NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY 94; BRAZIL; GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

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• Collection: NIS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP01-00707R000200080017-9
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tions are:
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rrinorffl rin
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BRAZIL
CONTENTS
This chanter supersedes the political cover-
age in the General Survey dated January 1970.
A. Introduction I
B. Structure and functioning of the government 6
1. Constitutional system
6
2. Federal government
8
a. Executive branch
8
b. Legislative branch
10
c. Judicial branch
12
3. State and local government
13
C. Political dynamics
15
1. Political forces and interest groups
15
a. The military
16
b. Social class interests
17
c. The church
18
d. Students
19
e. Centralism vs. regionalism
20
SECRET No FOREIGN DISSEM
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2. Political parties
20
a. The party system prior to 1964
20
b. Party activity since 1964
22
c. Brazilian Communist Party
23
d. Terrorist groups
25
3. Electoral law and practices
26
a. Formal election procedures
26
b. Voter participation
27
D. National policies
28
1. Domestic
28
a. Policymaking structure
28
b. Political
29
c. Social and economic
30
2. Foreign
32
a. General principles
32
b. Relations within Latin America
34
c. Relations with the United States
34
d. Relations with other nations
35
Page
E. Threats to government stability
37
1. Discontent and dissidence
37
a. Students
38
b. Catholic Church
39
c. Labor
39
d. Military
41
2. Subversion
42
3. Insurgency
43
F. Maintenance of internal security
47
1. Police
47
2. Intelligence and security services
4 9
3. Countersubversive and counterinsur-
8
gency measures and capabilities
52
G. Selected bibliography
53
1. General works
53
2. Specialized studies
54
Chronology 56
Glossary 58
FIGURES
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Fig. 1
President Emilio Medici photo)
1
Fig. 2
Federal buildings in Brasilia photos)
3
Fig. 3
Gen. (ret.) Ernesto Geisel photo)
6
Fig. 4
Constitutional structure of govern-
Luiz Carlos Prestes photo)
24
ment (chart)
7
Fig. 5
Vice President Augusto R -idemaker
(photo)
8
Fig. 6
Gen. Oriando Geisel photo)
9
Fig. 7
Gen. Joao Figueireido (photo)
11
Fig. 8
Joao Leitao de Abreu (photo)
11
Fig. 9
Gen. Carlos Fontoura (photo)
11
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Fig.
10
Administrative divisions (map)
14
Fig.
11
Archbishop Helder Camara photo)
19
Fig.
12
Luiz Carlos Prestes photo)
24
Fig.
13
President Medici at Trans- Amazon
Highway (photo)
31
Fig.
14
President Medici visits President
Nixon (photo)
35
Fig.
15
Brazilian police services chart)
47
Fig.
16
National Police Academy (photo)
48
Fig.
17
In, elligence and security structure
(chart)
50
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Government and Politics
A. Introduction (U /OU)
The armed forces provide the central block of
support for the regime of President Emilio Medici
(Figure I). Top ranking military officers hay(-
dorninatcd national political activity in Brazil since
deposing civilian President Joao Coulart in 1964 in if
rioveme'nt which the military labeled the "Brazilian
revolution." The federal executive has become even
more dominant as the locus of power, with an
accorripallyifig decline in the influence of the national
legislative and judicial branches and the state
governments. The political parties and special interest
groups that vied for influence over the direction of
political development between 1915 and 1964 have
since been circumscribed in their activities. The
Medici governnew's image of order and progress has
earned it considerable support among the people,
although the lack of open elections and censorship of
the media make it difficult to determine how deep this
support runs. Medici's predecessors had already stifled
student and labor opposition, and his administration
has used all the force at hand to suppress the� urban
terrorists who sli -VNIed in gaining international
publicity but never gained significant support from
the Brazilian people. The curly sector that the
government has found difficulty ;n muzzling is the
liberal eying of the Catholic Church. but the church
hierarchy wants to avoid antagonizing the regime and
has therefore exercised considerable restraint in its
dealings %yith the government. Almost ccrta;nh the
only real threat to the government no is the
Possibility of if fracturing of the military over issues or
personalities. However. such divisions are not very
likely as President Medici *s selections for President and
'ice President have met with general appneyal.
The military in most Latin American countries
ascended for it ti to if preponderant role in national
politics through their leadership of the independence
movements. Brazils peaceful transition to independ-
ent status provided no such opportunity to its military
forces. Not until the War of the Triple Alliance (156.1-
10) had ;ncreased their numerical strength and
prestige did the military assume i t political role. Since
deposing Emperor Pedro If in ISS9, however, the
armed forces have exerted if dominant infiucmx in
Malty political crises.
Brazil is the only c�nuitr\ in South America to have
existed as if monarcl until late in thu 19th century.
The ra!ion achicyed independence from Porti,gal in
1822 with little stniggle, and most of the follosying
seven decades were marked by reiatiye stability undo
it constitutional monarchy headed by Emperor Pedro
1, who ruled from 1822 to 1831, and his son Pedro 11,
from 1831 to 1889. The lwo political parties, labeled
Conservative and Liberal, represented factions of the
small elite group which ron the county. During the
first approximately 50 years of the empire it tradition
of peaceful alternation in power bet\%ven these two
parties prevailed. In the 1870's, however, republican
sentiment began to grow among politicians and the
militar, many of \1 limit were strongly influenced by
the doctrine of pos;tivisni. At the same time. Pedro 11
came into serious conflict \%:tit the major groups
heretofore supporting his rule, beginning %yilh the
Catholic Church. The abolition of slavery in 1888
Congressional office building in Brasilia
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FIGURE 1. President Emilio Medici (U /OU)

antagonized %%ealthy plantation owners. tilt- last
important group supporting the cro%vn. In 1889 a
bloodless military coup deposed the Emperor and
substituted if republican form of government headed
b% Mavhal Deodoro da Fonseca.
The Constitution adopted for the republic in 1591
%Sits modeled after that of the United States. It
provided for the separation of po\yers. with a
presidential executive. a bicameral legislature, and an
independent judiciary '1 he document re presented an
attempt to impose lib dvi n>cratic institutions on a
backward, patriarchal. patrimonial agrarian structure.
Ilowe%er, the %cry restricted franchise and the lack of
it secrv- ballot meant that the transition to if republic
brought very little political change for tilt- great
majorit% of Brazilians. in operation. the formal pox%er
of the national go%ern meat, as granted b% the
(:onstitulion. %was %ceakene(I b% the po%%er of some of
the states. Th(� political ssstcm that evoked was in
fact called tilt- "politics of til states." A "Repoblican
Party" %%-its fornied in each state, but there %was ao
national partN, nor opposition parties. 'I'll( incumbent
President with the approval and support of tilt- large
states selveted his successor, who in turn promised till-
governors favors. For host of the period front 1889 to
1930, the two 'wealthy states of Sao Paulo and Minas
Gerais dominated till- national government, furnishing
nearly all the presidents. 'fill- state governors sent to
the capital congressmen "ho %wire favorable to tit(
President, and he in tarn gavel- the governors a free
hand in running their states. A similar reciprocit%
existed between the governors and the astral coronets
(bosses, literally, colonels, so- called because of the
national gu:ord rank %which till- local leas: ers
ctistomaril% held ondrr the empire). %who delivered
vote.- in exchange for the right to ruiv their patriarchal
domains with an ilon haled.
The 1920's bronght if odildun cot pressures for social
an(I political changes in this ,%st( t. As the ne%w urban
middle class, nwny of the:, immigrants, chall(�nged
the power of the sugar barons and coffee planters,
young mililan officers took asp the cause of social
reform and staged revolts in 1922, 1924. and 1927.
TIRISl- iclealistic young officers, known as 1cucnles
(lieutenants), combined in 1930 %%-ill) politically
clisaffecte(I civilian elements to force the resignation of
the President, and his replacement I)v Gelulio Vargas.
till- defeated candidate in that Near's presidential
election. Vargas niled Brazil front 1930 to 1945, and
again front 1950 to 1951.
Tor diacritics on ,)lace mars see the list of nano�% at the ontl of
the eitttt!cr.
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Although he was a constitutional President during
most of this period, in effect Vargas ruled as a dictator.
His long regime brought irreversible changes in the
institutions of political life and public administration.
Most important. Vargas transformed the relationship
heh\een the federal authority and the state authority.
and thereby moved Brazil much closer to a truly
national government. In 1945. Bn:zii inherited ;tit
immea surahl\ stronger federal executive than it had
had \when V arg as took over. ;Many functions
previously exercised by state and local government
\\ere shifted into the area of federal competence.
Federal authority also extended into ne\w domains,
including economic fields where private capital --as
reluctant to enter. Increasing federal inter entio,t in
the economy required it(-\\ agencies. New fec.vral
power in social welfare and labor union organization
gave urban labor for the first time an interest in
government. Sustained industrialization and ur-
banization brought about at, increased political role
by industrial, commercial. and professional elements.
The growth of ne\% institutions on the federal level
served tvvo purposes: it was part of till process of
unifcing the sprt%wling conntry administratively. and
it helped the President to articulate a national network
of political alliances. Vargas quickly demonstrated his
ability to use persuasion, cajolery, and the promise of
spoils to exploit for his own benefit the traditional
power struggles \within the political leadership of the
major states. During most of his regime. Vargas did
not try to create a national political pc(rt\. since the
existing system offered h1e^ it perfect medium for his
great talents of conciliation and manipulation. which
in turn depended upon intimate personal contact with
allies and opponents.
During the last 2 ye:rs of his regime, however.
Vargas farsighted en( ;.gh to realize that his
dictatorship could not survive World War 11. Brazil's
participation in the war on the side of the Western
democracies strengthened tendencies Within till-
milit a nd civilian groups for it return of individual
liberties, and Vargas began lading the groundwork for
his later emergence as a "democratic" leader who
\\cold rely on support from a ne\w popular, labor
basl-d movement, as \\ell as front more established
groups such as rnral landowners, S.to Paulo
industrialists, and lhl- government bureaucrat-. In
19.15 he formed two political rtovettl-nts: I) the
Brazilian Labor Party (P'fB) to undercut til(
Communists on the left and gain for himself the
\corking class vole: and 2) the Social Democratic Party
(PSI)) to nniIv the poliIici(tns. bureaucrats.
lando\\ners, and industrialists Ito hall benefited from
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the Vargas \ears and who had grive unc�c�rtainties
about the stabilih of a more open political systent.
Opposing Vargas were the outs �w ho had
organized in 1944 the National Dcmoc�ratic� Union
(CDN). the ihird major part\. Dominant in this
nuivement were the liheril constitutionalists, who had
supported Vargas in 19-3(1 in the hope that he \\oul(I
print if new democratic era to Brazil. only to have
their hopes shattered bN the emergence of Vargas'
authoritarian. personalistic Estodo Noro (Nevv State).
The l'DN's protests against Vargas politicA
maneuvering in preparation for the scheduled 19
national elections were one factor that led the army
c�nnunand to rc�rnove hint rnt 29 October 1945.
Vargas, however. retained it strong; hold on the
popular imagination: for rnanv Brazilians he was and
still is if symbol of governmental concern for the
common ntan. Ilis fortiter Minister of War. X:orshai
Euric�o Gaspar Dutra, \%as elec, d President on the
PSD ticket in December 19 -15, and Vargas himself \vas
elected to the F'eder.(I Senate. By 1950, the people had
become disenc�hunted with the well meaning but
essentially c�onsery itiNe Dutra administration, and
Vargas used his new image its it "dernocnit" to regain
the presidenc�v �for the first time by dircet popular
vote. The political scene which Vargas encountered in
1951, hovvc�ver, was niore difficult to dominate than
am he had faced in his Nears of retie beNven 1930 and
1945. He now faced if suspicious bloc in the political
center, implacable opposition on the right, and an
:trip which \Nils at hest nentral. Vargas' appoinhnent
of Labor Minister Joao Gottlart, a voting, ambitious
protege, heightened suspicions within middle class
and conservative military circles that Veirgas was
preparim; to embark on a syndicalist regime of the
type that Juan Peron had c�reailed in Argentina.
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Vargas failure to cope with inflation and his ini, ilit\
to satisf, demands for ,oc�iiil reform led to loss of
popular support. Corruption also increased greatly.
When. in Aoogusl 19� :54. presidential .tides. \%ithrnt
Vargas knowledge, tried to assassinate his chief critic.
the brilliant polenicist Carlos Lac�erda. the ntilitary
dema Vargas resignation. and he c�ommllitted
snic�ide.
Vice President Cafe Filho stic�c�e Vargas and
presided over the 195.3 election. which wits \von by
Vargas politicml heirs. the leaders of the t"o parties he
had founded. Juscclino habits hek of the PSD became
President. and Joan Goularl. head of the PTI3. bec�atne
Vice President. Some of the ntilitary opposed their
taking office. hoot if countercoup led by Marshal
Ilenriyue Tvi\eini Lott, then Ministerof Wier, insured
their inaugucition. Kiibitschek. \\tins� c�anipaign
slogan Ii al been "Fifh bears of Progress in Five...
greatly accelerated ec�onontic� developnient projects
but neglected social welfare. Ile c�onstruc�tc(l, at great
expense. the if(-\\ capital 01. Brasilia (Figure 2).
Ktibitschek's tern, however. wits muirked by it steep
rise in the cost of living and increased social unrest. In
the� election of 1960 the voters gave an impressive
victory to San Paulo Governor Janio Qm idros, the
uan with the broom," .%[to had promised to sweep
out the corrm tion and inefficienc�v which 11a(1 grown
during the three decades following Vargas accession
to pow(-r.
Ittputient with congres and nther forces
frustrating his reform efforts. Cluadros, in what name
considered if ploy to gain a free hand, lenclered his
resignation in August 1961. To his surprise it woos
a;�cepled, anc: he departed after only months is
President. The resulting crisis brought the c�ountry to
the br ;nk of civil strife between ntilitary constilutiona-
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FIGURE 2. Federal buildings in Brasilia. (left) Palace
of Justice, with bust of Kubirschek in foreground. (right)
Congressional office building in front of Chamber of
Deputies (saucer) at left and Federal Senate (dome)
at right. Ministry buildings in far background. (U/OU)
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list forces and elements unwilling to allow Goulart,
who had sought Communist support and had
narrowly won reelection as Vice President, to take over
the presidency. The crisis was settled by a typically
Brazilian compromise: a modified parliamentar
,overnment, with circumscribed presidential powers,
was instituted as a prerequisite to Goulart*s taking
office.
Goulart's conduct during his 31 nnrmhs in office
confirmed the misgivings of those who apposed his
accession. Even after a popular referendum in January
1963 had restvied full presidential powers, he proved
an inept and irresponsible administrator, incapable of
coping with the serious economic and lu;litical
problems he had inherited. Inflation mounted rapidly;
foreign investment in the country dwindled, and
economic growth was sharply reduced. Goulart called
for "basic� reforms,' but the opposition was convinced
that he wanted to revise the Constitution so that he
could continue in power beyond the end of his term in
January 1966. Moreover, he permitted both
infiltration and virtual dominance of the labor
movement by Communists and other extreme leftists
in return for their help in exerting pressure on the
Congress through political strikes and demonstrations.
Among his closest advisers were a numberof Marxists,
and he abetted extensive Communist infiltration also
in journalism, education, and many government
agencies. By early 1964 there was a widespread
conviction that Brazil was drifting toward veomomic
catastrophe, that Coulart was incapable of governing,
and that he perhaps planned soon to set tip either a
dictatorship of the Peronist type or an authoritarian
regime which might fall under Communist domina-
tion. After Goulart had condoned political agitation
and mutinous attitudes on the part of noncommis-
si- -ed officers of the armed forces, and after he
endorsed an ultimatum by the Cum: iunist- dominated
Workers General Command to the Congress to accept
drast;c reforms by 20 April 1964 or face a general
strike, the military, joined by leading state governors,
revolted against him on 31 March. ll :s support
evaporated within a day, anti he fled into exile.
The Brazilian military has thus intervened directly
in national polities five times since World War II �to
topple the dictatorial Vargas regime in 1945, to oust
the corruption riddled Vargas government again in
1954, to assure the installation of Kubitsch-k in 1955,
to place restraints on Goulart after Quadnis'
resignation in 1961, and then to oust Goulart in 1964.
On the first four occasions the military immediately
relinquished the reins to civilian authority, but in 1964
it kept control with the deterininadon to eliminate
corruptic.n L nd ultraleftism from the government, and
it remains the dominant power in the ne Brazilian
political system.
Ilumberto Castello Branco, a highly respected army
general who had played a leading role in the Goulart
overthrow, was endorsed by Congress to serve for the
remainder of Goulart's term �until January 1966, the
term was later ext coded by Congress to 15 March
1967. The new President pursued policies which
emphasized administrative, political, and economic
reform, including greater participation of private
canital in the economy. He filled the key Cabinet
Posts with experienced, nonpolitical technicians, but
relied to a ;great extent on former military colleagues,
particularly those of the so- called Sorbonne group
senior officev, associated with the Superior War School
(ES(;)�for advice on broad policy matters.
The government focused its early efforts on
checking subversion and eliminating corruption.
Several hundred politicians, military personnel,
subversives, and other persons charged with illegal
activities were stripped of their political rights.
generally for 10 y �ars, and many Public officials,
including a substantial number of congressmen, were
ousted from office for similar reasons. Political
activities by labor unions and student groups xyere
sharply curtailed. Congress, with many of the
opposition leaders purged. from its ranks, generally was
reluctant to resist the regime and approved most of the
significant administration bills.
Although President Castello Branco exercised power
with relative restraint for the most part, his period of
rule was marked by strong authority embodied in
executive decrees with the force of la%v �four
institutional acts and more than 30 complementary
acts. Under the competent leadership of Roberto
Campos, ;Minister of Planning and General
Coordinatio'.n, the government instituted A s%veeping
financial stabilization and austerity program designed
to bring the rampant infiation under control. Housing
and banking reforms were very successful, but reforms
in land utilization were only slightly successful.
Castello Branco's successor, Arthur da Costa e Silva,
a retired army marshal, took o iic�e in March 1967,
after having been selected by the top military
hierarchy and formally elected President bx the
purged Congress in October 1966. The new
Constitution approved by Congress in January 1967
institutionalized many of the special powers employed
by Castello Branco. The political sitination deterior-
ated under the Costa e Silva government. The
President began by loosening somewhat the strong
political controls he inherited. I le also greatly changed
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the style and methods of government operation,
moving away from the highly personalized organiza-
tional ss'stem of Castello Branco and delegating more
extensive authority to his Cabine' ministers. On the
economic front the government generally maintained
the development and stah;;i;,:;;.,n program initiated
by Castello Branco. Ilo the basic problem of
seeking to slow inflation while producing some
tangible gains for the masses remained. Popular
dissatisfactions spread, and the administration
reinstituted arid tightened political erg itrols. By late
1968 many military officers believed that a number of
factors combined to threaten the maintenance of the
1964 "revolution." Svmptoms included student strikes
and demonstrations, the first noteworthv labor
agitation since 1964, open criticism of the government
by some clerics of the Catholic Church, increasingly
critical treatment of the military by elements of the
press, an unprecedented series of bank robberies arid
urban terrorist incidents, charges of corruption in the
administration reaching to the Cabinet level, and a
surprising number of victories in the November 1968
municipal elections by persons considered corrup, or
subversive by the militarv.
Ultimately, it was the defense: by Congress of its
diminished prerogatives that catalyzed the military
into taking action against the fractious civilians. The
military, taking umbrage when a federal deputy
denounced them in a spocch before' tit- Chamber of
Deputies, demanded that the government prosecute
the deputv for "undermining the revolution." The
Chamber refused, in a vote in December 1968, to lift
the deputy's immunity, and the strong rnilitary
reaction forced President Costa e Silva to issue
Institutional Act Number Five on 13 December 1968,
giving the President dictatorial powers. This act
overrode the Constitution by suspending most civil
liberties air(], in national securit cases, the right of
habeas corpus, arid, unlike the first four acts, carried
no expiration (late. i)sing the authority given him by
Institutional Act Number Five, the President
immediately suspended Congress, arid it new purge of
critics of the government was initiated. More than 100
persons were arrested, and many of these including
several members of Congress, were deprived t,f their
political rights for 10 years.
When President costa e Silva suffered a stroke in
August 1969, the three ministers of the forces
bypass('( the civilian Vice President and assumed
control of the government. The top lovel of the armed
forces hierarchy selected Gen. Emilio Carrastazu
Medici, commander of the "Third Army, to succeed
Costa c Silva. Medici chose retired Admiral Ilamann
Rademaker Grupewald as his Vice President. The
suspension of Congress was lifted so that it could -atif%
the "election" of the two men, and they took office on
30 October, 1969.
Because the communications media are censored,
virtually all public expressions o` dissent are
discouraged, and only elections of rational and state
legislators and mayors of small towns are held by
popular ballot, it is difficult to determine public
attitudes toward the Medici government. The popular
votes for legislators and very limited opinion surveys
that have been taken in urban centers sho"t�d a
considerable degree of approval. The administrations
success in promoting rapid economic growth, reducing
the rate of inflation, arid in pursuing the integration of
the nation through the construction of transportation
and communications links and opening up the
Amazon region have earned the support of man
Brazilians. The business arid financial community
whose center is Sao Paulo have been firm supporters of
the post -1964 governments based on their effective
economic performance. On the other hand, Medici
has recognized that most workers thus far have
received only slight per.;onal material benefits from
the economic progress achieved over the past 8 years,
and he has said that more attention should be devoted
to improving this record. The most consistently
negative attitudes toward the military -led govern-
ments have been found among certain university
students and professors, middle class professionals and
iniellectuals, arid clergymen of the Catholic left.
Violent opposition to the regime has been almost
completely limited to the small urban terrorist groups
whose operations reached a peak i:, 1969. By 1972,
aggressive, arid at times heavylrande�d, campaigns by
the security forces had severely hampered both violent
and nonviolent opposition groups, and mail% members
of ehese sectors now ha%e abandomrd the goal of
ousting the administration or even signific,litly
affecting its policies.
The Medici government, confidet:i that it is rapidly
petting its own house in order, is beginning to pay
much more attention tcs tirreign affairs. Medici :�nd
others in his ad .uni.stration, such is Minister of
For�� ;gn Aff ;tiis Gibson Barboza, are convinced that
Brazil L, rapidly becoming an influential factor in
..orld affairs and must play a role, both inside and
outside Latin Arnt ica, commensurate with its size
and destiny. Notable evidence of this expanding
foreign interest was ivledici official visit to
Washington in IX- 0 -mbe; 1971 and Barhoza's travels
to many Latin American, African, Middle Eastern,
and European nations in 1971 through 1973. Brazil
5
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has also L n the lead in various inter American and
worldwide forums on issues involving trade and
territorial sea limits. In some cases Brazil has adopted
positions on these issues that differ from those held by
the United States, and Medici has said that he accepts
the liklihood of more such friction with the developed
nations in the future as a sign. of Brazils growth into
an important power in world councils.
Retired army Gen. Ernesto Geisel (Figure 3) will
hecorne� President of Brazil on IS March 1974. Ilis
selection by President Medici, with the approval of
senior military officers, was it result of widespread
respect earned during his long army career and
subsequent effective performance as president of the
Brazilian state oil company, I)EIT11011RAS. Like Costa
c Silva and Medici, Geisel is a native of liio Grande do
Sul �a state that has produced many successful
politicians and military officers. I le was horn in 1905,
the last of five children of a German Lutheran
immigrant. Of the fonr sons in the family, three rose in
the army to the rank of general. One brother, Orlando
Geisel, serves as Arm% Minister rider President
Medici and probably had a discreet influence in the
selection of Ernesto as the next chief executive. After
the 1964 revolution, President Castello Branco
designated Erneslo Geisel as chief of the presidential
military household. Costa e Silva appointed him to the
6
Superior Military Tribunal, and he retired from 44
years of army service in 1969 to take over
PETROBRAS. Like Castello Branco, he is associated
with the "intellectual" current in the milit:!r, nearly
all of whose members are graduates of the Superior
War School. He is likely to continue many of the
domestic and foreign programs of the Medici
administration.
B. Structure and functioning of the
government (U /OU)
1. Constitutional system
The general outlines of the Brazilian governmental
structure (Figure 4) are similar to those of the United
States; in operation, however, the two systems are very
dissimilar. One marked difference is the concentration
of poser in the hands of the Brazilian federal
executive. The governmental structure is established
by a Constitution promulgated in 1967, extensively
revised in 1969, and slightly amended in 1972. The
governmental structure has also been profoundly
affected by it series of Institutional Acts issued by the
governments since 1964. The first four of these acts
have been incorporated into the Constitution, and,
tinder article. 182 of that document, Institutional Acts
Five through Seventeen remain in effect until they are
nullified h% decree of the President acting with tile
advice of the National Security Council. The overall
effect of constitutional changes, of the Institutional
Acts, and of other presidential decrees since 1964 has
been to strengthen the executive's power and greatly
reduce those of the legislative and the judicial
branches. 'I'll( measures hays also served to remove
from the political scene most of the administrations
important critics.
The 1967 Constitution was designed to institution-
alize and codify the principles of the "1964
revolution." The Constitution provides for a federal
republic of 22 states, four territories, and the Federal
District of Brasilia. It also provides for "independent
and harmonions" executive, legislative, and judicial
branches of the government. The presidents since 1964
generally have not depended strongly on :Ile
progovernment National Renewal Alliance (AIIENA)
party in Congress. In fact, since the erosion of its
legislative powers. Congress has only a minimal role in
governing the county.
Institutional Act Number Five, of 13 December
1968, the most sweeping of the acts, granted the
President strong authoritarian powers, including that
of recessing the federal Congress and state legislatures.
I
1
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FIGURE 3. Gen. (ret.) Ernesto Geisel (U/OU)

III =Is aCJ7W7A{ ea u
%9F
1IIC If n:Tr M nw.a 1 J I Y w I II
WA AI ra I I III ra I I I II Ki III N Wws
LEGISLATIVE EXECUTIVE
JUDICIAL
Federal
Ap
LEGISLATIVE EXECUTIVE
JUDICIAL
Federal
CONGRESS PRESIDENT to.
SUPREME
FEDERAL
FEDERAL VICE PRESIDENT
5 -year terms
TRIBUNAL I
SENATE
1
8 -year terms
A I
Federal _I
Cabinet
Tribunal 1
CHAMBER
of I
Appeals 1
OF DEPUTIES
I
j Special
310 Members
J Labor,
4 -year terms
Federal Electoral,
Courts and Military
of the Courts
First
Instance I
I
1
State
I
i
Legislative Governors
Tribunals
Assemblies 4 -year terms
of Justice
I
Other State
Courts
I
Local
I
1
I
1
Councils Mayors Capital
Local
Mayors
Courts
Key
ELECTORATE
Election
10 Appointment
f
-w- Appeal
President elected by an Electoral Calk" composed
Of all members of the National Congress and
1
sWected members of State Legislative Assemblies
FIGURE 4. Constitutional structure of government, 1972 (U /OU)
11C

This act overrode the Constitution by suspending the
right of li ;Jwas corpus and many other traditional civil
liberties in cases involving the broadly defined
national security. The chief execut; 'e was also
authorized to confiscate the assets of anvc. who had
obtained them illegally while holding public office.
The act further empowered the President to declare a
state of siege for an unlimited time. It also excluded
from judicial review all actions carried out under its
authorization and virtually eliminated all juridical
checks and safeguards. It, in effect, eliminated legal
protection against arbitrary actions by the government
against individuals who were suspected of acting
against national security.
The judiciary also became a target of the military.
Three liberal judges of the Supreme Federal Tribunal
were forced to retire, and two of their colleagues then
resigned in protest. Rather than replace the departed
jurists. Costa e Silva permanently reduced the court
from 16 members to 11. Institutional Act Number Six,
issued on 31 January 1969, stripped the court of some
of its powers in those matters about which security
forces were most sensitive; the act restricted the courts
power to review crimes against the very broad national
security laws. 'These actions placed the protection of
national security above the principle of an
independent judiciary.
2. Federal government
a. Executive branch
The President is the central figure in Rrazilion
politics. The President and Vice President serve 5 -year
terns. They are chosen, not by direct popular vote,
bait by an electoral college composed of Congress and
selected delegates from the state :csseniblies. The
President may not succeed himself. 'Pile order of
president'.) succession after the Vice President is as
follows: President of the Chamber of Deputies,
President of the Senate, and President of the Supreme
Federal Tribunal. Despite these procedures, the
succession to the presidency in practice is controlled
under the present government by the military. The
incumbent, retired (:en. I ?milio Carrastam Medici,
annococed in June 1973 that another retired army
gcoend, Fr lest o (:eisel, ill succeed him in March
197 -1. In case of presidential disability the vice
president is supposed to succeed to office. This
constitutional measure, however, has not always been
followed. When President Costa e Silva was
incapacitated in 1969, for vmimple, the military
service ministers bypassed the civilian Vice President,
Pedro Aleixo, and took power themselves under the
terms of Institutional Act Number Twelve. Although
this act applied onl} to the succession to Costa e Silva,
it similar pattern would probably be followed if
Medici were unable to continue in office for any
prolonged period. Vice President liadenmker (Figure
5) �a retired admiral �might be allowed to serve
during a brief incapacitation of Medici, but the army
probably would insist that one of its officers replace
Medici if he became unable to continue in office.
"Pile authority of the President was greatly
strengthened under the Constitution of 1967 and the
amendments promulgated in October 1969. He may
propose that the Supreme Federal Tribunal suspend
for a period of up to 10 vicars th� political rights of
persons found guilt of subversive or corrupt activity.
They nuy also be deprived of official posts to which
they have been elected. Persons accused of crimes
against national security can be tried by military
courts.
When the Presidents power to decree an unlimited
state of siege lapses with the terminatio:1 of
Institutional Act Nmnber Five, he will be empowered
by the Constitution to decree a state of siege for 60
daNs (extendable for another 60 days) Without first
consulting Congress. I le has broad powers to intervene
in the states and to issue decrees with the force of lacy
in the fields of national security and public finance.
1
H
1 9 f
oW?.�
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FIGURE 5. Vice President Augusto Rademaker (C)

A
Il
Ic
Iq
u
Congress can approve or reiec�t such decrees, but has
no power to amend them. Congressional action is
further restricted by if provision %yhich reserves to the
President the initiation of legislation pertaining to
Public finance, the civil service, the strength of the
armed forces, or administration of the Federal District
and national territories. Congress must ac t on the
federal budget within a specified period or it bec�ornes
la%% as submitted �a provision which ended one of the
traditional methods held by Congress under previous
constitntions for pressuring the President. Time limits
may also be set for congressional action on ordinary
hills (10) days), but those designated urgent by the
President must he acted "Poll within 40 days or they
become lase as drafted. With presidential concurrence,
Congress may grant Political amnesties. "I'he chief
executive may veto congressional hills in whole or in
part, hilt the Congress can ove-ride him by a two
thirds vote.
In addition to his special P�nvers, the President holds
normal executive prerogatives, such as appointing and
removing Cabi let officers, making high administra-
tive and indicial appointments (some of which require
Senate approval), and serving as Commander in Chief
of the Armed Forces. In addition to the Vice President,
the Cabinet is composed of the heads of the following
ministries:
Aeronautics Industry and Commerce
Agriculture Interior
Army Justice
Coin mu nica t ions Labor and Social Security
Education Mines and Energy
Finance N avy
Foreign Affairs Planning and General Coordination
Health Transportation and Public Works
The head of the National Intelligence Service (SNI)
and the chiefs of the Presidents Civil and Military
Households are also considered to have Cahinet status
and participate in Cabinet ine�etings.
Some of the Cabinet ministers have considerable
influence within the administration, based either on
the traditional strength of the entities thev head or on
their own personal ability. At the top of the list is the
Minister of the Artily, Ge11. Orlando (;eisel (Figure 6),
who has effectively maintained the army as a solid
base of support for Medici. Minister of Foreign Affairs
Mario Gibson Barboza and Minister of hinance
Antonio Dclfin) Neto hake earned respect for th �ir
effective performance, although personal and policy
'Fora c�urreol listing of kec gocennneot officials consult Chiefs of
Slnte and Cabinct Alrnibrn of Forrigil Gouc nments, hohlished
111 -101k by the Direc�torale of Inlellii;enee. (,entml Intelligence
Agrnc�y.
differences have at times caused friction behveen their
ministries. Oelfim Neto is the administrations chief
economic architect; among other duties, he chairs the
National Monet; -y Council, the top financial
Polievinaking body. Minister of "Transportation and
Public Works Mario Andreazza and Minister of
Education Jarbas Passarinho are retired arms colonels
who have proved ahle to fill important civilian roles in
fields on which the Medici administration places high
priority. Medici has been able to maintain
considerable continuity in the Cabinet compared with
Previous administrations; only three changes of
ninisters have occurred during his term. Medici rarely
m C
eets with the abinet as a body.; Cabinet sessions arc
usually called only when he wishes to announce an
important policy decision that he has already made.
The executive branch of the federal government is
an exceedingly complex apparatus, consisting of manv
specialized administrative hodies, advisory bodies,
foundations, government agencies, and mixed
corporations. Some of these are directly under the
authority of the President, while others are only loosely
supervised by the executive. There are nearly 30 hodies
directly under the President, and approximately 40
other entities are coordinated throng'i the office of the
presidenev, manv of then, being responsible also to
one or inore of the ministries. These include public
foundations, such as the GCtulio Vargas Foundation,
which conducts research in economics, business, and
other fields; mixed capital enterprises, such as the
Bank of Brazil, the National Steel Companv, and the
government oil enterprise PETBBBOr1S: and
government corporations, such as the Brazilian Coffee
Institute.
Anong the bodies directl under the President is the
National Security Conneil (CSN). Since 196.1 the
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FIGURE 6. Gen. Orlando Geisel,
Minister of Army (U /OU)

CSN, as a result of an expanded concept of national
security. has been given additional authority
concerning it wide range of internal matters. The CSN
is constitutionally charged with advising the President
on the formulation and execution of national seenrity
goals and policies in national and international affairs,
with special emphasis on problems concerning internal
and external security; programs on international
cooperation; agreements and conventions with other
nations concerning national boundaries; and activities
in matters indispensable to national defense. The CSN
secretariat also has responsibility for conducting
studies on problems that concern national security,
specifically policies regarding transportation�
development of national resources, nuclear energy,
labor. immigration, education, telecommunications,
and several other fields. Under Costa e Silva the CSN
played the leading role in purging the country of
stilwersive and corrupt elements, making the final
decision on executive action in the maj�rrity of
suspcasions of individuals' political rights.
The President is the presiding officer of the CSN
and may convoke it whenever he wishes. Other
nte�nthe�rs are the Vice President, the Chiefs of the
1residential Civil and Military households, all
Cabinet ministers, the director of the SNI, the� Chief of
the Armed Forces General Staff, and the chiefs of staff
of the army, navy, and air force. Its principal
functions are carried out by its general secretariat.
which, by statute. is headed b the Chief of the
Presidential Military household. This official is thus
in a key position to influence decisions regarding
national security.
Under Costa e Silva, and to an even greater degree
under Medici, three organizations �and their chiefs,
included in the CSN �have attained ;treat impor-
tance: these are the Presidential Military household,
under Gen. Joao Figueiredo, (Figure 7); the
Presidential Civil Ilottsehold, under Joao Lvitao de
Abreu, (Figure 8): and the SNI, under Maj. Gen.
Carlos Fontoura (Figure 9). These men, along with
Annv Minister Geisei, constitute Medic�i's "inner
C
ircle,' and are consulted by the President on policy\
matters on it daily basis. The four head the
organizations that represent the real �as opposed to
the theoretical �power stmc�htre in Brazil, and they
also have a close personal relationship with Medici.
Figneiredo formerly served as the I'resident Chief of
Staff when Medici commanded the Third Army.
The President has it small Special Advisor\ I Staff
that prepares rep on designated topics and writes
speeches for the chief executive. It is headed by Col.
Leo Etchigoyen of the array.
The problems of public administration are
manifold. Corruption, extending even to the
presidential level, had often been sizable prior to the
Castello Branco administration and, despite the
military's strong moral fervor, retrains widespread.
The Brazilian bureaucracy, although reduced under
Castello Branco, is still swollen. At the same time,
however, there is it scarcity of personnel trained in
modern administrative techniques. Time consuming
procedures, such as requiring numerous stamps and
signatures on official documents, remain the norm,
although administrative reform efforts are aimed at
streamlining archaic practices. Overlapping functions
and responsibilities among government entities often
serve to blur lines of authority. Certain ministries are
in direct competition, and there is often it lack of
coordination within a ministry and the agencies
loosely attached to it.
Since 1964, however, the efficiency of the executive
branch has improved considerably. 'There has been
more emphasis on recruiting administrators and
bureaucrats with specific technical skills. Several
inefficient auronomous agencies have been abolished
and many corrupt administrators have been purged.
Corruption has proved particularly difficult to
eliminate; some cases continue to conic to light under
Medici. he� has usually used the powers granted under
Institutional Act Number F: 'e to remove quietly the
guilty individuals. The persistence of corruption might
he used by military and civilian critics to try_ to impair
the regime s image.
b. Legislative branch
The Congress was recessed by President Costa e
Silva on 13 December 1968 after the declaration of
Institutional Act `dumber Five, and the President and
his Cabinet assumed legislative functions. Congress
was reconvened in October 1969 to legitimatize the
selection of 1resident Medici, and has held its regular
sessions since.
The Congress, which holds an annual session front 1
March to 30 November with it months recess in Jule,
is composed of the Chamber of Deputies and the
Federal Senate. There are 310 deputies, who are
elected for -1 -year terms by popul,.r vote tinder it
system of proportional representation. The deputies
are di among the states on the basis of the
number of registered voters, with each state being
entitled to at least three deputies and each territory,
except Fernando de Noronha, one. The three senators
from each of the 22 states are directly elected for terms
of 8 gars: to provide continuity, one third and two
thirds for the Senate are elected alternately every .1
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-jnno1nm1nm�
Qd:'
11
FIGURE 7. Gen. Joao Figueiredo, Chief of the FIGURE 8. Joao Leitao de Abreu, Chief of the
Presidential Military Household (C) Presidential Civil Household (U /OU)
N
0
s-
Y.
F
%ears. Members of both looses are re(puired to be
native Brazilians ill possession of their political rights:
senators imist he mci gars of age and deprntics over
21.
The present political makeup of the Congress
demonstrates the dominance of the progmernment
National (AIIENA), %%hick Controls
59 scats in the Senate and 22.3 in the :hamper of
Deputies, compared %%ith the opposition Brazilian
Democratic Mox�enrent's seen senators and tii
deputies.
The Congress leas generallN been a conservative
force. reflecting the overrepmsentation of the more
static rural regions NN hic�h is brought ghoul bN the
electoral ssstem. Presidents 1mve often found it
diffiCidt to obtain it nmjor;',c for their legislalivv
programs. Agrarian reform hills, banking and t:n
reform, and m:m\ other nicasures have become lost in
the legislative process. Congressional opposition to
President Qmidros, with fre(puent ovcwidivg of his
contributed to his (lec�ision to suinnit his
resignation in 19(il he :is not granted
e\traordimir% po\%c�rs.
Major changes in the relationship betm the
Congress and the President occurred ender Costello
Branco and %core incorporated in the 196
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FIGURE 9. Gen. Carlos Fontoura, Director of the National
Intelligence Service (U /OU)

Constitution. Congress lost many of its checks over the
President, such its delaying tactics used to slow
execution of his programs. Constitlttionally, tilt�
Congress retains the exclusive right to approve treaties;
to authorize the President to declare war or make
peace or to permit. foreign troops to transit or
temporarily remain on Brazilian tcrritorv; to approve
or suspend federal intervention ora state of siege ;"and
to oversee the acts of the President and the
decentralize(] agencies.
The initiative for proposing legislation has almost
completely shifted from the Congress to the President.
Nearly all important programs are prepared by the
President, with the advice of the organs of the
executive branch such as Cabinet agencies, the CSN,
and the SNI, and then are submitted to the Congress
for ratification as laws. To it degree the Congress serves
as a forum where the administration and its policies
can he examined and criticized; however, all the
legislators recognize that there are subjects which the
government considers out of hounds far public
discussion. These taboo areas include criticism of
Medici and of the armed forces. Legislators who speak
ont on these sensitive subjects are likely to hay(- their
remarks deleted from the congressional record and
banned from press coverage. Under the broad national
security legislation, congressmen could he subject to
imprisonment for attacking the government; none
have actually met this fate, although under Castello
Branco and Costa e Silva a number of members of
Congress were purged and had their political rights
suspended for 10 years. The congress clearly is "on
parole,' and any violations of the conditions under
which it operates could bring permanent closure. The
legislators appear to have accepted this fact, after
having experienced an imposed recess from December
1966 to October 1969. The next congressional elections
arc scheduled for 13 November 1974.
c. Judicial branch
Edneated Brazilians have a long tradition of respect
for at least the� forms of legal processes, and the
judiciary has enjo ed considerable prestige. Brazil's
legal order and traditions are based mainly on Roman
law and conFnental Enropcan usage, hilt legal
thought has conformed more closely to All',lo -Saxon
principles. In the early 19th century, the law schools
formalized the legal system. The extensively used xyril
of habeas corpus and the federal jury are two notable
examples of Anglo -Saxon principles that have been
"Until Institutional Act Nomber 1�tce is terminated, Ihr President
has Iha- right In declare unlimited stales of sirgv without the
nrcessilc of appros,d be Congress.
12
Too
r
introduce]. A jury, however, is mandatorN only in
specified :urinal cases including homicide and
abortion. The Brazilian legal system differs in severed
fund.unental aspects from the P.S. system. Brazilian
law is codified; precedents are not binding although
they arc considered one element in the chain of
judicial reasoning. The application of the express
provisions of the code to the case at hand is the key
judicial exercise. Brazilian lax\ is recorded in various
codes, such as the Civil Code, the Commercial Code,
and the Criminal Code. The Civil Code was approved
and promulgated b the Brazilian Congress in 1916
after a century of study and evolution. Primarily based
on the German Civil (:ode, it was a conservative
document but had the virtues of being flexible and
practical as well as comprehensive and concise. It has
served as it model for other Latin American countries.
A new Cavil Code -as tieing prepared in 1973. The
Commercial (:ode, promulgated in 1850, was the first
such original code in the Western Hemisphere, but it is
now largely outmoded. In 1969, the latest Criminal
Code, reflecting modern theories of criminal control
and rehabilitation, was adopted. Although it judge is
theoretically restricted to applying the la\% codes, he
still exercises it good deal of initiative and discretion in
resolving cases. This flexibility is achieved by alloy ing
the judge :o consider each case on its merits. Such an
approach, however, often tends to slow down the
process.
Judicial power is exercised by the Snprenu Federal
"Tribunal, the Federal Tribunal of Appeals. federal
courts of the first instance, and state courts empowered
to apply federal lacy. Brazil does not have it dual
system of federal and state hays as does the United
States. (hl the local level there is generally one trial
court in each ntunidpio (roughly comparable to a U.S.
c�ountv). The states nuty also establish inferior
jurisdictions, such as justices of the peace. In addition
to the regular court system dealing with civil and
criminal cases, there are speciJ labor, electoral,
maritime, and military courts with final authority in
their specialized areas, but with appeal to the Supreme
Federal 'Tribunal on constitutional questions. While
the election tribunals have contrihnted somewhat
toward guaranteeing free elections. they have been
more subject to political pressures than have the� other
courts.
The Snpremc Federal Trif is composed of I I
justices appointed by the President, subject, according
to the 1967 Constitution, to Federal Senate approval.
Members mutt be Brazilian -horn, over 35 years old,
and of notable judicial learning and excellent
reputation. The Supreme Federal Tribunal is
J
t
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empowered to declare laws nncorstitutional. Its
performance in this role h,. been limited, however, by
the ver extensive assumption of powers b%� the federal
executive branch, which necessarily les :.ens the
discretionary powers of the courts. The courts have
also tended to interpret the Constitution hroadh, with
a presumption in favor of federal executive and
legislative action. Judicial tolerance of tilt� executives
use of decree power to legislat for example, has
become a constitutional tradition.
Institutional Act Number Five and subsequent
decrees have severer restricted the jurisdiction of the
courts. All actions carried out under these acts are
excluded f judicial review. Institutional Act
Number Si:; restricted the powers of the Supreme
Federal Tri)unal to review crimes against the very
broad national security laws. Aiti:ough the
government has Fvc�one increasingiv authoritarian
and the courts* jwAsdiction in several areas limited, the
courts have main -wined a degree of independence.
A significant deve" 'Ment in the Brazilian judiciary
since 1964 has been the increased use of the special
military courts in cases involving civilians. The
military court ;ysterrt, consisting of the 13- member
Superior Military "Tribunal and regional military
courts, before 1964 had little impact on the civilian
sector. It was until then �and still is �used to tr
military persons for violations of military laws.
I lowever, under the gov,- rnments of Castello Branco
and Costa e Silva the use of military courts instead of
civilian courts to try crimes considered to affect
national security became an integral part of Brazils
legal :,ruchjrv. This came abont larger� because the
regimes believed that the civil courts were incapable of
dealing with the new problem of urban terrorism.
Under Costa e Silva, there was a broadening of the
definitions of national security through provisions of
the 1967 Constitution and the National Security Lary
sanctioned in 1969. Under the extended c�olleept of
national security, defense against covert efforts from
within the country to destroy national institutions�
political, econorric, sociopsychologica1, or military �is
as critical as defense against external aggression.
Article 122 of the Constitution states that the military
courts may try civilians for crimes against the national
security or against rnilitar installations. The Nation.11
Security Law states that all crimes connitted under
its provisions :%ill he tried by military courts, and the
number and type of crimes e