for each of the principal maritime
approaches to the U.S.S.R. These fleets are named
.'ter their respective geographic areas Baltic, Black
Sea, Northern, and Pacific. Each fleet is practically a
self contained force, having elements of naval
aviation, coastal and antiaircraft defense, naval
infantry, and the necessary rear services to support all
the forces ashore and afloat. The organizational
structure of it N :et headquarters parallels that of the
navy as a whole, with the fleet commander responsible
for all matters pertaining to his command. There are,
in addition, two independent commands: the Caspian
Sea Flotilla and lh- Leningrad Naval District. 'These
hav^ independent status directly subordinate, at least
in peacetime, to the Commander in Chief of the
Navy. In time of war they Would probably be
subordinated to the nearest major fleet.
Since 1964, the Soviets have maintain: -d a naval
fork in the Mediterranean called a squadron
(eskatlra). It has grown steadily in size and capability.
In 1972 it averaged 49 surface ships and submarines.
The political impact of the presence of this squadron
has given it international status roughly quivalent to
that of the U.S. Sixth Fleet. It is probable that the
Soviet Medi terra new i Squadron is now a permanent
force directly subordinate to the Commander in Chief
of the Navy.
2. Strength, composition, and disposition'
The personnel strength of the navy has remained
fairly stable at about 470,000 for several years. The
major fleet and flotilla strength consists of two guided
missile helicopter ships; 12 light cruisers; 14 missile
cruisers; 2 old heavy cruisers; -10 guided missile
destroyers; 38 destroyers; 105 destroyer escorts; and
310 submarines, including 63 ballistic missile
submarines and 66 cruise missile submarines. In
addition, there are 769 minor surface combatants, 370
mine warfare types, 229 amphibious ships and craft,
'Fur detailed information see the current issue of .Military
Intelligence Summary and the Automated :Vocal Order of Battle,
Volume 1, both published by the llefeuse Intelligence Agency.
and 725 auxiliary types. Some additional surface ships
are in reserve status (one cruiser, 23 destroyers, 14
destroye- escorts, and some minor combatants and
auxiliz Also, 73 medium- and short -range
submaroi� are believed inactive. These units could he
restored to active service if required. In terms of total
number of naval ships (but not total tonnage) the
Soviet Navy is the largest in the world. Figure 22
shows the disposition of the Soviet Navy.
The Soviets repeatedly have stated that nuciear-
powered missile- equipped submarines are tie main
striking force of their navy, and construction programs
reflect this. There is ample evidence, also, of efforts to
improve the ASW capabilities of the submarine force.
The VICTOR class has been built for an antisub-
marine submarine role.
3. Training
The navy operates a large netv.ork of training
establishments. All fleet areas contain schools for
enlisted men, officers, and future officers. Leningrad is
the chief center of training for naval officers and
officer candidates. Severomorsk, Sevastopol, and
Vladivostok are also important training centers. More
than 100 separate training establishments are
estimated to be in operation.
Unit training afloat and ashore is conducted in
accordance with tactical and operational doctrine
established for the navy as a Whole. Training is
constantly underway, is rigorously supervised, and
ranges in scope from squad drill to combined exercises
among the fleets of the Soviet European Communist
countries. Competitions and awards are liberally
employed as incentives for individuals and units to
attain high training standards.
Specialization is a basic principle of trainin;.
Separate higher naval schools train future officers for
line, line- engineering, shore engineering, submarine,
communications, aviation, coast artillery, and
political specialities, among others. It is usual for an
officer to serve his entire career within the specialty for
which he has been trained. Advanced specialization is
just as much a goal of enlisted training as it is of officer
training.
Political indoctrination is another important aspect
of training, just as it is in the everyday life of all Soviet
citizens. It is a standard feature in training afloat as
well as in units and schools ashore and occupies a
prominent part of all curriculums, training schedules,
and leisure activities.
Inductees iin it relatively short period of
recruit training, after which they are assigned to
operational units. The best qualified Oisted
31
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FIGURE 22. Disposition of active units of the Soviet navy (S)
BALTIC
BLACK SEA
NORTHERN
PACIFIC
FLEET
FLEET
FLEET
FLEET
TOTALS
Helicopter ships
0
2
0
0
2
Cruisers
6
10
6
6
28
Destroyer and escort types...........
43
*53
40
47
183
Minor combatant, mine warfare, and
amphibious types
422
*420
195
331
1,368
Auxiliary types
160
*172
200
193
725
Submarines
29
28
177
106
340
Total
660
685
618
583
2,646
*Includes three destroyer escorts in the Caspian
Sea.
**Includes 95 units in the Caspian Sea.
*Includes 16 units in the Caspian Sea.
personnel may be sent to specialist schools, with
consequent opportunities for advancement to petty
officer. Outstanding enlisted personnel are permitted
to apply for officer training in a higher naval school.
Until recently, however, preference was given to
graduates of naval preparatory schools or civilian
secondary schools.
Advanced training for officers is conducted at
officer specialist schools on a level equivalent to that
of the U.S. Navy postgraduate schools. One naval
academy in Leningrad, the Order of Lenin Naval
Academy, takes officers under the age of 36 who have
served in the fleet between 6 and 10 years and trains
them for senior staff appointments.
A number of naval repair yards are available,
though hard pressed, to support the expanding Soviet
fleet. Major naval repair yards are located at
Kronshtadt, Liepaya, Rosta, Severodvinsk, Sevastopol,
Vladivostok, and Petrovka. These repair yards are able
to provide all types of repairs, conversions,
modifications, routine maintenance, and overhauls.
The Soviets have and will. retain the capability to
build and maintain their fleet at a level which meets
their national requirements. In the event of
mobilization, there is sufficient shipyard capability to
satisfy increased demands on the ship construction
and repair industry.
5. Naval aviation
4. Logistics
All ships added to the Soviet naval inventory in
recent years have been built in Soviet shipyards,
except for a few classes of amphibious and auxiliary
ships of East European origin. Naval shipbuilding is
performed in yards specializing in naval construction
and in yards building both naval and merchant ships.
Current construction programs include both nuclear
and conventionally powered submarines; a large air
associated combatant; guided missile cruisers and
destroyers with increased ASW, antiair warfare, and
extended range cruising capabilities; escorts, sub-
marine chasers, mine warfare craft, amphibious craft,
and auxiliaries. New construction programs are being
augmented by submaune and surface ship conversion
programs.
Key naval ship construction yards are located at
Leningrad, Kaliningrad, Severodvinsk, Gorkiv,
Nikolayev, Kerch, Komsomolsk, Khabarovsk, and
Zelenodolsk.
32
Soviet Naval Aviation (Aviatsiya Voyenno-
Morskogo Flota), basically a land -based force, is an
integral component of the Soviet Navv. Naval
aviation has both tactical and strategic roles, but its
primary mission is the destruction of hostile surface
forces, with emphasis on the fast carrier strike force.
Additional missions include maritime reconnaissance,
antisubmarine warfare, destruction of enemy port
facilities, protection of the seaward flanks of the
ground forces from hostile surface forces, minelaying,
and, under certain circumstances, support of
amphibious operations.
Naval aviation crews are believed to be highly
trained in air -to- surface missile attacks against hostile
naval forces, and the acquisition of BEAR D aircraft
has greatly increased the naval aviation reconnais-
sance capability.
In recent years considerable emphasis has been
directed toward improving air antisubmarine v. arfare
capabilities through the introduction of new aircraft,
weapons, and sensors. In offshore areas these
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capabilities have been enhanced; however, despite the
introduction of the long -range BEAR F aircraft, Naval
Aviation open -ocean antisubmarine warfare capabili-
ties remain extremely limited.
The fleet air forces are administratively subordinate
to headquarters, Soviet Naval Aviation, Moscow,
through the Commander of Naval Aviation, who is it
deputy of the Commander in Chief of the Navy. The
four fleet air forces Baltic Flect Air Force, Black Sea
Fleet Air Force. Northern Fleet :fir Force, and the
I'acific Fleet Air Force �are operationally subordinate
to the respective fleet commanders.
Within the fleet areas the operational units are
organized into divisions, regiments, and squadrons.
While the division concept is evident in all fleets
among the medium bomber strike units, the
organization of reconnaissance and antisubmarine
warfare resources are oriented toward independent
units directly subordinate to the fleet headquarters
rather than to it division.
As of 1 April 1973, the combat aircraft strength of
:iaval aviation was estimated at 1,029 aircraft, which
is approximately evenly distributed among the four
fleet air forces, with emphasis on the Northern and
Pacific Fleet areas. The aircraft i�:, iude 45 heavy
reconnaissance BEAR D aircri 525 medium jet
bombers, 34 light jet bombers, 10 BEAR F long -range
ASW aircraft, 44 Mr11' land -based ASW aircraft, 93
MAIL ASW amphibians, and 278 MOUND and
1I01ILMONE helicopters employed primarily in the
ASW role. The BADGER C, which carries one
KIPPER (AS -2) missile or with it modification thus far
observed only in the Northern Fleet area, two KELT
(AS -5) or AS -6 air -to- surface missiles, and the
BADGER G (Figure 23), configured for delivery of two
A,S -5 or AS -6 missiles, constitute the primary striking
force of Soviet Naval Aviation. The MAIL (Figure
2 -1), XIAY (Figure 25), and HORMONE A (Figure 26)
are all employed in the ASW role.
FIGURE 24. Naval aviation MAIL (ASW) aircraft (C)
FIGURE 25. Naval aviation MAY (ASW) aircraft (U /OU)
'7r+ tom
FIGURE 26. Naval aviation HORMONE A (ASW)
aircraft (U /OU)
There are, in addition, about 190 transport aircraft
of various hypes assigned to the fleet air forces by
Military Transport Aviation. There are an estimated
45,000 personnel assigned to naval aviation, of which
10,000 are in operational units and support elements,
and 5,000 are at the Ministry of Defense level and in
preoperational training.
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FIGURE 23. Naval aviation BADGER G (C)

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E. Air and air defense forces
1. Soviet Air Forces (S)
The Soviet Air Forces' (\'oyenno- vozdnshnyye
Silt'� \'S) consist of bong Range Aviation, Tactical
Aviation, Aviation of Air Defense, and Military
Transport Aviation. These forces are being steadily
modernized and have strong offensive and defensive
capabilities.
Long Range Aviation (Oalnaya Aviatsiya- 1,13A),'
one of the three strategic offensive forces, has the
mission of striking targets of potential enemies with
nuclear or conventional weapons, performing armed
reconnaissance and homh- damage assessment, and
supporting naval and front commanders, as required.
I,RA crews are believed to be highly proficient in all
the basic aspects of strategic air operations:
navigation; bombing; air -to- surface missile (ASM)
strike procedures; staging; penetration tactics:
employment of electronic countermeasures (ECM);
and, for most heave bomber crews, in- flight refueling.
The total number of aircraft in the LRA bomber
inventory has gradually decreased, primarily through
BADGER attrition, but the BLINDER, BEAR, and
BISON inventory has retrained fairly stable since
1969. The capabilities of the force have been
improved by the introduction of the supersonic -clash
medium jet bomber BLINDEII (free -fall bomber and
ASM carrier) in 1962, the acquisition of an in- flight
refueling capability for about -10 of the BEAD force,
the introduction of the :350- nautical -mile KANGA-
ROO ASNI tQo BEAR units, the 250 nautical -mile
KITCHEN ASM into BLINDER units, the 120
nautical -mile KEI,T ASM and, more recently, the
i00- nautical -mile AS -6 into BADGER units. Figure 27
shows the LRA BEAR B aircraft. 13ISON (Figure 28),
the jet heavy bomber, is assigned only to LRA. About
55,0 of the BADGERS (Figure 29) are in I,RA; the
remainder are assigned to naval aviation.
Tacuc.,l Aviation (Fronlovaya Aviatsiya, literally
Aviation of the Front) is it multipurpose force. Its
mission is to provide counterair and close air support
for ground forces and probably to supp IWO Strany
in strategic air defense. Its employ, doctrine
stresses mobility and flexibility. It has i t good
capability for both tactical strike and defensive.
operations with either conventional or nuclear
weapons.
'fhe term Soviet Air Forces turd throughout this section dues not
include naval illation, an integral part of the Soviel Nav
"Additional detaik on this subjvct arc contained in the Def -mv
Intellegrncc Agency study Soriet long Range Aviation (AP- 2.10 -6-
I- 68 -INT), amended in April 1970.
3.1
FIGURE 27. Long Range Aviation BEAR B (C)
FIGURE 28. Long Range Aviation BISON B (C)
The overall strength of Tactical Aviation has
increased by 600 aircraft since 1968. This buildup has
been primarily along the Sino- Soviet border, including
four Soviet fighter units in Mongolia. The inc.-ase
consists mainly of older generation aircraft withdrawn
from storage and assigned to operational units. "There
has also [)evil a gradual increase throughout Tactical
Aviation of new reconnaissance units equipped with
late -model aircraft. The reequipment of "Tactical
Aviation with current model aircraft is continuing but
at it slow rate. Fighter aircraft include the FARMER
(MiG -19), FISIIBED (Mi(;-21) (Figure 30), FITTER
(Su -7) (Figure 31 FRESCO (MiG -17), it few
FIRE M11 (Yak -281)), and some FLOGGER. The light
jet bomber force consists of subsonic BEAGLE (11 -28)
a,.d supersonic BREWER (Yak -28) aircraft (Figure
1 2). Reconnaissance is performed by MANGROVE
(Yak -27), FOKBAT (Mig -25), and by versions of the
BEIAGI,E, BREWER, FISI-IBED, and FRESCO. All
fighters can he employed in multipurpose roles, i.e., an
air defense or ground support role. About 55% of the
fighters have un all- weather capability and are used
primarily for air defense. Roth the Bl ,AGL,F, and the
B111 "WER have an all weather bombing capability,
and both these aircraft can reach targets within it
radius of about 500 nautical miles. At least four
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FIGURE 29. BADGER A used
in Long Range Aviation and
in Soviet Naval Aviation (C)
FIGURE 30. FISHBED (MiG -21) used in Soviet Tactical
Aviation (C)
aircraft types (FISHBED, 14'I "1'TER, BEAGLE, and
BREWER) arc capable of delivering nuclear weapons.
Aviation of Air Defense (Avialsiya Prolivoyozdttsh-
noy Ohorony Slrany �APVO) is one of four functional
divisions of the PVO Slrany. Its mission is to provide
air defense of the U.S.S.R., especially for major
population, industrial, and military centers.
About 2i( of the APVO interceptor force is
composed of fighters introduced in 1957 or earlier: the
FR1? and FARMER. These subsonic or low
supersonic models are largely gun armed, limited to
tail attacks at ranges of a half mile or less, and have
little capability above 50,000 feet. 'I'hesc older fighters
are gradually being phased out of active units but may
be retained in a reserve status. A limited number of
FARMERS and FRESCOS are armed with AA -lb
(ALKALI) or AA -21) (ATOLL) missiles, providing
these aircraft with an air -to -air capability in the range
of 2 to 4 miles. Some 25% of the interceptor force
consists of the Mach 2 FISHPO"I'. 7'hc FISHPOT B is
armed with a first generation air -to -air missile (AAM
which limits this aircraft to tail attacks within a range
of 2 to 4 miles. 'I'hc FISF C, of which there may
FIGURE 31. FITTER (Su -7) used in
Soviet Tactical Aviation (C)
33
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FIGURE 32. BREWER (Yak -28) used in
Soviet Tactical Aviation (C)

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he as many as 100, is fitted with an improved air -to -air
missile and probably with it compatible airborne
intercept radar which may permit head -on attacks.
The remainder of the force is composed of new
interceptors introduced Ance 1964. The weapon
systems carried by these interceptors have longer
ronges and can be used in tw or more att ack modes,
thus significantly increasing Soviet air defense
capabilities.
The first of the newer aircraft to be deployed was
the all weather, low- and medium altitude FIREBAR
interceptor. The FIREBAR usually carries two AA -3
ANAB missiles, and sonic are modified to carry two
additional missiles. Radar or infrared homing
guidance on the ANAB, coupled with the aircraft fire
control vstem, enables the FIREBAR to conduct both
head on and tail attacks. FIREBAR h also been seen
armed with t1te ATOLL missile. The aircraft can
achieve speeds near Mach 2 at higher altitudes but is
limited to subsonic speeds at low altitude. Production
ceased on the FIREBAR in 1967. This aircraft is based
primarily on the periphery of the U.S.S.R., along the
se award and lowland approaches to strategic targets,
for defense: against low altitude penetration. In low
altitude defense the FIREBAR is used more effectively
over water or relatively flat terrain because of the
lirnited ground clutter suppression capability of its
radar. The lung- range, medium- and high altitude all
weather FIDDLER is another of the newer aircraft.
The 1 %DL.ER is armed with four AA -5 ASH missiles
which are usually carried in mixed loads of two
semi fictive horning or two infrared homing versions.
The FIDDLER is capable of attacking targets from
any direction. The third of these modern aircraft, the
mediunr and high altitude F!-AGON all- weather
point- defense interceptor, carries an Al radar and AA-
3 ANAB missiles. It can attack both head -on and from
the rear. 1 LAGONs have practiced low altitude
intercepts but do so infrequently.
The newest aircraft in the interceptor force is the
Mach 3 high altitude FOXBAT all- weather fighter,
first deployed with a 1 regiment in mid -1970.
FOXBAT carries a new air to air missile, the AA 6,
which incorporates infrared or semiactive radar
horning. There has been no indication that the
FOXBAT has it look -down /shoot -down capability,
although the aircraft is probably equipped with a new
radar.
Military Transport Aviation (Voyenno-transport-
nal,a Avialsiya� V'I'A) is responsible for deploying
men and materiel to meet war and near -war
requirements, and it operates an air logistic system to
supply deployed forces and support other Soviet
36
interests. VTA is committed to provide air transport
support to long- range, tactical, air defense, and naval
aviation; airborne troops; rocket troops; and special
missions under the control of the Soviet Air Forces.
A major recquipment program which began in 1960
has provided VTA with CUB (An -12) medium
turboprop assault transports a.,d the COCK (An -22)
heavy turboprop logistic transport. The CUB (Figure
33) can move men and materiel in close support of
combat areas. Most of these have been used to reequip
the element of VTA which supports airborne
operations �VTA Central (V'rA /CNT). One regi-
ment, at Orrnienburg, East Germany, is equipped
with the CAMP (An -8). The CAMP (Figure 34), used
for military logistic service and for parachute drop,
can operate into and out of selected unimproved
fields. The new long range, four engine heavy
turboprop transport, the COCK, first displayed in
June 1965, entered service in 1967. COCK (Figure 35)
is a long -range heavy logistic carrier. This transport
will provide it marked increase in airlift capabilities for
VTA /CNT. The COCK fulfills it long -term Soviet
requirement for a heavy transport capable of rapid,
long -range delivery of troops and larger, heavier
combat materiel than the CUB and CAMP can
handle. CO" is capable of transporting almost any
item of ground ordnance equipment, including heavy
tanks, radar vans, and tactical missiles.
The VTA /CNT, using the CUB as prime carrier,
can carry assault elements of two airborne divisions in
it parachute drop or airlanded operation to it distance
of 760 to 900 nautical miles, or it can transport a
division with all equipment in it ferry lift operation to
it distance of 1,400 nautical miles. Augmentation of
this capability can be provided within limits by the
civil air fleet. The CUBS assigned to the civil air fleet
are equal to three full- strength transport regiments.
Other assigned civil transports could be useful in an
initial attack. In addition to transport aircraft, the
VTA is assigned various models of helicopters. The
HOOK (Mi -6) (Figure 36) is it heavy transport
helicopter. The HIP (Mi -8) (Figure 37), it large single
rotor helicopter, has appeared in VTA.
Military 'Transport Aviation is a service organiza-
tion and, as such, is fragmented into transport units
deployed to various force commanders of the Soviet
Air Forces. The force commanders assume immediate
operational control of assigned transport units. Overall
operational and administrative control is retained by
he V'I'A commander which allows him to recall or
re.0 transports as necessary.
'I he operational chain of command of the V'I'A
flows from the Ministry of Defense to the Commander
in Chief, VTA. The major element of the VTA is
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'1+4 r.P"Yftfi l Er a 'k+nnt,p�.-
W T
FIGURE 33. Military Transport Aviation CUB
(An -12) (IJ /OU)
FIGURE 34. Military Transport Aviation CAMP (An -8) (C)
VTA /CNT which supports airborne troops and
performs other logistic support as required. VTA
retains operational and administrative control of this
unit.
a. Organization
The Commander in Chief of Soviet Air Forces, a
Marshal of Aviation, is also one of the deputy
ministers of defense, a member of the Party Central
Committee, and probably of the Higher Military
Council. As a member of the high command, he is
believed to participate in the planning and
development of strategy for employinent of the air
forces in conjunction with other force components
and, in this capacity, to participate in the issuance of
broad operational directives to the air forces.
The Commander it. Chief of Soviet Air Forces
provides overall supervision of the component forces in
matters relating to doctrine, organization, training,
manpower, and logistics. He is assisted by a first
deputy commander; three deputy commanders for
combat training, aviation engineering services, and
rear services; and the chief of the air forces main staff.
A subordinate commander for Tactical Aviation has
not been identified. Administrative functions related
to tactical aviation probably are provided by the air
farces main staff and it number of specialized
FIGURE 35. Military Transpc!t Aviation COCK (An -22) (C)
E4 01
f
r
FIGURE 36. Military Transport Aviation HOOK
(Mi -6) (U /OU)
37
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FIGURE 37. Military Transport Aviation HIP (Mi -8) (C)

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directorates within the air force headquarters. One of
these is the Military Council of the Air Forces,
believed to be an agency of the Communist Party,
within the Ministry of Defense.
Long Range Aviation is divided by geographic area
into three long -range air armies, each of which is
organized into medium bomber and heavy bomber
regiments. In addition, an arctic command supports
LRA aircraft operating in that region. This command
is under the operational control of the Minister of
Defense; administrative CY lta.a is exercised by the
Commander in Chief of the Soviet Air Forces. The
organization of LRA headquarters is similar to that of
air forces headquarters, but on a reduced scale.
Tactical Aviation is organized into 16 air armies.
Tactical air armies are a component of military forces
comprising waified or integrated commands assigned
to military districts within the U.S.S.R. and to Soviet
groups of forces outside the country. The size and
composition of each tactical air formation varies
according i'o need.
The organization of tits systems for command and
control of operations of Tactical Aviation ppears well
defined. The chain of operational command is from
the Ministry of Defense to commanders of military
districts, or groups of forces, to which air armies at the
field level are operationally subordinate. The
Commander in Chief of Soviet Air Forces, as a ranking
member of the high command at the ministry level, is
almost certainly included in the operational planning
and strategic direction of tactical air armies.
At the field level, commanders of air armies are
believed to be deputies for aviation to the military
district, group of forces, or, in wartime, front
comm ands. While coordination of weapons systems is
provided in these territorial areas through a joint
command and control structure, the operational
control and employment of aircraft is retained by
commanders of air armies so as to insure appropriate
utilization of aircraft capabilities and to provide
mobility and flexibility in employment.
For the strategic air defense function, certain fighter
elements of Tactical Aviation respond to orders of the
Commander of Soviet .Strategic Defense Forces (PVO
Strany) or his subordinate comm anders in air defense
territorial areas in which the tactical air elements are
located.
Soviet forces stationed in East Germanv have a
modified command structure for controlling fighter
aircraft, principally in an air defense situation. Here,
northern and southern corps echelons of command
have been introduced. This refinement in control
authority in it theater -type deployment of 'Tactical
38
Aviation enhances !rsatility in employment of fighter
aircraft. Additionally, it defines more precisely the
areas of responsibility in a w eapons saturated
environment and may serve as a medium for
integrating operations of weapons systems performing
an air defense function. This necessitates the Tactical
Aviation Commander, acting as Chief of Air Defense
of the Ground Forces (PVO Voysk), to have
operational control of all air defense forces, i.e.,
Aviation, c 1M's, AAA, and early warning radars,
within his area.
Aviation of Air Defense (APVO) is subordinate to
PVO S any headquarters near Moscow. The deputy
for 0VO is respo� Bible to the PVO Strany
commander for the deployment and employment of
fighter units and establishes fighter interception
procedures for all fighter aircraft, including fighters in
Tactical Aviation when needed for air defense
purr. iscs.
The operational chain oi` command of Military
Transport Aviation is from the Minister of Defense to
the commander of the vTA. Transport units and their
operational control are allocated to commanders of
force components by the commander of the VTA for
normal air support roles, bui retains overall control
and can withdraw or reassign aircraft as necessary for
emergency or priority tasks.
b. Strength, composition, and disposition'
The Soviet Air Forces have about 373,000 personnel
and over 11,600 combat and support aircraft,
including helicopters, in operational units. Of the
personnel, 472,000 are in operational units and
support elements of the several forces (including
130,000 in the air defense forces), and 101,000 are in
high command in generai zupport, including Ministry
of Defense, research and development, and
preoperational training.
As of 1 October 1973, Long Range Aviation, with
an operational personnel strength of 37,000, consisted
of 873 bombers and tankers deployed on 27 airfields
and organized into 26 medium bomber regiments and
9 heavy bomber regiments in three air armies. The lst
Long Range Air Army encompasses the northwestern
part of the U.S.S.R., the 2d Long Range Air Army is in
the southwestern portion of the country, and the 3d
Long Range Air Army is located in the far eastern
U. S. S. R.
Tactical Aviation consists of over 4,600 combat
aircraft organized into over 100 regiments. It has some
Tor detailed information on orcG�r of battle for all Soviet Air
Forces sec the current issue of the Soviet Aircraft Order of Battle
(AP- 2.10 -2 -4 series), published by the Defense Intelligence Agency.
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187,000 personnel assigned to operational units and
support elements. Approximately 6,000 pilots are
assigned to operational units. An estimated 3.3% of the
total personnel are assigned to the air armies in groups
of Soviet forces in Czechoslovakia, East Germany,
Hungary, and Poland. Approximately 33,000 are
assigned to the 16th Tactical Air Army in East
Germany. There are 12 air armies in the military_
districts of the U.S.S.R.
Aviation of Air Defense has about 90,000 personnel
in operational units and support elements. Combat
fighter aircraft total about 2,700 in 84 regiments.
About 75% o: these fighters tire late models.
Military Transport Aviation has approximately
100,000 personnel assigned to its operational units and
support elements. Total aircraft strength is about
3, 300.
'file Soviet air facilities' system consists of more
than 3,250 airfields vnd a few minor seaplane. stations.
About 550 airfields have permanent- surface runways,
and 469 airfields have runways which exceed 8,000
feet. The principal airfields used by military aircraft
number about 300. There are no active military
seaplane stations as Naval Aviation no longer has
flying boats in operational units.
In general the Soviet Union and the Eastern
European Communist countries each have an
adequate, well distributed air facilities system capable
of supporting all types of air operations. Construction
activity suggests that it continuing military airfield
construction program is considered necessary both to
accommodate newer aircraft and to provide a more
desirable deployment or dispersal capability.
However, airbase hardening, primarily aircraft
sheltering, has been the main airfield construction
activity for the past several years.
c. Training
(I) Preoperational �With the reduction in term of
service for aviation personnel effected by the 1967
Universal Military Service Law, preconscription
elementary military training has become compulsory.
Training is to begin when youths have reached 17
years of age. It is planned that this training will be
done without detaching the individuals from their
studies or work.
The training is to be accomplished in the general
education schools starting Nvith the ninth grade, in
'For current information see Volumes 3:3-39 of Airfields and
Seaplane Stations of the World, published b% the Defense
Intelligence Agenec. Other delails on Soviet air facilities are
provided in the Truuportation and' 1'elecommunications chapter of
this Ceneral Survey.
secondary specialized teaching institutions, and in the
teaching institutions of the vocational technical
education systems. It is to he directed by the Ministry
of Defense and DOSAAF. Training is expected to
emphasize vocations and technical specialties similar
to certain special military qualifications.
For personnel assigned to the air forces, the
postinduction period of training will necessarily
provide more selective, specialized, and professional
training, primarily for those who elect to become
careerists. Until about 1967, a total of 27 schools,
including two PVO schools, provided this training.
"There were two 5 -year higher military aviation
engineering schools, 10 -1 -year higher military aviation
1:1:hools for pilots, two 4 -year highet military aviation
schools for navigators, a 4 -ycat higher military
aviation political school, and nine 3 -year military
aviation technical schools. There is also a 2 -year pilot
school, probabl;; helicopter, whose graduates are
master sergeants with pilot certificates. This contrasts
with the 4 -year school graduates who are lieutenants
with it pilot engineering degree at a 3d -class pilot level
or less. In the past 6 years, six more schools have been
opened to try to cope with the increasing demand for a
greater number of highly skilled air personnel.
The peacetime 4 -year pilot training provides 200 to
250 hours of flight time, depending on the current
policy of educational direction. The ground training
portion includes studies in mathematics, physics,
aerodynamics, chemistry, languages, history, physical
education, and Communist Party history. Flight
training and related exercises in parachute jumps,
strafirig, bombing, and air -to -air interception
(simulation) begin in the first year.
Long Range Aviation trainees are probably
specially selected on the basis of aptitude, and their
practical training emphasizes formation flying,
navigation, and bombing practice. Total preopera-
tional flying time may average :300 to 400 hours per
crew.
(2) Operational� Combat training of LRA aircrews
is accomplished within the operational units its a part
of the normal training program. All units are expected
to maintain it relatively high standard of operational
preparedness. The unit training program covers 12
months of the year, but the individual crew members
actually spend 10 months on their flying duties
annually; 1 month each is spent on leave and on
political and administrative obligations. It is
estimated that LRA operational crew training has
progressed to a high state of proficiency.
The annual training prof* -:im of Tactical Aviation
includes all- weather flying, formation, air -to -air
39
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combat, rocketry, bombing, gunnery, reconnaissance,
and deployment exercises. The daily combat readiness
of the air units is a continual program, with the wets
maintaining varying degrees of alert posture according
to assignment. The climax of unit training is a series of
extensive maneuvers carried out at military district or
groups of forces levels in cooperation with ground
forces. These maneuvers are usually held in the
autumn.
The quality of Soviet pilots is difficult to assess.
Flying hours per year, about 100 to 120, are
considerably less than that of U.S, pilots. However,
extensive pro- and post planning, and mission cri-
tique;, coupled %with short distances to ranges, lessen
this discrepancy to it certain extent. Flying is
conducted under rigid ground control, allowing little
independent action. Upon graduation from it 4 -year
training school, i t new pilot is assigned to an
operational unit its a pilot 3d -class or, in come cases,
even it lower category. At this level, pilots are not
mission capable or combat ready. After extensive
training in it unit, they progress to 2d- class, at which
time they are combat capable but not proficient.
Further training advances them to 1st -class pilot, or
combat proficient. This training cycle takes 7 to 10
years. It is estimated that an average regiment is
composed of one squadron with 3el -class pilots, one
with 2d, and one with 1st -class pilots.
Operational training for Aviation of Air Defense
(APVO), in addition to the invaluable training gained
from actual scrambles aril intercepts of peripheral
non Soviet flights of various kinds, includes it training
cycle in which the training exercises for the year begin
in February or March. Local joint exercises in spring
maneuvers usually provide some fighter training in
air ground coordination. Summer months are used to
fulfill the assigned syllabus, with heavy air activity
during favorable weather. Training culminates in the
autumn of each year with large -scale joint maneevers
with other air units and ground or naval forces. The
operational training program is very detailed and
designed to take maximurn advantage of the limited
flight time available.
Flight training activity ranges from routine flight
activity (take -offs and landings, local flight activity,
weather reconnaissance flights) to ground controlled
intercept /airborne intercept /air -to -air missile train-
ing, and mobility training. The air defense or
interceptor training syllabus includes some air -to -air
gunnery and rocketry as well as durnmy runs, camera
gunnery, and firing runs on target sleeves. Practice
alerts are staged regularly as well as participation in
actual intercept of unidentified targets.
Deployment and mobility flights form a significant
phase of fighter training. Such flights are often
practiced in order to develop a tactical advantage over
hostile forces as well as to preclude the destruction of
the regiment's complement of aircraft in the event of
an attack on the base. The ability to deploy to
strengthen fighter defenses in specific areas is an
important aspect of the regiment's training tactics.
There has probably been an increased emphasis on
head -on intercept training as the new interceptors
became operational.
Soviet operational pilots fly only 100 to 120 hours
per year. They are given little opportunity to exercise
personal initiative in the air; practice interceptions
depend almost entirely on close ground control gather
than pilot interception of aircraft.
Operational training in Military Transport Aviation
is accomplished after officers and crews are integrated
into their units. Proficiency in flying transport aircraft
through all conditions of weather is acquired under
actual flight conditions� instrument training flights in
heavy overcast, and winter night flights from airfields
covered with snow and from icy runways. It can be
assumed that tactical paratroop drops by squadron are
part of the routine training. There is evidence that,
weather permitting field training exercises in
conjunction with airborne troops continue throughout
the vear. Crews receive extensive briefing before an
operation, and postoperation analysis of errors is
conducted.
There is evidence that cross- training in heavy
transports and helicopters is a requisite for
commanders. Commanders are trained for positions
one step higher than that which they occupy, so that
replacements are always available. It is probable that
older combat pilots from fighter and bomber units,
after retraining, are transferred to transport aviation.
Enlisted technicians in operational and main-
tenance units are given on -the -job training or attend
special schools which give: 1 to 2-year courses of
intensive theoretical and practical training. Technical
officers are assigned to operational units after
graduation from technical officer candidate schools.
These schools provide 3 -year courses with specializa-
tion in such fields as special equipment, electronics,
instruments, aircraft engines, and armament.
Advanced training for officers is accomplished
through it number of higher staff schools and
academies. These include Lipetsk Air Tactical School,
Advanced Officer School, Advanced Navigation
School, and the two major air academies �the
Military Air Academy and the 'Lhrtkovskiv Air
Engineering Academy.
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d. Logistics
Rigorous planning is required in determining the
Soviet Air Forces' (SAF) materiel requirements. Top
level control, planning, and procurement of items
peculiar to the SAF components is a primary
responsibility of the Directorate of Rear Services of the
Air Forces.
The Director receives logistic requirements, other
than those for complete aircraft, which have been
coordinated and forwarded through the various rear
services organization channels. Requirements for
subordinate units of Long Range Aviation, Aviation of
Air Defense, and probably Military Transport
Aviation, are compiled by the directorates of rear
services at the respective force headquarters. Logistic
control and planning for Tactical (Frontal) Aviation
occurs at the air army level. The Chief of Rear Services
at the tactical r r army level is tasked with the
coordination of supply plans and schedules for the
army's air units and is responsible for delivery to the
operational bases.
All requirements are coordinated by the SAF
Director of Rear Services who forwards them to his
counterpart at the Ministry of Defense for approval
prior to procurement.
The lowest echelon within the supply and servicing
organization is the Air Base Support Battalion (Air
Technical Battalion). Such a battalion is located at
each operational airfield where a unit of regimental
strength is assigned. It performs the housekeeping
functions necessary to maintain both the airfield and
the air unit in a state of combat readiness. Air Base
Support Battalions are comprised of six companies:
Headquarters, Guard, Air Traffic Control, Transport
(vehicle), Airfield Maintenance, and Technical
Support (POL and ammunition upkeep and delivery).
An essential elernent of the supply system is an
extensive network of depots for storing technical
supplies, fuel, and ammunition. Air Forces' depots
storing these stocks are established at several
echelons �SAF headquarters, air army, and airfield
and are under the control of the respective Rear
Services chiefs. Common -use items are procured at the
Ministry of Defense level for all services and
distributed through the military districts from their
central supply depots.
The Directorate of Engineering Services at SAF
headquarters places orders for the procurement of
complete aircraft with the Ministry of Aviation
Industry, and is responsible for the acceptance,
inspection, and allocation of these aircraft. Spare parts
kits are provided with each aircraft delivered from the
factory. These kits include all spares and special tools
required for normal maintenance up to overhaul, at
which time the kits are reissued. Individual item
requisitions are thus limited to replacing parts that
fail, malfunction. or are damaged before expiration of
their guaranteed service life.
Maintenance and repair of aircraft and associated
technical equipment are the responsibility of the
Directorate of Engineering Services. At SAF
headquarters, the duties of the Director, also known as
the Chief Engineer of the Air Forces, encompass
supervision of all Aviation of Engineering Services
personnel and facilities, in addition to formulating
aircraft maintenance policies and procedures in
conjunction with the Ministry of Aviation Industry.
The Director has a counterpart at every level of the air
forces, down to and including the regiment. Each
echelon in the chain of command is responsible for
inspecting its subordinate units and insuring that these
maintenance policies and procedures are strictly
enforced.
Aircraft maintenance is performed at the regimental
level by both squadron mechanics and regimental
specialists, at division -level repair shops, and at major
aircraft repair bases. At the regimental level, squadron
maintenance personnel are responsible for servicing
the aircraft, giving preflight inspections, and
eliminating minor defects. The regimental specialists
are assigned to Technical Exploitation Units whose
responsibilities consist of medium aircraft repairs and
periodic inspections. These maintenance personnel are
trained to work with mobile or potable tools and
ground support equipment, and frequently work on
aircraft parked in the open. They are accordingly
capable of moving quickly to other airfields without
degrading their effectiveness.
Division -level maintenance specialists primarily
perform intermediate -level maintenance, i.e., minor
modifications and repairs which are more extensive
and time consuming than those performed at
regimental level. Major aircraft maintenance and
overhaul are accomplished at the aircraft repair bases
which are under the control of the air army.
The SAF rear organization has proven effective in
peacetime and should be adequate to support
operational air units in a short conventional or nuclear
conflict. The Soviets have placed great emphasis on
providing adequate stocks of PO and ammunition in
the forward areas where conflicts are likely to occur.
The aircraft maintenance system, encompassing the
performance of minor or routine regimental
maintenance at the operational airfields, with major
maintenance and overhaul being accomplished at
41
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selected repair bases, eliminates the need for the
dispersal of extensive maintenance facilities and
highly trained specialists. This lack of specialized
equipment and personnel at the operational level
might well, however, prove detrimental to the SAF
combat capability in a sustained wartime environ-
ment.
2. Soviet Strategic Defense Forces
Soviet Strategic Defense Forces (PVO Strany) are
charged with the strategic air and missile defense of
the U.S.S.R. The system consists of aircraft control and
warning radars manned by Radio Technical Troops
(RTV -PVO), SAM sites manned by Surface -to -Air
Missile Troops ('!_RV -PVO), air defense aircraft
manned by Aviation of Air Defense (APVO), and
possibly the ABM sites manned by the Antiballistic
Missile Troops (PRO /PVO). Although PVO Strany has
improved means of handling defense threat data, it
would have great difficulty in coping with large -scale
air and missile attacks which employed a variety of
weapons and sophisticated tactics. The capability of
intercept aircraft and air -to- surface missiles decreases
with the altitude, and at very low altitude is limited by
the line -of -sight coverage of ground radars and by the
difficulty of track ag a target and interceptor through
ground clutter. Generally, in the western U.S.S.R. and
the approaches to major military industrial centers,
the air surveillance network is capable of maintaining
it continuous tract of aircraft flying down to about
1,000 feet. Some specially mounted radars may give a
coverage capability clown to 500 feet or less. In areas
of less dense coverage, Soviet radars are unlikely to be
able to accomplish continuous tracking of aircraft
below 3,000 feet. The only ABM system, the ABM
16 /GALOSEI, is located around Moscow and its
capabilities are limited to protection from only small
scale unsophisticated attacks. (S)
a. Organization (S)
PVO Strarty, an operational and administrative
command, implements coordinated air defense plans
involving all appropriate elements of the armed forces
and supervises operational training and effectiveness.
P\'O Strany headquarters includes offices for
administration, political affairs, personnel, research
and development, training, and a main staff; their
precise organizational status is not known. 'There is
also a military council, probably for the development
of plans and policies, which apparently consists of the
commander in chief and his deputies.
42
The U.S.S.R. is divided into 10 air defense districts,
which are subdivided into zones and sectors. District
commanders coordinate air defense operations, but
weapons are assigned at lower levels.
b. Strength, composition, end disposition (S)
There are about 475,000 persons in the air defense
forces. Of this number about 85,000 are in Aviation of
Air Defense, 90,000 in air control and warning radar,
and 300,000 in the SAM systcm.
There are about 2,700 interceptors in Aviation of Air
Defense corcentrated mainly in the European
U.S.S.R., although large numbers of fighters are
deployed in industrial and military areas throughout
the U.S.S.R. Most of the FIREBAR aircraft (Yak -28P)
(Figure 38) are assigned to APVO. The long -range
interceptor, FIDDLER (Tu -128), is operational in the
Moscow, Northern, and Trans Siberian air defense
districts. The short -range interceptor, FLAGON (Su-
15) (Figure 39), is operational in all air defense
districts. The Mach 3 high- altitude FOXBAT (Mig-
'For current information see Soviet Aircraft Order of Rattle (AP-
240 -2 -4 series), published by the Defense Intelligence Agencc.
FIGURE 38. Aviation of Air Defense FIREBAR (Yak -28P) (S)
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FIGURE 39. Aviation of Air Defense FLAGON A
(Su -15) (C)

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25) (Figure 40) was first deployed to an APVO
regiment in mid -1970. FOXBAT is now operational at
four APVO bases in the Western, Moscow, Baku, and
Sverdlovsk Air Defense Districts. An airborne warning
and control ai:_-raft, MOSS (Tu -124) (Figure 41), is
employed in limited numbers over Ovate and in
conjunction with long -range interceptors.
FIGURE 40. Aviation of Air Defense FOXBAT (MiG -25) (C)
FIGURE 44. GUIDELINE (SA -2) sur-
face -to -air missile (S)
FIGURE 42. FARMER (MiG -19) employed in Aviation
of Air Defense and in Soviet Tactical Aviation (S)
FIGURE 43. FRESCO (MiG -17) employed in Aviation of
Air Defense and in Soviet Tactical Aviation (C)
In the U.S.S.R. the FARMER (Mig -19) (Figure 42)
and the FRESCO (Mig -17) (Figure 43), in both day
fighter and all- weather versions, are being phased out
of APVO.
Four SAM systems provide air defense protection of
vital areas within the U.S.S.R. The SA -I /GUILD is
deployed only in the Moscow area, where there are 56
sites. "There are about 1,040 SA -2 /GUIDELINE sites
in the U.S.S.R., of which about 640 are believed to he
occupied on a more or less permanent basis. The SA -2
Figure 44) is widely deployed in the Soviet Union and
43
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FIGURE 41. Aviation of Air Defense MOSS
(Tu -124) (U /OU)

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other Communist and non- Commrnist nations. There
are about 240 SA -3 /GOA sites in the U.S.S.R., most of
which are believed to be occupied on it more or less
permanent basis. The SA -5 /GAMMON system is
deployed at about 105 complexes (a complex may
consist of from one to five firing sites). About 90 of
these complexes are believed to be operational, with
15 under construction. The system is a long -range
high performance SAM, deployed to counter a high-
speed, high altitude aerodynamic threat, and is
considered unlikely to have an ABM role, although
this possibility cannot he excluded. Evidence has been
available for several years that the Soviets have been
developing antimissile missile systems. The ABM
1 /GALOSH antiballistic- missile system (Figure 45) is
being deployed around Moscow and furnishes a
limited defense of the Moscow area.
There are more than 4,500 ACW radar sets
deployed in about 1,000 sites within the 10 air defense
districts of the U.S.S.R. TALL KING (Figure 46) is a
long -range early warning radar. BAR LOCK (Figure
47) is the most numerous ea �ly warning radar in the
Soviet inventory, and when collocated with a height
finder it often functions in a ground controlled
interception role. SIDE NET (Figure 47) is the most
widely deployed Soviet height finder, and ODD PAIR
(Figure 48) is the newest.
Training (C)
Operational training aims at the effective
integration of the various components and other
contributing forces into the overall system. Training
emphasizes practice in the specialized procedure of the
particular components as well as exercises involving
the overall system
d. Logistics (S)
The various components aircraft, surface -to -air
missiles, radar �that make up the air defense system
are supported by the Chief of the Rear and by the
parent organization, i.e., aircraft by the Soviet Air
Forces, surface -to -air missiles by the Soviet Ground
FIGURE 45. GALOSH (ABM -1) anti-
ballistic missile (C)
FIGURE 46. TALL KING early
warning radar (S)
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FIGURE 47. BAR LOCK early warning radar (left) and
SIDE NEf height finder radar (C)
Forces, and ACW radar by both ground and air forces,
since members of both services are employed in this
field.
F. Rocket troops (S)
The Soviet Strategic Fiocket Troops (Raketnyye
uoyska Strategicheskogo Naznacheniya) constitute the
main strategic striking force of the U.S.S.R. The
primary mission of this force is to destroy the enemv's
means of nuclear attack, main governmental and
military control centers, and important industrial
concentrations. Constituted in 1960 as a separate force
FIGURE 48. BAR LOCK early warning
radar (left) and ODD PAIR height
finder radar (C)
on a command level with ground, navy, air, and air
defense forces, the Strategic Rocket "Troops function as
one of the instruments in support of Soviet foreign
policy, form the main deterrent force, and enable the
Soviets to employ the element of maximum surprise in
intercontinental strikes.
1. Organization
The Commander in Chief of the Strategic Rocket
Troops is responsible for the organization and
administration of the organic forces and weapons
systems of the command and for implementing
operational policy formulated by high authority.
Army General V. F. Tolubko is Commander in Chief
of the Strategic Rocket Troops. The headquarters
probably consists of the commander, a main staff, and
directorates for political affairs; engineering;
inspection; rear services; equipment, including
technical services and special armament; and combat
training.
The Main Staff develops operational plans for tlj,:
Commander in Chief of the Strategic Rocket Troops.
It includes sections for planning and operations,
intelligence, budget and fiscal, personnel and
mobilization, communications, and transportation.
The Political Directorate, subordinate to the Main
Political Directorate of the Soviet Armv and Navv, is
responsible for the orientation and indoctrination of
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rocket troops in Communist ideology. Its control is
projected downward through subordinate echelons.
The Chief Engineering Directorate is probable
responsible for supervision and coordination of launch
site construction and maintenance. The Chief
Inspectorate administers the inspection system and
monitors all aspects of combat readiness and efficiency
of the Strategic Rocket "Troops to insure compliance
with directives. 'rhe Rear Services Directorate of the
Strategic Rocket Troops probably performs functions
similar to those of its counterpart at the Ministry of
Defense level, administering the procnrernent and
distribution of common -use items, probable through
several depots conveniently located with respect to the
deployed forces.
The Missile Troop Equipment Directorate is unique
to the Strategic Rocket 'Troops. In addition to the
rna "age file lit of items in the strategic missile
inventory, it also controls all associated ground
support equipment, as w as components and
maintenance parts. Its responsibility with respect to
strategic missiles is comparable to that of the Main
Missile and Artillery Directorate with respect to
tactical missiles. Coordination between the Missile
Troop Equipment Directorate and the Main Missile
and Artillery Directorate is effected at the Ministev of
Defense level. It is probable that the Special
Armaments Service, which is the supply channel for
equipment and maintenance clown to battalion level,
is subordinate to the Missile Troop Equipment
Directorate.
The Chief Directorate for Combat "Training is
responsible for setting standards of technical training
and combat efficiency of troops, including live
training exercises at the range. It supervises
implementation of the annual training plan in all
headquarters, units, and installations, including i t
number of combat training schools. Final responsibil-
ity for troop training, however, is at the regimental
level.
ICBM operational units are located at 6 launch
complexes, widely deployed along major railroad
systems from the Moscow- Leningrad area to the Fur
East. In addition, there may he some units at the
Plesetsk and Tynratarn Missile and Space Test Centers
which could have an operational role. Hach complex is
considered to he a division, and may be operationally
subordinate to Strategic Rocket 'Troops. Arnny or
independent corps echelons arc believed to exist,
primarily for administrative purposes.
Each complex (division) controls its subordinate
units regiments, possibly, and battalions and
batteries) and provides the fundamental administra-
tive and housekeeping services basic to a parent unit.
At soft complexes or parts thereof, each launch pad is
probably of battery level; each two -pact soft launch
site probably constitutes a battalion. Echelons at hard
complexes or parts thereof arc less well defined. The
SS -13 (SAVAGE) intercontinental ballistic missile is
shown in Figure 49; this missile is among the hypes
currently deployed.
The IRBM and MRBM force is organized into
missile armies, divisions, regiments, battalions, and
batteries. Each launch pad is believed to be of battery
level. A complex of two or three I RBM or M RBM sites
comprises a regiment which is considered the basic
command unit or field launching authority under the
direct operational control of Strategic Rocket Troops
headquarters at Moscow. Battalions and hatterics
function as component parts of the regimental
command and are completely under regimental
control. The role of the IRBM and MRBM armies and
division headquarters appears to be primarily
coordination of administration, planning, supply, and
training. Ilowever, in the event of an alert or actual
launch of missiles, these intermediate commands may
also perform an operational role in that they
authenticate alert and launch orders from Strategic
Rocket Troops headquarters and serve as centers for
assessnnent and evaluation of the launch units'
accomplishments and current status.
The relationship of the strategic missile units to the
long- es,ablished military district system is similar to
that of units of other components of the armed forces.
While the launch units are operationally subordinate
to the Minister of Defense through headquarters of the
Strategic Rocket Troops, the military district
commanders function in special administrative and
supply roles, such as procurenncnt and warehousing of
connrnon -use supplies and equipment. In addition,
Strategic Rocket Troops units with appropriate.
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FIGURE 49. SAVAGE (SS -13) intercontinental ballistic
missile (S)

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weapons systems might be called upon, in certain
circumstances, by military district commanders to
render support.
2. Strength, composition, and disposition
The personnel strength of the Strategic Rocket
Troops has increased steadily since its creation as a
separate force in 1960. 'Total personnel strength is
believed to he about 375,500, of whom some 300,500
are assigned to operational units, with the remainder
in support and training roles.
Since the inception of the Strategic Rocket Troops,
the Soviets have developed and deployed it family of
ballistic missiles capable of reaching any potential
enemy. The U.S.S.R. now has three categories of
strategic ballistic missiles intercontinental with
effective ranges of 2,500 to 6,500 nautical miles (some
Soviet ICBM's may be effectively used at ranges as
low as 500 nautical miles), intermediate with effective
ranges of approximately 2,000 nautical miles, and
medium with ranges up to about 1,000 nautical miles.
Operational ,'rengtli in these missiles as of 1 October
1973 is estimated as follows:
TYPE
MISSILES
LAUNCHERS
ICBM
1,683
1,549
IRBM
129
87
MRBM
916
496
In the ICBM category, the number of missiles exceeds
the number of launchers because the soft sites are
estimated to have it refire capability whereas the hard
sites do not. In addition to the number of ICBM
launchers given above, there are about 100
operational launchers which arc ordinarily used for
training and research but are suitable for military
missile launching.
To date, ICBM deployment has been limited to 26
operational launch complexes within the U.S.S.R.
Thus far there is no indication that deployment of this
system extends beyond the reaches of rail system
support. About 95% of the IRBM and MRBM force
has been deployed in western U.S.S.R., with lesser
concentrations in southern U.S.S.R. hardened
launchers constitute about 90% of the operational
ICBM force and about 205( of the IRBM and MRBM
forces.
3. Training
The Strategic Rocket Troops training program
emphasizes both individual and unit training.
Although it number of schools and training centers are
utilized, final training responsibility appears to be
focused on the regimental and battalion level of
combat units. Cadre training, by which experienced
personnel impart learned skills to the recruits, is also
emphasized.
Preliminary preservice training has been utilized to
the greatest possible extent in securing the hest
qualified personnel. Graduates of military secondary
schools are frequently brought into missile units. Other
recruits are obtained from artillery academies, air
forces technical training academies, engineering and
command schools, and the DOSAAF organization. In
addition, the Strategic Rocket "Troops are receiving an
increasing number of recruits who have completed
secondary school ROTC -type programs, which have
been expanded to include additional technical
training.
Officer training for the Strategic Rocket Troops is
carried out primarily at the Dzerzhinskiv Missile
Engineering Academy, which is under the direct
supervision of the Commander in Chief of the
Strategic Rocket Troops. The enrollment at this
academy is approximately 2,500, and graduating
classes number from 450 to 600. Two courses are
offered at this academy �a short course of 9 to 12
months, and one of 5 1 /2 years. Selected graduates from
the first course are chosen to attend the second. Most
graduates of the academy are assigned to the Strategic
Rocket Troops, although some go to ground forces
tactical missile units. Some graduates of the Artillery
Command Academy in Leningrad go to the Strategic
Rocket Troops, although this academy is main!;
concerned with the training of tactical missile
technical officers.
Ali unknown number of enlisted personnel assigned
to the Strategic Rocket Troops are selected for
specialized training and attend programs of
instruction at military engineering and artillery
schools. Courses in armament, instrumentation,
electronics, and engine and airframe maintenance,
varying in length from 6 to 18 months, are given these
enlisted personnel. In addition to schools, enlisted
specialists are sometimes detailed to missile factories
for specialized technicai training.
Unit training occupies an important role in the
missile forces. In fact, for most of the rocket troops unit
training under experienced officers and noncommis-
sioned officers probably provides the greatest
percentage of training. In the Strategic Rocket Troops
the period between the original assignment of a unit's
cadre until the deployment of the unit at full strength
tnav last as long as it year. After it unit has been
activated, it begins it training cycle known as
integrated weapons system training. During this
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period personnel qualified in individual specialities
are combined and trained as a unit in the sequential
duties necessary to launch a ballistic missile. This
training is conducted at speciO training bases, missile
test ranges, or operational sites. Actual missile
launchings are probably not mandatory as part of this
program. As units develop a high degree of
competence they participate in exercises in order to
perfect the methods and skills requires; in deploying
ground equipment, preparing it for eration, and
launching missiles. Certain of these training exercises
include actual launch operations. Another feature of
unit training is combat support operations, including
training of personnel in guarding missile sites against
sabotage and agent penetration.
Since its inception in 1947, the Kapustin Yar Missil^
Test Range has been the scene of missile training
activity for missiles of less than int,.reuntinental range.
Actual firings of missiles include those by operational
units returning to the range for "confidence firings."
Crew training of !CBM personnel is conducted at
the Tyuratam Missile Test Center and at the Plesetsk
Missile and Space Center, at various special training
centers, and at the operational missile sites.
Before an operational rocket troops unit can enter
combat duty it must be certified as operationally
ready by meeting a specified level of proficiency as
determined by an evaluation group responsible to the
commander in chief. Once a crew has been certified as
capable of performing its combat mission, it may be
assigned to perform an actual proficiency firing.' In
some instances operational units conduct live
launchings from their home bases.
4. Logistics
Logistic functions of the Strategic Rocket Troops are
the responsibility of the Missile Troop Equipment
Directorate. However, actual fabrication of missiles
and components is accomplished at plants under the
direction of the Ministry_ for Defense Industry.
ICBM complexes are believed to contain a division
supply depot while IRBM and \1RBM complexes
contain a regimental -level supply depot, each
complete with large reserve stocks of supplies for
support of launch sites.
Responsibility for supply and maintenance of
launch units is believed to be divided among several
organizations. Special Armament Service personnel
are responsible: for the supply and maintenance of
missiles and associated equipment except the reentry
vehicle and warhead. "Chey are assigned to all echelons
down to battalion. They operate the inspection and
48
maintenance vehicle station, a facility capable o. field
and unit -type maintenance on specialized missile
handling equipment, and provide on- the -job training
to launch crews on utilizatio of equipment and minor
maintenance.
Repair Technical Base personnel� attached to
operational launch units supply, maintain, and
assemble reentry vehicles, including nuclear warheads.
Committee for State Security (KGB) personnel retain
security control over nuclear warheads.
Technical Services personnel, under the admini.
tive and technical control of the Central Motor
Vehicle- Tractor Directorate, Ministry of Defense, are
responsible for the procurement and maintenance of
heavy equipment, including all types of rigging,
cranes, and construction equipment, but excluding
missile transporters and special propellant carriers.
The Engineering Directorate has responsibility for
the installation and maintenance of launch and
control equipment and for auxiliary facilities.
A deputy commander for the rear at each echelon
down to regiment is responsible for the procurement,
storage, supply, and transportation of quartermaster
and medical supplies.
The Soviets depend primarily on their rail system to
support their strategic iaunch complexes, on a
complex -by- complex basis. Air transport serves in a
backup and emergenev support role.
Supply and maintenwnce echelons in the Strategic
Rocket Troops are believed to go down to battalion
level. At the regimental level after the missile has been
inspected, assembled, and checked by the Special
Armament Service, and a reentry vehicle has been
attached under the direction of Repair Technical Base
personnel, responsibility for keeping the weapon
serviceable belongs to the launch battery. It is believed
that when maintenance problems arise which cannot
be handled by the Special Armament Service and the
Repair Technical Base, the components involved are
shipped back to repair plants under the control of the
Missile Troop Equipment Directorate.
Maintenance personnel usually are selected for
assignment to a strategic missile organization after
completion of an initial training period at it service
connected secondary technical school. It is believed
that there are unit schools within operational missile
launch complexes for the special training of personnel,
and that the everyday work of subunits is constituted
in large part in the operation of missile equipment.
It has been demonstrated that the Soviet Union has
the capacity in many technological fields to produce
original and advanced designs. A strong tendency to
go along with proven equipment also is apparent. As a
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result, specific. iuoi on many items in the U.S.S.R. are
more uniform than in the United States. Furthermore,
the Soviets produce simple and often more rugged
equipment than that used iu the United States,
leading to more simplified maintenance procedures.
The supply and maintenance programs within the
Strategic Rocket Troops are characterized by highly
centralized organizational control and rigidly defined
duties and responsibilities. The tightly knit
organization enables the Soviets to direct prioWk
support and distrihation of essential materials as
warranted in the development of their strategic missile
force. From the Soviet point of view the supply and
mainterance systems are capable of performing the
tasks assigned.
G. Militarized security forces (S)
The security forces constitute a force of an estimated
230,000 men. These forces are divided into two major
groups� Soviet Frontier Troops, estimated at 173,000,
and Soviet Interior Troops, estimated at 73,000.
Enlisted personnel are conscripted on the same basis
as personnel for the army and the navy. At the annual
Gallup, security troop officers sit with the local draft
board and select conscripts for the security troops.
Selection is made after consideration of political
reliability, social background, education, and general
physical health. This selection and the subsequent
training provide a force composed of troops who are
well prepared for their specific tasks, reliable, and
devoted to duty.
Basic training acquaints recruits with the forms and
methods of hostile activity engaged in by the "enemies
of the people" and with foreign espionage. Recruits for
the frontier troops receive special training in patrols,
traps, ambushes, search groups, and border picket
duties, while interior troops receive special training in
making individual, group, and mass searches of
persons, buildings, and populated localities as well as
in rounding up, arresting, and convoying prisoners.
About one fourth of the instruction time during basic
.raining is devoted to political training. After basic
training, recruits receive additional training with their
units, and selected enlisted men may take special
courses at special training centers and service schools.
Each frontier district normally has a noncommissioned
officer school. Frontier troops have their own officer
candidate schools. No information is available on
special officer candidate schools for interior troops.
Senior officers are trained at a special institute for
security troops in Moscow and at the Moscow Frontier
Troops School for the Advanced Training of Officer
Personnel.
The supply system for the militarized security forces
is probably under the supervision of the Ministry of
Defense's Chief of the Rear, who reportedly acts
through military district channels after receiving
projected supply requirements from the Moscow
headquarters of the particular security troop agency.
1. Frontier troops
The Main Directorate of Soviet Frontier Troops,
under the Committee f, r State Security (KGB), is
responsible for the prevention of unauthorized entry
into or exit from the U.S.S.R., defense of the border
against sudden armed attacks, maintenance of general
security control of the frontier populace, prevention of
smuggling, and patrolling of offshore waters.
The Main Directorate has eight staff sections to
support and exercise general supervision over the seven
border districts or operational groups. The Personnel
Directorate plans mobilization and training. The
Operations Directorate controls border security,
develops operational plans, and designates emplace-
ment of guard posts. The Counterintelligence
Directorate directs counterintelligence activities
among frontier troop personnel. The Political
Directorate is responsible for the promulgation of
party policy and Communist doctrine among frontier
troops. The Intelligence and Agents Section is
responsible for gathering intelligence on the frontier
zone. The Investigations Section investigates, in
conjunction with the Counterintelligence Directorate,
all political, military, and criminal charges placed
against frontier troops. The Communications Section
is responsible for conducting communications
intelligence opei_aions against frontier zones of
neighboring countries. The Department of the Rear
plans and procures supplies.
Each frontier district or operational group is
responsible for an established sector of the border. The
degree of physical seenrity precautions taken and the
strength of the frontier trc committed to the sector
depend on the degree of friendliness cf the country
facing the frontier and the importance of the Soviet
installations within the area. Subordinate to the
frontier district or operational group, which is usually
commanded by a major general or lieutenant general,
are frontier detachments, and in some cases separate
komendaturas and an air regiment. In coastal areas
sea guard squadrons, which are patrol vessel units of
komendatura strength, are subordinate to the frontier
district and may be attached to the frontier
detachment for operational control. Frontier
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SECRET
detachments range in strength from 1,000 to 2,000
men and are usually commanded by a colonel or
lieutenant colonel. Each is usually composed of three
to seven komendaturas. These may he supported by a
reserve group and, for cavalry patrol units, it cavalry
remount squadron. The frontier komendatura,
commanded by a major or lieutenant colonel, has a
strength ranging from 200 to 500 personnel. It is the
basic tactical unit of the frontier detachment.
Subordinate to the komendatura are three to seven
infantry or cavalry outposts with a strength of 30 to 65
men.
Frontier troop units make defense plans to include
anticipated routes of enemy attack; proposed
deployment and commitment of local troops; support
required; and evacuation plans for the wounded,
dependents, and classified documents. Joint plans are
also worked out between the ground forces and
frontier troop units. Some plans provide that upon
notification of attack the nearest division commander
designates troops to be a, the disposal of the
komendatura commander. After the division
commander deplovs his troops and they make contact
:th the enemy, the division commander assumes
command of the area and all troops. When the
situation is stabilized, or upon orders from higher
headquarters, the frontier troop unit is relieved to
assume its role of rear -area defense. In this role, as in
World War 11, frontier troops would form a continuous
and mobile protective hand, echeloned in depth,
responsible for defense against airborne troops; road
and railroad security; military traffic control; security
of military depots and storage areas; holding fleeing
Soviet troops; apprehending terrorists, saboteurs, and
spies; general maintenance of order; and the
50
supervision of the evacuation of civilians from critical
areas in cooperation with the interior troops.
2. Interior troops
The Soviet Interior "Troops include the internal
security troops, the internal and convoy guards, and
the government signal troops.
Internal security troops are operational units
responsible for suppressing dissident and subversive
elements, quelling revolts and strikes, and controlling
the civil populace in the event of disaster. They are
organized into divisions and separate regiments of
from 1,650 to 2,000 men each. Their weapons and
equipment are similar to those of comparable units of
the ground forces. Relatively small detachments are
used for guarding important installations and
government buildings. These troops are subordinated
to the ministries for maintenance of public order of the
constituent republics in which they are located.
Internal and convoy guards are responsible for the
guarding of labor camps, prisons, work parties, and
prisoners in transit. Convoy troops are normally
organized into regiments, battalions, and companies.
The guards are subordinated to the ministries for
maintenance of public order of the constituent
republics in which they are located.
Government signal troops are responsible for the
installation, maintenance, and security of com-
munication facilities (telephone and telegraphy)
between Moscow and high -level headquarters such as
military districts and grcaps of forces. They are
organized into regiments of approximately 1,000 men
and are subordinate to the Committee for State
Security (KGB).
CONTROLLED DISSEM.
SECRET
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