NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY 11; SWEDEN; GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

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• Collection: NIS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP01-00707R000200090019-6
• Release Decision: RIP
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 43
• Document Creation Date: October 25, 2016
• Sequence Number: 19
• Content Type: REPORTS

SECRET
11 /Gs /u "P
Sweden
May 1973
NATIONAL INYELLIGENCc SURVEY
SECRET
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This Section was prepared for the NIS by the
Central Intelligence Agency. Research was sub-
stantially completed by November 1972.
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CONTENTS
This Crneral Surery s- wvrv(-dvv hr oar t1artl Srp.
rnihrr 1)67. ropir.v of u;hirh Nhould be rlr
A. Introduction
Scandinavian political stability, backgroun(I for
reformist solutions to Swedish problems, enlitti)ced
parliaruontary douwcracy, narrow political dif-
fcrencev, th,' Social Dvino �ruts under the leadci-
ship of Olul Valnu', the welfare Mate, policy of
nonalliance and neutralky,
I. Structure and functionintti of the g
Mollar by with ccntrahze(i wovvrnmeni, civil
service'.
L ConstitutiotlFtl syst(r(n
i''our funclrunental laws, change to nnicamrrtcl
parliament, power of the Riksdag, debate over
the Act of Succrssion, respect for inclividn:d
rights.
.F;C)tI'll
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Page
2. Executive 3
a. Monarchy 3
Stipulations, power, anti responsibilities.
b. Council of State
Dominance of the Prime Minister, role of
the ministries.
3. Legislative
.volution, elections, sessions, censure, tlehato,
standing committers, passage of bills.
4. ,judicial system
Development of codes, the judiciary.
a. Courts
Three levels, appeal, the Supreme Court,
specialized courts, requirements for judges.
b. Penal system
Privileges under the enlightened system,
number of prisoners, dayfines, treatment
of juveniles.
5. Provincial and local government
Encroachment of central on local government,
influence of the Ministry of Interior.
a. Provincial government
The governors arid the governor general,
election and role of the provincial councils.
b. Local government
Towns, boroughs, and rural communes,
councils, cooperative associations.
C, Politicai dynamics
Factors making for smooth evolution, develop-
ment of the five political parties, rotation of
government among major parties, role of minor
parties.
1. Social Demccratic Party
a. Membership and electoral strength
Larj;cst party, support in trade union
movernent, victories in 1968 and 1970.
b. Organization and leadership
Congress and lesser bodies, training of
future leaders, activities of Palme, his
difficulties.
c. Program and policies
Compromise and cooperation, strte inter-
vention as an issue, social welfare, educa-
tional and truditiunal goals, inflation, non.
alliance and neutrality, influence of the
young activists, anti Americanism, defense
forces.
d. Press and finances
Two dailies and others, various sources of
funds.
2. Center Party
a. Membership and electoral strength
Origin and relative size.
ii
4
A
7
8
8
9
9
10
l.I
11
12
13
14
15
15
Page
b, Organization and leadership 15
National convention and lesser bodies,
auxiliary organizations, rise of lealldin.
c. Program and policies
Balanced economic lower, limits on social
welfare, neutrality and ndmalliance,, ordposi-
tion to Common Markel, defense, forces.
d. Pmts and finances
Limited publications, obscure funding.
3. Liberal Party
a. Membership and electoral strength
Origin, size, support.
b. Organization and leadership
National convention and lesser bodies, a ?x-
Iliary organizations, lendership of Ilelen.
c. Program and policies
L:conomic concepts, nonnllianca and neu-
trality, attitude toward the United States,
stron,; defense concept
d. Press and finances
Two leading dailies and others, chromic
financial difficulties.
4. Moderate. Coalition Party
a. Membership and electoral strength
Origin, size, support.
b. Organization and leadership
National convention and lesser bodies,
auxiliary organizations, Bohman.
c. Program and policies
Opposition to socialism and the Social
Democrats, exponent of strong defense,
protective tariffs, home ownership, neu-
trcelity and nonalllance.
d. Press and finances
Two chief dailles, pr',vate donations.
5. Party of the Lcft- Communist
a. Membership and electoral strength
Origin, size, and support.
b. Organization and leadership
Congress and lesser bodies, auxiliary or-
ganizations, leadership of Ilermansson.
e. Programs and policies
Formation of people's militia, nationaliza-
tion of economic assets, opposithn to the
Common Market.
d. Press and finances
One daily newspaper, other publications,
sources of funds.
6. Pressure groups
Status, LO and others, role.
7. Electoral procedures
Simultaneous elections, method of voting,
pn;portional representation, participation by
the clectorate.
15
16
16
16
1Q
17
17
17
17
18
18
18
18
18
19
20
20
20
20
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FIGURES
Page
Page
D. National policies
21 2. Communism
26
General agreement on domestic urd foreign issues.
Strength of the. UK, attempts to Infiltrate,
Fig, 2
1. D ornestiC
21 front organlzationN.
Fig. 7 Organization of the National Police
'Per+denry toward rornprnmisn, reordering of
3, l xtremist groups
27
priorities, industrial expansion, Inflation, so-
ftw ftwu
Letheorists, rlglrtwing organizatlens,
th N.
Trends in voting (chart)
vial welfare system, housing, in rN
terruonal
einigre grot
Fig. 5
exchange stability.
F. Maintenance of internal recurity
28
2. ForOgn
22 1, Police
28
Identification with Western liberal democracy,
Conditions concerning law and order, the Na.
attitude toward NATO, relations with other
tional Police Boe:rcl, organization and rrrpon-
Scandinavian countries, support for the United
NibilltieN of the National Police, mounted
Nations and regioncl organizations, the Corn-
police, disrupticnx to public order, technical
rnon Market, relations with the Soviet Union
Id training futilities.
and the Un',ted States, Nobel Prizes, policy
2. Intelligence and security services
29
fornnautlur
Limitations and evaluation.
3. Defense
a. Intelligence
2.5
30
flexponsibilirles of the three divisions of
Position of the military, formulation and
Section 11 of file Defense Staff, operations
purpose or policy, rising costs, civil defense,
of ter Special Bureau,
expenditures.
L. Security
31
E. 'Threats to government stability
fteNponsibilities of the Security Police,
2'S
C:. Selected bibliography
31
1. Discontent and dissidence
2,5 Chronology
33
Absence of grievances; stable society; results
of dawnte between East and West
Glossary
35
FIGURES
iii
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Page
Page
Fig. 1
Structure of government chart)
4
Fig, 6 Katarinaberget Lomb shelter photo) 26
Fig, 2
Stockholm Cultural Canter photo)
5
Fig. 7 Organization of the National Police
Fig. 3
Governmcnts since 14132 table)
11
chart) 20
Fig. 4
Trends in voting (chart)
11
Fig. H Intelligence ar.,d security services
Fig. 5
Party scats in the Riksdag table)
1 12
(chart) 30
iii
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Government and Politics
A. Introduction (U /UU)
The Sc;urcli11;lvian cminlrics have cvicicncrll a I(111g
ImIiIical stabililN lillws( unique in c(1r11i11c�11L�11
I� im pe. As the principal 11atimi in Ihc Scandimloal1
area. Sm-dc11 has (1(1111 scl the pm-1. fm. Ihc s(1cial and
ccnnr,snrc inu(1\;II i Ilr;,t 1);I, nimic I I I1)(� rcgi(1nal
Imlitic;Ii slca(lincss.
A 11lun1c�r (if cletcrnrinanls ;1s %m-iatc(I \%illr nimlcrn
S\cc(lish s(wicl) hitve IwIpe l I'(1r:n Ihc pipillar�
Icuchmil t(i suppoirl nom nisl ralhcr th;ur rccnllrli(1n
:1r% ,(111rti(111s in 11ali(1nal Irruhlc11r,: Ihc� Implilali(1n is
(IMvptiumll\ hoimo gencuu, and mikers;111\ litc�rnlc�;
Ihcrc are crc scri(1u,ly dki,kv u,c�i;11 issues; impid;1r
portic�ipatic.n ill the g(1vi nl Irrnccsses at the Inc�al
11\11 has ;1 tradition g(1ing back 1(r the \'iking c1 ;,1,.
Aciclitio nall\, S1vedvii is the 11;1111111 le;ulcr ill Ihc�
Nordic ;1rca -in side its \vcll as in \vcallh� �halving a
gross nalional Irroclocl almost ;IS large as that of Ihc
four olhcr Nordic c(1u11lrics c(mibimecl. And nnly the
Smdcs, through ;c combination of goOd luck ;1111 it
strong milihir; eslablishmc�nl. 11;111 hecn able to
aclherc 1() the c(minr�n Nordic dream of neulralily.
TI c Mdish p(ditical sysIvin has very mcenll\
cvolvecl into ;1 fomr OI' Iure parliamentary clenurc�racv
that has proved c�onsisteolly wwk able almost
exclusively in the Sc�anclitimian area. The Cmincil of
Statc is directly responsible to the Blksrla/,c, it sirlgle-
huuse parliament since jimitary 19 I. Shn111c1 Ihc
lilhscln/; imss it vote (If' no conficicncc, h(tw(wer�, the
governi�ccnt has Ihc right (cr call for lit-\\ elections.
141-c;11nc Ihc c;lrlicr 1)ica111cr;ll As(1 fcaturccl
icgid:11kc ,ulnrllulcc. ;11 Ic;1sl b\ c11,14 pu1, :111(1
v,mcminvids 11nnclhcic,s pi rcnlark;11)k Iahlc.
Ihc n;11im c�11lcrs irllcc it It(-\\ jwri (1cl (1I cnFrancecl
p;irhamvnl ;1r\ dem( rich c(ilh ju,tilic(I (I)limisnl.
hililic;cl (lilfc�rcm-cs (1vcr dmnv,lic jmlic\ arc mi11(ir
Mid ;nc unccrnc(I lrrimilril\ \011 tht-1 01�111 1(1 cc hic�h
I c glrvcrninvio sh(1ul(I guicic t1)(� ;111(1 ccilh
I1)(� scnluc (1I t;mcrimiciil- ,iippirlc(I \ccllc(rc� pr(1gr;1111s.
'I'll( 11nrrm\int, (,f p(ditic;ll clilh-rencc,, 1)(111(.\(.1. 11a
11(it becn acc1r111lru1ic(I 1) 1 it cmis4licla1i(1n (1f p(ditic;,l
parlic Fkc pialic�s. inclluling the t :nnlmisnisl,. 11+1vc
bccrl n Irr(,( 1111 cl (1r1 Ihc 1);111(11 in pa li;lnu�llt;1r1
ciccli(1m (luring Ihc� p'Ist 25 1c ars. �I'hcse partic,, ill
gcncr;ll. represcnl Ihc interest,. 4I particular 1�1�(mml1X�
;111(1 ,(1c�ial gr(1ul,s. I'1)(� mo di�riih- So ckil Ovnruc�r;rlic�
hir11 tSAI't h;1, 1)ecn clunrinaut 11)(� early 19:itl's�
go\enling al(1rn� since Ihc end (1I' \1'111111 War II \1ith
11)(� of 'i -\car period in Ihc car11 imd micl-
1950's.
At the Ircak (it' its polrlllarit\ ill the 1968 clecliom,
lcherl sijpp()rl 1'ronl cr,11111iIc :(1rr ill unist, (Ii,c11-
cha11tccl 1)1 Ihc Sovicl imasion (,f Czed (1slovakia
ena1)lecl Ihc SA I' 111 \vin mo rc than 50 (0 the Imlrular
v((tv, Ow earl\ c�hnsc as it, ue11 leacicr 11)(� Ilambman1
01of Pabnc. \Ithorlgll it capable p(diticia11. hilrue has
()n occaNion nffen(Ie(I moderates by his internperale
criticism of U.S. polio in \'ietimin and Can1b(1c1ia�
cven While wdairning it fely ;llmstatc Ichwing SAI'
votes. And his almil iutcllectimlisin I :1s bce11
Ili I'a%-( afrl\ conlrime(I \villr the lvurin, r.mlg(1ing
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IwrsmmIity (,I' II is mentor at 1redl-cessor. T.Igt-
?rlundvr. In 111(. 1070 t-lt'niorrs III(. Social Dvimicntrs'
chart' of the� vole (Implud b% alnua 5 Iligh (itws
1111(1 i1111ution Il:tv�� 1 list� 1 governnu nl.
but hills fur it Ims avcided a crisis b, ;uceliing the
support of 111(� Irnr11u11ist fart i11 order to rrsuster it
inaiorik over 1114. bourgeois o11c- ilion.
Like its rc.igfrbers, sill in dir No
(:ounc ill- it 11;(s totally i11legral -cl its soci;tl 1oiicy,
Ssyedc�rI is r-onsrniltpd In crvating ;I scu�ial dentoc�rac�, Fss
order to ;rdistribulc� the 11u1ioss;tl sye ;11111 111(1 ucllit-ye
soci ;11111 ece110111ic� s.curiI% for all its eiliiens. AI ;III
pvry ;Isive welfare ssstern Ilas virlually e1i11sinated
individual Irivalioss. Uni(Iuely, this swelfarr state l; Is
c�ot'xisled with at'' peon(my th;tl is Gill 90!'' in 1rivale
11,11lds, TI e lack of serious suciu! ;uscl ecc,notuic
griv%anc.s, co11lIt-d will' tilt- high or(ler of {x,lilical
s(1h{:aication .vfdenccd 1A lle average citizen, mill:,�,
Ssycdt'n ;s (xx,r target for sill wer ,.;.e acliyit%. Nm
:on11tunisl Iolitical I.ud.rs. the great rnajerik of
Iradp ursio11 I.aders, and lilt- Iress luvt- c�coler;tlecl
snake tilt' Iwblic awary of p.Ist :ormnnnist uim anti
tactics,
Ideologically aligned will' Olio democ�r;slie Wt-st,
S%l-clis11 {xliliVal Ivaders are Iwvertheie.s tr(mgl%
co11srrsilted le lnrrsning .1 11()1X�% of non;11li:11rc�(� ;(nil
nl-utraiily. Ssyt-dl-n clues not interlrel this {elicy ;Is
Imclu
Norrkoping
Malmo
Norrkoping
Loral Councils Lccal Executive Bodies
Election
ELECTORATE KEY vv
Responsibility
FIGURE 1. Structure of the government (U /OU)
Major executive decisions regarding the preparation
of legislation, the execution of Inws, and the issuance
of decrees are made in c�abitiet :neetings presided over
by the Prince N/linister. The weekly, sessions of the
King- in- Comic�il are nu rely the formal registration of
these decisions. Tliv King is informed in adv:in��c
about the most important natters, score as an act of
courtesy than anvlhing else.
In contrast to other W(e,tern 1- :uropean govent-
nu�nts, the Swedish ninistric�s. with the exception of
foreign Affairs and Justice, do not directly acbniaister
national laws. 'I'hcv are small units. usnalk wild) no
inure than 100 parsons. including the clerical staff.
Their I'unction is to aid the King- in- (;oincc�il in
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prelnrring 1egislatiorr for presentation to the liiksda
and for frandling rchtions %Nilh it. and issuing
c�xec�utivc orders to central achnirristratke ugeucie,.
'I'hesc scrniarrlonomnus agencies, ihich arc� usually
headed h, career ci%il servants. (lirec�tl\ rrdnrinistcr
nationc,l lairs. c,lc I imlepcncicntk ()f Ihe
ministries, dvi iur; their ;rnthorik h.\ statute rather
than from (lire,-lire, of the respunsihll nrinistrc. "I'hcir
routine it (Inrini s, (it k inchh(dcs the inspccliun
cruel control of uhorclinalc offices. curd then sornetinres
ac�t its a(Inriuistralkc c�orrrts of appc;rl. Uec�isic,rrs.
rulings. and rcgulat(,r\ dec�rc'cs issued h\ the ;rgerrcies
may be inraliclatccl 1) the cabinet or h\ lhc� Supreme
;ldnrinistratire :uurt, brit not hr the indiviclrr;rl
r,uuisters.
:3. Legislative
The Swedish Riksda,, dating frurn 1 is one ur.
the oldest enduring 1,arlianrer;ts in the world. "I'he
earl} Riksdn was cunrpu,( r( >\cd it constitutional reform that replaced t}re
hic;,nu�ral arrangenu�nt \pith an esp;urclecl till ic�anu�ral
I(�gislaturv. The reconstituted single chamber has :50
u�,(ts. lust :iI less Ihan the combined slrer,gth of the
precious houses. "fhc elections in SeW; tuber 1970 \cere
the first 1)d(I for the new Riksdu,rf and ruarked the
c�onconritmit adoption (J ii new electoral system ruiner
which elections for all parliamentary seats as well a,
for provincial and local offices core held c�oncnrrently
every :i gars.
The First session c,f llrc� single c�hanrher Riksda
convened
ill J;urrrary 19.1 (Figure 2). Of its :i�iO
nernhcrs. :311) are c lee feel I'ronr Ihe 25 districts or
c�orrsIitnenc�ic�s on the hasi, popul;rtion. The
renu(ining )O se ;rls �Ihe sc, calleil conrpcnsatory
seats �arc awarded (,n the basis of total n it ti(,nal
return, an(I tend to fay( r the major parties (see below.
under 1�;lec�toral Procedures). :anclidac�r to Ihe
Riksdag is open to all Swedish citirens yho ;ere ?O
yc acs of age on election clay ;rncl who are registered
s uteri,
a
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FIGURE 2. Stockholm Cu!t,sral Center. The new Riksdag
is temporarily located in these facilities. (U /OU)

Annual sessions of the Riksdag venerally occupy; 7
months. The first session convenes in early Janm ry
and recesses it June. After this break the Riksdag
reconvenes in October for a short fall session that
usually ends before the Christmas holiday. "I'he
government has the right to dissolve tl(- Riksdag and
call for extraordinary elections. S action, which in
the past had been resorted to only infrequently, is
facilitated b the new constitutional reforms.
The Riksdag is permitted to continue to work for as
long as 5 months afivr the date for new elections has
been set. If it is out of session during this interval, the
Prime Minister may reconvene it. During tliv interim
between the call for new elections and actual election,
the terms of office for members remain in force cznd are
terminated only when the newly elected representa-
tives actually begin their tenures.
"I'll(- Riksdag may censure the cabinet or ally one of
the ministers by calling for a vote of confidence. In
calling for such i t vote, the member must have the
support of at least I K of the Riksdag. 'I'll( reasons for
questioning an individual ninister are never stated,
and the voting issue is described b simply stating the
minister's name. The nnotion is tabled until t1w second
meetin!,r after the one ill which it is introduced, and
the motion is subject to vote not later than at the
third meeting after the one in which it was introduced.
'The charge may be directed against the Prinu>
Minister or against an individ ,al minister. The entire
cabinet must resign if an absoltnte majority votes
against the Prime Minister. Al, ;ibsolute majority is
also required to censure an individual ninister, b,t
only the minister in question is required to resign. Ili
both cases, however, the Prim( Minister has the right
to decide within l0 days if the Riksdag is to be
dissolved and if new elections are to be held.
Under the old bicameral systcm every member of
the Riksdag was entitled to express his opinion on the
floor without fear of interruption. It was not possible,
however, to avoid a legislative decision b filibustering
or otherwise prolonging debate. Parliamentary rules
governing s Jh conduct have loeg been c.lethiled and
specific. Because of the marked ;ncrease in size of the
new parliament, some restrictio;s have been unposed
or. the time allowed for debate, in the interest of
providing an opportunity for all members to sneak.
The speaker may suggest that during a particular
session the Riksdag decide beforehand lust how long
each speaker is permitted to hold the floor. In such
instances tle limitations apply to all speakers,
including ministers and party leaders.
Perhaps the most important single characteristic of
the Riksdag is its systcm of standing committees,
z
which number 16. The Conunitiee of Suppl which
deals with government appropriations, is the largest,
with 45 members, followed by the Committees on the
Constitution and 'Taxation (Ways and Means), with
27 members each. The other connrnittees have 17
members each. Ad hoc committees to address special
questions may be. formed. The chairmanship and
Composition of the connuiltees are distributed among
all the parties; representation is usually in proportion
to strength. Cabinet ministers are not permitted to be
present at committee nwetings but may be called
upon to provide information to the comnitte�es. The
speaker of the Riksdag and the, three deputy speakers
are also nominated through interparty agr(-(-nuents and
are decided upon by a voice vote in the Riksdag,
cnnless a secret ballot is requested by any one member.
During the first 15 days of cb session every
member is entitled to inlrodnce motions on any
subject. When government bills are introduced.
members have from 10 to 15 days to offer amendments
before the hills are referred to committee for thorough
discussion. t :onurittees often invite written comments
on motions or occasionally hold closed door hearings
on government bills. After it second reading, further
amendments or adjustments may he made and then
reconciled ill committee. A hill mnst be pass(-(] or
rejected on the third reading.
It is not possible to kill hills in committee, because
all of then, must he reported out of corn mittee,to the
Riksdag in plenary session. Only rarely, and reportedly
never for political reasons, is a hill held over and
referred to the next session.
4. Judicial system
Swedish jurisprulence, which traces its origins to
Old Norse common law, watt first codified nationwide
ill the National Legal Codes of King Magnus Eriksson
(c. 1350). New codification, the Gene al Code of 1734,
was prompted by concepts of Rornan !aw and b\
influences of the Enlightenment introduced by
increased contacts with Europe south of the Baltic.
Althougl; complete penal and criminal procedure
codes were included, they were almost immediately
subject to revision because of the continuing strong
influence of the Enlightenment. Most notable :acre
the impact of the Italian criminologist Beccaria, the
British jurist Blackstone, tl,e French political
philosopher Montesquieu, and the evolvinv, German
criminal law theories. British penology.. relativelv
advanced for the period, also left its mark. Although
continental influences continued to he felt in the
French Revolutionary and Napoleonic eras, reformist
impulses, indigenous and from across the North Sea,
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remained stronger. Such influences, incorporated
piecemeal for nearly it century, were definitively
integrated into Swedi.!: jurisprudence in the Penal
Code of 1864 anti the criminal procedure codes which
shortly followed. Subsequent measures curtailing
h,rshness were largely inspired by the Swedes
.he.-nselves and May be seen in the reforms to the
Penal Code adopted in 1890 and 1921, the latter
abolishing the death penalty. The most signal
advances in enlightened court procedure aril
petrology, however, have been made since the earl"
1940's, when Sweden began to lead the world in the
Whole field of social welfare.
The independence of the Swedisl; judiciary from
executive arid legislative interference is assured by the
constitution. The Justice Ombudsman -Justitieom-
hudsman) and the Chancellor of Justice �a high
ranking official attached directly to the cabinet, which
the constitution refers to in this connection as the
Royal Chancery �watch tlr courts for instances of
judicial corruption and prosecute individual judges for
malfeasance. Most j dg es are appointed by the King
in- Council, and all n.; serve until retirement at the
age of 65. Ad lwc juries are used only in cases relating
to freedom of the press.
a. Courts
Thcre are three levels of ordinary courts: the courts
of first instance, the courts of appeal, arid the Supreme
Court. Until 1971 the courts of t1w first instance
comprised 120 gate financed district court.; in rural
areas arid small towns aril 30 locally financed cit-
courts in the larger cities. As a result of a
reorganization that came into effect that year, several
district and local court,, were merged to reduce the
total number of courts of the first instance to 108; the
ultimate goal is to consolid:ae to 100 such ceyurts.
Those That are amalgamated are presumably financed
jointly by the state and urban community. All cavil
aril criminal cases are initially tried in the courts of
first instance. Each district court has a judge who is
assisted by 18 citizens elected by the local councils.
Th.-se laymen deliberate our questions of law as well as
evidence and can, by unanimous vote, overrule the
judges. 'The principal official in the local lower court
system is the president or chief magistrate, who is
assisted by a number of other judges arid judicial
trainees. Minor cases may be heard by a single judge,
whereas a panel of seven to nine judges hears the most
serious cases. A decision requires a majority vote of the
judges or, in the event of a tic, the decision of the one
presiding judge prevails.
An appeal from a court of first instance goes to one
of the six courts of appeal, located in Stockholm,
Gotegorg' Malmo, Jonkoping, Umea, and Sundsvall.
Each court has a presiding judge, a varying number of
associate and assistant judges, and two or more
division heads who are also qualified judges. Each
division specializes in certain types of civil and
criminal cases and is normally composed of five of the
court ridges. hour are sufficient to decide a case
provided three of them agree.
The S,preme Court (hogsta donrstolen) is the court
of final appeal in most instances. It is composed of 24
ustices, 21 of whom form three panels of seven jusCces
each. As few as five Justices may hear a case. Decisions
by the court are made by majority vote. In case of a
tie, the vote of the presiding justice is deciding in civil
cases. In criminal cases it tic results in acquittal, or if
the disagreement is over the severity of the sentence,
the lightest sentence proposed. The Supreme C:onrt as
such does not review national legislation for
constitutionality; however, the Law Council,
operating outside the court system and made up of
three justices from the Supreme (,our' aril one justice
from the Supreme Administrative Court, reviews
governmental legislative proposals for constitutional
ity before their submission to the Riksdag. 'I'lrc
council's opinion is only advisory but is almost always
followed by the government.
The Supreme Administrative Court is one of several
special courts designed to protect the individual
citizen against bureaucratic abuses of authority. Its 16
members handle cases sent up by lower administrative
authorities (including the ombudsmen) for final
decisions arid also cases on appeal from the central
administrative agencies which involve alleged abuse
of power by administrative officials against private
citizens. 'Theoretically, the National Court of
Impeachment tries cabinet ministers and members of
the Supreme Court and Supreme Administrative
Court for malfeasance or failure to carry out their
duties, but it has not been convened since 1854. The
Labor Coit rt, consisting of two jurists, two
representatives each from the Federation of Trade
Unions (LO) and the Swedish Employers Confedera-
tion (SAF), one rep esentative from the Central
Organization of Salaried Workers, and one member
representing the public, settles disputes arising front
labor-management contracts. Other special courts are
tic water rights, land partition, arid expropriation
courts.
Tor diacritics on pla,ee names see the list of nanus al the end of
the chapter.
N
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Judges of the courts of first iw4anc�e and courts of
appeal are law school graduates %yFrc, attain their
wisitions after 15 to 20 varrs of experience in the
judicial civil service. Most Supreme Court justices are
also chosen from the judicial civil serN jee. Irtrt
prominent attorneys and law professors are
occasic,nally appointed to the high court he!wh. In
terms of salary and prestige the justice, of the Supreme
Court and the presiding judges of the six courts of
appeal rank highest. T!rc division heads of the courts
of appeal are next in importance. District court judges
and city court chief judges generally enjo> eclnal
distinction.
b. Penal system
The Swedes share with their Sc�andivayiun
neighbors the most enlightened penal system in the
world. In the post -World War 11 period tlere has been
it strong movement for uniformity in criminal lacy and
in prison systems tltroughout the Nordic area.
Confined persons in Sweden Wray not only receive
visits from relative; and friends but arc given frequent
furloughs to visit their homes. bong -term inmates are
sometime, afforded the opportunit of spending
se veral days during the surnmer with their spouses in
pleasant accommodations rented from the slate at cost
I)\' the spouse The regalia prison facilities are
generally adequate to handle the prison population
comfortably, and treatment of iunales is humane.
'I'll(- amount of psychiatric care available, however, is
considered inadequate, and authorities are striving to
renud\ this. Only prison gu ards ;.ssigiwd to nraxinrurn
securit areas carry firearms. Swedish penologists are
loathe to risk inflicting bodily harm on inmates in
their custody, if "punishrnertt "I they rationalize, for
which there would be no justification %vithin the law.
In 1968 about 5.000 persons were given probaliort-
ary sentences for crimes punishable by imprisonment.
Another 10,000 were given prison terms, many for only
a few months. 'I'll( number o! inmates in Sweden at
any given time is about 5,000 in a total polntlation of
over 5 million. "There are some 3,100 prison employees,
or nea rly one staff mender for every two prisoners.
Many criminals, particularly young people, are given
institutional treatment for 6 to 5 weeks and then
placed under if supervisor who is similar to if probation
officer. The supervisors, who number sonit .0,000, are
selected, well adjusted, and respected inclividctals who
act as big brothers to minor lawbreakers and first
offenders. "I'hcy get it symbolic payment, about USES
a month, for their efforts.
All fines except for drunkenness arul disorderly
conduct are set in a fixed nnrnberof units called "da%.-
5
if holdover in tcnnim4op from an earlier era
Mien lire ,lour had to pa\ imposed fine, in daily
insla!Intenls.
'I'll( contentporar day-fi, range in
nurnl;.. r from oue to 120, depending upon the
seriousness of offenw. :1 rnaxintnnt of 150 day -fine,
Wray be imposed if several crime, are puni,hed
concurrently. The amount of at single clue fine varies,
depending avowedly on the offender', ability to pa\.
This aurcnutt is then tmtltiplied b the nundwrofday-
fines imposed. largely pwdctermined ill the peaal code
by the nature of the specific offense. A jingle daN -fine
may vary in amount from SKr2 to SKr-500.
Sweden, like other Scandinavian cnunlries, has ten
juvenile courts. Child welfare hoard,, elected by the
local councils, deal \%ith all cases of soc�ia:lly
nulaelietsted and delinquent jcn�coil tinder 1.5 years
of age: they arc also empowered to deal v ith juveniles
between 15 and 1 whose cases call fo,, special
corrcc�tiye measures. Offenders aged 15 to 20 gars
may be remanded to care under the Chill Welfare
Act, even though the regular correctional system is
responsible for offenders after they reach their 15th
birthday. TIIe child %elfare hoards afford advisory
assistance, admonish the parents, and supervise the
child's rellinu� under preventive procedures. Taking a
child into custody for social care is the last resort.
Institutions for child care are administered locally by
public authorities or, in certain instances, privately.
Youth welfare schools for lawbreakers arc operated by
tit( state.
5. Provincial and local government
The marked responsiveness of government to the�
governed in Sweden it typically sc�andivavian
phenomenon stems in important nu�asum from the
traditional vitality of the provincial and local councils.
Nonetheless, during the almost four decades of Social
Democratic political dominvtion. thy� c�cnlrai
government has steadily encroached on purely local
prerogatives. This erosion of local autononly, opposed
I
y the other parties and perhaps by if nwjorit of tit(
electorate, and a probable campaign issue in the 197
elec�tion,, showed signs of easing in early 1972.
Of the national government agencies, the Ministry
of Int -rior exerts the v,idest range of inflrtencc over the
provincial auld local govermuents. It prepare; national
legislation affecting them and considers appeals which
arise from decisions or actions of local officials; at the
provincial levels it supervises the National Police, the
fi-efighting and civil defense systc�tus. and the
ac:rninistration of the comprehensive national health
programs. Other ministries with extensive local
authorit are I ?duc�alion and Elec�lesi as( ic�aI Affairs,
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Fillance and Fcomom,y. Wd Social :affairs. Both the
lust'(�( Onrhruls lit n ;111(1 the (11ancellor of jii"tice arc
ellipmered to inyesligale the actiyilies of provi11ci;11
au(I local gmern memt officials and Prosecute or
arrange for prosec�utio11 for dewlic�liom of dots.
For adrmiuistratiye purposes. Ssyc den is cliyidecl into
Provinces un(I towns, boroughs, it( l rural c�omumuues.
.kll arc resporesivc to lleir respec�tiye rv
a. Provincial govcrnnu
Each of tit, 21 provinces (lanner). is heucled by it
governor (lands� /rov(jing) the (wily of Stockholm has
special statics and is administercd by a governor
general, Filch ,governor is.,issiste(l by an administrativc
staff--the pro%kic�ial cxec�utiye boar(I and till Office of
the Governor General ill Stockholm. The governors
and top officials of their staffs, although ;Ippoinlecl by
Ile King- in- 1, follow the dirccliyes of the
Ministry of Interior, to %%hick then are ire most cases
responsible. The governors act as tliv principal age�ncs
of the national government, insuring that 11atiom;ll
laws are carried out and that national interests and
property arc I mt e(-Iv(I. 'I'hc� to iIIc�i,II excculiyc
boards adrmiIIisIvr and supervise a yaricty of activities,
including tux assessrme11l and collection, civil defense,
social welfare, firefighting, roads 111(1 traffic control,
and 1)()1'1.1. l, Provincial chief of Police is directly
responsible to the board and is considvi-ed a board
official. "I'hc police chiefs of Stockholm, Got( bor,g
Malmo, and Norrkoping are indepcndcnt of II I(
provincial chiefs of Police but are responsibly t0 the
provincial board, or in the else of Stockholm to the
Office of the Governor General.
Each proviiiev is governed by it council; deresek
populated Kit lniar is (I iyidcd into two administrative
areas. Provincial cot 'I are electe(I every i years o11 a
proportional representation systen I,y all citizens 15
gars of age and over. 1 ?a u
ch concil selects art
executive com mittec of I t Icast five illembers who nay
he members of the colnrcil or brought in from ontsidc.
This committee pm-pares and a(hninisll-rs the hu(lgct,
rm-nagc�s property, prepares am annual report of
government activities for the council, and represents
the council betsyccetr sessions. It roust approve all
matters to be brought before tle connc�il except when
the board ,ally i t special session of th(. council. Special
nuretings of the council rmay also be called by the
Members, the cx(�cntivc committee, or the King -m-
Council. Procedures are similar to those of the
Riksdag. I,egislltivc proposals may f,c nzulc by tle
governor, tic provincial board, lFcc c�onncil itself, or
individual members. Council decisions are considered
to be ordinances, not laws. Provincial coumc�il
Icgisl ;Ilion r!; al PrinciP;tliy with lcallb and care of
11ick. \oc�:1tio11nl :ord ;1(11:11 ec!ul ;uccl social
ccr If ;arc. The dcnscly populated c�ilies of Goteborg.
Malulo. a(rccl Norrkoptng are governed by scmiallto110-
Molrs city councils that (Zeal direclls will, the� u_(tiorlal
government. maintaining only linitcd tics to their
respec�liye provinc�cs. Greater Stockholm is guyeriwd
by if joint city ;Ind provincial colulc�il 01 100 Popularly
elected utc rnhe:s. It appoints it board ill' 12 alderntctl
from n
its IMI, u�ndwrs to supervise administrrtivc
I'll ncli0rls. This council also elects nine dircctors to
hca(I lhc� ('it\ (Iepartnn nls-- finance, pro Perty. social
\wlfarc, cultural 111(1 (1111( Itional motlers. industr
city hospitals, srtburbaii planoi11g. amcl
housing and construction.
6. local government
In 1970 the basic units of local goyc�rnrIIeIIt
ac�corncled for 818 local admcinslralive councils. Im
I9-16 the Riksdag approved a proposal to cons( :lidatc
the nary sparser populated rural comcnum( into
larger ones, I 1)roc�e,s "bic�II conti11ucs gr dmilly.
2,281 com11mum(�s s(hic�h cxisled in 1952 had been
mduccd to 621 in 1970 b\ a process of merger and
COIISO!I(latir >Ir� In acl(lition to the comumumes. 1332
tolyns and 92 boroughs have elected local goyerm-
I'lenls. Tlic process of co11solidatiolc aims It achieving
a:] efficient proportion of population in (very local
unit by 1975. Industrial deyeloprc`rit and expansion
cord(' cause shifts in PoPulation that will require
;rdditional restrcturiug of the local governments after
1975. but the basic Irainework will have becu
F ;Ic�h local govenrnent is headed by a council.
elected 011 a Proportional rePmsentation basis by all
citizens 20 years of' age 111(1 over, with it nioncbership
ranging from 1$ to 60. The council appoints al,
cxecrrtivc� c�onrr)ittee consisting (if' fire to I I nenrbers;
it Prepares ticc agenda for council IIi cc t.imgs,
-d it IiII is( vrs Properly, dircc�ts administration, and
generally protects local interests. 'I'll( coumci. also
appoints other c�ornnittcc's to (teal \yith cicclicns,
construction, civil cl(.fellsc�, health and care of the� sic l..
and other community interests. Local as well as
provincial governments Inay Ievv taxes; lh(�% may also
borrow money with till- approval of the national
government. "ith the consent of the King- in- Co(rncil,
heavily populated areas within a rural commune hay(.
beers formed into special cormntluliti(�s; these units
remain part of the rural conmIIII( but lave councils
of their o%%n to deal will special problems created by
their urban characteristics.
9
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In order to handle the growing duties of local
government snore efficientiv, n eonununes have
joined to form c�ooperltke associations. Since 1957
these associations have been empowered by law to
create� councils and exec�utiyc cernnrittees from arnong
their rnendwrs. An association fetnctioning as it corrllc�il
may not levy taxes brit rllay request financial
contributions from the participating governments. In
addition to these associations, coil n rnav orrr,
special associations to furthe cooperation in regional
planning, traffic direction, and civil defense.
C. Political dynamics (C)
Significa;rt social and economic factors have
contributed to the staple evolution of Swedish polities
in the present century. Noninvolvement in external
wars for a centurN and a half, the exceptional eth
homogeneity of tilt� population, and a decentralized
and diversified industrial base of the economy have
helped foster a spirit of cooperation and pragnlatisnl.
Political compromise has become normal in the effort
to avoid any disruption of orderly soc�ioecotlornic�
growth. Although recent developments h;.tve
introduced sonle instability i nto the politi"., systenr.
tilt traditio �rat )rlttcrn still holds for the most part.
This stable ;)arliarnentary government matured
only during the Mast four decades. As elscwher. i
Europe-, modern political parties developed in Sweden
in the latter 19th century ;.ding essentially class lines
and engaged in somewhat the same class struggles.
The fundamental dorru'stic issues of the past �the
nature and extent of parliamentary government,
extension of the suffrage, the respective roles of
government and free enterprise in the economic
systell" urrd the institution of suite directed social
welfare were largely resolved b the early 19
'fhe cooperative effort in governing Sweden has
provided a model for the other Nordic countries.
Since the mid- 1950's the non- Conl ill unist political
parties have broadened their platforms, each one
attempting to attract the floating voto, chiefly of
farmers, small husinessme_n, and the growing group of
white- collar workers. A systern of proportional
representation in national and local elections, while
tending to disfavor the smaller parties, distributes the
scats broadly in accordance with the popular vote.
Major and sudden changes in the strength of the
significant parties tend to he rare, as are radical shirts
in public opinion. On the other hand, in line with the
rising tide of re volt among many Swedish vouths, thev
tend not to follow traditional voting patterns hilt to
10
shift to more extr positions oo the right :out
particularly the tell.
There are five major political parties: the Swedish
Social Democratic Workers Party usually called the
Social Democratic Party, drawing most of its support
front the� workers; the Center Party (CI)) suppe.,tecl
print, rily by white- collar workers and farn)ers; the
Liberal Party (1'P), representing for the roost part the
middle class; the Moderate Coalition Part' (MP�
of(en called the Conservatives), supported principally
by the upper social and ec�orronlic� sectors of t';c
IX)pulation but with souu middle class hacking; and
the small Party of the heft Conlnrl"list OTK), made
up of mirkers with it sizable admixture of professional
and inf)�Ilechl:rl groups and gaining scrpport among
yotrtb. During the 19?0's and early 1930's no
combination of parties with ;.l parlianiviitary majoril
proved possihle, and corlseque'n(I the go werninen
rotated among the Social Dcnlocrats, Liberals, and
(:o s, each making compromises in order to
gain office and to gc�t legislation enacted. By 1932,
however, the Social Dernocre,ic� P:rrty I;ad gained
sufficient popular support to enafle it to become
clorrillant, and for the next four decades it governed
alone or in coalition %%ith the C enter Party, or, as
during World War 11, in a national coalition with all
the other non- (:ornnlnnist parties (Figure 3). The
comprehensive' social welfare legislation in force to day
was enacted over the past four decades, f'regnently
With the support of the Liberal and Conservative
opposition in return for cornp:r on other i,siws.
Retveen 1957 and 1968 the SAP govemod alone
without rnajority parliamentary support. As a minority
government it frequently had to rely on its majority in
the Upper House or occasionally on the support of the
Communists in the lower (louse. In 1968 the Social
Dercocrats won an absolute majority, bolt their
nurnerica! suprenlacv disappeared in the 1970
elections. In the new Riksclag the Social Democrats
have been able to muster a majority on roost issues
with the support of one or more of the bourgeois
parties (Moderate Coalition, Liberal, Center).
Minor parties have played a limited role in S\V
politics. The only such party of ally significance in the
last 15 years is the Christian Democratic Union (KDS),
a rightwing splinter group whose principal ol)jec�tive is
an expanded role for Christianity in Swedish everyday
life. It appeared in the 1964 elections and received
1 8% of the vote but no scats. It was still active in the
1070 election, and while improving on its 1:?(iS returns
(in the expanded electorate) by 0.3"0. :vas unable to
do any better than its initial showing of 1.8%. The
maverick Bourgeois Rally Party in swrthern Sweden
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FIGURE 3. Governments since 1932 (U /OU)
PARTIES IN iii VERNMENT
PRIME: MININTER
TENURE
Social Denioeratic
Per Albin Hntims... (S)..........
Oct.
111:32 star. 1936.
Agrarian
A. Pehrmson- Briv ;iscurp (A)
Mar.
1936 Sep. 1936.
Social Democratic and Agrarian......
Pcr Albin llanacon (S)
Sep.
111313 Dee. 1939.
Social Detno rat,ic, Agrarian, Liberal,
P- r Albin I3anxMon (S)
Dee.
19:31) Aug. 1945.
and Conmervative."
Social Democratic
Per Albin Ilansson (S)
Aug.
19-15 Oct. 15151.
Dif -d in (Iffire; snr4.4f -df-d Inc
'Page Erlander Oct. 19413.)
So 1) it atic and Agrarlao......
Tage lrhander (S)
Oct.
11)51 (act. 1957.
Social Democratic
'Page Erlander (S)
Oet.
1957 Oct_ 1969.
Social Democraticc
010f Palme (S)
Oct..
1909 present.
S, Social 0enioerntie,
A Agrarian.
OBecamc the Center Party in 1958.
"Bec�arne the Moderate Coalition Party in 1969,
managed to take tIIrcc parli.i tit �nt.Iry scats in 196 -1,
but two of Ihcsecvcntuallc rcunitcd %%i(it tlivirorigin:al
parties. 'I'hc tiny Cotnnrttnist Leaguc for Marxists
Leninists (KI Ml.) participates in elections but
rc�ceis ��d a scant 0.4',' of talc vow in 1970.
t. Socia! Democratic Party
a. Membership and electoral strength
'I'hc Social Democratic Parh, founded in I %Brig. is
Swcden's largcsl lout in toots of popular support and
actual nnrnnbership. Since 1917 it has regularly polled
more votes in national cicetiotis than any of Icr party,
and after 1914 it consistently hehi tit( Ialrgc;t iminber
of seats in the Lower llouse of the Riksdag. In the
1970 elections the Social Democrats obtained 15.?i of
the popular vote, clown from their all time high in
1968 (Filrure 4). In size the party is almost four and a
half tittrs larger than its nearest competitor; its 1967
mcrnbership of some 886,M0 was 11.2 of the total
Swedish population that year. More than 7Mi cf the
Social DctnocratsI strength is the track union
movenwnt, but tit(- party also has cousidcrable support
among white collar workers and sinall businessmen
and, to a lesser extent, among intellectuals.
'I'hc landslide vic' ry of tit( Social Dcinocrats in
1965 was in good measure attributable to the efficient
organization of the election campaign, which had
been stiinulated by the heavy losses sustained in the
local cicctions in 1966. All parties campaigned
vigorously, howcvcr, resulting in a Swedish election
record; 89 .7= of the eligible voters cast their ballots.
Nearly :III of the 620,000 yoursg people eligible to vote
for the first titne participated and were probably
attracted to the modern, progressive Social
Dcnnlcnlhc� platform. '11h^ impact of tail� Soviet
invasion cif Czechoslovakia. which oc�currcd less (ball .1
weeks before the elation, clearly deterred matt\ \%bo
r onld norinally have voted Communist. Most of these
disviichanted icftists drifted their votes to the Social
Democrats.
n
10
t+Fa
W.
r)n4Ir taw tigttenrulha �Forty
q+e1 flee. rprton'` MY
Center trprlan to f 957; L'bntar to 1958
unist
70
FIGURE 4. Trends in voting since 1944 (U /OU)
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FIGURE 5. Party seats in the Riksdag: Lower House, 1944 -68; unicameral, 1970 (U /OU)
Ili 1970 the Social Democratic P:Irt l(st its majority
in the hiiks(lag, partly bec the ap ;)state
Conununists who 11,1(1 (lefec'tecl to the Soci;tl
Democrats in 1968 rettlnied to their party fold (I igur(-
5). The Social Democrats attributed' theirbacl showing
to if lackluster campaign and voter apathy; illey
Poiutcd out that a lower percentage of voters turned
out than in the 1968 elections. TIWN found it neevssary
to tailor some controversial legislation to suit ill
Cornrrunisls in order to assure a nzljority of support in
parliament. While the bourgeois parties still luck the
r( cohesiolt ifecessary to unseat the Social
Dernoc'rats, as evidence(I by the litters' success in
gaining occasional support from the Center Party, the
bourgeois parties have Moved closer together since
Novembe, 1971 In the face Prime Minister Paint's
confrontation politics.
k Organization and leadership
The SAP is the (rest organized of the non
Comnrttttist political parties. Discipline has peen
generally well rnaill taiIJV(I clespite the increase in
internal strains during the past few years, The highest
authority is the party congress, rnacle up of 350
delegates clectc (l b\ till rncrnbers In a system of
proportional representation. Theoretically the congress
is tie highest policyrnaking hotly; because it usually
meets only once every :3 years, however, nI, t of t!Ie
actual power, except the election of ;dl principal
national officials, rests in the hands :)f the national
and executive Committees. The national Committee,
nadC up of 28 numbers selected by the congress,
ineets regularly once i t year as the highest authority
between congresses. In this capacity it makes polic
regarding all aspects of party activity. ht national
committee selects seven of its rnvinbers, who must be
12
Stockholm residents, to act as the executive
conrn)ittet.
This book tmrts at least once it rnonth;utd
has the primary function of carrying out (lec'isions of
the congress and national Its seven
me;nlwrs are the SAP chairman and secretary, who are
Cx Offi(I" numbers; the chairman of till. 1,0, with
which the SAP has close ties; the cxeeutiwc director of
the :cutup !ir "'.(rizalion of Salarie(l f?rnpl sees
(TCO); ar(1 three top part\ leader~ in lie cabinet,
other than t!u c; :Airman. The l all of the party chairs
its parliamentary group ;!n(1 also serves as the Prirrle
Minister. The sevretary is responsible for executin;;
party Policies and decisions and coordinating all
national activities. TIIv national organization is
duplicated on tike district a?i(l local levels. District
COMIllittees act as liais,)n between national
bea(I(tuarters and the labor communes, which are the
basic units for recntiling and training rovinbers atxl
propagandizing the electorate. These c�omnlunes also
set up special part associations in resi(lential areas
and clubs in places of work; their main function is to
counteract Cornlnunist activity through political
propaganda.
To train future lea(lers the SAP uses the Workers
1 ?dtrcalional Association, organized by the party ;111(1
tiles 1,0 in 1912, to complement the regular school
system arcf provi(le general education. "I'ht Swedish
Social Detnocn,tic Youth Association (SSU) provi(les
young people with more practical lrainin) in party
and national a'fairs. The SSU, which wits organized in
1917, is the s largest and most influential
political Youth 9 1011 P in Sweden and had some 72,000
nreinbers in 1972. In addition to being a source of
future party leaders, tit SSU is a vehicle for
con(.lucting educational an(1 propaganda uetivities
within life party and among the electorate. Al the
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MO(�t Al.
No 0 o F. It AT F:
Y F;AIt DEMOCRATIC
1.I11 KIt
A1, CO ALIT 10N CFNT KIt
COMMe NIMT
o'r II F; It
TOTAL
1944.......
115
213
:311
35
Ifi
1)
230
1948.......
112
57
2:.
:30
M
o
2:30
1953.......
110
:58
31
213
5
0
230
;956.......
100
:58
42
111
1958.......
111
38
�15
32
6
5
0
23!
1960
114
40
:11)
31
5
1)
231
19(3.1.
113
I''
:i:)
:35
0
232
2:33
1908...
125
31
32
:31)
3
1970.......
163
5M
41
71
17
11
23:3
1)
1 50
*Formerly t.h:�
;'otiservulive Party; bevitnu the !Moderate
Coltlit.ion
Party in 1999.
*Formerly the
AKrarinn
Party;
became the ('enter Agrarian
Party in 1957, 1
and the
Center
Party in 1958.
"One deputy
xubscyvently joined the Liberals and one
the C.,nservatives.
Ili 1970 the Social Democratic P:Irt l(st its majority
in the hiiks(lag, partly bec the ap ;)state
Conununists who 11,1(1 (lefec'tecl to the Soci;tl
Democrats in 1968 rettlnied to their party fold (I igur(-
5). The Social Democrats attributed' theirbacl showing
to if lackluster campaign and voter apathy; illey
Poiutcd out that a lower percentage of voters turned
out than in the 1968 elections. TIWN found it neevssary
to tailor some controversial legislation to suit ill
Cornrrunisls in order to assure a nzljority of support in
parliament. While the bourgeois parties still luck the
r( cohesiolt ifecessary to unseat the Social
Dernoc'rats, as evidence(I by the litters' success in
gaining occasional support from the Center Party, the
bourgeois parties have Moved closer together since
Novembe, 1971 In the face Prime Minister Paint's
confrontation politics.
k Organization and leadership
The SAP is the (rest organized of the non
Comnrttttist political parties. Discipline has peen
generally well rnaill taiIJV(I clespite the increase in
internal strains during the past few years, The highest
authority is the party congress, rnacle up of 350
delegates clectc (l b\ till rncrnbers In a system of
proportional representation. Theoretically the congress
is tie highest policyrnaking hotly; because it usually
meets only once every :3 years, however, nI, t of t!Ie
actual power, except the election of ;dl principal
national officials, rests in the hands :)f the national
and executive Committees. The national Committee,
nadC up of 28 numbers selected by the congress,
ineets regularly once i t year as the highest authority
between congresses. In this capacity it makes polic
regarding all aspects of party activity. ht national
committee selects seven of its rnvinbers, who must be
12
Stockholm residents, to act as the executive
conrn)ittet.
This book tmrts at least once it rnonth;utd
has the primary function of carrying out (lec'isions of
the congress and national Its seven
me;nlwrs are the SAP chairman and secretary, who are
Cx Offi(I" numbers; the chairman of till. 1,0, with
which the SAP has close ties; the cxeeutiwc director of
the :cutup !ir "'.(rizalion of Salarie(l f?rnpl sees
(TCO); ar(1 three top part\ leader~ in lie cabinet,
other than t!u c; :Airman. The l all of the party chairs
its parliamentary group ;!n(1 also serves as the Prirrle
Minister. The sevretary is responsible for executin;;
party Policies and decisions and coordinating all
national activities. TIIv national organization is
duplicated on tike district a?i(l local levels. District
COMIllittees act as liais,)n between national
bea(I(tuarters and the labor communes, which are the
basic units for recntiling and training rovinbers atxl
propagandizing the electorate. These c�omnlunes also
set up special part associations in resi(lential areas
and clubs in places of work; their main function is to
counteract Cornlnunist activity through political
propaganda.
To train future lea(lers the SAP uses the Workers
1 ?dtrcalional Association, organized by the party ;111(1
tiles 1,0 in 1912, to complement the regular school
system arcf provi(le general education. "I'ht Swedish
Social Detnocn,tic Youth Association (SSU) provi(les
young people with more practical lrainin) in party
and national a'fairs. The SSU, which wits organized in
1917, is the s largest and most influential
political Youth 9 1011 P in Sweden and had some 72,000
nreinbers in 1972. In addition to being a source of
future party leaders, tit SSU is a vehicle for
con(.lucting educational an(1 propaganda uetivities
within life party and among the electorate. Al the
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congress in 1970, the SSI was chided fcrr living u
debating s(wiet) Mull out of Iuuc�h c.ith (fee ccurken.
Tritde unionist leader Arne G -iier wMnied the c�ottgress
that his pow( rkI labor organization. it nu(jor
c�otrportertt of the I.O. would establish it cmilpeting
socialist youth group from antcmg its �1(H),000 %uung
wcakers, but this threat appeared to be stemtnc(1
following tilt' SW in J une 1972.
As Ei L!!wer c�onficlanl ;mall protege for 15 years,
I'alme ac�te"I ;is the stAking horse for the party's
leftwing. A sharp critic of U.S. policies in Southea%(
Asia, Pulnue contributed to the increasing strui 1 in
S-m�dish -U.S, relations b marching adougside M North
\'ietnurr: se diplomat in if clemonstnttion against the
United Stales in February 1968, This gesture enclearecl
him t,r lefhying elements bvt caused clisyniel among
much of the parl\'s leadership and rank and file. The
sweeping victory of the Social Denuc�raIs in
September 1968 and the certainty of Iris succession to
the leadership lee! NMlnte to try t improve his standing
ccith the more conservative� trade union and inichlle
class members. In the months before the congres in
1961), Palne stressed the theme of unity among
conflicting elements ill Swedish society and tried to
soften the more radical inr;tt!e that had c�haracterize(I
his political styis Since 1965.
Strengthened by the Social Democrats' witiorit) in
parliament and their unanitnorts endorsement of his
policies, Prince Minister Pxlntc gained a sense of
confidence. The initial discncha fit ncnt began it few
wet�ks after he assumed offi whets Foreign Minister
To) rstct: Nilsson riled Swedish busincssnton by
presenting long -range plans to ai(1 North Vietnam as
concrete measures to be taken its the near fnhtre.
Patine was forced to quiet the clamor Mncl conciliate
local commercial interest by downplitNir(g Nikson's
remarks. Although Palms� succ�eedo(I in mollifying
more conservative opinion, his inwgv as a c�hantpion of
leftwing causes was tarnished. The 2 -month long
wildvat strike in December 1969 by miners in the
state- iron chines in Norrbottell threatened to
spread to other industries. The strikers' grievances, not
all economic, inchi(led charges of inclifferenc�e mt the
part of the govcrnrncrrt is well :is the unions to the
welfare of the miners. PMlrnc condemned the strike,
thus further alienating labor militants, blot
acknowledged that the work( complaints had some
validity. Leftist supporters because c\ (-if more
dissatisfied when Paline roac�ted to the annotntecnrcn(
of U.S. military operations to Carnboclia by delivering
only if mild rebuke. flis scorning abandonment of
leftist causes probably contributed to Communist
gains in the 1970 election.
GrosciiiK amt business fit ilunvs
continued h plagl,(� 1 through 1971, and in the
Lill he was forced to release government funds for
investuuvlt. This move Mppease(1 business interests mill
cyaS designed to get the ec�oromy through the winter
with the v\pec�lalion thitt proclnc�tion and entplo\ tnc�nt
\%mull improve cc the nornmil c�yc�licA upturn in the�
spring. The Soc�ia1 Democrats are ple(Iged to maintain
Sweden's high stmi(larcl (if' living, mill unless PMltne
can improve the domestic economy, the authority of
Ifte leaders ncay be sharpl\ challenged It'\ more radical
elements ccithin the parh.
e. Program and policies
The Social Democrats in Sweden, like those in other
S; iindinayian cmintrics, akm(lonecl their purely
Marxist doctrines of class carfare and socialization of
the means of production at un curly date and
developed into it :nodera(e. reformist part. 'Phis
change ryas effec�lecf ,incler nimlertte leaders, who
found it necessar, to cowprotnise and cooperate \cith
other parties in or(ler to eslablisl! universal suffrage.
parhimientmrianisnt, and an advanced system ref social
security and welfare. It became� apparent Ihat the
party haul to broaden its inontbership base to inciude
traditionally middle class groups if it were to continue
in power. The party adopted governinent-adntinis-
tered social and economic programs which hays
souglt to maintain it mixed economy, in which private
I'nterprise would remain dominant, but pub'icl
owned companies would operate most public utilities
mill certain basic inclust ;ies.
The (Iliestion of the extent of state intervention in
the cc�ouotm is still uu issue in Sweden, but only the
;omntunists and if haoditil of nulical Socialists
support nationalization of all privately o\yned
industries and business enterprises. Approximately
9:V of Sweden's total industrial production reinaincd
in private hands in 1970. ()illy about 200,000 workers.
6 "1 of the told gainfull\ cnployecl labor force, were
employed govermnc�nt owned or government
controlled firms. 'I'ftc formation of the :'\1inistry of
Indlostri ;il Affairs in 1961, however, presaged some
nuasure of increased official initiative in managing
tho ccouotn\. The first major project of the new
nrinistrs was the formation and operation of
additional state -owned industries. Blit plans to b(n up
failing small businesses proved so costly that they lime!
to be dtastically nurdifie(l.
Because the SAP hats been clontinanl for many
it number of party policies have become government
policy. At home the earl\ has supported social welfare
and insurance programs as i f means of raising the
I-3
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living standards of lower inc�orne groups, and programs
for inc�reash.g the income of the rural population to
attract its s tplxrt. It has also hacked changes in the
school system in an effort to bring educational
faciliti(- above the elementary level within the reach
of larger numbers of the lower income groups. I'll(-
party program continues to place greatest emphasis on
traditional goals, such as maintaining Full vntplo'-
ntent, raising this standard (if living of lower inconu�
groups, and increasing productivity in order to enable
Sweden to compete in world markets. These relatively
noncontroversial goals have lhc� support of most
Swedes, whereas sonte of the party's more recently
enuncicated proposals�such as increased government
planning and control over banking and industries
have been sharply attacked and are likely to tile(-
considerable opposition.
One of the most crucial problems facing the party,
and a potential threat to its dominant position in
Swedish political life, is the continuing high rate of
inflation. The "temporary" �tee freeze instituted by
the government in October 1970 remaived in eff(-ct
until January 1972. Plant closures and unemployment
reached serious proportions in the winter of 1971 -72. A
tax reform bill adopted in May 1972, which gives
relief to lower and middle income groups by increasing
pay roll taxes for the employer, threatens to prolong
unemployment difficulties.
In foreign affairs the SAP supports Swedcn':,
traditional policy of nonalliance and neutrality. Thc�
party reflects the views of the overwhelming majority
of Swedes, who remain opposed to membership in
NATO, despite the fact that Sweden identi`ies itself
with the other kk'estern dernocracies. Thc Social
Democrats are also opposed to full membership for
Sweden in the EC; because of the political and military
tics to the Western alliance entailed by membership.
Nevertheless. the government recognizes the reality of
c ^onontic dependence on the EC countri. s as markets
fo: Swedish products and is prepared to negotiate it
treaty providing for an industrial free -trade
arrangement that would protect many economic
interests of Sweden without requiring it to assume
political oblifrations that would compromise its
neutrality. The attitudes of party ivaders and the rank
and file toward the U.S.S.R. do not differ markedly
from other segments of Swedish society. Despite
certain ideological affinities between social democracy
and communism, most party supporters remain
suspicious of Soviet intentions toward the non
Communist world and are repelled by the atmosphere
of coercion and fear that characterize life in the Soviet
Union.
14
Since the early 1960 s domestic political consid era-
tions have impelled tk- SAP to assume it more neutral
stance in its foreign policy. Yount; activist members of
the leftwing, restless user what the% regarded as it
trend to tit(- right by the SAP, criticized the leaders for
their stavd on it nomber of foreign policy issues. In
mid -1965 the more radic�a: element began to press for
an '.ndependent, "Social IN-moc�ratic�� foreign policy
that wotdd after the part%'s traditional conjolitn,eul to
nonalignment and reluctance to criticize either Ili(-
blast or the %%'est and lead to a nurc� s igorioo,
approach to foreign policy issues. As international
opinion began increasingly to foc�cts on Vietnam, there
was growing pressure oil the part leaders to adopt an
anti -U.S. position on this issue. In order to forestall
Possible defections from its leftwing to the
Cornnn.tnisls, the SAP leaders decided to placate the
left on foreign policy issue.;, while aolvocating a
middle -of- the -road approach to domestic problems.
This was un effort to minimize opposition from its
moderate labor following. At first, the inme to the left
as limited to public remarks b 1) roruinent
goverument leads rs. In January 1969, hc: %vver, the
Swedish Government became the firs, Nordic country
to recognize North Vietnam, placing it considerable
strain on relations with il United Stales. sifter Palate
became Prime Minister, the government sought to
dissociate itself from the strident anti- Arnericanisnt of
the party's leftwing that had clouded bilateral
relations. The ebb and flow of anti- Americanism have
since been subject to the degree of fighting in the
(�ntnbat zone. \Vith the intensification of the Vietnam
syar in tit(- spring of 1972, leaders in the Riksdag, led
by the Prince Minister, stepped up their harsh criticism
of the united States.
There is considerable division within the party
regarding the size and mission, c,f national defense
forces. Most members hold that Su; cien should
maintain sufficient forces to deter it potential
aggressor, but there is also widespread sentiment that
military expenditures should be reduced in order to
permit further expansion of social welfare benefits.
Indeed, Swedish military commanders predicted it
significant reduction in the effectiveness of the
military as a result of inadequate defense appropria-
tions passed by the Riksdag in June 1972.
d. Press and finances
Since the demise of the morning daily Stockholms-
Tidningen in 1966, the Malmo morning daily Arbetet
Labor) has been the principal organ of the Social
Democratic Party. The Stockholm dliily Aftorthladet
represents the views of th(- leftwing and has the larger
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circulation. lit addition to these two leading dailies,
the� party pullisIt es it number of small daily
newspapers throughout Ssseden, the rnajorit} of which
are owned by the trade unions in the 1.0 and operate
in the red. '1'lhc� LO a n(I the SAI'sabsidize mativ of the
papers. The party's chief source of inc�onu1 is
membership clues, which vary in aniount in different
parts of the counts. Another source is payment to the
national c�- n:mittee by tit( labor cenuriunes and the
party district committees, which cars on or-
ganizational work at a local level with one� committee
to cac�h district. 'They assess extra dues for election
campaigns and special drives.
2. Center Party
a. Membership and electoral strength
The (:enter Part% %%as originall} established as the
Pariiwrs' Union in 1913, subseynently took the name
:lgraria n Pi.rty, and then, in 1957, became� the (;enter
agrarian Party in order In appeal to lot riiraI
elements; its present name was adopted it year later.
From 19 -1.1 to 196.1 the party generally ranked fourth
in popular appeal. although it moved to third place in
terms of scats wnti to the national elections of 1944
and 1 >)64. It incurred its greatest electoral losses while
cooperating with the Social Democrats from 1951 to
1957, after which it pride steady though modest gains.
In the provincial and local elections of 1966 the party
won 15.251 of the� total vote compared with 13.4' 1 its
1964. Its sricc�esses at the polls continued in the
national elections of 1968 and 1970. It is the second
party in terms of eirctoral support and third in size of
nu�rnbership, with approximately 120,000 numbers in
1969. No longer only it farmers' party, the UT derives
much support Irons office and factor\ workers.
h. Organization and leadership
The structure of the Center Party is somewhat
similar to that of the Liberal and Moderate Coalition
Parties (see below), but its tighterorganization is more
tike that of the Social Democrats. The Iighest
authority, the annually asserriblcd national conven-
tion, elects the party chairman and two vice chairmen,
who sit ex arj''cio on the national conunittcc. The
national committee. most of whose members are
elected by the Jistrict organization, prepares the
agenda of the rational convention and advises tlu�
eight mernber executive committer. This committee
principally through its appointed secretariat directs
the affairs of the party between conventions. Four
members of the executive cominitt c are elected by the
national committee and four by t,hc convention, to
which it is re�spo risible. On the district and local levels
the national organizatiou is reflected in smaller scale
replicas. The basic� unit of party organization is the
local section.
The (:e fart% relies heavily on its atixilias
organizations to s ipplernent and expard its actix ities.
I'It (:enter Part\ Youth association is the largest of all
the politically based youth groups, with some 90.0(X)
nu�nilwrs in 1969. It has won i t considerable folio wing
among rural vollth through educational and
recreational .ic�ti%iIi vs� including shidy courses,
Iectnres. and sports and travel facilities �and provides
training for futtire part\ leaders. F(hicational activities
are also conducted by the the Center Women's
League, which hail 6110)O members in 1969, acid by
its student nrganization, the Swedish Rural Sttulent
Association. Party propagan(la work is promoted by it
special press assoc�iatiort.
A change in the party leadership occurrcd in June
1971. when the 70 year -old Cainnar I ledbnd ,leppe(l
down after svrvii ;g for 22 %,�ars as head of lbe part).
II ;s protege and st,c�cessor, the 14 \ear -olcl Thorbjoru
aildiii, inherited it clear title to head any eventual
bourgeois coalition than may result from the 197 :3
elections. ()It the basis of the last hwo c�Iec�tions party
fortunes appear to be rising. and its opposition leader
in the Riksdag, Palldin is likeh to be an ;,nportaoit
leader ern the political scene. flis parlia ;nrentas
experi�iocv is equal to 1'.ilme's, both leaders having
eciterecl the Riksdag in 1956. Moreover, I1e
retirement 2 wears before the iwxt election has given
Fall(lin ample time to establish himself with the
electorate.
n. Program and policies
Since 1958 the domestic program of the Center
1'arty has been designed mainly to expand its appeal
beyond farming groups. The program emphasizes the
need to find a brlarte�e� between the concentration of
economic power in private and public spheres, the
need for individual enterprise, and the promotion of
decentralized self government as it means of
protecting the individual from the "experts" and
��society planners. The program also maintains that
all "small enterptise" rather than just the small
farmers should be protected and favored. to practice,
party leaders contir.tiv to favor the formers' interests,
advocating increased gov ^ntme subsidies to
supplement agricultural income and improved rural
living conditions, expanded credit facilities, and
reduced taxes on lower incomes. The party favors
social welfare and security programs, but wants to
impose limits on government expenditures for them.
15
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In foreign aff airs the Center Varty strongly supports
the traditional Swedish policy of neutrality and
nonalliance. The party's aversion to the Comrnoa
Market reportedly contributed to I'almc's decision to
seek something less than full membership in it.
Althougl tilt- party tends to be isolationist, tl;e leaders
and the rank and file: are equally strong ill support of
democratic ideals and identify saederr with the
Western European and knicrica n democracies.
Mernbvrs have been inclinrd to question increased
defense expenditures, but once convinced of such a
need, tile}' have gone along with the other no"-
Communist parties in supporting the reorganization
and modernization of the defense forces, in contrast to
some of their Norwegian and Danish counterparts. Ott
the Vietnam i "'w, the pasty has tended to take a
middle -of- the- risiai position.
d. Press and finances
1'hc Center Part has no newspaper which is read on
it nationwide scale. Its leading organ is the Malrtu,-
publis;ted Skanska Oagbladet iSkane D.til\ Nt-\%s
which has at relativel% mall circulation. It 1969 the
party published only 1: I.tily_ newspapers throughout
Sweden. Because the pat. keeps the sources of it
funds confidential, there are no estimates of its
financial status. "I':. e local sectiow, keep about 2W( Of
the clues collected and forward the remainder to the
district organizations. Mjich, in turn, keep 801i of the
amounts recei\-ed and forward the balance to higher
units.
3. Liberal Party
a. Membership and electoral strength
The Liberal Party, organized in 1934 by the inerger
of the hilightened People's I'arh and the swudislt
Liberal Party, has been out- of the principal opposition
parties throughout "lost of the poshvar era. Its
electoral support bas varied from about I i, to 2051 of
the popular vote. In size the Liberals rank fourth
among the parties, with it 1969 membership of about
100,000. Support comes from disparate elements-
basically middle class but often with conflicting
interests including white- collar workers, small
businessmen, small farmers, professional groups, and
some financia; and industrial interesis. Its most
dependable supporters are members of nonconformist
Protestant sects and the temperance movement.
h. Organization and leadership
In some structural aspects the Liberal Party is
similar to the Sm'. Its lines of authorit\-, lu,wever. are
1 6
not ne arly as elc arfv defined; it is probably the most
loosely organized of tl:c Swedish parties. The highest
antbority is the national party convention. which is
composed of 360 delegates and meets ever\- 3 vears. All
but scvvil of the� delegates are elected by tilt- district
party organizations on i t proportional basis. The
c�m\-ention includes four representatives of the party's
p trlianientary group, and oat- repmsentative each of
th- youth, women's, and press associations. A 68-
n:, tnber advisor\ council, chaired by the national
chi srtnan and including 10 members elected b\- tilt-
natto,lal convention and a representative of each of
the disWO orgarti.'�itions and of the two special
Stockholm ,'istricts, rnects once it year to make
decisions on ma:}ers not taken up by the convention.
The 2-- nrem1wr na,ional committee. which consisis of
the chairman, sc�cr,! trv, 22 members elected by the
national convention, out the chairmen of the youth.
women's, surd press as +ociations, meets at least three
times it year. \Cti\-itirs o4 the� executi\-e cot"ntittt-e are
determined by the nationa! cornntittee, and it nanes
special cornnriltees to collaborate oil recruitment,
orgauization. and propagaurcla.
The national committee selects nice of its rnentl:ers
to form Ibt- exccutive committee, which. together ith
:ht- secretary, carrie out the decisU "ts of tilt- national
cotunrittee, the advisory council, and the convention,
and directs the day -to -clay activitivs of tilt- part%
bVtWecu conventions. The national organization is
drtlrlicakd on the district and local levels in much tilt-
same way as that of the SAP, except that the basic
units at the lowest level arc clesigrtatecl "local
sections." and propaganda activity is carried nn
mainiy by the district organizations.
The Liberal Party depends to at great extent on
auxiliar\ organizations to supplement its owls activity
in training party leaders. The most important of tbest-
orgamizations is the Liberal Louth League JT
established in 1934. The NPU plays an important role
in carrying -,)It general educational as well as
propaganda .activities. The party maintains it women's
organization, the Liberal Women's Association, and
the Liberal Student Association.
The Liberal Party is heaut-cl by chairman Gunnar
Helen, who succeeded Sven \Veden in 1969 when he
tctired because of poor health. Me of the primary
problems facing Helen when ht- took charge was the
increasingly radical tone of the youth organization,
which threatened to destroy the unity of the party.
'I'll( results of the 1970 elections suggest that Ilelen
toil\- have succeeded ill taking some of the sting out of
the vocal youth group and placating more
conservative elements. The known friendship of thiv
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c�h;.innan tot\ard the United States, however, makes
him vulnerable to further criticism from the dissident
element of the part\.
c. Program and policies
The Liberals have had difficulty developing a
program on which their heterogewus supporters could
continue to unite, once the g,,als of a parlianentar\
democracy and uni�� rsal suffrage were attained more
than it half century ago. Since World War 11 the
platform in dornestic affairs has been designed to
attract a broad spectrum of voters and in general does
not differ greatly from that of the SAI except that the
Liberals put more stress on restricting intervention by
the state in the economy. The party supports it
comprehensive system of social and economic security,
along with opportunities for education and vocational
training; it has generally backed Social Democntlic
efforts to eliminate gross inequalities in the
distribution of income through taxation and social
welfare programs. The Liberals have accepted the
supplement ar\ retirement pension system as o scheme
"that has come to stay, although th(�\ oPpose the
turnover or value added tux (which contributes to the
revenue needed for financing the social welfare
programs) as unnecessary and call instead for less
lavish spending. They also favor profit- sharing in
industry, a shorter working period during the \car
through either longer vacations or more free
Saturelays, and the promotion of rural elevelopnent I)\
officio support for light industrial anal commercial
development in the countr\sidv. Policies regarding
foreign and defense matters have reflectc(I differences
among the factions. Platforms in wc�ent \ears have
been purposefully broad cm(l vague in stating
objectives. Oil foreign policy the liberals adyocatc
cnopenatiou with other peoples to prnnnotc inter-
national order and we and to increase internnotional
trade. Par le;tdt'rs support the tra(I iIion:iI
nomellianc'e curd nelltraIit\ police. small \ling,
however, consisting mucstI of urban and military
cicnu'nts, has long advocated Swe(lish nnctnbership in
NA "fO. The part\ is divided over the issue of U.S.
policy in Southeast Asia, despite the fact that sore
leaders are strong supporters of U.S. polio\ in general.
The radical leftwing minority, including nennbers of
the FIT, has vociferousl\ criticized the United States,
;and the liberal Stude nt Association vigorously
channpioned Swedish recognition of North VietlY;mn.
'I'hc Vietnam issue appears to have become it
clistrac�tion which has diverted various elements of the
party from focc:,ing on special u.: ctivcs, such as
isesta)lishnent of the church caul dissolution of the
m(cnarc�h\.
In mililar\ matters the Liberals have consistently
favored a strong defcuse bolt have smpported
reductions in the� military budget in line with tbcir
support for fisc�ai disc�iplinc across the board. Despite
fairl\ general agreement amtong leaders and mnun c,f
the rank and file that great:'r defense efforts were
necessar\, both the Liberal and Center Parties
reluctantly went alcntg with the go\crurmcnt's decision
in 1967 to nlairlain defense spending at existing levels
in order to permit un expansion of various social
welfare programs. Although the (Iv �lion of the
Liberals nwy have stemmed in part front it desire to
placate the party s antinifitarist youth., it more
significantly reflected the practical politics that have
become a tradition in Sweden.
d. Press and finances
The two leading dailies supporting the liberal
I'arh, the Stockholm- publislu'(I l)anens :\'ltheter and
Expressen, are the most wide I\ rea(I of Al Swedish
newspapers; t1w Goteborgs- Po.stcn, another Liberal
paper, has the fourth largest circulation. In adclitimi,
the part\ published more than 10 other dailies
throughout :Sweden in 1969. 'I'll(- Liberal press, for the
most mart, is strong enough financially to be
independent politically and plot its ntuajoremtphasis on
le\\s.
The part) IIowe\er, has chronic financial
difficulties and has to rely heavily on voluntar\
c�ontributinus: special fund- raising drives and lotteries
are conducted to meet election campaign expenses.
I'hc national contyeuticcn sets the ,amount that the
c luctoral clistric�t associations must pa\ cacti \ear to the
uatioual organization from membership dues.
Sitnilarl\, pa\ments most be made to the district
association by the local scc�tions.
4. 'Moderate Coalition Party
a. Membership and electoral strength
The predecessor of the present Moderate Coalition
fart\ was formed in 1935 through the anw1gantation
of two ,onservAk e parliamentary groups one in each
house of the old 13ik.sdag. Originally known as the
Conservative Part\, its name was changed to the
Hoge'partiet, or Party of the Right, in 1952. Then in
1969 it bec�anne the or
Modenate Coalition Party. Prior to 1918 the party
ranke(I second inn eleclond strength. but during most of
the posNar ern it trailed the Liberals in terms of
popular support. In recent \cars the Moderates have
dec�linc(1 further and arc now the smallest of the
nonsocialist parties in terms of parliumcntan
representation. Its fairly extensive organization has
IN
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enabled the part to enroll some 300,000 numbers,
slaking it the second largest political grouping in the
country. The Moderates obtain their principal support
from estaie owners and large fariners in rural areas and
from industrialists and employer groups it: the cities.
Additionally, some tipper level professionals, high
ranking military officers, and much of the clergy of the
Church of Sweden may Ire eouted among the partx 's
supporters.
b. Organization and leadership
The structure of the Moderate Coalition Party
closely resembles that of the Liberal 1 arty. Its national
party convention, which nuets every i years, elects tit(.
executive committee, "yhic�h consists of the chairman,
two vice chairmen, and 10 other members. The
advisory committee includes the entire executive
committee, in addition to 10 elected representatives.
as well as representatives front other part
organizations. The district organization is the prince
local authority.
The most important auxiliary organizations
stlrplemelttifig party activities, especially educational
and propaganda work ct'ul the training of future part
leaders, are the Moderate Yotltit Association, \yitit
approximately :35 ,000 menlbc'rs. and the Moderate
\1'onlen's Association, with soft'(' 55,000 ntentbers
(both figures as of 1970). signific�antiy large
proportion of party voters are wont(.n. Tile S\\edisll
Moderate Student ;kssurc�iation. organizationally
independent of the part\, is the largest political
student organization in lit(' country.
The Moderate Coalition Harty has experienced
considerably more turnover in leadership over the past
20 years than most other Swedish political partier '111
present leader, Costa Bohrtuul. is the fourt!t sin (.e
1950. Boltntan, born in Stockholrt in Jannary 1911,
succeeded 1'ngve Ilofrlberg in November 1970, when
he was blanud for party losses in the� 1970 viections.
Boftman has been it member of the Riksdag since
1958.
C. Program and policies
Moderates historically have he�en the� chief
opponents of socialism and (be SAP'.' The park has
been the principal exponent of a strong defense force
and protective tariffs for indt'stry and agriculture. It
supports social security and welfare rneasuves for
humanitarian reasons, although it opposes the� use� of
these programs as i t means of redistributing income. It
stands for the reduction of government expenditures.
particularly for social welfare, so that corporate,
inheritance, an(I iltconu taxes stay be lov. The
18
p art\ however, ia:., be(�t' nininfizing dernands for a
reduction in social welfare benefits, Itec�ause its past
position on th;s issue Contributed to election losses.
With an eve to broadening their appeal among the
vie�ctorate, tit(- Moderates have urged the creation of it
universal property owning democracy, i.(.. every
Swedc to he it fwnrcowner. Tbr� party maintains that
this objective is obstructed by confiscatory tax rates,
wbicb stake it difficult to accumulate sayings for the
ptlrc�hase of it hunt(., and by the government I s housing
progr which entpltasizes the construction of"
apartments itstead of inclividual homes. Although the
part\ supports educational reform art(! expansion.
some of its followers are appreftensive over the
inevitable lowering of aWialvrlic� standards in if
tburouglik dcrnuc�ratized tipper secondary and
university system. The Moderates are the principal
defenders of tL�e ntunarcln and the establisbe(1
Lutheran State Church: rnauv baye never accepted
lfle fail ac�cornpli of tit(- welfare st,:te.
In foreign affairs tit(. party offic�ial!\ supports
Sweden's policy of ncutralit and nuualliauce. but
strong efentrn;s have advocated joint defense
measure with Norway and 1)enntark. and it minority.
particularly th(. ttilitary. favors nunrbership in
N:kTO. The Moderates buy(. consistently aclvoc�ated
greater defense expenclittrres. Oil the vietnatn is.ue.
tlfe party and its pre have supported the l'.S.
position.
d. Press and finances
'ft\(. chief newspapers supporting the Ntoderalc�
Coalition I'arty are the Svenska Oagbhcdvl. published
in Stockholm, and the St/d Svenska I)a/;bladel
snallposh'n, ptblishe(I in Malfno. In a(ldition. 4')
other party dailies were published in 1969 �t1e largest
ntntfwr :sf newspapers for any Sw(.dish party. T'T
Moderate press. like the� Liberal press, is self
supporting. Most Swedish advertisers prefer the paper..
that cater to the affluent upper and middle classes
rather than the Social Democratic press. which is
aimed principally at the� working class. The party
depends largely on private donations to finance its
operations and campaigns. The ntet!lod of collecting
and fomarding ntentbersbip dues front the local to tit(
national level of die party is similar to that employed
I)v the Liberal Party.
5. Party of the Left Communist
a. Membership and electoral strength
'fhe Swedish Cont,nunisl Tarty was forned in 1921
by Social Democratic Ieft\ying dissidents, made up
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I ii rgeIy of svdic�alists, anarchists, and other
contemporary radical labor elements. At its congress in
May 1967. the part% changed its name from Svedges
Konnunistiska Partiel to \"(nsterr)artict-Konntntist-
ema (I'artv of the Left Communist, VPK). Ill its effort
to wit more Socialist support, the part\ rants
c\entually drop "Communki" from its title
altogether. It is the smallest of the S\ycdish ri'llitic�al
parties in tcrt;es of hr;th popular .cppoIt and
nenhersIf i1). Its performance in national elections
since World War II has been spotl\ .And slo\ys i f
general decline over the prc\\ar period. 'I'll(- 1968
elections were held shortly after the Czechosim ak
crisis and restIted in it sharp setback for the
Communists, who got only 30'1 of the vote and lost
five scats. The VPK recouped some of its losses in 1970.
however.
Communist strength is centered prim aril\ in the
urban industrial areas of Stockholm, Gavleborg
province. and Goteborg and in raining coinimmitics in
the pro\inec of Norrbotten in the north. Supporters are
nainly unskilled workers in the lumber. training.
rnetai, construction, and transportation industries.
I'll( party also receives scattered support from Nyhitc-
collar workers. professionals, and intellectuals.
\lembership droppccd sharpy from an estimated
65,000 in 194.1 to approximately 11.000 in 1970.
Support at the polls is considerably greater. however,
and the VPK polled over 16,000 votes in the 1970
election. The \'PK has been unable to capture control
of any of the national trade unions, and its nu�nnbers
dotnino.tte only about 80 of the approxim atcly 9.000
union locals in Sweden.
b. Organization and leadership
Theoretically, the organization of the PK is similar
to that of the tthcr Swedish parties. Actually. power
rests in the hands of i f fe\\ leaders, who maintain
discipline by forcing strict subordination of An�mbers
to the� hierarch\. The supreme organ is the congress,
Which is supposed to meet cycr\ I years and in theory,
at (cast, decides all fundamental piestions of police
and organization. The congress also elects the 35-
member central committee, known since 1964 as the
party hoard, which theoretically supervises national
activities. The party hoard chooses the chairman and
the other eight members of the executive committee,
which contains the top leaders and controls the day
to -day activities. There also appears to he a secretariat,
but little is known about its composition. The control
contrtission, selected by the congress, audits party
administration and finances and recommends
disciplinary action against members who violate
regulations. Below the national level are 28 districts.
corresponding to the 8 electoral districts, each with a
as the polic\making bocdv and an
exec:!tive hoard. Next are the workers' conimnncs, the
principal local units, mainly in urban areas. "Their
function is to coordinate hindraising, propaganda.
:end training activities of the overt units factory clubs
and residential associations �and the operations of the
setui- clandestine cells, each consisting of three to 10
rem hers.
The party's chief auxiliary organization. the Leftist
youth Le:;guc�, bc�cance virtually dcfnnct in 1971
foll(ming its takeover b\ pro- Chinese elements "ho
seceded from the party the \car before to form the
Marxist- I,c�ninist Struggle League (MLK). Too MI.K
supports the Communist Leaguc of Marxist- Leninists
lKI'MI 1. another brcaka\\ay group that was formed
in 1%7. Tliv \T K has no official women's
organization, but the women's secretariit' in
headquarters operates through various front groups.
Tlic PK has been headed by -hairman Carl I Ic mik
Ilermansson since january 1961, when he succeeded
Ilildnng llagbcrg. if confirmed Stalinist, ho as
chairman had followed the \Iosc�o\y line closely for
nearly 13 \cars. Ilcrmansson, horn in 1917, is
considerably younger than much of the old guard. As
leader of the revisionist faction. composed c�hiefl\ of
younger Com munisls, IlermanssoiCs immediate
problem was to arrest the decline in the popular
appeal of the Communists, hich had reached it low
point in the 1962 local elections. I le addmssed himself
to '�rejuvenatifig the parts and giving it a "ncss
face." Farly in 1904 tlc Cornntuuists adopted it police
designed to convince the electorate that they were a
Bona fide Swedish party independent of \'IoscoN
control, left- socialist ill political orientation, and
committed to supporting democratic institutions. The
success of the new tactics was evident ill the gains
made bs the Communists in ;he clec�tious of 1964 and
1966, which appeared to mark the end of the political
isolation experienced by them throughout much of the
poshyar era.
After sustaining great losses ill the 1968 election,
Ilerniansson managed to restom momentum and
captured 17 scats in the 1970 elections and if pivotal
balance between leftist and bourgeois forces in the
Riksdag. Ilernuutsson has an attrac�tivc personality
and gives the impression of being representative of the
n�w breed of Communists who now control the party
His bourgeois background �he is married to the
daughter of one of the country's higgest shipyard
owners� appeals to many persons who :,-o ill d
otherwise declin� to support a Icflist party.
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IIvrnanssoi's tactics have aggravated frictions
previonsiy existing within the party between the old
guard Communists, who wish to naint:.ti close
dependence on Mosc.rw, and the younger revisionist
elements, which have rebelled against what they
consider otitnloded and ineffective policies. Lot the
new principal opponent of f lernansson's ma deratte
policies has been the small pro- Chinese leftwing
centered in Goteborg; this group has accused
Ilerrnansson of transforming the paartN into an
appendage of the Social Democratic Party. ')espite
gains in 1970, Ilermansson remains under attack by
more radical dissident elements in the party. If the
party should adopt a more radical platform at the next
congress, there may he changes in the leadership. with
youthful, dissident elements increasing their influence.
c. Programs and policies
A ne%% party program adopted by the congress in
October 1972 was coached in stronger, more
revolutionary language than the prograun adopted ill
1967. Previously the party had called for ;abolition of
the value added tax, reductions ill military
expenditures, and opposition to Conimon Market
membership. The new program calls for complete
abolition of the .trilled forces, formation of a people's
Militia, which would replace the police, anci
destruction of secret files belonging to the Security
Police. 'I'll( party Wo"Id also nationalize c�omrncrcial
hanks, large companies, and important industries, and
confiscate extensive industrial holdings in the name of
the people. The party was compelled to advocate nore
radical solutions to it variety of problems in order to
prevent dissident elenu from stealing the limelight
popular issues.
The party has undertaken it number of foreign
policy initiatives, nrtinlc on Southeast Asia, but it has
been unable to derive great advantage from this issue
because of the governments decision to recognize
Ifanoi and increase aid to Vietnam. In all probability
Vietnam will continue to fade in importance as it
foreign policy issue in Sweden, and the focus will shift
to issues closer to home, such as membership in the
Cormmon Market. The VPK advocates independence
frorn both Moscow and Peking. Despite its announced
intention to avoid choosing sides in the ideological
dispute bctWeen the Soviet and Chinese parties, the
VPK sharply condemned Moscow for the 1968
invasion of Czechoslovakia.
d. Press and finances
The VPK has duly one daily newspaper,
Norrskensflamnutn, which is published in Lulea and
20
had it circulation of only :3,400 in 1969. Its central
organ is Ny Dar;, published twice weekly in
Stockholm. Virtually the same edition is circulated in
Goteborg and Western Sweden t% %ice tinder nder the
banner Arbetar- Tidningen. The party publishes a
theoretical quarterly called Socialistisk Debatt, which,
like its other publications, has experienced financial
difficulties. In the past the annual losses sustained by
the Communist press have approached USS200,000,
and the VPK has resorted to special membership
assessments to keep its newspapers on the street. In
addition to dues, the part\ has solicited contributions
from the East Germans. its well as the Sur iets, and has
established domestic commercial ventures to raise
additional revenue.
6. Pressure groups
Swedish pressure groups representing special
occupational and economic interests have achieved
semiofficial status through performing a number of
functions for the government. 'I'll( most important are
the LO, the TCO, the SAF, the Federation of Swedish
Industries, the National Farmers Union, the
Consumers (inoperative Union, and some associations
among educators and religions leaders. It has become
customary for the government to name representatives
of these groups to the agencies that regulate activities
affecting their interests. In addition, these groups are
given opportunities to express their views to nienbvrs
Of the cabinet, governnu�nl agencies, and parliamen-
tary committees in connection with proposer]
legislation. As it result of these institutionalized
channels, lobbying in the U.S. sense has become
largely unnecessary.
7. Electoral procedures
Under an electoral reform instituted in 1970, local,
provincial, and national elections are held concur-
rently every :3 years. The responsibility for printing the
ballots devolves upon the parties. Each party hands
out three ballots: it yellow one for the Riksdag, it blue
one for the provincial slate, and a white one for the
local candidates. Blank pieces of appropriately colored
paper may also be used by voters, who simply v, in
the nature of the party and list their preferred
candidates. As there are five major parties, each voter
is offered it minimum of li ballots (factions within
parties and new parties can sometimes increase the
nrttmber of ballots).
"I'hc name of the part\ is printed at the top of the
ballot and it number Of candidates slightly in excess of
the total nrtmber of seats available in the province or
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locality, and the designated number of Riksdag seats
apportioned to the voting district are listed on the
appropriate ballots. The voter marks only his party's
ballots and checks the candidates in order of
preference. Voters may cross o ut names of candidates
of whom they disapprove and, if they desire, may
write in the names of candidates of their choice.
Otherwise the voter simply selects the candidates in his
order of preference. The ballots, marked in secret, are
put in envelopes and dropped in boxes narked
Riksdag, provincial council, and local council.
The 350 members of the Riksdag represent the 28
electoral districts. The number of representatives
elected from each district is based on population and is
subject to reapportionment every 3 years. Sparsely
populated Gotland sends only two representatives to
the Riksdag, while Stockholm city has 36 Proportional
representation is a fundamental aspect of Swedish
politics, and although it may appear complex and
cumbersome compared to the simple win -lose system
in the United States, it assures that all parties of any
significant size will be represented in the government.
The formula for auditing the results is called the
weighted -odd number method. The total votes polled
by each party in a particular district are divided by
1.4, which has the effect of preventing the rise of very
small p artie s. The party with the highest number of
votes gets the first seat, and its total is divided by
three. The second seat is awarded to the party -with the
next highest number of votes, and then its total is
divided by three. As the system progresses, the
diminishing totals of successful parties are divided by
five, then Seven, then nine, and So on, until all the
apportioned seats are filled. Only 310 of the Riksdag
seats are awarded in this manner.
The 40 remaining seats are called compensatory
seats and are allotted by determining the number of
seats each part would have Lyon if the entire country
had been considered as a single constituency
Applying the weighted odd number method to these
national totals, it is determined that the more popular
parties would, nonetheless, have received more seats
and, to compensate for their losses under the
constituency tabulation, each party is awarded an
appropriate share of the 40 seats.
In order to prevent the prolife of sm all parties
.which might detract from the effectiveness of the
major parties, a barrier of =Iii of the national vote or
12`ii of a district vote must be realized in order for a
party to receive any seats. The cut -off point is
controversial, because it party that receives 49i of the
national vote automatically qualifies for 14 seats in
the Riksdag, while one that receives 3.9 �4 gets no seats.
The extent to which the Swedish population
participates in elections compares favorably with voter
turnout in other Westem European democracies.
Among the Scandinavian countries participation is
about the sa as in Denmark and Norway, but less
than in Iceland. A record was set in the 1968 national
elections, when 4,862,000 voters, out of an electorate
Of 5.445,01'0, or 89.3 cast ballots. By lowering the
voting age to 20 for the 1970 elections, new voters
obtaining eligibilih in 1970 increased the electorate to
5,643,1H)0, but only �1,976,000, or 88.2Si, participated.
torrent legislation lx fore the Riksdag would lower the
voting age to IS. a measure which is expected to result
in increased votes for the Social Democrats.
D. National policies (C)
Swedish pe!itical life during the past four decades
has been characterized by a relatively wide measure of
agreement among the non Communist parties on
basic domestic and foreign police questions. The
traditional police of awned neutrality and nonalliance
as it has evolved during the past century_ and a half
remains the cornerstone of foreign police and
commands the support of the Socialist and the non
Socialist parties, except for a minority among the
Moderates and Liberals. On domestic issues
fundamental disagreements among the parties rei.iain.
but they concern not so much the goals as the pace
and scope of social and economic programs which
have been developed by a succession of governments
dominated by the Social Denucrtts.
1. Domestic
Probably the dominant characteristic of Swedish
political life especially with regard to domestic police,
has been the tendency toward compromise and the
effort to .:welop a broad consensus among the
political parties. This has been particularly true of
social and economic development during the past
several decades and represents a melding of long -held
Socialist views with the more liberal ideas held by
some of the bourgeois parties. Swedish governments
during this period have placed highest priority on
maintaining fill employment, sustained econoric
growth, price stability, and the achievement of self
sufficiency adequate in the event of war. The setbacks
suffered by the Social Democrats in recent elections,
however, reveal xidespread voter dissatisfaction with
the growing inflation and ever- higher taxes, thus
necessitating some reordering of the priorities in the
domestic program. Unemployment, while not a
?I
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serious problem by U.S. standards, reached a seasonal
high of nearly 451 in early 1972 and elicited official
concern.
In order to control inflation, while trying to achieve
virtually full employment, the government continues
to emphasize industrial expansion. Although the
private sector still accounts for ov; r 90ci of the
industrial output, government plan ers make their
influence felt by channeling public investment into
areas which contribute directly to achieving the
national goals of full employment and industrial
growth� construction. transportation, communica-
tions, and the development of hydroelectric and
nuclear power facilities. In 1966 the Social Democrats
managed to pass legislation establishing it goyernnuvnt
investment bank which provides capital to private
companies, thus competing with private landing
institutions and increasing the governments role in
the private sector. Special tax provisions which alloy
companies to sat aside up to 105(' of their profits in a
tax -free reserve further enhance governmental
influence ill industry. About one -third of this reserve
may he used after 5 years, but the remainder may be
used only with government permission. Authorization
is given when the Labor Market Roars. a state agency,
determines that the economy needs a boost. as it did in
1958, 1962, 1967, and 1971.
Rising food prices, perhaps the most distitrbing
aspect of inflation, prompted direct popular action
reminiscent of less tranquil periods i: Swedish history.
Boycotts of meat and milk were widespread and
effective in Februar 1972. Without a significant role
in agricultural production the government semed
able to do little but to manipulate the few remaining
agricultural subsidies and to ease or eliminate
restrictions on foreign imports.
While the ever mounting taxes are hardest on the
large middle class, they are needed to finance the
comprehensive but still expanding social welfare
systern. Already one of the most pervasive and
generous in the world, the social police of the
government ranges over a broad field, including social
insurance, comprehensive health care programs,
family and child welfare, public relief, and labor
placement and protection. Recent reforms in the
already enlightened penal system have comn ended
world attention. The last major reform in conventional
social welfare was the enactment in 1959 of a
compulsory retirement pension program for all workers
to supplement the existing old -age pensions. The
program provides retirement income equivalent to
about two thirds of the average pay over it worker's
highest paid 15 rears.
22
Perhaps the domestic issue on which the Social
Democrats have been most vulnerable is the chronic
housing shoring, that has plagued Sweden throughout
the postwar period. housing construction was
markedly steppe =d up in 1965, when the goal \vas set
for the construction of 1 trillion new dwellings over
the next decade. The government encourage('. builders
to step up housing production b% offering incentives,
such as advantageous financing, tax concessions, and
priority procurement of materiel. About 82,000 new
units were constructed in 1966; by 1968 the goal of
100,000 units annually was exceeded. as it was in the 2
follo%yirg years. !laving achieved its immediate
objectives in housing, the emphasis is now shifting
toward providing more spacious d%%eIlirags for gro%%ing
numbers of Swedes. The Moderates, for example,
anticipate that rising expectations in an essentially free
economy will bring an increased demand for bonne
ownership; about 50 of urban residents still rent
their apartments.
The importance of foreign trade �it accounts for
approximately one fourth of the gross national
product �is an underlying factor in efforts to maintain
international exchange stability. The government
accords national trea tment to foreign firths operating
through incorporated Swedish subsidaries.. but
maintains strict control over foreign acquisition and
exploitation of natural resources and the operation of
certain services. Sweden's cyentuol relationship \%ith
the EC, which absorbed 28'(' of its total exports ill
1971, is of great national concern. At present, the
government is pledged to seek a relationship with the
EC: consonant with Sweden's neutrality.
2. Foreign
Despite their neutral position, most Swedes identify
themselves with the ideals and aspirations of Western
liberal democracy. They are repelled by the repressive
policies which have characterized the Communist
regimes of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.
In the late 1940's Sweden was faced with a
fundamental decision on the question of retaining its
traditional policy of nonalliance or seeking security in
a larger defensive grouping, such as NATO. After
intensive public debate, it was clear that majority
opinion favored continuation of the policy of
neutrality. Subsequent efforts ,it the part of Sweden,
Norway, and Denmark to join in a Scandinavian
defense alliance came to naught when the latter two
countries decided to join NATO. Despite its position
otntside NATO, Sweden has taken a favorable view
toward the organization and has regarded it as it
deterrent. to Soviet aggression against members and
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r
nonmembers alike. The division of Scandinavia
between numbers of NATO and neutral nations has
handicapped to some extent Sweden's policy of
expanding the traditionally close ties which have
existed a nong thorn. While Danish and Norwegian
membership it NATO precludes close cooperation in
the political and defense fields, this has been offset to
sortie degree by the wide range of common policies
pursued by thcsc countries in the economic, social,
and cultural fields. This cooperation has been
expanded to include, for example, common
membership in the European Free Trade Association
(EFTA) and the Nordic Council, free movement of
Scandinavian nationals within the area, and the trend
toward reciprocity and harmonization of policies
covering a wide range of activities, particularly in the
labor and social welfare fields. Aside from the value of
promoting close ties among the Scandinavian
countries, the Swedish Government considers that
these tics have great significance, because the\ enable
Finland to strengthen its connections Westward in a
manner least likely to arouse Soviet suspicion and
opposition. In line with the high priority Sweden
places on maintaining an independent Finland on its
frontiers, Swedish statesmen believe that the nations
policy of neutrality and nonalliance affords it some
leverage in alleviating some Soviet pressures on
Finland.
Next to its Scandinavian ties, Sweden attaches
greatest importance to rnetnbership in the United
Nations, which it joined in 19.16. A staunch supporter
of the United Nations, Sweden provided the
organization with its second secretary general, the late
Dag Hammarskjold, and is an active participant in a
wide range of the organizatio�i's activities. It is a
strong supporter of the U.N. peacekeeping activities
and has provided troops for this purpose in Cyprus, the
Middle: East, and the Congo. Sweden has also been in
the forefront in promoting disarmament. As a
re spected neutral, S%veden has sought to provide
responsible leadership for the sm -iller nonnuclear
states by seeking ways to persuade the major powers to
take meaningful steps toward disarmament. The
problems of the former colonial areas are followed
with great interest, and Swe has been a strong
advocate of aid and assistance to the less developed
countries. The government takes the position that the
United Nations should administer aid programs and
fa%ors the eventual termination of bilateral assistance
agreements. ,weden sittaportti 16- principle of
it? sal inbership inn the world ""c,,uization. On
tions involving furrier colonial areas, it ha
frequently sided with the A fro- Asmii nations.
Although occasionally at odds with the United States
on a number of issues facing the United Nations.
Sweden visually has sought to play a useful,
humanitarian role in the world body.
Sweden has been a strong supporter of several
nonmilitary regional organization% and has viewed
membership i them as consistent with its policy of
nonalliarice. Stockholm maintains close relations with
its Nordic neighbors, with which it cooperates in a
wide range of economic. social, a nA cultural problems.
Most joint enterprises Kaye been conducted under the
auspices of the Nordic Council, which Sweden helped
to found in 1932. Sweden is also a member of the
Council of Europe atd maintains missions to the EC
and the European Atomic Energy Community
(F.URATOM) in Brussels, and to the European Coal
and Steel Community (ECSC) in Luxembourg.
Sweden was a charter tneinber of the Organization for
European Economic Cooperation (OE:EC) and
remains a member of its successor, the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD). In addition, Sweden is a rnemberof some 20
other international organizations dealing with trade,
transportation, communications, energy, finance,
science, and health.
'I'll(- creation of the Common Market in 1937 and its
subsequent development have necessitated major
revisions in traditional Swedish trade policies. Swedish
leaders have tended to view the EC with suspicion,
fearing that its policies would he discriminator\ and
harmful to commercial interests, and that it would
eventually divide Europe into two competing trade
blocs. The EC also presents a difficult political choice:
Sweden most weigh the economic importance of
retaining access to the large markets of the recently
expanded organization against the passibility that
closer ties to the EC would require Sweden to accept
certain elements of the Ronne 'treaty_ that would
compromise its traditional neutrality. S\\eden was
able to offset some of the economic impact of the EC
by joining EFTA in 1960, but the outlook for that
organization is uncertain in view of the decision in
1972 of three of its members� Denmark, Irelartd, and
the United Kingdom �to join the EC. More than 3010
of Sweden's imports and exports are subject to EC
tariffs as a result, and unless the Riksdag ratifies the
draft free trade agreement with Brussels, the Swedish
economy will stiffer. One alternative: that has been
considered is to revive the Nordic Economic onion
(NORDEKI concept.
A major preoccupation of Swedish foreign policy is
the maintenance of good relations with the Soviet
t 'lion, but thi" goal has tended to he elusive because
23
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of tile tensions in Europe engendered h the East -West
struggle. Sweden's concern about relations with the
U.S.S.R. derives esscriti.-fly from its proximity and
overwhelming military preponderance in the Baltic
area. In tit(- early post -World War II period and at the
height of the (;old War. Soviet- Swedish relations were
little more than formal:w correct and were
characterized b\- periods of extreme chill. Notable
were developments such as the Wallenberg case (the
Swedish diplomat who disappeared during the Sowi(.t
"liberation" of Budapest in 1945 and subsequently
died in a Soviet prison), the destruction of Swedish
reconnaissance aircraft over the Baltic in 1952, and the
frequent seizure bw the U.S.S.R. of Swedish fishing
vessels. During the intervening years there have been
brief periods of relative relaxation, but more usually
periods of tension, as occurred in the .wake of the�
Hungarian uprising, Kitrushehev's tit re atening actions
against Berlin and Finland, revelations of Soviet
espionage in Sweden, and the Cuban missile crisis.
The Swedes were optimistic when the more pragmatic
and businesslike team of Brezhnev and Kosygin
assumed power, but hopes were dashed by the Soviet
invasion of Czechoslovakia in the summer of 1968.
Seasoned by the tips and downs in relations with
Moscow during the postwar era, the Swedish
Government continues to try to reach practical
agreements .which would I)e mutually profitable and
contribute to maintaining Northern Europe its an area
removed from direct involvement in the competition
between East and West. A series of governmental,
military, and labor union exchange" A -la\-ed since
1968, has served to supplement thei, Jleorts.
In direct contrast to the climate of fear and
suspicion %which has generally characterized Sweden's
relations during the emergence of the superpower next
door, relations with the United States have for the
most part been relatively good. Fostered by the
emigration in the latter 19th century of more than a
million Swedes to the United States, where the\ settled
and prospered, this rapport was further strengthened
by U.S. military involverent in Woriel War If and
subsequent economic aid to Europe after the war.
Relations began to take a downw.ird trend in the mid
1960's, as Swedish opinion became increasingly
critical of U.S. military involvement in Southeast Asia.
Furthermore, Sweden's inclination to regard itself as
the� "conscience of the world" and the vehement
denunciations of the United States by Swedish Imblic
figures and the media led to a further deterionttion in
relations in J%8 and tit c1 .inn to recall the U.
Arubassador. The Sovie ,,,.Sion of Czechoslovakia
later that year, along 1, signs that Sweden was
24
Facing it growing number of serious domestic
problems, led to an easing of the previously sharp
attacks on the United States. Although its official line
may not on occasion reflect the basically friendly
feelings of Sweden toward the United States, most
Swedes continue to regard U.S. militar\ strength as the
principal deterrent to troves by Nlosccn against
NATO and other nun communist countries.
The Vietnam conflict provides the main source of
friction between the United States and Sweden. While
most of tit( governments condemnation of the United
States is couched in ternis of relieving the suffering of
the \r'ietnames(. people, tile extrernc bias of the
Swedish protests suggests that the Social Democrats
are primarily concerned with e ncouraging leftist
support on other issues. However, the government
would probably wish to avoid allowing relations to
deteriorate to it point that would again cause
disruptio it, the normal. ambassador level
representation. The Social Democratic administration
may continue to use criticism of U.S. policy as a means
of further;ng its own o.;jectives. A case in point was
Prime Mie Palme's criticism of U.S. tariff
increases in 1971. Stringent efforts to control inflation
in Sweden caused increase unemployment and plant
closures and engendered significant opposition to the
Social Democratic programs. Palme countered
domestic opposition by criticizing alleged changes in
U.S. trade polio, to which he attributed Sweden's
economic ills. The charges had little basis in fact but
gave the government time to review its own domestic
policy, which was subsequently altered. Such practical
politics have not prevented the Swedes from
supporting U.S. initiatives in the United Nations and
other international bodies.
Swedea has derived much favorable publicit, from
its association with the Nobel Prizes. First award -d il!
1901, the monetary awards are presented to
individuals who have served humanity hest in the five
fields of physics, Chemistry, physiology or medicine,
lite rature and peace. The latter prize is awarded in
Oslo, while the ceremonies for the other four awards
are held in Stockholm.
Foreign policy formulation in Sweden is the
responsibilit' of the cabinet in general and of the
Minister of Foreign Affairs in particular. The minister
is obliged by law toconsrtlt with the Foreign Relations
Council of the Riksdag, which is composed of the
Foreign Affairs Committee of the Riksda/;, the Prime
Minister, the Foreign Minister, and the King, who
presides. The council meets approximately six times it
Year or when a serious foreign policy issue requires an
extraordinary session, and meetings are always held in
carnera.
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3. Defense
As in the other democracies of Western Europe, the
military establishment is clearly subordinate to the
popularly elected civilian government. Although
military officers frequently ittenipt to Irlfluelict' and
mold public opinion un matters relating to defense,
thev have little direct influence in making national
policy. Defense poliev is formulated by the Supreme
Commander of the Armed Forces, who is appointed
by the Minister of Defense, in coordination with the
Joint Chiefs Committee, consisting of the commanders
of the three armed services and the Chief of the
Defense Staff. Traditionally defense matters are
regarded as being above: narrow partisan interests. The
non Communist parties have cooperated openly in
formulating defense policy, but this pattern was
broken in May 1972, when the Social Democrats used
Communist support to push through a pared -down 5-
year defense plan with all three bourgeois parties in
opposition.
The main objective of defense policy is to keep
Sweden's military strength at a level high enough to
convince any potential aggressor that an armed attack
would be extrernely costly. This policy assumes that
Swedish autharities would have sufficient warning to
mobilize the defense forces, and that invasion would
he only a part of a larger invasion of Scandinavia and
the NATO countries. It; this event Sweden would
expect to receive aid from the NATO powers.
The government faces the difficult problem of
meeting the rising costs in the politically important
social welfare sector of the budget by instituting
cutbacks elsewhere, with defense expenditures the
most likely target. There is evidence that the
government will try to hold the line in the fire(- of
rising defense costs and will avoid in actual reduction
in defense expenditures. In order to provide for the
procurement of modern weapons in a period of
inflation and rising costs. Sweden may resort to such
measures as reducing the conscription period �a cost
cutting device currently being conside b% a number
of other Western European countries. Savings in
training could be diverted to the aircraft industry for
research and development of new generation aircraft.
The recent conclusion of an agree oil Berlin, the
conclusion of the agreements of the Strategic Arms
Limitation Talks, togethe ith the marked easing of
tensions in Europe, hax. -ngthened the hand of
domestic critics who oppose "unnecessary expendi-
tures" on the militarv.
Sweden has one of the most elaborate civil defense
systems in Western Europe, having a higher per capita
expenditure for this purpose than any other non-
Communist country. Government planning assumes
there will be no capitulation to the enemy and calls for
the speed% evacuation of nortessenFal persons front
likely urban target areas. Those remaining in the cities
Nvould he given refuge in large conventional shelters as
well as in the reinforced basements which are required
in every school, hospital, factory, office building, and
apartment building. In the 1 �1 largest cities enornwus
community shelters capable of accommodating over 2
million persons have been built underground, with SO
feet or more of solid ;ock cover. The shelters are
designed to permit tiler,' to be used for storage and
other purposes during peacetime and are capable of
being quickly converted to shelter use in an emergency
(Figure 6). In addition, special underground control
centers have been established to assure functioning of
the various gove c,genc�ies larder wartime
conditions.
Military expenditures for 1971 72 reached US$1.2
billion, or about I 1 of the central government
budget and TWA r of the gross national product (GNP).
Estimates for fiscal 1973 indic that the proportion
of funds allocated for defense purposes will decline.
The following tabulation shows the percentage of the
GNP budgeted for defense in selected West European
countries in 1970:
Belgium
3.1
Denmark
2.8
Germany
3.8
Netherlands
3.9
Norway
3.9
SWEDEN
IT
United Kingdom
5.8
NOTE �NATO percentages were taken from
State Department/1 N R/ Research
Study /RSGS -4/
14 March 1972. The percentage
for Sweden is
based on approximate defense expenditures.
E. Threats to government stability (S)
1. Discontent and dissidence
Sweden's stable and open society offers few
opportunities for the growth of subversive organiza-
tions capable of presenting a serious threat to the state.
The absence of dcepseated social and economic
grievances universal literacv, and a standard of living
second to none in Europe have contributed to
the development of a socially and politically stable
society in which all political parties except the
Communists are committed to democratic principles.
Nevertheless, the growing spirit of detente between
25
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East and West tilts caused an increasing inimber of
Swedes to Frclieve that the Soviet threat has
diminished. The growing radicalization of Swedish
youth lilts caused the government to nurclify its former
cool attitude towltrd the Soviet ['nion..1t present this
trend does not appear to present it threat to democratic
institutions in swedes.
2. Communism
The Pltrty of the Left- Communist is the only well
organized group with any potential for unde rmining
the securit rrf the slate. Iloweyer. its strength in the
Riksdag is far below the level that would afford the
part) even a remote chance of gaining a formalized
voice in go\ernrnent councils. Furthermore, its
extralegal suhversiye potential tends to he neutntlized
by the awareness of the government, organized labor,
and most of the general public to the tactics and
ofojectiyes of the Communists. 'I'hc popular support
enio\ed by the Communists dropped drastically after
World \N%ir 11, and the party still attempts to persuade
the electonrte that it r 't it tool of Soviet interests and
that it is a hue.. A- Swedish political party
committed to change through Icga! politica! processes.
For a discussion of the overt role of the pithy see
above, under Political Dynamics.
The part} has always placed highest priority on
attempting to infiltrate organized labor in order to be
26
able to disntpt the econnnty and \\eAen the strong
ties between labor and the Social Deinncr.ttic P;trty.
National, prow :nciA. and local governments are
relatively free of (;o ill ntttnist infiltration.
considemb1c number of r:onurtunists have entered the
civil service, from which they iii- not excluded, but
there is no evidence tlt ;tt they have attained higher
level positions. Although the part\ lilts representlttiyes
in the Riksdaa, they have been denied access to
classified infornrtliun relating to national defense mid
foreign polic on the grounds that their political
loyalties are suspect and that it would fre
inappropriate to disclose information ltf feet ing
Sweden's sec rtrity t members of a subversive
orgmiization. b\ concerted action of lh(� non
Communist parties. the (;onttnunists have h(
denied membership on Irtrliament try committees
dealing with sensitive subjects; when foreign polic} is
debated in the Riksdag classified information is not
made available to Conununist representatives. Tight
sec urity perctice is believed to have kept Cotnmttnist
infilinttion within the defense establishment to u
relatively low level. Communists entering the armed
seryic(,s through the draft ary placed in nonsensitiye
hosts, and known part\ nicmbers are barred from
officer training. background investigations for
entploees of the defense establishment and in other
sensitise areas are conducted log the police in
cooperAion \%ith the counterintelligence arm of the
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FIGURE 6. The Katarinaberget bomb shelter in Stockholm can hold 17,000 people.
Used as a garage, it has also a drive -in bank and a gasoline station. (U /OU)

i
a
Defense� Staff. Individuals in highlN sensitise pmiticros
are subject to periodic investigation by the Sectatity
Police, which was responsible for the detection of
master spy Colonel Stig Weunerstrum in 196:3.
The trade union movement. which is closely
associated with the Social Democratic Party, rermains it
primary target of Communist penetration. As of 1961
the Swedish Communist Party had reportedIN
succeeded in infiltrating some 2,000 parry members
into the trade unions, %%ith the objective of obtaining
information on the Social Democratic Party's plans
and activities. ConttntaniQ penetration has been
greatest in the unions representing the forest, mining,
metal. construction. and transportation workers.
Communist control, however, has been limited to
approximately 80 of the more than 90X1 trade union
locals affiliated through various federations with the
I,O. The part has not succeeded in capturing an% of
the 29 national federations affiliated with the LO, nor
has it obtained representation clu the general council
or executive board of the Lo.
In its continuing effort to attract ne%% members, the
Communist part relies heavily on front organizations
for the dissemiu;ttion of propaganda in behalf of its
own causes and those sponsored by the Soviet
Communist Parh "These fronts are composed largely
of Corm and fel!o%% travelers and are designed
to enlist the support of non- Communists who are
symPathetic to the� Communist position oil ecrtain
issues. Thr two most important fronts are the Swedish
Peace Committee and the Association for the
Promotion of Cultural and Economic Relations
between Sweden and tit(. Soviet Union. The Swedish
Peace Committee, founded it, 1919 as a local branch
of the Cormunist- dominated World Peace Cotancil,
was the host in Stockholm for t%%o congresses of the
council �the meeting in 19.30 that launched the
Stockholm Peace Appeal ::rd it 1954 conference for
the r+mlaxation of international tensions. In 1966 it was
host for a meeting ill Stockholm of Communist and
pacifist groups to launch "a world campaign to stop
the war in Vietnam." In recent \cars such activities
have been overshadowed by the activities of the
S.vedish !'ictmant Committee, which includes several
extremely leftwing Social Democrats. The Association
for the Promotion of Cultural and Economic Relaticmts
between Sweden anti the Soviet Union is a friendship
socieh' w?th the avowed purpose of promoting
contacts beh%een the two countries through exchanges
of artists, scientists, students, and members of labor.
sport, and women's organizations. It :also conducts
liussian language courses and serves as the chief
agency for distributing noncommercial Soviet films.
The association reported1% seers as a channel for
funds proN ided by Communist coalltries to the
SN%edislt Communist part,
3. Extremist groups
Sweden's traditional tolerance of activity by
individuals representing a wide range of the political
spectrum has led to it proliferation of extremist groups
of marginal importance on the national polite, -al
scene. Most if these groups are comprised of leftwig
theorists who have split off front the Communist part)
for reasons of ideology, or y,tasi- fascists bitterly
opposed to Sweden's brand of social democracy.
After splitting off from the Communist part\, muut%
of the left extremists have stafdividcd over the Sino-
Soviet split. I'll(- KFNIL, it recognized political part\
that received only 0.4!71 of the \cite� in 1970, split in
1970. The pro Maoist element formed the K FM L(r
the "r" stands for revolutionary. The same \car the
Clarte Federation, a Swedish briiach of the French
Clarte moyc nac'nt founded in 1919 to promote
understanding between socialist parties, subdivided
and formed it more orthodox :onrrmunist faction
called the Clarte M -1, (for Marxist- Leninisti. 'f'he
United National Liberation Front Groups heads the
liberation nimements and is believed to have peen
involved in the more violent anti American protests in
Sweden over the Viehiatn issue. Students for a
Democratic Society, the MLK, the Trotskyite
Federttiott of fievolutionary Marxists, and the
.anarchists Federation of Sweden are all part of the
extreme left Most of these organizations try to
iofiuence students, conscripts, auu
naentbers, and nearly all of them publish propaganda
tracts. "Their membership and scope of operations are
very small, and they pose virtually no threat to
government stabilit 'I'hc� same is true for the various
rightwing organizations which have been credited
with occasional anti Semitic acts. Three of the inost
prominent organizations among the Fascist groups are
the Neo- Swedish Movement, the Nordic National
Part, and the liberal Union Party.
Sweden has had far more trouble from e :uigre
groups to which it offers asyhun than fron; its native
extremists. Of particular concern are the violence
prone Yugoslav enigres, who assassinated the
Yugoslav Ambassador in Stockholm in 1971 and
reportedly placed a bomb on board it Yugoslav airliner
before it departed Stockholm for Belgrade in 1972.
Such terrorist activities are ;lien to tilt Swedes amd
eta\ cause the government to reconsider its liberal
police of accepting exiles, particulariy those who
advocate violetwe as it means of redressing grievances.
21
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F. Maintenance of internal security (S)
t. Police
The maintenance of la\\ and order is facilitated b\
the relative stability of social and ecUmnmic
c�rnnditions. The police are honest and efficient.
Although subject to fairly frequent e\alualions and
criticism by the public and the news media, the\ enjoy
a greater treasure of respect !hall do their co IIvagoes it
almost any other \Vestern European eouulr\ outside of
Scandinavia.
Tl'itditionall\ more decentralized than else\\here ;n
Europe, the police s\�slem, because of "inc�reasiug
problems altenaing the naaimtenance of public order
in it complex, modern, industrialized nation," \\,ts
full%� nationalized only ill 1965. :vnIralized
coordination was required hvcattse of the gro\\ing
geographic nobility and acute problems of road
traffic control (S\\eden ranked third among the
stations of the world ill per capita automobile
Ownership, with 8 automobiles per 100 population ill
1969) and the complexities inherent ill modern crtmd
control and crime dovo. and prevention. The
openness of the government process, as Well as some�
built -in restraints at butts the national ;uul the local
levels, assures protection from possible police abrtse.
\t the national level it command group plans and
coordinates all polio- efforts. The National Police
Board, consisting of the (thief of the National Police,
Isis deputy, and six la\ mendwrs appointed b\ the
Ding- in- :oumcil, heads the eonstnancl group. \II
Policy decisions must be approved b, the board, and
the activities of the conusartd group are under the
:miJanl scrutiny of the Minislcr of Justice. B\
constitutional la\w all dotmestic official plans and
doctunents, except the fee\\ that 111,1\ be classified
'�secret for limited, specified reasons, are public
proper!. and are available to the press. Loc police
chiefs are (directly� acc�o lit tit No. to the rational
authority and in administrative matters to the
provincial governor.
Under the (thief of the National Police are ifree
special assistants or chiefs, each heading it separate
(department (1';gurc 7), lVice Bureau I Of Department
A has nationwide responsibility for the planning and
coordination of suryeillamc�e ;tcliVihes and the
protection of life a property. Specifically, it hits
irisdictiou over yefaicnlar traffic, civil arnned guards,
patrol activities, alien control, and social policy work.
Contingency planning for tntilizotion of the entire
police force, the armed forces, and the civil defense
cstablishtnetnt in the event Of' \yar is coordinaWd
?5
through this hurcau. hdic�c Bureau 1 1 has national
jurisdiction over tlu� crimiva! police, inducting those
concerned \\ith both the suppression and detection of
crinu�. Th(� National (lomic�ide Commission, under
the jurisdiction of this bureau, coordinates and
supervises countr\\wide investigative procedures in
imst;uu�es of diffictnll murder cases and serious violent
crime,. TIiv bureau also tn;tinlaius c�ontac�t \with
INTEIIN)l., Tliv two bureaus of Department B are
msponsible for teclnnoIog and Iruiuing, and
I :epartmenl C is concenied \\ith administrative alld
legal matters.
In keeping with the gradual centralization of the
police, an ama;algannation of locid police autho,rit\ has
deyelopc(d since the earl\ post\\ar \cars. \chest there
\\ere 7 00 seniaulouonu,ns police districts. By 1962 the
number of districts had been redttctO to 562, \\ith it
total of 909 police stations. In 19 S\\eden had
reduced administration l0 119 police districts, \\ill
just o\( 500 police stations. Fach of the districts is
headed b\ a chief constable.
Pulic�e chiefs in the 1) royimces it it(', Stock Itoltit
coordinate all protection, surycillance, and criminal
\\ark among the districts under their jurisdiction.
Addilionall\, both men and horses of the special
maotsnted police divisions for riot and general er(md
control stationed in Stockholm, Goteborg, and Malmo
may be transported rapidl\ to ;u) place of potential
need. \n exception to the general pattern of enhanced
public security has been the detuonstration: since the
latter 1960's b\ both resident foreigners and S\%vdish
nationals against certain foreign enbassies in
Stockholm. The S\%vdish Government ha, responded
b contracting \\ith a private org ;mization to furnish
guards, eolttipped \\ith ra(Iios, at i lit porlait t
inter section, throughout entba>s\ re,\\. Their job is to
r;kdio for regular police in the e\�enl of a sport :uteous
demonstration or attack.
Another mlati\c I\ serious disrtptio of public order
kwcurred in 14170), Mien dissident youths ill Stockholm
and other principal cities ;unpaged throttgl IFte
business districts, \andali�ring and looting stores. The
rioters took advantage of it nationwide 2 day "sick
out" occasionc(I b\ police dissatisf;ction With the
practicer of assigning junior officers to tempor;try
positions of' authority \\thou cotnme�nsurate increases
in salar\. Successful bargaining be raven lino Polioc
Union and the authorities�probabl\ heiped by tlu�
disorders quickly resolved the probleun.
'I'eehnical and training facilities are of ;a high order.
The Natiorai Institntc of 'fechnir;I Police in
Stockholm is responsible for technical criminal
investigation and research for the courts, public
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25X1

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25X1

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by the National Central Bureau of Statistics in
Stockholm, contains detailed and comprehensive
figures on nearly all aspects of economics and social
affairs. The Yearbook of Nordic Statistics 1970,
published by the Nordic Council, provides a
comparative statistical frame for all the Nordic
countries. Stockholm's Enskilda Bank publishes a
a
32
ready reference called Some Data About Sweden
(19;0 -71), with charts and graphs of various business
indicators. For worldwide comparisons the UN
Statistical Yearbook includes entries on Sweden in
ruarly every category. Biographical information on
many Swedish personalities is found in Vern or det
(1971), the Swedish Who's Wilo.
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I
Chronology Wou)
800 -1060
Swedish Viking expeditions head eastward. Rurick founds
Russion state at Kiyev about 862).
829 -1160
Christianity comes to Sweden.
1157 -1293
Conquest of Finland takes place.
1397
The Union of Kalmar brings the kingdoms of Sweden,
Norway, and Denmark under one crown and endures
desultorily until c. 1520.
1435
The first parliament Riksdag) is convened, comprising
representatives of the mobility, clergy, burghers, and
Peasants.
1523
Sweden becomes an independent national state under
Gustav Vasa as King.
1630 -48
Sweden battles with brilliant success in the Thirty Years'
War, losing King Gustavus Adolphus at the battle of
Lutzen in 1632.
1809
Sweden surrenders Finland to Russia.
June
Sweden obtains a new constitution, the Instrument of
Government, the first of four fundamental laws on which
the present political system is based.
1810
August
Jean Baptiste Bernadotte, one of Napoleon's marshals, is
proclaimed heir apparent to the Swedish throne by the
Riksdag; he assumes the crown in 1818 as Charles XIV
John.
September
The Act of Succession, the second fundamental law, is
adopted, confirming the Bernadotte line on the male side
as heirs to the throne.
1814
January
Denmark is forced to cede Norway to Sweden by the
Peace of it iel. A 2 -month war with Norway, Sweden's
last, brings Norway into union with Sweden.
1866
January
The Riksdag Act, the third fundamental law, is adopted,
replacing the old representative assembly with .its four
estates by a bicameral body.
1882
Swedish emigration constituting 20% of mean popula-
tion between 1860 and 1930) to the United States reaches
its peak.
1889
April
The Swedish Social Democratic Labor Party is founded.
1905
May
Union with Norway is dissolved.
1914 -18
Sweden maintains neutrality in World War I.
1919
Universal suffrage is attained with granting of vote to
women.
1920
March
The first Social Democratic cabinet is formed under
Hialmar Branting.
1932
October
The Social Democrats become the ruling party and form
a government under Per Albin Hansson.
1939 -45
Sweden maintains neutrality in World War 11.
1946
November
Sweden joins the United Nations.
1948
April
Sweden becomes a charter member of the Organization for
European Economic Cooperation, later the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development.
1949
The Freedom of the Press Act, the fourth fundamental
law, updates previous laws safeguarding liberty of the
press.
33
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1952
March
Sweden, Denmark, Norway, and Iceland create the Nordic
Council joined by Finland in 1955).
1960
March
The Riksdag ratifies Swedish membership in the European
Free Trade Association.
1961
December
Sweden applies for associate membership in the European
Economic community.
1966
September
The governing Social Democratic Party suffers a sharp
setback in the provincial and municipal elections.
1967
May
The International War Crimes Tribunal, sponsored by the
Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation, convenes in Stock-
holm purportedly to investigate the extent and nature of
"U.S. aggression in Vietnam."
1968
February
Olof Palme, Minister of Education, marches alongside
North Vietnamese diplomats in an anti- American demon-
stration in Stockholm.
.34
September
Social Democrats win a clear majority in elections for the
Riksdag.
1969
January
Sweden recognizes North Vietnam.
October
Palme succeeds Tage Erlander as chairman of the Social
Democratic Party and assumes leadership of the govern
merct.
D member
Miners in Kiruna begin 2 -month long wildcat strike.
1970
September
In first elections under electoral reform, Social Democratic
Party loses clear majority but retains control of govern-
ment.
1971
January
New unicameral Riksdag convenes for first session.
1972
J� -uary
Housewives demonstrate against high food prices.
June
U.N. Enviro C `iference is held in Stockholm.
December
Sweden rhtilift free tracl< Rreement with the European
COM11lllll10"K, Sw'edrn re-- onizes East Germany.
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090019 -6

SECRET
Glossary (u/ou)
ADMEVIA-rZON
SWEDESH
ENcLtsa
ABF
Arbetarnes bildninsuforbu
Workers Educational Association
CP
DFFG
Centerpartiet
De Forenadc'-V�_
Central Party
JPPerna
United National Liberation Front
FP
F 1k -ad
Groups
F1
O;RJ W
Fa Fund
Liberal Party
Liberal Youth League
KDS
itch Arwa&mr,.,j �ling
Christian Democratic Union
KF
Mjjjjj F f
Consumers Cooperative Union
KFML
K 0,06WdSAA I Marxist-
Communist League of Marxists-
LO
AMWof M4
Land4,,
Leninists
MLK
Marxistt
Federation of Trade Unions
-,T. aamPforbtjndet
Marxist-Leninist Struggle League
MP
Moderatasarnhngsj)artiet
Moderate Coalition Party
RLF
Riksforbundct Landsbygdens Folk
National Farmers Union
SAF
Svenska arbetsgivareforeningen
Swedish Employers Confederation
SAP
Sveriges Socialdemokratiska Arbeta-
Swedish Social Democratic Workers
reparti
Party (Social Democratic Party)
SIF
Sveriges industriforbund
Federation of Swedish Industries
SKP
Sveriges Kommunistiska Parliet
Swedish Communist Party
SSU
Sveriges Socialdemokratiska Ungdoms-
Swedish Social Democratic Youth
forbundet
Association
TCO
Tian-stemannens Gentralorganisation
Central Organization of Salaried Em-
ployees
VPK
Vansterpartiet Kommunisterna
Party of the Left�Communist
Places and features referred to in this Chapter (U/OU)
SECRET
35
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COORDINATES
O 0 X
0 'E.
Gbteborg
57 43
11 5s
hinkiiping.
I 57 47
14 11
Kiruna
67 5 1
20 13
I'lliell
65 3.4
22 10
1,111111
55 42
1:3 11
MaJ1116
M 36
13 00
Norrk6ping
58 36
1 11
Stockhohn
5A
18 03
Sundsv all
62 23
17 18
L' "'ell
63 50
20 15
Uppsala
59 52
17 38
SECRET
35
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200090019-6

SECRET
SECRET
1
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090019 -6